Hume’s Conceivability Principle: A Preliminary Consideration

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アイテムタイプ	紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper
言語	英語
著者	Yajima Naoki
抄録	This paper discusses Hume’s Conceivability Principle, according to which whatever we conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense. Although this principle is not thoroughly argued by commentators, Hume relies on this principle in almost all significant arguments of his metaphysics. The principle is involved in the crucial relationship between mind and reality of modern philosophy. Therefore, it is possible to find a relevant counterargument of this principle in metaphysics from Descartes to Berkeley. This paper focuses narrowly on the comparison between Hume vis Descartes, and Hume vis Spinoza, and elucidates that Hume’s innovation of this principle intends the transformation of the concept of necessity, and development of the concept of probability. This paper also offers a possible solution to a famous interpretative problem regarding the relationship between what is inconceivable and impossibility, and with it, the fundamental character of Hume’s empiricism and scepticism will be clarified. This paper thus aims to be a preliminary consideration for clarifying the intricate connection between the Conceivability Principle and Hume’s entire metaphysics.
雑誌名	人文科学研究（キリスト教と文化）
号	51
ページ	77 - 92
発行年	2019-12-15
出版者	国際基督教大学キリスト教と文化研究所
ISSN	2434-6861