@article{oai:icu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00004936,
 author = {Yajima, Naoki},
 issue = {51},
 journal = {人文科学研究 : キリスト教と文化},
 month = {Dec},
 note = {This paper discusses Hume’s Conceivability Principle, according to
which whatever we conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense.
Although this principle is not thoroughly argued by commentators,
Hume relies on this principle in almost all significant arguments of his
metaphysics. The principle is involved in the crucial relationship between
mind and reality of modern philosophy. Therefore, it is possible to find a
relevant counterargument of this principle in metaphysics from Descartes
to Berkeley. This paper focuses narrowly on the comparison between
Hume vis Descartes, and Hume vis Spinoza, and elucidates that Hume’s
innovation of this principle intends the transformation of the concept of
necessity, and development of the concept of probability. This paper also
offers a possible solution to a famous interpretative problem regarding the
relationship between what is inconceivable and impossibility, and with it, the
fundamental character of Hume’s empiricism and scepticism will be clarified.
This paper thus aims to be a preliminary consideration for clarifying the
intricate connection between the Conceivability Principle and Hume’s entire
metaphysics.},
 pages = {77--92},
 title = {Hume’s Conceivability Principle: A Preliminary Consideration},
 year = {2019}
}