@article{oai:icu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00005301,
 author = {朴　, 根好},
 issue = {89},
 journal = {社会科学ジャーナル},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {Following the lost decade after the war, the Japanese economy entered its so-called high-growth period. With real economic growth setting a miraculous record, averaging 9.4% annually from the 1950s to the 1970s, Japan repeatedly experienced periods of economic expansion: from the Jinmu Boom to the Iwato Boom, and then during the Izanagi Boom. Breaking all previous records, Japan became one of the top economic powers in the world. Naturally, lots of attention was paid to this “economic miracle” aspect. More precisely, it had been a major concern for economists and policymakers to find out why only Japan could achieve such rapid growth while other developing countries remained under economic stagnation. Although some conventional Japanese researches have analyzed this question in relation to the Korean War, most of it has been investigated from the political science or international relations perspectives. Even studies on the Japanese economy have mostly been detailing the effects that the “Korean special procurements” had on Japan at that time. The reason we cannot find enough literature discussing the influence the Korean War itself had on Japan’s rapid growth might be because there is a tendency to try to discount such a distinctive factor when considering Japan’s economic development 240 model case. Furthermore, two aspects question the conventional research methodology that focuses on the Japanese government's role. First, even though the promotion of specific industries usually takes the form of introducing foreign capital and technology or importing machinery from abroad, these are strongly influenced by the “supplier side.” Second, although Japan at that time had already been released from the U.S’s occupation, the form and implementation of economic policies were still not carried out solely by the Japanese government; instead, the U.S. government strongly promoted Japan’s “export-oriented machinery industrialization” as a means of enhancing national security. The achievement of Japan’s rapid economic growth and its “exportoriented machinery industrialization” would have required various inputs and appropriate demand absorbers. The United States was involved in Japan’s “export-oriented machinery industrialization” in many ways, but it can be categorized mainly into three types. The first was to introduce a planned mass production system coupled with innovative technology, which had been developed in the U.S. The second was to utilize American-style scientific and rational business management methods. The third was to promote new industries while simultaneously developing new products in Japan in order to accelerate its access to the mass-consuming American market. It is important to note that only these three factors combined could realize Japan’s “exportoriented machinery industrialization.” The U.S’s role in Japan’s “export-oriented machinery industrialization” was particularly significant both temporally and functionally. First, the U.S. granted multi-faceted support in building up an American-style massproduction system in Japan. Second, the U.S. provided Japan with appropriate backup, both in terms of quantity and quality, in order to introduce an American-style business management system. Third, the U.S. played a huge role as a demand absorber for Japanese products – even though Japan’s exports to the U.S. were widely referred to as “downpour exports.”},
 pages = {211--240},
 title = {朝鮮戦争と米国国家安全保障戦略、そして日本の経済奇跡 —「米国の日本に対する目標と行動方針」と関連して—},
 year = {2022}
}