@article{oai:icu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002449,
 author = {田中, 極子},
 issue = {77},
 journal = {社会科学ジャーナル},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {Traditionally, the term “dual-use” was simply discussed in terms of military
versus civilian uses. However, dual-use problems are not limited to military uses
today; rather, materials, hardware, and knowledge that have peaceful applications
can always be exploited to harm humans, animals, plants, and the environment
in many different ways. Therefore, reframing the idea of “dual use” in terms of
“legitimate versus illegitimate” or “lawful versus unlawful” uses highlights the
ethical question at the heart of this problem, namely how a technology is used
rather than the technology itself.
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the multilateral legal frameworks
that have been set up to regulate illegitimate or unlawful uses of technologies
related to weapons of mass destruction, that is, nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons, in response to current dual-use issues. It focuses on the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) because current scientific and technological developments in
the life sciences are giving rise to unforeseen dual-use threats to our lives.
The first part of the paper examines the objectives and functions of the BWC
and CWC. It compares their verification mechanisms, implementation organs,
and review processes for scientific and technological developments, which have
all been considered as means to help ensure the compliance of states that are
parties to these conventions. Although the BWC and CWC are often regarded
as similar frameworks, the comparison finds that their functions are in fact
very different. Whereas the CWC is a hard regime with very precise rules and
regulations, the BWC is a soft regime that sets only a normative standard without
any rules.
The second part of the paper explores further the BWC as a soft regime,
examining current developments in the BWC’s response to dual-use challenges. It
assesses the outcomes of the seventh review conference of the BWC held in 2011,
which focused on strengthening the BWC’s effectiveness by emphasizing the
importance of keeping abreast of scientific and technological developments and
of involving all stakeholders, including government ministries, industry, research
institutions, academia, funding bodies, scientific journals, and scientific societies.
In conclusion, the paper argues that the ethical question raised by dual-use issues
cannot be resolved by a simple choice between hard or soft regimes; rather, a
hybrid of the two approaches is required. It refers to the advances made by the
BWC to emphasize the importance of a self-governing network of scientists and
experts to respond to dual-use issues.},
 pages = {53--77},
 title = {大量破壊兵器のデュアル・ユース性管理 —生物兵器禁止条約における発展—},
 year = {2014}
}