

# From National to Human Security? Reflections on Post 3.11 Japan<sup>(1)</sup>

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In spite of the challenge posed by globalization and the proliferation of “non-traditional security threats,” the concept of security continues to be understood in realist terms as “national security”. The “national security” doctrine, which conflates “state” and “nation” regarding them as coterminous, makes the state responsible for the protection of the population which it controls (often by force alone) from external threats. The state is both the referent object (i.e. the end which is to be secured) and the only legitimate means of “protection.” As Sadako Ogata, co-chair of the CHS points out, “[t]raditionally, security threats were assumed to emanate from external sources. Security issues were therefore examined in the context of “state security,” i.e. the protection of the state, its boundaries, people, institutions and values from external attack” (Ogata in Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 5).

Japanese foreign policy remains, despite the commitment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to promoting “human security,” deeply wedded to the “national security doctrine.” This has particularly been the case since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe returned to power in landslide election victory in the Lower House last year. Japanese foreign policy under Abe has notably been more assertive with more

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emphasis placed on defending Japan's national interest and territorial integrity at the risk of antagonizing Japan's neighbors and regional trading partners. The cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy remains the Japan-US security alliance whereby the United States provides "security" from external threat by stationing its own troops on Japanese soil. Critics have considered the security alliance to qualify Japan's status as a sovereign state. For Gavan McCormack, Japan remains a "client state" of the US; Japan enjoys the formal trappings of sovereignty but has internalized the requirement to prioritize the interests of the US in international relations as was noticeable in Japan's support for the invasion of Iraq despite its questionable legality and considerable domestic opposition (McCormack, 2007). Despite strong support for the US-Security alliance, Abe has made no secret of his desire to re-arm Japan thereby "normalizing" Japan's standing in international society as a fully "sovereign" state and regional power. In order to do so, he will need to revise Article 9 of the constitution under which Japan forever "renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." (The Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, 1947/2013).

This article will attempt to account for how war became "a sovereign right of the nation" in the first place by examining the origins of the national security doctrine in early modern Europe. It will be argued that its evolution is unintelligible without reference to the "wars of religion" (or more appropriately, intra-religious wars) of the seventeenth century and that the modern nation-state, which Thomas Hobbes introduced as a "Mortall God" in his classic *Leviathan* (1651/1985) is, in Carl Schmitt's term "a secularized theological concept" (Schmitt, 1922/1985). Next, the concept of Human Security which may be seen as an attempt to "broaden and deepen" security by making the individual and not the state the main referent object of security discourse will be introduced. Threats to individual security are seen to arise not only from *external* threats (that is threats from other states) as traditionally characterized by war and conflict but also *internally* from the violent actions of the state itself as well as by structures of violence and oppression which inhibit the realization of human

dignity and freedom. Both “narrow” and “broad” approaches will be examined before it will be argued, following Michel Foucault, that human security can best be understood as a form of racialized “biopolitics.” An attempt will be made to illustrate the argument with reference to Japan after the events of March 11, 2011 (hereafter 3.11). Finally, it will be argued that an explicit commitment to protecting and empowering *all* residents of Japan after 3.11 may serve the national interest better than a narrow obsession with territorial disputes and the renewal of the “blood alliance” between North Korea and “Imperial China” (Ikegami, 2012).

## **I. “The Mortal God”: The National Security Doctrine**

Conventional approaches to security studies remain anchored in a realist world view based on following assumptions. First, the state is viewed as both the key actor in the theory and practice of international relations and as the legitimate representative of the collective will of the nation. In the theatre of International Relations (IR), “states set the scene in which they, along with non-state actors stage their dramas” (Waltz, 1986, p. 89). Second, the primary responsibility of state leaders is to ensure the survival of their state in an anarchic international system characterized by the absence of a common power. The absence of a common power affords IR a structure which helps explain the persistence not only of separate territorially bounded units of international political activity but also conflict between these units. This structure is considered immutable having endured since either the Peace of Westphalia or the days of the Peloponnesian War. Conflict is, consequently, seen as inevitable and endemic to international relations with military action considered a legitimate instrument of state policy. Third, “national security” may occasionally necessitate the suspension of normal constitutional arrangements and the suspension of civil liberties including Habeas Corpus, particularly for those groups and individuals deemed to constitute a threat to the “national interest.”

This is akin to what Schmitt terms a “state of exception:” a situation of “extreme peril” and “danger to the existence of the state” which requires the

application of extraordinary measures (Schmitt, 1922/1985, p. 6). Threats to the “national interest” are seen as threats to the state’s boundaries, institutions, subjects and values from outside, even if these threats come from within the state’s borders (Shani, 2007, pp. 1-2). It is the sovereign who decides “whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it” (Schmitt, 1922/1985, p. 7). Thus, the sovereign is “he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 1922/1985, p. 5). Schmitt based his understanding of the “sovereign” on the founding father of the “realist tradition.” Thomas Hobbes.

Central to Hobbes’s thought is a view of the sovereign as a Leviathan, a secularized “Mortall God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defense” (Hobbes, 1651/1985, p. 227). This “Mortall God” alone is capable of bestowing protection on his subjects in return for their liberty. The Leviathan uses the strength of all others who have surrendered their power to Him in the first place to bring into being “a condition in which the right of each man to self-preservation could be realized” (Hobbes 1651/1985, p. 222). Without “a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in the condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man” (Hobbes 1651/1985, p. 185). There can be no rule of law in this state of “anarchy” because “law depends for its existence upon a “common power”” (Hobbes, 1651/1985, p. 185) absent in the “state of nature” and, for realists, in contemporary IR. Consequently, there can be no consideration of ethics or justice. As Hobbes succinctly put it:

To this war of every man against every man this is also consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice or injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no Law; where no law, no injustice. (Hobbes, 1651/1985, p. 188)

By effectively removing considerations of justice as criteria for political obligation, Hobbes was responding to contemporary Protestant challenges to earthly power and authority which denied Papal authority on the grounds that

God could not be represented by a human being but could only be known through Scripture. “Just as for the Protestant reformists there was no available presence of the authorizing deity, so too for Hobbes there was no available presence of the authorizing creator(s) of the commonwealth” (Orford, 2011, p. 115). The Leviathan itself is taken from The Book of Job (Chapters 40-41) where it is depicted as “the strongest and most tremendous sea monster” (Schmitt, 1938/2008, p. 6). However, the Leviathan itself is transformed in Hobbes’s imagination and, instead of a biblical sea dragon, we find a giant, crowned figure representing a sovereign made up of hundreds of individual citizens. The fact that he is clutching both a sword and a crosier, symbols of both “temporal” and “spiritual” power, makes the “political theology” (Schmitt, 1922/1985) of the Leviathan transparent. Seen from the frontispiece, Hobbes’ Leviathan “is a fearful dominus, the earthly version of an extreme nominalist God” (Elshtain, 2008, p.105). Man can only find “security” in their submission to this dominus, a “multitude of men...made one person” (Hobbes, 1651/1985, p. 220). The Leviathan in turn establishes the conditions whereby Man can enjoy his “liberty” for “in the act of our submission, consisteth both our obligation, and our liberty” (Hobbes, 1651/1985, p. 144). “Security” and “liberty” are thus not only interdependent but inextricably linked to the establishment of the state which alone, like a “Mortall God,” is capable of bestowing protection on its subjects.

## **II. “Putting a Hook in the Nose of the Leviathan”: From National to Human Security**

“In the eighteenth century”, Schmitt claimed “the leviathan as magnus homo, as the godlike sovereign person of the state, was destroyed from within.” It was “destroyed” not only by the French and American revolutions, but also by the emergence of the liberal differentiation between “public” and “private” spheres. In Hobbes’s worldview, freedom of religion, thought and conscience were unnecessary and deeply divisive impediments to the consolidation of sovereign power. There could be no “private” sphere if the leviathan was to

guarantee public security. For Schmitt, the “distinction between inner and outer became for the mortal god a sickness unto death.” However, “his work, the state, survived him in the form of a well-organized executive, army, police as well as a well-working professionally trained bureaucracy.” The state became to an increasing extent, “perceived as a mechanism and a machine.” As that perception grew, “so did the development of the concepts of right and law.” Once the absolutist state of sovereign princes became bound by law and transformed from a police “into a ‘constitutional state’ ...law, too, changed and became a technical means to ‘put a hook in the nose’ of the Leviathan” (Schmitt, 1938/ 2008, p. 65).

Just as law “put a hook in the nose” of the Leviathan, it is suggested here that the concept of human security seeks to do the same with the national security doctrine. However, the Leviathan, unlike in Schmitt’s domestic analogy, has so far managed to wriggle free. Consequently, human security remains dependent on an understanding of security which continues to assign primacy to the state as the main agent of protection and empowerment for individuals. Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan guaranteed rights through a framework of law. Obedience to the Leviathan would be binding since its origins lie in a mythical social contract between governors and the governed. The alternative to the order of the Leviathan was “anarchy:” a war of “everyman against everyman” (Hobbes, 1651/1985, p. 185). John Locke had argued that it would be irrational of men as citizens to surrender their natural rights to “life, liberty and estate” unless they received guarantees from the state. For John Locke, there was a natural right to life, liberty and property since God’s natural law stipulated that “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions” (Locke, 1689/1967). Thus, legal rights were substituted for natural rights. In order to ensure that the state fulfilled its contractual obligations to those it governed, the state’s power was limited by a constitution which guaranteed a separation of powers and, much later, representative democracy. Herein lies the problem of “human security:” how to protect and guarantee the rights of the individual from the very agent of protection, the sovereign state.

The notion of human security is premised on the assumption that the

individual human being is the only irreducible focus for discourse on security. Consequently, the claims of all other referents, including the nation-state, derive from the sovereignty of the individual (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, p. 2). While most advocates of human security agree that its primary goal should be the protection of individual human lives, they differ as to what the individual should be protected from. Although multiple dimensions and conceptions of human security have been identified, conventionally a distinction, or rather an antinomy, is made between “narrow” and “broad” definitions.

Broadly-speaking, this distinction corresponds to Sir Isaiah Berlin’s differentiation between “negative” and “positive” freedom. “Negative freedom,” for Berlin, denoted freedom from coercion whereas “positive freedom” was the freedom to act in a certain way. The first approach to human security conceives of human security “negatively,” in terms of the absence of threats to the physical security or safety of individuals. This “narrow” definition has been adopted by the pre-Harper Canadian government and is exemplified in the publication of the Human Security Report by the Human Security Centre based at the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia which defines human security as the protection of individuals from “violent threats” (Human Security Report, 2005). The “Canadian” approach has been institutionalized through the formation of the Human Security Network (HSN), a group of mainly western states led by Canada which meet informally at ministerial level to discuss issues pertaining to human security. Aside from providing methodological clarity, the “narrow definition” of human security has the advantage of being anchored in the western liberal tradition of rights-based political theory. The individual is viewed as “unencumbered” (Hopgood, 2000), abstracted from the social and cultural mores of his or her community, and invested with formal political equality. All individuals are seen as possessing inalienable and fundamental rights to “life, liberty and property” by virtue of their common humanity. These rights are enshrined in the United Nations Charter 9 and, in particular, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNUDHR). This rights-based approach seeks to strengthen these international normative legal frameworks

while also deepening regional and national commitments to human rights legislation. International institutions are invested with the responsibility of developing and coordinating regional and national human rights norms with a view to bringing about their convergence.

The “narrow approach” also informs the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) which, following its adoption by the General Assembly after the World Summit in 2005<sup>(2)</sup>, has recently been institutionalized by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 1970 and 1971 authorizing the creation of a “no-fly zone” over Libya in 2011. Paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome resolution stated that each “individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” “This responsibility,” the resolution continues, “entails the *prevention* of such crimes” (emphasis mine). Where states, such as Libya in 2011 or Syria at the time of writing, fail in their responsibility to protect the population under its legal authority, then the “international community” under paragraph 139, must assume that responsibility and, if attempts “to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means” through the United Nations to prevent “crimes against humanity” are not successful, must be prepared to “take collective action in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter” (United Nations General Assembly, 2005). Libya in February 2011 was reminded of its “responsibility to protect its population” through United Nations Security Council resolution 1970 (United Nations Security Council, 2011a), before resolution 1973, less than a month later, established a “ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to protect civilians” (UNSC, 2011b). The establishment of a “no-fly zone” enforced by the considerable airpower of NATO led to the eventual toppling of the Libyan regime of Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi under the weight of NATO bombing which was itself of questionable legality (Booth,

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(2) The World Summit was held at UN Headquarters in New York between 14 and 16 September 2005 to discuss the progress of the Millennium Development Goals. The Outcome was adopted by the UN General Assembly (A/Res/60/1).



2011).

Whilst the advocates of the narrow approach prefer to ground human security in terms of “negative liberty” (Berlin, 1969), the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September 2012 goes beyond a narrow focus on the responsibility of states to protect their citizens and appears to repudiate the use of force as a means of protecting the individual from “violent threats.” Responding to calls to come up with a working definition of human security as contained in the paragraph 143 of the World Summit Outcome document which committed the United Nations to “discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly”, the resolution posited a common understanding of “human security” based on “the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair.” “All individuals,” according to the resolution, “are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.” Furthermore, human security “does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures” nor seek to “replace State security” (UN General Assembly, 2012).

In part, the wording of the General Assembly Resolution reflects the conclusions of the Final Report of the Commission on Human Security (CHS), headed by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata, which put forward a “broader” conceptions of human security which takes into account “freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf” (Commission on Human Security, 2003). At the heart of the CHS approach, is a “positive” definition of human security as encompassing the “vital core” of all human lives: a set of “elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy” and consider to be “vital” to their wellbeing. The objective of human security is, thus, to protect “the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment” (CHS, 2003). Although this “vital core,” based largely on the capabilities approach pioneered by Amartya Sen, is not specified, its protection “in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment” (CHS, 2003, p. 4) is seen as the principal objective of human security. Elements

of the “vital core” include “fundamental human rights” pertaining to “survival, to livelihood, and to basic dignity” (Alkire, 2003, p. 24). As Sabine Alkire, the Report’s main architect, notes in a working paper, human security is “deliberately protective” in that “it recognizes that people and communities are fatally threatened by events well beyond their control” (Alkire, 2003, p. 2). Shielding people from danger requires concerted international effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities, including those arising from extreme poverty, ill health, and the effects of environmental degradation (CHS 2003, p. 6). However, protection alone is seen as insufficient to combat human insecurity: human security seeks also to “to empower them to act on their own behalf” (CHS 2003, p. 2 - *italics mine*). Empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making (CHS, 2003). Protection and empowerment are regarded as mutually reinforcing and needed to achieve greater human security for all.

### **III. Human Security as Biopolitics: Reflections on Japan Post 3.11**

It is argued here that human security as understood from a broad perspective may be viewed as a form of “biopolitics” (Berman, 2007; Duffield, 2007; Grayson, 2008; De Larrianga and Doucet, 2008; Shani, 2011) in contrast with the “sovereign power” of the sovereign state as exemplified by the national security paradigm. However, the “responsibility to protect” clearly demonstrates that the biopolitical project of Human Security rests on the firm foundations of the sovereign power of the state and “international community” (Foucault, 2003; Agamben, 1998). Whereas “sovereign power” refers to a sovereign’s right to “take life or let live” and is exercised over territories, biopolitics marks a new power: “to “make” live and “let” die” (Foucault, 2003, p. 241). Defined as “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species become the object of a political strategy,” the origins of biopower or biopolitics, go back to the attempt, starting in Europe in the eighteenth century, “to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena

characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birth rate, life expectancy, race” (Foucault, 2008, p. 1). The origins of this new type of power lie in none other than the pastoral individualizing power of the Christian ecclesiastical pastorate (Foucault, 2007, p. 364).

“Race,” understood as “ethnicized” difference is central to the exercise of biopolitics. For Foucault, racism introduced “a break into the domain of life which is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die...a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain” (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). Thus, racism enables a distinction to be made between those whom are “made to live” and those who “must die.” It is above all a “technology permitting the exercise of biopower” whose function is “to regulate the distribution of death and make possible the murderous functions of the state” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 19). Race, therefore, intimately and inextricably binds biopolitics to necropolitics (Mbembe, 2001).

It is argued here that human security is a racialized discourse permitting a distinction to be drawn between those who are “made to live” and “those who must die” (Duffield, 2007; Shani, 2012). Both “narrow” and “broad” approaches are complicit in reinforcing this distinction. The narrow approach reinforces the “sovereign” power of the state over “its” population through the “responsibility to protect.” In so doing, it re-legitimizes the post-colonial state which in many societies characterized by ethnic and religious diversity, may be the source of insecurity in the first place. Where the state is unable to adequately discharge the responsibility to protect “its” population, the burden falls on the “international community” through an “adequate and timely” response which, in the case of Libya, took the form of armed intervention (although at a distance) by western powers with neo-colonial overtones. Seen from a post-colonial (or Southern) perspective, “RtoP” makes sovereignty, which in many cases was achieved as a result of an often bloody struggle for independence, conditional on maintaining the “standards of civilization” of former colonial powers. An “adequate and timely response,” therefore, is merely another incarnation of the “White Man’s

Burden” given the propensity of NATO to intervene in the “name of the international community.”

The “shadow” of “race” which, as Mbembe (2003, p. 17) argues, has been “ever present in Western political thought and practice,” is also discernible in the “broad approach” to Human Security which, although it eschews violent means, inextricably links development to security. The “development-security nexus” (Duffield, 2007, Sörensen and Söderbaum, 2012) has been critiqued for making “security” dependent upon “development.” “Development” ceases to be a choice which post-colonial societies may make but becomes a pre-requisite for their entry into the “international community” since the security of those members of those “developed” members of the international community depends upon the development of those designated as “underdeveloped.”

Seen through a racialized biopolitical lens, Japan’s commitment to human security is significant in two respects. Internationally, it helps to define Japan’s role in international society within the confines of Article 9 through a commitment to international development. Human security was identified as a basic policy framework in the 2003 revision of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter and as Makoto Sato notes the referents of Human Security are understood as people living in developing countries (Sato, 2007, p. 90). Japan, furthermore, played a key role in the establishment, and is the main donor, of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. Domestically, it “interpellates” (Althusser, 1971) the Japanese people as members of a “developed” nation whose security needs—both from fear and from want—are fulfilled by the “mortal God” of the state.

The racialized divisions between “inside” and “outside” are maintained by a strong ethnic component to Japanese nationalism. Despite moves from the Japanese state to promote the internationalization of Japanese society through a discourse of multiculturalism (*tabunkashugi*), the modern Japanese state, dating from the Meiji restoration of 1868, is widely seen as having been built upon pre-existing ethnic origins: bounded by a common territory, language, religion and myths of common ancestry (Lehmann, 1982). Japanese identity is, therefore,

considered an ethnic identity, the ethnic bonds which unite the Japanese people or “minzoku” seen as “real” (A.D. Smith, 1999) rather than “invented” (Gellner, 1964) or “imagined” (Anderson, 1991). In recent years, this “primordial” view of Japanese identity has been challenged by modernists and scholars of Japanese “cultural nationalism.” For these scholars, contemporary Japan is constituted through discourses on the Japanese “*nihonjinron*” and is therefore “imagined” (Yoshino, 1992). If Japan is “imagined,” then it follows that it can as easily be imagined as a multiethnic society as an ethnically homogenous one (Lie, 2001). The prevalent “internal Others” which permit the Japanese nation-state to define itself are the *zainichi* and *nikkeijin* (Weiner, 1997), although they have been joined during the years of the “bubble” with “newcomers” from China, the Philippines and other areas of South and South-East Asia (Lie, 2001). The Japanese state now recognizes these new immigrant groups through a discourse of *tabunka kyousei* (literally “multicultural symbiosis”) but in the process reifies and homogenizes ethnic identities, preserving the category of “the Japanese” despite its great internal diversity.

3.11 shattered the binary opposition between “inside” and “outside” upon which the Japanese state based its commitment to human security. With the state unable to protect its own citizens from the triple disasters of 3.11, people in the Tohoku area were forced to evacuate their homes and communities as their security was sacrificed to protect those living in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Biopolitical divisions became inscribed *within* the Japanese nation. *Ganbaro Nippon* was an empty slogan when so much of the Tohoku area was in urgent need of reconstruction and assistance. In Fukushima alone, approximately 64,000 people were displaced by the disaster (IMC, 2011) and the total cost of 3.11 was estimated at 3 trillion yen, not including personal damage (Reconstruction Bureau, 2013).

The Fukushima nuclear crisis, furthermore, demonstrated the “powerlessness” of the state to protect its citizens in a globalizing world where the dominant economic actors are corporations. The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), according to the official report into the nuclear accident,

“strongly influenced energy policy and nuclear regulations while abdicating their own responsibilities and letting METI take the responsibility on the frontline” (The National Diet of Japan, 2012, p. 44). The Report described the “regulatory capture” of Japan’s nuclear industry, in which oversight by regulators effectively ceases, tracing this back to the establishment of the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC), an unregulated lobbying association of electric power companies which is accused of influencing government policy on nuclear power. FEPC “prioritized the interests of their organizations over the public’s safety,” and, in effectively deciding that Japanese nuclear power plant reactor operations would not be stopped in any circumstances, effectively compromised the security of the general public.

Specifically, the Report assigned primary responsibility for the accident to the government, regulators and TEPCO, accusing them collectively of betraying “the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents.” However, for the Chair of the official report into the disaster, the “fundamental causes” were to be found in the “ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to “sticking with the program;” our groupism; and our insularity” (The National Diet of Japan, 2012, p. 9). The implications for Japanese national identity are clear for all to see.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

Just as the detonation of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and defeat in the Second World War proved to be the catalysts for the unraveling of the old imperial order based on militarism and unconditional obedience to the Emperor, Fukushima will necessitate a rethinking of what it is to be Japanese; of who is to be included in a nation of many different regional and ethnic identities, and of who is to be excluded. Japan emerged from the ashes of the Second World War as a modern, democratic, affluent and peaceful society but it continued to be imagined as a homogenous, ethnic community. Colonial minorities such as the Korean and Chinese *zainichi* were excluded from the post-war Japanese “nation” at its very inception and the Japanese state has come to view the People’s

Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as Japan's natural "enemies" and a source of external threats (Ikegami, 2012). 3.11 exploded this myth by laying bare the biopolitical divisions upon which the modern Japanese state was based. Faith in the "Mortal God" of the state was badly shaken by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident as many Japanese nationals were forced to leave their homes and were effectively abandoned by the state. Only a commitment to protecting the human security of *all* of Japan's residents—from tsunami-hit and irradiated rural communities in the North-East to migrant workers employed on irregular contracts in the informal sector in urban areas—can, it is argued, form the basis of a new national ethic capable of rising to the challenges of a rapidly globalizing and increasingly complex and uncertain world.

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From National to Human Security?  
Reflections on Post 3.11 Japan

<Summary>

Giorgio Shani

This article will attempt to provide a genealogy of security by examining the transition from national to human security with reference to contemporary Japan after the tragic events of March 11, 2011. It will be argued that the national security doctrine, based on the assumptions that the state is the main referent of security and is responsible for the protection of its citizens, continues to be hegemonic in both the theory and practice of international relations. This will be discussed with reference to Hobbes's classic defence of sovereignty in the *Leviathan* (1651). However, in recent years, it has been seen as unable to deal with the plethora of challenges associated with globalization; global climate change, international economic crises, transnational terrorism and crime, nuclear proliferation, all challenge the capabilities of states individually and collectively to provide security for their citizens. Consequently, attempts have been made to "broaden and deepen" security by re-conceptualizing security as "human security". Both "narrow" and "broad" approaches to human security will be then introduced before it will be argued that human security may be seen as a form of "biopolitics" (Foucault, 2003, 2007, 2008). An attempt will then be made to illustrate the argument with reference to Japan. Whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japan International Cooperation Agency have both incorporated "human security" into Japan's Foreign Policy to differing degrees, the Japanese state remains wedded to the national security doctrine and has been reluctant to make human security a domestic priority after 3.11. In conclusion, it will be

argued that an explicit commitment to protecting and empowering *all* residents of Japan will better serve Japan's 'national interest' rather than a narrow focus on defending territorial claims against her neighbours and regional trading partners.