

A New Direction for Curriculum Theory

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To compete successfully in the arena in which curriculum decisions are wrought, scholars and teachers must have ideas and principles as an alternative to the raw power of bureaucratic, political, military, social, industrial, and commercial interests. Philosophies of education are not enough, for deriving specific choices or practices from a philosophy often leave adherents of a single philosophy with quite different conclusions. In the condition of schools and universities a variety of philosophies confront each other and the task of derivation is quite impossible. What schoolmen require, and by schoolmen I mean all members of faculties in schools, colleges, and universities as well as those who administer or serve them, what they require is a theory of practice for curriculum. In contrast with philosophies, theories are always partial; they characterize the actual quest for knowledge; they call for testing and revision; they generally do yield ideas and explicit practices capable of being judged. In this essay, after some necessary preliminaries, I shall outline briefly the development of curriculum, employing a representation of the nature of the world of knowledge as a model for devising the curriculum theory. With Arthur R. King, Jr., I have presented a detailed statement of the theory in a forthcoming book, *The Curriculum and the Disciplines of Knowledge*.

I use the term theory in a humanistic sense. A theory is a set of interrelated statements employing carefully defined and consistently used terminology. These statements are marked by logic, clarity, and precision, but glory in the richness of

metaphor. They must account for empirical data, the particular fact as well as the general idea, the person as well as the group, the predictable world of science as general idea, the person as well as the group, the predictable world of science as well as the free world of man. They must incorporate, state clearly, and give credence to beliefs, assumptions, values, and imagination. They must provide a conceptual framework with which to order, interpret, and assign meanings to facts so that the trivial and the crucial, the unique and the uniform, and the cause and the effect can be distinguished.

I should like to qualify this discussion further by limiting the theory of curriculum to that schooling designed to be common and general. By *common*, at whatever level, I stipulate a curriculum in which all students share; by *general*, at whatever level, I mean that curriculum which comprises studies characterized by the widest applicability, highest generativity, and deepest power of understanding, and, conversely, by least particularity and concreteness. For this common, general curriculum I shall apply the terms the *liberal curriculum* or the *liberal arts and sciences*, for I find that the widely used term of *general education* does not distinguish between commonality and generality, and I hold this distinction to be important.

Discussions of the proper nature of school and university curricula often grow quickly unproductive because no clear distinction has been made and maintained between schooling and education. In this essay I shall attempt to avoid the confusion by asserting at the outset that *education* is the nobler and more inclusive term and should, therefore, quite properly be reserved for the life-long process in the creating of one's own personhood. From schooling one commences; from education one graduates into eternity. Education comes by way of family, friends, community, church, mass media, travel, work, leisure, military service, politics, and formal schooling. The term *curriculum* is

clearly unsuited to many of these ways. Since schooling is only a part of education, I believe in the necessity of delineating its responsibility, that is, choosing and establishing priority among the claims upon it. For schools and universities to undertake the cultivation of the whole person is to equate schooling with education. Such an equation misses the dynamic, variable, un-systematic, and life-long character of much of one's education. The equation ignores the differing claims in the differing stages of man. It ensures a partial view becoming the total view. And it gives to schooling an aura of failure and confusion in the judgment of progress. At this stage, I should like to describe *schooling* at whatever level as a deliberate, purposeful organization supporting the dialogue among teaching colleagues and students, and to signify the *curriculum* as a planned series of dialogues among teachers and students.

Comparing even the incomplete listing of the avenues of education with the claims for occupational man, political man, social man, religious man, the intellectual man, I discover no avenue except schooling which concerns itself by nature, organization, or tradition with the planned development of man's symbolic powers. Such an assessment does not mean that occupational training, the responsibilities of citizenship, the processes of socialization and enculturation, or the spiritual and moral considerations of mankind are to be ignored. Primacy of the claim of intellect on school and university merely means it stands first in order, must be served first, must be supported first, and that intellect will be used to order the other claims rather than money, emotion, political power, group conformity, or sheer faith. I believe that I can give some limited justification of this point as a corollary of the following qualification.

A point of confusion in curriculum discussions is the failure to recognize and enunciate straightforwardly the relationships of one's assumptions about the nature of man to curriculum theory.

It matters much to discussions of schooling and education whether you consider man basically as a group member, or as a worker, or as an environmentally or genetically determined organism; or as a mindless creature to be conditioned by those in power, or as soulless or as a selfish being, or as explained by desires and irrational urges, for such beliefs influence our choices for curriculum. Perhaps a small part of the difficulty is that such assumptions are frequently known only implicitly to the disputants. The major part is perhaps that after nearly three thousand years of philosophical discourse and millenia of religious thought all of us feel humble in the face of such a request. However poorly done, I believe it to be a necessary task.

Man is a person, an agent, an initiator, a subject, an actor, a seeker of meaning, a spiritual whole, not merely a behavioral one. He possesses the potential for love and mercy. He is free. His choices, beliefs, and preferences matter. He is an end not a means, and, as such, is never to be sacrificed to systems of ideas or made merely an instrument of power. Man is the symbolizing creature. He reasons, questions, remembers, reflects, meditates, imagines, creates images. By some obscure process of alchemy what is known in his own consciousness—his private intellect—can become communal intellect and survive his passing. The capacity for knowing, an attribute of everyman, can be schooled as the survival of human culture attests. The qualities of intellect are universal among men although quantities appear to vary with individuals. It is this universal quality of intellect among men, however, which makes the human community possible and gives each one of us knowledge that we are selves. By becoming disciplined in symbolic behavior, the young lose dependence on adults and move toward freedom. Freedom is the right of choice and the essence of choice appears to be a symbolic function: the ability to foresee the several possibilities, to weigh them, and to direct one's behavior in light of one possibility.

Disciplined thinking makes one free—free from the minds of others, free from irrelevancies, free to become a person. The freedom of man is a spiritual affair and an intellectual or symbolic task for each person. But intellect is human and because man is fallible and finite, so is intellect. The world of reality is enormous and complex, the opportunities for error and ignorance varied and numerous. Some of our most profound experiences may be tacit. Yet, free man's greatest safeguard is freedom of the mind. As long as intellect follows its patiently developed rules of judgment, judges unremittingly, remembers the certainty of error and the lure of truth, it is man's best defense against all tyranny.

It is the potential or schooling for development of man's symbolic capacities and its potential for maintaining freedom of the mind which require the claim of intellect on the curriculum to be given primacy. But the granting of priority to intellect makes the many disciplines of knowledge a central problem for the content of the curriculum, for the disciplines are symbolic systems, the means by which men's minds master nature, apprehend images, and grasp ideals. It is these disciplines which give raw experience intelligibility and enlarge the circle of man's knowledge. It is the substratum of the symbolic systems of language, number, and form with which the youngest are inducted systematically into the realm of knowledge.

The radical postulate which I propose for the liberal curriculum is this: every student, regardless of race, color, creed, level of ability, age, sex, grade in school, family background, economic condition, or perceived need is driven by his very nature to seek intellectual encounter, to exercise the talents for symbolic behavior available to him and all men because they are men. Every student is *worthy* of an encounter with the disciplines of knowledge.

Merely asserting that knowledge is the content of the curricu-

lum and that all are worthy, even if absolutely correct, does not solve the questions of curriculum theory. The fact that knowledge is considered a "problem" by many of the great philosophical minds of the twentieth century cannot be underestimated. The questions of the unity and system of knowledge also have a direct relationship. These conditions are small comfort to those of us who wish to generate a curriculum theory from some model of the world of knowledge. And certainly the call for opportunity for all the young to participate in the liberal curriculum through the years of elementary, secondary, and lower university schooling raises enormous resistance, for such a curriculum has never been offered to more than a minority. Whether it can be accomplished is problematical, but it seems evident that without some theory to guide the attempt, failure is assured. There are indications, at least in the United States, that we may be compelled to make the attempt because of rising expectations and requirements. It is worth remembering that universal primary education only a century or so ago was considered decidedly utopian. However, as I view the situation, the model of the world of knowledge is the first step. Let me proceed with the attempt, by examining some developments in the history of the world of knowledge.

Until the mid-nineteenth century philosophy dominated all knowledge through four relations. First, philosophy provided the unity for all knowledge. Divisions of knowledge were merely the divisions of philosophy. By mid-nineteenth century the unity had crumbled. In the past one hundred or so years the task of maintaining wholeness in the face of advancement, specialization, and nationalization of knowledge has been too great. The mood of philosophy has turned from the universalistic, *a priori*, systematic-synthetic toward the positivistic, experiential, and analytical. The inner development of the problem of knowledge is no longer found in the study of philosophic

systems. There are now as many single forms of theory of knowledge as there are different disciplines of knowledge. Even within the disciplines there have been revolutionary movements which have shaken them to their very foundations. For example, by late nineteenth century non-Euclidean geometry had ousted Euclid from his position of uncontested supremacy and introduced entirely new questions for mathematical thought, forcing a new interpretation of its logical structure. By early twentieth century classical physics, in itself a prior revolution of thought, had been staggered by the development of quantum theory and general theories of relativity. History, biology, literature, language, visual and plastic arts have also been shaken and redirected.

Second, until mid-nineteenth century philosophy provided knowledge of reality, although this notion was under attack by the sixteenth century and crumbled slowly away each succeeding century with the rise of science. In the past century a great chorus of scornful voices have been raised against the value of speculative, metaphysical, or religious conceptions of the philosophy of knowledge. The growth of the separate disciplines and the explication of their methods of inquiry, it was argued, destroyed philosophy's claim as the sole approach to reality.

Third, until the mid-nineteenth century philosophy posed an answered epistemological questions about what is known and how it is known. For at least a century the individual disciplines have refused to delegate their authority for these questions. Each discipline now poses its own concerning what it can know and how it can come to know it. No one who is not himself a mathematician, physicist, linguist, *et al.*, can hope to contribute much to the clarification of ideas in the discipline. Autonomy has caused the disciplines to grow increasingly self-conscious. Specialist philosophies have appeared such as those of history, jurisprudence, criticism or aesthetic, language, religion, and mathematics.

This spirit of self-examination is still very much in evidence.

Fourth, until some time in the nineteenth century philosophy directed knowledge toward new goals and opened new paths. But by that time a fundamental alteration had occurred. Autonomy and diversity characterized the world of knowledge. In earlier centuries, philosophy, employing actually a model from division of knowledge, guided thought and determined the lines of inquiry, first with metaphysics, then theology, mathematics, and finally biology. Now all disciplines offer themselves—their concepts, logics, and modes of inquiry—as fulfilling the desirable unity.

For nearly twenty-four hundred years the unities of knowledge proposed were evolutionary as well as historical. They were based upon systems, methods, or language. The systems appear to have been either logical or teleological, with the logical being further subdivided into combinations of parts or organic wholes. Those who have spoken for the unit of knowledge have tended to deny the validity of certain alleged kinds or sources of knowledge. These denials have reduced the number and variety of kinds of knowledge to be correlated. Moreover, those who have asserted unity have attempted to show that apparently different kinds of knowledge are not really independent but are merely special forms of one single type. Their position seems to argue that the ultimate reality is simple, that each thing is fundamentally identical, and that all tradition can be traced back to experience. On the other hand, those who have affirmed the plural nature of knowledge have argued for a real difference among kinds of knowledge which cannot be overcome. Their ultimate reality is irreducibly complex. Their conception of the totality of knowledge is that of a progressive enlargement and interweaving of the various disciplines.

Whatever the reality, it seems clear that there is among men a longing for closure, and an impelling drive for unity. Unity

has been a holy word. Whitehead and Cassirer, among others, have argued that there is a way to achieve clarification and coordination of the many autonomous disciplines: steep oneself in the theorizing in each of the disciplines which has to do with methods of getting knowledge in each discipline and the distinctive conception of knowledge sought or believed attainable in each of them. Such a cure frightens most patients!

As one examines the living world of knowledge as he finds it in universities, research laboratories and institutes, libraries, galleries, concert halls, hospitals, museums, and technological developments he faces these claims: there are various symbolic structures for meaning, each has its own refractory power and must be understood and judged in its own terms. The contemporary divisions of knowledge, the disciplines, include the full circle of humanity, all man's works—language, poetry, plastic art, religion, science, mathematics, history. There is diversity and autonomy, yet something more—an ineffable interrelationship. We have, then, a requirement for pluralism: a diversity-in-unity, variety-within-a framework. Only some type of pluralism seems a plausible unity, for we have no consensus on the unity of knowledge amidst university scholars and nothing defensible has emerged from the lower schools. The school and university curriculum centered on knowledge must reach some accord with the autonomy and diversity of the disciplines of knowledge and the pluralism of knowledge. The curriculum must devote attention to all the various symbolic structures for meaning, the methods of gaining knowledge in each discipline, and the distinctive conception of the knowledge sought or believed attainable in each of them. And schoolmen must come to understand what pluralism means and find ways to institutionalize it.

Pluralism is not chaos nor radical disjunction of centers, but diversity within a structure. It opposes imposed unities and totalitarian monoliths. Its logical principle is that of contraple-

tion or related opposites—diversity and unity. But it is not syncretic, rather, co-existent. It is not to be confused with literary paradox, contradictions (true or false), or contraries (beautiful, ugly). In the pluralism of the world of knowledge, the diversity is clear to any sentient modern man. The unity, however, is not so-clear. I believe it is to be found in the end and direction of the movement of knowledge; the pursuit of truth and meaning, the adherence to discovery, penetrating inquiry, critical scrutiny. It is to be found in the stand for the future and the past as against the conforming power of the present, for the great abstractions, for the eternal against the expedient, for the evolutionary appetite against the day's gluttony, for intellectual integrity, but most of all for humanity. The unity is to be found in the human focus for knowledge; the unity of persons as ends not means.

Harmonizing school and university with the pluralism of the world of knowledge an adequate representation of that world. Such a representation, or theory model, would include those elements of the disciplines which appear to be common and general. The pursuit of such isomorphic features among autonomous and diverse disciplines is a most dangerous game and can only be entered into with foreboding, but the development of the curriculum theory presented in this essay requires such an effort. Professor King and I suggest these isomorphic features.

A discipline is a community of persons. The conception of a discipline as a self-conscious group of scholars whose ultimate task is the gaining of meaning is in accord with the sense of shared interests, colleague recognition, and agreement to press forward with the gaining and criticizing of knowledge. The discipline is a working establishment in the city of intellect. As a community it has elder and younger members and, if it is to survive, it must produce, that is, attract new members.

A discipline is an expression of human imagination. The role

of creative and intuitive persons in the production of novel theories in scholarship has often been cited. Every scholar in his studies and teaching depends heavily upon the symbolic constructions and meanings of colleagues. Highly germinal concepts stimulate further imaginative efforts in the discipline. The number of scholars with great imagination and highly developed imaginative powers is smaller than we care to admit.

A discipline is a domain. A discipline is often described and named by the domain which it stakes out for itself in the larger territory of intellectual life. The domain is that which the members of the discipline claim it to be. Stated generally, the domain is that natural phenomenon, process, material, social institution, human art, behavior, or other aspect of man's concern upon which the members of the discipline focus their attention. While there are cases of methodological imperialism, inter-discipline warfare, and pecking orders, the course of the centuries helps settle many claims, arbitrate intellectual wars, and shake up pecking orders.

A discipline is a tradition. The dialogue of a community of scholars can be understood only with some knowledge of the history of the discipline. While not all would agree that intellectual trends once born never die, there is striking evidence of the tenacity for life which ideas possess. The history and tradition of a discipline foster the sense of community and encourage the practitioners with the successful record of the advancement of knowledge.

A discipline is a syntactical structure, an avenue of meaning. The syntactical structure of a discipline is the characteristic ways in which the scholars of that discipline work at the problem of determining truth, of what criteria are used in judging evidence, of how problems of interpretation are posed and overcome, of the role of theory, and, in general, of the path from raw data to conclusions. Professor King and I add

the term *rhetoric* to the syntax of a discipline. This term suggests that discourse in a discipline has its preferred forms, its aesthetic qualities, its sense of appropriateness, elegance, and beauty. In short, there is an indisputable element of style in inquiry. The full significance of the concept of syntactical structures in disciplines and the extent of its applicability is still hazy, but the concept helps bridge that sterile chasm between content and method.

A discipline is a conceptual structure. Interrelated with the syntax of disciplined inquiry is a conceptual or substantive structure. Frequently the term *structure* of knowledge connotes a static structure, but "the organized ensemble of underlying principles," in Bruner's words, are in fact dynamic patterns rather than static ones. All of our inquiry strengthens the idea that substance and process, concept and syntax, occur together, and the role of a principle of inquiry or the model of investigation is fundamental to disciplined inquiry.

A discipline is a specialized language or other system of symbols. The ambiguities and imprecision of ordinary language require those disciplines which use verbal language to develop technical terms and definitive meanings for common words. Only the other members of the community may be certain that they understand. Where this process is not sheer pendency, it requires immersion of those who would be members of the discipline in the language of the discipline's discourse. The sciences and to some degree mathematics certainly have their own entire system of symbols which differ from ordinary language. In those less clearly defined systems of images, signs, and forms lie meanings for the disciplines of the visual and plastic arts, music, dance, religion, literature, and drama. Whatever the discipline, a very large part of joining its community of scholars is making its special discourse a part of one's mother tongue.

A discipline is a heritage of literature and a network of com-

munication. The working materials of a discipline are the heritage of writings, paintings, compositions, musical scores, artifacts, recorded interviews, and other symbolic expressions of the members of the discipline. Access to such materials is required for decent scholarship. The network of journals, publications, meetings, shows, scholarly papers, abstracts, *et al.*, provide the intellectual fare for the nourishment of the members of the discipline.

A discipline is a characteristic attitude. A discipline has its characteristic views of man, its emotional dynamism, its aesthetic qualities. Emotion, hope, faith, commitment, beauty, pleasure, fun, style provide fuel for the house of intellect. The prevailing conceptions of man implicit or explicit, tacit or central, vary with the disciplines.

A discipline is an instructive community. Philip Phenix sums up much contemporary writing on disciplines and their structures: "The distinguishing mark of any discipline is that the knowledge which comprises it is instructive—that it is peculiarly suited for teaching and learning." Perpetuation of the community of scholars in the discipline and the generative power of the discipline require analytic simplification, synthetic coordination, and a dynamism which acts as a lure to discovery. These things which disciplines continually perfect and exhibit are the attributes which make them peculiarly suited for teaching and learning.

In a single phrase, the disciplines of knowledge which comprise the modern world of knowledge can be described best as "communities of discourse." To avoid the static, geographic connotation of *communities*, it would be well to interpret the term as a *company* of persons moving in modest disarray, some straggling some forging far ahead, talking, gesticulating, demonstrating, singing, sketching, meditating, pausing now and again to build models to illustrate ideas or to do whatever is appropriate to the "discourse." As it moves ahead, the company draws

in the young to accompany the veterans, separating the young gradually, as the company moves on, from their homes, habits, and collections and systems of ideas they brought with them.

In devising a curriculum theory from this model of the world of knowledge the first principle for the curriculum and schooling is to begin with persons and their relationships: *the communities of discourse or disciplines of knowledge are the heart of every school and university.* They are not "subjects" or "studies" or "content areas" or selected "problems" or "topics." They are not accretions of haphazardly selected concepts, or skills, or understandings, or bits of information. They are not private unities of ideas unknown in the widest realm of intellectual endeavor. The communities of discourse *per se* are in the school and university. Each discipline, that is, each group of persons, brings with it a fabric of skills and values. Such values as integrity, self-control, truthfulness, objectivity, elegance, and beauty are exemplified and practiced in one or another forms of disciplined inquiry. Because commitments to values, freely given, are the only fulsome and lasting kind and the only kind in harmony with the concept of person as delineated in this essay, I do not believe it possible to establish specific programs for indoctrinating in values. Certainly values will be studied, for they are central to and the stuff of literature, ethics, aesthetics, political theory, and history, among others. But perhaps more significantly values will be caught not taught by the relationships among teachers and students.

The second principle follows from the first. *The teacher at any level is a veteran of encounters within the community of discourse, within his discipline.* He is and will remain a member and exemplar of the symbolic thought and behavior characteristic of his discipline. Most importantly, he is a continuing member of the discipline who has reflected on the nature of the discipline, its traditions, its ways of gaining knowledge, its assumptions

about what can be known and how it can be known, and how its knowledge is warranted. Not all the members of the discipline will have so reflected, but the teacher must. It is an essential and conscious part of his preparation as a teacher. How can he guide the student to freedom if he does not have some idea of the direction and the standards of judgment?

Third, *the student is a neophyte in the encounters within the community of discourse*. He is, nevertheless, to be considered a member of the community of the discipline, immature to be sure, but capable of virtually unlimited development. He is learning the ways of gaining knowledge in the discipline, continually reorganizing the principles or concepts which his studies and discoveries have provided, seeking always to gain meaning through the ensemble of fundamental principles which characterize the discipline as this time. His relation as student to teacher is one of dialogue.

Fourth, *the liberal curriculum is a planned series of encounters between a student and some selection of communities of discourse embodied in the faculty*. An encounter is a face-to-face meeting, a personal conflict or contact involving action and reaction. The student who is to mature as a person must be engaged with both the process and product in the disciplines of knowledge. Only with the practice of judgment and skill in analysis can encounters with a variety of areas of human thought and discourse be planned. In the school which makes intellect the prime claim on the curriculum, planning cannot be eschewed, vagueness cannot be approved.

But planning for discovery is not simple. Each discipline of knowledge is not only exemplified by the teacher but also through visitors, books, musical organizations, paintings, sculptures ceramic creations, recordings, radio and television programs and series, programmed learning materials, all chosen as most representative of the discipline at this stage of history.

To the highest degree obtainable, then, the curriculum faithfully represents the most significant portions of the realm of knowledge at work, each in its own way.

In the restricted sense of the term, the curriculum in a single discipline of knowledge is the complete set of courses in a discipline. Seldom will the complete set of courses capture the growing edge of the discipline, no matter how imaginatively planned, for the discipline is a dynamic movement, and discovery will outstrip the ability of any school or university to plan encounters for the young. In effect, then, the actual condition of the world of knowledge requires continual curriculum reform; as scholarship grows, the curriculum must change.

Fifth, a course can now be defined as a planned series of encounters within the structure of any single discipline, typically for an age, grade, ability, or interest group of students. A course will be based upon the historic and current nature of the discipline. It will embody a plan for knowing the discipline, that is, for working as a member of the community of discourses. This plan will create opportunities for imaginative and intuitive response from the students. It will embody the germinal or key concepts for these are the building blocks of the structure of the discipline. I will map out the domain of the discipline in such a way that, at any point, the major features and boundaries are recognized by students, with each succeeding course segment expanding the relationship of detail to these major features. It will have, as its most salient characteristic, the syntactical structure of the discipline, involving the students continually with the discipline's characteristic ways of working, its standards for evidence and judgment, its system of interpretation, and demonstrating again and again that concepts cannot be known truly apart from their principle of inquiry. It will systematically develop among the students the specialized language and symbol system of the discipline. It will incorporate

and induct the young student into the network of printed and other kinds of materials which nourish the discourse of the discipline. It will build into course materials and activities the characteristic attitudes of the discipline. To be an authentic microcosm of the discipline, the course must stress the instructive character of the discipline's knowledge, that is, those aspects which make it peculiarly suitable for teaching and learning. Therefore, this plan will be organized about promising points of encounter or contact for the induction of the novice or for the maturing or advanced student. The points of encounter will be arranged according to some strategy for knowing, some way of sustaining the encounter which characterizes the experienced practitioners. Periodically these ordered points will be recorded in a concise written statement or syllabus. Based upon the syllabus, a logistic support subsystem will be developed so that study questions, books, laboratory equipment, films, records, even buildings suit the requirements for the course. From the discipline as represented in the syllabus, a plan of appraisal will be derived. The teacher, guided by the syllabus, his own creative interpretation and artistry as a veteran in the discipline, and by the quality of student engagement, will initiate, carry out, and appraise the encounters. The teacher and perhaps others will apply the appraisal system for review and reteaching, for syllabus revision, for revision of teaching styles, and for record purposes. While the course is an analytically and systematically planned series of encounters, it is expressly incomplete without the teacher and student, without their active involvement in the dialogue and discovery which characterize all of the genuine practitioners of the discipline wherever they may be.

Given the communities of discourse in the schools and universities, the teachers as veteran discoursers, the students as those being inducted and developed in each community of intellectual

discourse, the curriculum as a planned series of encounters with the disciplines of knowledge embodied in faculty, and the course as a system of planned encounters with a particular discipline, the school and university are redefined. Consistency would require that the school be developed, organized, and function in harmony with the requirements of the curriculum. Administration, teaching, teacher education, organization of educational institutions for curricular change, school and university organization, student activities, instructional materials, and course advisement would require consideration and reform. The selection of faculty members, particularly in schools, would be radically altered. The total faculty of schools and universities would face these curricular issues: When is a field of study to be considered a discipline? Should a particular discipline be included or omitted from the curriculum? On what grounds? If interdisciplinary or non-discipline studies are to be organized, what principles govern their selection and organization for instruction? How should a discipline, once selected, be programmed into a set of courses? While Professor King and I have taken up these issues and derived practices to meet them in considerable detail in another place, in this essay the issues will be noted only.

The dignity and grandeur of man, the lure of truth, and the power of disciplined symbolic behavior bind the child and the sage into the same questing community of scholars. Their differences can be confined to the scale of degree rather than kind. Such is the new direction for curriculum theory.