

Media and Myth-Making:
Matsuoka Yōsuke's Tragic Engagement with America

メディアと神話化：
松岡洋右のアメリカとの悲劇的関与

A Dissertation Presented to
the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences,
International Christian University,
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

国際基督教大学 大学院
アーツ・サイエンス研究科提出博士論文

December 4, 2017
2017年12月4日

UKYU, Angela
宇久 アンジェラ

Acknowledgments:

Over the past seven years, I have been the recipient of immeasurable support and encouragement from a great number of individuals. First, this project would not have been accomplished without the guidance of Professors M. William Steele and Naoki Onishi. They have shown boundless patience in directing me along the appropriate channels as I worked my way through this dissertation from idea to completed study. In addition, I have benefited greatly from the advice and criticism of Professors Anri Morimoto and Richard Wilson.

I would like to thank my husband, Masao Ukyu, who has supported my studies, encouraged me, and translated for me where necessary. Kazuyoshi Ukyu's tireless scanning of Japanese language sources and timely explanations of Japanese texts significantly eased my workload, and our discussions about Matsuoka and Japanese history helped me to stay passionate about my subject. Midori Ukyu gave me endless emotional support, and helped me find balance when things started tilting out of control. I also owe special thanks to Brian Berry, who kept me writing and let me use him as a sounding board.

Finally, this journey would not have been started without the love, support, and encouragement from my family in Oregon. My parents, Pam and Michael Dane, fostered my love of learning and history. Without the years of stimulating discussions and trips to the library, I would not have taken on this project. Thank you for the Skype sessions, the emergency trips to copy English-language sources from the library, and for the wisdom you have imparted into my life. Thank you to Geoff Yocom for rescuing me at the last minute with library access. Thank you to Robin Bachtler Cushman, John Hazen, and Kurt Hazen-Diehm. Your love, support, and acceptance has made it possible to reach higher than I thought I could.

Media and Myth-Making: Matsuoka Yosuke's Tragic Engagement with America

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 - Introduction	1
1.1 - Objective	1
1.2 - Literature Review	4
1.3 - Approach	12
1.4 - Media Theory	14
1.5 - Organization	19
Chapter 2 - The All American Boy	22
2.1 - Life in a Poor Village	23
2.2 - Matsuoka in America	32
2.3 - Early Diplomatic Career in a Growing Empire	40
2.4 - Matsuoka at The League of Nations	50
Chapter 3 - Becoming a Bad Boy	74
3.1 - After Geneva	75
3.2 - Forging the Tripartite Pact	91
Chapter 4 - The End of the Road	123
4.1 - Life After the Foreign Ministry	123
4.2 - The Consequences of War	131
4.3 - The Posthumous Narrative	143
Chapter 5 - Conclusion	151
5.1 - The Media and the Matsuoka's Tragic Engagement with America	151
5.2 - Weaknesses	156
5.3 - Novelty and Future Research	157
Appendix A:	159
Index of Newspaper Articles Featuring Matsuoka	159

List of Figures

Figure 1:	44
A photograph showing Matsuoka as a young man towards the beginning of his diplomatic career. "Matsuoka, Japan's Noted Statesman, Once Peddled Coffee in Portland," <i>Oregonian</i> (Portland, OR), March 26, 1933.	
Figure 2:	69
Matsuoka laying flowers on the grave of Mrs. Beveridge during his visit to Oregon in 1933. "Matsuoka Honors Boyhood Friend. Marker Placed at Grave of Mrs. Beveridge," <i>Oregonian</i> (Portland, OR), April 10, 1933.	
Figure 3:	90
Matsuoka in Germany to discuss the Tripartite pact with Hitler, March 1941. Julian Ryall. "Yasukuni Shrine: The 14 'Class A' War Criminals Honoured by Japan." <i>Telegraph</i> , August 14, 2014.	
Figure 4:	93
"Ambitious." Hugh Byas, "Japan is Now Pushing a 'Greater East Asia'," <i>New York Times</i> , August 4, 1940.	
Figure 5:	100
Smiling and playful photograph of Matsuoka. David W. Hazen, "Pacific War may Rest in Ex-Portlander's Hands," <i>Oregonian</i> (Portland, OR), sec. Magazine, August 4, 1940.	
Figure 6:	101
"Dr. Matsuoka Sends Wreath. Japanese Leader Honors Benefactor," <i>Oregonian</i> (Portland, OR), sec. 2, September 13, 1940.	
Figure 7:	108
"Expert on America?" Otto D. Tolischus, "Japanese Ponder War on America," <i>New York Times</i> , sec. E, June 22, 1941.	
Figure 8:	118
"The Son of Heaven," <i>TIME</i> cover November 19, 1928 - Emperor Hirohito	
Figure 9:	119
"Japan's Foreign Minister," <i>TIME</i> cover September 5, 1932 - Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai	
Figure 10:	120
"War Minister Sadao Araki," <i>TIME</i> cover January 23, 1933	

Figure 11:	121
“Foreign Minister Matsuoka,” <i>TIME</i> cover July 7, 1941 - Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke	
Figure 12:	122
“Emperor Hirohito,” <i>TIME</i> cover May 25, 1945	
Figure 13:	147
Matsuoka mourning the loss of his American mother and Matsuoka the aggressive Asiatic. Paul F. Ewing, “Ex-Portlander Matsuoka no. 1 Jap Warmonger,” <i>Oregonian</i> (Portland, OR), July 14, 1946.	

Chapter 1 - Introduction

In an age when just a few keystrokes allow access to a wealth of information, it is easy to become complacent. Rather than doing careful research, many people are content to mindlessly repeat commonly accepted ideas on a given subject. This tendency holds particularly true when examining the past. The weight of years passed makes it harder to challenge established perceptions of ideas, events, and people. However, the difficulty of research does not preclude the necessity to conduct it. Scholars each have the duty to question the past and society's perception of it.

1.1 - Objective

This dissertation seeks to examine English-language media representations of the Japanese diplomat Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880 - 1946). Matsuoka is perhaps best remembered for his condemnation of the League of Nations, followed by Japan's withdraw from the league in 1933. He is also credited as the architect of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940. The latter event took place during his term as Japan's foreign minister, a role he began in 1940 and continued until he was ousted months before the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.¹

¹ Due to the difference in time zones, this event occurred on December 8, 1941, from the perspective of Japan.

Matsuoka lived and was educated in the United States between 1893 and 1902; he graduated from the University of Oregon Law School in 1900. Matsuoka's youthful experience in the United States has caused many historians to view his engagement with America as a sort of love-hate relationship. Certainly, in the years leading up to Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, Matsuoka was celebrated as a sort of "hometown hero" in the pages of English-language newspapers, especially in the Oregon press. However, thereafter his image changed. Despite repeated professions of love and friendship for the United States, Matsuoka was gradually transformed by the press into the man whose hatred of America was a direct cause of the war between the two countries. While it is unsurprising that media generated propaganda demonizes public figures working for the "enemy," the changes in perception did not stop with the end of hostilities. After the war, this image of Matsuoka, assuming mythic proportions, lay behind his indictment as a Class A war criminal. Inquiring into this myth-making process, the thesis will take up the following questions:

- 1) What was Matsuoka's experience as a youth in the United States and how was it represented in the media?
- 2) How and when did English-language media representations of Matsuoka change over the course of his diplomatic career in Japan?
- 3) How did the media portrayal of Matsuoka affect his treatment after the war ended?

Through the examination of these questions Matsuoka's life becomes a case study of how the media selectively creates narratives that eventually became myths entrenched in our collective psyche. This knowledge may lead us to a better understanding of how the media influences our perceptions of the world, both in the past and in the present. By illuminating the complexity of Matsuoka's relationship with the United States, this study seeks to contribute to an understanding of a time and figure shrouded in myth and propaganda. This examination of Matsuoka takes advantage of media-theory in order to enable a better understanding of his life; it seeks to show the way media influenced the memory of people and events, and provides us with the necessary tools to examine and untangle current historical narratives.²

² For other studies that deal with the idea of how media created representations influence the way people think about history see:

Ingvild Bode and Seunghoon Emilia Heo, "World War II Narratives in Contemporary Germany and Japan: How University Students Understand their Past," *International Studies Perspectives* 18, no. 2 (May, 2017), 131-154.

Judith Anne Betts, "The Battle of the Narratives: Australian Media Agendas and the Iraq War" (Doctor of Philosophy Ph. D., University of Sydney, 2015).

1.2 - Literature Review

There has been little scholarship on Matsuoka in English, even though a large body of work exists in Japanese.³ While Matsuoka was one of Japan's most famous diplomats, outside of Japan he is hardly remembered today except by scholars and students of Japanese history.⁴ A few English-language studies of Matsuoka's life and his role in bringing Japan to war against the United States are available. While many of these works use media representations of Matsuoka to construct their narratives, they fail to question their sources and offer little from

³ Some major works on Matsuoka in Japanese include:

David J. Lu and Shinichi Hasegawa, *Matsuoka Yōsuke to sono jidai [Matsuoka Yōsuke and His Times]* (Tokyo: TBS Britannica, 1981).

Kimitada Miwa, *Matsuoka Yōsuke sono ningen to gaikō [Matsuoka Yōsuke the Man and His Diplomacy]* (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1971).

Yūzō Fukui, *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke [Reviving Matsuoka Yōsuke]*, Kindle Edition, (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 2016).

Kiyoto Mori, *Ningen Matsuoka Yōsuke no zenbō [The Whole Story of Matsuoka Yōsuke the Man]* (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1933).

Saburo Ōkawa, *Kyogō Matsuoka Yōsuke [The Great Man Matsuoka Yōsuke]* (Tokyo: Tōyōdō, 1941).

Ryōe Saitō, *Azamukareta rekishi [History Betrayed]* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1955).

M. Uchiyama, "Matsuoka Yōsuke: sono hito to shōgai [Matsuoka Yōsuke: The Man and His Life]" *Kokusai seiji* 56 (1977, 160-165).

⁴ While it is not uncommon for once noted figures to fade into oblivion, this phenomenon begs the question: why is it that figures such as Tojo Hideki are remembered and Matsuoka is not?

the perspective of media studies. To date, there is no analysis of how media sources contributed to the creation of a mythological Matsuoka.

Probably the most important study on Matsuoka in English is David J. Lu's biography of Matsuoka, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke and the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire*, published in 2002.⁵ This work is a translation and revision of a biography Lu published in Japanese in 1981 *Matsuoka Yōsuke to sono jidai* (Matsuoka Yōsuke and his times).⁶ The former is notable for being the only widely published English language study to deal with Matsuoka's life as a whole.

The book begins with a description of Matsuoka's early life in Yamaguchi Prefecture between the years 1880 and 1893. It describes his family life as well as his defining personality traits. It describes his decision to go to the United States (February, 1893), and his life in Oregon. The biography follows Matsuoka as he graduated from the University of Oregon (1900) and returned to Japan (1902) to enter the diplomatic service (1904), as well as his career in the United States, Russia, and most of all, China, where Matsuoka would crystalize his vision for Japan's future.

Lu's book closely details Matsuoka's rise in public service. It follows his career in the Diet, where he was assigned to lead Japan in the League of Nations conference in Geneva (1932), and also his rise to the position of foreign minister in 1940. As foreign minister, Matsuoka had intimate relations with Russia, Italy, and

⁵ David John Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946* (Lanham, Md. ; Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002).

⁶ Lu and Hasegawa, *Matsuoka Yōsuke to sono jidai* [*Matsuoka Yōsuke and His Times*].

Germany, and went on to conclude the Tripartite Pact in the same year. Lu explains how Matsuoka was ousted from his position in 1941 and ends with Matsuoka's arrest for "Crimes against Peace" in 1945, followed by his subsequent death from tuberculosis in 1946.

David J. Lu is professor emeritus of history and Japanese studies at Bucknell University. Much like Matsuoka, Lu is both an insider and outsider when it comes to Japan. Lu was born in Taiwan during the time it was a Japanese colony, and had his primary education in Japanese. He was also educated in America for his graduate studies. Lu studied Japanese Diplomatic History at Columbia University and received his Ph. D. in 1960. His first book was based on Japan's entry into WWII.⁷ Lu's intimate knowledge of both nations lends his writing an authority that touches on the most relevant points of history between Japan and the United States. Lu's biography of Matsuoka is both a biography and a political history. It provides details on Matsuoka's life and focuses on his dealings with political superiors in Japan as well as with his negotiations with diplomatic officials in the United States, Lu does not, however, address the issue of American sentiment towards Matsuoka in more than a cursory manner. When the subject is broached, it is usually regarding Matsuoka's disagreements with specific American officials such as Secretary of State Cordell Hull (1871-1955) or Ambassador Joseph Grew (1880 -1965). Moreover, in a text of two hundred and

⁷ David J. Lu, *From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan's Entry into World War II* (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1961).

seventy-six pages, Lu only writes about Matsuoka's childhood and life in America in the first sixteen pages. His overall analysis of Matsuoka's relationship with the United States is simplified to "one of love-hate relations."⁸

While Lu's biography is mainly a work of political history, a work by Ano Masaharu covers Matsuoka's life from the social aspect of immigration history. An abbreviated version of Ano's master's thesis was published in a 1997 edition of *The Oregon Historical Quarterly*, "Yōsuke Matsuoka: The Far-Western Roots of a World-Political Vision."⁹ Ano discusses Matsuoka's early life, and time in America in-depth, giving the reader an intimate look not only into Matsuoka's experiences but also into the experiences of Japanese immigrants to the United States as a whole. Without a doubt, Ano's piece is the most detailed record of Matsuoka's youth available in English.¹⁰

In his English biography of Matsuoka, Lu recalls discussions with Ano while the latter was completing his graduate work. Lu cited Ano's article in his short section on Matsuoka's youth in Japan and America. Both Lu and Ano drew heavily on personal interviews with Matsuoka's family, friends, and co-workers, as well as from other primary and secondary sources in English and Japanese.

⁸ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 266.

⁹ Masaharu Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 98, no. 2 (1997), 164-204.

¹⁰ While many of the Japanese writings on Matsuoka briefly cover his childhood in Japan and his time in Oregon, a search failed to bring up any source that focused on this period in detail.

While Lu wrote extensively about Matsuoka's diplomatic career, he did so without much analysis of Matsuoka's experience with the United States and how his years in America shaped his view of the world and the choices he made as a diplomat. In contrast, Ano gives extensive information on Matsuoka's experiences in America, but with no more than a cursory look at Matsuoka's diplomatic career and with little attempt to show how the American experience may have influenced his diplomatic strategies. Regarding Matsuoka's attitude toward the United States, Ano notes:

Even modern U.S. historians have continued to emphasize Matsuoka's duplicity, denouncing him for "marked cynicism and opportunism."

A few historians have tried to explain Matsuoka's actions as a response to the racism he must have experienced while living in the United States, arguing that "many bitter memories of his years in America" influenced his foreign policy decisions. However, a closer study of Matsuoka's experiences in the United States reveals a more complicated picture. All accounts in newspapers and memoirs suggest that Matsuoka had warm memories of Mrs. Beveridge and other American friends. Moreover, while he would certainly have experienced racism while in the United States— it was a universal experience among Japanese on the West Coast during that period— Matsuoka never referred to specific incidents of racial discrimination in his writing. Matsuoka's decisions as foreign minister likely had more to do with his vision of global power politics than with anti-American attitudes.

This is not to argue that Matsuoka's years in the United States had no influence on his future career, but rather that

the effects were more complicated than current scholarship suggests.¹¹

Together Lu and Ano paint a detailed picture of the events of Matsuoka's life, but they place little emphasis on the question of Matsuoka's loyalty to or his feelings about America, a theme that is critical in understanding the news media's construction of Matsuoka.

In addition to the above scholarly works, which focused solely on Matsuoka, there have been many attempts to explain Japan's road to war, some of which include Matsuoka as a significant player. Two recent works that discuss the inner workings of Japan's government, and include chapters that focus on Matsuoka are Hotta Eri's 2013, *Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy*, and Ian Kershaw's 2007 volume, *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941*.¹²

Kershaw, a noted biographer, and professor of modern history at Sheffield University, looks at the decision making processes that changed the course of the war in both the European and Pacific theaters. Most notably, Kershaw focuses on the German invasion of the Soviet Union, a move that, he explains, launched Germany's full-scale genocide against the Jews, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a move that brought the United States into the war.

¹¹ Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision," 195-196.

¹² Eri Hotta, *Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy*, Kindle Edition, (Knopf, 2013).

Ian Kershaw, *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World 1940-1941*, Kindle Edition, (Toronto: The Penguin Press HC, 2007).

Hotta was raised in Tokyo and, like Ano, completed her education in the United States. Her book discusses Japan's road to war from the relatively unique perspective, in English-language scholarship at least, of how the Japanese people experienced these events. Hotta is particularly adept at showing how the United States government and President Roosevelt were culpable for waging an aggressive economic war against Japan while it was engaged in a desperate war on the China mainland.

Both Kershaw and Hotta view Matsuoka in the light of this diplomatic history. They show him as having played a vital role in bringing about the war between America and Japan because of his decision to seek an alliance with Germany. However, neither author does much to humanize Matsuoka or reconcile his decision with his professed love of the United States. Instead, they portray him as arrogant and concerned only with his own agenda. Hotta states: "Matsuoka loved to shock, and he adored the limelight. If Konoe was the melancholic Hamlet, Matsuoka was Don Quixote, afflicted with a severe case of megalomania."¹³

While the trend to describe Matsuoka in negative terms is undeniable, it is by no means universal. While casual books on Japanese history and diplomatic relations emphasize Matsuoka's anti-Americanism, scholarly sources tend to be neutral regarding Matsuoka's motivations. Rather than purposely pushing Japan and America into war, 2013's *Japan at War: an Encyclopedia* chooses to describe Matsuoka as "pro-Axis" rather than as anti-American. 2015's *Historical Dictionary*

¹³ Hotta, *Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy*. Chapter Two.

of *Japanese Foreign Policy* explains Matsuoka's hope to isolate America from the spreading conflict, and describes his surprise at having underestimated the US reaction to Japan's foreign policy.¹⁴

In addition to looking at the above interpretations of Matsuoka, this dissertation is part of a growing, Japan-led trend of re-examination of Matsuoka as scholars are looking into the historical treatment of Matsuoka and attempting to shed new light on his diplomacy. A 2008 book compiled by Iokibe Makoto on US-Japanese relations describes how even after the completion of the Tripartite Pact Matsuoka sought to avoid alienating the US and was determined to prevent a war between the two nations. According to one chapter, it was Matsuoka's refusal to be flexible on this matter that caused him to be ousted from the government by Prime Minister Konoe (1891-1945).¹⁵

While Iokibe's book mentions Matsuoka in a positive light, 2016's *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke* (Reviving Matsuoka Yōsuke) was written with the goal of

¹⁴ Louis G. Perez, *Japan at War: An Encyclopedia* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 226.

Mayako Shinamoto, Koji Ito and Yoneyuki Sugita, *Historical Dictionary of Japanese Foreign Policy* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 16.

¹⁵ Fumiaki Kubo, Ryūji Hattori and Satoshi Hattori, "The 1930s: Japan's War with China and American Non-Recognition," in *The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to Present* [*Nichibei kankei shi* [A history of US-Japan Relations], eds. Makoto Iokibe and Tosh Minohara, Palgrave MacMillan, 2017).

While this book has only recently been published in English, it is a translation of the 2008 book *Nichibei kankei shi* [*History of US-Japan Relations*].

Nichibei kankei shi [A History of US-Japan Relations], ed. Makoto Iokibe (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2008).

revising longstanding perceptions in Showa-era Japanese history texts that portrayed Matsuoka as seeking to antagonize the United States and thereby responsible for the war. *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke* puts the Matsuoka myth constructed in the postwar era aside and instead looks at his successes and failures as a statesman.¹⁶ While some might see such revisitation of history to be a form of revisionism, it is undeniable that the hardships of war, and decisions made before its outbreak, led to uncharitable perceptions of figures who had it in their power to make different choices. Therefore it is reasonable to re-examine commonly held ideas about history and in order to obtain a more complex picture of the course of events. Here, in taking a new look at Matsuoka Yōsuke and his tragic engagement with America, I seek to understand how media choices and content contributed to the building of men into myths.

1.3 - Approach

This dissertation re-examines Matsuoka's thought and behavior, paying particular attention to ways in which the English-language press interpreted his attitude towards the United States and his diplomatic policies. Moreover, by establishing how the media constructed images of Matsuoka it is also possible to see how these images were incorporated into later English-language publications. The media portrayal of Matsuoka is presented as a case study to examine how the media influences and controls public thinking through the creation of myths. In

¹⁶ Fukui, *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke* [Reviving Matsuoka Yōsuke], Kindle Edition,

addition to the published work noted here, the dissertation will undertake an analysis of more than 250 English-language newspaper articles that center on Matsuoka. These articles largely span from the early 1930s through the 1940s. The goal is a qualitative analysis of the available media to follow the events of Matsuoka's life, focusing both on tone and narrative.

Data collection principally centers on English-language newspapers and magazines, including the *New York Times* as a representative national "newspaper of public record" which was also internationally circulated as the *International Herald Tribune*, and *TIME* magazine that featured Matsuoka as the centerpiece of its July 7, 1941, issue. The *New York Times* provides a clear and detailed procession of the chief events in Matsuoka's life and career, but the professional distance between Matsuoka and the authors can make it difficult to gauge how his actions were received. Therefore, a more intimate view provided by local Oregon newspapers and University of Oregon publications supplements national media reports drawn from large newspapers and Associated Press articles. Matsuoka passed his time in the United States primarily in Oregon, and the Oregon press displays a decidedly proprietary attitude when dealing with Matsuoka. These often editorial pieces allow a more in-depth look into the relationship between Matsuoka and the United States, as well as into the mutual expectations each held for the other. The published editorials that discuss Matsuoka's life and career with considerable frankness lend a degree of authority and finality to the opinions and expectations. When considering the idea of myth-making, it is these less guarded

utterances that may have had the most significant sway on legacy, regardless of the actual veracity of the facts and ideas they contained.

1.4 - Media Theory

Media can be defined as any means of mass communication such as broadcasting, publishing, or the internet. No matter its form, media exists to fulfill three roles in society: information, entertainment, and persuasion. There is a general expectation that the purpose of any given piece of media should be readily apparent to the consumer, but this is not necessarily the case in practice. Currently, the United States is awash in accusations of false or misleading stories, categorized as “fake news.” According to *TIME*, the current dictionary definition of fake news reads:

Fake news: false news stories, often of a sensational nature, created to be widely shared online for the purpose of generating ad revenue via web traffic or discrediting a public figure, political movement, company, etc.¹⁷

By this definition, fake news exists for the purpose of amusing and manipulating the public and therefore fulfills the roles of entertainment and persuasion— if dishonestly so. United States President Donald Trump has claimed ownership of the phrase, however, the earliest use of the term ‘fake news’ was in 1890, and the phenomenon of falsified and heavily biased reporting has been an

¹⁷ Katy Steinmetz, “The Dictionary is Adding an Entry for 'Fake News',” *TIME*, September 27, 2017.

issue from the birth of mass media communication.¹⁸ This fact is unsurprising considering that publications are driven both by sales and by competition for funding from advertisers. The earliest mass publications, in the form of pamphlets and leaflets, focused on singular themes. They were printed and distributed to the masses, but in many cases, they were unconcerned with producing an accurate report. Instead, they relied on sensationalism to promote sales. With the advent of the first modern newspaper, *The Sun*, established in 1833, this attitude towards accuracy and objective reporting changed. Unlike pamphlets, newspapers produced collections of stories regularly under the same name. Competing papers were easily able to expose dishonest reporting and falsified accounts, and so standards for reporting rose.¹⁹ However, despite the overall shift to accurate and objective storytelling, such accuracy did not extend to every subject or every story.

Perhaps it is telling that we use the word “story” is used when describing a piece of news. Even relatively unbiased and factually based news reports are related using the narrative qualities of plot, actors in conflict, and colorful details. The Narrative Theory of Media suggests that the created narrative of a piece of news is significant both within the single story and as a method of understanding

¹⁸ In an interview with conservative pundit and former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, Trump said: “Look, the media is fake. The media is— really, the word, I think one of the greatest of all terms I’ve come up with— is fake. I guess other people have used it perhaps over the years, but I’ve never noticed it.”

¹⁹ Tom Standage, “The True History of Fake News,” *The Economist* 1843, June / July 2017.

one piece of the continuing story of human history.²⁰ Not only does each story have a narrative which, depending on how it is laid out, can have a powerful effect on the reader, but we can also treat history as a whole as a stream of narrative and media stories as puzzle pieces. As such, narrative media becomes a tool for the explanation of human experiences, and also a vehicle for myth and myth-making.

The standard understanding of myth is one of falsehood, but in reality, modern myth is a matter of perception. Myth exists as a device for creating order out of chaos. Myth sets social and moral boundaries and the penalties for overstepping these lines. Myth describes ourselves, others, and the world in which we live. Falsehood does come into play, but that is because the nature of myth is one of perception and repetition. Myth often finds its way into journalism because no matter how truthfully a reporter sets out to tell a tale, personal perception often affects choices made in the telling. Additionally, words, phrases, and themes from one story are drawn upon and perpetuated in future stories, and later in popular and academic settings. In writing stories, an author will “constantly draw on the inventory of discourse which has been established over time.”²¹ This resonance of repetition makes a body of stories cohesive to each other and to the stream of humanity.

²⁰ James W. Carey, ed. *Media, Myths, and Narratives: Television and the Press*, Vol. 15 (SAGE Publications, 1988), 69.

²¹ Ibid, 72.

It is not just the repetition within a story or the words and phrases that trail through a stream of stories that solidifies the weight of myth. In a review of a book about the role of myth in journalism, newspaper editor and journalism professor William F. Woo asserts that stories themselves are limited to a handful of themes including love, death, betrayal, redemption, and triumph-over-adversity.²² These timeless themes are important to keep in mind when analyzing the stories of Matsuoka. While the articles may vary to a degree, what is the overarching theme of journalism on Matsuoka and what stories do they tell?

In addition to a solid narrative, journalists also rely on eye-catching headlines paired with graphics and large, dramatic photos. The purpose is not only to draw the reader to browse the story, but also to influence the reader's perceptions of reality. An analysis of media truthfulness printed in *The Harvard Business Review* points out: "...news can change perceptions, and perceptions often become reality."²³ This is, perhaps, where myths as falsehood are likely to play a part. It is often said, both by those in the judicial system and by the media investigators, that if thirty different bystanders are asked to describe how an event occurred, the interviewer will receive thirty different answers. Stories are colored by our perceptions of events and by our emotional reactions. In turn, when conveying information, we transpose them into story form in order to make them

²² "Journalism and Myth: Do they Create a Cautionary Tale?" Accessed December 2017, <http://niemanreports.org/articles/journalism-and-myth/>

²³ Peter Vanderwicken, "Why the News is Not the Truth," *The Harvard Business Review* (May-June, 1995).

more relatable. Attributions become dialogue. Statistics become personal experience, and drama is enhanced to titillate and amuse.²⁴ The stories that have the greatest human impact are the ones that persist from one iteration to another, and in the retelling the emotional cues that color the receiver's perception of an event are refined.

On the one hand, media aspects of myth-making derive from style, that is, myth-making without a set intention to do so. On the other hand, it is also important to acknowledge that in cooperation with the government, media also plays a role in dispersing an "official" story to the public. Propaganda in media has long been a powerful tool for deliberately directing public knowledge and sentiment. Because these stories have the weight of official sanction and pressure, they are likely to be repeated uniformly across official media platforms, leaving the reader with little choice in what to believe. Propaganda driven narrative was not necessarily one-sided, as the subject of a story is able, to some degree, to control their self-presentation, although they cannot entirely control the way their presentation is spun in the final story.

Matsuoka was both a builder and a subject of myth. He actively sought the press with the intention of swaying public opinion to his cause. One way of gaining sympathy may have been to emphasize his Americanness, minimizing the physical and cultural distance between America and Japan by attempting to straddle the two sides. In this way Matsuoka as a potential ally was accepted and

²⁴ Carey, *Media, Myths, and Narratives: Television and the Press*, 77.

replicated in media accounts creating the myth of the “All-American Boy.” However, when his agenda, such as describing the necessity of Japan’s expansion into Manchuria or the explaining the wisdom of allying with Germany as a deterrent to war, was rejected by the US government, the journalists, and therefore the public in general, the narrative he sought to promote failed. The negative reaction to Matsuoka’s policies coalesced into a body of work turning him into the “bad boy” as “the man who detests America.” Like most myths, the myths that surround Matsuoka have elements of truth. It is possible that Matsuoka both loved and resented the United States. While it is tempting to attempt to dissect the myths in order to ascertain Matsuoka’s true identity behind these myths, the bounds of this dissertation are limited to an analysis of how narrative, as defined in media theory, contributed to their creation

1.5 - Organization

Using these concepts of narrative, storytelling, and myth, the dissertation seeks to analyze the media representations of Matsuoka’s life and policies. How and what narratives were created by the media and how did they change over time? How did media representations, myths, help to shape Western attitudes toward Matsuoka during his lifetime and after his death?

Chapter Two will addresss the first research question: “What was Matsuoka’s experience as a youth in the United States and how was it represented in English-language media?” The chapter will focus on Matsuoka as an “all

American boy.” It will follow his life from his birth in a small village in Japan, the decision to go to America and his experiences there, and his early career after returning to Japan. The chapter will identify Matsuoka’s feelings or attitudes towards the United States through reminiscences and speeches, as well as the newspaper reportage. The chapter will trace Matsuoka’s test America up to 1933, when, after he led the Japan delegation out of the League of Nations, he toured the United States.

Chapter Three will take up the second research question: “How and when did media representations of Matsuoka change over the course of his diplomatic career?” It will examine the events and press treatment of Matsuoka’s diplomatic career, between 1933 and 1941, particularly the media treatment of Matsuoka’s negotiations with Germany, Italy, and Russia. This chapter examines the changing tone of media, as well as Matsuoka’s efforts to direct a favorable view of his policies through his own dealings with and attempts to manipulate the press.

Chapter Four will answer the final research question: “How did Matsuoka’s media portrayal affect his treatment after the war?” It will follow Matsuoka’s life after he was forced out of government in July 1941, including his treatment in the media after Japan and America went to war. In particular, the chapter focuses on Matsuoka’s indictment as a war criminal. It looks at the way the media captured his arrest and indictment, the charges against him, and his interrogation by the Allied forces. The media’s reaction to Matsuoka’s death and

how he was remembered throughout the remainder of the occupation will also be discussed.

The **Conclusion** utilizes media theories of narrative and myth-making to analyze Matsuoka's life. It will show how the body of English-language media used narrative to re-examine Matsuoka's personal and diplomatic career. The attempt is to identify narratives used in English-language media to create a mythic story of Matsuoka, and question the extent to which such narrative choices were designed to manipulate Western perceptions of Matsuoka. Matsuoka's life thereby becomes a case study of the power the press wields through its narratives, and the lasting effects of media myths.

Chapter 2 - The All American Boy

This chapter traces the origins of what may be called Matsuoka's foundational image or trope, that of an "all American boy." It examines Matsuoka's childhood in Japan, the decision to go to the United States, his life and experiences and education while living on the West Coast, and his early diplomatic career spanning from his return to Japan in 1902 through his role at the League of Nations conference in Geneva in 1933.

Considering that Matsuoka never intended to permanently settle in the United States and never pretended to put American interests over those of his native Japan, perhaps "all American" seems to be a strange label. However, as this chapter will show, Matsuoka embodied many of the qualities that were considered ideal amongst Americans. He grew up poor in a small rural village. He loved his mother. He was intelligent, inquisitive, and unafraid to undertake challenges. He was unwaveringly determined to better his position through hard work and to rise into a position of power and authority. In fact, it was Matsuoka's embrace of the American dream that caused him to develop his own version of the Monroe Doctrine with the aim to expand Japan's power to the mainland in Manchuria.

Matsuoka hoped to create a new frontier where Japanese youths would have space to embrace the pioneer spirit the he had so admired in America.

The intention of this chapter is both to shed light on the development of Matsuoka's world view and to show how Matsuoka's early engagement with America predisposed the English-language press to favor him, even when his actions were not entirely favorable to the United States. While sometimes naughty, he was nevertheless an "all American Boy."

2.1 - Life in a Poor Village

Born thirteen years into Japan's Meiji period on March 4, 1880, Matsuoka's Japan was trying to stabilize itself and achieve parity with the West. He was born in the town of Murozumi in Yamaguchi prefecture, located at the southern tip of the island of Honshu. Yamaguchi was, in the Edo period, the location of the Chōshū domain and the birthplace of many of the men who took part in overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate in order to restore the emperor to direct rule. In fact, many young men from lower class samurai families in Yamaguchi became prominent leaders of the new nation state.²⁵ Matsuoka, however, was the fourth son of a once prosperous merchant family. Notable restoration figures such

²⁵ For more information see:

Albert Craig. *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 2000).

Thomas Huber. *The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).

as Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922) and Takasugi Shinsaku (1839-1867) had close connections with the Matsuoka family. If Matsuoka had been born into wealth, even without samurai heritage, he may easily have sailed a smooth course to Tokyo Imperial University. Unfortunately, by the 1880s, the Matsuoka family had lost its fortune and the connections that would have allowed him a direct path to success in Japan. Instead, Matsuoka was forced to find his own way to greatness.²⁶

Throughout his life, Matsuoka was fired by a determination to become a great man. This resolution was not unfounded. Matsuoka had some illustrious ancestors to use as a model for his success. In 1676, for instance, the Shogun awarded one of Matsuoka's ancestors, Imazuya Gorōzaimon, the status of *myōji taitō*, giving him the privilege of wearing a pair of samurai swords and of official use of a surname. Imazuya Gorōzaimon established the family company, Imazuya — a business concern that combined banking, warehouses, and shipping. The business prospered throughout the Edo period but declined with the changes and turmoil that came with Japan's Meiji Restoration of 1868. During this period, much of the wealth accumulated by Imazuya evaporated as the shipping business declined and the leaders of Chōshū demanded financial contributions for military campaigns in 1865-1866. These losses were compounded in 1865 when exclusive shipping privileges to trade outside Chōshū were given to merchants located in the rival port of Shimonoseki. Matsuoka remembered seeing chests in his family's

²⁶ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 1-2.

warehouses that, he was told, had, until his father's time, been full of gold coins.²⁷

In the years after the Meiji Restoration, when the family's coffers had all but emptied, Matsuoka's father borrowed heavily and made a desperate attempt to restore the business. However, these speculative investments failed, and a shipping venture that would have given the family economic stability ended in shipwreck and a bankruptcy. This failure cost Matsuoka his home and inheritance at the age of eleven.²⁸

It might have been enough that Matsuoka grew up with the knowledge of his ancestor's greatness. He was keenly aware of both his family's economic decline and of the need to restore their status in society. But, in addition, Matsuoka's determination was also fueled by devotion to his mother. By the time he was four years old, Matsuoka had been made aware of his family's impoverished state and suffered from seeing his mother's shame as she made the journey to her family's home in Tokuyama to ask for a loan. "Young as I was, I still could feel the embarrassment that my mother felt, so I decided that I would make a name for myself to console her!" That same year, on March 21, 1884, the

²⁷ Ōkawa, *Kyogō Matsuoka Yōsuke [The Great Man Matsuoka Yōsuke]*, 5-10.

²⁸ Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision," 165-166.

Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 3.

responsibility to restore the family became official when Matsuoka was named his family's heir.²⁹

There is a general agreement on the character the young Matsuoka.³⁰ He was praised as an intelligent but mischievous child. Even as a boy he was stubborn and hated to lose. He was a great orator, and rarely lost debates with his seniors and teachers. In addition to this, he greatly enjoyed challenging and teasing his superiors in an effort to prove his ability. His personality seems perfectly captured in an episode related by biographer Kobayashi Tomoharu, writing in 1940:

²⁹ Ibid, 1-3.

³⁰ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*.

Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision," 164-204.

Fukui, *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke [Reviving Matsuoka Yōsuke]*.

Lu and Hasegawa, *Matsuoka Yosuke to sono jidai [Matsuoka Yōsuke and His Times]*.

Miwa, *Matsuoka Yōsuke sono ningen to gaikō [Matsuoka Yōsuke the Man and His Diplomacy]*.

Mori, *Ningen Matsuoka Yōsuke no zenbō [The Whole Story of Matsuoka Yōsuke the Man]*.

Ōkawa, *Kyogō Matsuoka Yōsuke [The Great Man Matsuoka Yōsuke]*.

Uchiyama, *Matsuoka Yōsuke: sono hito to shōgai [Matsuoka Yōsuke: The Man and His Life]*, 160-165.

One day at school, Matsuoka asked to the most knowledgeable man in the region, his elementary school principal, “Can you give me an answer to a question?”

The principal replied with a smile: “What question is that? You can ask me anything.”

“The part of the toilet that you grab on to when you use it, what is it called?”³¹

“You don’t know its name? Its called a *kinkakushi* (testicle hider).”

“It must be called a *kinkakushi* because men have testicles... What should it be called when women use it? Teach me a name that can be used for both men and women!”³²

Matsuoka received high marks for his schoolwork and was very much admired by his peers. He is portrayed in Japanese sources as something of a leader among the boys of his village, a fierce fighter, and a kind leader who stood up for those weaker than himself. He was loath to walk away from conflict and prone to inexhaustibly brawling and debating until he settled the issue at hand. He developed a following of ill-tempered fishermen’s children, and even with the older ones, he showed no timidity, talking to them boldly as was his wont.³³

³¹ Japanese traditional style toilets, “squat toilets,” consist of a bowl set into the floor with a raised hood at one end. It is this hood that Matsuoka referred to.

³² Tomoharu Kobayashi, *Konoe naika no shimei [the Mission of Konoe’s Cabinet]* (Tokyo: Kokubōkōkyūkai, 1940), 19-20.

This anecdote and description of Matsuoka’s personality, particularly his love of logic and his drive to challenge authority figures is carried into more recent sources such as Miwa Kimitada’s *Matsuoka Yōsuke: sono ningen to gaikō*

Miwa, *Matsuoka Yōsuke sono ningen to gaikō [Matsuoka Yōsuke the Man and His Diplomacy]*.

³³ Ōkawa, *Kyogō Matsuoka Yōsuke [The Great Man Matsuoka Yōsuke]*, 9-13.

Both of his parents pushed him to make something of his life and entrusted him with the task of recovering the family's wealth and power. In order to encourage his budding abilities, his mother often told him stories of great men. His father gifted him a set of Chinese classic texts that had inspired men such as Itō Hirobumi to greatness.³⁴

By the time he was twelve years old, Matsuoka was studying the nine Chinese classics diligently. In order make sure that Matsuoka learned the material, his father tested him and hit him on the head with a bamboo practice sword if he failed to answer correctly. As an adult, Matsuoka reminisced, "If it is the case that I have become a great man, I owe this greatness to my father and for the education he gave me in the Chinese classics."³⁵

In 1893, at the age of thirteen, Matsuoka prepared to finish his elementary school education. Much like the fortunes of the Matsuoka family, the economy of Murozumi had been in slow decline. The loss of the shipping business, lack of farmland, and high taxes imposed by the modernizing Meiji Government had left the young men there with few local opportunities. In addition to this, Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi's (1835-1924) financial policy to curb rampant

³⁴ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 3.

Itō began his life as an adopted son in a low ranking samurai family in Tokuyama. He was a student of the great scholar Yoshida Shōin. He studied abroad in London in 1863, and by 1881 he had risen in the ranks of the Meiji government. In 1885 he established a cabinet system and became Japan's first Prime Minister, a position he held four times in total.

³⁵ Ōkawa, *Kyogō Matsuoka Yōsuke [The Great Man Matsuoka Yōsuke]*, 9.

inflation successfully deflated the money supply, but led to a massive devaluation of agricultural land, so those wishing to sell their land and look for better opportunities elsewhere in Japan would gain little.³⁶ As it was, many families in the village had relatives living in Hawaii and along America's west coast and the lure of American riches drew many young Japanese men to seek education and work abroad.³⁷ It was not long before Matsuoka, at the age of 13, joined these ranks.

Unfortunately, Matsuoka's thoughts towards America at this time are lost to us. His choice of America may be the result of a considerable propaganda effort. This was certainly the case with later immigrants who were spurred by writers such as Katayama Sen whose publications touted America's superior freedom, allowing Japanese immigrants the chance to enhance their education and commercial and industrial power.³⁸

The decision to go to America is an interesting point in Matsuoka's development. While it seems unlikely that any set of loving parents would allow their child to make such an important decision, there is evidence to suggest that

³⁶ Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh, "Institutions, Reforms, and Country Risk: Lessons from Japanese Government Debt in the Meiji Era," *Journal of Economic History* 60, no. 2 (June, 2000), 445.

³⁷ There are several works that describe this trend of immigration. For reference see:

Alan Takeo Moriyama, *Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration Companies and Hawaii, 1894-1908* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1985).

³⁸ Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion 1897-1911* (Harvard University Press, 1972), 87.

the idea derived from Matsuoka himself. As the Matsuoka household fell into bankruptcy, Matsuoka's father became a "broken man," and Lu indicates that from this point it was mainly Matsuoka (the heir since age four) and his mother who were responsible for the family.³⁹ As Matsuoka approached his graduation from elementary school, they tried to think of his next step in life. Ōkawa relates Matsuoka's story:

Born and raised from a wealthy family, I had no thought of doing manual labor.⁴⁰ Before long I was to graduate from my high class elementary school, and it was recommended that I should apply to be adopted by another family or become an office boy at the county government office.

My mother said to me, "Why not try working at the government office?"

The head official at that time was an acquaintance of my family who had worked in Kyoto as a government official for the Tokuyama-han together with my uncle.

"I refuse to grind ink and such for that man!" I plainly refused her suggestion.

My mother's expression was miserable as she answered, "Yes, I suppose so."

Even with my childish mind, I had that much pride.⁴¹

³⁹ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 3.

⁴⁰ Matsuoka probably meant to indicate the prestige associated with his family's former wealth.

⁴¹ Ōkawa, *Kyogō Matsuoka Yōsuke [The Great Man Matsuoka Yōsuke]*, 14.

At the same time, the Fujiyama side of his family was also falling into severe economic hardship.⁴² To restore economic stability to the Fujiyama family, one of Matsuoka's older cousins, Fujiyama Motosaburō, decided to travel to Oregon in 1892 and suggested that Matsuoka accompany him.⁴³ At that time Matsuoka was one term short of finishing elementary school. However, due to the urgency of the Fujiyama situation, as well as a possible desire to avoid Japan's strict military conscription policy, under which all men at age twenty were required to serve for three years on active duty and three years in the reserves, it was decided he too would go.⁴⁴

While Matsuoka was overjoyed at the idea of going to America, his mother needed some convincing before she would give her consent.⁴⁵ In this case, Matsuoka's natural skill for logic and debate served him well as he explained to his parents that he would soon have to leave home to continue his education, so he might as well accomplish it in America.⁴⁶ Matsuoka's family, especially his mother, were reluctant to let him go, but they eventually agreed that the trip was in the family's best interest. Moreover, according to Lu, Matsuoka's mother, a

⁴² Connected through his aunt.

⁴³ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 13.

⁴⁴ Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision," 165-166, 168.

⁴⁵ Ōkawa, *Kyogō Matsuoka Yōsuke [The Great Man Matsuoka Yōsuke]*, 14.

⁴⁶ Mori, *Ningen Matsuoka Yōsuke no zenbō [The Whole Story of Matsuoka Yōsuke the Man]*, 31.

devout member of the True Pure Land Sect of Buddhism (*Jōdo Shinshū*), was persuaded to give her permission in hopes that Matsuoka would be able to make America more accepting of Buddhist teachings.⁴⁷

Matsuoka's early childhood in Japan was marked by pride in his family, pride in his own capabilities, and a deep need to regain the wealth and prestige that had been lost. To do this, Matsuoka was determined to reach for greatness. His travel to America presented an ideal first step.

2.2 - Matsuoka in America

Matsuoka's trip to American shores in 1893 was a complicated process. In order to travel to America, the boys had to obtain passports and then pass a health examination before boarding the ship on February 23, which was bound for an immigration station at Albert Head near Victoria, British Colombia.⁴⁸

Immigration stations had been set up at various points along the route to the United States to process immigrants for entry and to quarantine those who may have been carrying infectious diseases. Even though all the passengers on the ship had gone through a routine physical screening process to eliminate the risk of infection, some passengers developed smallpox during the voyage requiring Matsuoka and others to undergo a two-week quarantine procedure upon arrival at

⁴⁷ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 4-5.

⁴⁸ Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision," 168-169.

the immigration station. After finally gaining entry to the United States, Matsuoka and his cousin made their way to Portland, Oregon. Altogether, their journey from Japan appears to have taken around six weeks.⁴⁹

The desire to spread Christian teachings to the masses of newly arriving “Oriental heathens” was a major force in the history of American-Japanese relations. This missionary impulse led many Americans to travel to Japan after 1873, when the official ban on Christianity was lifted.⁵⁰ Missions were also important institutions in the United States. They served as cultural mediators for immigrants. According to author and journalist Lauren Kessler, in addition to moral guidance, the Church provided inexpensive housing in the form of a dormitory, cheap meals served out of the basement kitchen, and help securing employment. Kessler writes:

The mission and dormitory were safe havens for the lonely, disoriented young men, most of whom knew neither the language nor the customs of their new country. Here might be the only place they could find a friendly white face, a person who could help them understand and cope with the challenges they faced.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Ibid, 170-171.

⁵⁰ *Clara's Diary* provides a look at the experiences of an American family who travelled to Japan to perform missionary work.

Clara A. Whitney, M. William Steele and Tamiko Ichimata, *Clara's Diary: An American Girl in Meiji, Japan*, 1st ed. ed (Tokyo; New York, NY: Kodansha International, 1979).

⁵¹ Lauren Kessler, *Stubborn Twig: Three Generations in the Life of a Japanese American Family* (New York, NY: Random House, 1993), 15.

As Japanese immigrants began moving to Portland during the 1880s, a need arose for a permanent mission to be established there to serve this growing community. By 1890, there were 1,559 Japanese immigrants in the United States, and this number continued to grow over the following decades.⁵² The bulk of these immigrants were from Matsuoka's home region of Yamaguchi, as well as from Hiroshima, Fukuoka, and Kumamoto.⁵³ In February of 1893, Reverend Kawabe Teikichi traveled from the Methodist community in San Francisco and opened the Japanese Methodist Mission.⁵⁴ It was here that Matsuoka and his cousin arrived in April 1893. The mission served not only as a center of religion but also as a community center where the Japanese could gather and network to stave off homesickness and to help each other adjust to life in America.⁵⁵ Ano describes the Japanese community in Portland through the eyes of Japanese diplomat Fujita Toshiro in 1891:

⁵² Yamato Ichihashi, *Japanese Immigration: Its Status in California* (San Francisco, CA: The Marshall Press, 1913), 7.

⁵³ Moriyama, *Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration Companies and Hawaii, 1894-1908*, 13.

⁵⁴ This mission, like all Pacific Coast Methodist Japanese missions at that time, was superintended by Merriman Colbert Harris (1846-1941).

Who's Who in American Methodism, ed. Carl F. Price (New York, NY: E.B. Treat & Co. 1916).

⁵⁵ The Japanese Methodist Mission later became Epworth United Methodist Church, one of sixteen Japanese Churches in America. To learn more about how the church guided the lives of Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans, see:

History of Epworth United Methodist Church, trans. Yoshimi Kamano (Portland, OR: 1982).

Approximately 120 Japanese resided in the city. Of these 60 worked at seven Portland restaurants; the rest were prostitutes, gamblers, or sailors. All of the Japanese restaurants were patronized by laborers of the lower classes. One or two were owned by honest persons with a decent amount of capital; another few were run by groups of shosei, young men who had come to the United States to study. The rest were financed or run by men and women “of immoral dealings.”⁵⁶

Reverend Kawabe took in the two boys and helped them settle into their new lives. He enrolled the thirteen year-old Matsuoka in a local grade school and found him a part-time job performing chores and errands for local Christian families.⁵⁷ Placing Japanese students doing odd jobs for Christian families served many purposes for Christian missions. It was a common and mutually beneficial practice that provided a source of cheap labor to the families and gave the boys a chance to experience how life was being lived in established American families. It also gave the boys good Christian role-models to emulate. Lastly, it provided them an opportunity to interact in and improve upon their English language abilities. Many immigrants came to America with little English, or with English taught so poorly that it was unintelligible.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Ano, “Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision,” 171.

⁵⁷ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 6.

⁵⁸ For a firsthand look at the trials and tribulations faced by Japanese boys who came to study in the US, see Henry Kiyama's autobiographical manga. Henry Yoshitaka Kiyama and Frederik L. Schodt, *The Four Immigrants Manga: A Japanese Experience in San Francisco, 1904-1924* [Manga yonin shosei] (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 1999).

Like many other immigrants, Matsuoka converted to Christianity soon after his arrival in America. For many, this conversion was a measure of convenience to gain acceptance in American society during their stay in the United States. For others, like Matsuoka, the conversion was true and wholehearted. While the exact timing of Matsuoka's conversion is unclear, Ano speculates that it may have been influenced by the kindness and sympathy shown to Matsuoka by Reverend Kawabe. The suggestion that Matsuoka's conversion to Christianity was sincere is supported by the knowledge that Matsuoka chose not to renounce the religion even after returning to Japan and reuniting with his mother. While he did show respect to the observances of Shinto and Buddhism and was happy to worship in temples and shrines, he maintained that he was a Christian, even if it was only in his own way.⁵⁹ Passing through Oregon in 1933 after making the speech that withdrew Japan from the League of Nations, Matsuoka referred to his religion:

While I am a Christian, I am a Matsuoka Christian. I don't believe in a lot of things that they have attached to the regular sects in America and Europe. But I believe in God, I believe in the saving grace of Christ, so I have the right, I feel, to call myself a Christian.⁶⁰

Not long after arriving in Portland, Matsuoka was invited to live with a Christian family. In return for his room and board, he helped out around the house doing small chores. He was taken under the wing of the lady of the house: Isabelle

⁵⁹ Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision," 173-174.

⁶⁰ "Matsuoka Wary of Navy Splurge. Position of Fleet Held None of Japan's Business," *Oregonian (Portland, OR)*, April 8, 1933.

Dunbar Beveridge. She lived with her brother, the widowed Mr. Dunbar, and helped to look after her young nephew. While their time together was short, sources give her a large degree of importance and influence in Matsuoka's life.⁶¹ Mrs. Beveridge treated him like a son, teaching him English and seeing to his education. Matsuoka remembers Mrs. Beveridge as a second mother. His description of the lady is as follows:

The lady was a faithful Christian who possessed a lucid penetration into everything. And besides, she was a very virtuous housewife. When I look back on myself, daily directed and enlightened by such a lady like an angel during my growing period from ages 14 to 16, I really think myself fortunate and I consider it a strange act of Providence.⁶²

In 1894, when Matsuoka was fourteen, his older brother arrived in Portland with another cousin, and the next year they moved to California with plans to open a restaurant. Later that year, after completing his primary education at Atkinson School, Matsuoka followed his relatives to Oakland, California so they could support him while he continued his education at Oakland High School. While attending high school, Matsuoka worked for the editor of *The Oakland Enquirer* where he obtained a firsthand look at the power of mass media.⁶³ It was during this time that Matsuoka encountered William Jennings Bryan, who visited

⁶¹ In this case, sources include previously mentioned biographies of Matsuoka as well as a variety of newspaper articles. See Appendix A for details.

⁶² Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision," 174.

⁶³ Ibid, 179.

the newspaper. According to Lu, this meeting had a profound effect on Matsuoka who admired Bryan's grassroots movement and his ability as an orator.⁶⁴

While there is no public record of Matsuoka's graduation from Oakland, he continued to pursue his education in America. He returned to Portland in 1897, and after studying some at the Methodist Mission, he was able to enroll in the University of Oregon School of Law in 1898. Courses were offered only in the evenings, so Matsuoka was able to support himself during the day by working as a recruiter of and translator for railway laborers.⁶⁵ Matsuoka proved a remarkably bright and keen student. He excelled at poker and was well liked by his classmates. One of his classmates, Ore L. Price, remembers Matsuoka as the student who always came prepared. Price recalls:

Our small class made it necessary for [each of] us to answer questions every night. Most everybody in the class was working days to keep alive, going to school at night. Consequently, we did not always have our lessons. But it was not so with Matsuoka. His hand was always waving, and he had a ready answer.⁶⁶

After two years of study, on June 14, 1900, Matsuoka graduated second in his class of 15 students. Price was again forthcoming when he commented: "To be

⁶⁴ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 112.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁶⁶ Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision," 183.

truthful he really should have had first place, but in those days the instructors thought it would be better to have an American first."⁶⁷

Although it is established historic fact that racism was prevalent along the West Coast, Matsuoka, perhaps by virtue of having been taken in by Mrs. Beveridge and having felt so much love from her as a mother figure, makes little mention of having experienced discrimination during his time in America.⁶⁸ It is also possible also that Matsuoka was willing to overlook the minor unpleasantnesses to which he was undoubtedly exposed. This latter view is suggested by a speech he gave in Hawaii in 1933. Addressing the issue of race and loyalty Matsuoka told his listeners to disregard racial prejudice which might have been demonstrated against them:

Racial prejudice is found everywhere... I experienced it when I attended school in America. But if one's pride is hurt it only shows the smallness of one's soul. To you members of the second generation of Japanese in Hawaii, I say that you must devote your entire efforts to the interests of the American government. ⁶⁹

With his innate sense of justice, honed debating skills, and outspokenness, it is easy to imagine Matsuoka fighting against racist ideology. Matsuoka does

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ A study of the prejudices against Chinese and Japanese immigrants on the West Coast can be found in:

Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1962).

⁶⁹ Leslie Nakashima, "Be Loyal to America, Word of Matsuoka to Hawaii Kin," *Honolulu Star Bulletin* April 19, 1933.

seem to have been aware of the unfairness of his ranking at graduation. He later commented “Japanese just can't get to the top.”⁷⁰ While some people might take this statement for bitterness at not being accorded his rightful station, Matsuoka used this experience to try to force the United States to see Japan as an equal, both socially and militarily.

After graduation, Matsuoka was offered a well-paying job managing a railroad storehouse for Mr. Ban, but he declined in favor of keeping his school-time work. Matsuoka had aspirations to continue his studies at an Ivy League University, but these were curtailed when his mother sent repeated requests for his return to Japan due to her falling sick with a serious illness.⁷¹ Matsuoka set sail for his homeland in the summer of 1902, where he faced the daunting task of re-adjusting to a society he had left more than nine years earlier.⁷²

He was 22 years old.

2.3 - Early Diplomatic Career in a Growing Empire

Indeed, it needs a sight of a great statesmanship to foresee outcome of an event that involves nations. It takes a divine inspiration to prophesy fate of a nation.... Only a thorough knowledge of nature and character of a people, from moral ethical and historical standpoints, at least, justifies one to be an authority on problems concerning them. Opinion of any

⁷⁰ Ano, “Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision,” 184.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 9.

person, that lacks such degree of knowledge, we must let it suffer the fate of a mere “guess,” if not of a groundless jargon. And, unfortunately, people are not nowadays a bit reserved or modest as to refrain from unnecessarily taxing the reading society with hosts of so-called opinions, or views, or studies that unhappily belong to this category.⁷³

The above quote is taken from an editorial piece published in the *Oregonian* newspaper in 1900. The writer was a young University of Oregon Law School graduate who went by the name of Frank Matsuoka.⁷⁴ While he had found it expedient to take an American first name during his time there, thirty years later Frank would be known around the world by his birth-name, Yōsuke, and he was central to a conflict between the United States, China, and Japan that eventually devolved into war.

In this editorial, ‘Frank’ extolls the virtue of getting to know someone before passing judgement. For Matsuoka, the years between his return to Japan in 1902 and his appearance at Geneva in 1932 was a time to get to know the world and to establish himself as a leader with enough experience in the English speaking world to help Japan overcome the diplomatic problems caused by events such as the Russo-Japanese War (February 8, 1904–September 5, 1905) and World War I (July 28, 1914–November 11, 1918). Most of all, it was the period where Matsuoka emerged in the world press. There he not only established himself as a spokesman for Japanese interests, particularly focusing on the need for the West to

⁷³ F. T. Matsuoka, “The Oriental Crisis: Local Japanese Writes of “Far Eastern Policy,” *Morning Oregonian* (Portland, OR), July, 23, 1900.

⁷⁴ Like many Japanese immigrants to America, Matsuoka chose to take an English first name in order to fit in better with his new culture.

know and understand Japan, but he also continued to assert his identity as the “all American boy” through his open and honest (if blunt and lacking tact) opinions, his appeals for friendship and cooperation between the two countries (as long as America refrained from interfering in Japanese affairs), and through his use of American ideologies such as the Monroe Doctrine to support his goals for Japan. This section will explore this early part of Matsuoka’s career.

Matsuoka returned to Japan in 1902 after finishing his degree at the University of Oregon. Although he had wanted to pursue a higher degree at an Ivy League university, his mother’s request for his return could not be ignored. Nevertheless, soon after his return to Japan Matsuoka enrolled in classes in law at Tokyo Imperial University. Upon starting lectures there Matsuoka came to the conclusion that what he could learn in just a year and half at an American university would take four years to complete at Tokyo Imperial University. He soon abandoned the studies and turned toward a career.⁷⁵

Just as Matsuoka’s decision to leave to study in America so early may have been attributed to his cousin’s wish to avoid military conscription, Matsuoka avoided conscription by joining the diplomatic service. His English language skill allowed Matsuoka to join the diplomatic corps in 1904. This afforded Matsuoka a permanent deferral of military service; otherwise he would have been called to serve, especially considering the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.⁷⁶ Matsuoka

⁷⁵ Fukui, *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke [Reviving Matsuoka Yōsuke]*. Chapter One.

⁷⁶ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 17-18.

passed the exam to enter the diplomatic service with top scores. He was posted as vice-consul in Shanghai (1904-1912) and went on to become the second secretary of the Japanese embassy in St. Petersburg (December 1912-October 1913), and then served as the first secretary of the Japanese embassy in Washington DC (October 1913-July 1916). Eventually, he became secretary to Japan's Foreign Minister Terauchi Masatake in October of 1916. Following the end of World War I, he served as a secretary for his country at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, alongside Prince Konoe Fumimaro, who in 1940, as prime minister, would appoint Matsuoka as foreign minister. he served as a secretary for his country at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, alongside Prince Konoe Fumimaro, who in 1940, as prime minister, would appoint Matsuoka as foreign minister.

Just as Matsuoka's decision to leave to study in America so early may have been attributed to his cousin's wish to avoid military conscription, Matsuoka avoided conscription by joining the diplomatic service. His English language skill allowed Matsuoka to join the diplomatic corps in 1904. This afforded Matsuoka a permanent deferral of military service; otherwise he would have been called to serve, especially considering the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.⁷⁷ Matsuoka passed the exam to enter the diplomatic service with top scores. He was posted as vice-consul in Shanghai (1904-1912) and went on to become the second secretary of the Japanese embassy in St. Petersburg (December 1912-October 1913), and

⁷⁷ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 17-18.



Figure 1:

A photograph showing Matsuoka as a young man towards the beginning of his diplomatic career. "Matsuoka, Japan's Noted Statesman, Once Peddled Coffee in Portland," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 26, 1933.

then served as the first secretary of the Japanese embassy in Washington DC (October 1913-July 1916). Eventually, he became secretary to Japan's Foreign Minister Terauchi Masatake in October of 1916. Following the end of World War I, he served as a secretary for his country at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, alongside Prince Konoë Fumimaro, who in 1940, as prime minister, would appoint Matsuoka as foreign minister.

The 1919 Paris Peace Conference was a defining moment in Matsuoka's career, although little attention to it is given in English studies of Matsuoka. The purpose of the conference, was to establish order after Germany's defeat in WWI. For Japan that centered on a goal of securing German holdings in the Pacific for Japan's use.⁷⁸ A primary goal of United States President Woodrow Wilson was to see the establishment of the League of Nations. These goals were somewhat in conflict as Japan's aims were designed around "old diplomacy," a method by which countries operated in spheres of influence, and Wilson's aims were dictated by a rejection of these spheres in favor of a more open and international type of "new diplomacy."⁷⁹ Between a lack of intelligence and government orders to refrain from participating outside of securing German possessions, notably the Shantung peninsula in China, the Japanese delegation was hard pressed to make

⁷⁸ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 38-40.

⁷⁹ Tadashi Nakatani, "What Peace Meant to Japan: The Changeover at Paris in 1919," in *The Decade of the Great War: Japan and the Wider World in the 1910s*, eds. Tosh Minohara, Tze-Ki Hon and Evan Dawley (Brill Academic Pub, 2015), 168-188, 168-170.

headway at the conference—a lack keenly felt by Matsuoka. Nonetheless, the delegation was eventually successful, obtaining their goals in exchange for their promise to return sovereignty to China and Japan's agreement to the League of Nations covenant.⁸⁰

Lu summarizes the global media outlook towards Japan at the end of the conference: "The French had interest but no concrete opinion. The British refrained from criticizing Japan too harshly because of the alliance between the two countries. Only the Americans were outspoken."⁸¹

In order to combat American objections to Japan's diplomacy, Matsuoka engaged in a public relations campaign by touring the United States on his way home from the conference. One article published during this time gives us a view of Matsuoka's awareness of media and his willingness to use it to his advantage.

On September 4, 1919, Matsuoka's name appeared in the *New York Times* for the first time, although, perhaps an indication of how little import he was to the political stage of the time, his name was repeatedly misspelled as "Matsuoko." In his premier statement, Matsuoka assured the world of Japan's willingness to play fair and to obey the agreement made in Paris. "I should not at all be surprised," he commented, "if our government opened, within a very few months, or even a few

⁸⁰ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 38-40.

Shandong was historically spelled as "Shantung."

⁸¹ Ibid, 40.

Mainly there were questions about why, if it were indeed Japan's intention to return the German holdings, control should not be immediately ceded to China.

weeks, negotiations with the Chinese government with a view to settling the Shantung question in a way satisfactory to all concerned.”⁸²

In addition to showing Japan as a team player willing to obey the rules agreed on at the conference, he takes his assessment of his countrymen one step further. Against allegations that Japan had stolen the Chinese holdings and were no better than looting pirates, Matsuoka appealed using an idea he had learned very well in America; that of freedom. To the charges of piracy, Matsuoka declared:

Japan has taken nothing from China, and proposes to give her much. China, he added, could not and dared not lift a finger to break German’s grip on Tsing-tao. Japan made sacrifices and China made none in wresting the territory from the Kaiser, and territory which was to all intents ceded to Germany is to be given back to China.

If this be an act of piracy, all benefactors and philanthropists must be pirates and robbers⁸³

Matsuoka’s first foray into American national media was characteristically bold. Unfortunately, Matsuoka’s attempt to unequivocally place Japan in the position of just liberator did not go by unchallenged. In a rebuttal that echoes the modern cries of “fake news,” a Chinese delegate passing through the US on his way home from the Peace Conference admonished:

Mr. Matsuoka’s statement published in the morning papers today regarding the Shantung question contains so much half truth and sounds so plausible that it creates an altogether false impression in the mind of the casual reader

⁸² “Expects Shantung Return in a Year,” *New York Times* September 4, 1919.

⁸³ Ibid.

as respects Japan's policy in Shantung in particular, and her policy in China in general.⁸⁴

Although the delegation had succeeded in their goals, Matsuoka had grave misgivings about both the League of Nations and the China situation. Despite Japan's protestations and his own assurances, the West was not inclined to trust Japanese motives. Matsuoka worried about future diplomatic relations, and even in this early encounter he sought not only to reason with and assure America, but also to assert Japan as a power to be respected. Earlier we saw Matsuoka's appeal for knowledge and understanding when dealing with foreign nations. In 1919 he again emphasized the need to know, but he hinted more strongly at the consequences of failure in this respect. Regarding the return of Shandong, Matsuoka said the progress would be quicker: "if the outside world would desist from uttering threats against Japan and attempting to apply pressure on her." He further appealed: "The Japanese are human. They have their national pride and their sense of national dignity should be respected."⁸⁵

While Matsuoka made his claim of dignity for Japan, he was on the verge of something of a mid-life crisis. He was tired of being in a position of considerable importance but little authority and felt confined by his work as a diplomat.⁸⁶ In 1921, at the age of 41, he retired from the diplomatic service.

⁸⁴ "Chinese Peace Delegate Declares Matsuoka's Statement Gives False Impression." *New York Times*, September 5, 1919.

⁸⁵ *New York Times* "Expects Shantung Return in a Year."

⁸⁶ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 40-43.

In 1922, he was offered a position with the South Manchurian Railway, and by 1927 he became the vice-president of this organization. During this time, Matsuoka again took up American ideas of freedom, in terms of both individual freedom and national autonomy, and adventure through his staunch support of Japan's activities in Manchuria, declaring the expansion to be from peaceful aims and economic necessity. He was also careful to pay homage to the new style of cooperative diplomacy that had been advocated by President Wilson.

While the extent to which Japan is dependent upon the economic resources of Manchuria is now so great that it could not brook any effort by China or any foreign country to infringe upon its interests, the Japanese desire nothing so much as a peaceful Manchuria in which all countries could unite to develop the vast wealth of the province.⁸⁷

Always seeking advancement, Matsuoka resigned his position in the railway to run in the 1930 elections and became a member of the Lower House of the Japanese Diet, where he continued to support Japan's position in Manchuria. Matsuoka's career to this point had given him an intimate knowledge of China, which, when paired with his understanding of America, made him an ideal candidate to explain Japan's position to the world.

After leaving Oregon, Matsuoka immersed himself in the world of diplomacy almost immediately upon his return to Japan. His career in the diplomatic service gave him the opportunity to interact with and learn about

⁸⁷ Herbert L. Matthews, "Peace Aim of Japan in Manchuria Told; Matsuoka, Vice President of Railway, Says Tokio Means to Keep Country Tranquil," *New York Times*, June 09, 1929.

China, Russia, and the United States. This familiarity took him to the Paris Peace Conference, where he supported the goals for negotiation set out by his country, and defended the Japan's position in his first foray into national media in America. The next part of this chapter will further explore Matsuoka's performance on the world stage, focusing on his role as the head of Japan's League of Nations delegacy in 1933.

2.4 - Matsuoka at The League of Nations

Matsuoka was elected to the Lower House of the Japanese Diet in 1930. A distinguishing characteristic of his service was a willingness to fight friend or foe if it meant achieving his goals. This tendency was quickly picked up by the American press when, only a year into his term, he lost no time in asserting Japanese rights abroad. This bluntness and determination to stand by his principals was, perhaps, a refreshing trait Westerners who were otherwise concerned about "sly" Japanese with hidden agendas.⁸⁸ He was particularly concerned about the exclusion of Japanese immigrants to America dictated by the Immigration Act of 1924. He even went so far as calling the foreign minister a traitor for failing to force the issue with America.⁸⁹ In addition to his concerns about the rights of immigrants to established countries, he was an avid supporter

⁸⁸ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 40.

⁸⁹ "Our Law Stirs Tokyo Diet: Matsuoka Scores Foreign Minister on Exclusion Measure," *New York Times*, January 24, 1931.

of the Japanese policy of *tairiku keiei* or “developing the continent.” Following in the footsteps of America’s westward expansion, which was in its final phases during Matsuoka’s stay in the United States, Matsuoka saw Manchuria as Japan’s frontier. Manchuria, at the center of Japanese expansionism, was a lifeline that served as a buffer zone to protect Japan from hostile nations, provided much needed natural resources that were scarce on the of Japanese Islands, and allowed space and freedom for the Japanese people to grow. These were the key goals of Japanese expansionism in the 1930s. Matsuoka appealed for international understanding of Japan’s position in Manchuria in an article titled “Economic Co-operation of Japan and China in Manchuria and Mongolia: Its Motives and Basic Significance,” published in *Pacific Affairs* in December 1929. Matsuoka made the firm claim that Manchuria had never been under Chinese control:

Manchuria was a crown land under the Manchu power, and was never made Chinese territory. Towards the last days of the Manchu dynasty so many immigrants began to come from China proper that Chinese elements grew predominant in the peninsula provinces of Manchuria. In later years, signs of agricultural labor began to be seen in the plains of which Changchun is the center. But Manchuria, even though placed under direct care of the ruling power, remained for the most part as it had ever been, uncultivated and without seeing the birth of any industry out of its marvelous resources.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Yosuke Matsuoka, “Economic Co-Operation of Japan and China in Manchuria and Mongolia: Its Motives and Basic Significance,” *Pacific Affairs* 2, no. 12 (1929), 786-795, 788.

Matsuoka unwaveringly maintained this claim of Manchuria as separate from China over the course of his lifetime.

Over the course of his career, Matsuoka consistently repeated the need for more space to allow Japan to grow and flourish. This expansion, in Matsuoka's mind, was as much for the good of the people as it was for the safety and autonomy of Japan. In a 1932 explanation of Japanese expansion, famous columnist George Sokolsky cited Matsuoka's defense of Japan's aims in Manchuria.⁹¹

If I am right... in the premise that what lies at the root of international peace is protection of every race in its right to live and recognition of its legitimate aspirations, it follows that the people of Japan should have the right to ask for the security of their national existence, with assurance as to their opportunity for progress and growth.⁹²

It was not just to the foreign press that Matsuoka intended this message of growth. In an October 8, 1933, appeal to his countrymen in Okayama City, Japan, Matsuoka delivered a speech titled "*Sekai no henkyoku to teikoku no chii*" (A crisis of the World and the status of the Empire). This speech used the impetus of freedom to persuade Japanese youths to seek their fortunes by braving life on the continent. It is particularly remarkable as one of the few direct references Matsuoka made to racist treatment in the United States. "We should not go [to another country] after others have been settled... only to be disliked by them."⁹³ While Matsuoka never suggested that he regretted his decision to study in America, this quote suggests

⁹¹ Sokolsky was pro-republican China as well as anti-communist.

⁹² George E. Sokolsky, "Japan's Expansion: Her Aims and Obstacles," *New York Times*, sec. 9, February 28, 1932.

⁹³ Yosuke Matsuoka, *Seinen yo tate [Stand Up Youths]* (Tokyo, 1933), 39.

he recognized the hardships faced there, especially in terms of massive immigration which, now that the Japanese exclusion act was in place, was impractical. For Matsuoka Manchuria was the only choice for his countrymen to realize their version of the “American Dream” of personal and economic freedom and the security of their nation.

Unsurprisingly, Matsuoka’s views on Manchuria, and on Japan’s rights there remained unchanged throughout his life. He elaborated on Manchuria’s space and resources in *Kōa no taigyō* (A great work of developing Asia), where he likened life in Manchuria to the American Western frontier during its expansion to the Pacific. Matsuoka talked about his experience in America where the wide open spaces had allowed youths to run wildly and juveniles to try their strength and learn how to become men. Matsuoka went on to lament how Japan had already been cultivated to the point where such spaces no longer existed, making it impossible for Japanese youths to have the same character-building experience. He then pointed out that by venturing into Manchuria: “Japanese youths could be trained, tempered, and cured of petty mindedness and insular thinking.” He concluded that the Japanese had been traveling to the continent to build character long before the issue became a conflict, and therefore it was not unethical for the Japanese to continue their advancement and the taming of Manchuria.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Yosuke Matsuoka, *Kōa no Taigyō [A great work of developing Asia]*, (Tokyo: Daiichi Kōronsha, 1941), 36-37.

In terms global diplomacy at this time, the Western powers were keen to maintain their own economic interests in China, which meant preserving Chinese independence and integrity. During the years after the Paris Peace Conference, China did stabilize to some degree as the nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek established a central government in Nanking. The United States financially supported this new government as it began building transportation and communication infrastructure in China.⁹⁵

While the Western powers were happy to see a strengthening and independent China, Japan saw this foreign involvement as a threat to its own interests in the region. Chiang Kai-Shek's government organized boycotts of Japanese goods and began infringing on Japan's established rights in Manchuria. Both the Japanese civilian population and the members of the military expressed dissatisfaction with the Japanese government's compliant stance in international affairs, seeing it as detrimental to Japanese interests. This dissatisfaction was particularly strong among members of the Kwantung Army, a group that had been established in 1906 to guard Japan's Manchurian possessions. On September 18, 1931, officers in the Kwantung Army engineered an attack on the South Manchuria Railway, planting explosives and blaming the subsequent explosion on the Chinese. While the incident was planned and carried out without sanction, it received overwhelming support after the fact and allowed for the Japanese

⁹⁵ Kershaw, *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World 1940-1941*, Kindle Edition, Chapter Three.

invasion of Manchuria. Eventually, Japan created the 'puppet state' of Manchukuo a nominally sovereign nation under Japanese guidance. China appealed to the League of Nations for help.⁹⁶

This complex series of events caused global chaos, but they set the stage for Matsuoka to again emerge in a diplomatic context. As demonstrated, Matsuoka's support for Japan's position in and right to Manchuria was heavily influenced by his experience in America just before the turn of the twentieth century. The conflict between China and Japan came to a head with the Shanghai Incident of January 28, 1932, where, after days of street violence and vandalism between the Chinese and Japanese, and the threat of the arrival of the Chinese army, Japan firebombed the city. The world press reacted negatively to the incident and articles were published criticizing Japan's conduct in Shanghai.⁹⁷ Matsuoka took measures to show Japan's perspective on the situation. He firmly felt that the United States and European powers did not understand Japan's case and were purposefully swaying world opinion against Japan. He soon travelled to Shanghai to try to smooth over the diplomatic tensions. Less than a month after the incident, on February 22, 1932, he made a plea for understanding in the *New York Times*:

The Chinese are taking advantage of America's and Europe's lack of a real appreciation of the Far Eastern situation. Due to ignorance of the relations between China and Japan, the big

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ One interesting editorial condemnation of Japan's actions in Shanghai is:

"The Pity of it," *New York Times*, January 30, 1932.

powers and the League of Nations are giving the world the impression that sympathy lies with the Chinese.

This is unfortunate from the Japanese viewpoint, as the Japanese realize the situation has now reached an impasse from which Japan must either quit China or fight, and the Japanese, with big interests at stake, dare not quit.

The narrative of his defense went on to talk about the military situation in China, and ends with a direct appeal for American understanding:

The protection of Japanese interests is the sole reason for the presence of Japanese troops, and I would like to make clear to the American people that the Japanese have no ulterior motive.⁹⁸

Little more than a week after his editorial, on February 28, 1932, Matsuoka travelled with Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō to meet with Chinese General Huang Qiang, and Wellington Koo, who was the personal representative of Chinese Foreign Minister Luo Wengan. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the mutual withdrawal of forces from a twenty-kilometer radius around Shanghai. After a night of surprisingly civil discussions lubricated by a bottle of champagne, a ceasefire was arranged, and the troops of both sides withdrew from the city.⁹⁹ His negotiating skills during this period served to help him win the nomination of his government to defend Japan's actions in China at the League of Nations.

Matsuoka travelled to Geneva in November of 1932. By this time, Matsuoka's ideology of Manchuria as a vital lifeline had been taken up by the

⁹⁸ Yosuke Matsuoka, "Sees Sympathy with Chinese," *New York Times*, February 22, 1932.

⁹⁹ Ian Nish, *Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations* (Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1993), 104.

general Japanese population connecting those in Japan to Japanese settlers and Japanese interests in Manchuria.¹⁰⁰ According to Lu, Matsuoka held two principles regarding Japan's position. The first was that Japan's position in Manchuria could not be altered, and the second was that Japan should not withdraw from the League of Nations.¹⁰¹ Adhering to these principals was a challenge for Matsuoka when dealing with the Lytton Report, a document compiled by an independent commission, led by an English Earl, Victor Bulwer-Lytton. The commission had gone to Manchuria to see firsthand the conflict occurring between China and Japan. The report condemned Japan for its invasion of Manchuria and recommended that Japan withdraw its troops and return sovereignty of the region to China.

Going into conference, American media presented a flattering picture of Matsuoka. The New York Times writes:

Few delegates to international conferences have left Japan so well prepared or amid greater manifestations of public interest than Yōsuke Matsuoka, who left last night for Geneva, where he will make the Japanese Government's supreme effort to avert a break with the League.¹⁰²

As the league went into discussion, the narrative concerning Matsuoka remained positive, but also began to emphasize his, and Japan's, intransigence.

¹⁰⁰ Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Los Angeles, CA: Berkeley, 1999), 88-89.

¹⁰¹ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 81.

¹⁰² Hugh Byas, "Matsuoka Reveals His League Defense," *New York Times*, November 6, 1932.

One editorial puts this attitude in vivid contrast by juxtaposing the blunt and forceful Matsuoka with the eloquent and experienced Koo. The article describes Matsuoka as “a blunt, bespectacled alumnus of Oregon State University,” and went onto say:

Japan has felt that she has not put her most persuasive foot foremost— that is, if a foot can be other than forcibly persuasive— in explaining her Manchurian adventure to somewhat critical diplomats of the world gathered at Geneva. In Mr. Matsuoka she has her strongest, best-informed advocate sitting with the League of Nations.¹⁰³

In contrast, Koo is described as “a slim, suave Columbia graduate,” and the article goes on to explain:

As an advocate for China he boasts that he is “spokesman for one-quarter of the human race.” That is a hefty burden to place upon the slim shoulders of Mr. Wellington Koo, but there is no more gracefully persuasive advocate. There is none more adaptable than Mr. Koo.¹⁰⁴

The light shone by the press on Matsuoka here is not of the highest quality, but it did attempt to soften the distastefulness of the topic at hand through a reminder that both men have strong connections to the United States, and that Matsuoka, while bound by his position to make an argument distasteful to the international community, was well disposed to do so.

¹⁰³ The University of Oregon was originally named Oregon State University. This citation has no connection to the current Oregon State University.

S. T. Williamson, “Headline Footnotes: A Versatile Railroad Man, and Mr. Koo,” *New York Times*, November 27, 1932.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

On February 24, 1933, the League of Nations decided to adopt the Lytton Report and demanded Japan's withdraw from Manchuria. Of the forty-three votes cast over the adoption of the report, Japan's was the lone voice of dissent. Japan had suffered shock, disbelief, and indignation at the contents of the report, which Foreign Minister Uchida viewed as an ostensibly neutral body taking sides with China against Japan. Uchida prepared to implement "scorched-earth diplomacy," and ordered Matsuoka to withdraw Japan from the league.¹⁰⁵

Even in his disagreement with the League of Nations, Matsuoka did not fail to highlight his westernization. On February 8, 1933, at a time he was still fighting to stay in the his speech to the league, Matsuoka, perhaps remembering his days as a memorizing scripture in Oregon and seeking to put Japan on common ground with the West, made a speech that compared the international persecution of Japan to the persecution of Jesus:

Humanity crucified Jesus of Nazareth two thousand years ago. And to-day? Can any of you assure me that the so-called world opinion can make no mistake? We Japanese feel that we are now put on trial. Some of the people in Europe and America may wish even to crucify Japan in the twentieth century. Gentlemen, Japan stands ready to be crucified! But we do believe, and firmly believe, that, in a very few years, world opinion will be changed and that we also shall be understood by the world as Jesus of Nazareth was.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, 154.

¹⁰⁶ Japanese Delegation to the League of Nations, *The Manchurian Question: Japan's Case in the Sino-Japanese Dispute as Presented before the League of Nations* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1933).

Chapter Two noted the role of the Missions as a cultural mediator for immigrants to Japan. For immigrants like Matsuoka, Christianity had a deep connection to Americanism. By referencing Jesus in his speech, Matsuoka may well have been reminding the West of his identity as “the All American Boy.” Matsuoka felt a keen injustice regarding international treatment toward Japan and its interests in China.

The withdrawal from the League of Nations was reported soon after in America’s popular *TIME*:

In loud, decisive tones Yosuke Matsuoka read to the League Assembly milder words from Tokyo than had been expected. He implied rather than announced Japanese withdrawal from the League. “The Japanese Government are obliged,” he read, “to feel that they have now reached the limit of their endeavors to cooperate with the League regarding the Sino-Japanese differences.”

Stepping down from the Tribune, Japan's Matsuoka beckoned imperiously to the rest of his delegation, some members of which were known to oppose a dramatic exit. Obediently but rather slowly they rose, followed their Chief who marched firmly from the hall. In the lobbies, in the cloak room no non-Japanese spoke to pariah Matsuoka. Impassive, he clipped a cigar, struck a match, puffed air mechanically, threw away the match, walked out unconscious that his cigar had failed to light. Cameras clicked. Cinemachines whirled. Up swept a bright limousine with the flag of the rising sun streaming from its radiator cap. Stepping in, with the cold cigar still clenched between his teeth, Japan's Matsuoka was whisked to his hotel, consoled his crestfallen staff that night with a champagne supper. His next duty, having defied the world, was to report home.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ “The League: Crushing Verdict,” *TIME*, March 6, 1933.

The story in *TIME* portrays Matsuoka in both a dramatic and comedic light, depicting him as a showman. The whole event, as described, seems comical.

This use of comedy in *TIME* bares the roots of a propaganda technique that was often used against Japan in the following decade. In *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, John Dower explains how propaganda media was used to diminish an opponent or to amplify his threat. One such technique is to categorize the other as “lesser.” Dower writes: “The contempt for Japanese capabilities prior to the actual outbreak of war was shared equally by the English and the Americans; and in retrospect, the calamitous consequences of such arrogance have overtones of a bleak, contemporary morality play.”¹⁰⁸ While Matsuoka performed his role at the League of Nations with the utmost deliberation and sincerity, the reporting of it served to diminish Matsuoka’s authority, and thus lessen the importance of his actions by turning him into a comedic caricature. Less comical, however, was the American response to the issue.

The League of Nations was keen to have assurances that its members would support the sanctions against Japan, and after some time, Secretary Stimson gave his assurances to the League that the Hoover Administration would back the League’s decision.¹⁰⁹ Even though America was not a member of the League of Nations, its opinions were highly valued by the League, and by the international

¹⁰⁸ John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1986), 99.

¹⁰⁹ *TIME* “The League: Crushing Verdict.”

community. Both the League's Lytton Report and American Secretary Henry Stimson advocated a policy of nonrecognition for Japan's position in Manchuria. The day after Matsuoka faced off with the League; his mind turned to Japanese relations with the United States. Matsuoka was keenly aware of the danger the diplomatic situation between the two countries could pose if left unchecked.

Having suffered from lack of autonomy and information at the Paris Peace Conference more than a decade earlier, Matsuoka was determined to make the most of his service in Geneva and to make an effective use of media with an aim to garner support for his country.¹¹⁰ Matsuoka expressed his worries to the American people in an article published in the *New York Times* on February 25, 1933:

What is done is done. It is now up to us and up to your statesmen in Washington to see to it that the dangerous situation which now faces us shall not lead us toward a conflict. We must be patient. We must counteract the rash and insane propaganda of those in both countries who would store up ill-feeling.

Nothing could be madder or more criminal than to do anything but work for the best possible relations between Japan and America, now above all times. Neither of us has the slightest reason to make war on the other and nothing could be worse. Yet, we must realize that some incident or some ill-considered, rash action can start a train of events which would be dangerous in the extreme.

Japan must not be allowed to believe the United States is at fault for what happened at Geneva. I don't for one moment believe they were, but even if it had been America's fault Japan cannot be allowed to think so.

¹¹⁰ Fukui, *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke [Reviving Matsuoka Yōsuke]*, Chapter Three.

What happened at Geneva is perhaps the best thing for us all. We are deeply sad that events forced us into the present situation. I have already started to do everything possible to make my people see the point of view of the league members.¹¹¹

In contrast to the Western habit of diminishing the perceived enemy, Matsuoka here, and often throughout his career, displays a technique that Japan employed throughout the interwar and wartime years, that of the 'pure self' While we have already addressed the idea of Matsuoka having become embittered by racism and discrimination aimed at himself, historian John Dower made a sharp point when he suggested that the cultural and racial inferiority that was projected by the West onto Japan since its forceful opening to trade in the mid nineteenth century was rejected by Japan through the assertion of superior morality.¹¹² Matsuoka makes it clear that Japan is above blaming the United States for the rift at the League of Nations, and that Japan will seek out peaceful relations regardless of whether America mistakenly views its actions as provocative.

While Dower presents the technique of 'pure self' as a propaganda tool, it was not necessarily deceptive or deliberate. Matsuoka, on this and many later occasions, lamented over the American inability to sympathize with or understand Japan's position. Just a year after the withdrawal, Matsuoka again took to the *New York Times* to decry the unfairness of the Lytton Report and Japan's poor standing in the international community. He attempted to display the similar positions held

¹¹¹ "Matsuoka to Try to Restrain Japan," *New York Times*, sec. F, February 25, 1933.

¹¹² Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, 204-205.

by America and Japan, and how different the international reactions to those positions were.

The United States may obtain rights for Christian missionaries to downland in any province in China, but if we were to require similar rights for Buddhists there would be pan-Christian objection.

America may acquire the Philippine Islands, Asiatic territory 6,000 miles away from her shores, but when Japan takes control of Korea, a country smaller in territory than the Philippines and only 100 miles away from her borders, the action is denounced.¹¹³

Matsuoka was clearly frustrated by what he saw as hypocrisy on the part of Europe nations and the United States, and while he could not help but utilize the debate skills he honed as a youth on the American West Coast to point out the logical similarities between the actions of those nations and Japan and their respective consequences, he did so in a way that comes across as a plea for understanding rather than anger and blame. In the same piece, Matsuoka went on to further compare Japan and the United States.

To the Western mind it would seem what Europe or America does in Asia is in the nature of duty and in the line of human progress, while what we do is in the nature of selfish interest. But, in fact, we being Asiatics, are far more capable of dealing with other Asiatics in their best interests than are Americans or Europeans. For example, in bringing order out of chaos in Korea, we killed far fewer people than the Americans killed in suppressing the independence movement in the Philippines. Yet independence was the key-word in the making of America.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Yosuke Matsuoka, "Matsuoka Challenges the Critics of the Japanese Policy on China," *New York Times*, April 29, 1934.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

Here, again, Matsuoka brought up the issue of freedom as an American institution. The refusal of American recognition of the Philippines fight for independence stands in contrast to Matsuoka's descriptions of a Manchuria where both Manchurians and Japanese find freedom.

The months following Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations demonstrated how deeply Matsuoka wished peace and understanding between Japan and the United States. As he stated in the *New York Times*, he wanted to be sure that Japan understood America's position regarding the censure over Manchuria, but even more, Matsuoka strove to improve American perceptions of Japan and explain Japan's position to them. Upon leaving Europe, Matsuoka made a trip to the United States.

While Matsuoka's tone towards the United States was conciliatory, it was by no means soft. Matsuoka was aware of the irony present in the situation of the United States taking a pivotal role in an organization to which it did not belong. Ano writes that Matsuoka had been in the United States while the government was debating whether or not to take part in the League of Nations, and had correctly predicted that America would decline to be a part of the League. In his 1933 work, *Seinen yo tate* (Rise up youths), Matsuoka lamented that President Wilson and the American people seemed to have had a sixth sense about the troubles that would be awakened by joining the League of Nations and that Japan

should have declined membership when the United States chose not to participate.¹¹⁵

Days after his announcement of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, Matsuoka gave a characteristically frank interview to *New York Times* Reporter Aline E. Johnson. In this interview, Matsuoka's tone is highly accusative towards the United States. He suggests that America had constructed Japan as an enemy in order to justify naval spending to maintain control of the Philippine Islands after WWI, and that, in regard to Manchuria: "The attitude of the Western Powers made the Chinese believe that some of you would come to their support against us beyond the scope of diplomacy."¹¹⁶ Matsuoka went on to assure readers that his long experience in the United States has shown him that America's attitude stems from not from hostility but from capriciousness, and states his belief that American-Japanese relations would remain unaffected by the current events. "I personally knew that your attitude was only a caprice, a psychology evolving out of the great war, from which you had quickly recovered."¹¹⁷ Without an understanding of Matsuoka's personality, it is possible to read his language, chiding and accusatory, as deliberate antagonism. Interviews such as this might be a contributing factor to the perception of Matsuoka as anti-American, however,

¹¹⁵ Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision," 186.

¹¹⁶ Albine E. Johnson, "Matsuoka Regards Us as Caprecious," *New York Times*, February 26, 1933.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

even when making possibly antagonistic statements Matsuoka tried to repair the breach caused by his words by narrowing the gap between himself and his audience. "...Not all Japanese know you as well as I do. I spent the formative period of my life in your country— from 13 years of age to 22 in your schools. And I was again in your country for three years in the diplomatic service."¹¹⁸

As if to further prove his affinity with America, Matsuoka's next step on his way home from Geneva was to visit the United States in order to "lay the cards on the table" for the American government and to rekindle a sense of goodwill by visiting his adoptive home.¹¹⁹

Matsuoka traveled to New York, then to Washington DC, before making his way west to Oregon. Although Matsuoka made a habit of stopping in Oregon earlier during his career as a diplomat, this trip was special. Famous worldwide, Matsuoka was welcomed as a returning son of Oregon. Matsuoka used this chance to emphasize the lessons he had learned while living in America when giving a speech to a packed crowd in a Portland ballroom:

Japan has no reason to quarrel with the United states, but has every reason to want a long peace. In the orient, Japan is merely trying to do what the United States has done on the

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

This phrasing is possibly connected to Matsuoka's days playing poker, and a sign that Matsuoka sees diplomatic relations as a game to win.

western hemisphere— maintain peace, progress, and liberty.¹²⁰

Here in this phrasing we can see Matsuoka emerge again as the “all American boy.” By drawing parallels to Japan’s actions in light of American history he connected to his own American identity forged during his youth spent as a student there. He again connected Japan’s ideas of progress and freedom in Manchuria to American progress and freedom.

It is on the Asiatic mainland now for that very purpose and intends to hold to that purpose only, even though it is “misunderstood” by the rest of the world, for the Russian Soviet threat is very real.

Japan has now become the defender of the east, China being unable to defend herself. People of the west may laugh at such a statement. It may appear to them grotesque. Nevertheless, it is as true as that the United States is the guardian of the liberty of the western hemisphere. We, too, have a Monroe Doctrine in the east.¹²¹

Matsuoka frequently drew on his knowledge of and experience with America to stir sympathy for Japan’s plight in Asia. While the strategy had little effect, judging by America’s lack of a change in attitude or diplomacy, Oregonians at least appreciated Matsuoka’s American-ness, as shown by frequent articles detailing how an impoverished young waif from Japan received both a home and an education there. Portlanders were moved by Matsuoka’s effort to erect a monument over the grave of Mrs. Beveridge, who had passed away years

¹²⁰ “Japan Seeks Only to Preserve Peace on Asiatic Mainland, Matsuoka Avers,” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 09, 1933.

¹²¹ Ibid.



Figure 2:

Matsuoka laying flowers on the grave of Mrs. Beveridge during his visit to Oregon in 1933. "Matsuoka Honors Boyhood Friend. Marker Placed at Grave of Mrs. Beveridge," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 10, 1933.

previously. The photo of Matsuoka kneeling at her grave was reprinted in newspapers around the country (**Figure 2**).

During the time Matsuoka traveled from the East Coast to Oregon, he gave several interviews, each emphasizing the need for cooperation, but also refusing to back down regarding Japan's position. These interviews were reprinted in various media outlets. Some of his comments could be classified as antagonistic and were in fact seen that way in retrospect, but they are also consistent with Matsuoka's view of Americans and what he thought was needed to garner respect.

A defining aspect of Matsuoka's thinking about Westerners in general, and Americans specifically can be summed up in a story. Shortly before his death, he was asked: "What are Americans like?" In reply, Matsuoka stated the following:

Now assuming that you are walking on a small path in a field which is so narrow that only one person can pass through, and an American comes from the opposite direction. You are facing each other, and neither side is willing to yield his right of the way. Soon becoming impatient, the American will clench his fist and sock you in the jaw. Taken by surprise you may lower your head and let him pass by. Next time when you meet him at the same path, he will simply raise his fist. He considers that the best solution.

On the other hand, if you do not retreat the first time, and engage in a counterattack, the American will be shocked and take another look at you. "Well, this fellow knows what he is doing," so recognizing, he will become your best friend.¹²²

¹²² Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 12.

Out of all speeches attributed to Matsuoka, it is this anecdote that seems to best describe Matsuoka's understanding of the United States, and of the thought patterns of Americans and other Westerners. Matsuoka equated respect in America to physical and mental strength. In order to further Japan's aims, he resolved to use quick, frank, and aggressive means. Japan's position in the world depended on gaining the respect of the United States and large European powers. Rather than put his head down and attempt to avoid conflict when delicate subjects were broached, Matsuoka chose to show his Americanness by attacking. An example of this can be seen in a Chicago interview printed through the Associated Press in the *Oregonian* newspaper on April 4, 1933.

"It is our firm conviction that both America and Japan have a great mission to perform in building the coming Pacific civilization. I feel that every Japanese or American who says anything that would lead America and Japan to go to war commits a crime against humanity and against God."

When a question was put to the fiery little delegate as to the attitude of Japan toward the Pacific mandate islands, in view of the withdrawal from the league, Mr. Matsuoka said:

"Why do Americans keep asking that question, and just at this time? I was never asked that in Europe. No such question was brought up at Geneva and no such question can arise for two years. Have the American people any interest in this? Why and how? It is true that we govern under a mandate, under terms of the covenant of the league, but it is not required that a nation be a member. The league has nothing to do with it unless the terms are violated.

If Americans continue to put that question, many leaders of Japan will wonder why America is so interested. Do they want them? I would suggest that you be a little negative, a

little careful if you have the welfare of the two nations at heart."¹²³

This style of Matsuoka's, to soothe and then to antagonize, was a pattern that was seen throughout his career when dealing with the United States, and it is likely to have contributed to the development of America's poor image of Matsuoka.

Despite having been involved in world events for his entire adult life, his role at the League of Nations catapulted him into the eye of the global public. Matsuoka's life was shaped by many factors. By his family's past greatness, by his responsibilities as the heir to his family and the expectations of his mother, and by his inherent personality that compelled him to seek challenges and to always push for success. As much as any of these, Matsuoka's life was shaped by his experiences living in America and the lessons he learned there. Matsuoka took the education and skills he learned in the United States and applied them to obtain a career that afforded him both power and prestige. This career placed him squarely under the eye of the international media.

The English-language press and Matsuoka shared some degree of reciprocity. Both the Japanese government and the English-language media counted on Matsuoka to translate Japanese policies into terms that could easily be Understood by Western audiences. Matsuoka counted on the media to do this by transmitting a sympathetic image of himself, and therefore Japan, through the lens

¹²³ Philip Kinsley, "Americans Warned by Japanese Envoy. Critics might Disturb Peace of Two Countries," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 4, 1933.

of the honest, forthright, and freedom loving American Christian he had once been. Sometimes he was successful in this and other times not, but by looking at the overall scope of his media interactions during these years it is clear see that his American identity is clearly a part of the narrative.

The next chapter will explore Matsuoka's rise to foreign minister, and his involvement with Germany in establishing the Tripartite Pact, and follow his career until July 1941, when he was ousted from his position in the government. From 1919 to his death in 1946 Matsuoka was the subject of nearly 200 articles in the US *New York Times*. Over the course of Chapter Three, we will examine the narrative in these articles in an attempt to understand how the English-language media's portrayal of Matsuoka changed during this time. A list of articles is provided in Appendix A. They are organized chronologically in order to show the progression of news about Matsuoka and how the language used in connection with him changed over that period. The table of articles also contains keywords which illustrate notable themes within the articles.

Chapter 3 - Becoming a Bad Boy

Chapter Two established Matsuoka's relationship with the United States, his driving ambition, and the challenges he encountered as a diplomat and as a member of the Diet. Throughout this timeline Matsuoka's relationship with the media has been highlighted, noting both how Matsuoka was portrayed by the media and how he sought to use it. Chapter Three will continue this theme during the period from 1933 to 1941— these are the years that led to war with the United States. During these years Matsuoka's "hometown hero" image saw a significant darkening. Here the thesis will focus on the trope of betrayal and Matsuoka's transformation from an "all American boy" into a "bad boy" known for his hatred of America.

Matsuoka left Geneva as a blunt and comical caricature. A man who may have been wrong headed but was who acted out of good intentions and respected the American ideals of truth and freedom. Perhaps it was this emphasis on freedom that became his downfall. While Matsuoka's actions in Geneva can be attributed to the will of his superiors, when Matsuoka gained the position of foreign minister, the responsibility for the actions of Japan as well as for his own decisions was placed on his shoulders. Whereas the media was willing to suspend doubt for Matsuoka the messenger, Matsuoka the decision-maker received no such

latitude. Although it was possible to believe that Matsuoka carried an affection for America while withdrawing Japan from the League of Nations, his 1940 agreement with Hitler could only be seen as an ungrateful rebellion and undeserved aggression against the country that had once fostered him. Despite his attempts to guide the media narrative in his favor, Matsuoka was thrust back, becoming the symbol of Japan's unprovoked aggression.

3.1 - After Geneva

This section will cover some of the background necessary to show Matsuoka's changing position and views between 1933 and 1940. This period starts with his departure from Geneva and spans the years to his appointment as foreign minister. The section covers Matsuoka's rise as a fascist thinker, signaled by the Party Dissolution Movement and his cooperation with the Kwangtung Army. While Matsuoka still used his American identity to appeal for friendship and understanding with the West, this period was marked by his increasingly vocal nationalism, a trait that was picked up in the English-Language press.

Matsuoka dreaded his return to Japan. He considered himself a failure for his inability to prevent a break with the League of Nations. Much to his surprise, once in Japan found himself a celebrated hero.¹²⁴ His strongly voiced withdrawal rallied the Japanese populace to his side. Despite being pitted against larger and wealthier Western powers, Matsuoka (read Japan) had refused to back down, and

¹²⁴ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 99.

thus proved himself (read Japan) the West's equal, achieving a notional goal that had been set long before Matsuoka was born.

Still, the admiration of the masses was not enough for Matsuoka. He chafed at the restrictions imposed on him by his superiors. He felt that his experience in the United States gave him superior knowledge of how to deal with (and manipulate) the West, and he was frustrated when, despite this knowledge, he had to go against his own judgment and follow orders. True to his view of the American spirit, outlined in Chapter Two, Matsuoka wanted to practice a form of independent diplomacy with Japan boldly leading the way to a more prosperous world. This was a stark contrast to men such as prior Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō (1872-1951), who put focus on mutual decisions and international cooperation, a viewpoint that Matsuoka considered pandering and subservient, and current Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai whose intransigence had left Japan with no choice but to withdraw or lose face.¹²⁵ A Japanese newspaper in Los Angeles printed these discordant words from Matsuoka's return trip to Japan, showing both his sense of the futility of the current government and his aspirations for a future where he would be able to steer Japan's course to greatness: "There is no use reporting to Uchida. If I open my mouth, depending on what I say, the cabinet may fall, so I shall remain silent. But when I reemerge in

¹²⁵ Ibid, 92-95.

Shidehara had served as Japan's foreign minister for two terms (1924-1927 and 1929-1931) and became the second Prime Minister after the end of WWII (served October 9, 1945-May 22, 1946).

politics, I intend to change the people's way of thinking fundamentally."¹²⁶

Matsuoka's words here are evidence of his wish to break out from the conformity and seniority-driven government. His American upbringing had introduced him to a meritocracy, although one that he was unable to take full advantage of due to his race. He was tired of playing the game of cordiality to his superiors, furthermore, previous occasions had proven that he played such a game badly.

No matter Matsuoka's aspirations for the future, his confidence was shaken by his failure at Geneva. Matsuoka had no misgivings about the morality or wisdom of Japan's activities in Manchuria, so his inability to convince the League to respect Japan's position likely hit him hard. Just like his midlife crisis after the Paris Peace Conference, Matsuoka underwent a shift in identity after Geneva. Whereas prior to Geneva he had prioritized Japan while extending his own understanding to the West, the West's unwillingness to "know" Japan pushed Matsuoka deeper into Nationalism. Lu provides a changed image of Matsuoka after Geneva: "Visiting the Schloss Schönbrunn, he commented that he would prefer a Japanese tearoom to a Western castle for, as he termed it, 'Only in the tearoom could one find the soul of Japan.'"¹²⁷ It is possible that in the rejection of Matsuoka's diplomacy at Geneva, both by the foreign diplomats and by Uchida who had refused to heed his advice to draw the United States into the negotiations, Matsuoka not only became more nationalistic but also became less

¹²⁶ *Rafu Shimpō* (Los Angeles, CA), April 27, 1933.

¹²⁷ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 95.

flexible in his ideas and diplomacy. This combination of nationalism and rigidity may be one cause of Matsuoka's transformation into a "bad boy."

In addition to an increasing nationalism, the failure at Geneva derailed Matsuoka's political aspirations to become foreign minister. Feeling betrayed by his superiors who, like Uchida, had neglected to heed the wisdom of his advice, or who outright refused to aid him, such as former Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi (1849-1940) who had failed to restrain the military from pushing for withdrawal, Matsuoka's reacted with a bad tempered bluntness which resulted in his being shunned by those in power.¹²⁸

Persona non-grata in political circles but hero-worshiped by the general populace, on December 8, 1933, exactly one year following the speech in Geneva that had likened Japan's persecution at the hands of the West to Jesus on the cross, Matsuoka resigned from the Diet to launch a new campaign aimed at the dissolution of Japan's political parties. Already popular due to the strength he had shown in Geneva, this announcement further cemented Matsuoka in the hearts of the Japanese population. He also strengthened this admiration by using techniques gained from his youthful study of the grassroots candidacy of William Jennings Bryan, coupled with inspiration from Benito Mussolini, who he had met during the Geneva convention. Never short on words, Matsuoka resolved to use

¹²⁸ Ibid, 100.

those words to fire up the lower-middle and lower class majority and to push for significant political reform.¹²⁹

Matsuoka saw the avoidance of war with England and America as the surest method of preserving Japan. He felt that the bad choices that lead to Japan's withdrawal in Geneva were made because of Uchida's poor judgment combined with the aggressive influence of the military and the hawkish politics of men such as Shiratori Toshio (1887-1949).¹³⁰ In order to save his country from further damage, Matsuoka felt it was necessary to break up the existing political system that was leading Japan along a path to certain destruction.

The end game of Matsuoka's plan can be summed up in the title of the newsletter he published during this period: *Showa ishin* (Showa Restoration). His was a populist movement that paid homage to the great activists who worked towards the Meiji Restoration (1868), such as Chōshū born Yoshida Shōin (1830-1859).

During the next few years, Matsuoka's support among the lower classes and the youth continued to grow. One piece of evidence for this could be seen in the rapidly expanding network of the Matsuoka Youth Corps, a group that existed to recruit members to Matsuoka's movement and to organize events such as

¹²⁹ Ibid, 106.

¹³⁰ Satoshi Hattori, "Japan's Diplomatic Gamble for Autonomy: Rethinking Matsuoka Yōsuke's Diplomacy," in *Tumultuous Decade: Empire, Society, and Diplomacy in 1930s Japan*, eds. Masato Kimura and Tosh Minohara, Kindle ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).

meetings and lectures.¹³¹ Naturally, the leaders and influential members of the political parties such as Matsuoka's mentor, Yamamoto Jōtarō (1867-1936)— a member of the *Seiyūkai* party that Matsuoka had belonged to during his term on the Diet, were nervous about his popularity. Japanese politicians walked a delicate line, supporting Matsuoka with an aim to appeasement so that he wouldn't turn his dissolution movement on their parties.¹³² To Matsuoka, this grassroots movement was a show of patriotism. Kick out the bickering and ineffective politicians in order to form a pure government with Japan's, and the emperor's, own good at its heart. While Matsuoka revealed in the hero worship and adoration of the common citizen, his focus was on the good of his country and maintaining a strong Japan in the face of international dispute. Lu speculates that this sudden emphasis on Japanism was a way of cleansing himself of the American influence gained by spending his youth in the United States. A way of proving to his superiors and his followers that he was pure and untainted Japanese.¹³³ In the scope of Matsuoka's story, this is where Matsuoka's image begins to drift significantly from being an "all American boy" to being an "all Japanese boy."

During Matsuoka's dissolution movement, he all but disappeared from American newspapers. Appendix A shows that there were only three articles

¹³¹ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 110.

¹³² Ibid, 110-114.

¹³³ Ibid, 117.

published in 1934 which focused on Matsuoka. The two articles published on April 29, 1934, are actually the same article reporting of Matsuoka's defense of Japan's policy in Manchuria. We looked at the version in the *New York Times* at the end of Chapter Two. The version printed in the *Oregonian* is identical but for the forward which identifies Matsuoka's as "an ex-Portland resident, a former University of Oregon student, and [a] man of high influence in Japanese public life."¹³⁴ As we saw in Chapter Two, this article condemns the hypocrisy of the West by comparing Japan's treatment of Manchuria with European and American expansionism. "If the League of Nations, ignoring the United States, were active in Mexico, Americans would object— although Mexico is a comparatively small country beside the United States, while China is seven times as large as Japan in population."¹³⁵ However, the article is written with some degree of respect for the United States, assigning blame to a misunderstanding of the Japanese situation and intent rather than as a planned attack on Japan's moral character. However, the article is markedly stronger in its wording than anything Matsuoka had produced previously, and it placed great emphasis on Japan's moral superiority

¹³⁴ "Japanese Resent Foreign Attitude. Nations Stand Defended by Matsuoka. Ex-Oregon Student Pleads for Western Understanding in Campaign for Peace," *Oregonian* April 29, 1934.

In the *New York Times* the article is: Matsuoka, *Matsuoka Challenges the Critics of the Japanese Policy on China*.

¹³⁵ *Oregonian*, "Japanese Resent Foreign Attitude. Nations Stand Defended by Matsuoka. Ex-Oregon Student Pleads for Western Understanding in Campaign for Peace."

(and by extension his own) in its comparisons of the Japanese treatment of the territories in its sphere with the behavior of Western colonization.

Despite Matsuoka's growing nationalism, Oregon was still eager to claim Matsuoka as its own. A lengthy 1934 interview published in the *Oregonian* centered on an interview with Paul P. Steintorf, the American trade commissioner in Tokyo. Unfortunately for readers wanting to know about trade policy, it would have been difficult to find it without knowing where to look. The headline of the article reads: "Yosuke Matsuoka Has Hard Time With Political Party." The content did focus on trade goods, with the exception of two small paragraphs buried in the middle.

The writer asked the man from Tokio what progress Yosuke Matsuoka, the University of Oregon graduate who withdrew his country from the League of Nations, is making with his attempt at forming a new political party.

"I don't think he is making any headway at all," came the reply. It was explained that the famous statesman's ideas didn't click at all with the group he had hoped to win over.¹³⁶

Mr. Steintorf was not the only one concerned with the shifting politics in Japan. Interested in the Political Party Dissolution Movement and its connection to rising fascism in Japan, Welsh journalist Garrett Jones interviewed Matsuoka to obtain a sense of the political climate in Japan and the ramifications of the changes Matsuoka was pushing. When asked about his political aims, Matsuoka replied: "I am agitating to abolish political parties." "The West is already doing it." Here

¹³⁶ "Yosuke Matsuoka has Hard Time with Political Party," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), July 01, 1934.

Matsuoka is primarily speaking of the party dissolution carried out by Hitler and Mussolini, but he also tries to tie the idea in to the United Kingdom and America: “Even in the United States politics are not carried out now according to party lines.”¹³⁷

Matsuoka explains that his goal was not fascism, but merely the wish to remove political parties, and therefore their ability to exercise their will on government policies. He justified this by framing the question of fascism in terms of Japanese national character and political history.

Examine our national and racial history. Take Hideyoshi, the greatest warrior statesman of our country who lived in the sixteenth century. Even he could not do what Mussolini has done. He had to consult with the daimyos, the lords. Hideyoshi did not unite Japan by force; he had to use diplomacy and negotiate internal treaties by compromise. Take Ieyasu, the founder of Tokugawa Shogunate, which ruled for over two and a half centuries until the Meiji Restoration of 1867. Ieyasu did not have the power of a Hitler or a Mussolini. Even the Emperor has not ruled the country autocratically¹³⁸

To Matsuoka, the removal of political parties was not a consolidation of power into authoritarian rule by force, but rather a “Showa Restoration” giving power back to the emperor, and thus back to the people of Japan.

The State Ministers are solely responsible to the Emperor, and through the Emperor the Ministers are responsible to the people. For 3,000 years we have had that notion. That Ministers are responsible to Parliament can have no place in

¹³⁷ “Will Japan Adopt Fascism?: Interview with Mr Yosuke Matsuoka, Japan’s Last Representative at the League of Nations.” Accessed December 2017, http://www.garethjones.org/articles_far_east/will_japan_adopt_fascism.htm.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

our history, for you cannot make a Briton out of a Japanese in one day. However, the idea has got into our politics that Ministers should be responsible to Parliament and it causes confusion and corruption. I am trying to convince the people that is not our way. We must get back to real Japonism, which means not Fascism but that Japanese democracy which is the rule of the Emperor.¹³⁹

From this point going forward, Matsuoka's image in the English-language press split. Sometimes he was an educated Western thinker, at other times he was the fascist mastermind of Japanese nationalism. Despite his protestations that his goal was not to follow in the authoritarian footsteps of Mussolini or Hitler, his admiration of their policies was clear, a factor which caused major damage to his image in English-language media.

In 1935, Matsuoka realized that dreams of political party dissolution would not come to fruition in the short-term.¹⁴⁰ Deciding that it was time to move on to other projects, Matsuoka headed to Manchuria, a place he had always associated with new beginnings and opportunities.

In Manchuria, Matsuoka became President of the South Manchurian Railway. This position was facilitated by his mentor Yamamoto Jōtarō in order to mediate and heal the conflict between the *Seiyūkai* political party and Matsuoka's political party dissolution movement.¹⁴¹ The move should have been a happy and

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ The parties did eventually disband in 1940, but Matsuoka moved on from his campaign well before this happened.

¹⁴¹ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 116.

comfortable one, as Matsuoka had served the railway before as Vice President. However, the position mandated close cooperation with the Kwangtung Army, which was becoming increasingly restless and defiant toward the politicians controlling Japan. Matsuoka was given the job only on the grounds that he work with the army and that he avoid interfering with the politics of Manchukuo and with the Army itself. He was also warned against allowing any of the political parties to do so.¹⁴² The news of Matsuoka's appointment was reported in the *New York Times*:

Mr. Matsuoka, who has served as vice president of the line, is a believer in forward policy.

The newspapers attach political importance to the change which they regard as a victory for supporters of aggressive economic policies in Manchukuo and North China.¹⁴³

This story is an example of a media narrative that connects past, present, and future, leaving a favorable impression of Matsuoka. It mentions his past as the railroad's vice-president, his current forward-thinking policy, and the projected economic success expected to result from his guidance.

Not all English-language press was pleased with Matsuoka and his policies. *TIME* also put out an article covering Matsuoka's appointment to the South Manchurian Railway. This article echos the accusations of fascism discussed earlier by Garrett Jones. The piece titled "Foreign News: Fascist Revolution?"

¹⁴² Ibid, 121.

¹⁴³ "Manchurian Railway in a Political Shift," *New York Times*, August 1, 1935.

shows the transition in Western thinking about Matsuoka. While the “all American boy” trope was still in play, a more sinister Matsuoka also took form.

The article affirmed Matsuoka’s Oregon heritage and discussed both his bond with Mrs. Beveridge and the difficulty he must have faced as a Japanese man at that time: “Brought up in the U. S. by a hardy Oregon woman, Yosuke Matsuoka was toughened by the hard knocks Japanese got in those days on the Pacific Coast. “He is further described not only as “Japan’s arch-Fascist and patrioteer,” but also as “the most Westernized of Japanese leaders and the most dangerous to the West.”¹⁴⁴ In a span of five years, Matsuoka’s image in the West had gone from being pro-Japanese but earnestly international to “arch-fascist patrioteer.” This theme of Matsuoka as dangerous to the West only grew stronger in the coming years.

While Matsuoka’s leadership of the South Manchurian Railway was predicted to be a successful venture, economic success was not easily accomplished. Two years into his work, Matsuoka was caught in a tug-of-war with the Kwantung Army over the government’s purse strings. According to an article published in 1937, both the railway and the army needed funds for continued development of their own spheres of influence within Manchukuo, but the government and the bankers on the mainland proved unwilling to forward any funds. The article hints at discord. “Mr. Matsuoka’s visit was less important in

¹⁴⁴ “Foreign News:Fascist Revolution?” *TIME*, August 12, 1935.

itself but more significant as a symbol. That he had to argue for money for Manchukuo and, what is more, that he argued in vain is a portent.”¹⁴⁵

During his struggle to manage the railway, Matsuoka again took to English-language media to gain sympathy and support for Japan’s position in Manchuria. In 1938 he published *Building Up Manchuria*. The book is a 247-page volume that details the history of the region including its position as an independent territory subjugated by China and Russia. Matsuoka touted the progress brought to Manchuria by Japanese-built infrastructure and commerce. His goal was to show that through Japanese leadership Manchuria had improved in every respect. He explained:

For long ages this land was ruled by successive war-lords whose main, if not sole, business in life was to wage war, further their own interests and power, to provide solely for their own families, and to welter in luxurious pleasures...

...Within the area adjoining the railway the South Manchuria Railway Company went to the limit of their resources to suit the tastes of its inhabitants, sometimes even to the extent of anticipating their wishes. Within the bounds of their authority, the inhabitants, drawn from five different nationalities, found peace and harmony, and they were content to go on, living and letting live.¹⁴⁶

Matsuoka continued to be covered sporadically in the English-language newspapers. Just as his promotion to president of the South Manchurian Railway had been announced, so too was his resignation from this post. Interestingly, the

¹⁴⁵ Nathaniel Peffer, “Outlays in Manchukuo Pinch Japan,” *New York Times*, January 24, 1937.

¹⁴⁶ Yosuke Matsuoka, *Building Up Manchuria* (Tokyo: The Herald of Asia, 1938). 128-129.

news of his resignation was broadcast before any official announcement had been made. Indeed, the reporting of his resignation was combined with a juicer bit of speculation about his future, the likelihood that Matsuoka would be tapped to head the Foreign Ministry. Should this occur, the story explained, Japan would see extensive personnel shifts and drastic policy alterations within the ministry. With the importance of his probable position in mind, the remainder of the article details a narrative of Matsuoka's life, education, and career up to that point in time.¹⁴⁷

The prediction turned out to be correct. In July, 1940 the military manipulated the resignation of Prime Minister Yonai Mitsumasa (1880-1948), thus forcing the resignation of his entire cabinet. While at that point in time there had been no official decisions made as to the new members, Matsuoka's name was put forth for foreign minister. English-language media, despite having been critical of Matsuoka's fascist leanings, supported his candidacy.

As British-born Japanologist and prolific journalist Hugh Byas reported in the *New York Times*:

The most important post and the most difficult to fill is that of Foreign Minister. There are almost no senior diplomats available who would be acceptable to the army. Yōsuke Matsuoka and Toshio Shiratori are the favorites in Nationalist quarters. Mr. Matsuoka is an able and ambitious man, capable of carrying out strong measures. Mr. Shiratori openly advocates an alliance with Germany and an

¹⁴⁷ "Matsuoka to Quit as Railway Head," *New York Times*, October 18, 1938.

understanding with Russia and his appointment would please none except the extremists.¹⁴⁸

Foreshadowing is a literary device that builds tension within a narrative.

While this news story was published without any way of knowing how the situation would play out, it still shows a strange foreshadowing here. That these two names should be thrown together at this stage is noteworthy. While Shiratori was accused of amicability towards Germany and Russia, in actuality it would be Matsuoka who secured relationships with these nations as well as with Germany.

¹⁴⁸ Hugh Byas, "Japanese Cabinet Forced to Resign," *New York Times*, July 17, 1940.



Figure 3:

Matsuoka in Germany to discuss the Tripartite pact with Hitler, March 1941. Julian Ryall. "Yasukuni Shrine: The 14 'Class A' War Criminals Honoured by Japan." *Telegraph*, August 14, 2014.

This photograph, chosen for its clarity, is almost identical to the photo of Matsuoka and Hitler published with the article "Matsuoka Confers Long with Hitler," in the *New York Times* on March 28, 1941.

3.2 - Forging the Tripartite Pact

In July 1940 Matsuoka was at last offered the position of foreign minister. He took this position in the cabinet of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro.¹⁴⁹ Matsuoka's term in Konoe's cabinet was not to be a lengthy one. In fact, it lasted just a year, ending with his ouster in July, 1941. During his year as foreign minister, relations with the United States steadily worsened, particularly after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.¹⁵⁰

The Japanese change in direction of foreign policy under Matsuoka was almost immediate. On August 3, the government rolled out a new policy with a new catch-phrase, "Greater East Asia." The *New York Times* made no delay in announcing Japan's new standpoint. The publication marks a decided shift of attitude towards Matsuoka. In a two column story that ran the full length of the paper, Hugh Byas, firmly placed responsibility for the diplomatic changes in Matsuoka's hands and painted him as anti-American:

Japan today is being borne forward by driving forces which share all the ideals of the new Germany. Those forces have begun national preparations with the same thoroughness as Hitler began preparing his present triumph. The Japanese nation, like the German nation, is being steeled to endure to the limit today in order to achieve glory and riches in the future.

The mood of the nation is perhaps best reflected in a statement made to the press the other day by Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka. "The Japanese Government is

¹⁴⁹ Alternately romanized as Konoye.

¹⁵⁰ Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision," 193.

through with toadying," he said. "Previous Cabinets believed that Japan should be friends with powers that assisted her in China but reject those who obstructed her. That is still our policy.

The Cabinet will make all the friends it can to accomplish its new foreign policy, but some countries can become our friends while others seem hopeless. For now on Japan will not make vain efforts to shake hands with countries who cannot be turned into friends."¹⁵¹

Byas closes his article with an analysis of Matsuoka's words. He conclude:

"among other things Mr. Matsuoka's statement is considered here to be a definite and sensational abandonment of any attempts to appease the United States."¹⁵²

In addition to the text, the article includes a photograph of Matsuoka dressed in a long black overcoat and holding a topcoat and cane (**Figure 4**). He is somber and unsmiling. The caption of the photograph simply reads "ambitious."¹⁵³

The tone of Byas' evaluation is interesting. It seems unusual to associate the idea of friendship with that of toadying or appeasement. It seems more logical that these are opposing terms, and that Matsuoka meant them as such. If we examine Matsuoka's words in light of his thinking on Western attitudes discussed at the end of Chapter Two, we can see that Matsuoka was absolutely convinced that any show of deference from Japan would result in more demands from the Western

¹⁵¹ Hugh Byas, "Japan is Now Pushing a 'Greater East Asia'," *New York Times*, August 4, 1940.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

AMBITIOUS



Figure 4:
"Ambitious." Hugh Byas, "Japan is Now Pushing a 'Greater East Asia'," *New York Times*, August 4, 1940.

country. By making such a firm, declarative statement to the press, Matsuoka attempted to repeat his success in Geneva by being blunt and unapologetic about his aims and intentions. Yes, Matsuoka's tone was aggressive, it was measured to be so. Perhaps Byas' reaction to Matsuoka's statement gives us some insight into America's views at this time. Through Matsuoka's use of language, Byas paints America as a country that expects appeasement and toadying, as he makes no effort to separate these ideas from friendship.

Matsuoka was a man of action as well as words. He followed the announcement of Japan's new foreign policy with the action of "purging" Japan's foreign service of diplomats with liberal leanings and those who were sympathetic to British or American interests. When reporting this news, Byas was slightly more charitable to Matsuoka, than before, explaining the action as a joint decision between the Cabinet and the army: "There is no doubt that this blow at the diplomatic service was planned when the formation of the cabinet was discussed by the army."¹⁵⁴

Matsuoka, true to his word, combined Japan's pull away from the United States and Britain with an equal stretching out towards Germany, Italy, and Russia. One fruit of this labor was the friendship and mutual cooperation outlined in the Tripartite Pact.

¹⁵⁴ Hugh Byas, "Tokyo 'Purge' Calls 40 Diplomats Home," *New York Times*, August 23, 1940.

The Tripartite Pact is credited to Matsuoka, and is often treated as if it were solely his idea and the result of his efforts. However, in reality The military as well as diplomats like Shiratori had been attempting to come to an agreement with Germany for a some time before Matsuoka became foreign minister. Where they had failed, Matsuoka succeeded. Lu points out that the failure to secure a deal with Germany was a major issue that had forced the resignation of the Hiranuma cabinet in 1939, and was also the cause of a lack of confidence in the Yonai cabinet, contributing to its collapse. While it is common to consider the agreement with Hitler to be Matsuoka's idea, in reality credit should be given to him for achieving a long-standing goal.¹⁵⁵

Matsuoka's "bad-boy" image was enhanced greatly by his successful negotiations with Hitler. While it is indisputable that he was the one who completed the pact with Germany, the success may have had less to do with Matsuoka's intentions or skill, and more to do with being the man in charge at the right time.

In August 1940, Hitler had come to the conclusion that Great Britain would not readily surrender to German forces, and was being sustained by the United States and the Soviet Union. While Germany was confident in its ability to fight the Soviets, it needed to take every precaution be sure that America did not enter into the war in Europe. Hitler's agreement to the Tripartite Pact was a means to

¹⁵⁵ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 154.

this end.¹⁵⁶ If this theory, which explains why Matsuoka succeeded when previous administrations had failed to secure an alliance with Germany, is correct, then Matsuoka's successful negotiation was more a matter of being the one in office at the time Germany was willing to deal, rather than being the mastermind of any arrangement, despite how he was later be categorized. For Matsuoka, diplomacy with Germany was not about allying in order to fight the United States, but about deterring America from interfering in Japan's policies in Asia and keeping the United States and Japan from entering into war.

No matter his intentions when signing, once the pact was signed, Matsuoka felt honor bound to keep his promise to Germany. Kershaw likens the situation to a statement made a few years earlier by Matsuoka after Japan signed the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936:

It is characteristic of the Japanese race that, once we have promised to cooperate, we never look back or enter into an alliance with others. It is for us only to march side by side, resolved to go forward together, even if it means committing double suicide.¹⁵⁷

The news of the pact was not well received in the United States. Shortly after the conclusion of the pact, Matsuoka was quoted in the *New York Times* giving assurances to a nervous American population that the pact was designed to insure peace rather than as an impetus for war:

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 158.

German newspaper editor Theo Sonmer was an early advocates of this view.

¹⁵⁷ Kershaw, *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World 1940-1941*, Kindle Edition, Chapter Five.

The tripartite pact was not entered into with the intention of directing it 'against' the United States, but was directed, if at all, 'for' the United States.

The Parties to the pact wished earnestly that such a powerful nation as the United States in particular, and all other nations at present neutral would not be involved in the European war or enter by any chance into a conflict with Japan because of the China incident or otherwise.

Such an eventuality, with the possibility of bringing an awful catastrophe upon humanity, is enough to make one shudder, if one stops to imagine the consequences. In short, the pact is a peace pact.¹⁵⁸

True to form, Matsuoka pleaded for peace while threatening force. In an interview with *TIME*, Matsuoka was quoted:

Japan will be compelled to fight the United States if our sister nation on the shores of the Pacific enters the war in Europe. I fling this challenge to America: If she in her contentment is going to blindly and stubbornly stick to the status quo in the Pacific, then we will fight America. For it would be better to perish than to maintain the status quo.

I have always considered America my second home land. I have always known the American people as a good and decent people, so it grieves me to realize that today America is the most unprogressive nation on earth... It is nice for the United States to say that we must settle everything peacefully, but if we wait for America we must perish in the years of waiting. So I say to America: Now is the time for action, and Japan will not hesitate when its hour arrives.¹⁵⁹

The words of this interview were received as an insult by the American government. While President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull remained silent on the

¹⁵⁸ Hugh Byas, "Foreign Minister Matsuoka Says the Alliance is Not Directed Against Us," *The New York Times*, October 11, 1940.

¹⁵⁹ "International: Thunder in the East," *TIME*, October 14, 1940.

issue, Senator Key Pittman, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, attacked Matsuoka in an address during his campaign for re-election.

According to the *New York Times*:

Discussing the foreign situation and the recent joining of Japan and the Axis powers, Senator Pittman described Yosuke Matsuoka as the “bluffing bulldog of the Japanese military clique which has threatened the United States with war unless we surrender our rights in the Pacific and cease to protest against the mistreatment of our citizens in China.” “We will do anything honorable to reach a peaceful adjustment,” Mr. Pittman said, “but we will not surrender our rights by reason of a brutal bluff made by an insignificant Japanese soldier.”¹⁶⁰

Although it eventually came out that the interviews in *TIME* that had spurred this reaction were not intended for publication, but were rather given as background, and off the record, the damage was done. Matsuoka retracted the statement quickly, and described the release of this statement a “betrayal of confidence.”¹⁶¹ Even though Matsuoka’s claim was backed up by an investigation by Ambassador Grew, the words were out and this media blunder helped to further seed American mistrust of Matsuoka.

While the *TIME* article was decidedly against Matsuoka painting him as an aggressor with ill intentions towards the United States, the sense of betrayal and transformation of Matsuoka to “bad-boy” status did not quite reach Oregon.

Furthermore, just a month after Matsuoka became foreign minister, and about a

¹⁶⁰ “Matsuoka is Called a 'Bluffing Bulldog': Pittman Assails Japan's Foreign Minister and Army Clique,” *New York Times*, October 18, 1940.

¹⁶¹ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 215.

month before the Tripartite Pact was sealed, an article appeared in the Portland *Oregonian* newspaper: “Pacific War may Rest in Ex-Portlander’s Hands”¹⁶² In contrast to the somber photograph accompanying the Hugh Byas article discussed earlier, the photo attached to the *Oregonian* harkens back to the friendly and cartoonish Matsuoka of Geneva, the article prominently displayed a large picture of a comically posed Matsuoka lifting his hat in greeting (**Figure 5**). The article reminded Oregonians of Matsuoka’s background, especially for those who were too young, or disinterested seven years earlier when he visited Oregon fresh from the sensational role he had played in Geneva.

The article reintroduced the “all American boy” trope through a recounting of the history of the poor Japanese boy taken in by a kind American family, his struggle to obtain education, and his conversion to Christianity. Matsuoka’s words of love for his second home, taken from his 1933 visit, were printed here:

It is a kind of fate,” he said, low and slowly. “I can’t tell to this day why she took care of me, why she loved me, and she cared for me as though I had been one of her own boys.”

“The memory offer kindness is freshen my mind, and next to my own mother, who now awaits me in Japan at the age of 90, Mrs. Beveridge is dearest in my heart of any other person.¹⁶³ I was a wild little boy when she and her brother William Dunbar, took me into their home here.”

¹⁶² David W. Hazen, “Pacific War may Rest in Ex-Portlander's Hands,” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), sec. Magazine, August 4, 1940.

¹⁶³ This passage is recalling words Matsuoka spoke in 1933. At the time of publication of this article in 1940, his mother, Matsuoka Yū, had already passed away in April, 1936.



Figure 5:
Smiling and playful photograph of Matsuoka. David W. Hazen, "Pacific War may Rest in Ex-Portlander's Hands," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), sec. Magazine, August 4, 1940.



PORTLAND Shiroji Yuki, Japanese consul here, places wreath on grave of Mrs. Isabelle Beveridge, who mothered Dr. Yosuke Matsuoka, Japanese foreign minister, in this country.

Figure 6:

"Dr. Matsuoka Sends Wreath. Japanese Leader Honors Benefactor," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), sec. 2, September 13, 1940.

That Matsuoka still remembered the kindness of Mrs. Beveridge was further supported by his actions at that time. In commemoration of his rise to foreign minister, instructed Yuki Shiroji, the Japanese Consul, to lay a wreath of chrysanthemums on her grave (**Figure 6**).¹⁶⁴

In addition to reviving Matsuoka as a beloved son of Oregon, the article that accompanied the photograph particularly addressed the issue of the build up of the American naval fleet in the Pacific. The American presence in the Pacific had been a source of worry and a cause of friction between Japan and America since Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. When asked if he thought America should withdraw the fleet, Matsuoka made the following reply that, while not overtly threatening, was an indication of growing tension:

I have no right to say anything about that, having been sent by my government to present the Manchurian question. But there are some Japanese in Japan who have misgivings on the matter... While I maintain it is none of my business where you assemble your fine fleet, I would say it might be better not to concentrate the entire fleet in the Pacific at this time. As it is, many persons in Japan think America is taking the part of China, and the concentration is unfortunate, I think!¹⁶⁵

The "all American boy" still existed in Oregon, and if Matsuoka's negotiations with Hitler made him feel any less like an Oregonian, it did not show. In October, 1940, the university alumni magazine printed an article written by Matsuoka in order to apprise the United States of the conditions in the Far East.

¹⁶⁴ "Dr. Matsuoka Sends Wreath. Japanese Leader Honors Benefactor," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), sec. 2, September 13, 1940.

¹⁶⁵ Hazen, *Pacific War may Rest in Ex-Portlander's Hands*.

Although it does not say when the article was requested, Matsuoka makes it obvious that he wrote it while busy with his new position, and that writing it was an act of devotion to his former home. He prefaced the report with:

When the last mail across the Pacific brought me word that I should write something for our college alumni paper, OLD OREGON, of the University of Oregon, I happened to be one of the busiest men in Tokyo. But a call from my old college I looked upon as something demanding obedience. For the thought of Alma Mater conjures up the image of Mother, whom we Japanese are early taught to hold with pious thoughts. Like a dutiful son I sit down and write. And as I do so I feel I could write nothing better than a report on the country to which I belong.¹⁶⁶

Perhaps Matsuoka wrote this preface knowing Japan's alliance with Germany was causing tensions between the two countries to deepen, and wanted to ease possible backlash by reminding Americans that he was, in effect, one of them, again renewing his identity as the "all American boy," assuming Matsuoka's motive was purely propaganda is not in keeping with Matsuoka's character or conduct as a whole, which proves him to have been a passionate man driven by the emotions of a moment, but nonetheless, an honest man.

Matsuoka used the remainder of the "report" to summarize the situation in Asia. Much like his speeches during the Geneva conference, Matsuoka showed his awareness of the international criticism against Japan, and asserted his country's right to determine its own destiny without interference from the West.

The East that has often been accused of being static is swinging into a new pace. The East now demands what it

¹⁶⁶ Yosuke Matsuoka, "A Far Eastern Report," *Old Oregon*, 22, no. 2 (1940).

has not done for ages: a chance to build its own house and a chance to live its own life under the new order born of its own mind.

Our undertaking has often been criticized abroad. Because of this undertaking we have lost the sympathy of those people whose friendship and opinion we valued most. We have not been deaf to voices raised in our condemnation. But we remain steadfast to our purpose because we know its true quality. We feel we have been wrongfully charged and condemned before the bar of international opinion. But we remain faithful to the spirit that gives us strength and sustains us in these none too cheerful times and we feel that we may bide our time because we know "counsels to which time hath not been called, time will not ratify."¹⁶⁷

In the meantime the construction of a new East Asia must go on.¹⁶⁸

The American press, and the *New York Times* in particular, showed Matsuoka as foreign minister in total control of Japan's diplomatic negotiations. Beginning in March 1941, the *Oregonian* ran Associated Press stories covering Matsuoka's tour of Europe, including his meetings in Moscow, Berlin, and Rome. Before leaving Japan for Europe he reportedly showed an interest in talking with the American government, telling the journalists "I am leaving with an open mind. I am willing to extend my tour to Washington and London if invited."¹⁶⁹

The papers over the following weeks would be peppered with small reports of Matsuoka's meetings with Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini. The question of

¹⁶⁷ A quote from Ralph Waldo Emerson. Here Matsuoka means that any venture takes time and patience to produce success.

¹⁶⁸ Yosuke Matsuoka, "A Far Eastern Report," *Old Oregon*, 22, no. 2 (1940), 6-8.

¹⁶⁹ "Trip Started by Matsuoka," *Oregonian* March 14, 1941.

whether the talks would help to settle world affairs or further stir the pot was in everyone's mind. Even with such a serious situation hanging over the globe, the *New York Times* would continue to make light of the situation by dismissing it as showmanship, all style and little substance.

Conscious of the fact that, in the words of Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, his personal contacts with Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini may decide the issue of war or peace for them, the Japanese today turned their eyes toward Berlin, where so many fateful decisions have been made in late years and where Mr. Matsuoka is being received tonight with the greatest honors that the Nazis' unrivaled showmanship can organize.¹⁷⁰

The spectacular greeting that awaited Matsuoka in Germany made the front page of the *Oregonian*:

In a ceremony scarcely less spectacular than those for visiting royalty, Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka of Japan was welcomed here Wednesday for conversations which German commentators said would be intended to promote the axis' new order in both Europe and the Far East... The Japanese foreign minister issued a message to the German people assuring them "The Japanese nation is with you in joy and sorrow." Matsuoka said Japan has faith in Hitler and the capacities of the German people.¹⁷¹

This sentiment echoes Matsuoka's earlier claim of loyalty to an alliance once made, even should the agreement not prove beneficial to the parties involved.

While Matsuoka voiced his belief in Germany, his words foreshadowed some indications of a rocky if not tragic road ahead.

¹⁷⁰ Otto D. Tolischus, "German 'Souvenir' Awaited by Japan," *New York Times*, March 27, 1941.

¹⁷¹ "Japan's Envoy Gets a Big Hand," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 27, 1941.

Matsuoka's March 14, 1941 statement of willingness to visit Washington, and London sparked a widespread interest on the topic of Matsuoka coming to America.¹⁷² A month later, articles started appearing in the *New York Times* with “Matsuoka Urged to See Roosevelt” on April 28 suggesting he make such a trip.¹⁷³ Soon afterward, the idea of a friendly Matsuoka wanting to negotiate with Washington was rejected by head of the Information Bureau, Ishii Koh, who claimed that Washington had done the inviting. “Japanese Says We Invited Matsuoka,” and that just because Japan recently negotiated a non-aggression pact with Russia (April 14, 1941) did not mean it would attempt to do so with the United States.¹⁷⁴

Despite heavy pressure from his colleagues in Japan, this suggestion ended in a complete rejection of the idea on May 5, “Matsuoka Rejects Idea of Trip to U.S.”¹⁷⁵ While Matsuoka did not reject diplomacy with the United States, he did insist that he understood America’s position and suggested that Roosevelt or Hull

¹⁷² *Oregonian*, “Trip Started by Matsuoka,”

¹⁷³ See Appendix A for a chronological list of *New York Times* and *Oregonian* articles featuring Matsuoka.

¹⁷⁴ Otto D. Tolischus, “Japanese Says we Invited Matsuoka,” *New York Times*, May 3, 1941.

¹⁷⁵ Otto D. Tolischus, “Matsuoka Rejects Idea of Trip to U.S.,” *New York Times*, May 5, 1941.

Many *NYT* articles were published at this time, and five out of six dealing with the possible visit to Washington, were authored by Otto D. Tolishus, a journalist who had already won a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of the German warpath in 1940.

visit him in Japan instead, again perpetuating the idea that was America and not Japan that failed to understand the global situation:

I understand... that some reports regarding my visit to the United States are current in the United States, but I think under the present circumstances that it is unnecessary for me to visit the United States because I well understand the current situation of the United States.

I would rather wish that President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull could visit Japan to see the actual situation of Japan.¹⁷⁶

The logical progression of this series of articles reflects the progression of Matsuoka's image in the West. First, good natured and willing to negotiate, then misunderstood but still willing to cooperate, to finally asserting his own superior wisdom and demanding unearned concessions from the United States. The media's loss of confidence in Matsuoka is encapsulated in a June 22, 1941 political cartoon showing a stark and grumpy looking Matsuoka with the caption "Expert on America?" (**Figure 7**)¹⁷⁷

For Matsuoka, the end of the road would come much sooner than he might have anticipated. Soon after his return to Japan from Europe, he entered into a deep disagreement with the other members of the Konoe cabinet over the course that Japan should take next. While Matsuoka was in Moscow he had spoken with the American Ambassador to Russia and told him to prepare for upcoming

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Otto D. Tolischus, "Japanese Ponder War on America," *New York Times*, sec. E, June 22, 1941.



Figure 7:
“Expert on America?” Otto D. Tolischus, “Japanese Ponder War on America,”
New York Times, sec. E, June 22, 1941.

negotiations between America and Japan. At the same time, without consulting with Matsuoka, Prime Minister Konoe had sanctioned the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Nomura Kichisaburō (1877-1964), to enter into negotiations with the United States, resulting in the Japanese-American Draft Understanding.¹⁷⁸ When Matsuoka found out about the Draft Understanding, and saw that the document not only went counter to instructions he had given to Nomura, but included an oral statement condemning Matsuoka, he was outraged.¹⁷⁹ Matsuoka always maintained that the Tripartite Pact was initiated with the express purpose of avoiding war with the United States:

The tripartite pact was not entered into with the intention of directing it 'against' the United States, but was directed, if at all, 'for' the United States. The parties to the pact wished earnestly that such a powerful nation as the United States, in particular, and all other nations at present neutral would not be involved in the European war or enter by any chance into a conflict with Japan because of the China incident or otherwise.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Hattori, *Japan's Diplomatic Gamble for Autonomy: Rethinking Matsuoka Yōsuke's Diplomacy*

Kazuo Yagami, *Konoe Fumimaro and the Failure of Peace in Japan, 1937-1941: A Critical Appraisal of the Three-Time Prime Minister* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006). 108-109

¹⁷⁹ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 237

¹⁸⁰ Hugh Byas, "Axis Tie for Peace, Japanese Asserts," *New York Times*, October 11, 1940.

Despite continuous assurances to the United States and the international community through the English-language press, Hull's oral statement accompanying the Draft Understanding was unequivocal:

Some Japanese leaders in influential official positions are definitely committed to a course which calls for support of Nazi Germany and its policies of conquest, and that the only kind of understanding with the United States which they would endorse is one that would envisage Japan 'fighting on the side of Hitler should the United States become involved in the European hostilities through carrying out its present policy of self defense'

So long as such Japanese leaders maintain this attitude in their official positions and apparently seek to influence public opinion in Japan in the direction indicated, is it not illusory to expect that the adoption of a proposal such as the one under consideration offers a basis for achieving substantial results along the desired lines?¹⁸¹

Hulls statement was a direct reprimand of Matsuoka and his diplomatic policies. In essence, Hull refused to enter into diplomatic relations with Japan as long as Matsuoka remained in government.

At the time Hull's revisions to the Draft Understanding reached Matsuoka (June 24), Germany had just invaded the Soviet Union. At this time Konoe wanted to reach a compromise with the United States, but Matsuoka insisted that by entering into the war against Russia, based on the Tripartite Pact, Japan and Germany could secure a quick victory and thus have stronger negotiating power

¹⁸¹ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 237-238.

with America.¹⁸² Matsuoka and Konoe reached an impasse. Since Matsuoka refused to resign his position, the entire cabinet forced his resignation by resigning en masse. However, Konoe was immediately re-appointed as prime minister, and re-established the same cabinet but for Matsuoka.¹⁸³

Matsuoka was ousted from his position in July 1941, but the damage to his reputation through the Tripartite Pact was cemented in English-Language media. One article published in early July, 1941 in the wildly distributed, weekly, general-interest magazine, *Liberty* was titled “Why Matsuoka Hates the United States.”¹⁸⁴

Most of the two-page article authored by the columnist George Sokolsky was devoted to an analysis of Matsuoka's feelings towards the United States. The narrative began by showing how Matsuoka's personality had been Americanized during his teenage years in Oregon, causing him much much difficulty and conflict upon his return to Japan. Sokolsky writes about Matsuoka as the “all American boy”:

Here he worked as a bus boy, a waiter, in lumber camps in Oregon and Washington. Here he learned to speak English like an American, to smoke a pipe, to go directly to the point and to hit hard... It was only when he returned to Japan that he realized that he was unfitted for any career there, as he

¹⁸² Hattori, *Japan's Diplomatic Gamble for Autonomy: Rethinking Matsuoka Yōsuke's Diplomacy*.

¹⁸³ Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 238.

¹⁸⁴ Byas, *Axis Tie for Peace, Japanese Asserts*, 9; George E. Sokolsky, “Why Matsuoka Hates the United States,” *Liberty*, July 5, 1941, 10-11.

knew little Japanese and less of the Chinese classics. His problem then was to start his education all over again.¹⁸⁵

In Sokolsky's story, Matsuoka's supposed hatred of the United States resulted from racism. This later became a common detail for casual writings on Matsuoka. follow a logic that is common in writings about Matsuoka in English. Sokolsky's narrative makes the argument that Matsuoka, and all Japanese or non-white people, must hold an intense dislike of America due to the racist attitudes they were forced to endure:

Does Matsuoka hate the United States? Americans may not like the thought, and Japanese and Chinese will deny the truth of my assertion, but I am sure that I am correct when I say that every Oriental who has ever lived in this country resents the attitude of racial superiority, the contempt that "white" folks have for the pigmented races. Matsuoka lived in America during the years of fiercest agitation against Orientals in the pacific coast states. That agitation left its mark upon a sensitive human being.¹⁸⁶

In his conclusion, Sokolsky attempted another explanation as to "why Matsuoka Hates America." Noting the well known saying, "The enemy of my enemy is my Friend," Sokolsky shifted the logic to "The friend of my enemy is my enemy." Matsuoka had negotiated the Tripartite Pact that allied Japan with

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 10.

It was noted in Chapter Two that Matsuoka received some training in the Chinese classics from his father, and no sources substantiated Sokolsy's idea that Matsuoka's Japanese was insufficient. To the contrary, upon his return to Japan in 1902, Matsuoka was able to attend classes at Tokyo Imperial University and passed the government exam to enter the diplomatic service with top marks.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 10-11.

Germany and Italy. Following the above logic, Matsuoka must therefore have hated America:

Before he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the present Cabinet, he was appointed president of the South Manchuria Railway, during the organization of the new state of Manchukuo. He had to work closely with the Japanese militarists; but he had to deal day by day with the border problem, arising in Manchuria and Mongolia, with Soviet Russia. I have often wondered whether the Soviet-Japanese Alliance was not born in his mind in those days.

It was during this period that Matsuoka, offended by the attitude of the League of Nations toward Japan by American and British support of China, by the so-called Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition of Japan's position in Manchuria, turned on America and aroused his people to friendship for Hitler and the Axis.

Matsuoka, more than any one else in Japan, is responsible for Japan's alliance with Hitler and now with Stalin. He has completely reversed Japan's attitude of friendship for Great Britain and the United States, and fear of and even hatred for Soviet Russia.¹⁸⁷

An interesting thing to note is that Sokolsy's accusation of hatred is specifically leveled against Matsuoka. Matsuoka is accused of "rousing his people" against the United States and hatred from Japan stemmed from Matsuoka's own feelings and influence.

Sokolsky's editorial is representative of the new "bad boy" images of Matsuoka that appeared in English-language media, in particular he suggested that Matsuoka hated America. The article also conforms to the timeline for this perceived shift in Matsuoka's image—the completion of the Tripartite Pact with

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, 10-11.

Germany and Italy in September 1940. This article was the first direct mention of Matsuoka “hating” the United States, and thus played a pivotal role in the myth making process; Matsuoka’s hatred of the United States was based on plausible and persuasive narrative that lacked any concrete evidence for the existence of such hatred. Indeed with Matsuoka out of the way, the new Konoe Cabinet continued unimpeded toward war with the United States, culminating with the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The convoluted road to war is well illustrated through the cover illustrations and photographs of *TIME*. During his lifetime, five *TIME* covers featuring important Japanese officials appeared. The way in which these figures, Emperor Hirohito, Foreign Minister Uchida, War Minister Araki, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, and, again, Emperor Hirohito were displayed show a timeline of the relationship and tensions the United States had with Japan over the course of Matsuoka’s career.

The first three images show the men in stiff, and passive postures, dressed in traditional Japanese clothing. The emperor (**Figure 8**) is shown in color in 1928, somber against a black background as he emerged onto the world stage two years after his ascension. Uchida (**Figure 9**, 1932) and Araki (**Figure 10**, 1933) are in black and white, and are sitting stiffly, seemingly unconcerned with the affairs of the world. Here they are curiosities to be viewed rather than actors in important affairs.

In contrast to the first three covers, the last two, Matsuoka (**Figure 11**, 1941) and a mature Hirohito (1945), are full of color and vigor, and denote a sense of strength and interest in the affairs of the world. Matsuoka is shown in a western style suit, hat in hand. This is far more similar to the Matsuoka seen in **Figure 4** than in **Figure 5**. In **Figure 5** Matsuoka is a benign and comical character. In contrast, Byas' anti-American Matsuoka in **Figure 4** is somber and reserved. Like **Figure 4**, *TIME*'s Matsuoka is dignified. The dignified demeanor is made more menacing in brilliant color with the rising sun background. It shows Matsuoka as a modern man with the backing of radiant and patriotic nation. In this picture, Matsuoka is seen in mythical terms. There is nothing real or human about the image, which is sharply different from the previous covers.

Matsuoka's *TIME* cover bears a far more striking resemblance to **Figure 12**, Emperor Hirohito in all his military glory as he is gifted a weapon from his Sun Goddess ancestor in order to lead Japan to victory than it does to any other cover, but there is one more striking difference. Looking at the captions on the first three covers, "The Son of Heaven," "Japan's Foreign Minister," and "War Minister Sadao Araki," the nuance of these captions is introductory. It is though *TIME* does not expect the reader to know the subject of the cover. The latter two covers are captioned "Foreign Minister Matsuoka," and "Emperor Hirohito." Both men are given only by surname, suggesting the audience possessed a much greater familiarity with these men. The composition and detail of these five covers are

commensurate with the increasing global interest in and knowledge about Japan over the years, but also with the idea of Japan as a growing threat over that time.

Matsuoka dealt with America during a particularly difficult period of diplomatic relations. In the late 1930s and especially after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, America was unable to sanction Japan's actions in the East, and Japan was unable to give ground to appease American ideals. This tension is shown in the way Matsuoka expressed admiration for America in one breath, and exasperation in the next, both coaxing and antagonizing the United States to form better relations with Japan. After the war, Matsuoka was arrested as a Class A War Criminal and indicted on several counts. That Matsuoka would be blamed for war was foreshadowed even before he left office. On March 30, 1941 a widely known writer on Far Eastern affairs, H.G. Woodhead, published an article accusing Matsuoka of the crime of *lèse-majesté*— the offense of violating the dignity of a reigning sovereign. In this case, Woodhead made the case: "Emperor Hirohito of Japan consented to Nipponese adhesion to the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo alliance only with the stipulation it would not mean war with the United States." He contended that Matsuoka was "flaunting the sacred imperial edict" when he sought out talks with Hitler and Mussolini in order to settle the question of what would happen in the Pacific.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ H. G. Woodhead, "Lèse-majesté Acts Laid to Matsuoka," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 30, 1941.

By the time Japan and the United States went to war Matsuoka's transition from "all America boy" to "bad boy" had been completed. While the former never disappeared, the "bad boy" image is the one that has withstood the test of time.




Figure 8:
"The Son of Heaven," *TIME* cover November 19, 1928 - Emperor Hirohito



Figure 9:
"Japan's Foreign Minister," *TIME* cover September 5, 1932 - Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai




Figure 10:
"War Minister Sadao Araki," *TIME* cover January 23, 1933



Figure 11:
"Foreign Minister Matsuoka," *TIME* cover July 7, 1941 - Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke



Figure 12:
"Emperor Hirohito, "TIME cover May 25, 1945

Chapter 4 - The End of the Road

The previous chapter examined the transformation of Matsuoka's media image from "all American boy" to that of a "bad boy." While there is no defining moment when media and public opinion turned against Matsuoka, it is clear that his reputation was significantly tarnished by the time Japan and the United States went to war in December, 1941. This chapter will continue the theme of myth-making through an examination of reporting on Matsuoka after the outbreak of war. For a large part, Matsuoka lived his life out of public view, but not out of public mind. The articles published during his time on the world stage left a lasting impression on a global audience. This chapter will look at Matsuoka's reaction to the war, his feelings about the ongoing conflict, and the role media played in indicting him as a war criminal. Unfortunately, Matsuoka died of tuberculosis while preparing for Tokyo War Crimes Trial. He did not live to defend himself, but the process of myth making continued to be perpetuated well after the war had ended.

4.1 - Life After the Foreign Ministry

Matsuoka was forced out of government on July 16, 1941, but as negotiations between Japan and the United States failed to produce results, there

was speculation that Matsuoka might re-emerge. On October 1, 1941 an article appeared in the *New York Times*:

As indications multiply that the tentative American-Japanese parleys in Washington will result in a stalemate, inner circles in Tokyo and other key centers in the Far East are already expecting another Japanese Cabinet overturn, with Prince Fumimaro Konoye probably surviving as Premier and with the re-emergence of Yosuke Matsuoka and his adherents in places of high authority, backed by extremists.

Significantly, when Mr. Matsuoka was forced into retirement because of the loss of face as a result of Adolf Hitler's assault upon Soviet Russia it was announced that the former Foreign Minister was ailing and needed a period of rest and recuperation. Equally significant now, when it is becoming apparent that Tokyo's tentative feelers in Washington will be without result, another terrific loss of face is looming and it is announced that Mr. Matsuoka has been restored to his full health and vigor.¹⁸⁹

Unfortunately for Matsuoka, this possibility to return to the Foreign Ministry, and even the return to his former vigor, never played out. Considering Matsuoka's character, his love of the spotlight, his need for recognition, and his long-winded tirades and propensity for debate, it is not surprising that Matsuoka did not take well to retirement. The already intolerable situation was made worse by declining health and the knowledge that few further opportunities to restore his personal and family legacy would be forthcoming.

Despite the lack of truth to the English-language press assertion that Matsuoka would return to government, the fact of intractable difficulties in the

¹⁸⁹ Hallett Abend, "New Tokyo Crisis Believed in Offing," *New York Times*, October 1, 1941.

negotiations between Japan and the United States was undeniable. In a November 10 article, Tolischus made the argument that the lack of progress was not due to a lack of understanding or knowledge, but rather a problem of Japan not knowing its own policy. Tolischus explained that Japan's foreign policy remained unchanged in the new Konoe Cabinet, but that its policy regarding the Tripartite Pact had been purposefully obscured by the recently retired Matsuoka in hopes of gaining a stronger hand to negotiate.

The reason [for the misunderstanding] is inherent in the provisions of the Triple Alliance on the one hand and the secret oral proviso, to which Germany explicitly agreed, that nothing in the pact obligated Japan to go to war in the Pacific except by her own decision.

This proviso was worked out by Yosuke Matsuoka, author of the alliance, in lengthy preliminary conversations with German envoys, and it was only on that condition that the alliance, which had been debated by five Cabinets in more than seventy sessions, proved finally acceptable to the Japanese ruling powers. Also it was on this basis that it was sanctioned by Imperial rescript as an instrument of peace, and it is with this provision mind that Japanese statesmen insist it is a purely defensive pact and that Japan is pursuing her own "independent and autonomous policies" depending on her own power alone.¹⁹⁰

The article further went on to clarify Matsuoka's mission to use the Tripartite Pact as a means to avoid war with the United States:

Matsuoka made clear that in line with his dictum that diplomacy without power is futile, he proposed to use the combined power represented by the Triple Alliance partners to "keep America out of the war." In this his primary concern

¹⁹⁰ Otto D. Tolischus, "Japan Not Bound to War for Axis," *New York Times*, November 10, 1941.

as Japanese Foreign Minister was to keep America out of the Sino-Japanese conflict away from “interference” in the Far East generally, to permit what is termed here successful conclusion of the China Incident and establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Despite Matsuoka’s intentions, and his government’s commitment to seek a peaceful resolution with the United States, Japan declared war less than a month later.

By December 8, 1941, Matsuoka had returned to his residence in *Sendagaya*, Tokyo, and was all but in quarantine due to progressing tuberculosis. It was here that Matsuoka heard the news that war had finally begun. Lu relates this incident recounted during an interview with Hasegawa Shinichi.¹⁹¹ While his family had debated even telling him about the Japanese attack, worried about the shock the news might bring to his health, Matsuoka responded to the outbreak of war with jubilation. Lu suggests that this is not due so much to Matsuoka having desired the conflict, but that the inaction and constant round of negotiations were intolerable to him.¹⁹² Even though he was in enforced retirement and confined by illness, at last the world was moving. Perhaps more than anything, Matsuoka, a man of action, was glad of an end to the ceaseless monotony his days had become.

The initial positive response Matsuoka felt at the thought of Japan in action mellowed into solemn reflection and despair within hours. Saitō Ryōe (1880-1956), a friend and adviser to Matsuoka who had worked with him in the Foreign

¹⁹¹ Hasegawa had been Matsuoka’s personal secretary in charge of press relations.

¹⁹² Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 246-248.

Ministry revealed the following account from the same day in his book

Azamukareta rekishi (History Betrayed):

Upon hearing about the outbreak of war I was shocked. I rushed to the private residence of the ill former Foreign Minister, Matsuoka Yōsuke, in *Sendagaya*. When he looked at me I could see tears brimming in the eyes of his illness ravaged face. "I have just realized that concluding the Tripartite Pact is my life's greatest failure. My diplomacy was intended to create world peace, as I think you know, but the world views me as an accomplice to aggression. It is my shortcomings that brought about, and is truly regrettable. the Tripartite pact was meant to keep America from the war, to prevent the occurrence of another world war, and to restore world peace, to reassure many countries, but despite my intentions it has come to be the source of this disgraceful event. Even if I die this disgrace will follow me," he sobbed. "I... I...," Watching Matsuoka struggle with his tragic confession of repentance, I wept with him.¹⁹³

If these two first-hand accounts of are any indication, Matsuoka's feelings about the war shifted erratically during the years of war against the United States. A recently discovered letter written to journalist and historian Sohō Tokutomi (1863-1957) on the evening of December 10, 1941 saw Matsuoka back in high spirits. He was excited over the early success of the Japanese campaign, and at the shake-up that the unexpected attack and sudden war had imposed on England and America. He envisioned a rise in Japan similar to the rise in Germany and

¹⁹³ Saitō, *Azamukareta rekishi* [History Betrayed], 5.

Italy after their blitzkrieg. He also considered Japan's increased importance to Germany.¹⁹⁴

In both his letter to Sohō and in another letter to Tōyama Mitsuru, Matsuoka predicted that the war would be protracted and that Japan should prepare to fight for at least ten years.¹⁹⁵ Over the next few years, Matsuoka played the role of armchair diplomat. At times he was consulted by government officials on affairs relating to the war and in April, 1945 he was even asked to undertake a special peace-seeking mission to Russia. Despite his need to be involved, Matsuoka refused this request on the grounds that Japan had no right to negotiate as it was losing the war. For Matsuoka, who believed that power was necessary for successful negotiations and that no power meant unconditional concession, defeat would bring no diplomacy.¹⁹⁶ From the time he was foreign minister, Matsuoka had resolved not to seek appeasement and thus was willing to die rather than commit any action he interpreted as lowering himself or his country.

Even after the futility of the war was apparent, Matsuoka continued to urge Japan to keep fighting. In his book "Through Japanese Eyes," Tolischus described

¹⁹⁴ This is a loose translation of the letter, but it gives a glimpse into Matsuoka's changing state of mood after the outbreak of war.

Shizuko Takano, *Sohō e no tegami: Nakae Chōmin kara Matsuoka Yōsuke made* [Letters to Sohō: From Nakae Chōmin to Matsuoka Yōsuke] (Tokyo: Fujiwara shoten, 2010), 23.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*, 248.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, 249-250.

Matsuoka's hatred for Westerners by using the example of a poem from a book of Japanese poetry translated by Matsuoka and gifted to Australian Chief Justice, Sir.

John Latham:

What a glorious day it will be when the foot of the white man no longer presses the soil of Asia. How much more wonderful will be the day when the divine mission of Japan is accomplished and the white race shall have been exterminated from the whole world.¹⁹⁷

Unfortunately, there is no record of what else was contained in this book, and a search failed to turn up the title of either book or poem, so it is difficult to know if the book was thematic or if the inclusion of that particular poem was incidental. If in fact Matsuoka hated America, then, given his stubbornness, it may be reasonable to assume that he would rather die than make deals with a hated enemy. However, in view of Matsuoka's thinking about Westerners in general, and Americans in particular, different interpretations emerge. As related in the story about an American and a Japanese meeting on a narrow path at the end of Chapter Two, Matsuoka believed that the worst thing for Japanese-American relations was to assume a conciliatory attitude. Matsuoka thought that surrender would place Japan in too weak a position. Without a platform of power from which to

¹⁹⁷ Otto D. Tolischus, *Through Japanese Eyes* (New York, NY: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1945), 84.

This poem and its attribution to Matsuoka (translator) first appeared on November 6, 1943, and was published within the text of newspaper articles around the world in November 1943, April 1945, and August 1945. These articles all used the poem as justification to assign the Japanese a murderous hatred of America.

negotiate, the Allied Forces could force Japan to give up total control, in effect destroying the nation to which he had devoted his life. Matsuoka related a similar idea in a letter to Sohō dated December 11, 1941, just a day after his first, jubilant, letter. This second letter was much more somber, describing a diplomacy between Japan and the United States that had failed. The letter began with an assessment of Shidehara's foreign policy during his terms as foreign minister.¹⁹⁸ Matsuoka placed the blame for the first steps on the road to war on Shidehara, writing that by placating America at the expense of ignoring the passionate feelings of the Japanese citizens, Shidehara had ruined the diplomatic relations between the two countries.¹⁹⁹ With this ideology as a central feature of his diplomacy, for Matsuoka the end of the war was a case of accepting destruction by death or destruction through loss of freedom and identity. If these were his choices, Matsuoka was more inclined to take the second option.

In any case, with the dropping of atomic bombs on August 6 and 9, 1945, the choice to die or keep fighting was removed from Matsuoka's hands. Despite a general agreement among politicians and officers to keep fighting, the Emperor's voice was too weighty to contradict. Once the Emperor had decided to accept the Potsdam declaration, Matsuoka had to give up any thought of martial resistance.

¹⁹⁸ (1924-1927) and (1929-1931).

¹⁹⁹ Takano, *Sohō e no tegami: Nakae Chōmin kara Matsuoka Yōsuke made* [Letters to Sohō: From Nakae Chōmin to Matsuoka Yōsuke], 412 31-32.

4.2 - The Consequences of War

August 15, 1945, marked the beginning of a new era for Japan, and perhaps for the world. At noon on that day, Emperor Hirohito spoke directly to all of his subjects for the first time. During the preceding week, the nation had suffered enormous shock when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastated by the atomic bombs Little Boy and Fat Man, but the shock of the Emperor's voice emanating from the radio as he read the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War in stilted, classical Japanese was equally profound.

For most Japanese subjects, this was the first time to hear the voice of their Emperor. During the twenty years of his reign prior, his words were passed down to his subjects in the form of printed Imperial Rescripts. During the course of the war, the Japanese were taught that their role was to "offer [themselves] courageously to the State."²⁰⁰ In a culture that emphasized death before dishonor, the people gathered and waiting to hear the special broadcast expected to be told that they must fight to the end or to sacrifice themselves through suicide rather than accept the shame of surrender. It is not difficult to imagine the mixture of relief, confusion, and dismay that they must have felt at the end of the emperor's radio address— relief that they would not be expected to suffer ever increasing deprivations while fighting an increasingly hopeless war, or be expected to give up their lives en masse rather than surrender, and confusion over the sudden

²⁰⁰ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company (The New Press, 1999), 34.

change in attitude from a government that had consistently pushed them onward, even as they “died in hopeless suicide charges, starved to death in the field, killed their own wounded rather than let them fall into enemy hands, and murdered their civilian compatriots in places such as Saipan and Okinawa,” and dismay over an as yet uncertain future now in the hands of those whom wartime propaganda had depicted as demonic forces.²⁰¹ The Japanese people had no way of knowing what to expect from the soon to be occupying powers, and the uncertainty must have weighed on them heavily.

This feeling of uncertainty was shared by Matsuoka. He listened to the emperor’s radio address from his *Sendagaya* property, but where he had heard the news of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor from the second floor of his residence, he heard news of surrender from the second floor of a fire scorched earthen storehouse, the best shelter available on the property. Matsuoka’s first thought upon hearing the address was that during the confusion and uncertainty he needed to find a safe place for his family.²⁰²

Matsuoka did not have to wait long to learn what to expect under occupation. The formal surrender to the Allied Powers took place on the USS Missouri on September 2, 1945, while the ship was anchored in Tokyo Bay. Once the formal surrender had been signed, the Supreme Commander of the Allied

²⁰¹ Ibid, 22.

²⁰² Fukui, *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke [Reviving Matsuoka Yōsuke]*, Chapter Six.

Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, began his work. One of the first orders of business was to decide responsibility for the war and to mete out justice.

The Potsdam Declaration, a statement drafted by the United States, Great Britain, and China on July 26, 1945, detailed the terms for Japan's surrender, and the processes by which the occupying forces intended to restore order to the country.

The following passages from the Potsdam Declaration detail the intention to prosecute war criminals, and the leaders who contributed to taking Japan to war, Matsuoka was among them:

There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.²⁰³

Although the Potsdam Declaration clearly stated the intention to prosecute Japanese war criminals and to hold Japanese leadership accountable for the choices made along the path to war, the Japanese government had no way of determining the extent to which blame would be allotted. SCAP did not release

²⁰³ "Text of the Constitution and Other Important Documents: Potsdam Declaration." Accessed December 2017, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html>.

the “Tokyo charter”²⁰⁴ until January 19, 1946. It was to be expected that the allies would punish those persons who had carried out “Conventional War Crimes,” but two other unprecedented categories of criminal were established during the trials. Those who planned, ordered, or were in a position to prevent such war crimes and failed to do so were guilty of “Crimes against Humanity,” and anyone deemed to have contributed to bringing Japan to war was considered to have committed “Crimes against Peace.”²⁰⁵

For many Japanese, the period immediately after the war was a period of reflection. A reexamination of the road that had led them to war included the vilification of leaders such as Matsuoka, civilian supporters of the war, or anyone who was considered a part of the road to war— regardless of whether or not war had been their intention. Crimes against peace, in particular, were a landmark set of rulings because the definition of the crimes did not exist at the time they were committed, but rather were imposed at the court’s discretion once the occupation began.

The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal was convened on April 29, 1946, wherein twenty-eight men were indicted as war criminals using fifty-five counts of Class A, B, and C war crimes. Imperial Japanese Army General and later Prime Minister, Tojo Hideki is probably the best remembered of this group today. While Matsuoka has faded from public memory, his participation in the war crimes trials and his

²⁰⁴ Counterpart to the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter outlined the jurisdiction and functions of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

²⁰⁵ Class B, Class C, and Class A War Crimes respectively.

death are nonetheless useful in understanding the role media plays in myth-making, and to what degree the media impacted Matsuoka's trial and his memory after death.²⁰⁶

Even before the end of the war, journalists were scrambling to assign blame for the conflict. Unsurprisingly, Matsuoka did not remain unscathed in the meting out of responsibility. Tolischus began his examination of guilt in a 1942 story in the *New York Times*. Of Matsuoka he wrote:

Yosuke Matsuoka, as Foreign Minister labored hard to back up the army by committing Japan to the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy, though he, too calculated for a time that he might be able to "keep the United States out of war" by a policy of intimidation, which would permit Japan to swallow "Greater East Asia" without "a Greater East Asia war."²⁰⁷

This instance is remarkable as Matsuoka was seen as being in league with the military. While it is not implausible, given Matsuoka's deep nationalism and cooperation with the military such as the Kwangtung Army in Manchuria, the media until this time had portrayed Matsuoka more as an opportunist who was willing to get along in a reasonable manner with anyone who would take his advice and allow him the freedom direct policy.

On November 19, 1945, Matsuoka was staying in the small agricultural village of *Kemi*, in Nagano prefecture, to the West of Tokyo. On that day reports

²⁰⁶ A scan of world history textbooks designed for Middle and High School students produced information about Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Tripartite Pact, but no source consulted in this field mentioned Matsuoka by name or described his role in these proceedings.

²⁰⁷ Otto D. Tolischus, "Japan's War Plot is Laid to Clique," *New York Times*, August 26, 1942.

appeared in many local newspapers across the United States, including the front page of the Portland *Oregonian*, that Matsuoka had made a failed attempt at suicide:²⁰⁸

Yosuke Matsuoka, former Japanese minister who was credited with taking Japan into the tripartite pact, attempted to commit suicide at his country villa at Shuenji.

The report said Matsuoka used poison instead of the traditional hara kiri knife or pistol.

Yōsuke Matsuoka was educated in Portland public schools and the University of Oregon. On completing his education he returned to Japan and entered politics.²⁰⁹

Considering Matsuoka's dedication to the fight, and his conviction that surrender would mean the subjugation of Japan, the report was not necessarily a far-fetched idea, but it was, nonetheless, "fake-news." According to *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke*, Matsuoka's son Ken'ichi, worried that his aging and ill father would be executed at the hands of the enemy, smuggled some potassium cyanide to Matsuoka. In response, Matsuoka gently told him: "I am grateful for the thought, but I have no need of such things." He explained later, during a visit by Saitō Ryōe:

²⁰⁸ The article starts appearing November 18, 1945 due to the international dateline, and were circulated for about a week. The purported origin of the story is the Army Newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*, but at the time of writing this a copy was unobtainable. No mention of the incident was printed in the *New York Times*.

²⁰⁹ "Suicide Attempt Laid to Matsuoka," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), November 18, 1945.

The content of the article is fairly uniform across the local papers in which it was printed.

It is likely that I will be imprisoned before long. However, I will not, cannot commit such a cowardly act as suicide. As far as Japan is concerned, the Tripartite Pact was absolutely not conducted with the intention of aggression. My loyalty to the emperor and to my country demands that I explain this fully to the satisfaction of the Allies.”²¹⁰

While the English-language media narrative paints Matsuoka as a coward who could not even suicide properly, Matsuoka scholars show that Matsuoka did resolve to fight to the end in the only way left to him: by using his words.

Matsuoka lost no time in trying to clarify his position to the world. On November 24, 1945, a letter Matsuoka had written to the Associated Press was quoted in the *New York Times* stating that he had been prevented from attempting to negotiate a neutrality pact with the United States in 1941 only because of his growing illness. “I meant later to obtain an opportunity for myself to proceed in person to Washington to conclude a treaty on the Pacific,... and gradually ask our Army and Navy to withdraw our forces from China. Later I wished to cooperate with America to end the European war.”²¹¹

Unfortunately for Matsuoka, his message of intended peace was drowned out by a more sensational story. On the same day, in the same paper, two articles appeared accusing Matsuoka of having secretly negotiated with Hitler to make a surprise attack on the United States:

²¹⁰ Fukui, *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke [Reviving Matsuoka Yōsuke]*, Kindle Edition, Chapter Six.

²¹¹ “Matsuoka Declares He Sought U.S. Amity,” *New York Times*, November 24, 1945.

As regarding the Japanese -American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he had always declared in his country that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable if Japan continued to drift along at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later.

...Why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America?²¹²

While there was no mention of corroboration of these charge against Matsuoka by members of the Japanese cabinet, even those hostile to him, the idea that Matsuoka desired to begin an “unprovoked” war with the United States would count against him in the impending war crimes trial.

Although Matsuoka was committed to defending his position for as long as he could, not everyone shared Matsuoka’s conviction to carry on to the bitter end. One of the most damning sources of blame against Matsuoka come from the memoir Konoe wrote shortly before committing suicide on December 16, 1945. Konoe’s memoir was serially published in Japanese in the *Asahi shinbun*, and parts were reprinted in English, notably in the *New York Times* on Christmas Day.²¹³

²¹² “Excerpts from Hitler-Matsuoka Documents,” *New York Times*, November 24, 1945.

Kathleen McLaughlin, “Hitler-Matsuoka Plot on U.S. Described at Germans' Trial,” *New York Times*, November 24, 1945.

²¹³ “Konoye Memoir Says Envoy to U. S. Didn't Grasp Ouster of Matsuoka,” *New York Times*, December 25, 1945.

According to the article, Konoe's memoir sought to shift blame for the breakdown of negotiations to Matsuoka. The tone of these accusations was set by the opening line of the article:

When the second Konoye Cabinet resigned on July 16, 1941, its sole purpose was for the elimination of Nazi-phile Foreign Minister [sic] Yosuke Matsuoka, and Japan's Ambassador to Washington, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, failed to understand that reason and ten days passed in which negotiations for an Asiatic peace appeared to have broken down, according to the most recent installment of the memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, which will appear on Wednesday in the newspaper Asahi.²¹⁴

According to the report, Konoe accused Matsuoka of having delayed Japan's response to the Draft Understanding by playing sick while secretly meeting with the German Ambassador, before he "bullyragged" the cabinet into issuing a less conciliatory reply emphasizing Japan's commitment to Germany.²¹⁵

An *Oregonian* account of the memoir continues the narration: According to Konoye, Matsuoka then demanded that Nomura be instructed to immediately reject Hull's oral statement, terming it a "rude irrational note." "Unless the United States government first abandons it Japan cannot drive ahead the discussions on an understanding plan." Konoe reportedly had planned to send both this refusal of the oral statement and a counter proposal simultaneously, whereas Matsuoka unilaterally sent only the refusal.²¹⁶

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Murlin Spencer, "Japan's Peace Proposal of 1941 Discussed First with Nazi Allies," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), December 19, 1945.

Judging from the opening lines, the December 25 article seems disposed to accept Konoe's narrative of events, while the *Oregonian* presented Konoe's story in a more neutral tone. The narrative spawned by Konoe's memoir proved damaging to Matsuoka's claims of peacemaking.

Matsuoka did not give up his defense. A month later as he was detained in Sugamo Prison awaiting trial, a short article appeared in the *New York Times* stating: "[Matsuoka] has contended that the Tripartite Pact was an alliance for peace and not for war."²¹⁷ In addition to this claim, Matsuoka dictated his own memoirs refuting Konoe's statements. Unfortunately, these were not published until after Matsuoka had succumbed to tuberculosis on June 26, 1946.²¹⁸

Matsuoka's memoir, like Konoe's, was published in the *Asahi shinbun*, and in excerpts in English-language newspapers. According to the files for prosecution by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), Matsuoka, too sick to write, dictated his responses in English to Konoe's Japanese newspaper text.²¹⁹

Matsuoka again asserted that the "Triple Alliance was a treaty of peace" and intended to keep war out of the Pacific. In response to Konoe's assertions that

²¹⁷ "Matsuoka Now in Jail; Awaits Crimes Hearing," *New York Times*, January 23, 1946.

²¹⁸ June 27, Japan time.

²¹⁹ The entire text of Matsuoka's memoir juxtaposed with the corresponding points of Konoe's memoir (translated into English) can be found in Case File #118 of the IMTFE's prosecution files.

Rengōgun shireibu, *Kokusai kensatsu kyoku (IPS) jinmonchōsho [International Prosecution Section (IPS) Interrogation Files]*. eds. Kentarō Awaya and Yutaka Yoshida, Vol. 19 (Tokyo, Japan: Nippon Tosho Senta-, 1993), 32-72.

Matsuoka had deliberately wrecked the Draft Understanding negotiations,

Matsuoka, via the *New York Times*, rebutted:

I expressed the view that it would be better for Japan to enter a Soviet-German war on the German side rather than make a southward advance at the risk of a military clash with Britain and the United States. This, however, was not my true intention. It was a trick to restrain the Army and Navy, because I was fully aware that neither the Army nor the Navy had any intention of fighting the Soviet Union."²²⁰

In addition to the dictated memoir, the IMTFE records contain a lengthy transcript of Matsuoka's interrogation. During the questioning Matsuoka categorically refuted the idea that he had made a secret agreement with Hitler to attack the United States.²²¹ He also asserted that after conducting the non-aggression pact with Russia he had intended to work toward an understanding with the United States:

I had a mind to fly myself to Washington and thrash out the questions with the President and Mr. Hull, and reach a second understanding in the Pacific and also about China proper. Without the influence or aid of your country, I could not very well withdraw Japanese from China, but my main intention was to withdraw these forces.²²²

Finally, in response to the Konoe memoir accusations that Matsuoka had deliberately delayed negotiations for ten days after returning to Tokyo, Matsuoka claimed that the Draft Understanding was not a document that could be easily

²²⁰ Lindesay Parrott, "Matsuoka Memoir Denies War Design," *New York Times*, June, 29, 1946.

²²¹ Rengōgun shireibu, *Kokusai kensatsu kyoku (IPS) jinmonchōsho [International Prosecution Section (IPS) Interrogation Files]*, 129.

²²² *Ibid*, 124.

negotiated. The Japanese and English drafts both contained vagaries and differing content, and Hull's oral statement against Germany obligated Japan to confer with its allied partner before response. Additionally, Matsuoka had suffered from a bad cold and had been forced to rest during that critical ten-day period.²²³

The IMTFE's records contain a wealth of materials relating to Matsuoka's diplomacy and his defense against the war crimes charges. As this dissertation is focusing on media representations, it is suffice to say that Matsuoka, even under interrogation, remained staunch in his assertions that war had never been his motive and that he had, in fact, acted always with an intent for peace.

Despite repetitive stories from journalists such as Tolischus and Byas, agreeing with Konoe that Matsuoka was a "bad boy" intent on causing confusion at best and outright aggression at worst, Matsuoka consistently maintained assertions of good will toward the United states, stating unequivocally that his intent was to create conditions for perpetual peace and friendship between Japan and the America. Matsuoka fought until his death to be remembered for his amicable intentions despite media reports to the contrary. With his death, Matsuoka's self-advocacy also died, leaving a vacuum into which the "bad-boy" image spread.

²²³ Ibid, 127-128.

4.3 - The Posthumous Narrative

During the course of his life Matsuoka was both a master and a target of media. He actively sought the press to advance his ideas, and sought support for his professed goal of a stable global society. He was also the object of countless articles that made unsubstantiated claims designed to tarnish his character, such as Sokolsky's assessment of his hatred for America. In life, Matsuoka could not escape the idea that he was anti-American, and in death, without an ability to answer these charges or assert his version of the truth, the idea seems to have grown. This section will conclude the document analysis by examining the media reports of Matsuoka's death, and his legacy within the English-language press in the years since.

Considering Matsuoka's fame and connections to the West, it is unsurprising that articles reporting his death began appearing in American newspapers immediately after his passing. June 27, 1946, saw a column-long article appear in the *New York Times* proclaiming his death at age 66. The article began with an overall assessment of Matsuoka's foreign policy: "As an early apostle of aggressive foreign policy and Oriental expansion for Japan, the enigmatic Matsuoka advocated "Strong" measures that eventually led to his own and his country's downfall."²²⁴

The article described Matsuoka's education in Oregon, his views on Manchuria as Japan's essential lifeline, and the Tripartite Pact as the first "major

²²⁴ "Yosuke Matsuoka Dies in Tokyo at 66," *New York Times*, June 27, 1946.

stroke“ in Japan’s plan to dominate Asia. The end of the article repeated Konoe’s memoir assertions that Matsuoka deliberately blocked critical peace negotiations.

In essence, no matter the intentions, the newspaper laid the blame for the critical diplomatic failure between Japan and the United States at Matsuoka’s feet. The article ended by emphasizing Matsuoka’s diplomacy by reviving the idea that he had actively planned to go to war with the United States:

Captured German files and confidential files in November, 1945, showed that a secret discussion between Matsuoka and Hitler proved conclusively that a preliminary pact had been concluded between them in February of 1941 by which the Japanese were to attack the United States as soon as Matsuoka could complete the plans.²²⁵

That Matsuoka was directly responsible for the downfall of his country was repeated in Matsuoka’s obituary in the *Oregonian*: “Yosuke Matsuoka, former Japanese foreign minister, died early Thursday morning in gloomy Imperial University hospital of tuberculosis— only a thin, feeble ghost of the cocky, American-educated diplomat whose axis treaties tied Japan to a losing war.”²²⁶

An editorial analysis of Matsuoka by James D. White was published in the *Oregonian*, the same day. White lead off by writing: “Matsuoka’s Youthful Love of U.S. Turns to Scorn,” and firmly declared Matsuoka as anti-American. As if trying to reconcile the image of the “bad boy” with the “all American boy,” the article explained:

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ “T.B. Claims Matsuoka in Hospital,” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), June 27, 1946.

He was grateful to individual Americans, in a family feeling sort of way instinctive to any Japanese, especially to the American woman in Oregon who helped him through the University of Oregon. He placed her next to his mother.

But apparently he regarded her as an American exception, for in 1933 he raised a monument to her just after he had turned history toward World War II by leading Japan's delegation out of the League of Nations

He had soured on America. Was it in the early 20s when American exclusion legislation against orientals provided Japanese militarists with the talking point they had been looking for?

In any case, Matsuoka went along with the militarists. He scoffed at what was left of democracy in Japan.²²⁷

White made an interesting analysis, separating Matsuoka's love for his adoptive mother from his feelings towards America in general. Another article in the *Oregonian* published a few weeks later on July 14 proclaimed "Ex-Portlander Matsuoka No. 1 Jap Warmonger."²²⁸

While the headline showed a similar condemnation of Matsuoka to that of White, this article worked to show Matsuoka's change from an "all American boy" to a "bad boy" through imagery. Here the sense of betrayal is highlighted by the juxtaposition of the commonly reprinted 1933 photograph of Matsuoka laying

²²⁷ James D. White, "Matsuoka's Youthful Love of U.S. Turns to Scorn," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), June 28, 1946.

The article does note that it is an editorial based on the available facts at the time of publishing. A search was unable to turn up information regarding the author.

²²⁸ Paul F. Ewing, "Ex-Portlander Matsuoka no. 1 Jap Warmonger," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), July 14, 1946.

flowers at the grave of Mrs. Beveridge.²²⁹ with another photograph of Matsuoka dressed in traditional Japanese garb swinging a sword. The photographs were arranged to overlap, almost making it seem as though Matsuoka were attacking the grave of his American 'mother' (**Figure 13**)²³⁰

The idea of betrayal is a narrative that has been carried from Matsuoka's death into the present. An article published in the *Oregonian* on the sixtieth anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor reflected on Matsuoka's history in Oregon, asking how Matsuoka went from being the "illustrious son of Oregon" to "No 1 Warmonger."²³¹

Considering the turmoil caused by the end of the war and the steady release of information by the war crimes trials in progress, is unsurprising that sentiment turned against Matsuoka. With his death came a firm rejection of the image of the "all American boy" that had been repeated during his lifetime with varying success. Even though the charges against him were dropped upon his death, Matsuoka remained convicted of war crimes in the court of public opinion.

The longevity of the narrative of Matsuoka as a "bad boy" can be seen by examining Sir Winston Churchill's summary of the war, "The Grand Alliance," published serially in newspapers including the *New York Times*. Churchill

²²⁹ The full image can be seen in **Figure 2**.

²³⁰ Paul F. Ewing, "Ex-Portlander Matsuoka no. 1 Jap Warmonger," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), July 14, 1946.

²³¹ Steve Duin, "Culling the UO in Matsuoka," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), December 2, 2001.



Figure 13:

Matsuoka mourning the loss of his American mother and Matsuoka the aggressive Asiatic. Paul F. Ewing, "Ex-Portlander Matsuoka no. 1 Jap Warmonger," *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), July 14, 1946.

described Matsuoka as not only anti-American, but bitterly so. His phrasing has echoed through the years to the present:

Sir Winston Churchill: “Although he had been educated in the United States, Matsuoka was bitterly anti-American”²³²

Oscar Handlin: “The new minister, Matsuoka, was bitterly anti-American and anti-British. It was he who had led the Japanese out of the League of Nations in protest over the resolution of censure on the Manchurian incident. He had neither forgotten nor forgiven those he held responsible for the insult.”²³³

Herbert Hoover: “Any success for Nomura’s negotiations was hindered in Tokyo by the bitterly anti-American Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka.”²³⁴

The years of repetition of Matsuoka as a “bad boy” can be seen definitively in his treatment in matters dealing with Yasukuni Shrine. While Matsuoka had cited loyalty to his Emperor and his country as a reason for the continued fight to show

²³² Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, Vol. 3 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 161.

This chapter was also published in *The New York Times* on February 1, 1950.

²³³ Oscar Handlin, *Chance Or Destiny: Turning Points in American History* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1977), 174.

This is a reprint of the original 1955 version, a point that shows not only the longevity of the phrase, but the also the popularity of the source.

²³⁴ Herbert Hoover, *Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover’s Secret History of the Second World War and its Aftermath*, ed. George H. Nash (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2011), 264.

Authored by Hoover in 1951, finalized in 1964, and published edited by John Nash in 2011.

he was not an aggressor, forgiveness was not forthcoming. The vitriol still directed towards Matsuoka can be felt by examining “The Yasukuni Shrine Problem.”

Yasukuni Shrine was established to honor Japanese soldiers and civilians who died in service to the Emperor of Japan from the Civil War leading to the Meiji Revolution of 1868 to the end of the occupation in 1951. The shrine remained of little international importance until the 1970s.²³⁵ In 1975, the thirtieth anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the war, Prime Minister Miki Takeo (1907-1988) began a custom of visiting the shrine to pay respect to the dead. Three years later, on October 17, 1978, the souls of fourteen Class A war criminals, including Matsuoka, were enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine, but this fact would not become public until April 1979. Once the public became aware of the war criminal enshrinement, the outcry against the government visits, both within Japan and internationally, began to build.²³⁶ The visits were the cause of great tension between Japan and China, Korea, and Taiwan, who often cite the visits as proof of Japan’s unrepentant attitude for atrocities committed during the war.

In 2006, an article appeared in the *Japan Times* explaining why, even though it is still common for government figures to pay homage at Yasukuni, the Emperor

²³⁵ It is noted in the *New York Times* in 1948 that the visits are acceptable as long as the separation between church and state is maintained.

Lindesay Parrott, “Japanese Return to Shinto Custom,” *New York Times*, January 4, 1948.

²³⁶ M. William Steele, “Christianity and Politics in Japan,” in *Handbook of Christianity in Japan*, eds. Mark Blum, R. Kersten and M. F. Low (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003), 359-382, 366-368.

had stopped making visits to the Shrine after some of the war criminals were enshrined there in 1978. Imperial Household Agency Grand Steward Tomohiko Tomita's diary contains the record of a conversation with the Emperor explaining: "At some point, Class-A criminals became enshrined, even including Matsuoka and Shiratori."²³⁷ That the Emperor singled out Matsuoka and the hawkish Shiratori for censure shows the depth of Matsuoka's disgrace as a "bad boy." While Matsuoka's representation in the press changed over the years, Shiratori was always depicted as hawkish.²³⁸

This chapter completes the analysis of the transition of the English-language media's narrative of Matsuoka. While he was alive he fought to maintain the image that he had always held amicable intentions towards the United States. The end of the war, and flood of information after Japan's surrender brought a darker tone to Matsuoka's story; particularly so with the release of Konoe's memoirs accusing Matsuoka of causing an end to diplomatic negotiations with the United States. After Matsuoka's death the sympathetic Matsuoka faded away leaving behind a character who was driven by hatred of the west, and who had betrayed the place that had fostered him as a youth.

²³⁷ "Hirohito Visits to Yasukuni Stopped Over War Criminals," *The Japan Times* July 21, 2006.

²³⁸ An example of Shiratori's character presented in English-language media can be seen in: Hugh Byas, "Patience with Japan Urged: But this, it is Held, should Not Take any Form of Appeasement," *New York Times*, sec. C, September, 25, 1941.

Chapter 5 - Conclusion

This thesis has examined narratives of Matsuoka's engagement with the West using English-language media, particularly news reportage, as its primary source material. Matsuoka's diplomacy as interpreted and transmitted by the press reveals two alternate versions of Matsuoka during his tragic engagement with the United States: the "all American boy" and the "bad boy."

Here I summarize these findings in order to show how media narratives have contributed to the construction of myths about people, places and events. The Conclusion will also look at weaknesses and potential limitations of this study before exploring areas of future research.

5.1 - The Media and the Matsuoka's Tragic Engagement with America

In "War Without Mercy," Dower remarks: "It is easier to begin wars than to end them, and the war in Asia not only confirmed this truism but gave it new meaning for the modern age."²³⁹ Dower's work is an examination of the use of propaganda by both sides of the conflict, and the way these created images were dealt with once peace had been achieved. Both objective reporting and propaganda had a huge impact on public perceptions of the 'enemy' during the

²³⁹ Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, 293.

war. Likewise, media plays a defining role in our understanding of public figures such as Matsuoka. Over the course of his lifetime, it is undeniable that Matsuoka's image underwent a series of drastic transformations. Such change was largely driven by the use of news media, both by and against Matsuoka. While it may never be possible or desirable to rehabilitate Matsuoka's image, understanding how that image developed is critical to understanding history and therefore our modern society.

Images of Matsuoka can be split into two categories: Matsuoka the "all American boy," and Matsuoka the "bad boy." The Image of the "all American boy" that dominated his early career, was facilitated by an assumed and presumed affinity with the United States, especially in light of his youth spent on the Pacific Coast. While living in Oregon, Matsuoka developed a mastery of English, converted to Christianity, was educated, and was able to experience first-hand the pioneer spirit and opportunities created by American expansionism and the spirit of manifest destiny. These were qualities that stayed with him throughout his lifetime.

In the media, Matsuoka's identity as an "all American boy" was portrayed as part of a world view that saw Manchuria as Japan's frontier and his desire to spread freedom and encourage the growth of Japanese countrymen through territorial and economic expansion in mimicry of the United States' Monroe Doctrine. It can also be seen in Matsuoka's understanding of Wilson's new diplomacy centered on international understanding and cooperation rather than

on unilateral adherence to national interest. Matsuoka's goal of international understanding appeared repeatedly in his actions and speeches, such as his 1933 press tour in Washington DC and in Oregon where he both admonished America for its lack of understanding of Japan's position, and at the same time stressed that Japan and America were really following the same goals and policies, separated only by time. As seen throughout Chapter Two, Matsuoka built up an American identity while he lived on the West Coast. In his treatment of the press Matsuoka actively encouraged the "all American boy" narrative. He consistently spoke of the need for friendship and cooperation between Japan and America, and even attributed what were seen as hostile actions to the necessity of preventing conflict in the long run.

Though Matsuoka did his best to direct the way media perceived and discussed him, the perceptions of Matsuoka began to change, particularly during his time as foreign minister. The "bad boy" image grew out of what might be seen as a rebound effect. Matsuoka's established pro-America identity meant that anything running counter to this Americanism was seen as betrayal. Perhaps ironically, Matsuoka's adoption of American ideas was seen as a good thing, but his use of those same ideas for nationalistic purposes transformed him into a "bad boy." In particular, Matsuoka's reputed basic understanding of Western character, that Westerners only respect power, led to a rigidity in his diplomacy that the English-language media, and in turn, the American public, interpreted as a lack of desire for amicable relations.

For most of Matsuoka's life, these two narratives existed concurrently, often overlapping. No matter how "bad" he was being, such as his negotiation of the Tripartite Pact, Matsuoka continually insisted his actions were intended for peace, and in the best interest of both nations. Whichever their leanings, Matsuoka's words and deeds were readily spread by the English-language media.

Throughout his lifetime, Matsuoka accused the West of a lack of understanding. According to Matsuoka, the West's inability or unwillingness to take Japan's precarious situation into account was difficult to fathom. His speeches during the League of Nations made it clear he felt there was a double standard; what was allowable for the West was out of bounds for Asian countries, including Japan.

Dower suggests that in the end images are doomed to re-emerge over time as military, political, or economic stresses bring countries into renewed conflict, which will then facilitate aggression.²⁴⁰ This phenomenon can be seen compared to Matsuoka's world view toward Westerners. The tragedy of Matsuoka's engagement with the West stemmed from his inability to recognize his own misunderstandings of American thought and behavior. His insistence on negotiating from a place of power, even where no base for that power existed, was his downfall. This can be seen in his negotiations with America through Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull. According to the Konoe memoir, Matsuoka's design was to end negotiations. However, it is more likely that

²⁴⁰ Ibid, 316-317.

Matsuoka sought to increase America's efforts to negotiate by his outright refusal of Hull's oral statement. In essence, Matsuoka may have been "playing hard to get" in order to increase America's ardor to seal the deal before Japan walked away. While Matsuoka was not wrong about the West's inability or unwillingness to understand Japan, he tragically failed to recognize his own limitations. Dower talks about the power of knowing your enemy, but also the inability to change or put "knowledge" aside once peace is achieved. This seemed to be the case with Matsuoka and America.²⁴¹ From both his perspective and the perspective of America, the problem was one of national character: an irrational marriage between war and social and behavioral sciences.²⁴² For Matsuoka and the United States, 'Knowing' the character of the other resulted in mutual misunderstanding and intransigence based on the absolute certainty of one's position. Despite professed amicable intentions on both sides, when Matsuoka and America approached each other on a narrow path, both were willing to swing a fist to intimidate the other into submission, neither was willing to step aside and make way for the other to pass, and neither was willing to re-examine the other to find a means of friendship.

As long as Matsuoka was not blocking America's path in China, the narrative of the "all American boy" was easily carried and spread. However, once Matsuoka decided to take his stand on that narrow path, despite repeated

²⁴¹ Ibid, 22.

²⁴² Ibid, 118-119.

protestations of friendship, the English-language press judged Matsuoka as having acted from hostile intentions. This way of thinking was spurred on by negative stories from journalists such as Hugh Byas and Otto D. Tolischus and by the accusations of powerful government figures such as Konoe Fumimaro.

In the end, with Japan defeated and no one left to advocate his good intentions, the narrative of Matsuoka the “all American boy” was smothered by the weight of years and documents proclaiming him to be bitter, hawkish, and passionately anti-American.

Matsuoka’s story, illustrated through media, therefore illustrates both the tragedy of mutual misunderstandings and of the power of media to create both popular and official discourse.

5.2 - Weaknesses

This dissertation is an interdisciplinary project seeking to understand how history is made. It focuses on the so-called facts of history but also questions those historical sources from which so-called facts were derived. Even though this study has pieced together a narrative of Matsuoka’s life through representations in the news media, there are several periods, such as his retirement before Pearl Harbor, where documentation was lacking, thus breaking the narrative, and creating gaps in the analysis.

In addition to an insufficient number of documents, the current study uses a narrow range of primary source documents, mostly deriving from Oregon

newspapers and the *New York Times*. While these documents allow for a broad and general study, the opinions that drove the narratives examined are pulled from a relatively small pool of known journalists, such as Byas and Tolischus, as well as a number of anonymous journalists with unknown biases.

Finally, much of the purely historic driven narrative is derived from David J. Lu's English-language biography of Matsuoka. This allows for the events to be told with a definite focus on Matsuoka as the central figure, but the lack of greater inclusion of other consulted sources means that this dissertation may not have as broad a viewpoint as is desirable. I have tried to rectify this situation somewhat by referencing a recent revisionist account of Matsuoka's life and times, *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke*. I also was able to expand some of what is known about Matsuoka's thinking through the use of his unpublished IMTFE case file.

All three of these issues would benefit from a general broadening of source material in order to examine the remarkably complex network of information that served as the basis for the sort of myth-making that ultimately defined Matsuoka's life and legacy.

5.3 - Novelty and Future Research

This dissertation provides a unique look at the construction of historical narratives surrounding a figure who is not well known outside of Japan or beyond the world of scholarship on modern Japanese history. It includes translations of conversations and anecdotes not currently available in English-language studies

on Matsuoka. More to the point, this study is unique for its analysis of English-language newspaper accounts of Matsuoka over a span of nearly fifty years, from his college days in Oregon at the turn of the century to his indictment as a war criminal and death in 1946. My approach has been to use media theory to means to understand the understanding of Matsuoka's tragic engagement with the United States. To this end I have focused on two mythic narrative, that of the "All American Boy" and its obverse, the "bad boy." In doing so, however, I have sought to show how the voices of media we consume (without thinking) influences perceptions of people, places, and events over time.

As noted above, the weakness of this research is primarily the limitation of source material, both in breadth and in number. This work could be developed further in the future by broadening the sources used, such as including a comparison of Japanese media sources to see if there was a similar myth-building process in Japan.

Today we live in an age surrounded by information. One of the dangers of this is the tendency to become complacent and to accept what is presented in the media at face-value. This study is one example of how the media uses narratives to create stories and build myths. It is important to recognize that the length of a belief or its reputation does not mean it is an honest truth. All stories have a purpose, and recognizing that purpose and how our perception of the narrative is thereby being manipulated is a duty that becomes more vital with every technological advance.

Appendix A:

Index of Newspaper Articles Featuring Matsuoka

The following table is designed to give an organized timeline of *Oregonian* and *New York Times* newspaper articles that featured Matsuoka. By scanning through the titles of the articles, it is possible to get an idea of the overall narrative describing Matsuoka's participation in global affairs. The table also serves as a comparison to show The similarities and differences between Matsuoka was treated in his adopted state of Oregon versus the national stage.

I have also included keywords illustrating ways in which the information contained in the individual stories contributed to the creation of Matsuoka's story as myth.

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>		Expects Shantung Return in a Year	Sep 4, 1919	"Matsuoko"
<i>Oregonian</i>		Japan's position in Shantung situation discussed	Oct 12, 1919	
<i>New York Times</i>	Matsuoka, Yosuke	Sees Sympathy With Chinese	Feb 22, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>	Sokolsky, George E.	Japan's Expansion: Her Aims and Obstacles	Feb 28, 1932	Expansion
<i>New York Times</i>		New Peace Offers are Made By Japan	Feb 29, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Tokyo Concessions to League Forseen	Oct 20, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Says Japan Backs Peace Machinery	Oct 22, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>	Streit,Clarence K.	Tokyo to Seek Soviet Aid	Oct 27, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>		Better Relations Expected	Oct 28, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>		Stimson's Address Belittled in Japan	Oct 28, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Matsuoka Reveals his League Defense	Nov 6, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>		Insists Manchukuo Retains'Open Door'	Nov 13, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>		7 Envoys Consult on Japan's Defense	Nov 16, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>		Oral Reply is Unlikely	Nov 16, 1932	aggressive
<i>New York Times</i>	Matsuoka, Yosuke	Matsuoka Defends Manchurian Action	Nov 21, 1932	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Eyes turned on Geneva. Matsuoka, Japan's spokesman, once U of O student	Nov 24, 1932	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>	Streit, Clarence K.	League Set to Hear Lytton Body Today	Nov 25, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>	Williamson, S.T.	Headline Footnotes: A Versatile Railroad Man and Mr. Koo	Nov 27, 1932	Oregon
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas, Hugh	Japan Will Change Tactics at Geneva	Nov 27, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>		Yen and Matsuoka Heard on the Radio	Dec 5, 1932	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka defends Japanese policy. Nipponese sure they are right, Geneva told	Dec 9, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>		Conciliation Plan Opposed by Japan	Dec 17, 1932	
<i>New York Times</i>		League Gets Japan's Terms	Feb 3, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>	Streit, Clarence K.	Japan to Maintain Manchukuo Policy, She Tells League	Feb 14, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Coming to See Roosevelt	Feb 16, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>		Final Tokyo Message	Feb 25, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>		Addresses of Yosuke Matsuoka Criticizing Report of League Assembly	Feb 25, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka to Try to Restrain Japan	Feb 25, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>	Johnson, Albine E.	Matsuoka Regards us as Caprecious	Feb 26, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>	Matsuoka, Yosuke	Japan's Valedictory	Feb 26, 1933	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Asks us to "Thunk Twice"	Feb 27, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>	Matthews, Herbert L.	Share in Railway Urged for French	Mar 1, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>		Report Japanese in Big Arms Deals	Mar 10, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Jeered By London Crowd	Mar 12, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>		Criticizes Our Naval Policy	Mar 12, 1933	Oregon
<i>New York Times</i>		Mellon Takes Ship Home From London	Mar 18, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Urges Amity for Japan	Mar 18, 1933	Bellicose
<i>New York Times</i>	Matsuoka, Yosuke	A Japanese Viewpoint	Mar 19, 1933	
<i>Oregonian</i>		We received a stranger	Mar 20, 1933	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka to Get Police Guard Here	Mar 23, 1933	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka, Oregon graduate, laments Japan is misunderstood in America	Mar 25, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Arrives; Says Japan Makes Plea to No Nation	Mar 25, 1933	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka, Japan's noted statesman, once peddled coffee in Portland	Mar 26, 1933	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon
<i>New York Times</i>	Matsuoka, Yosuke	Asiatics, Not Europeans	Mar 26, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Denies Japan Seeks China	Mar 29, 1933	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>	Matsuoka, Yosuke	Matsuoka Finds Us Inconsistent In Entangling Ourselves in East	Apr 2, 1933	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Americans warned by Japanese envoy. Critics might disturb peace of two countries	Apr 4, 1933	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka arrives in Portland today	Apr 7, 1933	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka wary of navy splurge. Position of fleet held none of Japan's business	Apr 8, 1933	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka Wary of Navy Splurge. Position of Fleet held None of Japan's Business	Apr 8, 1933	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon
<i>Oregonian</i>		Portlanders pay tribute to Japanese	Apr 9, 1933	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Japan seeks only to preserve peace on Asiatic mainland, Matsuoka avers	Apr 9, 1933	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka honors boyhood friend. Marker placed at grave of Mrs. Beveridge	Apr 10, 1933	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon
<i>Oregonian</i>		Flaws in Matsuoka's case	Apr 11, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Matsuoka Critical of Japanese Spirit	Apr 27, 1933	
<i>New York Times</i>		Japan Looks with Suspicion Upon Our Policy Toward Her	Apr 30, 1933	Oregon
<i>Oregonian</i>	Matsuoka, Yosuke	Japanese resent foreign attitude. Nations stand defended by Matsuoka. Ex-Oregon student pleads for western understanding in campaign for peace	Apr 29, 1934	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>	Matsuoka, Yosuke	Matsuoka Challenges the Critics Of the Japanese Policy on China	Apr 29, 1934	
<i>Oregonian</i>	Hazen, David W.	Yosuke Matsuoka has hard time with political party	Jul 1, 1934	Oregon
<i>New York Times</i>		Manchurian Railway in a Political Shift	Aug 1, 1935	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Japan Open to Aid in China Projects	Aug 22, 1935	
<i>New York Times</i>	Abend,Hallett	Japanese Plan to Control the Yellow River; Begin Preliminary Work on 20-Year Project	Aug 30, 1936	
<i>New York Times</i>	Matsuoka, Yosuke	A Knockout Blow Held Aim of Japan	Oct 10, 1937	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Aims of Japanese in China Outlined	May 7, 1938	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka to Quit as Railway Head	Oct 18, 1938	Oregon
<i>New York Times</i>	Abend,Hallett	Japanese Leader Doubts Mediation	Nov 12, 1938	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Konoye is Seeking Quick China Peace	Jul 19, 1940	
<i>Oregonian</i>		New Foreign Minister of Japan Remembered as Portland Schoolboy	Jul 19, 1940	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon
<i>New York Times</i>		Prosperity in Asia is Aim, Says Tokyo	Aug 1, 1940	
<i>Oregonian</i>	Hazen, David W.	Pacific war may rest in ex-Portlander's hands	Aug 4, 1940	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Japanese Delay Reply to Germany; Inner Cabinet Meeting Is Canceled	Aug 15, 1940	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>		U.S. Presses Japan to Respect Rights	Aug 28, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>		Tokyo Reporters to Become Ambassadors; Foreign Office Wants Fast, Accurate Envoys	Aug 31, 1940	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Dr. Matsuoka Sends Wreath	Sep 13, 1940	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon
<i>Oregonian</i>		Dr. Matsuoka sends wreath. Japanese leader honors benefactor	Sep 13, 1940	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka pens alumni article	Oct 3, 1940	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka threatens war on U.S. ex-Oregon student declares America must 'keep out'	Oct 5, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>		Japanese 'Insult' Seen	Oct 5, 1940	Japan will declare war
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas, Hugh	Japan Stakes Her All on Treaty with Axis	Oct 6, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>		Japan Urges China to Join Axis Pact	Oct 8, 1940	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Break rumors get exodus. Yosuke Matsuoka says 'Americans needn't worry'	Oct 11, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas, Hugh	Axis Tie for Peace, Japanese Asserts	Oct 11, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas, Hugh	Foreign Minister Matsuoka Says the Alliance is Not Directed Against Us	Oct 11, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka is Called a 'Bluffing Bulldog': Pittman Assails Japan's Foreign Minister and Army Clique	Oct 18, 1940	Threatened the United States with war.

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Japan Considering Her 'Aid' to Italy	Oct 29, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Disclaims Interest in U.S. Vote	Nov 3, 1940	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Consul Called Back to Tokyo	Nov 8, 1940	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon
<i>New York Times</i>		Grew and Matsuoka in Long Conversation	Nov 11, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>		Fleisher Sees Japan Avoiding U.S. Break	Nov 22, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>	Post,Robert P.	War Aid to China Hinted in London	Dec 10, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>		Grew Tells Tokyo Facts are Judged	Dec 19, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Amity up to U.S., Tokyo Press Says	Dec 21, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>		Japan Asks French Amity	Dec 29, 1940	
<i>New York Times</i>		Japan's Aims Linked to Those of Germany	Jan 6, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Japanese Protest Bermuda Seizures	Jan 8, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Bond of Japanese to Nazis Stressed	Jan 16, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	The Associated Press	'New World Order' Only a Matter of Time, Says Matsuoka, Urging U.S. to 'Allay' Crisis	Jan 21, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Japan Defies U.S. to Upset her Plan	Jan 22, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Kluckhohn, Frank L.	Roosevelt Sending Aide to Chungking	Jan 24, 1941	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Outside Mediation is Barred by Japan	Jan 26, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Matsuoka Accuses Hull of Distorting Case of Manchuria	Jan 27, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Objection Called Outrageous	Jan 27, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Nazis Voice Approval	Jan 28, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Matsuoka Rejects Threats to Indies	Jan 29, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Japan Would Keep U.S. Out of the War	Jan 30, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Linked to the South	Jan 30, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	U.S. View of Pact Surprises Japan	Feb 5, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Japan Will Steer Indo-China Parley	Feb 6, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Meet opened by Matsuoka	Feb 8, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Japan Renews Aim as Parley Starts	Feb 8, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Assures Diet	Feb 15, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Tokyo Fears Red Threat	Feb 20, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka denies mediation try	Feb 21, 1941	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>	The United Press	Japanese Newspaper Gives Version of Note to Eden -- Minister Says 'Mediation' Referred Only to Thai Dispute	Feb 21, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Front Page 2 -- No Title	Feb 21, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	The Associated Press	'Anglo-Saxon' Plot to Encircle Japan Charged in Tokyo	Feb 22, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Japan's Push South is Held Up by Russia	Feb 23, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Nazis are Aroused by Matsuoka's Bid	Feb 23, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Oceania: Here Japan Covets Territory	Feb 25, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		New Denials in Tokyo	Feb 25, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	The United Press	Cession Demanded	Feb 25, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Japanese Acclaim Churchill's Reply as Easing Tension	Feb 26, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Break is Averted in Tokyo Parleys	Mar 2, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Vichy Surrenders to Tokyo Demands Over Thai Border	Mar 3, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Japanese Request Clear Vichy Reply	Mar 5, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Matsuoka Weighs Journey to Berlin	Mar 7, 1941	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>		Japanese Troops "on Spot"	Mar 7, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Minister to Leave Soon	Mar 9, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	James,Edwin L.	Matsuoka Will Explain the Situation to Hitler	Mar 9, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Kanuth,Percival	Berlin Announces Visit by Matsuoka	Mar 9, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Thai Peace Parley in Full Agreement	Mar 10, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Way Cleared for Matsuoka	Mar 10, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka to Leave for Berlin Tonight	Mar 11, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Matsuoka to Meet Alliance Partners	Mar 12, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Thai Border Deal Closed Formally	Mar 12, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Italy Announces Visit	Mar 12, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Nazis Record a 'More Militant' American Attitude and Note Reaction to It -- Italy Thinks Japan Will Act	Mar 12, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Indo-China Pledges No Anti-Tokyo Ties	Mar 13, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Leaves Tokyo for Berlin	Mar 13, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Matthews,Herbert L.	Italians Warn U.S. of 'Enemy' Status	Mar 13, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Trip started by Matsuoka	Mar 14, 1941	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	Matsuoka Hopeful of Results of Trip	Mar 14, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Hopeful of Peace in Pacific	Mar 16, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japan Pins Her Hopes on Matsuoka's Mission	Mar 16, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Objectives of Matsuoka mission mulled in article	Mar 18, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Think fast, Mr. Matsuoka	Mar 19, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka to Talk with Soviet First	Mar 19, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Pertinax	Soviet Pact Terms Take Japan Aback	Mar 22, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Reds included by Matsuoka	Mar 23, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Byas,Hugh	An Enigma Named Matsuoka	Mar 23, 1941	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon, Doesn't use jargon, Generous, Speaks like an Oriental.
<i>Oregonian</i>		Japan envoy in Moscow	Mar 24, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Arrives in Russian Capital	Mar 24, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Tokyo Comment Cautious	Mar 24, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Stalin visited by Matsuoka	Mar 25, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Stalin Joins Talk with Matsuoka	Mar 25, 1941	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>		Attacks on Envoys in Japan Protested	Mar 25, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka on German soil	Mar 26, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Near Precedent for Stalin	Mar 26, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Test of Ambassador Seen	Mar 26, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Japan's envoy gets big hand	Mar 27, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Yugoslav Envoy in Line	Mar 27, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Peters,C. Brooks	Matsuoka Greeted Royally in Berlin	Mar 27, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	German 'Souvenir' Awaited by Japan	Mar 27, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Aces of axis talk English	Mar 28, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Confers Long With Hitler	Mar 28, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Tokyo Learns Axis Will Seek Action	Mar 28, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka again sees Ribbentrop	Mar 29, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Confers on Nazi Trade Ties	Mar 29, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Chungking Watches Mission	Mar 29, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka leaves Berlin suddenly	Mar 30, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Lese majeste acts laid to Matsuoka	Mar 30, 1941	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka quits Berlin for Rome	Mar 31, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Leaves Berlin for Rome	Mar 31, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Expresses New Confidence	Mar 31, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Rome greets Matsuoka	Apr 1, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Matthews,Herbert L.	Matsuoka in Rome; Denies War Motive	Apr 1, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Matthews,Herbert L.	Matsuoka is Feted by Italian Leaders	Apr 2, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Matthews,Herbert L.	Matsuoka Enjoys Talk with Pontiff	Apr 3, 1941	Bellicose
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka off on trip home	Apr 4, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Article 9 -- No Title	Apr 5, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Matsuoka's Report Awaited	Apr 6, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka cuts short his visit	Apr 7, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Thai Axis Tie is Reported	Apr 8, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Calls at Kremlin Again	Apr 8, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japan Watches Soviet Policy	Apr 8, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka to Stay Longer in Mascow	Apr 9, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka visits commissar again	Apr 10, 1941	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>	Robertson,Douglas	Shangai Believes Japanese Divided	Apr 10, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japanese Hopes Raised	Apr 10, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japan is Warned of Long Struggle	Apr 11, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Japanese Leaving Indies	Apr 12, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Chamberlin,William	Tokyo - Moscow - Berlin Posing World Riddle	Apr 13, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Post,Robert P.	London Discounts Soviet-Japan Pact	Apr 14, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Pertinax	Soviet Pact Omits North China Issue	Apr 15, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japan Now Plans 'Diplomatic War'	Apr 18, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japan's Industry Warned to Expand	Apr 20, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Durbin,F. Tillman	Tokyo Peace Drive Expected by China	Apr 21, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Matsuoka Advised to Visit U.S. Next	Apr 22, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Stalin Quoted as Calling Our Naval Plans Futile	Apr 23, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Vitctor's Welcome Given to Matsuoka	Apr 23, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Pledges by Soviet Asked by Japanese	Apr 24, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Matsuoka Visions Axis 'Millenium'	Apr 27, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Matsuoka Urged to See Roosevelt	Apr 28, 1941	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Trip by Matsuoka to U.S. is Debated	May 1, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japanese Says We Invited Matsuoka	May 3, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Emperor Learns New Tokyo Policy	May 4, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		'Come see me,' Matsuoka says	May 5, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Duranty,Walter	Matsuoka's Peace Hopes	May 5, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Matsuoka Rejects Idea of Trip to U.S	May 5, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Hull Makes No Comment	May 6, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka's Stand on Visit Deplored	May 6, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		U.S. -Nazi Conflict Applauded in Japan	May 7, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Axis Conferences Started in Tokyo	May 10, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Confers with the Emperor	May 13, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	British, U.S. Envoys Call on Matsuoka	May 15, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka set for premiership	May 16, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Reich Envoy Reports ot Matsuoka on Hess	May 16, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Soviet Envoy Sees Matsuoka	May 17, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Taks with U.S. Envoy	May 20, 1941	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japan Reaffirms her Bonds to Axis	May 31, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Manila Export Curb is Assailed in Japan	Jun 2, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japanese Seizure Protested by U.S.	Jun 6, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japan Now Likely to End Indies Talks	Jun 11, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Backs Duce Against U.S.	Jun 15, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Tokyo Paper Hints at Rift in Cabinet	Jun 17, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Grew Again Warns Tokyo on Bombings	Jun 17, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japan Astonished at American Step	Jun 18, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japan Ponders War on America	Jun 22, 1941	US Educated
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Tokyo Continuing to Sift Soviet War	Jun 27, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>		Emperor Sees Matsuoka	Jul 5, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Pertinax	Matsuoka Shaken by Turn of Events	Jul 11, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japanese Cabinet Will Rule Finance	Jul 12, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		All cabinet heads quit Japan posts. Army, Navy seen with whip hand in new setup	Jul 17, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Honda Obeys Call to go to Nanking	Jul 23, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japan is Seen Bound to her Course in Asia	Aug 3, 1941	Bellicose

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>	Abend,Hallett	New Tokyo Crisis Believed in Offing	Oct 1, 1941	
<i>New York Times</i>	Tolischus,Otto D.	Japan Not Bound to War for Axis	Nov 10, 1941	Keep America out of the
<i>Oregonian</i>		Runt complex, deflater of pride, declared back of Japan's hatred	Dec 23, 1941	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka named envoy to Vatican	Mar 25, 1942	
<i>New York Times</i>		Grew Says Japan Warned US in 1941	Jul 14, 1943	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Suicide Attmpt Laid to Matsuoka	Nov 18, 1945	Oregon
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka must pay the price	Nov 20, 1945	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Declares he Sought U.S. Amity	Nov 24, 1945	Wished to cooperate with America
<i>New York Times</i>		Excerpts From Hitler-Matsuoka Documents	Nov 24, 1945	Attack the United States
<i>New York Times</i>	McLaughlin, Kathleen	Hitler-Matsuoka Plot On U.S. Described At Germans' Trial	Nov 24, 1945	Attack the United States
<i>New York Times</i>	Kluckhohn, Frank L.	Ruse of Matsuoka Revealed by Aide	Nov 25, 1945	
<i>Oregonian</i>		Japan's Peace Proposal of 1941 Discussed First with Nazi Allies	Dec 19, 1945	Konoe Memoir
<i>New York Times</i>		Konoye Memoir Says Envoy to U. S. Didn't Grasp Ouster of Matsuoka	Dec 25, 1945	
<i>New York Times</i>		Hirohito Scolded his High Command	Dec 27, 1945	

<i>Newspaper</i>	Authors, Primary	Title Primary	Date	Keywords
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Now in Jail; Awaits Crimes Hearing	Jan 23, 1946	Konoe Memoir
<i>New York Times</i>		Japan Sought to Keep U.S. at Peace Early in 1941, Court Record Shows	Feb 8, 1946	
<i>New York Times</i>		Allies Indict Tojo and 27 for a Plot to Rule the World	Apr 29, 1946	
<i>New York Times</i>		Matsuoka Critically Ill	Jun 24, 1946	
<i>Oregonian</i>		T.B. claims Matsuoka in hospital	Jun 27, 1946	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon, Death, Court erases
<i>New York Times</i>		Yosuke Matsuoka Dies in Tokyo at 66	Jun 27, 1946	Oregon, aggressive policy,
<i>Oregonian</i>		Matsuoka's youthful love of U.S. turns to scorn	Jun 28, 1946	
<i>New York Times</i>	Parrott,Lindesay	Matsuoka Memoir Denies War Design; A Family in China Fights for its Existence	Jun 29, 1946	Triple Alliance was a treaty of peace
<i>Oregonian</i>		Ex-Portlander Matsuoka No. 1 Jap warmonger	Jul 14, 1946	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon
<i>New York Times</i>		Japan's Evil Spirit	Oct 2, 1946	Pearl Harbor, Konoe
<i>New York Times</i>	Parrott,Lindesay	Aim of Axis Pact Found 'Aggressive'	Nov 8, 1948	
<i>Oregonian</i>	Duin, Steve	Culling the UO in Matsuoka	Dec 2, 2001	Mrs. Beveridge, Oregon

Bibliography

Books In English

History of Epworth United Methodist Church. Translated by Kamano, Yoshimi.
Portland, OR: 1982.

Who's Who in American Methodism. Edited by Price, Carl F. New York, NY: E.B.
Treat & Co. 1916.

Asada, Sadao. *Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations: Historical Essays*.
Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.

Betts, Judith Anne. "The Battle of the Narratives: Australian Media Agendas and
the Iraq War." Doctor of Philosophy Ph.D. University of Sydney, 2015.

Bix, Herbert P. *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*. 1st ed. ed. New York, NY:
Harper Collins Publishers, 2016.

Blaker, Michael. *Japanese International Negotiating Style*. Studies of the East Asian
Institute, Columbia University; Studies of the East Asian Institute. New York,
NY: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Borg, Dorothy and Shumpei Okamoto. *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American
Relations, 1931-1941*. Studies of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University;
Studies of the East Asian Institute. New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 1973.

Butow, Robert J. C. *The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941*.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974.

——— *Tojo and the Coming of the War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1961.

Carey, James W. ed. *Media, Myths, and Narratives: Television and the Press*. SAGE
Annual Reviews of Communication Research. Vol. 15: SAGE Publications,
1988.

Cashman, Greg and Leonard C. Robinson. *An Introduction to the Causes of War:
Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq*. Rowan and Littlefield
Publishers, 2007.

- Cashman, Sean Dennis. *America in the Gilded Age: From the Death of Lincoln to the Rise of Theodore Roosevelt*. New York, NY: New York University Press, 1993.
- Churchill, Winston S. *The Grand Alliance*. The Second World War. Vol. 3. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1950.
- Craig, Albert. *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 2000.
- Craig, Gordon Alexander and Felix Gilbert. *The Diplomats: 1919-1939*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Daniels, Roger. *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1962.
- Dower, John W. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company / The New Press, 1999.
- . *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1986.
- Evans, Harold. *The American Century*. Knopf, 1998.
- Farago, Ladislav. *The Broken Seal: The Story of Operation Magic and the Pearl Harbor Disaster*. New York, NY: Random House, 1967.
- Feis, Herbert. *The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War between the United States and Japan*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Fukuzawa, Yukichi. *The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi*. Translated by Kiyooka, Eichi. New translation. ed. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1972.
- Gregory, Ross. *America 1941: A Nation at the Crossroads*. New York, NY: Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 1988.
- Hammel, Eric M. *How America Saved the World: The Untold Story of U.S. Preparedness between the World Wars*. Minneapolis, MO: Zenith Press / MBI Pub. Co. 2009.
- Handlin, Oscar. *Chance Or Destiny: Turning Points in American History*. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1977.
- Hattori, Satoshi. "Japan's Diplomatic Gamble for Autonomy: Rethinking Matsuoka Yōsuke's Diplomacy." Chap. 9, In *Tumultuous Decade: Empire, Society, and*

Diplomacy in 1930s Japan. Edited by Kimura, Masato and Tosh Minohara.
Kindle Edition: University of Toronto Press, 2013.

Hoover, Herbert. *Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and its Aftermath*. Hoover Institution Press Publication. edited by Nash, George H. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2011.

Hosoya, Chihiro. *Japan and Postwar Diplomacy in the Asian-Pacific Region*. Occasional Papers / International University of Japan ; Occasional Papers (Kokusai Daigaku) ;. Urasa, Japan: International University of Japan.

Hotta, Eri. *Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy*. Kindle Edition, Knopf, 2013.

Huber, Thomas. *The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.

Hull, Cordell. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*. New York, NY: Macmillan Co. 1948.

Ichihashi, Yamato. *Japanese Immigration: Its Status in California*. San Francisco, CA: The Marshall Press, 1913.

Ienaga, Saburo. *The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese 1931-1945*. The Pantheon Asia Library. 1st American ed. ed. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Iguchi, Takeo. *Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective from Japan*. LTCB International Library Selection. Tokyo, Japan: International House of Japan, 2010.

Ike, Nobutaka. *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967.

International Military Tribunal for the Far East. *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial*. edited by Pritchard, R. John, Sonia M. Zaide and Donald Cameron Watt. Vol. 1-22. New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 1981.

Iriye, Akira, ed. *Mutual Images: Essays in American-Japanese Relations*. Harvard Studies in American-East Asian Relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.

——— *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion 1897-1911*. Harvard University Press, 1972.

Ito, Kazuo. *ISSEI. A History of Japanese Immigrants in North America*. Translated by Nakamura, Shinichiro and Jean S. and Gerard. Seattle, WA: Executive Committee for Publication of Issei. 1973.

- Japanese Delegation to the League of Nations. *The Manchurian Question: Japan's Case in the Sino-Japanese Dispute as Presented before the League of Nations*. Geneva: League of Nations, 1933.
- Kershaw, Ian. *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World 1940-1941*. Kindle Edition, The Penguin Press HC, 2007.
- Kessler, Lauren. *Stubborn Twig: Three Generations in the Life of a Japanese American Family*. Oregon Reads. New York, NY: Random House, 1993.
- Kikumura-Yano, Akemi. *Encyclopedia of Japanese Descendants in the Americas: An Illustrated History of the Nikkei*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2002.
- Kiyama, Henry Yoshitaka and Frederik L. Schodt. *The Four Immigrants Manga: A Japanese Experience in San Francisco, 1904-1924* [Manga yonin shosei]. Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 1999.
- Kubo, Fumiaki, Ryūji Hattori, and Satoshi Hattori. "The 1930s: Japan's War with China and American Non-Recognition." In *The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to Present* [Nichibei kankei shi [A history of US-Japan Relations]]. edited by Iokibe, Makoto and Tosh Minohara, Palgrave McMillan, 2017.
- Lu, David J. *From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan's Entry into World War II*. Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1961.
- Lu, David John. *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke in the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*. Studies of Modern Japan. Lanham, MD.; Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002.
- Malloy, Sean L. (Sean Langdon), 1972-. *Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to use the Bomb Against Japan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.
- Matsuoka, Yosuke. "Address of the Honorable Yosuke Matsuoka before the Chamber of Commerce and the Japan Society in Portland, April 8th, 1933." Speech, Special Collections & University Archives, University of Oregon Libraries, Eugene, Oregon.
- . *Building Up Manchuria*. Tokyo: The Herald of Asia, 1938.
- Mears, Eliot Grinnell, (1889-1946.). *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast: Their Legal and Economic Status*. Asian Experience in North America: Chinese and Japanese. New York, NY: Arno Press.
- Minear, Richard H. *Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Moriyama, Alan Takeo. *Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration Companies and Hawaii, 1894-1908*. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.
- Morley, James William, and Columbia University *The Final Confrontation: Japan's Negotiations with the United States, 1941*. Japan's Road to the Pacific War.; Studies of the East Asian Institute. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Morley, James William, and Nippon kokusai seiji gakkai. *Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935-1940 Selected Translations from Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, Kaisen Gaiko Shi*. Japan's Road to the Pacific War.; Studies of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Studies of the East Asian Institute. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Nakatani, Tadashi. "What Peace Meant to Japan: The Changeover at Paris in 1919." In *The Decade of the Great War: Japan and the Wider World in the 1910s*. Edited by Minohara, Tosh, Tze-Ki Hon and Evan Dawley Dawley, 168-188: Brill Academic Pub, 2015.
- Nish, Ian. *Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations*. Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1993.
- Oka, Yoshitake, (1902-). *Konoe Fumimaro: A Political Biography*. [Tokyo]: University of Tokyo Press.
- Perez, Louis G. *Japan at War: An Encyclopedia*. . Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013.
- Pierson, John D. (1937-). *Tokutomi Soho, 1863-1957, a Journalist for Modern Japan*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Shillony, Ben-Ami. *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan*. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.
- Shinamoto, Mayako, Koji Ito, and Yoneyuki Sugita. *Historical Dictionary of Japanese Foreign Policy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.
- Shiroyama, Saburo. *War Criminal: The Life and Death of Hirota Koki*. 1st ed. ed. Tokyo; New York, NY: Kodansha International; distributed through Harper & Row.
- Sokolsky, George E. "Why Matsuoka Hates the United States." *Liberty* 18.27, (July 5, 1941): 10-11-25.
- Standage, Tom. "The True History of Fake News." *The Economist* 1843 (June / July 2017).

- Steele, M. William. "Christianity and Politics in Japan." In *Handbook of Christianity in Japan*, edited by Blum, Mark, R. Kersten and M. F. Low, 359-382. Leiden, Boston, MA: Brill, 2003.
- Takami, David A. *Divided Destiny: A History of Japanese Americans in Seattle*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press; Wing Luke Asian Museum.
- Tamura, Linda,(1949-). *The Hood River Issei: An Oral History of Japanese Settlers in Oregon's Hood River Valley*. Asian American Experience. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Tolischus, Otto D. *Through Japanese Eyes*. New York, NY: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1945.
- *Tokyo Record*. New York, NY: Reynal & Hitchcock.
- Vanderwicken, Peter. "Why the News is Not the Truth." *The Harvard Business Review* (May-June, 1995).
- Whitney, Clara A. *Clara's Diary: An American Girl in Meiji, Japan*. Edited by Steele, M. William, Tamiko Ichimata. 1st ed. ed. Tokyo; New York, NY: Kodansha International, 1979.
- Yagami, Kazuo. *Konoe Fumimaro and the Failure of Peace in Japan, 1937-1941: A Critical Appraisal of the Three-Time Prime Minister*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006.
- Young, Louise. *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*. Los Angeles, CA: Berkeley, 1999.

English-language Journals

- "Foreign News:Fascist Revolution?" *TIME* (August 12, 1935).
- "International: Thunder in the East." *TIME* (October 14, 1940).
- "The League: Crushing Verdict." *TIME* (March 6, 1933): 19.
- Ano, Masaharu. "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far Western Roots of a World Political Vision." *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 98, no. 2 (1997): 164-204.
- Bode, Ingvild and Seunghoon Emilia Heo. "World War II Narratives in Contemporary Germany and Japan: How University Students Understand their Past." *International Studies Perspectives* 18, no. 2 (May, 2017): 131-154.

- Cox, Gary P. "The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero." *Journal of Military History* 70, no. 1 (2006): 250.
- Haines, Gerald K. "American Myopia and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, 1931-41." *Prologue* 13, (Summer, 1981): 101-114.
- Matsuoka, Yosuke. "Economic Co-Operation of Japan and China in Manchuria and Mongolia: Its Motives and Basic Significance." *Pacific Affairs* 2, no. 12 (1929): 786-795.
- Steinmetz, Katy. "The Dictionary is Adding an Entry for 'Fake News'." *TIME* (September 27, 2017).
- Sussman, Nathan and Yishay Yafeh. "Institutions, Reforms, and Country Risk: Lessons from Japanese Government Debt in the Meiji Era." *Journal of Economic History* 60, no. 2 (June, 2000): 445.

Books In Japanese

- Nichibei kankei shi [A History of US-Japan Relations]*. edited by Iokibe, Makoto. Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2008.
- Fukui, Yūzō. *Yomigaeru Matsuoka Yōsuke [Reviving Matsuoka Yōsuke]*. Kindle Edition, PHP Kenkyūjo, 2016.
- Gaimushō, ed. *Nihon gaikō bunsho [Documents of Japan's Foreign Policy]*. Vol. 28 bk.2 Jan-December 1895. Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengōkai/ Gaimushō, 1953.
- Hosoya, Chihiro. *Nihon gaikō no zahyō [the Seat of Japanese Diplomacy]*. Chūkōsōsho. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1979.
- Kobayashi, Tomoharu. *Konoe naika no shimei [the Mission of Konoe's Cabinet]*. Tokyo: Kokubōkōkyūkai, 1940.
- Lu, David J. and Shinichi Hasegawa. *Matsuoka Yosuke to sono jidai [Matsuoka Yōsuke and His Times]*. Tokyo: TBS Britannica, 1981.
- Matsuoka, Yosuke. *Koa no taigyō [A great work of developing Asia]*. Tokyo: Daiichi Kōronsha, 1941.
- . *Seinen yo tate [Stand Up Youths]*. Tokyo, 1933.
- Miwa, Kimitada. *Matsuoka Yōsuke sono ningen to gaikō [Matsuoka Yōsuke the Man and His Diplomacy]*. Chūkōshinsho. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1971.

Mori, Kiyoto. *Ningen Matsuoka Yōsuke no zenbō [The Whole Story of Matsuoka Yōsuke the Man]*. Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1933.

Ōkawa, Saburo. *Kyogō Matsuoka Yōsuke [The Great Man Matsuoka Yōsuke]*. Tokyo: Tōyōdō, 1941.

Rengōgun shireibu. *Kokusai kensatsu kyoku (IPS) jinmonchōsho [International Prosecution Section (IPS) Interrogation Files]*. edited by Awaya, Kentarō, Yutaka Yoshida. Vol. 19. Tokyo, Japan: Nippon Tosho Senta-, 1993.

Saitō, Ryōe. *Azamukareta rekishi [History Betrayed]*. Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1955.

Takano, Shizuko. *Sohō e no tegami: Nakae Chōmin kara Matsuoka Yōsuke made [Letters to Sohō: From Nakae Chōmin to Matsuoka Yōsuke]*. Tokyo: Fujiwara shoten, 2010.

Uchiyama, M. "Matsuoka Yōsuke: sono hito to shōgai [Matsuoka Yōsuke: The Man and His Life]." *Kokusai seiji* 56, (1977,: 160-165.)

Newspapers -*New York Times*

"7 Envoys Consult on Japan's Defense." *New York Times*, November 16, 1932.

"Addresses of Yosuke Matsuoka Criticizing Report of League Assembly." *New York Times*, February 25, 1933.

"Allies Indict Tojo and 27 for a Plot to Rule the World." *New York Times*, April 29, 1946.

"Article 9 -- no Title." *New York Times*, April 5, 1941.

"Attacks on Envoys in Japan Protested." *New York Times*, March 25, 1941.

"Better Relations Expected." *New York Times*, October 28, 1932.

"Chinese Peace Delegate Declares Matsuoka's Statement Gives False Impression." *New York Times*, September 5, 1919.

"Chungking Watches Mission." *New York Times*, March 29, 1941.

"Conciliation Plan Opposed by Japan." *New York Times*, December 17, 1932.

"Criticizes our Naval Policy." *New York Times*, March 12, 1933.

"Emperor Sees Matsuoka." *New York Times*, July 5, 1941.

"Excerpts from Hitler-Matsuoka Documents." *New York Times*, November 24, 1945.

"Expects Shantung Return in a Year." *New York Times*, September 4, 1919.

"Final Tokyo Message." *New York Times*, February 25, 1933.

"Fleisher Sees Japan Avoiding U.S. Break." *New York Times*, November 22, 1940.

"Grew and Matsuoka in Long Conversation." *New York Times*, November 11, 1940.

"Grew Says Japan Warned US in 1941." *New York Times*, July 14, 1943.

"Grew Tells Tokyo Facts are Judged." *New York Times*, December 19, 1940.

"Hirohito Scolded His High Command." *New York Times*, December 27, 1945.

"Hull Makes no Comment." *New York Times*, May 6, 1941.

"Insists Manchukuo Retains 'Open Door'." *New York Times*, November 13, 1932.

"Italy Announces Visit." *New York Times*, March 12, 1941.

"Japan Asks French Amity." *New York Times*, December 29, 1940.

"Japan Defies U.S. to Upset Her Plan." *New York Times*, January 22, 1941.

"Japan Sought to Keep U.S. at Peace Early in 1941, Court Record shows." *New York Times*, February 8, 1946.

"Japan Urges China to Join Axis Pact." *New York Times*, October 8, 1940.

"Japanese 'Insult' seen." *New York Times*, October 5, 1940.

"Japanese Leaving Indies." *New York Times*, April 12, 1941.

"Japanese Protest Bermuda Seizures." *New York Times*, January 8, 1941.

"Japanese Request Clear Vichy Reply." *New York Times*, March 5, 1941.

"Japanese Troops "on Spot"." *New York Times*, March 7, 1941.

"Japan's Aims Linked to those of Germany." *New York Times*, January 6, 1941.

"Konoye Memoir Says Envoy to U. S. Didn't Grasp Ouster of Matsuoka." *New York Times*, December 25, 1945.

"League Gets Japan's Terms." *New York Times*, February 3, 1933.

"Linked to the South." *New York Times*, January 30, 1941.

"Manchurian Railway in a Political Shift." *New York Times*, August 1, 1935.

"Manila Export Curb is Assailed in Japan." *New York Times*, June 2, 1941.

"Matsuoka Arrives in Russian Capital." *New York Times*, March 24, 1941.

"Matsuoka Arrives; Says Japan Makes Plea to no Nation." *New York Times*, March 25, 1933.

"Matsuoka Asks Us to "Think Twice." *New York Times*, February 27, 1933.

"Matsuoka Assures Diet." *New York Times*, February 15, 1941.

"Matsuoka Backs Duce Against U.S." *New York Times*, June 15, 1941.

"Matsuoka Calls at Kremlin again." *New York Times*, April 8, 1941.

"Matsuoka Coming to See Roosevelt." *New York Times*, February 16, 1933.

"Matsuoka Confers Long with Hitler." *New York Times*, March 28, 1941.

"Matsuoka Confers on Nazi Trade Ties." *New York Times*, March 29, 1941.

"Matsuoka Confers with the Emperor." *New York Times*, May 13, 1941.

"Matsuoka Critically Ill." *New York Times*, June 24, 1946.

"Matsuoka Declares He Sought U.S. Amity." *New York Times*, November 24, 1945.

"Matsuoka Denies Japan Seeks China." *New York Times*, March 29, 1933.

"Matsuoka Disclaims Interest in U.S. Vote." *New York Times*, November 3, 1940.

"Matsuoka Hopeful of Peace in Pacific." *New York Times*, March 16, 1941.

"Matsuoka is Called a 'Bluffing Bulldog': Pittman Assails Japan's Foreign Minister and Army Clique." *New York Times*, October 18, 1940.

"Matsuoka Jeered by London Crowd." *New York Times*, March 12, 1933.

"Matsuoka Leaves Berlin for Rome." *New York Times*, March 31, 1941.

"Matsuoka Leaves Tokyo for Berlin." *New York Times*, March 13, 1941.

"Matsuoka Now in Jail; Awaits Crimes Hearing." *New York Times*, January 23, 1946.

"Matsuoka Talks with U.S. Envoy." *New York Times*, May 20, 1941.

"Matsuoka to Get Police Guard here." *New York Times*, March 23, 1933.

"Matsuoka to Leave for Berlin Tonight." *New York Times*, March 11, 1941.

"Matsuoka to Quit as Railway Head." *New York Times*, October 18, 1938.

"Matsuoka to Stay Longer in Moscow." *New York Times*, April 9, 1941.

"Matsuoka to Talk with Soviet First." *New York Times*, March 19, 1941.

"Matsuoka to Try to Restrain Japan." *The New York Times*, February 25, 1933.

"Matsuoka to Try to Restrain Japan." *New York Times*, February 26, 1933.

"Matsuoka Urges Amity for Japan." *New York Times*, March 18, 1933.

"Matsuoka's Stand on Visit Deplored." *New York Times*, May 6, 1941.

"Mellon Takes Ship Home From London." *New York Times*, March 18, 1933.

"Minister to Leave Soon." *New York Times*, March 9, 1941.

"Nazis are Aroused by Matsuoka's Bid." *New York Times*, February 23, 1941.

"Nazis Record a 'More Militant' American Attitude and Note Reaction to it -- Italy Thinks Japan Will Act." *New York Times*, March 12, 1941.

"Nazis Voice Approval." *New York Times*, January 28, 1941.

"Near Precedent for Stalin." *New York Times*, March 26, 1941.

"New Denials in Tokyo." *New York Times*, February 25, 1941.

"New Peace Offers are made by Japan." *New York Times*, February 29, 1932.

"Objection Called Outrageous." *New York Times*, January 27, 1941.

"Oceania: Here Japan Covets Territory." *New York Times*, February 25, 1941.

"Oral Reply is Unlikely." *New York Times*, November 16, 1932.

"Our Law Stirs Tokyo Diet: Matsuoka Scores Foreign Minister on Exclusion Measure." *New York Times*, January 24, 1931.

"The Pity of it." *New York Times*, January 30, 1932.

"Prosperity in Asia is Aim, Says Tokyo." *New York Times*, August 1, 1940.

"Reich Envoy Reports Ot Matsuoka on Hess." *New York Times*, May 16, 1941.

"Report Japanese in Big Arms Deals." *New York Times*, March 10, 1933.

- "Soviet Envoy Sees Matsuoka." *New York Times*, May 17, 1941.
- "Stalin Joins Talk with Matsuoka." *New York Times*, March 25, 1941.
- "Stalin Quoted as Calling our Naval Plans Futile." *New York Times*, April 23, 1941.
- "Stimson's Address Belittled in Japan." *New York Times*, October 28, 1932.
- "Test of Ambassador seen." *New York Times*, March 26, 1941.
- "Thai Axis Tie is Reported." *New York Times*, April 8, 1941.
- "Thai Border Deal Closed Formally." *New York Times*, March 12, 1941.
- "Thai Peace Parley in Full Agreement." *New York Times*, March 10, 1941.
- "Tokyo Comment Cautious." *New York Times*, March 24, 1941.
- "Tokyo Paper Hints at Rift in Cabinet." *New York Times*, June 17, 1941.
- "Tokyo Reporters to Become Ambassadors; Foreign Office Wants Fast, Accurate Envoys." *New York Times*, August 31, 1940.
- "U.S. -Nazi Conflict Applauded in Japan." *New York Times*, May 7, 1941.
- "U.S. Presses Japan to Respect Rights." *New York Times*, August 28, 1940.
- "Way Cleared for Matsuoka." *New York Times*, March 10, 1941.
- "Yen and Matsuoka Heard on the Radio." *New York Times*, December 5, 1932.
- "Yosuke Matsuoka Dies in Tokyo at 66." *New York Times*, June 27, 1946.
- "Yugoslav Envoy in Line." *New York Times*, March 27, 1941.
- Abend, Hallett. "Japanese Leader Doubts Mediation." *New York Times*, November 12, 1938.
- "Japanese Plan to Control the Yellow River; Begin Preliminary Work on 20-Year Project." *New York Times*, August 30, 1936.
- "New Tokyo Crisis Believed in Offing." *New York Times*, October 1, 1941.
- Byas, Hugh. "Aims of Japanese in China Outlined." *New York Times*, May 7, 1938.
- "Amity Up to U.S. Tokyo Press Says." *New York Times*, December 21, 1940.
- "Axis Tie for Peace, Japanese Asserts." *New York Times*, October 11, 1940.

- “Bond of Japanese to Nazis Stressed.” *New York Times*, January 16, 1941.
- “Break is Averted in Tokyo Parleys.” *New York Times*, March 2, 1941.
- “An Enigma Named Matsuoka.” *New York Times*, March 23, 1941.
- “Foreign Minister Matsuoka Says the Alliance is Not Directed Against Us.” *The New York Times*, October 11, 1940.
- “Indo-China Pledges no Anti-Tokyo Ties.” *New York Times*, March 13, 1941.
- “Japan Considering Her 'Aid' to Italy.” *New York Times*, October 29, 1940.
- “Japan is Now Pushing a 'Greater East Asia'.” *New York Times*, August 4, 1940.
- “Japan Open to Aid in China Projects.” *New York Times*, August 22, 1935.
- “Japan Renews Aim as Parley Starts.” *New York Times*, February 8, 1941.
- “Japan Stakes Her all on Treaty with Axis.” *New York Times*, October 6, 1940.
- “Japan Will Change Tactics at Geneva.” *New York Times*, November 27, 1932.
- “Japan Will Steer Indo-China Parley.” *New York Times*, February 6, 1941.
- “Japan would Keep U.S. Out of the War.” *New York Times*, January 30, 1941.
- “Japanese Acclaim Churchill's Reply as Easing Tension.” *New York Times*, February 26, 1941.
- “Japanese Cabinet Forced to Resign.” *New York Times*, July 17, 1940.
- “Japanese Delay Reply to Germany; Inner Cabinet Meeting is Canceled.” *New York Times*, August 15, 1940.
- “Japan's Push South is Held Up by Russia.” *New York Times*, February 23, 1941.
- “Konoye is Seeking Quick China Peace.” *New York Times*, July 19, 1940.
- “Matsuoka Critical of Japanese Spirit.” *New York Times*, April 27, 1933.
- “Matsuoka Hopeful of Results of Trip.” *New York Times*, March 14, 1941.
- “Matsuoka Rejects Threats to Indies.” *New York Times*, January 29, 1941.

- “Matsuoka Reveals His League Defense.” *New York Times*, November 6, 1932.
- “Matsuoka to Meet Alliance Partners.” *New York Times*, March 12, 1941.
- “Matsuoka Weighs Journey to Berlin.” *New York Times*, March 7, 1941.
- “Matsuoka Accuses Hull of Distorting Case of Manchuria.” *New York Times*, January 27, 1941.
- “Outside Mediation is Barred by Japan.” *New York Times*, January 26, 1941.
- “Patience with Japan Urged: But this, it is Held, should Not Take any Form of Appeasement,” *New York Times*, September, 25, 1941, sec. C.
- “Says Japan Backs Peace Machinery.” *New York Times*, October 22, 1932.
- “Tokyo Concessions to League Forseen.” *New York Times*, October 20, 1932.
- “Tokyo Fears Red Threat.” *New York Times*, February 20, 1941.
- “Tokyo 'Purge' Calls 40 Diplomats Home.” *New York Times*, August 23, 1940.
- “U.S. View of Pact Surprises Japan.” *New York Times*, February 5, 1941.
- “Vichy Surrenders to Tokyo Demands Over Thai Border.” *New York Times*, March 3, 1941.
- Chamberlin, William H. “Tokyo - Moscow - Berlin Posing World Riddle.” *New York Times*, April 13, 1941.
- Duranty, Walter. “Matsuoka's Peace Hopes.” *New York Times*, May 5, 1941.
- Durbin, F. Tillman. “Tokyo Peace Drive Expected by China.” *New York Times*, April 21, 1941.
- James, Edwin L. “Matsuoka Will Explain the Situation to Hitler.” *New York Times*, March 9, 1941.
- Johnson, Albine E. “Matsuoka Regards Us as Capricious.” *New York Times*, February 26, 1933.
- Kanuth, Percival. “Berlin Announces Visit by Matsuoka.” *New York Times*, March 9, 1941.
- Kluckhohn, Frank L. “Roosevelt Sending Aide to Chungking.” *New York Times*, January 24, 1941.

——— “Ruse of Matsuoka Revealed by Aide.” *New York Times*, November 25, 1945.

Matsuoka, Yosuke. “Asiatics, Not Europeans.” *New York Times*, March 26, 1933.

——— “A Japanese Viewpoint.” *New York Times*, March 19, 1933.

——— “Japan's Valedictory.” *New York Times*, February 26, 1933.

——— “A Knockout Blow Held Aim of Japan.” *New York Times*, October 10, 1937.

——— “Matsuoka Challenges the Critics of the Japanese Policy on China.” *New York Times*, April 29, 1934.

——— “Matsuoka Defends Manchurian Action.” *New York Times*, November 21, 1932.

——— “Matsuoka Finds Us Inconsistent in Entangling Ourselves in East.” *New York Times*, April 2, 1933.

——— “Sees Sympathy with Chinese.” *The New York Times*, February 22, 1932.

——— “Sees Sympathy with Chinese.” *New York Times*, February 22, 1932.

Matthews, Herbert L. “Italians Warn U.S. of 'Enemy' Status.” *New York Times*, March 13, 1941.

——— “Matsuoka Enjoys Talk with Pontiff.” *New York Times*, April 3, 1941.

——— “Matsuoka in Rome; Denies War Motive.” *New York Times*, April 1, 1941.

——— “Matsuoka is Feted by Italian Leaders.” *New York Times*, April 2, 1941.

——— “Peace Aim of Japan in Manchuria Told; Matsuoka, Vice President of Railway, Says Tokio Means to Keep Country Tranquil.” *New York Times*, June 09, 1929.

——— “Share in Railway Urged for French.” *New York Times*, March 1, 1933.

McLaughlin, Kathleen. “Hitler-Matsuoka Plot on U.S. Described at Germans' Trial.” *New York Times*, November 24, 1945.

Parrott, Lindesay. “Aim of Axis Pact found 'Aggressive'.” *New York Times*, November 8, 1948.

——— “Japanese Return to Shinto Custom.” *New York Times*, January 4, 1948.

——— “Matsuoka Memoir Denies War Design.” *New York Times*, June, 29, 1946.

- Peffer, Nathaniel. "Outlays in Manchukuo Pinch Japan." *New York Times*, January 24, 1937.
- Pertinax. "Matsuoka Shaken by Turn of Events." *New York Times*, July 11, 1941.
- "Soviet Pact Omits North China Issue." *New York Times*, April 15, 1941.
- "Soviet Pact Terms Take Japan Aback." *New York Times*, March 22, 1941.
- Peters, C. Brooks. "Matsuoka Greeted Royally in Berlin." *New York Times*, March 27, 1941.
- Post, Robert P. "London Discounts Soviet-Japan Pact." *New York Times*, April 14, 1941.
- "War Aid to China Hinted in London." *New York Times*, December 10, 1940.
- Robertson, Douglas. "Shangai Believes Japanese Divided." *New York Times*, April 10, 1941.
- Sokolsky, George E. "Japan's Expansion: Her Aims and Obstacles." *New York Times*, February 28, 1932, sec. 9.
- Streit, Clarence K. "Japan to Maintain Manchukuo Policy, She Tells League." *New York Times*, February 14, 1933.
- "League Set to Hear Lytton Body Today." *New York Times*, November 25, 1932.
- "Tokyo to Seek Soviet Aid." *New York Times*, October 27, 1932.
- The Associated Press. "'Anglo-Saxon' Plot to Encircle Japan Charged in Tokyo." *New York Times*, February 22, 1941.
- "'New World Order' Only a Matter of Time, Says Matsuoka, Urging U.S. to 'Allay' Crisis." *New York Times*, January 21, 1941.
- The United Press. "Cession Demanded." *New York Times*, February 25, 1941.
- "Japanese Newspaper Gives Version of Note to Eden -- Minister Says 'Mediation' Referred Only to Thai Dispute." *New York Times*, February 21, 1941.
- Tolischus, Otto D. "Axis Conferences Started in Tokyo." *New York Times*, May 10, 1941.
- "British, U.S. Envoys Call on Matsuoka." *New York Times*, May 15, 1941.

- “Emperor Learns New Tokyo Policy.” *New York Times*, May 4, 1941.
- “Expresses New Confidence.” *New York Times*, March 31, 1941.
- “Front Page 2 -- no Title.” *New York Times*, February 21, 1941.
- “German 'Souvenir' Awaited by Japan.” *New York Times*, March 27, 1941.
- “Grew again Warns Tokyo on Bombings.” *New York Times*, June 17, 1941.
- “Honda Obeys Call to Go to Nanking.” *New York Times*, July 23, 1941.
- “Japan Astonished at American Step.” *New York Times*, June 18, 1941.
- “Japan is seen Bound to Her Course in Asia.” *New York Times*, August 3, 1941.
- “Japan is Warned of Long Struggle.” *New York Times*, April 11, 1941.
- “Japan Now Likely to End Indies Talks.” *New York Times*, June 11, 1941.
- “Japan Now Plans 'Diplomatic War'.” *New York Times*, April 18, 1941.
- “Japan Pins Her Hopes on Matsuoka's Mission.” *New York Times*, March 16, 1941.
- “Japan Reaffirms Her Bonds to Axis.” *New York Times*, May 31, 1941.
- “Japan Watches Soviet Policy.” *New York Times*, April 8, 1941.
- “Japanese Cabinet Will Rule Finance.” *New York Times*, July 12, 1941.
- “Japanese Hopes Raised.” *New York Times*, April 10, 1941.
- “Japanese Says we Invited Matsuoka.” *New York Times*, May 3, 1941.
- “Japanese Seizure Protested by U.S.” *New York Times*, June 6, 1941.
- “Japan's Industry Warned to Expand.” *New York Times*, April 20, 1941.
- “Japan's War Plot is Laid to Clique.” *New York Times*, August 26, 1942.
- “Matsuoka Advised to Visit U.S. Next.” *New York Times*, April 22, 1941.
- “Matsuoka Rejects Idea of Trip to U.S.” *New York Times*, May 5, 1941.
- “Matsuoka Urged to See Roosevelt.” *New York Times*, April 28, 1941.
- “Matsuoka Visions Axis 'Millenium'.” *New York Times*, April 27, 1941.

- “Matsuoka's Report Awaited.” *New York Times*, April 6, 1941.
 - “Pledges by Soviet Asked by Japanese.” *New York Times*, April 24, 1941.
 - “Tokyo Continuing to Sift Soviet War.” *New York Times*, June 27, 1941.
 - “Tokyo Learns Axis Will Seek Action.” *New York Times*, March 28, 1941.
 - “Trip by Matsuoka to U.S. is Debated.” *New York Times*, May 1, 1941.
 - “Vittor's Welcome Given to Matsuoka.” *New York Times*, April 23, 1941.
- Williamson, S. T. “Headline Footnotes: A Versatile Railroad Man, and Mr. Koo.” *New York Times*, November 27, 1932.

Newspapers - *Oregonian*

- “Aces of Axis Talk English.” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), 03/28/1941.
- “All Cabinet Heads Quit Japan Posts. Army, Navy seen with Whip Hand in New Setup.” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), July 17, 1941.
- “Break Rumors Get Exodus. Yosuke Matsuoka Says 'Americans Needn't Worry'.” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), October 11, 1940.
- “‘Come See Me,’ Matsuoka Says.” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), May 05, 1941.
- “Dr. Matsuoka Sends Wreath. Japanese Leader Honors Benefactor.” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), September 13, 1940, sec. 2.
- “Eyes Turned on Geneva. Matsuoka, Japan's Spokesman, Once U. of O. Student.” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), November 24, 1932, sec. 2.
- “Flaws in Matsuoka's Case.” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 11, 1933.
- “Japan Envoy in Moscow.” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 24, 1941.
- “Japan Seeks Only to Preserve Peace on Asiatic Mainland, Matsuoka Avers.” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 09, 1933.
- “Japanese Resent Foreign Attitude. Nations Stand Defended by Matsuoka. Ex-Oregon Student Pleads for Western Understanding in Campaign for Peace.” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 29, 1934.
- “Japan's Envoy Gets a Big Hand.” *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 27, 1941.

"Lese Majeste Acts Laid to Matsuoka." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 30, 1941.

"Matsuoka again Sees Ribbentrop." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 29, 1941.

"Matsuoka Arrives in Portland Today." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 07, 1933.

"Matsuoka Cuts Short His Visit." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 07, 1941.

"Matsuoka Defends Japanese Policy. Nipponese Sure they are Right, Geneva Told." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), December 09, 1932.

"Matsuoka Denies Mediation Try." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), February 21, 1941.

"Matsuoka Honors Boyhood Friend. Marker Placed at Grave of Mrs. Beveridge." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 10, 1933.

"Matsuoka Leaves Berlin Suddenly." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 30, 1941.

"Matsuoka must Pay the Price." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), November 20, 1945.

"Matsuoka must Pay the Price." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), November 20, 1945.

"Matsuoka Named Envoy to Vatican." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 25, 1942.

"Matsuoka Off on Trip Home." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 04 04, 1941.

"Matsuoka on German Soil." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 26, 1941.

"Matsuoka Pens Alumni Article." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), October 03, 1940.

"Matsuoka Quits Berlin for Rome." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 31, 1941.

"Matsuoka Set for Premiership." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), May 16, 1941.

"Matsuoka Visits Commissar again." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 10, 1941.

"Matsuoka Wary of Navy Splurge. Position of Fleet Held None of Japan's Business." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 8, 1933.

"Matsuoka Will Arrive at UO Tomorrow Noon." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 06, 1933.

"Matsuoka, Japan's Noted Statesman, Once Peddled Coffee in Portland." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 26, 1933.

"Matsuoka, Oregon Graduate, Laments Japan is Misunderstood in America." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 25, 1933.

"Meet Opened by Matsuoka." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), February 08, 1941.

- "New Foreign Minister of Japan Remembered as Portland Schoolboy." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), July 19, 1940.
- "Portlanders Pay Tribute to Japanese." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 08, 1933, , sec. 3.
- "Reds Included by Matsuoka." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 23, 1941.
- "Rome Greets Matsuoka." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 01, 1941.
- "Stalin Visited by Matsuoka." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), Mar /25/ 1941.
- "Suicide Attempt Laid to Matsuoka." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), November 18, 1945.
- "T.B. Claims Matsuoka in Hospital." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), June 27, 1946.
- "Think Fast, Mr. Matsuoka." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 19, 1941.
- "Trip Started by Matsuoka." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 14, 1941.
- "We Received a Stranger." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 20, 1933.
- "Yosuke Matsuoka has Hard Time with Political Party." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), July 01, 1934.
- Ewing, Paul F. "Ex-Portlander Matsuoka no. 1 Jap Warmonger." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), July 14, 1946, Sunday.
- Hazen, David W. "Consul Called Back to Tokyo." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), November 8, 1940.
- "Pacific War may Rest in Ex-Portlander's Hands." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), August, 4, 1940, sec. Magazine.
- Kinsley, Philip. "Americans Warned by Japanese Envoy. Critics might Disturb Peace of Two Countries." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), April 4, 1933.
- Matsuoka, F. T. "The Oriental Crisis: Local Japanese Writes of 'Far Eastern Policy,'" *Morning Oregonian* (Portland, OR), July, 23, 1900.
- Smith, Larry. "Matsuoka Threatens War on U.S. Ex-Oregon Student Declares America must 'Keep Out'." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), October 05, 1940, , sec. 1.
- Spencer, Murlin. "Japan's Peace Proposal of 1941 Discussed First with Nazi Allies." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), December 19, 1945.

Sweetland, Reginald. "Runt Complex, Deflater of Pride, Declared Back of Japan's Hatred." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), December 23, 1941.

White, James D. "Matsuoka's Youthful Love of U.S. Turns to Scorn." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), June 28, 1946.

Woodhead, H. G. "Lese Majeste Acts Laid to Matsuoka." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 30, 1941.

Young, James R. "Objectives of Matsuoka Mission Mulled in Article." *Oregonian* (Portland, OR), March 18, 1941.

Newspapers - *Register Guard*

"Yosuke Matsuoka, UO Alumnus and Japanese Foreign Minister, Revisited Eugene in 1933." *Register Guard* (Eugene, OR), May 16, 1965, sec. EE.

Tims, Marvin. "The Honorable Mr. 'Walking Dynamite': Most Infamous Alumnus of the U of O." *Register Guard* (Eugene, OR), May 16, 1965, sec. EE.

University of Oregon

"League Delegate Will Visit Campus on Way to Japan." *Daily Emerald*, March 01, 1933.

"Matsuoka Defends Japan's Policy in East." *Oregon Daily Emerald*, April 08, 1933.

"Matsuoka Will Arrive at UO Tomorrow Noon." *Oregon Daily Emerald*, April 06, 1933.

"Matsuoka, UO Alum, Makes Key Speech at Geneva." *Oregon Daily Emerald*, November 22, 1932.

"Oregon Graduate Gets High Honor in Native Country." *Daily Emerald*, October 26, 1932.

"Oregon Student to Leave for Orient Soon to Help Matsuoka." *Oregon Daily Emerald*, May 17, 1933.

"Time Will Mention Matsuoka Report." *Daily Emerald*, October 05, 1940.

"Yosuke Matsuoka Will Speak here Today." *Daily Emerald*, April 07, 1933.

Matsuoka, Yosuke. "A Far Eastern Report." *Old Oregon* 22, no. 2 (1940): 6.

Olson, Laura. "Board Indicts UO Alum as Nippon War Criminal." *Daily Emerald*, May 02, 1946.

Overland, Peggy. "Up from UO." *Daily Emerald*, February 03, 1944.

Yasui, Minoru. "Illustrious Alumnus." *Old Oregon* 22, no. 2 (1940): 7.

Other Newspapers

"Hirohito Visits to Yasukuni Stopped Over War Criminals," *Japan Times*
July 21, 2006.

Nakashima, Leslie. "Be Loyal to America, Word of Matsuoka to Hawaii Kin,"
Honolulu Star Bulletin April 19, 1933.

Ryall, Julian. "Yasukuni Shrine: The 14 'Class A' War Criminals Honoured by Japan." *Telegraph*, August 14, 2014.

Web Pages

"The Russo-Japanese War in Political Cartoons." Indiana University. Accessed December 2017. <http://www.indiana.edu/~jia1915/war.html>.

Columbia University. "Map of Colonial Asia." Accessed December 2017. <http://www.columbia.edu/~amm2009/3956/mapcolonialasia.jpeg>.

Graham, James. "China's Loss of Sovereignty in Manchuria 1895-1914." Accessed December 2017. <http://www.historyorb.com/asia/manchuria2.php>. International Military Tribunal for the Far East. "Summary Brief of Interrogation of Matsuoka, Yosuke." Tokyo War Crimes Trial Digital Collection, University of Virginia School of Law. Accessed December 2017. <http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavener/2/3/summary-brief-interrogation-matsuoka-yosuke>.

Jones, Gareth. "Will Japan Adopt Fascism?: Interview with Mr Yosuke Matsuoka, Japan's Last Representative at the League of Nations." Accessed December 2017. http://www.garethjones.org/articles_far_east/will_japan_adopt_fascism.htm.

National Diet Library. "Text of the Constitution and Other Important Documents: Potsdam Declaration." Accessed December 2017. <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html>.

Woo, William F. "Journalism and Myth: Do they Create a Cautionary Tale?" Accessed December 2017. <http://niemanreports.org/articles/journalism-and-myth/>.