慣用的含意と前提
Conventional Implicature and Presupposition

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ABSTRACT

　グライス（1989）は発話の意味を「言ったこと」と含意とに区別し、後者を更に、会話の含意と慣用的含意とに区別した。会話の含意は協調の原理をもとに、また慣用的含意は語彙的要素や構文をもとに生成される。これとは独立して、ストローソン（1950/2013）によって、断定と対照される概念として前提の概念が紹介された。前提は、語彙的要素や構文をもとに生成されるものと、会話的要素をもとに生成されるものとがある。そこで問題となるのが、含意と前提の関係である。文献ではこの問題についてさまざまな見解が示されている。特に、意味のオントロジーにおける慣用的含意の位置づけは明確化の余地がある。本稿は、慣用的含意を引き起こす表現の主な候補（supplements, expressives, *therefore*, *manage to*, *only*, *stop ~ing*）について調べ、慣用的含意と前提の関係を議論する。慣用的含意と前提はともに独立した概念を形成するが、その定義と性質には明確化の余地があることがわかった。

　Grice (1989) divided the meaning of an utterance into what is said ("explicature") and what is implicated ("implicature"), and the latter in turn he divided into conversational implicature and conventional implicature. Conversational implicatures are generated on the basis of cooperative principles, whereas conventional implicatures are generated on the basis of lexical items or constructions. Independently of this, the notion of presupposition was introduced by Strawson (1950/2013) as contrasting with assertion. Some presuppositions are triggered by lexical items or constructions and others by conversational factors. A question then is the relation between implicature and presupposition. The literature presents different views on this matter. In particular, the status of conventional implicature in the ontology of meaning leaves room for clarification. This paper investigates major candidates for the triggers of conventional implicatures (i.e., supplements, expressives, *therefore*, *manage to*, *only*, *stop ~ing*) and discusses the relation between

conventional implicatures and presupposition.

The notion and classification of presupposition vary in the literature, as does the treatment of conventional implicature. In order to examine the status of the expressions in question, the following criteria were used: the definition of conventional implicature provided by Potts (2005); the backgrounded property for presuppositions; and the constancy under negation test for presuppositions. It was found that both conventional implicature and presupposition deserve an independent label but their definition and properties leave room for clarification.

1. Introduction

Grice (1989) divided the meaning of an utterance into what is said ("explicature") and what is implicated ("implicature"), and the latter in turn he divided into conversational implicature and conventional implicature (CI). Conversational implcatures are generated on the basis of cooperative principles, whereas CIs are generated on the basis of particular lexical items or constructions. Independently of this, the notion of presupposition was introduced by Strawson (1950/2013) as contrasting with assertion. Some presuppositions are triggered by lexical items or constructions and others by contextual factors. A question then is the relation between implicature and presupposition.

The literature presents different views on this matter. In particular, the status of CI leaves room for clarification. For example, Levinson (1983) and Huang (2014), among many others, have independent chapters for implicature and presupposition, offering little, if any, discussion about the relation between the two. In contrast, Karttunen and Peters (1979) propose reducing presupposition to CI, whereas Bach (1999) argues against the very notion of CI. Potts (2005) investigates CI, focusing on two categories which he calls supplements and expressives.

This paper investigates major candidates for the triggers of CI and discusses the relation between CI and presupposition. Section 2 provides a literature review, section 3 investigates major candidates for the triggers of CIs, section 4 discusses the relation between CI and presupposition, and section 5

concludes the paper.

2. Literature review

I first provide a historical background for the key notions of conversational implicature, CI, and presupposition (section 2.1), and then give an overview of recent work (section 2.2).

2.1 Historical Background

In Grice (1989), the meaning of an utterance is divided into what is said ("explicature") and what is implicated ("implicature"). By the former, Grice means the "at-issue entailment" (Abbott, 2000; Potts, 2005) of the utterance. Implicature in turn is classified as either conversational implicature or CI.

Conversational implcatures are generated through inferences made based on cooperative principles, which consist of the broad cooperative principle (i.e., "Be cooperative") and four subordinate maxims (i.e., maxims of quality, quantity, relation, and manner). For example, the utterance (1) generates a conversational implicature that the speaker has *exactly* two sisters, by virtue of the maxim of quantity, which says 1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange), and 2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required (Grice, 1989).

(1) I have two sisters.

Logically, (1) means that the speaker has *at least* two sisters. However, if the speaker utters (1) when

s/he has three sisters, for example, s/he is providing less information than is needed. In order to be cooperative, s/he should say "three" instead. By "two" in (1), s/he is expected to mean "*exactly* two". It is worth noting that conversational implicatures, unlike CIs, are cancellable. For example, the continuation in (2) below sounds fine.

(2) I have two sisters. In fact I have three.

The following dialogue between Fred and Ann illustrates one more example of conversational implicature:

(3) Fred: Do you have the time?
    Ann: Well, the museum is not open yet.
        (Huang, 2014, p. 34, with my modifications)

Fred is indirectly asking what time it is. Ann's reply does not provide a direct answer to this question. However, Ann conversationally implicates that it is before the time when the museum opens (e.g., 10 a.m.). Fred can get this implicature by assuming that Ann is following the maxim of relation ("Be relevant").

Conversational implicatures can be generated not only by following (or "observing") the maxims but also by flouting the maxims. For example, by uttering an irrelevant thing in reply to someone's utterance, one can generate a conversational implicature that s/he doesn't want to continue the topic given by the addressee (For more details about conversational implicature, see Levinson [1983] and Huang [2014], as well as Grice [1989]).

CIs, in contrast with conversational implicatures, are generated on the basis of particular lexical items or constructions. Grice (1989) offers *therefore* as an example of such a lexical item in the sentence below.

(4) He is an English man; he is, therefore, brave.
    (Grice, 1989, p. 25)

Grice argues that if he says (4), "I have certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words, to its being the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an English man" (p. 25, original parentheses). Grice also mentions that the falsehood of the above-mentioned consequence relation does not affect the truth condition of the sentence, as he notes, "I do not want to say that my utterance of this sentence would be, *strictly speaking*, false should the consequence in question fail to hold" (pp. 25-26, original italics).

Independently of (and in fact much earlier than) Grice's (1989) work, the notion of presupposition was introduced by Strawson (1950/2013) as contrasting with assertion, although Strawson did not use the term 'presupposition' in his 1950 paper. Some presuppositions are triggered by lexical items or constructions ("presupposition triggers") and others by contextual factors (e.g., Huang, 2014; Potts, 2005; Simons, 2013).

To take a classic example:

(5) The king of France is bald.

Following Strawson (1950/2013), sentence (5) assumes (or 'presupposes') that there is a unique individual who has the property of being the king of France. This assumption should hold in order for (5) to be true or false. Otherwise, sentence (5) lacks a truth value, resulting in a truth value gap. This kind of assumption introduced in terms of truth condition is called semantic presupposition. Presupposition triggers create a large, heterogeneous set (e.g., Huang, 2014; Levinson, 1983). The following illustrate other examples of presupposition triggers (italicized):

(6) a. Susan *stop*ped beat*ing* her boyfriend.
    b. Susan *start*ed beat*ing* her boyfriend.

The predicate *stop ~ing* in (6a) triggers the presupposition

that Susan was beating her boyfriend. The predicate *start ~ing* in (6b) triggers the presupposition that Susan was not beating her boyfriend. Predicates of this kind ("change of state predicates") are thus presupposition triggers.

The notion of presupposition has been discussed from a pragmatic perspective too. Pragmatic presupposition is the condition in order for an utterance to be felicitous. Keenan (1971) introduces pragmatic presupposition with the example of the *tu/vous* distinction in the second person singular in French. This distinction expresses the relationship holding between speaker and addressee, and, importantly, it does not affect the truth condition of the sentence in a context. Levinson (1983, p. 205) defines pragmatic presupposition in terms of a common ground:

(7) An utterance A *pragmatically presupposes* a proposition B iff A is felicitous only if B is in the common ground of the participants.
    (with my modifications, original italics)

This definition is challenged by Lewis (1979), who proposed the principle of accommodation (p. 340). Huang (2014) observes: "accommodation provides an explanation for how missing proportions required by what has been said by the speaker can be accepted. In other words, the addressee accommodates to the speaker" (p. 108). Thus, presuppositions need not be in the common ground of participants at the utterance time: they can be 'repaired'. To put it differently, presuppositions are also generated conversationally.

Presuppositions have certain properties. One property is "constancy under negation" (Huang, 2014, p. 89): The (semantic) presupposition of an affirmative sentence survives under negation. For example:

(8) a. Susan *stop*ped beat*ing* her boyfriend.
    b. Susan didn't *stop* beat*ing* her boyfriend.

The presupposition of the affirmative sentence (8a)

(i.e., Susan was beating her boyfriend) is also the presupposition of the negative sentence (8b). This property is commonly used for a test of presupposition.

2.2 Recent Work

The literature presents various views on implicature and presupposition (e.g., Abbott, 2000, 2016; Atlas, 2004; Beaver & Geurts, 2012; Beaver, Roberts, Simons, & Tonhauser, 2009; Grice, 1989; Gutzmann, 2015; McCready, 2010; Potts, 2015; Simons, 2013; Soames, 2005/2006). In particular, the status of CI leaves room for clarification. Levinson (1983) and Huang (2014), among many others, have independent chapters for implicature and presupposition, without mentioning, at least directly, how the two notions are related to each other. Karttunen and Peters (1979) propose reducing presupposition to CI. Bach (1999), on the other hand, argues against the very notion of CI.

Abbott (2000) discusses cases such as (9).

(9) In her talk, Baldwin introduced *the notion that syntactic structure is derivable from pragmatic principles.* (p. 1426, original italilcs)

Following Abbott, the italicized definite NP in (9) triggers a presupposition about the existence of the notion in question but the presupposition provides new information not in the common ground of participants. (Essentially, this example can be explained in terms of the principle of accommodation mentioned in section 2.1 above.) Illustrating with more examples, Abbott claims that presuppositions do not always provide old information but they are nonassertions (in the sense of the non-at-issue entailment of an utterance). Remember that implicatures were introduced by Grice (1989) as the complement of what is said (in the sense of the at-issue-entailment of an utterance). Here, we are motivated to explore the relation between implicature and presupposition.

Potts (2005) provides an ontology of meaning as

below.

(10) Ontology of Meaning

Meanings
➢ Entailments
• At-issue entailments
  (not invariably speaker oriented, vary under holes, plugs)
• Conventional presuppositions
  (not speaker oriented, backgrounded)
• CIs

➢ Context dependent
• Conversational implicatures
  (not conventional, not speaker oriented, not backgrounded)
• Conversationally-triggered presuppositions
  (not speaker oriented, backgrounded)

(Potts, 2005, p. 23, with my modifications)

In (10), presuppositions are classified as either conventional or conversationally-triggered. At this point, this distinction seems to be related to the classical distinction between semantic presupposition and pragmatic presupposition as follows: Conventional presuppositions are semantic presuppositions or conventionally-triggered pragmatic presuppositions, whereas conversationally-triggered presuppositions are conversationally-triggered pragmatic presuppositions.

In light of this ontology, we could critically reconsider Bach's (1999) claim: "to the extent that putative conventional implicatures really are implicatures, they are not conventional, and to the extent that they are conventional they are not implicatures" (p. 338). Bach seems to take implicature in the sense of non-entailment. However, for Grice (1989), implicature is the complement of what is said, and *what is said* is used in the sense of the at-issue entailment. Thus, in Grice's sense, being conventional and being an

implicature are compatible.

In his later work, Potts provides a typology of a total of eight classes of presupposition and implicature, in terms of three properties (i.e., conventional, backgrounded, and projective) (Potts, 2015). The eight classes are: semantic presupposition, local semantic presupposition, pragmatic presupposition, local pragmatic presupposition, conventional implicature, at-issue entailment, conversational implicature, and local conversational implicature. In that typology, the difference between semantic presupposition and pragmatic presupposition lies in conventionality:

(11) Semantic presupposition is conventional, whereas pragmatic presupposition is not.

If Potts's (2005) ontology lines up with Potts's (2015) analysis, then there is no category of conventionally-triggered pragmatic presupposition. Conventional presuppositions in (10) should be semantic presuppositions. In fact, Potts (2005) treats expressives (including the *tu/vous* distinction in the second person in French, which Keenan treated as generating a pragmatic presuppsition) as generating a CI. Potts (2015) also argues that the difference between presupposition (both semantic and pragmatic) and CI lies in the backgrounded property:

(12) Presuppositions are backgrounded, whereas CIs are not.

Thus, the information generated by expressives, if it is treated as generating a CI, should be 'not backgrounded'. On an intuitive basis, this is controversial. Potts (2015) concludes his analysis by observing "It is easy to imagine future theoretical developments leading us drop all of these terminological distinctions in favor of more abstract concepts from language and social cognition" (p. 193).

Beaver et al. (2009) define "a notion of *projective meaning* which encompasses both classical

presuppositions and phenomena which are usually regarded as non-presuppositional but which also display projection behavior – Horn's assertorically inert entailments, conventional implicatures (both Grice's and Potts') and some conversational implicatures" (p. 1, original italics). McCready (2010) provides "a system capable of analyzing the combinatorics of a wide range of conventionally implicated and expressive constructions in natural language" (p. 1). Gutzmann (2015) employs a use-conditional perspective, in addition to the truth-conditional perspective, and proposes what he calls hybrid semantics for the analysis of natural language expressions.

In summary, the notion and classification of presupposition vary in the literature, as does the treatment of CI. I will now move onto the analysis of specific candidate triggers of CIs.

3. Analysis of Candidate Triggers for Conventional Implicatures

This section analyzes major candidates for triggers of CIs, and discusses whether these candidates in fact generate CIs or should be considered something else. I first discuss the two categories that Potts (2005) focuses on (i.e., supplements and expressives). I then analyze *therefore*, which Grice (1989) himself used as an example when he introduced the notion of CI. Then, I take a few examples from the list of ACIDs ("Alleged Conventional Implicature Devices") mentioned in Bach (1999, p. 333), based on Karttunen and Peters (1979): They are *manage to*, *even*, *only*, and *stop ~ing*.

Potts (2005) provides the definition of CI based on Grice (1989), as below (Potts, 2005, p. 89, original italics).

(13) a. CIs are part of the conventional meaning of words.
      b. CIs are commitments, and thus give rise to

entailments.
      c. These commitments are made by *the speaker of the utterance* 'by virtue of the meaning of' the words he chooses.
      d. CIs are logically and compositionally independent of what is 'said (in the favored sense)', i.e., independent of the at-issue entailments.

(13b) means that CIs are not cancellable. (13d) means that CIs do not affect the truth condition of the at-issue entailment. In what follows, by "presupposition" I mean conventional presupposition, unless I note otherwise. I will use the following criteria to identify CI and presupposition in my analysis below: 1) the definition of CI given in (13) above, 2) the backgrounded property for presuppositions, and 3) constancy under negation test for presuppositions.

3.1 Supplements

Potts (2005) provides a list of examples of supplements as below (p. 90, original italics).

(14) a. Ames, a successful spy, is now behind bars. (*nominal appositive*)
      b. Ames was, as the press reported, a successful spy. (*As-parenthetical*)
      c. Ames, who was a successful spy, is now behind bars. (*supplementary relative*)
      d. Amazingly, they refused our offer. (*speaker-oriented adverb*)
      e. Thoughtfully, Ed destroyed the evidence for us. (*topic-oriented adverb*)
      f. Just between you and me, Aldo is a dangerous spy. (*utterance-modifying adverb*)

Below is another example of supplementary relative noted in Potts (2005, p. 24).

(15) 'I spent part of every summer until I was ten with my grandmother, who lived in a working-

class suburb in Boston.'

Potts argues that we would think that (15) makes two assertions but that "the supplementary relative plays a secondary role relative to the information conveyed by the main clause" (p. 24). That is, on his view, the supplementary relative is committed to a non-at-issue entailment, and whether the proposition expressed by the supplementary relative is true or false does not affect the truth condition of the main clause. Nominal appositives and *as*-parentheticals as in (14a) and (14b) have the same property.

A question arises. As we just saw, Potts (2005) claims that "the supplementary relative plays a secondary role relative to the information conveyed by the main clause" (p. 24). Doesn't that mean that the information given by the supplementary relative is backgrounded? Potts (2005, 2015), however, says that CIs are *not* backgrounded. We need a clarification of the meaning of the term "backgrounded". If we consider the foregrounded-backgrounded distinction in the sense of the figure-ground distinction in Gestalt psychology (e.g., Kohler, 1930, p. 169f), then, it may well mean the distinction between the primary-secondary information provided by a sentence. This raises the possibility that supplementary relatives are conventionally-triggered pragmatic presuppositions.

In fact, Levinson (1983) analyzes supplements as presuppositions, using the following example (p. 179). (For the current purpose, ignore the presuppositions triggered by *regret*, *stop*, and *before*.) He argues that (16b) is a presupposition of (16a).

(16) a. John, who is a good friend of mine, regrets that he stopped doing linguistics before he left Cambridge.
b. John is a good friend of the speaker's.

Levinson applies the constancy under negation test as in (17) below.

(17) John, who is a good friend of mine, doesn't regret that he stopped doing linguistics before he left Cambridge.

Levinson observes that (16b) survives under negation (i.e., it holds both in (16a) and (17)), and argues that (16b) is a presupposition of (16a).

Now, let us stop and have a closer look at the relation between (16b) and (16a). Does (16b) always hold in (16a)? It should be noted that the requirement of (16b) concerns the felicity, not the truth condition, of (16a). (16b) and the main clause of (16a) make independent statements. Thus, the truth value of (16b) does not affect the truth condition of (16a). In other words, there is no guarantee that (16b) holds in (16a) semantically. If (16b) does not hold in (16a), the result is not a truth value gap: (16) has a truth value independently. From this, if (16b) is a presupposition of (16a), it should be a *pragmatic* presupposition in the classical sense as in Keenan (1971).

In view of Potts's (2005) and Levinson's (1983) analyses, whether supplements generate a CI or a presupposition depends on whether the information provided by supplements is backgrounded or not. Thus, we need a clarification of the notion of "backgrounded" in order to go any further.

Speaker-oriented adverbs as in (12d) and topic-oriented adverbs as in (12e) seem to both express the speaker's evaluation (in a broad sense) of the main clause. Utterance-modifying adverbs as in (12d) modify the utterance to follow (or precede). Expressions such as *to be honest*, *to tell the truth*, and *frankly speaking* are also utterance-modifying adverbs, whereas expressions such as *to my surprise* and *to my embarrassment* are speaker-oriented adverbs.

3.2 Expressives

The other category that Potts (2005) mentions as generating CIs is expressives. Potts mentions Japanese verbal (subject) honorification (e.g., *Sensei-wa eigo ga o-wakari-ni nar-u*, 'The teacher understands

English'), expressive attributive adjectives (e.g., *Shut that blasted window!*), and epithets (p. 153, original underlines). As I already mentioned, Potts regards the *tu/vous* distinction as generating a CI, rather than a pragmatic presupposition (cf. Keenan, 1971). The status of the *tu/vous* distinction can be determined based on whether the generated information is backgrounded or not, and here again, we need a clarification of the notion of "backgrounded". I will not discuss expressives any further, since they are not involved in the analysis of other candidate triggers of CI to be given below (See Potts [2005] for more details).

3.3 *Therefore*

I will now analyze *therefore* in (4), repeated here as (18). As noted above, Grice introduced CI with the example of *therefore*.

(18) He is an English man; he is, therefore, brave.
(Grice, 1989, p.25)

Grice notes that (18) generates a CI that being brave is a consequence of being an English man. Let us check the definition of CI given in (13) above.

(13a) obviously holds. The consequence meaning comes from the conventional meaning of *therefore*. Next, let us check (13b). The continuation of (18) as in (19) sounds odd. This indicates that the consequence meaning in question is not cancellable, supporting (13b).

(19) He is an English man; he is, therefore, brave.
Actually, I don't think English men are brave.

Next, let us check (13c). By using *therefore*, the speaker states a conclusion and expresses the basis for that conclusion. Other people may draw different conclusions. Thus, the commitment is made by the speaker of the utterance by virtue of the meaning of the words s/he chooses (i.e., *therefore*). That is, (13c) holds.

Finally, let us check (13d). If the person in question (i.e., "he" in the sentence) is an English man and he is brave, then (18) is true, even if being brave is not a consequence of being an English man. Thus, the meaning generated by *therefore* does not affect the truth condition of (18). That is, (13d) holds. I have just confirmed that *therefore* in fact generates a CI, based on Potts's (2005) definition of CI given in (13).

Next, I will consider the basic format in which *therefore* is used. It is (20a) below. (18) is considered to be derived from (20b).

(20) a. P_1, P_2, … P_n. Therefore, Q. (P_1, P_2, … P_n, and Q are propositions. $n \geq 1$)
   b. He is an English man. Therefore, he is brave. (P_1 = "He is an English man", Q = "he is brave")
   c. P_1, P_2, … P_n, From this/these, I (hereby) conclude that Q.
   d. He is an English man. From this, I (hereby) conclude that he is brave.

In (20a), the sequence of P_1, P_2, … P_n (i.e., how many preceding sentences are related to *therefore*) are established in the discourse. From the speech act perspective (Austin, 1975), (20a) can be paraphrased as (20c). Specifically, (20b) is paraphrased as (20d).

I analyze that *therefore* in (20a) does two things. For one thing, it expresses the illocutionary force of concluding: In saying "Therefore, Q", the speaker makes a conclusion that Q. For another thing, *therefore* refers to the sequence of P_1, P_2, … P_n, which is the basis for making the conclusion. *This/these* in (20c) refers to the sequence of P_1, P_2, … P_n. In this light, I see that *therefore* is relevant to supplements discussed in 3.1 above. I analyze that *therefore* is an utterance-modifying adverb as in *just between you and me* in (14f). What is special about *therefore* is that it expresses the illocutionary

force of the accompanying utterance (i.e., Q). To mention in passing, *just between you and me* in (14f) is a shorter version of *this is just between you and me*. Here, *this* refers to the utterance modified by the adverb. This is relevant to the point that *therefore* refers to the immediately preceding part of the discourse (i.e., $P_1, P_2, \ldots P_n$).

Concerning the backgrounded property, the information generated by *therefore* is not backgrounded, given that it involves the illocutionary force of the modified utterance (i.e., Q). This supports the argument that *therefore* generates a CI, rather than a presupposition.

3.4 *Manage to*

Next, I analyze *manage to*, using the examples and analysis from Levinson (1983, p. 178).

(21) John managed to stop in time.

Sentence (21) entails (22a) and (22b).

(22) a. John stopped in time.
    b. John tried to stop in time.

(22a) is an at-issue entailment and (22b) is a secondary entailment. As Levinson says, (22b) survives under negation. That is, the negative version (23) also entails (22b).

(23) John didn't manage to stop in time.

To put it another way, if (22b) does not hold, then (21) lacks a truth value. Since the falsity of (22b) affects the truth condition of (21), (22b) is a presupposition, not a CI.

3.5 *Even*

Next, I analyze *even* as in (24a) below.

(24) a. *Even* Fred passed the exam.

    b. Fred passed the exam.
    c. Fred was among those who were least likely to pass the exam.

The meaning of utterance (24a) has two components, which are (24b) and (24c). (24b) is the at-issue entailment. The question is whether (24c) is a CI or not. Let us check the definition of CI, given in (13), step by step.

(13a) obviously holds. The meaning (24c) comes from the conventional meaning of *even*. Next, let us check (13b). The continuation of (24a) as in (25) sounds odd. Thus, (24c) is not cancellable, and (13b) holds.

(25) *Even* Fred passed the exam. I thought he was doing well.

Next, (13c). The assumption of (24c) is in the speaker's mind, and it needs not be a common evaluation by the community. Thus, the commitment is made by the speaker of the utterance by virtue of the meaning of *even*. That is, (13c) holds. Finally, let us check (13d). Sentence (24a) is true even if Fred was actually doing well. Thus, the truth value of (24c) does not affect the truth value of (24a), supporting (13d).

Furthermore, let us apply the constancy under negation test to (24a). (24c) does not hold in the negative sentence (i.e., *Even Fred didn't pass the exam*), indicating that (24c) is not a presupposition of (24a).

From these, I conclude that *even* generates a CI.

3.6 *Only*

Next, I analyze *only*. Let us consider (26a). Its meaning consists of (26b) and (26c).

(26) a. *Only* Bob came.
    b. Bob came.
    c. Nobody other than Bob came.

(26b) is presumably an at-issue entailment of (26a).

(26b) cannot be cancelled as indicated by the infelicity of (27):

(27) # *Only* Bob came. In fact, he (=Bob) didn't come.

Then, what is the status of (26c)? (26a) also entails (26c): If (26c) does not hold, (26a) is false. Since the truth value of (26c) affects the truth condition of (26a), (26c) is not a CI. Furthermore, the negation of (26a) (i.e., *Only Bob didn't come*) does not entail (26c). Thus, (26c) is not a presupposition of (26a). Therefore, (26c) seems to be another at-issue entailment of (26a).

Abbott (2000) argues that "an ideal assertion is one atomic proposition, consisting of one predicate with its unanalyzed arguments" (p. 1431). This causes a possible problem with the above-mentioned view that (24a) has two at-issue entailments, which are (24b) and (24c). Abbott (2000) proposes an analysis of conjoined and disjoined sentences as a sequence of utterances. However, it does not seem to be appropriate to reduce (24a) to a conjunction of (24b) and (24c). Thus, for the moment, we could analyze that (24a) has an at-issue entailment in a hybrid structure consisting of (24b) and (24c).

3.7 *Stop ~ing*

Next, I analyze a change of state predicate *stop ~ing* in (6), repeated here as (28).

(28) Susan *stop*ped beat*ing* her boyfriend.

As we saw in (6), *stop ~ing* generates a presupposition, given that it passes the constancy under negation test. Now, let us consider the backgrounded property. In (28), the fact that Susan was beating her boyfriend is backgrounded. Then, how about (29a)?

(29) a. Susan is not beating her boyfriend. She *stop*ped do*ing* so.

b. Susan was beating her boyfriend.

In the second sentence in (29a), the information (29b) generated by *stop ~ing* seems to be foregrounded. (The first sentence in (29a) just mentions the current state of affairs. In the second sentence in (29a), there appears to be a stress on "stopped".) Thus, it is possible to consider that (29b) is a CI, not a presupposition, of the second sentence of (29a). This observation indicates that the same expression (i.e., *stop ~ing* in this case) can generate either a presupposition or a CI, depending on the context in which it appears.

4. Relation between Conventional Implicature and Presupposition

4.1 Summary of Observations

In section 3, I examined some candidate triggers of CI. I analyzed them based on the definition of CI given in Potts (2005) (i.e., (13)), the backgrounded property for presuppositions, and the constancy under negation test for presuppositions. The results are as follows.

Supplements can be analyzed to generate either CIs or presuppositions. The difference between CI and presupposition lies in the backgrounded property (Potts, 2015). The examples of supplements I examined make secondary entailments, providing new information. If we attribute secondary entailments to the backgrounded property, then supplements can be analyzed to generate pragmatic presuppositions. If we attribute the new information to the non-backgrounded property, then supplements can be analyzed to generate CIs. To go any further, we need a clarification of the notion of the backgrounded property. If supplements are considered to generate backgrounded information whose truth value does not affect the truth condition of the main clause, we would need subcategories of conventional presupposition: semantic presupposition, which affects the truth value of the main clause, and pragmatic presupposition,

which does not affect the truth value of the main clause. Alternatively, we could remove the condition of the backgrounded property from CI. The same holds for expressives.

Therefore is analyzed to generate a CI, given that it has the non-backgrounded property. Importantly, I analyzed that *therefore* involves the presentation of the illocutionary force of the accompanying utterance.

Manage to generates a semantic presupposition, based on the constancy under negation test as well as the effect that it has on the truth condition of the main entailment.

Even generates a CI.

Only generates neither a CI nor a presupposition. It can be analyzed to make an at-issue entailment in a hybrid structure, consisting of two entailments.

Change of state predicates such as *stop ~ing* generate either a CI or a presupposition, depending on the context in which they appear, in view of the backgrounded property.

4.2 Feedback to the Ontology of Meaning

There could be a case in which a lexical item or construction generates a meaning which is backgrounded and speaker oriented. Supplements indicate such a possibility, as we saw in section 3.1. The ontology proposed by Potts (2005) as illustrated in (10) assumes that CI are not backgrounded, whereas conventional presuppositions are backgrounded and not speaker oriented. A suggestion that I would make is to remove the non- backgrounded property from the criteria for CI. Furthermore, we could also remove the speaker oriented property. In doing so, we could focus on the property concerning whether or not the truth value of the generated information affects the truth condition of the at-issue entailment. In that case, under the category of entailments, we would have semantic presupposition, which affects the truth condition of the main entailment, on the one hand, and the union of CI and (conventional) pragmatic presupposition on the other, which does not affect the truth condition of the at-issue entailment.

5. Concluding Remarks

This paper first overviewed the historical background and recent work on the notion and property of implicature and presupposition. It then investigated major candidates for the triggers of CI and discussed the relation between CI and presupposition. The status of CI in the ontology of meaning can vary depending on the key notions used for distinguishing different kinds of meaning. In Potts's (2005) ontology, the definition of backgrounded property, among others, plays a crucial role in the identification of CI and needs more clarification. As an alternative, it was suggested to focus on the property concerning whether or not the truth value of the generated information has an effect on the truth condition of the at-issue entailment. In that case, under the category of entailments, we would have semantic presupposition, which affects the truth condition of the main entailment, on the one hand, and the union of CI and (conventional) pragmatic presupposition on the other, which does not affect the truth condition of the at-issue entailment. Both CI and presupposition deserve an independent label but their definition and properties leave room for clarification.

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