

CONTENDING THEORIES OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

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To China scholars and laymen alike, China's foreign policy behavior appears to be inconsistent, erratic and above all, unpredictable. Scholars disagree widely on the explanations and interpretations of Beijing's policy postures.⁽¹⁾ In the first two decades of communist rule, China studies were handicapped by the paucity of information from mainland China. Analyses on the conduct of China's foreign policy by seasoned China-watchers resembled the famous blind men and the elephant analogy, each offering a partial and distorted picture of Beijing's policy behavior. After China's dramatic turn to the West in the early seventies, however, information from mainland China such as first-hand accounts of foreign journalists and statistics released by Chinese officials began to flood the West. The traditional case study approach to Chinese foreign policy has been criticized as unsystematic and atheoretical.⁽²⁾ Concerned students of contemporary China have developed theories for explaining Beijing's foreign policy behavior. Yet, primarily because of their trainings, backgrounds and personal biases, scholars have attempted to resolve the China puzzle from different perspectives. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the various, contending theories of Chinese foreign policy in Western scholarship.

I HISTORICAL APPROACH

Some scholars maintain that the complexity of Chinese foreign policy behavior can be adequately interpreted and understood only in terms of China's historical experience in both its domestic development and external contacts.⁽³⁾ The historical approach emphasizes the continuity of China's foreign policy. After more than a century of humiliating

defeats and sufferings under foreign powers, the historical school argues, China is particularly sensitive to any outside interference in its domestic and foreign policies. Prolonged weakness has also created a sense of insecurity among Chinese leaders. In addition, modern China's preoccupation with the domestic goals of economic development and social revolution has conditioned the Chinese reaction to foreign affairs. Thus, according to the historical school, China's policy predispositions and priorities such as its overt concerns with national sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and equality with other nations are all rooted in modern Chinese society. Indeed, as remarked by one noted scholar, the elements of continuity in Chinese foreign policy are so strong that a shift in Chinese diplomacy could only be caused by "convulsive upheavals" on the international scene.⁴¹

The mainstream of the historical school has portrayed China as cautious, prudent and inward-looking, preoccupied itself with efforts in building up a unified, strong and modern state. China's alliance with the Soviet Union and its "leaned-to-one-side" global strategy of the fifties was explained as necessitated by China's strategic and defense needs under hostile American containment policies; likewise, China's sharp turn to the West, especially to the United States, in the early seventies was explained in terms of Beijing's concerns about territorial integrity threatened by the Russians. Even China's border wars with India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969) and Vietnam (1979) were explained (or explained away) by some scholars as China's "defensive" offensive in maintaining its territorial integrity. Yet not all China scholars are sympathetic to the Chinese cause. Some regard Imperial China just as expansionistic as other colonial powers. It would be a grave mistake, a writer had warned, to overlook traditional Chinese ambition in Central Asia because Communist China's ambition was to restore China to the limits of Qian Long's empire.⁴² Even more alarmingly (because of its racial implications), China was regarded by one renowned scholar as following the path of the "Yellow Peril", pursuing a "deliberate military attempt at changing the existing frontier."⁴³ Ostensibly, there is no easy clue to interpret the complexity of several thousand

years of Chinese history. It is thus no surprise that scholars disagree widely, even diametrically, on the impact of China's Imperial past on Beijing's diplomacy.

Interpreting China's foreign policy behavior in terms of its historical precedents has a built-in tendency to over-emphasize the uniqueness of the Chinese experience. After all, national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity are universal goals eagerly sought-after by all nations, especially developing states which, like China, have emerged from decades of colonial or semi-colonial rules. Then why did Beijing behave differently from other developing countries in global politics? A more satisfactory answer may thus lie elsewhere rather than in Chinese tradition. Furthermore, to argue that the Chinese case is unique is to underestimate the important process of "internationalization". It is inconceivable that the People's Republic of China (PRC) has not somewhat conformed to international norms after three decades of dealings with foreign nations and more than ten years' experience with the United Nations and other international organizations.

The historical approach also has its inherent weakness as a theory or model for explaining Chinese foreign policy behavior. It is a static rather than a dynamic model. While emphasizing the impact of political and social traditions, the historical school neglects that cultural and social values of a nation are not constant but always changing and evolving. In fact, no serious students of Chinese politics would deny that the present culture and society of mainland China is very different from old China. We can not, therefore, write off the effect of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism on shaping the Chinese communist ideology as well as the PRC's world outlook. It would be a mistake to regard Beijing's polemical policy statements as mere rhetorics. Information affecting China's perceptions and evaluations of the international situation is filtered through the Chinese leaders' ideological predispositions. At most, today's China is a mere shadow of its past.

This is not to deny the value of the historical approach. It provides a broad and general understanding of China's foreign policy as well as a rationale for Beijing's sometimes erratic, unpredictable behavior. How-

ever, a historical interpretation is helpless in explaining or predicting specific foreign policies. One can of course cite numerous historical precedents in a *post hoc* explanation, yet none of them may be the real cause of the current event. In short, history may be irrelevant.

II BALANCE OF POWER APPROACH

Evolving from a century old concept that described elegantly 19th Century European politics, the balance of power theory has many followers from the academia and the diplomatic circles. According to the main premise of the theory, nations are primarily concerned about their national security. Nations are therefore prone to shifting alliances in order to assure a stable military balance with neighboring states. The rapid advance of military technology in the last three decades that enabled the two superpowers to possess global reach capability has sustained and stimulated enthusiasm in applying the balance of power theory. The world-wide concerns with energy supplies in recent years, moreover, have given additional weight to geostrategic calculations. This does not mean to suggest, of course, that balance of power theorists have ignored other political, social and economic factors in their analyses. In fact, many are aware of other forces than military considerations that may determine policy formulation. Nevertheless, balance of power theorists more or less agree that strategic calculations prevail when a country's national security is at stake. Commenting on China's foreign policy from a balance of power perspective a noted China scholar wrote: "When Beijing's leaders believe vital Chinese security are at stake, these take clear precedence over other interests, and realpolitik considerations and balance of power approaches come to the fore."⁽⁷⁾

According to the balance of power school, strategic calculations dictate Chinese policies toward the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and other countries. There is little doubt that China's overwhelming security concern is with the threat from the north. Beijing still has some options, however, the balance of power theorists believe.⁽⁸⁾ One obvious choice for the Chinese leaders is to lean to one side — like what they did in early 1950s when they leaned to the Soviet side — and to rely

totally on U.S. military technology and supplies, through U.S. allies or even directly from the U.S. when that becomes possible. In effect, China will become a U.S. ally. This option has the advantage of enabling the Chinese to rapidly modernize their defense. It may also, however, provoke the Soviets to attempt preempting China's modernization efforts by using military forces. Alternatively, the Chinese may choose a slower but safer route to increase their military capability. They may seek from the United States and its allies technology know-how that can be developed by their own efforts for military purpose. In either option, however, a balance of power strategist may argue, Beijing will increase its ties with Japan, the U.S. and other Western countries that will certainly arouse Soviet apprehensions and keep the two communist rivals away from rapprochement. Indeed, one writer even argues that Beijing will deliberately avoid any rapprochement with Moscow as a gesture to please the Western countries for more technology products and other benefits.¹⁹

It is thus not difficult to understand the appeal and the popularity of the balance of power approach in explaining China's relations with other major powers. If Chinese leaders and leaders of other major powers perceive international situations solely from a strategic perspective, China's policy options and limitations are seemingly clear and predictable. Yet it is precisely this deceptive predictability that casts doubt on the validity of strategic analyses. In an increasingly complex and interdependent world the decision-makers of a few major powers can no longer control the outcome of international events. Since China's bilateral relations with countries other than the major industrial powers are ignored by the balance of power theorists, China's policy interests and calculations are often distorted. For instance, Beijing's avowed concerns about the new international economic order and its self-proclaimed spokesman's role for Third World states are considered as mere rhetorics with no real policy significance by balance of power theorists.

The balance of power approach emphasizes the impact of the external environment on the conduct of China's foreign policy. Scholars from this school argue that Chinese policy has been determined or conditioned by the changing power pattern of global politics. Because of the enor-

mous capability gap between China and the two superpowers, it is argued, Beijing has no choice but to react to the shifting environment with little room for policy initiatives. Domestic Chinese politics and Beijing's policy priorities and objectives are thus regarded by balance of power theorists as insignificant in determining the regime's foreign policy behavior. Likewise, since the balance of power approach has been equated to realpolitik, the role of ideology is downgraded, if not totally discarded.

The major weakness of the balance of power approach, however, is its over-emphasis on China's security concerns. China of course, like other nations, is concerned about its national security. Yet China is not Hungary, Korea, Kampuchea or Israel. Its vast land area with harsh topographical conditions and its huge population impose a formidable deterrence against any possible future invaders. The Chinese leaders seem to be confident of repelling foreign invaders by relying on Mao Zedong's "people's war" strategy, despite China's inferior weapons. The Soviet Union's failure to win a decisive war against the local guerrillas three years after its invasion of Afghanistan has reinforced the Beijing leaders' belief in the invincibility of a people's war. The balance of power strategists, however, sticking by the power politics traditions, choose to ignore the psychological and moral dimensions of warfare. They insist that China, like it or not, must play the power game in order to ward off the military threats from its enemies. Chinese moves toward or retreat from the West have thus been interpreted by scholars of this school as deliberate power games — "American card" or "Soviet card" — played by Beijing, notwithstanding the latter's vehement denial.

Furthermore, it is often forgotten that the great majority of China's foreign policies have little to do with its security. China is not under any imminent military attack; its major foreign policies are made without being threatened. Indeed, the major thrust of China's current foreign policy is its concerns with the modernization programs, which put economic development a clear priority over defense. To analyze China's foreign policy from a balance of power perspective may thus misread Beijing's policy intentions and create misunderstanding in dealing with

the Chinese. The current stalemate of Sino-American conflict over the Taiwan issue is partly caused by Washington's miscalculation of Beijing's policy objectives. Washington's balance of power strategists have over-estimated China's fear of the Russians and hence Beijing's dependence on the U.S. and under-estimated policy ramifications of China's resolve in striving toward a unified, strong and modern state.

III NEO-IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH

During the Cold-War years of the fifties and early sixties and before the disputes between Beijing and Moscow became open, China was perceived by many scholars as an aggressive power, pursuing relentlessly its military and political goals. It was suggested that the basic force behind this aggressive drive was the world communist movements, or communism, which was regarded by one scholar as *the* goal of Chinese foreign policy.¹⁰⁰ The neo-ideological approach, however, regards ideology not as the "end" of Beijing's foreign policy but rather the "means" which the Chinese leaders use to analyze the global situation and to define China's international role.¹⁰¹

The central thesis of the neo-ideological approach argues that the conduct of China's foreign policy is primarily determined by Beijing's analyses of major contradictions among political forces in global politics. In the 1950s, according to the neo-ideological school, the principal contradiction in global politics was perceived by Chinese leaders as that between the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union and the capitalist camp dominated by the United States. China declared its international role as a member of the socialist camp, acknowledging the Soviet leadership. It is argued that ideological necessity, therefore, rather than the fear of encirclement by the United States, drove Communist China leaning one-sided to the Soviet Union in the fifties. By the mid-sixties, however, the principal contradiction was perceived by Beijing as that between the two superpowers, which were contending for world power supremacy. The two opposing camps no longer existed. The "intermediate zone" of Western developed states and the developing countries were exploited and oppressed by the two superpowers. China's self-

proclaimed role had thus shifted from a member of the socialist camp to the champion of medium and small nations as well as the new "center of communist movement", after accusing the Soviet Union of abandoning communism and turning to revisionism. Hence China advocated an anti-Soviet, anti-U.S. policy and a hard-line revolutionary diplomacy in the mid- and late sixties.

Beginning in the early 1970s, according to the neo-ideological school, there was again a major shift in China's analyses of contradictions in world politics. The principal contradiction has since been regarded as that between the two superpowers and the intermediate zone states, which are now re-classified as the Second World developed and Third World developing nations.¹² Beijing has therefore urged the formation of an international "anti-hegemony" united front comprising all nations against the two superpowers, especially the more aggressive Soviet Union. Declaring that China belongs to the Third World, Beijing acts as a spokesman for the Third World and puts itself at the forefront of the "anti-hegemony" united front. China's strategic shifts, the neo-ideological school argues, have thus been caused by Beijing's changing ideological outlook that affects the Chinese leaders' assessment of the international situation and hence their strategic moves.

To a scholar of the neo-ideological school, the balance of power approach offers only a narrow and superficial explanation of China's foreign policy since Beijing's strategic changes have little to do with external threats. Also, in contrast to the historical approach, the neo-ideological school discards the possible impact of Chinese tradition while emphasizing the importance of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism on China's world outlook. Yet, under close examination, the neo-ideological approach is even more vulnerable and subject to criticism than the historical or balance of power approach. There is a fundamental flaw in the neo-ideological arguments. Ideology no doubt plays a very important "symbolic" function such as rallying domestic support in formulating China's foreign policy; it is often, however, added *after* a "realistic" assessment of the international situation. That is, ideology is used by the Chinese leaders as a justification for China's foreign policy behavior. In

fact, Beijing's analyses of contradictions in global politics are determined by its foreign policy goals and national interests. Analyses of "contradictions" are thus more likely the effects and not the causes of China's global strategies, the exact reverse of the neo-ideological thesis. For instance, China's split with the Soviet Union began when Beijing still regarded itself as a member of the socialist camp; likewise, Beijing took steps to normalize relations with the U.S. in the early 1970s even though the latter was still officially regarded as China's chief enemy. Indeed, one will only be puzzled and confused in seeking the causes of China's foreign policy from Beijing's ideological rhetorics.

At best, Beijing's self-defined role orientation gives us a general and partial understanding of China's policy objectives and limitations. Like the historical and balance of power approaches, the neo-ideological school does poorly in explaining or predicting specific Chinese foreign policies. Moreover, a country's self-proclaimed international role is subject to approval by other nations. Do Third World developing nations regard and accept China as their spokesman? Do small states trust China, itself a major power? It is thus equally important to examine China's international role as perceived by other nations. Yet this is largely neglected by the neo-ideological school.

IV COGNITIVE APPROACH

Unlike the aforementioned approaches, the cognitive approach borrows heavily concepts and theories from other disciplines, particularly psychology and communication theories. The central thesis of the approach asserts that the Chinese leaders behave and act according to their definitions and perceptions of global situations, which they analyze by using complex "decision-rules".¹³ These decision-rules are directly related to the Chinese leadership's "operational code" belief systems — beliefs pertaining to, among others, the nature of politics, human relations, functions of history, the role of chance in strategic calculations, risk-taking and timing in policy implementations. The cognitive school thus emphasizes the study of beliefs and attitudes of Chinese leaders and follows closely the changes of Chinese leadership.

Scholars of this school have singled out four bimodal attitude pairs which they claim are particularly pertinent to Chinese decision-making about critical international incidents: optimism-pessimism, boldness-caution, rigidity-flexibility and emotional arousal-analytic distance.⁴⁰ It is argued that the Chinese leaders are often optimistic, bold, rigid or uncompromising, and emotionally aroused about China's long-term policy goals, yet they could be extremely skeptical, cautious, flexible, and objective in specific encounters with the enemy. Among these attitude pairs, the optimism-pessimism bimodality is regarded as the most important maxim in helping Chinese decision-makers to cope with the stress and uncertainties of international politics. The optimism component stresses the inevitable vindication of the communist cause and consequently reduces psychological stress resulting from the inherent uncertainties of the situation; the pessimism component stresses the inevitability of setbacks and mental preparation for them. In sum, the proponents of the cognitive approach assert, the first element in each bimodality has particular import for broad, long-run Chinese foreign policy "strategies", while the second for "tactical" decisions about immediate actions in specific situations.⁴¹

The cognitive approach studies the perceptions and beliefs of the Chinese leaders by systematic content analyses of official Chinese documents and press. Despite the use of sophisticated research methods and the painstaking efforts of the analysts, there are serious drawbacks in the cognitive approach. First, there is always a gap between "manifested" beliefs such as that indicated in public documents and the actual or "latent" beliefs of the policy makers. In a country like China where foreign policy debates are regarded as top secrets pertaining to national security, the beliefs or perceptions of individual leaders are all but suppressed in government documents. It is virtually impossible to discern actual beliefs of individual leaders from official attitudes in tightly controlled mass media.

Second, the cognitive approach assumes that there exists a common "operational code" belief system among the Chinese leaders. This assumption is false, however. The Chinese mass media may give un-

animous views on policy issues. Yet the views expressed in official press represent only the policy stands of the leadership faction that controls the mass media, which may or may not be in congruence with the official policy position taken by the Foreign Ministry. Even the Chinese government has admitted that gross mistakes or distorted views had been reported in official mass media during the Cultural Revolution when the media were controlled by the radical leftists. In any case, there is no strong evidence to support the existence of a common "operational code" among the Chinese leaders in conducting their foreign policies.

Third, the gap between beliefs and actual policy behavior remains unresolved. It is a common knowledge in social science that a person may not act in accord with his beliefs and attitudes. There is no attempt, however, by the cognitive school to study systematically the correlations between beliefs and policy outputs. There is no way to know how one belief may affect, and to what extent, a specific policy output; neither is it possible to compare the relative impact of various, sometimes incompatible, beliefs on policy formulation. For one thing, it is extremely difficult to draw a line between long-term and short-term goals, or strategic and tactical moves. It is not clear how the incompatible bimodal beliefs compromise and affect China's intermediate goals or policy moves lying somewhere between the strategic and tactical calculations. The Chinese, after all, stress the "whole system" approach and assert that one wrong policy move may cost the whole game.

Fourth, there is no attempt to analyze the correlations between various beliefs. In what way and to what extent do beliefs affect each other? Are there any "core" beliefs that dominate other beliefs and the decision-making process? Are the Chinese elite's belief systems unidimensional or multi-dimensional? In another study, I have found that there are only weak, if any, correlations between the "operational code" beliefs of Canada's foreign policy elite; neither have I found any "core" beliefs which can explain satisfactorily the conduct of Canada's foreign policy. I have thus concluded that the "operational code" belief systems are mere clusters of beliefs, unrelated to each other, and have little impact on foreign policy decision-making.¹⁶ The cognitive approach to

analyze Chinese foreign policy has not succeeded to disapprove my earlier conclusions.

V TOWARD A THEORY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

From the above discussions, it is clear that a general or grand theory of Chinese foreign policy has yet to be developed. I have pointed out the major arguments and shortcomings of various attempts to explain China's foreign policy. At best, each approach by itself offers only a partial explanation of Beijing's behavior. All do better in explaining the general direction of China's policies than predicting specific policy moves. A combination of the four approaches may give us a more comprehensive understanding of China's foreign policy, but this is not the solution to our search for an adequate theory. There are some common flaws and methodological limitations underlying the various approaches that have to be overcome first in the strenuous process of theory development.

First, the current contending approaches all stress on identifying independent variables, or causes, in China's foreign policy. The historical approach, for example, stress the importance of Chinese nationalism, tradition, territorial and security concerns as the major causes of Beijing's behavior; likewise, the neo-ideological school stresses communist ideology and revolutionary movements, the balance of power theorists stress realpolitik and national interests, and the cognitive approach stresses the perceptions and beliefs of decision-makers. Yet none of the approaches has focused on examining the dependent variables and situational variables of China's foreign policy. There is no systematic effort to study the causal linkages between independent and dependent variables.

As a result, it is never spelled out clearly the relative impact of an independent variable such as, for example, Chinese nationalism on the formulation of policies in the areas of military-security, political-diplomatic, and economic-technological issues. Obviously it is naive and absurd to assume that nationalism is equally important in influencing decision-making in all issue areas. But scholars from the historical school have not given us a satisfactory answer as to how nationalism, and to

what extent, shapes policy outputs in various policy issues. Moreover, even within the same issue area the impact of nationalism on policy formulation may vary when the "target" of China's policy is different. For instance, the Chinese were ostensibly equally heroic and patriotic when they were fighting against the Russians and the Vietnamese, yet Beijing's military posture toward its northern neighbor is much more prudent and less venturesome than its policy toward the south. In addition, under what situation is the decision made? Aroused nationalism may serve as the crucial motivation for military ventures in times of crisis situation, but it may lose much of its emotional appeal in normal or non-crisis situation when realistic, geostrategic calculations prevail. One can easily extend the example of Chinese nationalism to other independent variables such as communist ideology, balance of power strategies, or belief systems of policy elites and examine their relative impact on foreign policy formulation in various issue areas under different situations. A systematic study mapping the causal relations between independent, dependent and situational variables is thus badly needed as a first step toward a general theory of Chinese foreign policy.

Second, students of Chinese politics are often too emotionally involved in their analyses. Anti-communist scholars who still lament on having "lost" China to the communists describe Beijing as an aggressive, expansionist regime. Every single move of the regime is considered as part of a grand Chinese strategy, aiming at regional hegemony or assisting communist insurgent activities. Scholars more sympathetic to Beijing, on the other hand, stress the elements of tradition, nationalism and consistency in China's foreign policy; they argue that China would venture outside of its border only when provoked by hostile enemies. Ironically, both the critics and sympathizers of the communist regime stress the continuity and rationality of Beijing's foreign policies and that the Chinese behave in a cool-headed, calculated manner in accord with their policy objectives. Few scholars have paid attention to possible Chinese policy mistakes and miscalculations. After the death of Mao and the arrest of the Gang of Four, even the Chinese leaders themselves admitted that numerous policy mistakes had been committed during the turmoil of the

Cultural Revolution.

This is apparently due not merely to oversight of China scholars; it is a direct result of China studies that attempt to "rationalize" all Chinese policy moves. In some extreme cases obvious policy blunders such as the Red Guards' anarchic demonstrations against foreign embassies in Beijing and abroad had been interpreted by China-watchers as part of China's revolutionary diplomacy. In fact, the Chinese Foreign Ministry itself was then controlled by the ruthless Red Guards and ceased to function for a few days. Even in the area of military-security issues, the Chinese leaders may also commit policy mistakes. A noted China expert has pointed out that China had initiated the Quemoy 1958 crisis as a result of Mao's miscalculations of American strategies and intents in the Taiwan Strait.¹⁷ Deng Xiaoping may also have miscalculated Hanoi before launching a full-scale military attack against the Vietnamese in the spring of 1979. Admittedly, it is difficult to detect Chinese "miscalculations", partly because of the deliberately ambivalent Chinese policy motives as well as the rhetorical, *post hoc* rationalization of policy actions offered by the Chinese themselves. Beijing could thus hide its possible policy mistakes and claimed that China had achieved its objectives of "punishing" the Vietnamese even though the border war ended inconclusively. Yet, neglecting possible Chinese policy miscalculations could hardly help but impede our theory building efforts.

Finally, despite the relatively more open society in post-Mao China, the inaccessibility of many relevant research materials remains the major stumbling block to study Chinese politics and foreign policy. We have already pointed out the validity problem in analyzing official Chinese policy statements and the government controlled mass media. Furthermore, without access to various policy inputs and deliberations during the policy making process we know very little about the loci of power in the Chinese leadership. Press interviews of top level Chinese leaders, which are rare in any case, indicate merely carefully monitored official positions. It is a taboo to Chinese leaders to talk about foreign affairs in public, especially to foreigners. It is thus extremely difficult, if possible, to study the policy viewpoints and positions of individual

leaders. Many well-established research methods in studying international relations and comparative foreign policies such as the decision-making approach and the bureaucratic politics approach could hardly be applied to the Chinese case for the lack of sufficient information. We should not, however, over-state the problems of data gathering in China studies. The same problems exist, to a different degree, in studying foreign policies of other societies. With determinations, imaginations, and, above all, cool and unemotional analyses of Beijing's policy behavior, we may come up with a more satisfactory explanation of Chinese foreign policy than the current partial theories.

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Notes

- (1) See my article entitled "Schools of Thought on Chinese Foreign Policy Behaviour," *China Report*, vol. XV, no. 3 (May-June, 1979), pp. 7-21.
- (2) See, for example, Davis Bobrow, "Old Dragons to New Models," *World Politics*, vol. 19 (January 1967), pp. 306-319; Chalmers Johnson, "Political Science and East Asian Area Studies," *World Politics*, vol. 26 (July 1974), pp. 560-575; and Tang Tsou, "Statesmanship and Scholarship," *World Politics*, vol. 26 (April 1974), pp. 428-451.
- (3) The two excellent books on China using the historical approach are John Gittings, *The World and China 1922-1972*, London: Eyre Methuen, 1974 and Wang Gungwu, *China and the World since 1949: The Impact of Independence, Modernity and Revolution*, London: the MacMillan Press, 1977.
- (4) John Gittings, "China's Foreign Policy: Continuity or Change?" *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 2, 1972, p. 17.
- (5) Anthony Harrigan, "Sinkiang: A Sino-Soviet Trouble Spot?" *Military Review*, vol. 43 (May 1963), p. 4.
- (6) Bernard B. Fall, "Red China's Aims in South Asia," *Current History*, vol. 43 (September 1962), p. 139.
- (7) A. Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings, 1977, p. 18.
- (8) I have dealt elsewhere in more detail with China's policy options in global and Asia politics. "China's Asia Policy Options in the

- 1980s," *Asia Pacific Community*, no. 12 (Spring 1981), pp. 101-124.
- (9) Banning Garrett, "China Policy and the Strategic Triangle," in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild and Robert J. Lieber (eds.), *Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World*, New York: Longman, 1979, pp. 251-252.
- (10) Franz Michael, "Communist China and the Non-Committed Countries: Motives and Purposes of Communist China's Foreign Policy," in Kurt London (ed.), *New Nations in a Divided World*, New York: Praeger, 1963, p. 243.
- (11) For reference to the neo-ideological approach see J.D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977; Michael B. Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs*, London: Croom Helm, 1978; and Greg O'Leary, *The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy*, London: Croom Helm, 1980.
- (12) *Renmin Ribao* published a lengthy document on November 1, 1977, entitled "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism."
- (13) Davis B. Bobrow, Steven Chan and John A. Kringen, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: the Chinese Case*, New York: the Free Press, 1979.
- (14) *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.
- (15) *Ibid.*, p. 67.
- (16) Herbert S. Yee, "Correlates and Dimensions of the 'Operational Code' Belief Systems: Empirical Findings from a Survey of Canadian Foreign Service Officers," *Journal of Social Science (I.C.U.)*, No. 20-(1), (October 1981), pp. 27-57.
- (17) Allen S. Whiting, "Quemoy 1958: Mao's Miscalculations," *China Quarterly*, no. 62 (June 1975), pp. 263-270.

中国外交政策の理論

〈要 約〉

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中国の外交政策行動を解明しようとするさまざまな試みが、それぞれの観点からなされている。「歴史アプローチ」は、中国の国内・対外両方における歴史的経験を考慮してこそ中国の外交政策が正しく理解できると主張し、現代と過去の連続性を強調する。「勢力均衡アプローチ」によると、中国は主にその安全保障を重視し、戦略的計算が米国、ソ連、日本またその他の諸国に対する政策を規定している。「新イデオロギー・アプローチ」は、中国の外交政策は、世界政治における政治的諸力間の主要矛盾に対する分析によって決定されたとする。「認知アプローチ」は、中国の指導者たちは彼らの複雑な「決定規則」によって分析した全世界の状況に対する規定と認識に沿って行動すると唱えている。これらの理論は各々特有の欠点を持つと考えられる。

中国の外交政策行動の全容を明らかにするような一般理論は未だ提出されていない。何故なら、第1に、中国の外交政策の独立変数各々へのみ分析が集中し、従属変数、状況変数、独立変数間の体系だった分析がなされていないからである。第2に、中国研究者は、分析に過度に感情的に巻き込まれている。第3に、開放的になった毛沢東以後でさえ、中国政治・外交政策に関する資料が入手困難であるからだと言える。調査、想像、そして冷静な分析によってこそ、現在の部分的な諸理論よりも充分な説明ができると考えられる。