

**THE PACIFIC WAR DEBATE IN BRITAIN:
SIR ROBERT CRAIGIE VERSUS THE FOREIGN OFFICE**

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Unlike the United States where officials of the State Department were subjected by the Senate to postwar Congressional investigation in the Pearl-Harbour hearing, British Far Eastern policy-makers were saved such parliamentary ordeals. The loss of the whole British position in the Far East at the hands of the Japanese between December 1941 and May 1942 was humiliating enough. It was, as Winston Churchill later claimed, "the worst disaster and the largest capitulation of British history."⁽²⁾

With the publication of Dr. Peter Lowe's monograph,⁽³⁾ historians can now claim to have a fairly well-documented chronology of Britain's policy in the Far East during the crucial period, 1937-41. Lowe's major preoccupation in his book is to answer two important but related questions: Was Britain responsible to some extent for the outbreak of the war? Could the war have been avoided? He adduces a wealth of evidence to prove that though the responsibility for beginning the Pacific war was chiefly that of Japan, the British and American responsibility was unwittingly to ensure that the war started on 7 December 1941, rather than at some date in 1942.⁽⁴⁾ But one reads Lowe's book in vain for an answer to his second and perhaps more important question. This is because Peter Lowe fails to go into Sir Robert Craigie's final report on his mission to Japan to the Foreign Office — a report of great historical significance, in which he argued forcefully that the war could have been avoided altogether.

Like Sir Neville Henderson's mission to Berlin, Craigie's to Tokyo ended in failure. For this failure, he later, in an important document he sent to Anthony Eden on 4 February 1943, blamed the Foreign Office

for refusing to come to terms with the Japanese moderates. Craigie firmly believed that war between Britain and Japan was not inevitable, because he held that unlike Germany, Japan was not a totalitarian state, and felt convinced that moderate opinion was important in Japan. Thus, he concluded that if the British Government had courted the moderates who were opposed to war with the Western Powers, the militarists would not have been able to drive Japan into war. In short, Craigie blamed the anti-Japanese bias in the Foreign Office which he thought had militated against Britain propitiating Japan. But more importantly, he thought that there was an opportunity for averting the Pacific war when the Japanese, during their conversation with the Americans in 1941, put forward a compromise formula on 20 November, which would have removed Japanese troops from southern Indo-China, and freed Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies from the threat which they posed.⁽⁵⁾ In essence, Craigie thought the Pacific war could have been avoided.

The Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office whose officials such as Charles Orde, Nigel Ronald, Robert Howe, John Sterndale Bennett, Esler Dening and Sir George Sansom — exercised considerable influence on the making of Britain's Far Eastern policy, disagreed with Craigie's thesis.⁽⁶⁾ These officials seem to belong to the school of thought which holds that war between the Democracies and Japan was inevitable; that war could only be averted if Britain had been willing to abandon her great position in the Far East, or alternatively, if Japan had voluntarily abandoned the policy which, from modest beginnings, grew into the "New Order in Greater East Asia." But the possibilities of both gradual adjustment, according to the Far Eastern Department, were found to be illusory.⁽⁷⁾ In short, they did not see the chauvinistic and militaristic features in Japanese policy in the 1930's as an aberration; rather it was a master-plan which had started to unfold itself since 1931 and which required a decisive blow from the West at that critical moment in 1941. Thus, there was a fatalistic belief in the inevitability of war between Japan and the Democracies in the Foreign Office.

The purpose of this paper is to put Craigie's report in its historical perspective by analysing the conception or misconception, perception or

misperception, of the Far Eastern situation by Sir Robert Craigie and the Foreign Office during the crucial period, 1937 to 1941. Indeed, Craigie's final report to the Foreign Office in 1943 is seen as the culmination of an attitude which he had assumed even before he became the British Ambassador to Japan in 1937. It is hoped that, by concentrating on major policy disagreements between Sir Robert Craigie and the Foreign Office between 1937 and 1941, this study would make an important contribution to knowledge since it would highlight the differences of opinion between Craigie and the Foreign Office on the inevitability of war between Japan and Great Britain. Thus, it would help to provide an answer to Dr. Lowe's second question: Could the war have been avoided?

Sir Robert Craigie arrived in Tokyo on 3 September 1937 in a Canadian Pacific Liner, *Empress of Russia*, to assume duty as British Ambassador to Japan. Craigie was not new in Tokyo in 1937. He knew Japan well. He first visited the country when he was seven years old, and constantly went to Japan during the summer holidays as a student. During this impressionistic period of his life, certain Japanese characteristics were indelibly registered in his mind. He considered them "courteous and considerate people."¹⁸⁾

These impressions never deserted him in his adult life, when he became the British Ambassador to Japan in September 1937. They were to aid the development of his pro-Japanese feelings during the crucial period from 1937 to 1941. On the eve of his appointment as the British Ambassador to Japan, Craigie was highly optimistic that Britain and Japan would come to terms. There were two reasons for this belief: he seemed to put much hope in the discussions which had been proceeding in London since 1936 between the Japanese Ambassador to London, Yoshida Shigeru, and the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. He had thought that these conversations would lead to better Anglo-Japanese relations. He also believed that the Japanese Government of the time, particularly after the appointment of Sato Naotake as Foreign Secretary, was moderate and Anglophil, and would like to put relations with Britain on a better footing.¹⁹⁾ But as I have pointed out elsewhere, the interests of Japan and Britain concerning China were fundamentally irrecon-

cilable; indeed the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in July 1937 made rapprochement between the two countries impossible.¹¹

Craigie never despaired; he was determined to understand the problems facing Japan and to seek ways of improving Anglo-Japanese relations.¹¹ Indeed, he perceived his task as one of founding means of protecting British interests in China, and defending Britain's dignity and prestige against the assaults of the Japanese military without recourse to arms.¹²

On arrival in Japan in September 1937, he was hopeful that he would accomplish his task. His optimism rested on his belief that moderate leaders in Japan were "willing to collaborate in circumscribing the ill-effects on Anglo-Japanese relations of the conflict in China." "These moderates," he argued, "were for the most part suspicious of Nazi aims, antagonistic to the Germans as a race, convinced that Japan's ultimate aims would be achieved by reaching some friendly understanding with Great Britain and the United States." In short, Craigie divided the Japanese society into two: the militarists and the moderates. Even when he was charitable enough to admit that the ultimate objective of the militarists and the moderates were the same — that is, the establishment of a Japanese political and economic hegemony in Eastern Asia and southwestern Pacific — he believed that there was a difference in the methods by which the objective could be achieved. According to him, "the more moderate elements believed that a major war with another great Power should be avoided and the objective secured through the exercise of political pressure combined with the prosecution of a vigorous policy of commercial and industrial expansion; the extremists, on the other hand, held this method to be too slow and too uncertain and believed that war with Great Britain and possibly the United States must be faced at no distant date."¹³

On the other hand, the Foreign Office officials thought the distinction Craigie made between the moderates and the militarists was more apparent than real. They did not even see the so-called moderates in Japan as the spiritual heirs to that earlier liberal tradition in the country which was genuinely opposed to the whole conception of national aggrandize-

ment at the expense of their weaker neighbours.⁶⁰ In short, the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office denied the existence of moderates in Japan, and even if they existed, officials in the Foreign Office did not think that they counted much in the formulation of Japan's foreign policy between 1937 and 1941, a view that has now been validated by recent researches.⁶¹

The fundamental difference between Craigie and the Foreign Office about their conception of Japanese society in the 1930's was to profoundly affect their policy orientation. While Craigie held that British diplomacy towards Japan during the critical years of 1937-41 should have been one of "extreme flexibility designed to play opposing forces against each other" since, according to him, "the militarists were constantly facing a solid mass of conservative opinion, representing the Court, Finance, Industry, the majority of the politicians and most of the intelligentsia," the Foreign Office wanted the British Government to adopt a firm attitude. "The only sure foundation for a policy towards Japan was a prudent and dispassionate appraisal of the general direction of Japanese policy," the Foreign Office concluded in 1943. In essence, officials of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office were convinced that the Japanese were set on a course of expansion and it was necessary for Britain to stand forth with determination against them. Thus, in their interpretation of Japanese attitudes as well as the tactics and strategy to adopt, Sir Robert Craigie and the Foreign Office officials had serious disagreements. The Far Eastern Department seems to have accepted Japanese militarism as the all-sufficient cause of trouble in the Far East in the 1930's, and to have been little impressed by the existence of moderate opinion in Japan.

The first major disagreement on policy between Sir Robert Craigie and the Foreign Office was on how to resolve the undeclared war between China and Japan which occurred on 7 July 1937. When the Sino-Japanese war broke out on the day, the Foreign Office officials were quick to hold Japan responsible for the war. It is now easy to assume, reading through their minutes on the China Incident, that the Foreign Office officials were decidedly biased against the Japanese. But the fresh-

ness of the Manchurian Incident in their memories underlined their reaction to the Sino-Japanese conflict. The head of the Far Eastern Department, Charles Orde, who had then served in that department for seven years, wrote a perceptive minute to show that Japan seized on the Lukuochiao Incident to advance the objectives of its policy. "Quite probably," he wrote, "the Lukuochiao Incident was not deliberately engineered — it was seized upon and exploited for the furtherance of a policy of blatant aggression which the Japanese have not the good manners to attempt to conceal." "What cannot be contested for two minutes," he asserted, "is that it was provocative and unnecessary to hold night manoeuvres in that area, and what is common knowledge to anyone who has resided in North China is that the employment and demeanor of Japanese military is always marked by the maximum possible provocative offensiveness." Nigel Ronald agreed and further contended that the occurrence of the incident did afford the Army the excuse "to let in motion a plan long and carefully prepared in advance and of very considerable scope, the exact object of which only the present accomplishment can show." Alex Cadogan, the Permanent Undersecretary and former Minister in China whose experiences in the Far East had left him no Japanophil, minuted: "In spite of reassuring messages from Tokyo, I cannot say I like the look of things. The Japanese assurances that they want a local settlement remind me forcefully of six years ago and I couldn't put much faith in them yet . . . I hope my pessimism will prove unfounded."¹⁶ Eden, thus, decided to take a definite lead as regards the Far Eastern crisis. But Eden was aware that a recent assessment of the strategic situation in the Far East had revealed the weakness of Britain in the region.¹⁷ The need to approach the United States became evident. If it was the unspoken assumption of the British Cabinet as well as the Foreign Office officials that a united front of both the United States and Britain would help to reduce militarism in Japan, the United States did not allow such an assumption to be tested. Stanley Hornbeck, the head of the Far Eastern division in the State Department, told Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador to the United States, that the American Administration saw the importance of Anglo-American

cooperation in exchanging information about the dispute and of acting on parallel lines in relation to it. But Hornbeck stressed that with the existing temper of the Japanese Government, it was to be feared that "any concerted action might defeat its own object."¹⁸ This view was consistently held by American spokesmen throughout July.

The collapse of Eden's quest for an Anglo-American joint action might have been followed by a period of disillusioned, and preferably, ominous silence on Britain's part, especially since she did not possess the force to back up a vigorous interventionist policy in the Far East. But Eden took the view that an effort must be made to secure a settlement of the Far Eastern crisis. He laboured hard to achieve a standstill in troop movements, which he perceived as a threat to peace in the region. The Japanese turned deaf ears to Eden's plea, saying that they would prefer a local settlement of the dispute.¹⁹ As it turned out, all efforts to arrive at a local settlement of the dispute in July proved futile.

By August, the war had spread to Shanghai, the citadel of Western influence in China. But the consensus of opinion in the Foreign Office was that Britain should follow a policy calculated to avert embroilment with, but not appeasement of, Japan.

Though the British did not like the Chinese appeal to the League of Nations, they cooperated with the League in condemning Japan's aggression in China.

Meanwhile, the role which the British had played in the Sino-Japanese conflict between July and September 1937 did not please Sir Robert Craigie, who succeeded Sir Robert Clive as British Ambassador to Japan in September 1937. Craigie would have preferred British mediation in the crisis to any possible reference of it to the Nine-Power conference, for he feared that the discussion of the crisis at a Nine-Power conference would only strengthen the position of the military extremists in Japan, and even push that country into the arms of Germany. Since he believed that a large group of civilian moderates in Japan wished to end the fighting by agreement, he advised his government to pursue mediation.²⁰

Craigie did not provide any concrete evidence to support his claim that a large group of civilian moderates wanted to end the crisis by agree-

ment, nor did he identify this group and its influence in Japan. What actually happened in September was that the Japanese General Staff expressed its eagerness for a prompt settlement of the China Incident,²¹ but it consistently maintained its preference for German mediation. Perhaps Craigie got wind of this, and wanted to preempt German mediation, hence his appeals to his government to mediate in the crisis.

Such mediation, according to Craigie, must be based on list of peace proposals which he obtained from "an absolutely reliable" Japanese source. These proposals include the establishment of a neutral zone in North China, the recognition of Manchukuo, the retention of Japanese forces in North China and the independence of Inner Mongolia, among others.²²

The British Foreign Office received the peace proposals with a high degree of skepticism, and would have liked to leave them in abeyance since they did not think that China would be prepared to bow to Japan's will. It was also feared that if the Japanese terms were transmitted to Nanking, "Britain might become inconveniently involved."²³

Craigie refused to be persuaded by such an argument. The urgency of the case for negotiations was expounded by him on 29 September 1937, in a remarkable telegram to London. He rejected the policies of inaction or sitting on the fence. For he argued that, "if negotiations were started at once, Japan would agree to leave Nanking with an authority in the northern provinces not less and possibly even greater than that exercised before the present incident occurred in return for economic concessions by China. Tokyo would also want the Chinese to resist the spread of communism, to grant *de facto* recognition to Manchukuo and allow Japan to assist Inner Mongolia in blocking Soviet penetration." The British Government must not dillydally. "If London and Nanking delayed at all, the Japanese terms would harden . . . Japan might soon crush Chiang Kai-Shek . . . It was futile to hope that the Japanese armies would be defeated either by China or by financial difficulties at home . . . Thus, Britain should make the Chinese face facts and help them recover by diplomacy what they were never likely to regain by force of arms."²⁴

This was a bold, if somewhat equivocal proposal, which engendered much uneasy debate, not all of it unfavourable, among the cabinet. Anthony Eden and some cabinet members were extremely suspicious of Japanese peace terms. Many cabinet members did not want Britain to act as an intermediary between Japan and China, as such action would breach Britain's neutrality in the war.²⁵

However, Neville Chamberlain, who thought highly of Craigie, wanted to give his ideas and proposal a trial. He believed that it was important that Britain should not miss any opportunity to bring about a cessation of the present horrors if it could be done without undue risks to British interests.

Chamberlain's views carried the day; the Japanese terms were transmitted to Nanking. But Eden's doubts soon materialized. There was little or nothing in the peace proposals to attract Chiang Kai-Shek, who would settle for nothing less than complete sovereignty of North China.²⁶

Craigie was predictably disappointed by the failure of his initiative. He was, no doubt, a man of resource, courage and ideas; he was single-minded in the pursuit of his goals. But on this occasion, he allowed himself to be carried away by his admiration for the Japanese, his perceived weakness of China and his abhorrence of Bolshevism. He genuinely believed that Japan was the only bulwark against Bolshevism in the Far East, and as such, must be conciliated. But Craigie did not allow such a disappointment to dampen his enthusiasm.

On 4 November 1937, Craigie sent an important telegram to London which clearly revealed his mind. It was an invaluable telegram as it judged the rights and wrongs of the British role at the League of Nations, and revealed his conception of the Far Eastern situation. He was of the opinion that Japan was hostile to Britain because of the lead the latter took in proposing the League resolution which condemned Japan as an aggressor. He recounted some other measures which Britain had taken to excite Japan's hostility, among which were the calling of the Brussels conference and the economic measures which Britain had taken since 1932 to mitigate the effect of Japanese economic competition in the British Empire.

Craigie's categorical disapproval of the United States' role and his awareness of the lack of British defence in the Far East in other parts of his despatch sincerely expressed his intentions. He believed that since Britain's lack of military power, her preoccupation with the European situation, and her inability to secure Washington's cooperation made it imperative for her to avoid trouble in East Asia, the wisest policy would have been to seek cooperation with Japan in the hope of exercising a restraining influence on her. He thought that the Japanese would "listen to us as they would listen to no one else." Thus, he urged that Britain must sufficiently demonstrate that she was not irretrievably opposed to every Japanese ambition, and did not view in the worst possible light every Japanese activity. He concluded with an advice to the British Government that it must have the courage of its conviction to advise China to make reasonable terms while "reasonable terms are still to be had."²⁷

Craigie's telegram plunged the Foreign Office officials into an agitated discussion of the propriety of appeasing Japan. Henderson feared that friendship with Japan would involve an economic infiltration which "our economic organisation in the outlying parts of the Empire is too weak to withstand . . . Cool relations with Japan are desirable until our imperial economic structure is adequate to withstand the shocks of the energetic and efficient Japanese attack to which it will be subjected if opportunity offers . . ."

Also H. H. Thomas disagreed with Craigie's view that Japan would listen to Britain. What Craigie overlooked, as suggested by Thomas, was that, "the Japanese are in an expansionist mood, and the exponents of expansion know that inevitably they must sooner or later come into collision either with Russia or with British Empire . . . They seem to think that no time will be more favourable for a clash with us than now when we have so many other preoccupations. Whilst they are in this expansionist and aggressive mood, it will be quite impossible for us to be on terms of friendship with them . . . I do not think these people would listen to us as they would not to any one else."²⁸

The Foreign Office's apt assessment of Japan's militarism did not

convince Robert Craigie. He believed that expediency called for an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement. When the broadening of Japan's activities in China in 1938 was severely undermining Western interests in Shanghai, Tientsin, Amoy, and threatened the British stake in the Maritime Customs, Craigie was anxious to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the Japanese Government. The view that Craigie put strongly to the Foreign Office in July 1938 was that a satisfactory agreement with the Japanese was possible if direct negotiations with them started immediately. Craigie warmly supported direct negotiations especially because General Ugaki Kazushige, a liberal by the standards of the Japanese Army and a moderate, had been appointed Foreign Secretary since May. With the appointment of General Ugaki by Premier Konoe, Craigie thought that political conditions in Japan were ripe enough to reach a working arrangement with her, which would safeguard British interests in China and perhaps pave the way for an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement.²⁹ Though the Foreign Office doubted Craigie's optimism, he was allowed to enter into negotiations with General Ugaki.³⁰

It soon became clear that Craigie's optimism was unfounded. Though Ugaki was a moderate, he shared the political vision of the Japanese military. He could not, on his own, arrive at any agreement with Craigie, without the consent of the military. That consent was not forthcoming; indeed the military regarded the diplomatic exchanges as a sign of Japan's weakness. The hostile attitude of the military to the Craigie-Ugaki talks confirmed the view consistently held by the Foreign Office that moderates and militarists shared similar foreign policy objectives, and where the moderates' objectives differed from the military's, the latter's view would be predominant. Thus, it did not come as a surprise to the Foreign Office officials that negotiations between Craigie and Ugaki foundered on the irreconcilable interests between the two countries.³¹

Craigie continued, however, to show interest in negotiations with Japan. Thus, we were to witness another instance of serious disagreement on policy between Craigie and the Foreign Office soon after the Japanese had proclaimed the "New Order" in East Asia in November

1938. Craigie was perturbed by the new developments in East Asia, and feared that Japan might move closer to Germany and Italy. He raised this specter in his telegram to the Foreign Office on 2 December 1938.

Then, he had written to Halifax, expressing his conviction of the absolute necessity for good Anglo-Japanese relations in the interest of peace in East Asia; he thus stressed from the start the need to wean Japan away from the totalitarian states. For he thought that the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact would be a turning point in Japan's history. Besides encouraging Japan "to prosecute conflict *a outrance*," he asserted that, "if Japan were allowed to enter into a hard and fast alliance with the totalitarian Powers, the process of ultimate reconciliation with Great Britain would obviously be retarded, if not completely arrested." His anxiety arose from his own understanding of the German character, and the pressure he thought the Germans would exert on the Japanese. For Craigie told Halifax that Germany was always fond of demanding from her allies "their pound of flesh." If this happened, there would be no alternative for Japan than to fall more and more under the German influence — "Moreover, in Germany itself," Craigie reasoned, "the advocates of a rapprochement with Great Britain must surely lose ground if their country were to enter so powerful a military combination directed primarily against ourselves."

It was, therefore, essential to British policy to deter Japan from strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact. This depended, Craigie thought, upon the maintenance of close Anglo-Japanese relations, which could only be achieved if Britain was prepared to cooperate with Japan. He now explained what he meant by cooperation: "It need not necessarily involve a complete surrender to the wishes of the Japanese extremists or the abandonment of the cause of China. However, it would definitely mean the abandonment of any further scheme to support or give material assistance to the regime of Chiang Kai-Shek." "It would mean," he claimed, "recognition of the actual fact of Japan's military and economic predominance in China today and an effort to win back ultimate Chinese independence through cooperation with Japan and China, in establishing

that assured market and that source of raw materials which represent Japan's primary needs in the economic field."

Craigie, nonetheless, recognized that his suggested line of policy would not be attractive to the Foreign Office because of what he perceived to be their permanent anti-Japanese bias of the officials, but he cautioned that it should not be rejected out of hand if the need to separate Japan from the totalitarian countries was considered real and urgent. For he warned that if the Anti-Comintern Pact turned into a defensive alliance, the tensions and rivalries that had bedevilled Anglo-Japanese relations since the Sino-Japanese conflict broke out would only increase in intensity. In fact, he favoured British cooperation with the Japanese on another important count. He perceived China as a weak country, whose resistance to Japan would soon collapse. And he feared that under Japan's political domination, China might become the instrument of her imperialist designs in Asia. As he put it, "with China dominated, equipped, organized, trained and directed by Japan, the Yellow Peril would become not a mere abstract conception but a harsh and pressing reality. Its first manifestation would doubtlessly take the form of the swamping of foreign markets by goods produced by Chinese labour under Japanese supervision, but its ultimate aim would be political." Strategic considerations seemed to govern Craigie's attitude at this time. He was keenly aware of the power structure in which he was operating in the Far East, and saw himself as a guardian of the British imperial interests in the region within it. Thus, he advised Halifax that it was only through cooperation with Japan that Britain could safeguard her imperial interests in the Far East. This was the more so when he knew that the United States Administration "would not proceed beyond protests and remonstrances and would even prefer, to the risk of war, a progressive withdrawal of their interests in China and the Far East." And from his experience, protests and remonstrances had not succeeded in enhancing "our prestige in the Far East or securing proper respect for our interests in China."²²

This suggestion was not attractive to the Foreign Office. After all, the post Munich and the post Anglo-Italian agreements did not lead to better

relations between Britain and these Powers. For instance, on 2 November 1938, Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Secretary, and Ciano, his Italian opposite, had met at the Belvedere Palace in Vienna to carve out of the southern boundary of Czechoslovakia an area to satisfy the Hungarian claims without referring either to Chamberlain or Daladier.⁶³ This was no doubt a breach of the Munich spirit, and there is no evidence to suggest that the appeasement of Japan would have been wise if it had not paid off elsewhere.

Thus, the Foreign Office officials were right in rejecting Craigie's suggestion. But more importantly, their strategy differed from his. To Sir John Brenan, "the goal to be aimed at is nothing less than the weakening of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle by a shrewd blow at its weakest member. If there is any possibility of achieving this in cooperation with the U.S., the problem is at least worth considering in that light." This view was supported by William Strang, an Assistant Secretary of State and formerly head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office. This position seemed to be rationalized thus: There was no general disposition in the United States to sympathize with Japanese ambitions in East Asia; in fact, Japan was in no mood to compromise. As he summed it up:

I do not myself believe that the Japanese could be bought off by any compromise or concession that we could safely offer them: nor does their present military and economic position seem to be so strong as to warrant our choosing this moment to abandon Chiang Kai-Shek and by so doing nip in the bud a useful form of collaboration with like-minded governments in Europe which has already gone far beyond what we could have dared to hope for a few months ago.

This sentiment was echoed by the Southern Department: "to make use of the sympathy and support of the U.S.A. must surely remain the cardinal principle in the conduct of our foreign policy."

Strang opposed Craigie's suggestion on a more serious note. To him, the distinction which Craigie drew between "Japan's undesirable liaison"

and her "*mesalliance*" with her fellow associates of the Anti-Comintern Pact was unreal. Strang echoed a general feeling in the Foreign Office when he asserted:

The Anti-Comintern Pact in its present form is a powerful diplomatic instrument and has had a potent effect upon the international situation to our disadvantages. The Anti-Comintern Powers do not need to be in alliance in order to help each other to secure advantages and there are signs that they are likely in the coming year to push what they conceive to be their advantage for the achievement of new objectives of wide scope . . . The Pact is of the greatest danger to us even in its present form, and we have some reason to think that Herr Hitler, with his well-known contempt for paper obligations, is not in favour of establishing precise contractual obligations between the parties since he holds that in case of a general conflict, the three parties concerned will act in the manner best designed to serve their own interests whatever their obligations might be . . .⁶⁴

It was against this background that Halifax rejected cooperation with Japan. The discontent and derision Halifax and his advisers shared on Craigie's suggestion also greeted, not surprisingly, Shigemitsu's plan for an Anglo-Japanese cooperation in the Far East. Shigemitsu, who had assumed office as Japan's ambassador to Britain in 1938, had proposed that Britain should recognize Japan's special position in China while a Committee would be appointed at Shanghai to discuss outstanding Anglo-Japanese problems. Sir George Mounsey, an Assistant Secretary in the Far Eastern Department, summed up the strength of opposition in the Foreign Office when he said that the scheme was "preposterous — we are to concede precisely what Japan wants in exchange for mere consultation in regard to all our legitimate grievances."⁶⁵

In sum, Britain was not prepared to cooperate with Japan, as Cadogan pointed out, "for fear of alienating the United States opinion." Not only that, there was the all-pervading reason that Japan could not dominate China. In other words, British leaders did not share Craigie's anxiety about the collapse of China. On 1 November 1938, Neville Chamberlain

had explained to the House of Commons that, contrary to Clement Attlee's view that Japan was closing one of the largest potential markets in the world, there would be great opportunities for British capital in China at the end of the Sino-Japanese conflict. This, explained Butler, meant that British capital would be able to help China in the work of reconstruction, and did not anticipate a Japanese dominated China.³⁶

There, the matter of conciliating Japan rested. It would appear that the Foreign Office had complete control over the conduct of Britain's Far Eastern policy. This was necessarily the case because of the Cabinet's preoccupation with the European situation.

When in June 1939, the Foreign Office, as a result of poor information, was mishandling the Tientsin crisis – a crisis which could have led to a war between Britain and Japan – the Cabinet asserted its authority over the formulation of Britain's Far Eastern policy. The strongest man in the Cabinet was the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, who ensured that his diplomacy did not outrun his resources. His active role in the Cabinet during the Tientsin crisis reveals that he shared Craigie's view that the maintenance of British prestige in the Far East would depend on not antagonizing Japan.

Thus the British Cabinet moved quickly to recognize the actual situation in the Far East. This was no doubt a victory for Sir Robert Craigie, but it was still far short of his conception of Anglo-Japanese cooperation. Indeed the Tientsin Agreement which was eventually signed in June 1940 reveals that Craigie was not allowed by the Foreign Office to sign away British interests in the Far East. The Foreign Office insisted and ensured that the Fapi (Chinese currency) was not prohibited in the Tientsin concession; the silver was sealed in the Bank of Communications rather than in the Yokohama Specie Bank as the Japanese had demanded. And the compromise decision contained in the text such as using part of the silver for relief purposes limited, rather than extended, Japan's control over Chinese silver, for it was to be supervised by joint Anglo-Japanese staff.³⁷ Thus, the Foreign Office's position seemed to reveal that they would never condone Japanese ambitions in China.

The agreement of June 1940 left the Japanese with a keen sense of

outrage. The pressure they soon mounted on Britain to close the Burma Road was partly an expression of their frustration and partly due to the fortunes of the European war. The German triumphs of May and June 1940, especially the fall of France, added impetus to the Japanese desire to strangulate the Chinese economy and weaken their resistance. This led the Japanese to put pressure on France to stop the passage of munitions to China through Indo-China, which the French accepted. With the closure of the Indochina-China route, the Burma Road, apart from the Sinkiang Road from Russia, became valuable as China's main means of communications with the outside world. Not surprisingly, the Japanese saw the route as a symbol of opposition to their war in China since munitions that got through it to China propped up the Chinese resistance.

Sir Robert Craigie thought that Japan's demand for the closure of the Burma Road, and the European situation, especially the fall of France, were enough reasons for the Foreign Office to make a fundamental readjustment of British Far Eastern policy. He would like the Foreign Office to re-examine, and forget about the reliance Britain had hitherto placed on the United States. As he summarized his feelings, he noted:

In the wider context of policy, we have been content to rely on the United States which has favoured a purely negative policy designed to wear down Japanese resistance that the army in Japan would be deposed from its paramount position. Whatever merit there may have been in this policy before the French collapse, it is now certainly ineffective. Long before it could produce results, the whole face of things in the Far East may be changed by that very army at which the United States seeks to strike with such puny weapons.⁸⁸

In other words, Craigie was censuring the policy of the United States, and at the same time, warning the British leaders that the army in Japan was gradually occupying a predominant position in decision-making. Thus, he favoured a negotiated compromise with Japan. Lord Lothian advised Halifax to make a settlement with Japan "based on the present day realities and which it might be willing to accept."⁸⁹

These ambassadors' urgings on Halifax to forget about the United

States in the calculations of British interest in the Far East were not shared by the Chiefs of Staff. The strategic appreciation conducted in June 1940 concluded that the British Government could not send reinforcements to the Far East even if Japan sought to alter the *status quo* in that region and that "we should therefore have to rely on the U.S.A. to safeguard our interests there."⁴⁰ With this strategic appreciation, a fundamental readjustment of Britain's Far Eastern policy as suggested by Craigie and Lothian was impossible. This seemed to be the verdict of the Foreign Office officials and Lord Halifax, for rather than embarking on a thorough reappraisal of Britain's Far Eastern policy, Halifax sought the opinion of Cordell Hull, who advised that it was preferable to submit to *force majeure* than make an agreement of appeasing character.⁴¹

Indeed, Churchill has at the same time come to the conclusion that since the Japanese military possessed mercurial temperament, it would be suicidal folly to incur their hostilities for reasons mainly of prestige. One significant point worth noting in this Burma Road episode was that Churchill's perception of Japanese society was confused and blurred. In accepting to close the road, he revealed his distrust in the Japanese military, whose control over policy he did not doubt. But deep down in Churchill's mind was the feeling that the closure of the road would have a sobering effect in Tokyo. Churchill seemed to share the hope of Sir Robert Craigie in Tokyo that the period of three months for which the road would be temporarily closed would be used to search for an understanding with Japan.

There was really very little in all this to attract the Foreign Office. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office produced a comprehensive peace proposal, without enthusiasm, for other government departments to consider.⁴² As it turned out, these government departments, including the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Colonial, Dominion, India and Burma Offices, and the Petroleum Department, were unenthusiastic about a general settlement with Japan.

The objection to a general settlement with Japan gathered cogency during August and September when Konoe's government put pressure on the Vichy Administration in Indo-China to grant Japan bases in the

northern half of the country, and then aligned Japan overtly with Germany and Italy in the tripartite pact. In essence, the Japanese refused to be appeased by the closure of the Burma Road, and with the warding off of German threat to Britain, Churchill felt free to reopen the road to traffic in October 1940.

The opening of the road took place at a time the Japanese were moving into Southeast Asia to gain access to raw materials, especially the oil resources of the Netherlands East Indies. For Britain, as well as the United States, Japan's move into Southeast Asia brought into sharp focus the defence of East Asian balance of power. Britain's policy began to harden as it searched around for a deterrent. British leaders made attempts to concert defence efforts with the hope of improving the image of the British Government in Japan. It soon became clear, however, that Britain's defence calculations in the Far East were not shared by the United States; indeed the United States refused to accept responsibility for the defence of the Singapore naval base, the main pivot of British defence in the Far East.⁴³ Lack of cooperation between Britain and the United States on defence matters relating to the Far East seemed to convince the Japanese that the two Democracies were not yet ready for war in the region. This would perhaps explain the intransigence of the Japanese in their irrevocable commitment to move southwards. Yet, Japan's southward expansion seemed to have overshadowed, in Western eyes, the Sino-Japanese conflict, for it appeared that the Japanese were prepared to launch an assault on British and American interests in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the intention of the Japanese, as perceived by Sir Robert Craigie at the time, was to secure bases in Indo-China, Siam, from where to launch an ultimate attack on Singapore.⁴⁴

The British suspicion of the trend of Japanese policy gathered strength as from February 1941 amidst rumours of an imminent Japanese attack. Churchill, in particular, was becoming apprehensive of the Japanese posture in Southeast Asia. As he told Roosevelt on 15 February 1941, Japanese intentions were by no means clear, but an attack on British possessions was definitely possible. Thus, he appealed passionately to Roosevelt to do all he could "to inspire the Japanese with

the fear of a double war . . .," for he warned Roosevelt that "if they come in against us and we are alone, the grave character of the consequences cannot easily be overstated."⁴⁵ However slow the United States responded to Churchill's appeal, it soon became clear that Roosevelt was willing to check Japan's expansion into Southeast Asia. He imposed economic sanctions against Japan in July 1941.

The leadership of the United States was viewed from different perspectives by Sir Robert Craigie and the Foreign Office. In the main, Craigie thought that the conduct of diplomacy in the United States had always erred on the side of rigidity and formality, whereas the Far Eastern situation called for a reasonable elasticity in diplomatic technique. He did not share the opinion current in the United States that economic sanctions could put Japan "on the spot," or make her yield to a general settlement involving peace with China, or that Japan, involved in a four-year war with China, was not in a position to risk war with the United States. Rather, he believed that the Japanese economic structure was resilient; that the Japanese Government was progressively concentrating all available economic resources upon the building up of their war potential, and finally, that the China war was no impediment to Japanese ability to prosecute war elsewhere. Thus, he warned the Foreign Office not to delude themselves into believing that the Japanese could not attack the British and the United States possession in the Far East anytime.⁴⁶ Craigie's views were greatly influenced by what he perceived as the ominous intentions of the military in Tokyo and the temper of the Japanese Cabinet, especially after the fall of Konoe Cabinet in October 1941. Craigie's perception of a direct, not-too-distant Japanese threat to the United States and her possessions influenced his ardent desire to see the British Government show keen interest in the Japanese-U.S. talks which had been proceeding in Washington since May 1941. Craigie would have liked Britain to exercise a moderating influence on both Japan and the United States. In essence, he wanted Britain to participate actually in the conversation. But there are reasons to believe that Britain was not interested in the conversation. When Eden heard about the plan of the United States to engage in conversation with

Japan in mid-May 1941, he left no doubts in the minds of Cordell Hull about his objections. Eden made the perceptive observation that Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy severely limited its ability to resolve the Far Eastern crisis by diplomacy. Moreover, he regarded Japan's diplomatic moves in Washington as a calculated ploy to drive a wedge between the United States and Britain. What further strengthened Eden's misgivings about the talks was Japan's recent Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union. Eden reasoned that the Pact would facilitate Japan's "peaceful penetration into Southeast Asia, where she would build up her defences in order to attack Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies." It was reasonable, in these circumstances, for the United States to adopt a firm policy towards Japan, for as Eden concluded, the talks would be inadequate to solve the Far Eastern crisis.

In Washington, Cordell Hull was infuriated by Eden's reaction. When Halifax saw him on 25 May, he was in "a state of pained and reproachful indignation . . . to have received a 'lecture' from H.M.G." Nevertheless, he explained that he was trying to postpone Japanese action in view of the British position in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and could not understand why Eden should be disturbed except he doubted the United States intelligence and good faith.⁴⁷ The Foreign Office has since used Hull's explanation to explain the British Government's decision to leave the conduct of the conversation entirely in the hands of the United States.⁴⁸ But this was not the whole story. The objective of British Far Eastern policy which Churchill vigorously pursued was to secure the active intervention of the United States in the Far Eastern situation — an objective which seemed to have been realized with the inception of Japan-U.S. conversation. It thus seems unlikely that Churchill, in particular, would accept Craigie's advice to intervene decisively in the talks.

Meanwhile, the negotiations in Washington proceeded without the United States giving adequate information to the British Government. The discussion of the conversation need not detain us here; by mid-November, the talks had reached a critical stage. Deadlock seemed imminent as Cordell Hull and Kurusu failed to see each other's point of view. At this stage, Sir Robert Craigie and the Foreign Office held di-

vergent views about Kuru's mission to Washington. Craigie believed that Kuru, though acceptable to the Japanese army, was a leader of the pro-American party in Japan, who did not want war with the Western Democracies. And if he discovered a real basis for a compromise with the United States, he would use his decisive influence in the army to get the agreement accepted. As Craigie wrote in 1943, "I regarded — and still regard — this step as having been a genuine effort on the part of the Japanese Government to prevent a rupture with the United States."⁴⁹

On the other hand, the Foreign Office believed that there was nothing moderate in Kuru's demeanour when he arrived in Washington. Relying on a Dutch source in the Far East, the Foreign Office held that Kuru had nothing new to offer, and moreover, that he merely went to Washington to discover whether the United States Administration was bluffing. In short, Kuru could never have been an agent of peace in the United States.⁵⁰ This was an accurate assessment of Japan's position, for there is yet no evidence to suggest that Japan wanted to abandon her dreams of Asian domination in 1941.

However, the divergent attitude of Craigie and the Foreign Office affected their policy positions concerning the Japanese compromise proposal of 20 November 1941. On that day, the Japanese representatives in Washington put forward a proposal for a partial or interim settlement based on a virtual return to the *status quo ante* at the time of the Japanese entry into southern Indo-China. In essence, Japan would be prepared to move her troops in southern Indo-China to northern Indo-China, and on conclusion of peace with China, the United States would lift the economic embargo on Japan, especially the supply of oil. The rest of the proposal was that neither government was to send any armed forces into southwest Pacific areas except Indo-China and they were to cooperate in securing commodities from the Netherlands East Indies.

It was at this point that Cordell Hull thought it fit to consult the British Government on the conversation. Craigie held that a *modus vivendi* on Indo-China alone could be arrived at, for that would remove the threat of a Japanese offensive against Yunnan from northern Indo-China. Apart from this strategic advantage, Craigie seemed to believe

that a compromise could be reached on the basis that the United States and Britain would supply to Japan only such raw materials as could be spared, having regard to the importance of their own war requirements. He was convinced that this could be worked out in such a way to prevent any actual increase in Japan's war stocks.⁶¹

But events moved so rapidly that this telegram did not reach London before the Foreign Office replied to Hull's telegram. The position of the officials there was one of caution — an attitude that seemed to border on hostility to the proposal. Sterndale Benett commented, "we cannot rule out the possibility that a piecemeal settlement may merely give the Japanese a breathing space. But to get them really moving in reverse would be a great gain for us." Ashley Clarke commented that "if the Kurusu suggestion is genuine, there seems to be some ground for a very cautious response on the part of the Americans."⁶² In the end, the British Government wrote to the American Administration expressing their pessimism about Kurusu's proposals. "Japanese aim was to secure the speedy removal of economic pressure but not the speedy settlement of anything else . . . Nevertheless, if Mr. Hull, who was in the best position to judge, thought a counter-proposal on a limited and temporary basis was good tactic, His Majesty's Government would give their support."⁶³

Before the British reply arrived in Washington, Cordell Hull had drawn up a counter-proposal, the essence of which was that the Japanese would withdraw their forces from southern Indo-China and reduce the number of their forces in northern Indo-China to 25,000. Furthermore, the United States would modify their freezing regulations, but this would be dictated by Japan's willingness to settle the Sino-Japanese conflict "on the basis of law and order and justice."

The reaction of the British Government, especially Winston Churchill, was governed by the attitude of Chiang Kai-Shek to Hull's proposal. Chiang dubbed Hull's proposals as a policy of appeasement vis-a-vis Japan; and though Churchill privately expressed his wish for a U.S.-Japanese settlement in a minute to Eden on 23 November, the ferocious reaction of Chiang led him to change his conciliatory policy towards

Japan. He wrote to Roosevelt on 25 November, "... it is you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai-Shek? Is he not having a thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse, our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves."⁶⁴

Churchill's reaction, together with China's disavowal of Hull's *modus vivendi*, convinced Hull that his plan was unpopular. He dropped his *modus vivendi*, and on 26 November, gave to Nomura his "comprehensive basic proposal" which was designed as reply to Kurusu's earlier proposal. In essence, it was a call on Japan to renounce the basic principles of its aggressive policy in the Far East, and a recreation of the Nine-Power Treaty. Cordell Hull thought less of his document and observed that it would be unacceptable to Japan. He was right, for his document had no attraction for Kurusu.

The breakdown in negotiations undoubtedly hastened the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and Singapore on 7 December 1941. The crucial question to ask is whether Hull's *modus vivendi*, if presented, would have saved the situation in the Far East. Sir Robert Craigie felt that it would have either averted the war altogether, or helped Britain to gain more time in the region. He was convinced that had the United States and Britain followed the earlier precedents — the agreements relating to Tientsin, the use of Burma Road as a route for the supply of war materials to China — Japan would not have attacked the British and the United States' possessions.

On the other hand, the Foreign Office attitude was influenced by the memory of the Munich Agreement — an agreement that did not provide a reassuring precedent. It was believed there that Japan was set on a course of expansion and that the *modus vivendi*, if accepted by Cordell Hull, could not have prevented her from launching an attack on the British and the United States' possessions "in the not far distant future."

Records and secondary sources now reveal that Craigie was wrong, and the Foreign Office right. Christopher Thorne argues quite persua-

sively that "despite the extent to which it is possible to argue that Washington pushed Tokyo into a corner, Japan's momentum towards war was by then almost certainly too great to be checked."⁵⁸ Undoubtedly, the Japanese Cabinet was disappointed by the reaction of the United States to Kurusu's plan; indeed as one scholar rightly remarked, desperation led the cabinet to prefer war to the continuation of stalemate in the negotiations.⁵⁹ The fact that the naval task force which eventually attacked Pearl Harbour was asked to sail on 26 November from the Kurile Islands into the central Pacific may be a good evidence of their desperation at failure to get a settlement with the United States. In fact, decision to go to war was not made until 1 December 1941, and debates show that they were desperate.⁶⁰

However, it would be wrong to assume, as Craigie did, that the compromise formula of 26 November, if accepted by the United States and Japan, would have prevented war in East Asia. Such a conclusion ignores the fundamental point that the Japanese leaders were bent on achieving certain national objectives in East Asia during the 1930's and early 1940's, which were incompatible with those of Britain and the United States. Even if Japan's national objectives — liberation of Asia from the yoke of Western imperialism and the establishment of a Greater Co-Prosperty Sphere of Living in East Asia — were not entirely the product of conscious or deliberate decisions, the Japanese leaders were aware of the implications of abandoning them. It would have meant, as Peter Duus pointed out, the Japanese willingness to accept "national humiliation or the role of a second rate power" in East Asia.⁶¹ Neither was acceptable to most Japanese in 1941. It is therefore difficult to see, as Nish rightly asserts, how any Japanese cabinet could push through the sort of settlement to which the United States were likely to agree.⁶² Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the Foreign Office officials had a clearer insight into Japan's policy than Robert Craigie.⁶³ War, therefore, as the Foreign Office rightly assumed, was inevitable between Japan and the Democracies unless Britain and the United States were prepared to accept a Japanese political and economic domination of the Far East.

(May 31, 1982)

Notes

- (1) Department of History, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Currently a Japan Foundation scholar and a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo.
- (2) Winston Churchill, *The Second World War, III*, Lond., 1950, pp. 551 ff.
- (3) Peter Lowe, *Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War*, Oxford, 1977.
- (4) *ibid.*, p. 287.
- (5) Craigie to Eden, 4 February 1943, F 821/821/G, FO 371/35957.
- (6) In fact, Alex Cadogan, the Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, found it "a pretty sweeping indictment of U.S. policy." Winston Churchill referred to Craigie's memorandum as "a very strange document." Christopher Thorne, *Allies of A Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-45*, Oxford, 1978, p. 75; Winston Churchill, *The Second World War, III*, p. 539.
- (7) Far Eastern Department (Foreign Office), Memorandum on "From Burma Road Crisis to Pearl Harbour," 23 April, 1943, F 2602/821/G., FO 371/35957.
- (8) R. Craigie, *Behind The Japanese Mask*, Lond., 1946, p. 9.
- (9) Craigie, Memorandum on "the survey of political events during the period of my appointment as H. M. Ambassador in Tokyo with particular reference to the period of six months immediately preceding the outbreak of war," secret, 3 Feb., 1943, FO 371/35957.
- (10) S. O. Agbi, "The Foreign Office and Yoshida's Bid for Rapprochement with Britain in 1936-37: A critical reconsideration of the Anglo-Japanese conversation," *The Historical Journal*, 21, 1 (1978), pp. 173-9.
- (11) Peter Lowe, "The Dilemmas of an Ambassador: Sir Robert Craigie in Tokyo, 1937-41," in *Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies, II, Part I, "History and International Relation"*, University of Sheffield: Centre of Japanese Studies, 1977, (ed.) G. Daniels & P. Lowe, p. 35.
- (12) R. Craigie, Memo, 3 Feb. 1943, FO 371/35957.
- (13) Craigie, Memo, 3 Feb. 1943, FO 371/35957.
- (14) Far Eastern Department, Memo, 23 April 1943, FO 371/35957.
- (15) See articles by J. B. Crowley, Akira Iriye, Chihiro Hosoya in James Morley (ed.), *Dilemmas of Growth in Pre-War Japan*, Princeton, 1971; Also Katsumi Usui, "The Role of the Foreign Ministry" in D. Borg and S. Okamoto (ed.), *Pearl Harbour as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-41*, New York, 1973, pp. 127-48.
- (16) Minutes by Orde, Ronald and Alex Cadogan, 15 July 1937, FO

- 371/20955.
- (17) For an analysis of Britain's strategic position in the Far East during the 1937-41 period, see S. O. Agbi, "The Strategic Factor in Britain's Far Eastern Diplomacy, 1937-41," *Nigerian Journal of International Studies*, vol. II, No. 1, Ibadan, 1978, pp. 53-80.
 - (18) Lindsay to Eden, 15 July 1937, FO 371/20950.
 - (19) Dodds to Eden, 15 July 1935, FO 371/20950.
 - (20) Craigie to Eden, 19 Sept. 1937, FO 371/20956.
 - (21) J.B. Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy*, Princeton, 1965, p. 375.
 - (22) Craigie to Eden, 19 Sept. 1937, FO 371/20956.
 - (23) Minutes by Ronald and Cadogan, 21, Sept. 1937, FO 371/21030.
 - (24) Craigie to Eden, 29 Sept. 1937, FO 371/21030.
 - (25) Cabinet Conclusions, 29 Sept. 1937, CAB 23189.
 - (26) Howe to Eden, 5 Oct. 1937, FO 371/20957.
 - (27) Craigie to Eden, 4 Nov. 1937, FO 371/21030.
 - (28) Minutes by Henderson and H. H. Thomas, Nov. 1937, *ibid.*
 - (29) Craigie to Halifax, 29 June 1938, FO 371/22109.
 - (30) Minute by Brenan, 30 June 1938, *ibid.*
 - (31) Minute by Brenan, 16 July 1938, FO 371/22092.
 - (32) Craigie to Halifax, 2 December 1938, FO 371/22181.
 - (33) *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, vol. IV*, pp. 118-26; *Ciano's Diary 1937-38*, Lond., 1952, pp. 188-9.
 - (34) Minutes by Brenan, Strang and the Southern Department, 2 Dec. 1938, FO 371/22181.
 - (35) Shigemitsu to Halifax, 21 Dec. 1938, FO 371/22163 with minutes.
 - (36) Parliamentary Debates, (Common) vol. 341 col. 165-6.
 - (37) Craigie to Halifax, 5 April 1940, FO 371/24651 for the text of the Agreement.
 - (38) Craigie to Halifax, 22 June 1940, FO 371/23725.
 - (39) Lothian to Halifax, 25 June 1940, *ibid.*
 - (40) C.O.S. Review, 13 June 1940, CAB 80/14.
 - (41) War Cabinet Decision, 1 July 1940.
 - (42) F.O. Memo on Possibility of a General Settlement with Japan, 10 August 1940, FO 371/24708.
 - (43) S. O. Agbi, *British Imperial Defence and Foreign Policy in Asia and The Pacific, and the Impact of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1937-41*, Ph. D. Thesis, Univ. of Birmingham, July, 1976, pp. 288-304.
 - (44) Craigie to Eden, 13 June 1941, FO 371/27778.
 - (45) Churchill to Roosevelt, 15 Feb. 1941, FO 371/27887.
 - (46) Craigie to Eden, 4 Feb. 1943, FO 371/35957.

- (47) Eden to Halifax, 21 May 1941, Halifax to Eden, 25 May 1941, FO 371/27880.
- (48) F.O. Memo, "From Burma Road to Pearl Harbour," 23 April 1943, FO 371/35957.
- (49) Craigie to Eden, 22 Oct. 1941, 4 Feb. 1943, FO 361/35957.
- (50) F.O. Memo, 23 April 1943, FO 371/35957.
- (51) Craigie to Eden, 4 Feb. 1943, *ibid.*
- (52) Minute by Ashley Clarke, 19 Nov. 1941, FO 371/27912.
- (53) Eden to Halifax, 20 Nov. 1941, FO 371/27913.
- (54) Minute by Churchill to Eden, 23 Nov. 1941, FO 371/27913.
- (55) Christopher Thorne, *Allies of A Kind*, p. 75. For reasons which might have forced the United States to push Japan to a corner, see Kinhide Mushakoji, "The structure of Japanese-American Relations in the 1930's," in D. Borg and S. Okamoto (ed.), *Pearl Harbour as History*, pp. 595-604.
- (56) Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations*, N.Y., 1967, pp. 225-6.
- (57) Nobutaka Ike, *Japan's Decision for War*, Stanford, 1967, pp. 262-3.
- (58) Peter Duus, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, Stanford, 1976, p. 228.
- (59) I. Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy 1869-1942*, Lond., 1977, p. 245.
- (60) Although, as Gore-Booth remarked, Craigie's mission in Tokyo had been "a brave effort." See P. Gore-Booth, *With Great Truth and Respect*, Lond., 1974, p. 109.