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WAITING TILL MIDNIGHT
Japan's Reluctance to Surrender and its Immediate Post-War Behaviour: July-September 1945

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> 'President Truman on whom I called at midday this morning with the Duke of Windsor has just heard from the Swiss Chargé d'Affaires that the telegram received from Tokyo by the Swiss Legation at Berne "did not contain message awaited by the whole world".
> 2. The President remarked sadly that he now had no alternative but to order an atomic bomb to be dropped on Tokyo'.[1]

This paper offers commentary on Imperial Japan's belated decision to surrender and the beginnings of the Allied occupation of Japan. It will attempt to review recent publications on the ending of the war and suggest that attention might now be also placed on the related issue of how occupations start. Those who complain that historians and political scientists have neglected to tackle the question of "Why Wars Don't End" might also note that the literature on aspects of what follows is even thinner. Comparative studies of post-1945 occupations are rare indeed.[2]

On the controversial question of the circumstances of Japan's surrender there is, of course, a mass of evidence and a series of helpful publications. Much, however, still awaits clarification, which in the case of some of the participants is unlikely to be forthcoming. The recent death of the Emperor has hardly been an excuse to elaborate on his activities beyond endless repetition of his exceptional intervention in favour of surrender in the face of deadlock within

the cabinet and Supreme War Council. What is apparent is that Imperial Japan's government found it immensely difficult to capitulate and that the alternative option of fighting on had very powerful ministerial support and would have been accepted by a hungry, demoralized but resigned nation. Japan in August 1945 needs to be seen as an empire that expected to resist. The military position was hopeless, but Japan was still far from defeated.

Japan's reluctance to surrender had only the faintest of military justification. The United States was in complete control of the skies and its navy had a tight blockade around the Japanese archipelago. However, American War Department reports on 15 August 1945 stated that over 8,000,000 Japanese males of military age were still left in civilian life, and that these should not be seen today as mere Dad's Army misfits.[3] Presumably any Allied invasion forces would have been met with sustained resistance, though the number of casualties that the remaining Japanese units would have been able to inflict before being overrun is doubtful.[4] The fact that cabinet meetings in the summer of 1945 were having to be continually interrupted by air raids from B-29s and that munitions and fuels were in short supply indicated that the end could not be long delayed.

The political issue, however, remained as intractable as ever. Both before and indeed after the atomic bombings, the agreement to surrender without precise details over what the Allies intended for the Emperor was simply not forthcoming from the Japanese cabinet. Invasion under these circumstances was on the cards. Lack of equipment, food and medical care would sooner or later have produced capitulation, though the danger would have been that by such a moment there would no longer be an effective government still in place to call a halt and carry out surrender terms effectively. The implications for the Allies of having to operate in Japan without a competent state structure of Japanese officials need not be underlined.[5]

The centrality of the fate of the Emperor to the Japanese

government's unwillingness to surrender without precise and seemingly unrealizable preconditions is unlikely to be greatly disputed. The Japanese military was not prepared to capitulate without gaining a remarkably lengthy number of concessions concerning the Emperor and was, of course, only eventually obliged to do so under duress. The military had studied the issue of surrender from the collapse of the Philippines campaign onward in the winter of 1944. The War Ministry had then concluded that the Allied version of unconditional surrender would involve: (i) the elimination of the sovereignty of the Emperor, (ii) military occupation of the Japanese mainland, (iii) disarmament and (iv) punishment of war criminals.[6] One such study had then concluded that it would be impossible to envisage the retention of the Emperor once Japan were occupied and the Imperial forces disbanded.[7] It followed that the Imperial army would rather fight on than surrender. The complicated debate within the Japanese government in August 1945 concerned persuading a divided cabinet of the hopelessness of Japan's position and the folly of a last stand. The Emperor's two interventions on 9 and 14 August eventually tipped the balance, although the inner cabinet continued to be split and, as the Emperor noted in his second intervention, 'there are those of you who distrust the intentions of the Allies'.[8] The military leaders of Japan would not have by themselves been prepared to stomach the American terms whereby the Emperor, under Secretary Byrnes' reply received in Tokyo on 12 August, was 'shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who shall take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms'.[9] The Military Affairs Bureau's opinion was that the entire Byrnes note would infringe on the 'prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler' and was totally unacceptable.[10] Critics in the military and elsewhere doubted that the Japanese people would necessarily elect to retain the Emperor despite the commitment of the Potsdam Declaration to open government and democratic freedoms. Japan's elite had less than complete faith in the public's

regard for the Imperial institution, although the Emperor said on 12 August that 'even if the Allies permit the Imperial Household to be preserved, it would be meaningless without the Japanese people's trust in it. It is desirable to decide on the question of retention or abolition of the Imperial Household by the free will of the Japanese people'.[11] Japan without an Emperor was apparently a prospect that unnerved the Palace advisors more than the Emperor himself. Both War Minister Anami and Baron Hiranuma, the president of the Privy Council, were concerned that leftist elements might be encouraged by the occupation authorities to campaign for the abolition of the Imperial institution.[12]

It is difficult to deny that the Emperor's intervention, acting on advice and personal judgment, made the difference between capitulation and fighting on. The army was still ready to do battle, even though the chief of the Naval General Staff had admitted to the Imperial conference on 9 August that 'We cannot say that final victory is certain but at the same time we do not believe that we will be positively defeated'.[13] A last battle would be preferable to surrendering without assurances over the Emperor, the disarming of Imperial forces, and handing over of suspects for trial.

Japan had lost but was stubborn beyond belief in Allied eyes. Prime Minister Suzuki spoke publicly of the danger that unconditional surrender would mean the end of the Emperor and therefore the end of Japan. He maintained that '"unconditional surrender", therefore, means death to the hundred million: it leaves us no choice but to go on fighting to the last man'.[14] This type of rhetoric (if rhetoric it was) spoke of urging the nation 'to sacrifice everything to continue the war'. In the circumstances Suzuki had few options. Military police monitored peace feelers from politicians and diplomats, while army elements were zealous over the slightest hint of surrender. The Americans might be closing the ring in the first months of 1945, but those prepared to recognize the obvious could only inch their way forward.

The question then to be asked is clearly whether the United States

might have done more to accelerate this highly limited Japanese peace process. The additional sources recently published are supportive of the view that the Soviet intervention in the war was the final straw that permitted an opportunity for those within the cabinet to have the Emperor intervene. Leon Sigal claims that it was this factor rather than the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that appeared 'more shocking' to army officers, although he cautions that 'neither the atomic bombings nor Soviet entry caused anyone in the cabinet or the high command to change his convictions about war termination'.[15] The key to the surrender decision may well be the fact that the Soviet option had been eliminated once Stalin's forces began their drive through Manchuria. Until that moment there was still a desperate gambler's last chance that the Soviet Union could be employed to assist Imperial Japan. Of course it turned out to be a blind alley, but until this was starkly discovered it may be that American overtures would have been rejected by the Japanese government.

The opposition within the Japanese cabinet to surrender, before knowing of the outcome of approaches to the Soviet union, was unlikely to alter. Greater precision from the American side might have helped, but it was ultimately a Japanese governmental decision that could be but marginally influenced by the United States. Informal channels existed whereby Japan could contact American sources over clarification of terms, but continued military and cabinet resistance left little common ground between the two sides. The conditions that the War Minister and Imperial service chiefs insisted on demanding from the Allies after news of Nagasaki's bombing would have made peace impossible but for the Emperor's intervention, which they were subsequently not prepared to challenge by a mass resignation.[16] The Emperor's action – whether he was pushed or he took the initiative is in doubt – was the extraconstitutional or unconstitutional measure that broke the logjam. General MacArthur and Sir George Sansom were later to suggest that the Emperor's role was controlled by others. MacArthur informed the

Far Eastern Commission's inspection team in 'the present Emperor had been from the beginning to the end a puppet, a "complete Charlie McCarthy", who had neither begun the war nor stopped it. At every point he had acted automatically on advice, and he could not have done otherwise. The Cabinet meeting which ended the war was as much staged as those which began it, though the Emperor was certainly more enthusiastic about the former than the latter'.[17]

Until the Japanese decision had been made, the United States government remained in the wings. Indeed it still marked time immediately after the surrender had been agreed to, since it was through Imperial commands that the fighting ceased and the demobilization schemes began to function. Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa reported on 15 August that it was the Emperor's personal decision, 'His, and only his... to accept the Potsdam Declaration on condition that the structure of the nation be left intact'. The minister concluded his message by stressing that order must be maintained 'so as to prevent our nation's being forced to go back to the very beginning of its history'.[18] The war ended, and the surrender process began with the necessary (if reluctant) compliance of senior Japanese military figures. The vast majority of Japanese forces then obeyed orders and returned home from their 'holy war' to a society about to be transformed by its conquerors.[19]

The wretchedly slow process whereby the Japanese cabinet inched its way forward towards ending the war displays (at charitable best) what the editor of The Day Man Lost termed 'half-hearted attempts to surrender'.[20] Given the fact that Germany had been obliged to surrender unconditionally and had been threatened with Carthaginian economic policies, the response of Foreign Minister Togo to the Potsdam Declaration deserves to be recalled. He assessed the Potsdam terms as 'evidently not a dictate of unconditional surrender', since he immediately sensed that the Emperor might be retained, and 'felt special relief upon seeing the economic provisions of the declaration', though Togo still wriggled over the loss of Japanese overseas territories, the extent of any Allied occupation

over Tokyo and the 'ambiguities concerning the eventual form of the Japanese government'.[21] Receipt of the Potsdam Declaration did not, however, prevent him and his officials from continuing to sound out the Soviet Union, while attempting to persuade fellow cabinet members of the absurdity of bargaining with the Allies over excessive surrender terms. Given the length and barbarity of the Pacific War and Japan's continental wars since the 1930's, the American government's response to Tokyo's 10 August message accepting the Potsdam terms (with the vital qualification over the Emperor) was as much as could be expected. It did not provide a clear guarantee for the safety and position of the Emperor, but those military officers who persisted in talking of the rights of the Emperor as a sovereign ruler above any occupying commander would never be satisfied.[22] Japan received generous terms from the United States. Opposition to this "conditional" unconditional surrender within Japan merely underlines the absurdities at large in her military, who feared any diminution of the Emperor's prerogatives would inevitably reduce the stature of those with privileged access to the throne.

The ending of the Pacific War was the result of decisions taken by the Emperor following the unprecedented failure of his government to either agree on policy or to respect precedent and offer its resignation. Obviously without American concessions the war would have been prolonged, and the consequences incalculable for Imperial Japan and the United States. It does less than justice to the behaviour of the American government for Sigal to claim that his nation 'did little to ease Japan's predicament' and to list the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and the conventional bombing of Japanese cities as 'gratuitous' and to argue that any more attacks against Tokyo were 'potentially self-defeating'.[23] What alternatives did the United States possess than to employ maximum force? The delays and divisions within the inner Japanese cabinet are an enormous barrier to those who would claim that Washington should have shown more mercy and patience. The bitterness of the war years is

too easily forgotten by some who argue that American policymakers should have behaved differently.[24] It is unconvincing for critics of the Truman administration to note in the period from 10-14 August that 'America's decisions prolonged the war for four days and narrowly missed extending it well beyond August 14, for the Japanese militarists almost triumphed in this brief period'.[25] Attention ought better to be placed on the behaviour of the Japanese government.

Japan's belated subscription to the amended Potsdam terms provided one guideline for the occupation that, quite unexpectedly for most observers, began so shortly afterwards. If the ending of the Pacific War had been largely the result of a shift in influence among those within the Japanese cabinet who favoured peace, the occupation rested on considerably stronger American direction. Ending the war had ultimately been a Japanese affair, beginning the occupation saw a reversal of roles. Certainly there remained large areas of confusion and contingency, but the United States commenced its occupation with a remarkably precise idea of its objectives. Four factors, whose relative importance was to shift dramatically in the next six years, deserve to be identified. These were (i) the extent and character of presurrender planning by American officialdom, (ii) the subsequent interpretation, amendment and, not infrequent, disregard of instructions by General MacArthur and his senior staff in Tokyo, (iii) the Japanese response, and (iv) the changing international environment. Taken together these items form the backcloth to a highly ambitious attempt to transform both Japanese institutions and behaviour.

Despite the caution of the Imperial rescript of 14 August 1945, which spoke of the certainty of 'future hardships and sufferings to which our nation is to be subjected hereafter', the occupation confounded many of these fears. While not without its revengeful side, as witnessed by the Pauley reparations proposals and the Tokyo war crimes trials, the general approach was constructive. In a private letter of 21 October, the commander of the Eighth Army

could be forgiven for claiming that 'a tremendous amount has been done in seven weeks... In fact there are very few things that haven't been done to them already'.[26] The pace was frantic, the impact on Japanese society immediate.

The temptation, however, to stress what happened to Japan and to neglect the importance of Japan's contribution to the initial months of the occupation ought to be avoided. Even when seemingly most vulnerable to foreign command the Japanese government was not without considerable resource. One important Japanese card was the position and influence of the Emperor on the conduct of the Japanese people in directing some of their responses to the conquerors. The Emperor's role in the surrender process and his behaviour subsequently undoubtedly made the going easier for SCAP GHQ. It was widely recognized by MacArthur and his staff that the Emperor's actions facilitated a relatively peaceful beginning to the occupation. What violence there was may have been more the result of American delinquency than Japanese resistance.[27] Fears of sabotage gradually disappeared. Few American officials doubted that the Emperor, whatever his role in 1941, acted as an anchor amidst the demoralization and confusion. The deputy chief of Government Section would later note that, while 'it wasn't absolutely indispensable to keep the Emperor on... it certainly was extremely helpful... because if the Emperor had been removed from office or even worse had been tried as a war criminal, there would, undoubtedly, disorder in the country... there would probably have been chaos and General MacArthur himself said that he would have required several hundred thousand more troops from the United States and possibly also from the British Commonwealth, especially Australia, if he were to maintain law and order'.[28]

It may be that the Emperor's visit to MacArthur on 27 September 1945 and the impression that the Emperor apparently made on the supreme commander[29] contributed to the case for retaining the throne. It was, however, conditional on Japan's receptivity to the reformist intentions of the United States, and did not prevent the

American prosecution team for the International Tribunal for the Far East from putting forward the Emperor's name for indictment. Presidential instructions may have prevented any such movement from succeeding, though a large number of other governments were far less forgiving and pressed for action.[30]

In addition to the role of the Emperor, the Japanese state had an equally important second influence over the occupation in the American decision to conduct an indirect control system. Instead of direct military occupation, the United States administered its business in Japan through the existing governmental structure. This policy inevitably strengthened the hand of the Japanese authorities and produced opportunities for foot-dragging and SCAP GHQ complaints of lack of cooperation between its officials and groups within the Japanese bureaucracy. Indeed by September 1946, the seriousness of American objections would lead to threats of the imposition of direct military rule in the face of Japanese opposition.[31] This presumably had already been dismissed by the United States as highly impractical in the first days after American troops landed in Japan, and would have been a recipe for chaos if seriously considered twelve months later. Given the extent of American reforms and the lack of competent staff available to implement such programmes, there were few alternatives in truth, although it must have been galling to have to be informed that it was all merely a case of the Japanese administration not being able to cope with the work load required of it by the United States.[32] Undoubtedly there were instances of major policy differences between SCAP GHQ and the Japanese bureaucracy, but these had to be resolved piecemeal and without resort to more interventionist action by MacArthur's staff. The fact that all Japanese, regardless of political persuasion, were united in hoping for both an early conclusion to the occupation and constantly aware of their nation's dependence on the United States for emergency food supplies and the necessary funds for industrial reconstruction limited any confrontation.[33]

Clearly, the circumstances of employing the Emperor and Japanese

officialdom to carry out American policy left the Japanese state in a strong position. It was, of course, the opposite approach to that adopted by the United States for its parallel occupation of Korea and differed in many aspects from the schemes adopted in Germany. It has been described recently by one senior participant as 'pragmatic' with clear recognition that the Japanese government had 'organized quickly and expeditiously and put their best personnel into the posts that dealt with the occupying forces',[34] though without perhaps too much realization of the extent of American reform goals. If the Pacific War had ended through a degree of bargaining and can be termed a "conditional" unconditional surrender, then the same phrase might also be applied to the occupation that followed. Short of seemingly total conventional and nuclear bombardment and invasion the Truman administration had eventually agreed that the Imperial line might be retained, and had likewise seen the advantages of working through the throne and the Japanese state to obtain American objectives. Yet such American decisions were not easily reached in the face of very widespread public hostility, and it would presumably have been possible (though dangerous) to have disregarded the implicit pledges to the Japanese government. Debate continued throughout the occupation over the terms under which Japan had surrendered and the extent to which the United States was committed to conforming to any such texts when considering the preparation of peace treaty drafts.[35]

On the wider question of what the events in Japan during August and September 1945 tell us over why wars end and occupations begin, it is hard for the historian to avoid retreating to his conventional defence that the particular circumstances of the termination of the Pacific War preclude the possibility of making any effective generalization. What follows goes against all union instructions, and is highly tentative. First, it is apparent that, to repeat the blindingly obvious, wars end when states are prepared to recognize what in the case of Imperial Japan had been apparent for many months and consider surrender terms with their opponents.

Domestic factors, however, may act to delay or (as was almost the case with Japan) reject capitulation even though the alternative of fighting on would be catastrophic for the state involved. Second, there are limits on the ability of enemies in wartime to persuade by intensifying military force (in this case nuclear attacks) that the alternative to surrender is sufficiently unpalatable for the need to end hostilities promptly. Additional destruction, however, would at some point have become counter-productive in that the state structure would have been either sufficiently weakened or even destroyed to make further negotiation with one's opponent impractical, though in the instance of Imperial Japan the civilian bureaucracy was still remarkably competent and was able to demonstrate this fact immediately after the surrender by acting as the agent for American occupation goals. Third, concessions by the more powerful nation or alliance grouping may still be necessary, despite military superiority, unless a government is prepared to literally plough under its opponents. Provided the option of bombing one's opponent back to the stone age is rejected, then some process of negotiation, via intermediaries, will be required. Fourth, consideration of what the victor nation has in mind for its enemy after hostilities have been concluded is likely to shape this bargaining session. The American occupation of Japan was assisted immensely by the decision of the Truman administration to retain the Emperor and employ his servants, even though the political necessity of speaking out of both sides of its mouth resulted in considerable ambiguity as to what exactly constituted the surrender terms and the legal foundations for the subsequent lengthy occupation. War termination needs next to be studied in the light of what occurs afterwards rather than be seen merely as endgame.

Notes:

(1) Minister Balfour to Ernest Bevin, most immediate/top secret, 14 August 1945, Bevin private papers (FO 800), Public Record Office, Kew. Duke of Windsor's meeting confirmed from Truman's Appointments Schedule for 11:45 a.m. to

12:15 p.m., 14 August 1945. (Box 82, P.S.F., Truman Library, Independence, Missouri).

(2) An attempt was made to examine aspects of American policy in occupied Germany and Japan in Robert Wolfe (ed.), *Americans as Proconsuls* (Carbondale, Illinois, 1984).

(3) 'Preliminary Report on Pacific Order of Battle Conference', 15 August 1945, in Robert H. Spector, *Listening to the Enemy* (Wilmington, Del., 1988) pp.249-273. The special guards units could have caused considerable trouble and were judged, 'if given sufficient arms', to 'probably form fairly effective fighting units'. Imperial naval human submarines might also have created damage.

(4) See Rufus E. Miles, Jr., 'Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million American Lives Saved', *International Security* (Fall, 1985).

(5) I am grateful for information over this point from Professor Saito Makoto.

(6) Paper presented by Hatano Sumio to Kyoto American Studies Summer Seminar Specialists Conference 1986 entitled *'The Politics of Surrender: The Japanese Side'* (Kyoto, 1986).

(7) ibid.

(8) Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, 1954, 1983) p.207. Butow notes that no transcript was made of the Emperor's remarks.

(9) Secretary of State Byrnes 'reply to Japan's first surrender offer to Swiss Chargé d'Affaires, 11 August 1945, Appendix E, Butow, ibid., p.245.

(10) Hatano, op. cit., p.54.

(11) Hatano, op. cit., p.56.
The Emperor was replying to Kido Koichi, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal who met with the Emperor almost daily. Kido's influence on the Emperor was considerable.

(12) Hiranuma had been responsible for the amendment to Japan's answer to the Allied governments of 10 August that the Potsdam Declaration would be accepted, provided that it did not 'comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogative of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler'.

(13) Butow, op. cit., p.174.

(14) The Pacific War Research Society, *The Day Man Lost* (Tokyo, 1972) p.127.

(15) Leon V. Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish* (Ithaca, 1988) p.278.
See also comment in Asada Sadao (ed.), *Japan and the World, 1853-1952: A Bibliographic Guide to Recent Scholarship in Japanese Foreign Relations* (New York, 1989).

(16) The Army wanted to limit the size of the occupying forces and the areas where they might be stationed. It also demanded that any war crimes tribunals should be presided over by Japanese judges.

(17) Sir George Sansom to Foreign Office (seen by Bevin), 31 January 1946.
Sansom noted on MacArthur's 'somewhat florid' but 'remarkably lucid and well ordered statement of his personal opinions' that 'I may add from my own previous knowledge and from a good deal of inside information which I have gleaned here in the last three weeks, I am convinced that the Supreme Commander's judgment is correct'.
Others within the Foreign Office held a more positive opinion of the Emperor. See Buckley, *Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the US and Japan* (Cambridge, 1982) p. 41.

(18) Spector, op. cit., p.283.
Yonai committed suicide shortly afterwards.

(19) For those that remained behind, see Donald G. Gillin with Charles Etter, 'Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949', *Journal of Asian Studies* (May, 1983).

(20) *The Day Man Lost* (Tokyo, 1972) p.199.

(21) Shigenori Togo, *The Cause of Japan* (New York, 1956) quoted in Edwin Fogelman (ed.), *Hiroshima: The Decision to Use the A*-Bomb (New York, 1964) pp.72-73.

(22) See Hatano, op. cit., pp.53-60, for the division between the Army and the Japanese Foreign Ministry on the nuances of the Potsdam terms as elaborated in the Byrnes reply of 12 August (receipt in Tokyo).

(23) Sigal, op. cit., p.280.

(24) Decisions to avoid the bombing of the Imperial palace in Tokyo and to spare Kyoto were taken for reasons of state, but deserve to be noted.

(25) Barton J. Bernstein, 'The Perils and Politics of Surrender: Ending the War with Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb', *Pacific Historical Review* (February, 1977).

(26) General Eichelberger to his wife, Yokohama, 21 October 1945 (letters file, October 1945, Eichelberger collection, Duke University). Eichelberger was surely correct to list the initial changes and to doubt the wisdom of American public opinion that wished to see tougher treatment of the Japanese. He suggested that 'the average American' would have difficulty in giving 'a coherent statement of what has been done'.

(27) Eichelberger wrote to his wife that 'several rape cases were reported among the Marines when they first landed, but investigation didn't bear out that these things really happened. I believe it would have been easy for us to have had a lot of minor fittings if we had come in here swinging our fists. The same thing applies now. Beat them up, and some hotheads are going to blow up tunnels'. op. cit.

(28) Transcript of BBC interview with Charles Kades for forthcoming TV series "Nippon". I am grateful to Peter Pagnamenta for access to his research material on the occupation period.

(29) Comment by Faubion Bowers, secretary to MacArthur, suggests that this may have been the case. MacArthur was instructed by Washington not to return the Emperor's call.

(30) On the IMTFE, see R. John Pritchard, *An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo War Trial* (Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, Oxford, 1987).

Alvin Coox has suggested that plea bargaining between the United States and Soviet Union resulted in the Emperor not being tried in return for agreement that the IMTFE would commence with evidence relating to 1931. Coox lecture at International House of Japan, Tokyo, 21 February 1989.

(31) See reports in *Asahi Evening News*, 26 July 1976, and *Japan Times*, 28 July 1976, for commentary on newly released Japanese documents of the period.

(32) Comment by Yamada Hisanari, then head of the political section of the Japanese Central Liaison Office, in *Japan Times*, ibid.

(33) Conservative Japanese figures were generally more fearful of disruption and what they regarded as subversion from left-wing groups than SCAP GHQ. Yoshida is supposed to have questioned MacArthur about whether the supreme commander wanted 'to turn this country red'.

For a lengthy analysis of the role of the Emperor in Japanese society from the 1920's onwards, see Miyamoto Kenji, chairman of the central committee of the Japan Communist Party, interview with *Akahata*, in *Japan Press Weekly*, 14 January 1989.

(34) Kades BBC interview, op. cit.

On the necessity of using indirect rule, see Kosaka Masataka, *A History of Postwar Japan* (ed., Tokyo, 1982) pp.40-42; also his comments on 'subtle resistance' by the Japanese bureaucracy when its own fate was in question, pp.49-51.

(35) For a recent account of Allied and Japanese perceptions of the role of the Emperor during the Pacific War and after, see Takeda Kiyoko, *The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor* (Basingstoke, 1988). The Emperor is now known to have considered abdicating on three times after the war in 1945, 1948 and 1952. See press report based on Kido interviews with staff of the Diet Library, *Asahi Evening News*, 20 February 1989.

終戦への長き道のり

降伏に対する日本の抵抗と降伏直後の態度：1945年7月～9月

〈要　約〉

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太平洋戦争の終結とそれに続く連合国による日本占領は，詳細に研究されるべき対象である。日本現代史を理解するために，また戦争終結から占領に至る経過を考察する際参考となるであろう理論的基盤に立脚した上で，1945年7月から9月の間の降伏受諾等の決定の遅れや政治的混沌の理由が示される必要がある。

関係資料の一部は，すでに破棄されていたり，未公開の状態であるが（特に，昭和天皇の行為に関わる部分），1945年夏の極めて危機的な状況にはより関心が払われるべきである。特に，日本の内閣中枢における諸決定には十分な考察を要する。アメリカ合衆国は，大日本帝国に降伏を受諾させる術をほとんど持たず，また日本の一般民衆にもそのような力はなかったのである。

太平洋戦争が長引く事がいかに不毛であるかを認めたくないという暗い空気が政府内部ではなかなか消えなかった。ソ連参戦が明らかとなり，広島と長崎が原爆によって消滅した後で，ようやく彼らは終戦を決意したのである。一方，帝国陸海軍上層部の見せた異常なまでの降伏への抵抗は，連合国による占領下では，占領がどのような形態をとるものであれ，天皇の将来的地位に関する保証が得られないのではないかとの懸念，そして軍部自身による戦況など将来展望の判断の甘さと不可分に結びついていた。

仮に，通常並びに核兵器を用いた日本への攻撃があれ以上長く続いたならば，軍事・民生両面の指揮系統は壊滅的被害を受け，米国政府にとって直接統治以外はほとんど不可能となっていたであろう。自発的であると否とに関わらず，終戦を決断し，連合国による日本占領を支持した昭和天皇の行為は，もたついた降伏の後始まった占領を，総じて国家再建指向なものとするのに大きく貢献したのであった。