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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN JAPAN

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I attempt to understand what public and private mean in Japan, where those values are located, and what characteristic problems or tensions arise in this society along various dimensions of public and private. As an approach to doing this, I make use of comparisons between Japan and the West to highlight what seems different or remarkable about Japanese ways of thinking about public and private.

The essay focuses on the concepts of public and private in Japan: what do they mean? how are they related, and how do they contrast? where do they come from, and how have they evolved? A brief concluding section contrasts the emerging public debate about household responsibilities in the West to the apparent contentment and consensus about domestic life in Japan.

The Concepts of Public and Private

In English, "public" comes from the ancient Latin word *poplus*, meaning the entire adult male population.[1] In modern usage, "public" can refer to that which affects or is of concern to all or most of the people, that which has broad impact; it can also refer to an open, visible, participatory manner of arriving at a decision, or the quality of being shared or representative—for example, the public good or the public interest. The word "private" has the ancient Latin word *privare* as its root, meaning to deprive or bereave. In contemporary usage, "private" still sometimes means deprived or lacking in public significance or status, for example, a private in the Army, or matters of individual or particular concern which have limited interest or impact. "Private" is also related to the word "privilege" (*privi*: private, *legium*: law), and many of the

current senses of "private" seem more related to privilege than deprivation. Thus, "private" refers to ownership or control of property by an individual (or by that fictive individual, the corporation), and to matters related to intimate or household life, which are hidden away from public view.

In Japan, the meanings of "public" and "private" have evolved quite differently.[2] "*Kô*," the word and kanji (ideograph) most commonly used in words relating to "public," usually contrasts with "*shi*," the same kanji as "*watakushi*," or "I." For example, *kôshi*, the word formed from these two opposites, can refer to public and private, government and people, or public and personal affairs. In early usages, *kô* often referred to members of the Imperial Court: thus, *kôshi* meant a young noble; *kôbu* meant nobles and soldiers (for example, a *kôbu* marriage was a marriage between members of the Imperial and Shogun's families). Now *kô* is used in a variety of words that suggest a public purpose (*kôji*, public affairs; *kômin*, "public person" or citizen; *kômin seikatsu*, public life; *kôminkan*, public hall or community center; *kôyô*, at public expense or for public use), or public access, availability (*kôshu* + *denwa*, public phone; *kôen*, park), or widespread impact, common concerns (*kôkyô no rieki*, the public interest; *kôgai*, "public harm," that is, pollution), or governmentally provided, insured (*kôhô*, public law; *kôshô*, a licensed prostitute; *kôei jûtaku*, public housing). The verb *kôkai suru* ("public open make"), to present something to the public, contains the idea of making something open or known to the public. A related word, *ôyake*, at one time was written with the characters for "great house"; it also referred to the Imperial Court. *Ôyake* means more explicitly "official" or "governmental". *Ôyake ni suru* is to make something public. *Kyô*, meaning "together" or "common," is used in the words for public land (*kyôyûchi*) and publicly owned (*kyôyû*), and in *kôkyô no rieki* (mentioned above, "the common good").

In Japanese the words having to do with private often mean having to do with the self (*shi*) or individual (*kojin*), though sometimes *minkan*—"people's space"—is used to contrast private or homely to official (e.g., *minkanjin* is a private citizen; *minkan dantai* is a private organization;

also *minkan* can mean "folk," as in folk tale or folk remedy.) Interestingly, the words stemming from *ko (jin)* and *shi* either carry a neutral or negative connotation; there is no sense, as in English, of private as privileged. Further, the negative associations are more common and stronger than in English. *Kojin no...* means "private," but the connotation is "... and selfish." Thus, expressions like *kojin shugi* (individualism) and *kojin mondai* (personal affair) suggest selfishness. Several "*shi*" words are neutral, simply denoting private or particular: *shiyûchi*, private land; *shiyû*, private ownership; *shitaku*, private house; *shijô*, personal feelings. But a number of expressions have strikingly negative connotations: *shiseiji*, an illegitimate child; *shitsû*, illicit intercourse; *shiyô*, meaning personal use, private business, and also misappropriation, embezzlement; *watakushi suru*, to arrogate to oneself; and *shishin*—"self heart"—selfishness. Let us look more closely at where these notions of public and private came from.

Historian Mary Berry argues that *kôgi*, the notion of the public good, was the critical factor in the sixteenth century unification regimes' success in concentrating power and achieving national integration. Berry shows how the sixteenth century rulers Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598), Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616), and Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) were able to subordinate their daimyos (feudal lords) to their rule by eliminating private alliances and sources of private power. They pacified warring daimyos by limiting their means for building power, for example, by forbidding them from entering private alliances,[3] setting their own quarrels,[4] or arranging political marriages.[5] In addition to regulating various kinds of private behavior, the unifying rulers explicitly argued that personal interest must be sacrificed in the name of *kôgi*, or the public good. *Kôgi* was pitted against fractious private interests and actions of all kinds: "duplicitous private thoughts, personal enmities and interests, factionalism, partiality, and willful action."[6] Pacification and unification were possible because these rulers were able to identify "rightful authority with service to the 'public interest.'"[7]

Just as the Sovereign was Thomas Hobbes' solution to the violent religious and political strife of seventeenth century England, *kôgi* was

the solution to omnipresent civil war and factionalism in Japan. *Kôgi* was seen as the antithesis of local privilege and personal justice, the divisive politics of faction, and self-interest broadly speaking.[8] While Hobbes believed rational men driven by fear of death would consent to the sovereign, who could insure their security and safety, *kôgi* became a new principle of legitimacy which justified sovereign rule in Japan.

But unlike Hobbes' sovereign, *kôgi* was not based on the consent of the collective citizenery; it was in Berry's words a good "defined and benevolently bestowed by the powerful upon a subject people."[9] The very rudimentary form of consent to absolute authority in Hobbes' political theory developed in the West into fuller notions of consent and participation, limited state power, and respect for individual privacy and property as the bases of legitimate government. In contrast, the notion of the public interest in Japan continued to associate self interest with violence and discord, and obedience to the ruler with peace.[10]

The notion of the public developed in the Tokugawa period, which associated *raison d'etat* with the public good and opposed it to selfish private interest, is clearly present in modern Japanese political thought as well. Although the Meiji enlightenment of the late nineteenth century saw some move toward embracing western ideals of individualism and participation, traditional notions of public and private were little changed. The Meiji Charter Oath of 1868 purported to invite and respect public discussion (*kôronshugi*), but Matsumoto Sannosuke writes that in fact respect for public opinion and discussion

> inevitably implied exclusion of personal opinions (*shikeru*) [sic] and private discussion (*shigi*)... private means the individual desires and emotions that should be denied while public implies virtuous action in accord with universal principles, free from individual impulses.[11]

Not only do Meiji concepts of public and private bear a strong resemblance to the older Tokugawa period understanding, they have also had an important effect on modern Japanese social and political life.[12] Since the Meiji period, political parties have been identified with

partiality and special interests, and thus viewed as incapable of representing the nation as a whole. That left only the bureaucracy, which was presumed to be impartial and immune to special pleading, and thus able to "correctly pursue the best interests of the whole according to the 'supreme principles of justice and public interest.'"[13] It is interesting to contrast the Japanese faith in the technical expertise, wisdom, and impartiality of bureaucrats, which continues to this day, to the work done on "capture" of government agencies by special interests in the United States.[14] American scholars and citizens are skeptical of the impartiality of bureaucracies, which often are viewed as serving narrow and partial interests rather than the public good. Of course, bureaucrats in Japan are *the* elite, and may well be devoted to a vision of the public good their American counterparts do not have; but one wonders if the traditional suspicion toward private interests and respect for the public interest as defined by public authorities does not lead Japanese citizens into passivity and credulity about the "public" purposes served by Japanese bureaucrats.

If faith in bureaucrats is one consequence of the overwhelming suspicion of private opinion and faith in public authority, the other side of this is difficulty developing an active, critical citizenry. For example, Meiji enlightenment thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote of the difficulty of generating the independence of mind necessary for democracy.

> Superficially, the government has undergone marked changes in recent years. But its despotic, oppressive disposition remains little altered. The general populace would appear to have obtained a few new privileges, but the old spirit of cowardly mistrust persists... the tendency to cower is everywhere... Japan today seems to have a government but not a citizenry.[15]

Though Japan today has an active, powerful government, it still seems to lack an active citizenry. However one assesses the import of the citizens' movements of the 1960s, 70s and 80s, apathy and passivity continue to be legacies of the value or weight traditionally accorded public and private matters.

The scope of government involvement and the notion of public interest are more encompassing than in the United States. For example, government interaction with the private sector in order to encourage shifts in resources, greater efficiency, or preserve productive capacity in critical areas is quite extensive and collegial; fostering industrial productivity is viewed as a primary governmental goal. Even more remarkable, corporate success—making sure one's company is productive and turns out big profits—is itself widely viewed as a public good for which private interests rightly ought to be sacrificed.[16] In the post war period, companies have come to be seen not as

> "private property but [as] public organs with administrators and managers appointed to operate them." That meant continuation of the prewar value of *messhi hôkô* (sacrifice self in service to the public), with the "public" role now filled by business and industrial management.[17]

Despite the continued potency of public commitments and values—respect for the public administration of bureaucrats and corporate managers, close ties between government and industry, a passive, pliable citizenry—there have been attempts in the post war period to legitimize the private and to attack the authority of the state. I want to look briefly at three of these attempts, the citizens' movements, "my homeism," and legal protections for privacy and religion, and to assess their significance.

Citizen's Movements

Writers such as Matsumoto Sannosuke, Matsushita Keiichi, Oda Makoto and Takabatake Michitoshi have argued that ordinary citizens can make experiences in their daily lives a basis for developing an autonomous, critical stance toward the state.[18] They praise the citizens' movements of the 1960s and 70s, which were mostly locally-based political movements organized around a variety of issues: protecting consumers; opposition to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; American imperialism and the war in Vietnam (Beheiren); pollution; the construc-

tion of the new international airport at Sanrizuka; nuclear weapons and power plants, and military bases. The citizens' movements enabled people living in a community to connect their "private" experiences to the public priorities of the state, and to begin to see that problems and issues which affected their lives weren't so meager and paltry as the traditional *watakushi*—*ôyake* dichotomy made them seem. In a system of thought where any perspective narrower, less all-encompassing and universal, than that of the whole nation is suspect as partial and selfish,[19] the citizens' movements argued that legitimate power should be more concerned with the everyday needs and interests expressed by ordinary citizens than those of the expert state bureaucracy.[20] Leftist intellectuals writing about the citizens' movements argued for democracy and participation, encouraging fledgling citizens to participate and helping them to see local problems as a source of legitimate grievance and activism.[21] Their goal was to foster a spirit of independent thinking and resistance that could enable citizens to become engaged in actively participating in politics. Autonomy, individuality, and especially concern about local problems—all of which would be associated with *watakushi* or *shi* in traditional Japanese thought—needed to be seen as valuable and constructive if citizens were to feel they were right or entitled to "stick out" (*medatsu*) and challenge the public authority (*ôyake*) of the state.

"My Homeism"

Tada Michitaro approaches the value of individuality and private life in a somewhat different fashion in an essay titled "The Glory and Misery of 'My Home'." Instead of viewing the private realm as a source of democratic resistance to state power, Tada's essay explores the possibilities and dangers of the home as a place where individuality can be preserved from the forces of mechanization, productivity, routinization, and conformism in society. Tada believes that for all of the criticism it has received, "my homeism" expresses a strong need people have to protect their individuality and personal integrity.[22]

But just how effective is the home as an enclave which protects and nurtures individuality and uniqueness? For the men who spend most

of their time outside the home working, home is primarily a place of rest and relaxation. Compared to the practice in the West, where most workers arrive home in time to eat dinner with their families, even the "*mai homu papa*," Japan's dedicated family man, is an absent, distant figure. In the case of conflicts between domestic or personal commitments and job responsibilities, valuing or choosing private commitments over public ones is usually seen as unmanly, weak, embarrasing, and shameful.[23] Further, "my homeism" is widely discredited, having been declared in the mid 1960s to be inimical to productivity.[24]

Even when we consider those who have more time to spend at home—women, old people, and children—the hope that the home will nurture individuality seems misplaced. The "my home" movement was rooted in an advertising campaign which supported the "electric boom" of the 1950s, and clearly the home continues to be shaped and controlled by competition, consumerism, and the homogenization of tastes and preferences.[25] Consider, for example, the prevalence of *kyoiku mamas*—"education mamas"—who are intent on shaping their children into achievement-oriented producers who can pass exams, or the mass-marketing of such individual, expressive ceremonies as weddings, not to mention fashion, entertainment, and so on.

As a footnote to our discussion of "my homeism", let us briefly consider the *shinjinrui* phenomenon. The current (1987-88) discussion of the *shinjinrui* also frowns at what is viewed as the younger generation's preoccupation with personal or private matters. Though there seems much to admire about the *shinjinrui*, such as their concern with finding rewarding work and the high priority they give to personal life, the *shinjinrui* are generally portrayed as part of the "me" generation: self-indulgent, more interested in what they do with their free time than in developing intense loyalty to the company, unwilling to accept the discipline of overtime work and out of town postings.[26] Others see the *shinjinrui* as part of a larger postwar reaction against the restraining power of a shared notion of the public good. For example, Victor Koschmann writes,

> When defeat in war and the reforms of the Occupation swept away the restraining, channelling and centralizing influence of *ôyake*, they left in their wake privatized, centrifugally oriented selves (*watakushi*) and households.[27]

Whichever interpretation is right, both the *shinjinrui* and "my homeism" exemplify ambivalence about private life and uneasiness about embracing private interest or a thoroughly commercialized, socialized domestic life.

Legal Protections for Privacy and Private Conscience

Ambivalence about privacy as at once a source of autonomy, rebellion and individuality, and at the same time shameful and egoistic, is also reflected in legal decisions and practices. Although protections against defamation and invasion of privacy exist in Japan,[28] individuals rarely bring suit to protect their good name or privacy, and even when they do, courts tend to weigh the public's interest in a free press and access to information heavily against the harm suffered by individuals. In a country where large circulation weekly magazine (*Friday, Focus, Flash, Emma, Touch*...) regularly market scandalous 2:00 a.m. candid photographs of and gossip about the famous, this lack of strong privacy protections and civil suits for invasion of privacy is even more remarkable.

Why do so many people who have legitimate claims refuse to sue, but "go to bed crying" (*naki neiri suru*)?[29] Lawrence Beer, an American scholar of Japanese law, suggests that individuals find it difficult to confront higher authority unless they are members of a group, and so give up fatalistically and suffer in silence when they are injured by the media.[30] Whereas in the West people assert their rights as a matter of course in order to insist on the respect or treatment to which they are entitled as human beings, doing the same thing in Japan would be perceived as acting like a trouble maker.[31] Clearly, norms of collective life and group harmony remain quite strong, and in practice often outweigh recently transplanted norms of respect for individual rights.[32]

Though it involves the individual's right to freedom of conscience or religion rather than an invasion of privacy *per se*, a recent (1988) Japanese Supreme Court decision and the circumstances which surround

it underline the burden which faces individuals who wish to assert their private rights. The case was brought by the widow of a Self Defense Forces serviceman who was killed during the course of his job. Mrs. Nakatani, a Christian, wanted her husband (who was not a Christian) to receive a Christian burial, and so she challenged the usual practice of interring SDF members in a Shinto shrine. The Court ruled against Nakatani. First, the justices found no unconstitutional enforcement of a state religion because the SDF Friendship Association which was responsible for the interment was deemed not to be a public organization carrying out state policy. Second, although they recognized the individual's right to worship however she wishes in private, they argued that the individual could not force others to recognize this claim in public—that is, by requiring the SDF service organization to allow Mr. Nakatani's remains to be buried rather than interred, according to his wife's wishes. Third, rather than arguing that religious tolerance required the SDF organization to let Mr. Nakatani be buried, the Court urged *Mrs. Nakatani* to be more tolerant of the religious views of others—namely, the SDF members who supported her husband's interment. In addition, Mrs. Nakatani was subjected to a hate campaign—abusive phone calls and the like—from members of her community who told her if she couldn't go along with the majority's wishes, she should move to another country.[33]

The Nakatani decision has generated considerable criticism within Japan from those who fear its implicit attack on individual freedom of conscience and its lean in the direction of reestablishing a state religion. Certainly the decision is instructive for those interested in understanding the status of public and private values in Japan today. The public value of group membership, consensus and harmony of the SDF group clearly outweighed the private value of a particular widow who wanted her husband to receive a Christian burial. While religious freedom in the West usually entails certain forms of public recognition of one's private beliefs (e.g., not having to work on one's Sabbath day or on one's religious holidays), religious freedom in Japan apparently means only the right to believe as one pleases in the privacy of one's home, on one's free

time — unless one belongs to a group with sufficient clout to insist on support for religious rites that support the group's identity. In the West, conscience or religious belief are taken as central to the person, whether defined publicly (e.g., as student, soldier, worker) or privately, whereas in Japan it appears that there are two selves, a public one and a private one, who are separate and disconnected, and whose responsibilities and commitments appear to receive very different degrees of respect.[30]

To review the ground covered so far, we have seen that private interests and concerns have been identified consistently as narrow, selfish, partial, and morally suspect. The public good, on the other hand, has been identified as primary, universal, encompassing and superior in its claims and virtue. Although in the West, respect for private interests and rights would be taken as (partly) constitutive of the public good, in Japan they are seen as irreconcilable opposites, so that private concerns or perspectives must always take back seat to public ones. Though one would expect Japan to have become much more concerned with privacy, individualism, rights and the private sphere since the end of the Second World War, in fact there continues to be a great deal of ambivalence about the value of the private: articles on "my homeism," the *shinjinrui*, and recent legal practice all suggest that privacy is still a highly suspect value or commitment. On the other hand, the citizens' movements suggest that local, community problems or interests, which are private when compared to a large corporation or the nation as a whole, can be a focus for democratic participation and a source of resistance to state power. But whether participants in citizens' movements are really more individualistic or attuned to private life than most Japanese is not clear to me; rather, I think they are attuned to, and arguing for, a more immediate, visible public than the abstract, uncontrollable, and questionably legitimate "national interest."

Concluding Remarks: The Household

In the West, many women regard the privatization of the home and the marked division of labor between women and men as a kind of deprivation (to which, recall, "privacy" is etymologically related.)

Housework is viewed as repetitious, unchallenging, boring, and is widely demeaned, even by housewives themselves. ("What do you do?" "Oh, I'm just a housewife.") As increasing numbers of women have entered the workforce, women have begun to argue that the private world of the home, and especially the division of domestic responsibilities between men and women, has a powerful and adverse impact on women's ability to succeed in the work world, and so must be dealt with as issues of public, political concern.[35]

Although Japanese women also are working outside the home in increasing numbers, there has been little discussion of Japanese men sharing in household work,[36] and remarkably few complaints about the segregation of women in low-paying, low status part time jobs. Nor has there been much outcry about the "deprivation" of housework: a home-grown version of Betty Friedan's *Feminine Mystique*, the bestseller published in 1963 about the boredom and unhappiness of American housewives, has not yet been written. Why is this so?

There are two main reasons why Japanese women's attitudes toward housework and job discrimination are so different from those of western women: 1) because the job of being a housewife is taken more seriously and given more respect in Japan, and 2) because basic attitudes about privacy, individualism, rights and entitlement to equal treatment are very different.

Most women in Japan believe that being a housewife is a job which requires skill and training.[37] Women commonly attend classes in household arts (sewing, cooking, flower arranging) before and after marriage. Standards for housekeeping are high. The job of childrearing is viewed as extremely demanding, at least until children enter college, because mothers must encourage and prod their children to study for their entrance exams, beginning with elementary school clear through to the exam for entry into a high-ranking college, which in turn settles their destiny (what kind of firm they can get a job with, who they will be able to marry).

Beyond their role in preparing children to do well on exams, women sometimes see their role as a good wife and wise mother (*ryôsaikenbo*)

as one which requires them to be active in various grassroots political movements, including the consumer, environmental, and feminist movements.[38] As one western writer put it, although she had expected women involved in housewives' groups active in consumer issues to reject the housewife role in favor of roles which afforded a greater voice in bureaucratic and corporate decision making,

> what I found was just the opposite: the consumer movement derived its strength from the identity of its members as housewives and mothers; and conversely, the movement seemed to strengthen, rather than weaken, commitment to the role of housewife.[39]

In addition, Japanese writers make much of the fact that Japanese women have more autonomy and control over running the household, spending money, and making major decisions (buying houses and cars, for example) than their western counterparts.[40] The demand western feminists commonly make that women and men should have similar roles and responsibilities in both workplace and home strikes many Japanese men and women as odd: why should women want to give up their power and autonomy in the home in order to slave away with the *sarariman*? Women shouldn't try to be "masculine," but should discover in women's roles and sphere the potential for a new "women's world" of sisterhood and feminist activism.[41]

It appears that Japanese women are relatively content with the domestic sphere, but lack of complaining may also have to do with fear of "sticking out" or being thought selfish. Whereas western women generally expect and feel they are entitled to equal treatment and opportunities, Japanese women do not. Though there have been bows in the direction of sexual equality in recent years with the Equal Employment Act of 1985, in fact there is neither a strong commitment to equal employment practices nor a groundswell of popular discontent among women with current hiring and promotion practices. Rather than a tradition that enshrines rights, equality, and individualism, Japanese tradition holds up notions of group life, duty to one's job or superior, complementarity, and harmony. Thus, the basic attitude among Japanese

women is one of acceptance that being a woman and mother entails certain responsibilities to one's children and home that are simply incompatible with the kinds of careers men lead. Women do not expect to lead the same kind of lives as men, and for the most part do not feel aggrieved because their only option is to take low paying, low status part time jobs. (But note that this does not apply to women who remain single and pursue careers.) High status or demanding jobs in Japan are simply viewed as incompatible with family responsibilities. Mothers who work willingly take jobs that permit them shorter hours and more flexible scheduling so they can take care of their domestic responsibilities.[42]

As we saw earlier, those who assert their rights or "stick out" from the crowd are likely to feel nervous or threatened in their encounters with authority or a hostile majority. Women who voice discontent with their work or with their role as mothers tend to be viewed in a negative light.[43] Acceptance of, or resignation to, one's role is viewed as a graceful, fitting attitude for women: constant irritability, chafing, and dissatisfaction is not.[44]

So although the home and housework have become public issues in the West, in Japan dissatisfaction with domestic responsibilities is very muted. If one reason for this is that housewives actually feel more satisfaction and contentment from their job, another is unwillingness to push their "selfish" private concerns or desires in the face of the greater good and harmony of the family and society.

Notes

(1) The etymological discussion is drawn from the Oxford English Dictionary.

(2) The etymological discussion is drawn from Andrew Nathaniel Nelson. *The Modern Reader's Japanese-English Character Dictionary*, and *Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionary*.

(3) Mary E. Berry, "Public Place and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early Modern Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, v. 12 n. 2 (Summer 1986), 244.

(4) *Ibid.*, 243, 245.
(5) *Ibid.*, 261.
(6) *Ibid.*, 248.
(7) *Ibid.*, 269.
(8) *Ibid.*, 270.
(9) *Ibid.*, 269.
(10) *Ibid.*, 271.
(11) Matsumoto Sannosuke, "The Roots of Political Disillusionment: 'Public' and 'Private' in Japan," in *Authority and the Individual in Japan*, ed. J. Victor Koschmann, University of Tokyo Press, 1978, 47. Harry Hartoonian's assessment of the Meiji era is similar: "*Ôyake* was always associated with high sounding purpose: public tranquillity and order, fairness, and the "consultation of public opinion" (*kôgi*); *watakushi* was identified with irregular dealings, bad faith, selfishness, personal feelings, and private desires... in the inevitable encounter between the realms, individuals were admonished, as a kind of moral imperative, 'to dissolve the personal and honor the public' (*messhi hôkô*)," Hartoonian, quoted in J. Victor Koschmann, "Soft Rule and Expressive Protest," in *ibid.*, 11.
(12) Though there have been important oscillations in Japanese attitudes toward public and private, for example, movements for democratization in the 1880s and 1920s, and after World War II, as well as virulent attacks on private interest and fierce promotion of the public good during the Second World War, for the most part there has been striking continuity in the dominant notions of public and private from the Meiji period to the present. Most people continue to accept the primacy of public concerns and values over private ones.
(13) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, 49.
(14) Grant McConnell, *Private Power in American Politics*, is the seminal work in this area.
(15) Fukuzawa, *Gakumon no susume*, quoted in Matsushita Keiichi, "Citizen Participation in Historical Perspective," in Koschmann, *op. cit.*, 187.
(16) See Tada Michitaro, 207-209, 211. An acquaintance who teaches Confucian and Japanese thought defended this point of view in a personal conversation, explaining that Japanese workers prefer not to take the vacation time they have coming to them because vacations are just a waste of time, while work contributes to the greater good of society. He argued that *all* kinds of work—making Pachinko machines, sweeping up buildings, making the tea for the men in the office—is for the public good, and that people under-

stand the work they do in these terms. Certainly neither academics nor working people in the West understand work in this way. Many doubt whether "what's good for GM" is really what's "good for America," and wonder whether what a Japanese would call the "public good" is really just corporate greed.

(17) J. Victor Koschmann, "Introduction to Part II," Koschmann, ed., *op. cit.,* 147.

(18) See essays translated and collected in Koschmann, *Authority and the Individual in Japan.*

(19) Matsumoto, *op. cit.,* 49-50.

(20) Matsushita, *op. cit.,* 185-6.

(21) Thus, Oda writes of the need to develop autonomous individuals, Matsushita is concerned with how to "help citizens see themselves as true participants in, and initiators of, political action" (179), Takabatake believes even a political spare-time amateur activists "are capable of organizing into a powerful movement" around the problems in their daily lives (198), and Matsumoto says that constructing "private realms of interest" is the first step to changing "from government guided by the pleasure of the state bureaucracy to government responsive to people's life needs as a new, autonomous guiding principle for state action." (50) (All citations to Koschmann, ed., *op. cit.*)

(22) Tada Michitaro, "The Glory and Misery of 'My Home'," (originally titled, "*Maihomu no eiko to hisan*"), in Koschmann, ed., *op. cit.,* 211-212.

(23) See Tada, *op. cit.,* 207-209. Also see Tada's opening hypothetical situation about the young man asked by his boss to work late, who blurts out that he can't work because it's his first anniversary, and can't understand his boss' incredulity at such a request, 207. And consider the following story: During summer of 1988, an American player for a Japanese baseball team, Randy Bass, decided to go back to the United States for an indeterminate stay because his son was due to undergo brain surgery. Coverage in the Japanese press was disapproving; readers were treated to a variety of "the show must go on" testimonials about Japanese workers and performers who stuck to their work under trying personal circumstances.

(24) Tada, *ibid.,* 211.

(25) *Ibid.,* 210, 214-215.

(26) Ishimori Shizo, "The 'shinjinrui' world," *Japan Times,* 5-10-87, 8; Nakano Osamu, "A Sociological Analysis of the 'New Breed'," *Japan Echo,* v. 15, Special Issue, 1988, 12-16 (originally published as "Shinjinrui genron," *Seron,* Nov. 1986).

(27) J. Victor Koschmann, "Soft Rule and Expressive Protest," in

Koschmann, ed., *op. cit.,* 17.

(28) Lawrence Ward Beer, *Freedom of Expression in Japan: A Study of Comparative Law, Politics, and Society,* Kodansha International, 1984, 318.

(29) *Ibid.,* 316.

(30) *Ibid.,* 317.

(31) Kawashima Takeyoshi, "The Status of the Individual in the Notion of Law, Right and Social Order in Japan," in Charles A. Moore, ed., *The Japanese Mind,* Tuttle, 1973, 267. In addition, Beer believes that reluctance to assert rights is closely related to the problem of intimidation and ostracism in small communities — the traditional *mura hachibu,* which continues to occur in contemporary contexts (Beer, 318). That is, one who has a legitimate grievance may be reluctant to complain because he feels he may be the target of retaliation or censure from a significant group.

(32) Kawashima, *op. cit.,* 263-267.

(33) Discussion drawn from George Fields, "Tolerance in Japan: A matter of majority rules or individual crushed?," *Japan Times,* June 9, 1988, 16.

(34) One might even point to the very different kinds of cultural heroes of the West and Japan: Socrates, Antigone, Christ, and Thoreau as martyrs to conscience in the face of state power, vs. the forty-seven ronin, or the couple in Mishima's "Patriotism," who die because they must honorably resolve conflicting commitments to the state and personal loyalties. In the first set of examples, the private or individual voice of conscience (or faith) is a basis for challenging state authority, and is deemed morally superior to the state. In the second, the actor is caught between the pull of irreconcilable duties, both of which must be lived up to if one is to maintain honor. What is admirable is the fortitude ro respect both sets of duties even though it means death.

(35) See Ann Sassoon, ed., *Women and the State,* Hutchinson, London, 1987.

(36) But see "Work and the Family: Four Case Histories," Nihon Keizai Shinbun, in *Japan Echo,* v. 15, Special Issue, 1988, 63-65; also see letters in *"Agnes ronsô" wo yomu,* JICC, Tokyo, 1988.

(37) See Suzanne Vogel, "Professional Housewife," *The Japan Interpreter,* v. 12 n. 1 (Winter 1978).

(38) Catherine Lewis, "Women in the Consumer Movement," in *Proceedings of The Tokyo Symposium on Women,* 1978. International Group for the Study of Women, Tokyo, Japan 82-83; Ueno Chizuko, "Genesis of the Urban Housewife," *Japan Quarter-*

ly, April-June 1987, 141.

(39) Lewis, *op. cit.,* 85.

(40) Sakaiya Taichi, "Women's status vs. power," *Japan Times*, 11-10-88, 18; Ueno, *op. cit.,* 140-1. Whether this is in fact true, and whether a high degree of autonomy within the home really makes Japanese women powerful or equal, are issues this essay cannot explore. But it is something men and women in Japan often say and apparently believe.

(41) Ueno, *ibid.,* 142.

(42) I once attended a talk on women and work in Japan where a very odd discussion ensued between the mainly western audience and a Japanese presenter speaking on the topic of women and work in Japan. She kept talking admiringly about the diligence of Japanese workers and how "the lights always burn until late in Kasumigaseki," as though this proved that most women could not participate in the workforce. When the audience kept insisting that the organization of work in Japan was at fault and should be changed to permit husbands a chance to spend time with their families, and wives a chance to pursue real careers, she seemed incapable of understanding the criticism.

(43) For example, "single mama" is used in Japanese to disparage mothers who leave their children with their mothers and mothers-in-law so they can work, or go out at night. A woman who expresses dissatisfaction with housework or raising small children is likely to be viewed as selfish. Finally, new religions which explicitly reinforce women's subservience to patriarchal power have recently been gaining popularity, especially among Japanese housewives. "Housewives turning to new religions to cope with changing society," *Japan Times,* 11-13-88, 2.

(44) A joke Japanese men like to tell goes like this: "Who's the luckiest man in the world? He drives a British car, eats Chinese food, lives in an American house, and has a Japanese wife. Who's the unluckiest man in the world? He drives a Chinese car, eats British food, lives in a Japanese house, and has an American wife."

日本における「公」と「私」

〈要　約〉

パトリシア・ボーリング

この論文の目的は，日本における「公」と「私」の概念を，語源と歴史的事象に言及しつつ，考察することにある。具体的には，主たる論点は，(1)「公」が天皇または国家の権威と関連して，高く評価される傾向にあるのに対し，(2)「私」は，中立的，あるいは消極的なニュアンスを持ち，“privilege”の含意もなく，本来の固有の価値が認められない点で，英語の用法とは異なっている。「私」と「個」とは，しばしば「利己」という含意があるものととらえられ，公的利益や公的な秩序に敵対するもののごとく思われることがある。こうした考え方は，英語の用語法や概念化，つまり“public”は民間人が参加できる公開的で公明な決定過程を含み，“private”がしばしば“privilege”の含意を持つものとして，積極的な意味でとらえる場合とかなり違う。

この特殊日本的な「公」と「私」の関係づけを理解することを通じて，現代の日本社会の様々な一面——個別的で私的な利益代表としての政党への不信感，官僚に対しての深い尊敬，市民の無関心，政府と企業の緊密な関係，企業の利益と公共利益とが同一に考えられること——が判ってくる。戦後に私的な立場と権利を正当化しようとする試みがいくつか現われるが，それらの中には，種々の市民運動や，マイホーム主義，そしてプライバシーと良心の自由を取り扱う裁判などが含まれる。中谷氏という自衛隊員の合祀問題を扱った一事件は，特に個人と団体の宗教的立場の確執に関する興味深い問いを提供している。

最後に家事と家族生活の問題を取り上げる。