

## HOW JAPANESE VIEW THEIR ECONOMIC AID POLICY

### —With Particular Reference to a Questionnaire Study—

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Japanese made such a big mistake as Pacific War but in general, skillfully steered the country in the difficult international surroundings. It was due to good 'intuition' of Japanese. In particular, leaders in Meiji had a good sense of 'intuition'. I have accordingly often referred to this intuition. The 'intuition' however, like good fortune, can not be produced at our will. It is after all a kind of gift from heaven to the people who have worked hard with good sense of history.

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## I Introduction

Japanese aid policy has been relatively unknown among Japanese people especially regarding the formulation of ODA policy and their implementation. Since the amount of ODA surpassed 9 billion dollars in 1988, it has become a close rival of the U.S.A. (See Table 1). In view of the recent rate of the annual increase of ODA even greater than that of defense budget, it has rapidly drawn the attention of the general public.

With the increasing attention on the Government's aid policy, a few points of the past policy have been brought into close scrutiny.

Japanese aid policy on ODA has been primarily handled on the request basis. Government has tried to stay away from being misunderstood as interfering with domestic affairs of the recipients. As the quantity of aid rising to a gigantic level, however, questions have been raised whether or not the Japanese aid policy should remain

Table 1 Net ODA from DAC Countries : Net Disbursements (1976-1988)  
(by Million of US \$)

	1976-78 Average	1986	1987	1988	Annual Growth Rate of ODA 1982/83-87/88	Share of GNP (1988)	Share of Total 1988
U.S.A	4,902	9,564	8,945	9,777	-0.5%	0.20	20.5
Japan	1,582	5,634	7,454	9,134	5.5	0.32	19.2
France	2,372	5,105	6,525	6,959	2.4	0.73	14.6
Germany F.R.	1,886	3,832	4,391	4,700	-1.8	0.39	9.9
Italy	267	2,403	2,615	3,012	15.4	0.37	6.3
Netherlands	903	1,740	2,094	2,231	2.1	0.98	4.7
U.K.	1,155	1,737	1,865	2,615	-1.4	0.32	5.5
Canada	979	1,695	1,885	2,340	6.9	0.50	4.9
Sweden	723	1,090	1,377	1,534	1.4	0.87	3.2
Norway	289	798	890	988	4.9	1.12	2.1
DAC Total	16,574	36,663	41,531	47,583	2.3	0.35	100.0

Source: OECD, Development Co-operation, 1988.

Taken from Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs. Japan 1990

unchangingly passive. Some of the Japanese experience in her modern economic development could be more positively utilized to avoid the possible bottlenecks of the developing countries.

Some opinions have been raised as to the need for spelling out the clear conceptual framework of Japanese aid policy and make the standard for priority explicit. Implicitly, however, there is an increasing realization that the economic development of the developing countries will contribute to the global stability and economic development which in turn will create a favorable impact on Japanese development.

There are also explicit criticism on the aid directly related to the expansion of Japanese exports. This could be interpreted as an expression of composure.

The enhancement of the free market system is often suggested as a useful conceptual framework since Japanese economic development has taken benefit from the system. At the same time, a due consideration on the distribution side of the system will be indispensable to render

help for the developing late comers.

It is not as yet clear, however, whether there is a general consensus on the universal idea as to a goal of Japanese aid. Perhaps it is revealing an absence of explicit unique Japanese target in Japanese leadership. Freedom, democracy and peace, these have been brought into Japan and Japanese postwar leadership has been based on these value premises. To take some degree of leadership in the world, it will be required to examine these implicit values and make a conscious effort to make universal goals explicit. It goes without saying that aid policy is to follow such a broad framework of national target. To think about aid policy raises thus a challenging question as to what is the ideal of Japanese leadership. Giant donors, without respectable sense of mission, otherwise, might find the global milieu less congenial.

In this paper, I have tried to explore the under current of Japanese views on aid policy, on the basis of a questionnaire survey conducted in 1989.

The survey has been conducted in 1989-90 by mailing questionnaires to 900 developmental experts in Japan asking basic factors determining Japanese views on her aid policy. The questionnaires have been formulated and examined by the joint works of three professors of economics, A. Hosono, T. Nakauchi, M. Saito and Japan Research Institute, and financially commissioned by Economic Planning Agency. Processing of the survey has been done at Japan Research Institute including compilation of the collected data.

Out of the 900 persons to whom the questionnaires have been sent, 293 found to be eligible answers which meant 32.6%. The vocational break down of the 293 is shown in Table 2.

With respect to the population of 900, these people have been picked up from those who have contributed their writing in journals and public reports on developmental issues. They are generally representing the leading group in Japan in formulating implementing or commenting Japanese aid policies.

The questionnaire contained 17 questions. They are broadly classified into five categories:

Table 2

Occupations	No.(%)
University staff	
i) Economics, Commerce, Business Administration	102( 34.8)
ii) Politics, Law, Sociology, International Relations	30( 10.2)
iii) Natural Science, Agriculture, Medicine	8( 2.7)
iv) Humanities	8( 2.7)
Private firms	65( 22.2)
Mass communication	12( 4.1)
Think tank	30( 10.2)
Authors & Critics	6( 2.0)
Government agencies (including JETRO, OECF)	20( 6.8)
Others	9( 3.1)
Unclassified	3( 1.0)
Total	293(100.0)

- i) A change in the international milieu,
- ii) The concept of Japanese aid policy,
- iii) ODA,
- iv) Implementation of ODA,
- v) Aid other than ODA.

In the following, the results will be explained and the relative number of people under different opinions will be indicated by percentage. It will help to indicate the structure of Japanese views on the aid policy.

## II The Structure of Japanese View on Aid Policy

- (1) Change in an international milieu
- (a) After Malta

It is of interest to notice with respect to the Malta Conference that 55% of these who answered expected the dissolution of the cold war and both the aid to the east from the west and to the third world would expand. Following this, 31% thought while the cold war framework will diminish, the aid to the developing countries would also decline. 4% expected the quick dissolutions in the cold war and the

convergence of the east and the west will stimulate economic aid. Only 3% expected the continuation of the cold war and no change in the status quo.

(b) Primary prices

As regards the trends of prices in primary products, 55% expected the plateau though the demand for them would increase, as resource saving technological innovation would develop. Rise in the oil price has been expected by 30% of population and the terms of trade would deteriorate. 8% expected over supply of resources due to resource saving technology and the sluggish industrialization in the developed countries.

(c) North-South gap

Majority of people (84%) foresaw no noticeable decrease in the North-South gap in general. Most of these expected the widening gap between the developing countries. There were 13% of pessimists who worried the expansion in the north south gap during the nineties. Only 1% expected the decrease in the north south gap.

(d) Future of free trade

Opinion was divided on this question. While 46% expected obstacles against the smooth growth of trade for the developing countries will follow the free trade agreement although it might create regional free trade, it will at the same time formulate a block economy, 35% of people expected no barrier for the trade of developing countries as regional free trade will not fall into protectionist strategies. Minority of 13% assumed that regional free trade will eventually lead to the expansion of the global trade hence stimulate the trade of the developing countries.

(e) Environment

Majority of those answered had expressed the strong need to connect aid policy with the preservation of the environment. 43% felt the environmental issues in the developing countries are related with the problem of poverty one way or other, therefore aid for development will be required to preserve the environment. Also 41% felt the need for environmental consideration when aid policy is to be formulated, as

the consciousness on environmental issue will grow ever stronger in the future. 40% expressed the needs for the new type of aid for the preservation of environment. The above division of 43%, 41% and 40% followed the question "please make the closest expression to your own view". Question could have been more refined but we can at least say that majority felt the consideration of environment in aid policy important, as only 16% explicitly denied the influence on the formulation of aid policy.

## (2) Conceptual framework of Japanese aid

### (a) Is the framework necessary?

Responding to the question asking whether or not a clear expression of conceptual framework for Japanese aid is needed, 96% answered yes and only 2.4% gave negative answer. It is of this interest to note that the passive attitude of Japanese aid policy staying away from interfering in the domestic affairs of the developing countries in the past is casting some feeling of doubt in these answers. Clear statement of ideal, directions and priorities of Japanese aid policy is expected.

## (3) Official development assistance (ODA)

### (a) Amounts

In 1988, Japanese ODA has amounted to 9.1 billion US dollars, which meant second in amounts to those of the U.S.A. Japanese government has expressed the target level of 50 billion US dollars during 1988 and 1992, with the concomitant rise in the proportion to GNP above 0.32% of 1988.

According to the questionnaire, 40% required further efforts to go beyond the target level, while 30% did not mind any specific target, and 26% thought that the above bench mark by the Government about right. This shows that the majority of two thirds support the Government's policy on ODA. That fact that 40% of people agree on an increase in Japanese ODA will be a significant support of public opinions for the Japanese ODA policy in the future.

### (b) Conditions

The questionnaire contained three kinds of questions relating to the conditions of ODA: they are, grant element, proportions of technical co-operation and the proportions of untied aid.

The grant element rose as high as 60.7% in the peak year 1986 then fell to the low rate of 47.3% in 1987. The DAC average has been in the range of 70%-80% since 1977 and was 84.3% in 1986, considerably higher than the Japanese rate.

About this grant element, 52% thought that Japanese should at least become the same as DAC average while 34% thought while an improvement is desirable, DAC average need not be a target. Altogether, trend is strongly to support an increase in the grant element.

With respect to the proportion of technical co-operation among ODA, the consensus was even clearer, 63% deemed it desirable to match the DAC average while 35% thought while an improvement being appropriate DAC level is not mandatory. An overwhelming majority, at any rate, support for an increase in the rates of technical co-operations among ODA.

In the case of an untied ratio, those who want a higher ratio were 52% while 15% were satisfied with the present level. It is interesting to note that fairly significant 30% admitted even lower ratio of untied aid.

#### (c) Diversification

As for the diversification of the possible types of aid, 63% desired for joint aid with other donors or international organizations, 39% wanted an increase in the quota for international organizations and 36% pointed to the need for joint aid with NIES. It was 20% who wanted an increase in the present form of bilateral aid. Here lies an interesting gap between the present global trends in favour of bilateral aid and the views of this group of questionnaire. In this view of the present Japanese bilateral proportion of 70.3% in ODA, this result raised an interesting challenge for the future Japanese aid policy.

Concerning the regional proportion of Japanese aid with the dominance in the Asian region, 18% approved the past trend, 32% stated generally affirmative views as helping Asia will create a global

growth core thus permeate growth impacts to the other developing countries. However 44% preferred diversified aid to a variety of countries in commensurate with the enlarged pie of Japanese economy. Priorities on Asia and the globe thus seem to be roughly divided half and half. This implies also that it is good timing to increase the aid programme to some new areas such as South Asia or Africa.

With respect to the type of aid diversified in various forms, the following preferences were indicated. Four kinds of aid were surveyed; i) infrastructure, ii) technical co-operation, iii) loan, and iv) NGO. For infrastructure, 51% preferred social infrastructure such as schools and hospitals which are expected to contribute directly to the enhancement of the social welfare of the recipient countries. The next group of 31% preferred economic and industrial infrastructures such as roads and ports which will help the economic development of the recipients.

Regarding the technical co-operation, 50% preferred an increasing proportion of soft technology such as business management and public administration. The next largest group of 34% preferred the expansion of hard technology designed for the quantity and quality of industrial production.

As for loans, 50% of those answered wanted an expanded proportion of project loans for infrastructures while the next largest 22% preferred two step loan for the improvement of financing capacities of the recipients. Those who put a priority on the programme loans filling the gap in foreign exchange were relatively low at 13%.

Relatively strong preference for an increase in the proportion of aid to NGO activity was revealed as 75% chose for the active support of NGO activities as an important auxiliary function of public sectors. Meanwhile, 14% held the view that private financing to be preferred in view of the specific purpose and goals of such an organization.

These preferences in infrastructure of project type and soft technical know-how have an interesting area to develop in the future. As part of the inefficiency created in the aid administration was often due to the request basis, for fear that active involvement might be misunderstood to be domestic interference, it will be worth while exploring expanded



possibilities of feed backs of information between governments through co-operation in the planning. Comprehensive regional surveys through ODA such as JICA projects on Southern Thailand and Malaysia or Hainan Island are good cases in the points. Efficient infrastructure building always needs good coordination with the *pari passu* growth of the other related sectors which need effective feed back of information with a comprehensive development plan of government. In this connection, the coordination under Thai NESDB of the Northern part of Southern Thailand and the Sixth five year plan showed a good absorption of Japanese know-how in the regional economic feasibility survey.<sup>(2)</sup>

#### (4) The implementation of ODA

##### (a) Request basis of aid policy

Japanese Government has taken the stance of a request basis in formulating Japanese aid policy. Only 10% of answers supported the unmodified continuation of the same request basis while 78% expressed the need to add Japanese proposal to the request of the recipients. However the total denial of the request basis revealed only 4%. Japanese generally understand the sensitiveness of the Asian people who might easily rise the feeling of being interfered.

Whether or not Japan should continue a request basis of aid administration thus keeping possible interference in the domestic affairs of the recipient countries is one of the most crucial issues of aid policy in Japan. The questionnaire revealed a fairly conservative result in this respect. It is in a sense reasonable because the aid should after all be geared to the need of the recipient countries, it is however significantly clear that the largest share of people (78%) recognized the need to add the wisdom based on donor's skills and experience. In the vocational break down, it is noteworthy that 92% of journalist and 83% of private business chose this answer. In the group of writers and critics of five, 100% chose this.

This will be a good guidance for Government in the future in the sense that an effort should be made explicitly to improve the effect of

ODA by the joint work of the donors and the recipient to improve the process of formulation and implementation of ODA.

(b) Shortage of personnels

About the shortage of administrative personnels comparing with those of the U.S.A., 45% preferred the active utilization of private sectors and other administrative organizations while those preferred the personnels of the directly related aid administration were relatively fewer showing 28%. There were 11% of people recommended active utilization of overseas aid organizations and consultants. 4.1% pointed to the need for improving the efficiency of existing organizations. It is well understood that the mere improvement of efficiency of the existing aid organizations is not enough to improve the situation.

As to how to rectify the present shortage in personnels, there is an interesting vocational difference in the distribution of suggestions. University professors in politics, law and sociology have pointed to the need for an increase of direct aid agencies, while in the faculties of economics, business administration, utilization of outside personnels in the private sector and other government organizations was most emphasized. The same stress was shown also among private business, journalists and think tanks.

These expressed needs lead us to think of more fundamental measure for providing required human resources to this area of high administrative demand. The idea of the International Development University has been announced by Mr. Kuranari, former Minister of Foreign Affairs a few years ago. Time is getting ripe for realizing university of this sort to enable efficient aid administration of the largest ODA donor country.

(c) How to improve the effect of ODA

Breakdown of the answers for the question asking what area of activities should be strengthened in order to raise the effect of ODA showed that the highest 56% pointed to the follow up activities after the implementation. The second highest 36% marked the basic studies of various sectors of the developing countries, and 31% marked development education. 22% of answers marked ex post evaluation, 18%

pointed to the need for the efficient implementation of the project and 17% for the feasibility studies, 4% for the public relations.

It is implicitly shown that unless aid is channeled into the sector for which the potential demand for the development of the recipient country is significant, it will not bear the effective fruit; the need for follow up, ex post evaluation and basic studies are all supposed to improve the effect.

It is therefore necessary to see the total structure of the central development plan. It is often necessary to have a feedback of information of local potentiality, feasibility of development projects and interrelatedness of the local development with the related sectors. When such information is fully available and carefully scrutinized, a good result of implementation can be expected. It is often very useful, therefore, that part of ODA is dovetailed in such a project as comprehensive regional development project and have a close working interrelatedness with the central economic development board which could use these data as a basis for formulating a five year plan. It is interesting to notice that journalists who are supposed to have a good deal of knowledge in these circumstances have marked very high 58% on the need for basic study. Private business, on the other hand, marked very high 68% for the need for the export follow up activities. In view of the close and wide range of their contact with the grass root level of economic activities this emphasis on follow up should be born in mind. Development education collected high votes among university staffs of politics, law and sociology (52%). Faculties of arts and business economics followed with 38% and 31% respectively indicating the long-run importance of the item. The importance of the follow up is well reflected by the generally high per percentage of 57% by all group answered. A further cross relation study indicates that this follow up is particularly stressed by those groups who stressed freedom (67%), eradication of poverty (61%) and world peace (54%). These will support the sufficient follow up studies of ODA.

### III Economic Aid, Its Raison d'être

#### (1) Japanese Government's idea of aid

Ministry of foreign affairs announced the 134 page pamphlet "Keizai Kyoryoku no Rinen" (Idea of aid) in December 1980.<sup>(3)</sup> The ministry has summarized the idea of aid into two kinds; humanistic aid and interdependence. Then in chapter 3, the aid has been interpreted as the cost of building international order to guarantee a comprehensive security for Japan.

As the reasons for aid, the ministry has mentioned four points:  
 i) Cost of peace keeping ii) Cost of being an economic giant  
 iii) Guarantee for favorable economic inter-dependence, iv) Necessary condition for a leader of non-Western modernization.

Most of these four points have been frequently referred to in the debates in the diet. Whether national consensus has been obtained on these explanation is as yet uncertain. For example, a research conducted by the Asahi news paper has raised a question especially for the point iv.<sup>(4)</sup> Samejima has pointed out that the main stream of capital from the north to the south of Japanese aid has been altered by the pressure from the US and the strong request from Korea to buttress her resilience to the Communist threats in early eighties.<sup>(5)</sup> Korea insisted six billion dollars worth of yen credit whereas Japan was reluctant to pay more than four billion.

In the latter half of the eighties, the balance of payment difficulties in the US required more Japanese surplus of saving to be invested in the US, which caused a substantial decrease in the proportion of Japanese capital transfer to the developing Asian countries. In Table 3, we can see a clear decrease in the ratio of Japanese direct investment to Asia to total from 29% of thirty years prior to 1981 to 11.8% in 1988, while that of North America increased from 27.1% to 47.5%. If North America and Europe are combined, the ratio bid up from 38% to the tune of 70%. Perhaps we need a closer scrutiny whether or not these proportion mean a substantial deviation from an ideal pattern of capital transfer.

**Table 3 Direct Foreign Investment of Japan**  
(by Million of US \$)

	1951-81	(%)	1988	(%)	1951-88	(%)
North America	12,320	(27.1)	22,328	(47.5)	75,019	(40.3)
Central & South America	8,349		6,428		31,617	
Asia	13,169	(29.0)	5,569	(11.8)	32,227	(17.3)
Middle East	2,355		259		3,338	
Europe	5,269	(11.0)	9,116	(19.4)	30,164	(16.2)
Africa	2,018		653		4,004	
Oceania	2,949		2,669		9,315	
Total	45,429		47,022		186,356	

Source: Ministry of Finance, Oversea Investment Report

## (2) The need for the new idea of aid

In view of the above mentioned questionnaire perhaps it would not be too dogmatic to say that there is a broad consensus among Japanese about the validity of general idea of development aid namely the recognition of humanistic consideration and interdependence, announced by the Japanese ministry of foreign affairs in early eighties.

It does not seem, however, that these two broad areas of Japanese interest show clear future orientations of Japanese policy. It may be possible that her policy would be a mere combination of multiple current pressures from domestic as well as international circumstances. Unless clear target is shown as to where the country is heading, it would not be easy for the global society to predict the future step of Japanese policy. The increasing amount of Japanese capital transfer makes it necessary for Japan, whether she likes it or not, to show explicitly the fundamental stance of Japanese aid policy. It then requires some philosophical background or value premise to give clear shape to Japanese foreign aid policy that matches her economic influence.

It seems to me indispensable to give metaphysic thinking when we have to proceed on fundamental thought on the north-south co-opera-

tion. It is a philosophical, spiritual metaphysics on the human nature. I have once tried to base the reason on economic co-operation on the deliberation on three aspects of human nature<sup>(6)</sup>. One is the social characteristic of human nature that a human being needs society in which they live in inter-dependence. Second is the conflicting nature of aggressiveness which is built in the human brain that is so aggressive that it fails to maintain self-restraint in killing the same species. This is not the case in other species. It goes without saying that the former must dominate the latter. Third is the useful mental capacity of man which is often called 'irony'. Sören Kierkegaard, a Danish philosopher defined this as "a kind of mental situation in which one can disregard the treasure for which people pine, at the very moment one obtains it". Whether due to self discipline or love for others, we may attain the sort of mental freedom.

Politics or administration, are motivated for power. As is required for economic development to restrain from egotistic behavior, so have we to curtail our aggressive power motive to enhance peace in the international society. Essence of irony in Kierkegaardian sense can provide useful basis for education for peace.

### (3) Concluding remarks

As Yoshida put it in the passage at the beginning of this paper, Japanese have steered this country skillfully. We did not have, however, our own guiding principle.

On the contrary we have somehow followed, and tried to accept American democracy. Perhaps we were lucky in the sense that this universal value of democracy has checked other subversive factors to disarray the possible path of growth. On the eve of the new Century, however, this past trend of the passive acceptance of values, like technology would not be good enough to focus the Japanese responsibility which the present size of her economy requires.

Interfutures of OECD predicted in the end of seventies, possible scenarios for the twenty first Century.<sup>(7)</sup> It predicted the demographic stationary states of 12 billion in the middle of 21st Century and

concluded that it would be possible to avoid absolute shortage in the resources and foods if the distribution and allocation policies are appropriate. This was an optimistic denial of the earlier Club of Rome Report, "Limit to the Growth". A few traces of pessimism in the report consist in the degrees of supply-bottlenecks that might result from the transitory political crisis of the oil producing countries.

After ten years, I am rather surprised by the accuracy of the Report, which was once called "Japan project". In the hindsight, however, the EC was predicted too pessimistically. It was quite accurate with regards to Japan and other East Asia NIEs. It is observed that out of four scenarios, Japan's future clearly depends on the harmonious development of the North-South relationship. It seems that the actual development in the past ten years reflects the scenario B-3 of the Report where Japan and Germany take over the productivity of the US.

To earn the respect which matches the growth, Japanese aid philosophy should add some universal values to the American democracy which reveals Japanese characteristic onto the aid administration. It should contain at least elements of peace and harmony with nature and cultural plenitude which brings maturity over the tyranny of material pursuit.

The Japanese advantage is that the studies of the conditions which gave favorable impact on her economic development in the past provides the targets to maintain. Free trade principle, peace in the global politics, rational pricing in crude oil and other resources are also the common infrastructure for the developing countries.

Then on the maintenance of these basic conditions, Japan could provide her developmental experience as a tutor for the developing countries. Comparative analysis projects have been conducted by K. Ohkawa et. al. at International Development Center of Japan.<sup>(6)</sup>

Economic assistance needs however, wider basis for universal values than the experience of one country. In this sense, Japan is facing the new turning point for the long-term target for her global leadership.

### Notes

- (1) Shigeru Yoshida, "Nippon o Kettei Shita Hyakunen," (Japan's decisive Century), Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1967 p.3.
- (2) The Sub-regional Development Study of the Upper-Southern Part of Thailand Vol. 1 & 2, The Royal Thai Government & JICA, 1984.
- (3) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Economic Co-operation, "Keizai Kyoryoku no Rinen," (Idea of economic co-operation), APIC, Feb. 1981.
- (4) Shinsuke Samejima, "Nihon no Taigai Enjo Seisaku," (Oversea assistance policy of Japan), Asahi shimbunsha, 1982, p.127.
- (5) Samejima, *ibid.*, p.130.
- (6) Tsuneo Nakauchi, "Keizai Kyoryoku no Shiso," (Thought of Economic Co-operation), *Asian Cultural Studies*, Feb. 1984, ICU.
- (7) "Interfutures", Report by OECD, OECD Paris, 1979.
- (8) Kazushi Ohkawa and Hirohisa Kohama, "Lectures on Developing Economies," — Japan's Experience and Its Relevance — University of Tokyo Press, 1989. Chapter seven summarizes the salient points of the analysis.



## 日本人の経済協力観

### 〈要 約〉

中 内 恒 夫

わが国のODA（政府開発援助）も90億ドル台を超えるに至って、世界経済に対する影響力が甚大となった。その影響力にふさわしい政策的内容を備えているかどうかが問われている。まず日本人自身がわが国の協力政策をどう考えているか、そしてその改善・充実の方途を那邊に求めたらよいか。本論はこういう問題に迫るために資料を求め、方途を考えてみた結果の一文である。

基本的な考え方は、世界のリーダー国の一つとなるためには、哲学的な理念が必要だということである。勿論それは自国の手前勝手な要求を貫徹するための方便などであってはならず、地球全体を考えた上で、人類の理想を明確にする普遍性を具備した理念でなくてはならない。日本は西洋を範として大急ぎで近代化を行って来た。そのためのモットーは脱亜入欧であった。一応の近代化を成し遂げて、繁栄を手に入れた時、精神的な貧しさを意識せざるを得ないのが現状であって、この貧しさが外からは丸みえであるために、世界の尊敬をかちえることができない。

吉田茂は、本論冒頭にも引いたように日本人の「勘」について述べている。「勘」はすぐれた歴史感覚をもち、勤勉に働く国民に与えられる贈り物だという。「自らの成功に酔ったり、実力を過信する人々には幸運も勘も与えられはしないのである。」

さて、筆者は昨年日本総合研究所において日本の新しい援助政策を求める研究を行った。そこで行った日本の識者900人に対するアンケートの結

果と分析を本論に紹介した。そして今後の日本の協力政策の基本を何処に求めるかについて終節をまとめた。要するに、日本の識者の多くが求めているのは新しい日本の協力理念である。従来政府の説く理念が無かったわけではない。だが、それは普遍性に於いて充全であっただろうか。筆者はあえてキェルケゴールの「イロニー」の概念の導入を試みた。このたてまえに真剣である時、要請主義から積極的共働主義への政策転換が世界にも説得力を持ち得るのではあるまいか。