

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT FOR EUROPE

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Europe, and the entire Cold War System including not only the Soviet Union but also the United States, have undergone a dramatic period of accelerated history. Only future generations will be in a position to appreciate fully the significance of a process affecting directly the lives of 275 million inhabitants in North America, 540 million in Europe — West and East, North and South, and Center — and 290 million in the Soviet Union; all together well above 1.1 billion human beings, close to one fifth of humanity. Obviously, there are also implications for the rest of the world, but they are less direct and immediate. The following is an effort to spell out the significance in ten points, with some sub-points.

I The Transformation of Conflict Formations

Two major scourges of humankind are gone from Europe, and probably irreversibly so, in a process that started with the conclusion of the Final Act of Helsinki in 1975, and culminated fall 1989. The first is the totalitarian **stalinism** of the Soviet Union, including the continuation and expansion of Russian imperialism within and outside the Soviet Union. The second is the genocidal **Nuclearism** of superpowers and alliances planning for a credible and winnable nuclear war. With these two mutually reinforcing syndromes gone, the Cold War is over. There are good reasons to celebrate.

However, four new conflict formations are now taking shape; all of them complex and demanding our most creative attention.

First, the rapid disintegration of **pax sovietica**, a peace-keeping

system under Moscow military control, which may or may not coincide with political disintegration of the Soviet Union. So far there has been open fighting between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, and between Hungarians and Romanians. Disintegration of *pax americana* followed by, say, fighting between Greeks and Turks has not (yet) taken place. There is an asymmetry in the process.

Second, the rapid transformation of some East European economies from centrally planned socialism to peripheral capitalism with such Third World characteristics as vertical international division of labor, asymmetric investment, tight elite cooperation and increasing inequality and unemployment, even misery at the bottom of society. Central planning with immobilization of people and inability to deliver goods and services is gone for now. But the problems of capitalism are the same as before, with impressive center growth at the expense of periphery depression and misery.

Third, the rapid unification process for two parts of pre-war Germany, BRD and DDR, posing the question of what will happen to the other three parts; now Polish and Soviet territories, and Austria. **Das Dritte Reich** occupied 17 countries in Europe and caused the death of 26 million in the Soviet Union alone. The way unification is brought about by the 2+4(+1?) formula looks like Versailles in reverse. Are demands for Polish apologies, leaving the eastern border ambiguous, indicative of **Das Vierte Reich**?

Fourth, the rapid transformation of the European Community to a European Union, with not only cultural and economic, but also political and military integration, using the West European Union⁽¹⁾. With the unification of Germany 340 of 540 million Europeans, or 63% , will live in the present EC member states.

In short, we are witnessing two conflict transformations: from a *bipolar* Europe with two alliances confronting each other to a *unipolar* Europe with the hegemonical center in Western Europe commanding tremendous military and economic resources; and from *military* to *economic* resources as the leading factor. Integration in the West, except for German unification, is nothing new in post-War history. It is

the disintegration in the East that brings about the steepest West-East gradient in European history. Along this gradient all kinds of power are bound to flow, sooner or later.

Deploring this, warning of the consequences, implies no nostalgia for stalinist *pax sovietica*, nor for Cold War nuclear confrontation with a non-zero probability of a hot nuclear war. Although there are still important military residues remaining from the Cold War, the hard core of the conflict formation, the bone of contention, disappeared when the fate of Eastern Europe was decided in Moscow's disfavor. Not only the population of the former Cold War System but also peoples in the Third world — who will no longer have the Cold War acted out hot, by proxies — can feel relieved.

The Europe taking shape bears strong resemblance to Europe one century ago; but with power and integration more discrepant. Consequently, *security has to be redefined, rethought, re-searched.*

II The Transformation in the East

In this process the Soviet Union and East Europe have:

- a: destalinized politically, working at it economically;
- b: changed military doctrine, toward defensive/sufficient/non-provocative defense, more deeds now have to follow the words;
- c: proposed total withdrawal of nuclear weapons, of Soviet troops by 1995-96 and all foreign bases by the year 2000;
- d: argued for the transformation of NATO and WTO from military-political to political alliances;
- e: put forward imaginative proposals for a Common European Home based on the equality of all participating countries.

Much of this makes virtue of dire necessity, for economic and political change. But the trust toward a New European Peace Order is clear. And the new virtue is preferable to the old vices.

III The Non-Transformation in the West

In the same process the United States and Western Europe have:

- a: declared their own system victorious with no self-criticism of the

- dark side of nuclear terror balance and capitalist economies;
- b: kept a highly offensive military doctrine, entering the discourse of defensive defense only in a CFE context;
- c: argued short-range nuclear arms increases and for keeping 195.000 US troops in Central and 30.000 in Southern Europe regardless of what the Soviet Union does, and European bases.
- d: announced plans to expand NATO, admitting unified Germany;
- e: put forward asymmetric, West-centered concepts for Europe.

IV The (West) European Superpower

At the same time the superpower character of the 12-member (so far) European Community/Union is becoming clearer, comprising⁽²⁾:

- a: *economic integration*, with an inner market from 1993;
- b: *political integration* from around 1995/96;
- c: increasing argumentation for *military integration*, possibly based on the 9-member (out of the 12) West European Union;
- d: a very high level of *cultural integration* based on shared history, Christianity/Enlightenment and (mainly) similar languages;
- e: a sense of *global mission* based on the sunny side of European culture and the dark colonial experience shared by 9 EC members;
- f: potentially continental size and a 9-digit population base;
- g: a deep-water navy with nuclear submarines, French and British nuclear forces independent of NATO, missiles, space satellites;
- h: an inner French-German friendship axis combining French political vision since 1950 with solid German economic backing.

Of course there are problems in the EC/EU-Germany-US-NATO quadrangle, and some of them may have security implications. Thus, will the EC always remain pregnant with a baby the size of Germany, and if not, will the delivery be painless? Can Germany forever be "contained" in NATO, with foreign troops stationed in what may look increasingly like occupation, even by six countries, rather than protection, now that the threat is gone? Will the US involve the other NATO-members in new confrontations, for instance in North Africa or in the Middle East as the classical East-West conflict dissolves further,

and how will members and others react?

V Prognosis: From Bloc-Confrontation to Hegemony

The major security problems both *in* and *of* Europe will from now on be variations over the general theme of Western hegemony. One hypothesis might view the Yalta and the Malta system as similar only that the former divided Europe and the latter the whole world in "spheres of interest". The US will exercise hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East; the EC in the ACP system in general and in Africa in particular; Japan in East and Southeast Asia and the Soviet Union over itself, like India and China. Thus, the US may involve EC in the Middle East and the EC the US in Africa; both of them invoking the fight against terrorism and drug control as major motives. But an unprovoked threat to the security *of* Europe from Africa or the Middle East is hardly on the horizon.

The consequences for the security *in* Europe of the gradient from the Western peak to the Eastern trough will be considerable.

Western military superiority derives from a number of factors: an intact alliance, the possible transfer of Eastern Germany from WTO to NATO, three nuclear powers in the West as against one in the East, a Western superpower whose territory falls outside the purview of the CFE whereas Soviet territory does not, and US sea-based missiles and Star Wars strategic superiority.

Western political superiority derives from the five strong intergovernmental organizations: NATO in Brussels, WEU in Paris, EC in Brussels, OECD in Paris and Council of Europe in Strasbourg.

Western cultural superiority derives from free world dynamics as opposed to the backwaters of stalinist cultural repression.

VI Cassandra's Scenario

But the basic threat to security derives from *Western economic superiority*. Imagine the economic landscape of Eastern Europe/Soviet Union, devastated by stalinist economics, invaded economically by heavy EC economic investment up to the Urals, with Japan also

investing up to the Urals, from the East. With the Frankfurt Stock Exchange established in Volgograd and German and Japanese businessmen meeting in the Urals, World War II is over. Popular, including vulgar, Western culture with commercials and commercialism, junk food, junk news and junk entertainment will replace stalinist scarcity and austerity. What happens then? Using general knowledge of hegemonical, unipolar systems with economic superiority as the leading factor, for instance from the Western hemisphere or from the European (very recent) colonial past, this is one image, painting the future Cassandra dark:

- a: there is heavy economic growth in Eastern Europe/Soviet Union around capital-, technology- and management-intensive growth poles; *and* increases in unemployment, even misery, and property crime;
- b: consumerism as cultural invasion collides increasingly with old European values, already eroded in the West, with loss of identity, more alcohol/drug consumption, violent crimes and suicide/homicide;
- c: there is *tristesse*, even nostalgia for the socialist security and cultural identity of the past, even if job, food and shelter were inadequate and the identity and cultural creativity was a consequence of stalinist oppression and may disappear with it;
- d: as this unrest cannot be articulated in marxist-socialist terms although that discourse may be used as blackmail—" If you don't invest more we'll become communists again"— *ideological expressions* will probably take such right wing forms as nationalism, religious fundamentalism, even fascism, with governmental rule by decree;
- e: this formula suits those who benefit from periphery capitalism while also suppressing those who think they will not benefit;
- f: class conflicts will be hitched onto the rich texture of ethnic conflicts, in post-war Eastern Europe hidden by *pax sovietica*;
- g: *violent expressions*, such as terrorism, destruction of foreign enterprises, kidnapping of foreign nationals etc. will be more than local police are able or willing to handle;

- h: Western Europe then responds with European Peace-keeping Forces (EPKF) to protect investment abroad; and European Rapid Deployment Forces (ERDF) to come to the rescue of its own nationals. Both will be by invitation of Eastern governments totally dependent on investment from the West, and will be referred to as self-defense;
- i: a complication might be most favored economic treatment to former German territories in Poland and RSFSR, leading to *de facto* economic integration and demands for political *Anschluss*;
- j: US interests may separate from EC interests, like in Latin America, making US troops stationed in Germany and Japan look irrelevant or like occupation forces checking economic competitors;
- k: German interests may also separate from EC interests in general, being more East European, less generally ACP-oriented;
- l: new alliances may take shape, and major violence may occur.

VII Polyanna's Scenario

There is no disagreement with the major and rather obvious premise that a transformation is taking place from bipolar to unipolar, and from military to economic, confrontation. Nevertheless, there are alternatives with more balance in Europe and more pan-European cooperation, in a scenario painting the future Polyanna light:

- a: *economically* the weaker countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union might produce as much as possible locally and nationally, cooperating among themselves, and trade more with the 33 million EFTA countries⁽³⁾ in Western Europe, small but EC's largest trade partner, with solid welfare state traditions;
- b: *culturally* the Eastern countries may find it to their advantage to preserve and develop further Central/East European culture while being open to the rest of the world and not only the West;
- c: *politically* the Eastern countries might in all contexts insist on pan-European decision-making, using fully the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) with the US and Canada (the Cold War System) to ensure that any *fait accompli* to major issues

like German unification is not forced upon the Europeans;
 d: *militarily* the Eastern countries may not only insist on the transformation of NATO and the WTO to political alliances or — as a minimum — on the transformation from offensive to defensive doctrines and postures, but also on the creation of a **UN Security Commission for Europe**⁽⁴⁾, SCE, like the UN Economic Commission for Europe, as a permanent CSCE secretariat to monitor agreements and process complaints, possibly also with peacekeeping capacity.

VIII A Future between Cassandra and Polyanna?

The near future will probably be closer to the Cassandra than the Polyanna scenarios. If so an opportunity is being lost. Europe has rarely been so *plastic* as fall 1989. The Western leadership quickly understood this and shaped skillfully the raw material, a plastic Europe, to their advantage. They had been the spectators, taken entirely by surprise ("nobody could have predicted this"). *They* could not have predicted anything so far outside their discourse as Europe was liberated from the scourges of stalinism/nuclearism essentially by an unlikely alliance⁽⁵⁾ of the dissident movement in the East, the peace movement in the West, and Gorbachev⁽⁶⁾.

Using the **confederation** as the most effective general peace formula we know, combining cooperation within with separation of parliaments, governments and financial/foreign/military policy so as not to be provocative, even aggressive without, five ideas can be proposed for Europe⁽⁷⁾, some of them still feasible:

- a: a **German confederation** of BRD, DDR, and Berlin (West), as **Staatenbund**, not **Bundesstaat**, with neither *Mauer* nor *Zaun*, and free flow of ideas, persons, and production factors and products;
- b: keeping the **European Community** as a confederation, not moving further toward financial/foreign policy/military unification;
- c: creating a **Central and East European Confederation**;
- d: transforming the Soviet Union from tsarist/stalinist empire to a **Soviet Confederation**, with the present republics as members;
- e: creating a **Common European Home** essentially as a confederation,

with the CSCE as the supreme organ and the SCE as one secretariat.

K Cold War Residues

There are still residues to be dealt with, energetically and boldly "cleaning up the mess" left behind by the irrationality of the arms race of recent decades. In so doing it might be worth reflecting on one major point: neither the western, nor the eastern side is in possession of the proof that the other side ever seriously prepared an unprovoked attack. The Soviet Union had plans for massive invasions westward and the West for massive bombardment, including nuclear, eastward in case of an attack. But that is no proof of aggressive intent, only proof of offensive postures and doctrines and their provocative implications⁽⁸⁾. Consequently:

- a: under CSCE or UN auspices an international conference should be organized on military doctrines, requesting all CSCE countries to state explicitly their military doctrines with a view to moving the whole continent toward non-provocative doctrines and postures;
- b: the CFE process of disarming offensive weapons systems — thereby transarming Europe toward conventional defensive defense — should be accelerated, focussing particularly on offensive armed vehicles;
- c: the US position notwithstanding, time-tables should be established for the removal of all foreign bases, weapons systems (particularly for mass destruction) and armed forces from Europe;
- d: the Swiss referendum 26 November 1989 with 35.6% voting in favor of the abolition of the Swiss Army by the year 2000 could be repeated in other countries; opening for a serious debate about what a future Europe without national armies might look like.

X Conclusions

For a person used to the Cold War, Europe today is hard to recognize. This also has implications for the neutral/non-aligned countries. With the bipolar confrontation gone neutrality in the sense of nonalignment makes no sense: who can be nonaligned when there is no

major conflict with clear conflict parties to be aligned with? But neutrality as a general foreign policy doctrine of non-participation in military conflict is equally meaningful in a unipolar configuration. The pledge is made credible through defensive defense and would be very meaningful for unified Germany.

The ambiguity of unified Germany in NATO — will NATO contain German revanchist/expansionist forces or will these forces be able to persuade NATO to push eastward — will remain as long as NATO is a military alliance. A transformation of NATO to a political alliance would remove that objection to unified Germany in NATO.

Stationing of Soviet troops in the eastern part of unified Germany as a *quid pro quo* for US troops in the western part will only preserve the *status quo* and serve to legitimize overstaying US troops. Hopefully the Soviet Union will not play that game.

But even German unification is overshadowed by the emergence of the (West) European Union as a superpower. This is as deplorable as it was predictable from the early 1950s onwards. The EC relation to the inner periphery of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and to the outer ACP periphery is loaded with tensions. But that is where the major security problem of Europe is located now. *In a world that badly needs fewer, not more superpowers.*

And this is where the multipolar context of the new version of the “old continent” Europe, that has brought so much disaster and so much blessing to the rest of the world, enters. Which are the other poles? United States no doubt, and whatever will remain of the Soviet Union (minus the Baltic republics, Moldavia, Georgia and Azerbaijan? — but possibly in a confederation), if for no other reasons because of the land mass and the formidable weaponry. Then there are China and India because of land mass and population, and Japan because of the economy. It may be argued that the United States, the European Union and Japan have global reach whereas the Soviet Union, China and India are regional superpowers, formidable relative to their regional neighbors, but not global — alone.

US, EU, SU; China, Japan, India — three North/white/European-

American and three South/non-white/Asian — in a context of the Americas south of Rio Grande with the Caribbean, Africa and the rest of Asia/Pacific. How is that going to shape up? A multipolar system is very difficult to maintain in a stable equilibrium. The tendency will be for the system to become bipolar after some time. So, which of the ways of dividing six superpowers into two or three camps is more likely, and what are the implications for the rest of the world? Here are some possible scenarios:

- a: **Europe/North America against Asia**; a disastrous combination, filled with racism, but not entirely unlikely. A Japan-China-Korean Common Market is potentially stronger than US/EU; incidentally.
- b: **Europe/Japan against the rest**; with Japan and Germany as the leading countries, an economic continuation of World War II.
- c: **Europe/Soviet Union, China/Japan and the US**; leaving out the US and India — who would not find each other. The two big blocs would center on EU/Germany and Japan, the US would be marginalized as the Argentina of 21st century, clinging to military/political power over the Western Hemisphere. The big blocs might then easily add one superpower each, meaning that c becomes a above.
- d: **Soviet Union as a broker between US/EU and China/Japan**. This is an interesting possibility for the Soviet Union, making constructive use of the basic geographical fact of being located in two continents at the same time. The SU could maintain good relations to the EU and to China, the geographical neighbors with continental borders in common, and at the same time cultivate good relations to the US and Japan, and continue the good relations to India. Investments and trade could be invited from all four and the Soviet Union could become some kind of cross-roads — provided communication/transportation improves. A certain internal cohesiveness, at least at the level of confederation would be needed. The pattern, incidentally, would also be the only one mentioned that would include India, otherwise left out.
- e: **Europe/Soviet Union/China against US/Japan**. A look at the map

is enough to inform us that this is not far-fetched: the "Eurasian landmass" against the Pacific Basin. But right now scepticism against the Soviet Union both in Europe and in China, and the tension between the US and Japan, would argue against this pattern.

And the Third World? Left to its own devices. Which might be the best outcome, **forcing development through self-reliance.**

Notes

- (1) The communique from the Meeting of the WEU Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Den Haag 26-27 October 1987 mentions (Preamble, 2) the determination to create the European Union and the conviction that this will be incomplete so long as the integration does not also include security and defense.
- (2) See Johan Galtung, *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making*, London: Allen&Unwin, 1973 for an early discussion of this theme, and the follow-up in *Europe in the Making*, New York/London: Taylor & Francis, 1989, chapter 2, "Europe the contradiction-free: From community to superpower", pp. 22-36.
- (3) Nobody would deny the overpowering relevance of the EC countries for the neo-liberal regimes in Eastern Europe. But a deal with EFTA would create a community of close to 150 million persons, with the Soviet Union 100 million more than even the EC with the eastern part of Germany. A negotiation between two equals might bring about a better European Economic Space, EES. But the EC in an early stage had Monnet and Schuman; the Soviet Union had Gorbachev. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have what EFTA does not have, charismatic leaders — but they have other problems!
- (4) See J. Galtung, and S. Lodgaard., eds., *Cooperation in Europe*, Oslo: Norwegian Universities Press, 1970, chapter on security commissions. The research was done for the Council of Europe 1967.
- (5) They both came into being as mass movements around 1980, the dissident movement above all in Czechoslovakia and Poland and the peace movement above all in the Netherlands and Western Germany. Typically the dissident movement saw the peace movement as willing to compromise with the communist regimes if they showed moderation in the arms race; and the peace movement saw the dissident movement as willing to drive the world closer to war if that would serve the end of stalinism. There was some truth to both perceptions, but frequent meetings between the two made the dissidents more

peace-oriented and the peaceniks more human rights oriented through the first half of the 1980s.

- (6) See Johan Galtung, "Europe Fall 1989: What happened, and why?", Honolulu, spring 1990; written for many publications.
- (7) There are many proposals of this and similar kinds circulating in Europe now. Thus, Peter Glotz in his *Gesamteuropa* summarizes his proposals in six theses. In the first he underlines the significance of CSCE, in the second he argues for the continuation of the security system of East-Central Europe, in the third that the EC has to integrate foreign and military policy to be able to incorporate states in East-Central Europe, in the fourth that EFTA should cooperate with East-Central Europe and then there should be an association agreement between the EC and EFTA, in the fifth he argues in favor of pan-European institutions for disarmament, environment, culture and in the sixth for more sub-regional cooperation in Northern, Central, Western and Southeastern Europe; and then all kinds of cooperation among the parts.

Then there is the Vision for Europe by Michael Mertes and Norbert J. Prill (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 July 1989) which argues in favor of a four-speed Europe:

1. A United States of Europe, a European Union, organized as a **Bundesstaat**, with the original six EC members, but open for more;
2. A European Community like now, possibly with Austria and Norway, organized as a **Staatenbund**;
3. An Association of European States, organized more like EFTA, including the other Nordic countries and the new democracies in East-Central Europe and the Baltic states;
4. The Common European Home, the CSCE with the Soviet Union, USA and Canada, assuming the security functions of the present military alliances.

There are also reports about a Soviet plan (*International Herald Tribune*, 26 March 1990) based on regionalization of Europe in a Nordic Council (interestingly with the Baltic states), a West European Confederation and a Central Europe Group with Italy, Austria and Hungary, and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

In his speech to the US Congress Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia, did not present any architecture for Europe beyond welcoming multipolarity, wishing that Europe could manage her own security problems, welcoming the CSCE summit conference and hoping for Europeanization of structures that "are formally European but de facto West European" (*Congressional Records*, 21 February 1990).

There will be many more such ideas. To serve peace three points to keep in mind would be (a) all-over balance in levels of economic power and political

integration, (b) local, national, regional and pan-European solutions are more peace-productive than imbalanced structures and (c) let many flowers bloom, combine many formulas for peace-building, also in a messy, disorderly pattern — a point strongly made by Peter Glotz. An example would be all confederations mentioned in the paper, at the same time. Incidentally, except for the Soviet Confederation the reader will find these confederations developed in Europe in **the Making**, particularly in the Introduction and in the Conclusion.

- (8) Another, also important, consequence would be that nuclear weapons did not deter a major war in Europe: there was nothing to deter. And they certainly did not deter Soviet aggression on Eastern Europe, particularly not Hungary 1956 and in Czechoslovakia 1968; but then they were not intended to do so either. See Galtung, *op. cit.*, chapter 4 "The Structure of a Myth: 'Nuclear deterrence has preserved peace in Europe for 40 years'", pp. 49-59.

This does not mean that we are approaching the end of the era, initiated with bacteriological and chemical warfare, of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons may be faced out as impractical; because they destroy too much, including the sender (secondary radioactivity); missiles may be ruled out as being too slow. But next in line would be the US Star Wars generation of weapons with laser beams, being very precise and moving at the speed of light.

One possible Soviet response was given by Valentin Falin: "If you develop something in space, we could develop something on Earth — We'll take asymmetrical means with new scientific principles available to us. Genetic engineering could be a hypothetical example. Things can be done for which neither side could find defenses or countermeasures, with very dangerous results" (as quoted by Flora Lewis, "As if time had lost its neutrality", *International Herald Tribune*, 12-13 December 1987). Thus, most important to watch is probably not what is already on the negotiation table but what is being developed, using disarmament negotiations to conceal the R&D on new "systems".

When it comes to disarmament in general a basic factor is the pressure generated on the economy of the two superpowers by releasing hundred thousand soldiers on the labor market, in the Soviet case also on the housing market. As reported in *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (quoted by *World Press Review*, January 1990): "Until now, 60 percent of the \$300-billion U.S. defense budget has gone into defending Western Europe. For every million dollars that the Pentagon cuts from its arms budget, almost 30,000 jobs will be lost by industry".

The basic CFE guideline would be transarmament to defensive defense, hoping that this time Europe will succeed better than under the League of Nations, see Hollins, Powers and Summer, *The Conquest of War*, Boulder:

Westview Press, 1989, pp. 64-68. Also see my own **There Are Alternatives**, Nottingham: Spokesman, 1983, chapter 5.2 on transarmament including nonmilitary defense.

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