

JAPAN'S AND CHINA'S PERCEPTIONS OF
THE SOVIET MILITARY "THREAT"
AND THEIR DIFFERENCES

— With Special Reference to the Afghan Incident, 1979 —

Ryo Ota

I Introduction

This paper aims to analyze the Japanese and Chinese⁽¹⁾ perception of the Soviet military "threat" and their differences through a case study on their respective behavior after the Afghan incident of December 1979.

Here, *perception* means *definition of situation*.⁽²⁾ *Perception* is not equivalent to *image* though they are highly related.⁽³⁾ *Threat*, in this paper, is defined as: *perceived or objectively existing signs of danger and trouble*.⁽⁴⁾

Japan and China, at the beginning of 1970s, seemed to have a similar perception toward the USSR. China, perceiving an increasing threat from the USSR after the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and a series of Sino-Soviet border conflicts, made a dramatic turn to the United States in 1971. Only seven months after the Sino-American Joint Communique of February 1972, Japan's Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Beijing and issued the Sino-Japanese Joint Communique in September 1972. Though Japan's decision to shake hands with the PRC was not a consequence of her prudent calculation over her strategic situation in the world system, it certainly pushed Japan to lean to the PRC in the Japan-China-Russia triangle.

Japan and China, when they signed the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in August 1978, seemingly had a similar, if not identical, stance in their relationship with the USSR, which was strengthened by the subsequent Sino-American normalization in January 1979. The

second clause of the treaty, the so-called "anti-hegemonism" clause which the PRC insisted on inserting, has been interpreted to be antagonistic to the USSR though the Japanese government denied its anti-Soviet intention by inserting the third clause which claims that the treaty is not against any third country — the USSR.⁽⁵⁾

China's approach to Japan did not stop only in the diplomatic milieu but extended to the military milieu as well.

Su Yu, the Vice-Minister of Defense in the PRC, remarked that Japan could strengthen her defense and increase her defense budget in his talk with Hisao Iwajima, a member of the National Defense College of the Agency of Defense, in March 11, 1980.⁽⁶⁾ Wu Xiuqian, the Vice-Chief of the General-Staff of the People's Liberation Army, stated that Japan could increase her defense budget from the 0.9% level of her GNP to a 2% level, to Yasuhiro Nakasone, a leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, in April 29, 1980; and Hua Guofeng, the Premier, emphasized to him that Japan should strengthen her air force to maintain her security, in April 30, 1980.⁽⁷⁾ China in 1980 supported Nakasone whom she had criticized as being a leader of Japan's militarism in 1970.

The subsequent behavior of the two nations, however, shows a widening differences in their Soviet policy. Generally, Japan has become more antagonistic to the USSR while China slowly but steadily reduced the existing tension between China and Russia.⁽⁸⁾ Japan decided to participate in the economic sanctions against the USSR though, as a result, Japan would have to sacrifice her economic interest.⁽⁹⁾ Japan took measures to reduce the governmental interaction between Japan and the USSR, to put restrictions on the export of strategic and technological goods to the USSR, and to put a check on credit loans for the Siberian development.

China, in contrast, though postponed by the outbreak of the Afghan war, has had talks on the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, one in October 1982 in Beijing and again in March 1983 in Moscow, between China's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen and its Soviet counterpart, Leonid Ilyichev.⁽¹⁰⁾

In addition, China did not protest against the Soviet deployment of

SS-20 in the Far East, which is generally considered to be a serious threat to both Japan and China, while the Japanese government repeatedly protested to the Soviet government.⁶⁰

Facing similar military threat from the USSR and holding tentatively similar stance in world politics, why and how are these differences made? This is the major point to be analyzed, and this paper focuses mainly on *how*. More theoretically, how are these differences in outputs created between Japan and China in spite of similar inputs being made? To answer this question the intervening variables should be analyzed. Among various intervening variables such as domestic politics and international politics (these can be called *environmental variables*), the perception of decision-makers has the top priority to be analyzed since it is the decision-makers who in actuality produce the policy-outputs; and it is the perception which to the largest extent and most directly controls the decision-makers' options on security matters whose objective evaluation is most difficult. It is not the attributes of the international system nor pressure of domestic groups which directly define decisions over national security.⁶¹

Hereafter, the term, *decision-makers in Japan*, denotes leaders of the LDP, bureaucrats of the government, mainly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the MFA) and the Agency of Defense (or the Defense Agency; the AD or the DA), and those financial leaders who have influence over security issues.⁶² This paper focuses on the former two actors, and the role and significance of the financial leaders in security matters will be analyzed in a future study because politicians and bureaucrats are more influential than economic leaders on military security issues. *China's decision-makers* means: a group of leaders of the Communist Party in China (the CPC), bureaucrats of the State Council, and the military leaders of the PLA.

In making an analysis on the perception of the decision-makers, we assume that it is possible to find a tendency and patterns in their "collective" perception, although we do admit that as aggregates of individual perceptions, there certainly exist differences at the individual level.⁶³

As for threat, it consists of at least two elements -- capability and in-

tention (or strategy) of the attacker.⁰³ The intention of the USSR, or the perception of Soviet intention, should be primarily analyzed since intention of the USSR is more difficult for decision-makers of Japan and China to estimate than the Soviet military and economic capability to attack these countries. This paper, regarding threat as an entity, will analyze its existence and level.

II Existence of the Soviet Military "Threat"

The question is: do the decision-makers in Japan and China see the USSR as a threat to their countries? The answer is yes. Both Japan and China have the perception that the USSR is a threat to their security. Ōhira's administrative speech in 1980 (see note 9) assumed the existence of the Soviet threat to Japan. The succeeding Prime Minister Zenkō Suzuki generally restrained himself from referring to the Soviet threat because he was too much involved with the factional politics within the LDP for conducting the policy making. Nakasone, who was appointed to be the Prime Minister in November 1982, remarked in the Standing Committee for the Budget of the House of Representatives that Marxism is a philosophy of power and that the USSR has been increasing its military force in Europe and in the Far East, so that we cannot help but choose the policy of deterrence and balance of power.⁰⁴ Since both deterrence and balance of power presume the equilibrium of mutual threat among countries, his remark apparently assumes that the USSR is a threat to Japan.

Bureaucrats in the government also see the USSR as a threat to Japan. Hiroaki Fujii, a member of the Asian Bureau of the MFA, pointed out that the USSR is the cause of instability in Asia — the confrontation in the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam's military intervention in Cambodia and Soviet military reinforcement in Asia.⁰⁵ Akitane Kiuchi, the Director of the Asian Affairs Bureau, supported Fujii's view on the USSR.⁰⁶ The Agency of Defense also perceives the Soviet military threat. *The Defense White Paper in 1980* asserted that the USSR was a major threat to Japan's security. This was the first time that the Agency, in its Paper, referred to the USSR as a threat to Japan.⁰⁸ Sōichirō Itō, the Director-

General (Minister of State) of the AD, remarked that Japan should pay attention to the Soviet increasing military presence in Asia in order to maintain Japan's security.²⁰

China's decision-makers apparently see the USSR as one of the major threats to China. However, on the significance of the Soviet threat, different opinions among leaders are observed. For example, Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the CPC, asserted that the two super-powers, both the US and the USSR, are the major threat to world peace [and to the security of China] in his speech at the Twelfth Party Congress.²¹ Hu perceived that China was threatened not only by the USSR but also by the US. Hua Guofeng, in contrast, asserted that the major threat was from the USSR. However, neither Hua nor Hu denied the USSR as a threat to China, in spite of their different assessments on the significance of the Soviet threat.

III Level of Threat

Both Japan and China perceive the existence of the Soviet military threat, but their perceived levels of threat are far from similar. Generally, Japan perceives an increasing threat from the USSR while China perceives a decreasing threat. Japan, seeing the Soviet construction of military bases in the Kurile Islands in the late 1978, which Japan claims to be her own territory, has already become antagonistic to the USSR. The Afghan incident was the turning point of Japan's Soviet policy. In 1979, before the incident, the Japanese government still hesitated to take less friendly measures to the USSR. It only protested to the Soviet government through a diplomatic channel twice in 1979 – on February 5 and on October 2.²² The Afghan crisis triggered a series of Japan's antagonistic behavior against the USSR. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sunao Sonoda, did not refer to the territory issue between Japan and the USSR in his speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1979,²³ but a year later, he criticized Soviet's behavior in the Kurile Islands.²⁴ This was the first time that the Japanese government publicly referred to the territory issue and criticized the USSR in the United Nations.

The AD stressed the increasing Soviet military threat to Japan, pointing out her military activities in the Kurile Islands.²⁵

The MFA perceives increasing threat from the USSR, too. Kiuchi remarks that [not only in Europe, but also] in the Far East, Soviet military presence has become too powerful, and to make matters worse, it seems to keep its pace and never stops.²⁶ *Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō* (usually translated as *The Blue Book*), whose content was agreed upon in the Cabinet meeting in August 1980, waived the term “all-direction diplomacy” (or “omni-direction diplomacy”) which had been a theoretical framework for the expected negotiation with the Soviets over the peace treaty and the northern territory issue. The strategy of “all-direction diplomacy” was already being criticized by the LDP in 1979 as being practically impossible to carry out.²⁷ The ending of “all-direction diplomacy” seems to show Japan’s theoretical turnabout to the Western bloc²⁸ though Japanese officials recognized a perception gap within the Western bloc, particularly between Japan and the United States, over the significance of the Soviet threat.²⁹

The evaluation of decreasing threat from the USSR is, to a certain extent, a political necessity for China to promote her economic construction. Evaluation of the Soviet military threat is deeply related to the distribution of her limited resources between two major national purposes – economic construction and military security. The decisions on limiting resources between them can be made only after China maintains a certain level of security, but threat is a vague entity that the decision cannot be made with a perfect rationality. Also, there is no objective standard of minimum security. Here, factional and organizational politics is introduced into the decision process.³⁰

The difference is observed between military leaders of the PLA and presumably non-military analysts of the CPC over the Soviet military threat. Generally, military leaders emphasized the danger of war and perceived the consistency of Soviet’s military policy.³¹ Information analysts, in contrast, stressed the shortcomings and weakpoints of the military force and economy of the USSR, and were relatively prudent on the evaluation of the Soviet threat. On the consistency of Soviet’s policy,

they denied the existence of "time-scheduled" strategy.⁶²

Political leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang saw a decreasing threat from the USSR,⁶³ but there is no evidence that their evaluation of decreasing threat of the Soviet Union is approved by the majority of the leaders of the CPC, PLA, and the State Council.

IV Intention of the USSR

The Japanese leaders, generally, perceive the Soviet external policy, which can be called her intention, to be expansionistic, and believe that the Soviets will not stop their expansion policy.

MFA has the perception that the Soviet Union is trying to isolate the US in international politics.⁶⁴

AD has a similar perception to that of the MFA. *The Defense White Paper 1982* asserts that the Soviet Union intends to divide the Western bloc by her "peace offensive."⁶⁵ It also asserts that the Soviets have the perception that a war [the world war] is inevitable so long as imperialism exists in the world, and that the USSR considers the military power as its indispensable means for carrying out her defense and external policy.⁶⁶

The LDP has a sophisticated analysis on the driving force behind the Soviet expansionistic policy. They assert that the Soviet external policy has been shaped mainly by three factors — the momentum of the Soviet bureaucracy, unsatisfied desire for her national security, and her inferiority complex toward Western Europe.⁶⁷

China's perception of the Soviet intentions, entangled with her assessment of the Soviet military and economic capability, will be analyzed in another paper. Generally, Chinese leaders seem to believe that the domestic problems in the Soviet Union will make her become less expansionistic in the future.

V Discussion and Concluding Remarks

This paper, so far, concentrates on the comparison of Japan's and China's perceptions of the Soviet military threat, assuming that their different perceptions can be analyzed in a parallel manner. The assumption

of a perfect parallel was necessary to have only a minimum number of analytical concepts and to keep the Occam's razor sharp with a risk of making an analytical deviation. Here, influence of domestic politics and international politics on their perceptions of the Soviet threat will be briefly discussed to minimize the deviation of the analysis.

Among Japan's domestic factors relevant to the issue of the Soviet threat, "ukei-ka" (leaning to the right) may be most important. Ukei-ka represents an aspect of Japan's desire to recover the autonomy as a nation lost by her defeat in the Second World War. As the first step of the recovery, it is requested that her national security be maintained in diplomatic and military manners. National security as a political issue has been a taboo because it has often been associated with her militarism in the past. Emphasis on increasing threat from the USSR, in part, is a political necessity for justifying Japan's internal ukei-ka. In practical politics, it functions to justify the increase of her defense budget.

In international milieu, Japan faces pressure from the NATO countries to increase her defense budget and assume her responsibility as a member of the Western bloc.³⁸ However, the Japanese government cannot increase her defense budget just because of pressure from the US and Western Europe. Pressure alone is not convincing enough for the Japanese to assume responsibility as a member of the developed nations in the Western bloc. The image of Japan threatened by the USSR is employed in order to warrant such a move. Here, a link between international politics and domestic politics is observed.

China's perception of the Soviet military threat should be analyzed within the multilateral relationships among China, the USSR and the US, because it has changed primarily as a result of overall assessment of China's strategic situation in the Russo-American balance. The Sino-American rapprochement of 1971-1972 was, to a certain extent, a compromise between the declining US and the frightened China in the face of an increasing Soviet threat. Gradual improvement of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the early 1980s is mainly a result of China's disillusionment with the utility of the Sino-American rapprochement.³⁹

There is a link between China's diplomatic change and its domestic

politics. The rapprochement in 1971-1972 was obviously related to the Lin Biao affairs. China's concession in the negotiation process of the Sino-American normalization was initiated by Deng Xiaoping to maintain his advantage over Hua Guofeng and his supporters in the third plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of December 1979.⁶⁰ The cooling-off of the Sino-American relationship, in part, is a reaction of China's over-concession to the US. "Perception" of decreasing threat from the USSR, expressed by the Chinese government, may be a *ballon d'essai* for the Sino-USSR rapprochement.

We have thus examined Japan's and China's different perceptions of the Soviet military threat — its existence, levels, and intentions. Both countries perceive the USSR as their threat, but Japan sees it as increasing while China considers it decreasing. We also have found the critical influence of domestic politics and international politics to their respective perception of the Soviet threat.

In conclusion, the assumption of the decision-makers' perceptions as an intervening variable must be critically re-examined. In bilateral relationship between the USSR and China and between Japan and the USSR, the assumption of their respective perceptions as an intervening variable is valuable as a working hypothesis, but it loses its validity when the analytical scope is expanded to include the influence of international system and of domestic politics, since perception cannot be defined solely as an intervening variable but has the characteristics of dependent *and* independent variables at the same time. At domestic level, perception of threat is a variable controlled by the decision-makers. On the level of international politics, more strictly, in the multilateral relations in the international system, perception of the decision-makers is partly a dependent variable on which decision-makers make their decisions and partly an independent variable which the world system defines in a very fuzzy manner.

An analytical concept which has the characteristics of the three variables at the same time will lose or greatly reduce its analytical utility. Re-examination and systematic clarification of perception as an analytical tool is necessary for further analysis. (May 31, 1983)

Notes

- (1) In this paper, *China* means *the People's Republic of China*.
- (2) Ole Holsti, Richard Brody, and Robert C. North (1969).
- (3) *Image* can be defined as *the organized representation of an object*. See Herbert C. Kelman (1965), p. 24. Perception does not necessarily have an *organized* structure of representation while image must have.
- (4) For a detailed discussion on the definition of threat, for instance, see *The Kokusai Mondai [International Affairs]* No. 217 (April 1978), the Special Issue on National Security and Economy.
- (5) Tomohisa Sakanaka (1978).
- (6) Haruo Tobari (1981), p. 94.
- (7) *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.
- (8) In terms of "absolute level" of tension, China may still have a higher tension in the relationship with the USSR than Japan has, but in terms of the "direction" of tension vector, China may have the minus sign and Japan has the plus sign.
- (9) *Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō 1981* (usually translated as *The Blue Book*, 1981), p. 333 of "Prime Minister Ohira's Administrative Speech, January 25, 1980".
- (10) In 1981, Deng Xiaoping remarked that the Sino-USSR negotiation over their border is one thing and the Afghan incident is another thing. (*Asahi Evening News* December 21, 1981).
- (11) Tomoyuki Kojima (1983). And see Special Editorial of the *Renmin Ribao* [The People's Daily] November 1, 1980, and Ambassador Li Luye's speech in Geneva in February 1980, (*The Asahi Shimbun* [The Asahi Newspaper] February 9, 1980). *The Asahi Shimbun* February 19, 1983.
- (12) For a discussion of perception as an analytical tool in international relations, for example, see Robert Jervis (1970).
- (13) Ministry of International Trade and Industry is a major organizational actor in Japan's security policy in general. However, MITI seems to remain a minor actor over the specific issue of Soviet military threat, compared to other economic security-related issues such as the trade friction with the US and EC. cf. *The Asahi Shimbun* May 21, 1983, p. 4.
- (14) Different organizational and factional interests, various types of personalities and beliefs and other seemingly non-political factors may define the differences of perception of the decision-makers.
- (15) Dean G. Pruitt, and Richard C. Snyder (1969), pp. 22-26.
- (16) *The Asahi Shimbun* February 7, 1983.
- (17) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan (b), 1981, pp. 24-25.
- (18) *Ibid.*, 1981, p. 79.

- (19) Agency of Defense, 1982, p. 35.
- (20) The Minutes of the Special Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, January 24, 1982, pp. 1-3, Speech of Sōichirō Itō, the Director-General of the Agency of Defense. However, some members of the Agency consider that the Pacific Fleet of the USSR, which is usually thought to be the major threat, does not constitute Soviet major threat to Japan. See the Minutes of the Special Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, April 12, 1982. *cf.* Yōnosuke Nagai (1978).
- (21) *Renmin Ribao* September 8, 1982.
- (22) MFA (a) 1980, p. 135.
- (23) *Ibid.*, pp. 369-377.
- (24) MFA (a) 1981, pp. 399-400.
- (25) AD, 1982, pp. 28-32. *cf.* the Minutes of the Special Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, April 12, Speech of Kōichi Arai, the Councillor of the Agency of Defense.
- (26) MFA (b) 1983, p. 73.
- (27) LDP (a) 1979, pp. 12-13.
- (28) "All-direction diplomacy" and "equi-distance diplomacy" are analytically different concepts – the latter requires Japan's neutrality in the triangle of the US, China, and the USSR, while the former does not – but are often used interchangeably. The Document of the LDP (a) 1979 (see note 27) criticizes the impracticability of the all-direction diplomacy.
- (29) *The Asahi Nenkan* [*The Asahi Yearbook*] 1982, p. 213.
- (30) For the discussion on the significance of factional and bureaucratic politics in China, for example, see Ryō Ōta (1981).
- (31) For example, see Xu Xiangqian (1977) and Zhang Aiping (1983). *cf.* notes 12-17 of Herbert S. Yee (1983) and Shigeo Hiramatsu (1979).
- (32) Qi Ya and Zhou Jirong [1981 (a), 1981 (b)], Xing Shugang, Li Yuhua and Liu Yingna (1983).
- (33) For example, Deng Xiaoping (1982), Hu Yaobang (1980; a secret speech, autumn 1980, *The Asahi Shimbun* March 21, 1983, p. 6)
- (34) MFA (b) 1983, p. 52.
- (35) AD 1982, p. 7.
- (36) *Ibid.*
- (37) LDP (b) 1979, pp. 22-27. LDP in 1979 already surveyed the limitation of China's pro-West policy and the inevitability of the Sino-USSR rapprochement. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-45.
- (38) *The Kokusai Nempō* [*The International Yearbook*], pp. 117-121.
- (39) Qi Xin (1983), p. 52.
- (40) Haruo Tobarai (1983), pp. 81-82.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agency of Defense 防衛庁, 『防衛白書』
- Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, 「中国共产党第十二次全国代表大会开幕词」『人民日报』1982年9月2日, p.2.
- Hiramatsu, Shigeo 平松茂雄, 「中国の国際情勢・脅威認識と戦争論——華国峰政権下の軍事論争」, 『外務省調査月報』Vol. XXI No.3 (1979), pp.28-63.
- Holsti, Ole R., Richard A. Brody and Robert C. North, "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis," James N. Rosenau ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York, The Free Press, 1969), pp. 679-696.
- Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦, 「全面创造社会主义现代化建设的新局面——在中国共产党第十二次全国代表大会上的报告(一九八二年九月一日)」, 『人民日报』1982年9月8日, pp.1-5.
- Hua Guofeng 华国峰, 「现代化强国而奋斗——一九七八年二月二十六日在第五届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上的政府工作报告」, 『人民日报』1978年3月7日, pp.1-5.
- Jervis, Robert, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1970)
- Kelman, Herbert C., *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1965)
- Kojima, Tomoyuki 小島朋之, 「対ソ絡みで日本をためす中国」, 『東亜』No. 110 (April 1983), pp. 43-53.
- The Liberal Democratic Party 自由民主党 (a), 『総合安全保障』(自民党, 1979)
(b), 『国際環境の変化』(自民党, 1979)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs 外務省(a), 『わが外交の近況』(外交青書)
(b), 『最近の国際情勢』
- Nagai, Yōnosuke 永井陽之助, 「日中“片面”条約の帰結——国際政治の変動と日本外交の課題」, 『霞山』No. 135 (September 1978), pp. 1-24.
- Okabe, Tatsumi 岡部達味, 「中国をめぐる国際政治観」, 『アジア時報』No. 158 (June 1983), pp. 8-26.
- Ōta, Ryō 太田亮, "Japanese and Chinese Attitude toward Soviet Military Threat: Perceptions and Policies", unpublished paper, March 2, 1983.
 "A Study of Powers and Functions of the Economic Commissions of the State Council in China: An Interplay of Politics and Administration," *The Journal of Social Science* (I. C. U.) 20-(1) (October 1981), pp. 147-167.
- Pollack, Jonathan D., "Chinese Global Strategy and Soviet Power," *Problems of Communism* Vol. XXX No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1981), pp. 54-69.
- Pruitt, Dean G. and Richard C. Snyder eds., *Theory and Research on the Causes of War* (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1969)

- Qi Xin 齊辛, 「從戰略「聯盟」到中美雙邊關係」, 『七十年代』 No.159 (March 1983), pp. 51-54.
- Qi Ya and Zhou Jirong 启亚, 周纪荣(a), 「反对霸权主义斗争的几个突出问题」, 『现代国际关系』 Vol. 1 No. 1 (October 1981), pp. 1-11.
-(b), 「苏联究竟有没有全球战略?」, 『人民日报』 1981年5月20日, p. 7.
- Sakanaka, Tomohisa 阪中友久, 「日中条約の國際政治上の意味」, 『東亞』 No. 136 (October 1978), pp. 15-22.
- the Special Committee on National Security, House of Representatives 安全保障特別委員會(衆議院), 『安全保障特別委員會議錄』
- the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 外務委員會(衆議院), 『外務委員會議錄』
- Tamba, Minoru 丹波実 [the Director of Security Division, North American Affairs Bureau, MFA 外務省北米局安全保障課長], 「外交と安全保障」, 『アジア時報』 No. 129 (November 1980), pp. 8-28.
- Tobari, Haruo 戸張東夫, 「中国觀察——実践と方法」, 『東亞』 No. 189 (March 1983), pp. 70-86.
-, 「華国峰 vs. 鄧小平——対立の軌跡」(新泉社, 1981)
- Tow, William T., "Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation: Evolution and Prospects," *Pacific Affairs* Vol. 56 No. 1 (Spring 1983), pp. 51-83.
- Xing Shugang, Li Yunhua and Liu Yingna 邢书纲, 李允华, 刘英娜, 「苏美力量对比及其对80年代国际局势影响」, 『国际问题研究』 No. 7 (July [?] 1983), pp. 25-31, pp. 63-64.
- Xu Xiangqian 徐向前, 「提高警惕 准备打仗」, 『红旗』 1978年8期, pp. 42-50.
- Yee, Herbert S., "The Three World Theory and post-Mao China's global strategy", *World Today* (forthcoming).
- Zhang Aiping 张爱萍, 「关于国防现代化的若干问题」, 『红旗』 1983年5期, pp. 21-24.

※ Other relevant editorials, *Renmin Ribao*, 1978-1980.

- 1978年1月26日 「抓纲治军 准备打仗」(p. 1, p. 3), reprinted from Jiefangjun Bao 解放军报.
- 1978年9月19日 「社论 苏联全球战略的新动向」(p. 1, p. 4)
- 1978年12月30日 本报评论员 「社会帝国主义在亚洲的战略」(p. 5)
- 1979年12月31日 「社论 苏联加紧扩张的新步骤」(p. 1)
- 1979年12月31日 胡征庆 「八十年代国际形势展望」(p. 6)
- 1980年1月11日 特约评论员 「苏联争霸世界的军事战略」(p. 7)
- 1980年12月26日 观察家 「阿富汗事件一年说明了什么」(p. 6)

ソ連軍事的「脅威」に対する 日中両国の認識とその差異

——1979年アフガニスタン事件前後——

〈要 約〉

太 田 亮

ソ連の軍事的「脅威」という類似した入^{インプット}力にもかかわらず、日本と中国の対外政策という出^{アウトプット}力の様相はかなり異なっている。本稿は、媒介変数としての両国政策決定者の「脅威」認^{パーセプション}識に焦点をあて、その相違点をさぐる。細かくみると、両国ともに政策決定者集団の成員の属する組織や派閥、彼らのパーソナリティなどの相違などに起因する認識の差異が存在するが、大まかなパターンは観察される。すなわち、両国共に「脅威」の存在自体については一致しているが、そのレベルや増減の方向については認識が異なる。日本は「脅威」の絶対水準は低いが増加傾向にあると見、中国は絶対水準は高く、また減少方向にあると断言しないまでも、ソ連の直面する軍事的・経済的制約に以前よりも注目することが多くなった。ソ連の意図については、日本はひきつづき拡張を試みるとするが、中国はしばらくの間は大規模な拡張の意図はないとする。

これら2国間の比較は、厳密にはパラレルではない。国際政治全体（特に対米関係）においての戦略的条件などがかなり異なるので、両国の対外政策・認識において無条件の比較はできない。また、「脅威」は国際・国内政治の要請から故意に誇張または過少評価されるので、その度合の^{エスティメーション}推定も将来の課題の1つである。さらに、国際・国内政治要因の導入によって、認識は入力・出力の性格をもあわせもつようになり、認識を媒介変数とする定式化それ自身も再検討を要することとなる。