

## DISCUSSION

Aoyagi: Thank you very much, panellists, for your very interesting talks. Now that we have heard all six speakers, I'd like to open the floor for questions from the audience. To do this, I shall presently be distributing sheets of paper to you, and I ask those of you with questions to please write them down on that paper, specifying to which panellist the question is directed. We shall now have about five minutes to prepare the questions.

.....

Aoyagi: I now have many questions with me here – so many that with the limit on our time, we may not be able to have all of them answered. The way we will proceed with this is that while I continue to sort out the questions and group them by the panellist, Prof. Hara will read out to you the questions, *all* the questions, addressed to our first speaker, Prof. Kojima. Prof. Kojima might then wish to answer them individually or comment on them as a whole.

Hara: Here are the questions for Prof. Kojima. The first one is:

“Efforts for economic integration in the South Pacific region are already being made, although admittedly not on a full-scale basis, by such organizations as SPEC. This being the case, what in your view would be the commendable relationship between OPTAD, which you say could play an important role in bringing about economic integration in the Pacific region, and such regional organizations as SPEC that are already in existence?”

The second question is:

“When speaking of multilateral assistance in the form of direct investment, how is a private firm's benefit maximized? Will companies actually participate?”

These two are the questions we have for Prof. Kojima. And now,

Prof. Kojima please.

Kojima: I'd like to start by saying that when I came here today to speak at this symposium, I was quite aware of the fact that the word "Pacific" region could mean different things to different countries. And my understanding was that I was to talk on the Pacific as I saw it, which in my case is the Greater Pacific. But the focus of this symposium seems to have been very much on the South Pacific. And here, I'd like to pose a question — perhaps to Mr. Craig; and the question is this. I have been told that in Oceania, when you speak of the "Pacific," it inevitably means the South Pacific. If this is the case, what are the words you use to signify the Greater Pacific? I ask you this, because unless we know what we mean by the Pacific region — whether we use it to mean the South Pacific or the Greater Pacific — it is a bit hard to go on with our discussion. This was one point I wanted to make.

I'd like to go on and speak a bit on the status, the importance, which the South Pacific region holds in our proposed OPTAD forum. Frankly speaking, South Pacific issues have as yet only a very insignificant status in our forum. But this does not mean then that we can neglect the region. In a way, it is a region that poses some very delicate problems to us all. For example, when the Canberra seminar was held in September last year, and when Sir John Crawford first sent out the invitations and Prime Minister Mara of Fiji received it, Mara is reported to have said that he couldn't go when "no other prime ministers are going." This goes to show how delicate the whole issue is and how carefully it must be handled.

Now moving onto the question of the relationship between OPTAD and the existing sub-regional organizations in the South Pacific: I've come to know through my talks with various scholars and people in Fiji and in Port Moresby that there are two views concerning this issue. One is the view which says that a sub-regional integration *within* the South Pacific is the priority issue, that, just as the ASEAN nations are saying, unity among themselves is what must come first. The other is the view which says that, unless they extend themselves

for contact and cooperation with countries outside their immediate region, they cannot hope to achieve economic development or any other development, and that therefore an organization like OPTAD is very valid and important. But my view, my personal observation, is that the countries in the South Pacific — while admitting that the level of development differs from country to country — have not yet reached the stage whereby economic development can be considered as the major issue. There are other issues that must be dealt with before they go ahead with economic development. This being the case, the kind of assistance which OPTAD has in mind for this region is not in the line of those aimed directly at promoting economic development, but rather, they are of the kind which Mr. Hogen has referred to as cultural and educational assistance. And so we have been asking ourselves, as well as the people in the South Pacific: "What kind of help can we best offer in this direction? What sort of help do they want?" But as yet we haven't arrived at a satisfactory answer. On the one hand, they — as Prof. Hatanaka has pointed out — say that they want to preserve their "Pacific Way." Hence, "Please don't disturb us. Leave us in peace." But on the other hand, they also say that they want to develop, that they want to advance their countries. "What would you like us to do then?" — we ask. But in this situation, we are not the only ones who don't have the answer; they, the island people themselves, don't either.

There is one thing I want to mention, and, not being an anthropologist myself, would like to have Prof. Hatanaka's opinion on. In my talks with the island people, I have often asked them what they thought of Hawaii. Hawaii, I believe, is one of the Pacific islands. It has been completely colonized by the United States and today enjoys a per capita income that is equalled to, if not more than, that in the mainland. When compared with Hawaii, the per capita income in Fiji is about one-third; that in Papua New Guinea is incomparably lower. Well, do the island people consider Hawaii to be a blessed land, or do they not? Would they like to see their countries become like Hawaii too? No, no, no, we don't want to become like Hawaii — so

they say in Fiji, for example. Yet, at the same time, they say they want to develop. And so we are back to our old problem: we want to help, but we don't know how.

Now moving onto the next question, which is on business ventures: I am not entirely clear about the meaning of the question, but what I was trying to say in my talk was that — to take just the example of Indonesia — there is still plenty of room left for developing its oil resources. At present, most of the promising oil-fields in Indonesia are in the hands of American oil majors and are not being developed simply due to the company's consideration for profits. What would be more beneficial to all concerned is to allow Japan, also, to participate in the oil venture, in return for a pledge that she would buy and provide the market for the petroleum thus produced. Australia, who is also in need of petroleum, could do the same. So can other countries. Meanwhile, the technology needed for development could be American. In this way, many countries would cooperate in the development of oil resources in Indonesia, with each country making a contribution in the field she is best at. Indonesia, of course, will also have a majority ownership in the venture. Through this sort of truly international joint venture, we can develop oil resources in Indonesia much more efficiently.

And this is an effective way of doing things, which Japan unfortunately has yet to learn. The Japanese approach toward overseas aid has been predominantly a bilateral one, as in the case of the ASEAN Five Integration Industry Projects. There again, Japan proposed that she would furnish one billion dollars and look after the Projects all by herself. It's always "Japan will . . . Let Japan do . . ." This is not at all a commendable way of doing things. A more multi-lateral approach is strongly called for, as we must have learned by now from our recent experience with China. Fearing that the United States might obtain a hold on the Hozan Steel Mill Project, Japan volunteered to shoulder the project entirely by herself, saying that she would furnish some two billion dollars for it. And she pledged this without having any clear understanding as to how the accounts

might be settled. Had the whole project been conducted more carefully in the context of an international joint venture together with other Western countries, Japan would not be encountering the kind of hardship she is faced with now. Also, with an international joint venture, we can avoid the danger whereby the economy of a nation becomes dominated by one particular country.

Aoyagi: Thank you very much, Prof. Kojima. As we have many questions for the other panellists too, we are not able to take time here to direct further questions on what Prof. Kojima has just said. We shall move on to the questions addressed to Mr. Osborn and Mr. Craig.

Hara: The first question is:

"Could you elaborate on the desirability of a regional multilateral cooperation effort, rather than traditional bilateral cooperation, to the South Pacific countries?"

The next question, addressed to Mr. Craig, is:

"You said that Australia did not have any colonies. But isn't Norfolk Island an Australian colony?"

And the last question is:

"Will the Government of New Zealand protest if the Japanese Government goes ahead and deposits low-level radioactive wastes in the Pacific region?"

Osborn: Let me start with the one that I have in front of me, which is about Norfolk Island. And I start with that, because I think it's personally the most interesting and also the most unlikely. Norfolk Island isn't an Australian colony. Norfolk Island, you'll remember, was an island with no inhabitant in the 19th century. Australian convicts were taken there, and it was used as a penal settlement, and they were the first settlers. Eventually the conditions on the island became too expensive to maintain as a penal settlement, and it was vacated. It was largely populated eventually, later in the 19th century, by people brought from Pitcairn Island, because the British felt Pitcairn was too small to sustain the population on it.

I understand that the Pitcairnese received from Queen Victoria

some undertaking about their right to govern the island. Exactly what it was, I'm afraid I don't know. Eventually most of the Pitcairnese went back to Pitcairn Island, preferring their original island. By this time, the island was too small to be left on its own, too close to Australia to be left on its own; and it was administered by New South Wales for a while and, after federation, by the Commonwealth Government.

The emphasis on the island having an independent existence has received a great deal of publicity, not from an islander, but from an American who has settled there and runs a local newspaper. He has masterminded a very efficient campaign with support, of course, of some of the islanders, seeking subsidies from the Australian taxpayer, the right to setup a tax-free haven for investment purposes and to have complete control of internal affairs. It always seemed to me that this man and the people who support him wanted both, we would say, to have their cake and to eat it. The solution has been to grant to the Legislative Assembly of the islanders control of their own affairs, but the ordinances they pass have to be approved by a Minister of the Australian Government who has responsibility for the territories.

Norfolk Island is no more a colony of Australia than Tasmania is, or one of the other islands off the Australian coast but closer to it. This question was addressed to Mr. Craig, because he was the one who said that Australia didn't have any colonies in the area any longer. Mr. Craig is quite right. We don't have any colonies in the area.

Aoyagi: Now Mr. Craig please.

Craig: I would just like to say something to Prof. Kojima who raised a question of me in his answers. I know the word Pacific region means many things. I know that, strictly speaking, it means all the countries around the Pacific, including Canada, the United States, the South American countries on the Pacific, even Korea and China and certainly Japan, and the Southeast Asian countries even, and certainly Australia and New Zealand, plus all the countries within the Pacific Ocean area. But on this occasion, I thought it appropriate to talk

particularly about the developing countries of the South Pacific.

On the question about the multilateral rather than traditional bilateral cooperation: I know that previously many countries in the South Pacific area had closer relations with countries in Europe than they had amongst themselves. To take the example even of my own country, New Zealand, I think it's true to say that the relations between New Zealand and Britain were every bit as close, if not more so, than relations between New Zealand and Australia. This was simply because of the original colonial relationship. There are obviously lots of possibilities for regional approaches on development, education, even political cooperation to some extent. I think we all know that throughout the world there is a movement towards regional cooperation amongst groups of countries like the Southeast Asian (i.e., the ASEAN) countries. It's happening in Europe, in Western Europe I mean, and also in the South Pacific. Nevertheless certain traditional bilateral relationships remain important for trade and other purposes.

Hara: Now the question about the nuclear wastes ...

Craig: Yes. Will the Government of New Zealand protest against depositing the nuclear wastes in the Pacific Ocean by Japan? There is, as we know, a proposal of the Japanese Government to make experimental dumpings of nuclear wastes some nine hundred kilometers from Japan. It is in the Mariana Trench, and is closer to Japan than to anywhere else in the Pacific. There has been a delegation which has visited New Zealand to explain the Japanese Government's purpose. It has explained to the New Zealand Government that Japan will observe all the international regulations. There are several international treaties that lay down guidelines and regulations for such nuclear waste dumping, which is already carried out by a number of other countries in the world, particularly some European countries. The Japanese have made it clear, as I understand it, that they will abide by international regulations most strictly. So my government feels there isn't anything to *protest*, although of course we are sure that the Japanese Government will take every step to reassure coun-

tries in the region that still have anxieties about this step. There is a strong feeling in the Pacific that the Pacific area should be kept free of nuclear contamination and nuclear rivalries, and we are sure that the Japanese Government understands this feeling.

Aoyagi: Thank you very much, Mr. Osborn and Mr. Craig.

And now, the questions for Ambassador Nombri.

Hara: There are three questions for Ambassador Nombri.

"Please briefly describe any national-level project for an educational system to overcome the difficulties of the seven hundred distinct languages and countless dialects you have referred to. Do you have any research institute for an educational system relating to this?"

The second question is:

"Dr. Hatanaka has pointed out that the rapid economic growth of developing countries has destroyed respective traditional cultures. What do you think of this observation?"

The third question is:

"Does Papua New Guinea have a domestic demand potential to utilize direct foreign investment? What benefits will accrue to investors?"

Nombri: I will start off by answering the second question. Does rapid economic growth in developing countries destroy traditional cultures? I think it's true to say that not only economic development but also other developments, brought about because of improved communication and more contact with outside countries, destroy traditional cultures. But we in Papua New Guinea believe that respective governments can also control the effect which development has on traditional cultures. We have ministries set up to handle this very aspect so that when big economic projects are planned, various measures are taken to make sure that not everything is destroyed in the process of economic development. There are some things in our traditional culture which are negative in their application to modernization, but there are other things which we believe are constructive and should be maintained. One of these, I think, is keeping one's own identity. To



say that you have a lot of money but don't know where you belong, we feel, is a shame. We also feel that you should know who your forefathers are, what your traditions are. And we believe it is possible to develop economically without sacrificing your identity, your traditions.

Now moving onto the first question: How does Papua New Guinea plan to combat its diversity in language and culture? We opt out in a very cowardly, but I think positive, way. To use one of our many languages, or to use them all, would not keep us together as a unit. Unity in a country depends on all of us working together. So we have adopted the English language to be our national language. In all schools, English is the mode of instruction. All transactions and records are kept in English. Although we have three languages used in our Parliament, English is the language in which all debates are recorded. And this, we believe, will create unity among the people. It would also be cheaper than to use a new language, as writing textbooks for schools, law books, etc. in a new language would be a very expensive exercise.

Now on the third question, which is on domestic demand for investors and the benefits that the investors would accrue as a result of investment: I have attempted to outline this in my talk but I was very sketchy. There is definitely a demand for direct investment in Papua New Guinea by foreign enterprises. What I have outlined this afternoon was to point out the controls that are exercised in order to make sure that the people of Papua New Guinea benefit from such investment. But what I did not point out is that we also have incentive schemes that are part and parcel of the whole plan. In the investment incentive, the foreign investors are allowed to take their profits out of the country. They are also allowed to repatriate loan capital and profits out of the country. Nationalization of industry is forbidden unless it is within laws that are in practice in Papua New Guinea. I'm afraid I did not make this point too clear in my talk; but what it is, is that there is a comprehensive scheme, which, in my view, should be a very attractive one for any foreign investor.

Aoyagi: Thank you very much, Ambassador Nombri. Now, for Prof. Hatanaka we have so many questions that it would take us several hours to have them all answered. We have here with us today Prof. Kiyoko Cho of this university, who has long been engaged in studies of modernization. Prof. Cho has kindly accepted to give a brief talk on the subject of modernization as related to Prof. Hatanaka's talk. Prof. Hatanaka will then speak to us again on some of the points brought up in the questions from the audience.

Cho: I am, on the whole, in agreement with what Prof. Hatanaka said in her talk based on her field research of many years. On these premises, I would like to comment on a few points.

The first point is the definition of "modernization." Modernization is not identical with Westernization, although it is true that Western advanced nations, as indigenous modernizers, have had a considerable impact on modernization in non-Western nations. Then again, modernization is not synonymous with industrialization, although industrialization is of course a part of it. To attempt to make a thorough definition of modernization here would take too long, but I think some of its features might be mentioned.

One of the features of modernization is "rationality" in the Weberian sense. As Benjamin Schwartz also states, rationality in the sphere of the natural or physical environment creates material technology and makes it possible for man to control his physical environment, while rationality in the sphere of the social environment creates the modern state bureaucracy and other modern social institutions. Industrialism reflects both material technology and social technology. Rationalization implies the question of ethos or value concepts, because rationalization of the natural environment or/and of the social environment is based upon certain ethos or value concepts. This is evident when we examine the process of modernization and change in Western civilization — i.e., the indigenous modernizer.

Today, in the discussion of modernization, we find two different emphases: one is "soft" modernization and the other is "hard" modernization. "Hard" represents such things as technological revolu-

tion, industrial modernization and so forth; and "soft" represents values, thought patterns, behavioral patterns, etc. that are deeply rooted in the consciousness and culture of those who initiate or participate in the process of modernization. That the latter constitutes a very important facet of modernization should not be forgotten when considering what modernization is.

In the case of modernization in non-Western societies, technological methods or instruments which have been produced and developed in the West can be rather easily introduced and imported to non-Western societies. The adoption of technology is often regarded as the main method of modernization, neglecting or forgetting the ethos or value concepts of those who utilize the modern physical technology or the modern social institutions. The impact which comes from the outside sometimes stimulates indigenous modernization from the bosom of traditional ethos, social relations or social institutions. Sometimes such an impact (often technology) destroys the traditional values of the non-Western world. At other times, strong traditional leaders utilize modern techniques and methods in order to preserve and strengthen their traditional, authoritarian societies.

I am sure that Prof. Hatanaka too had these questions in mind when she gave her talk. As is already clear, I think modernization has to be considered from both the hard and the soft aspects and at the same time from the concepts of "from outside" and "from within." An impetus for modernization coming from the outside is not in itself a bad thing, since often the impact of contact or encounter with other cultures can give rise to something new and original "from within." What is important is that we are aware of these two processes, and that no one nation (usually Western developed nations) can be the model for developing nations. The experience of the developed nations can be one of the various models and stimulations with which the developing nations can explore their own new, unique model. Simple imitation or adoption of other models will not bring about any creative results. This is what is meant by responsible initiation "from

within" in modernization. To repeat, modernization should not be gauged merely in terms of industrialization but rather in terms of both its hard and soft elements that are conducive to the formation of a modern society.

I would like to speak a bit about the relationship of modernization to nationalism. Nationalism in Asia, as Prof. Hatanaka has pointed out, is inseparable from the question of identity. But I feel that it is also inseparable from the question of modernization. If we are to point out some of the features of Asian nationalism, we might come up with the following: 1) self-determinism, or freedom from outside control; 2) establishment of a unified nation-state and of a democratic political system within; 3) freedom from poverty and equitable distribution of wealth, namely social justice; 4) re-evaluation of traditional culture and distinction between the positive and negative elements of one's cultural heritage, particularly in relation to modernization; and 5) peaceful co-existence among the Asian nations so as to enable the pursuit and realization of the above-mentioned four objectives. I think that when we look at the question of modernization in the light of these features of nationalism, particularly in the case of developing countries in Asia, we might obtain a new perspective on the relationship between modernization *and* traditional culture too. This was one point I wanted to make.

Prof. Hatanaka has pointed out that a traditional culture has three functions — that it functions 1) as an identity marker; 2) as a channel through which to express values and sentiments, and also as a form of communication; and 3) as a marketable asset. In addition to these important points, a traditional culture, if it sticks to a stagnant, particularistic and irrational traditionalism, may function as an obstacle to modernization. However, if a liberal openness to constructive development, human dignity and social justice emerges out of the bosom of traditional culture, it may function as an indigenous cultural energy for modernization. I am in agreement with Toynbee in his rejection of the notion that there is but one civilization. The existence of multiple cultures in the world is a very important thing. However,

in each of these indigenous, traditional culture, I think there are both favorable and unfavorable elements for the modernization of a nation, for healthy nationalism and for the development of its culture as one with universalistic value while keeping its unique and particular significance. Therefore, in attempting to *develop* a traditional culture — not just Westernizing it but developing it from within — what is of utmost importance to the people is to distinguish those favorable “plus” elements from the unfavorable “minus” elements. This is a question involving self-examination, and this is where education can come in to play an important role.

Lastly, I would like to speak briefly on Christianity. Prof. Hatanaka has stated that the introduction of Christianity into the region has resulted either in a complete destruction of traditional culture in a Westernizing transformation, or in the co-existence of indigenous and Western cultures side by side. I understand the situation described very well. However, I do not believe that Christianity itself has anything in it that destroys or disintegrates traditional culture. If it does, I suppose it is because of certain missionaries' behavior, and not because of Christianity itself. And while admitting that there might have been cases of such undesirable situations in the past, I suppose most of the missionaries today are more careful and sensitive to indigenous cultures.

Kanzo Uchimura, an outstanding Japanese Christian leader who went to America in 1884, wrote an excellent autobiography entitled “How I Became a Christian.” In it, he says that by living in America, a Christendom, he came to discern the various beastly evils, as well as the splendid goodness which overcome their sinfulness. By discerning this, he, in turn, came to realize some promising values in the indigenous culture of heathendom, his home country, which he could be proud of and cherish, along with the sinful and stagnant reality, a tepid state of human existence that needed to be awakened and innovated by Christianity. This sort of critical as well as appreciative evaluation of the Western developed nations and re-evaluation of one's own culture is the task facing the indigenous citizens of Asia and

particularly that of the indigenous Christians of the non-Western countries.

Aoyagi: Thank you very much, Prof. Cho. And now Prof. Hatanaka, would you like to comment on what Prof. Cho has just said, adding as you go along your own reply to some of the points brought up by the audience?

Hatanaka: Prof. Cho has talked about self-determinism and nationalism in Asia. My feeling is that the case of Asia and that of the small island states in the South Pacific are somewhat different on this. The non-Europeans in Asia have had a religion which they regarded as the primary mode of confirming their national identity. They also regarded it as the very thing that protected them from the excessive development seen in Western society. And it was under this religion that they organized themselves and founded their nationalism and unity. But in the case of Polynesia, what you might consider as their traditional religion is not at all like Hinduism or Islamic, for instance. Theirs is the kind in which genealogies have played a major religious role. By the time Christianity came in, they had already firmly established a society in which these genealogies served as the basis of their political society and hierarchical structure — like the Emperor system in Japan — with its supreme god, Tangaroa, at the beginning of the genealogical tree. Christianity had the effect of obliterating this genealogy as well as of ignoring their oral tradition, with the result that what was the only cultural heritage for the Polynesians was completely destroyed.

Melanesians didn't have an Asian-type religion either. Theirs was animism. They did not accept white people nor their religion; but, when they saw the various goods and articles which the white people brought in with them, they too started wanting them. And, thinking that if they believed in the white people's god they too might be able to obtain the things that the white people had, they converted to Christianity. This is what later came to be known as the cargo cult. The cargo cult had disappeared by the late 19th or early 20th century, but the colonial government continued to make use of the cult in its

effort to crush people's desire for social development. This desire for social development, however, grew into a social movement — which both the missionaries and the colonial government had considerable difficulty trying to control — and later into a positive forward-looking stance, such as what they have now, toward economic development.

I have received many questions from the audience — perhaps because my talk was in Japanese. As this is a symposium on the Pacific region, I have confined my talk to only those things that can be commonly said about the region. But among the questions, there are quite a few which deal with the question of the process of modernization or with that of the relationship between modernization and tradition. But this varies from place to place. Even within Melanesia, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Fiji all present different pictures. As mentioned earlier, Fiji, for example, is a multi-racial country; and here the very question of nationalism — what it is — takes a very complex turn. In Western Samoa, which was the first to gain independence among the island states, the process of modernization is an exceedingly slow one, because the people there are not happy to let their traditional way of life become completely destroyed for the sake of quick modernization. Here, the question of how best to give the needed vitality to the process becomes a very important issue.

In the case of Papua New Guinea, one of the features of its traditional culture is the high regard for prestige. And so, after their independence, they exerted much of their energy in building, one after another, magnificent, impressive facilities in the capital. The public library in Port Moresby, for instance, is such a splendid place that I can only look at it with great envy. The library at my university, the Kanazawa University, is nowhere near its magnificence. But when I visited there January last year, I was told that the people who use the library are mostly expatriates — foreigners who work there and their family members — and that it is hardly used by the local people themselves. Speaking for the local people, I cannot help but hope that the Government will decentralize its efforts and build these facilities

in such districts as Chimbu and Mount Hagen instead of centralizing them in the capital for use by the elite. This would enable a more general levelling of culture throughout the country. Needless to say, the proliferation of basic education must precede everything.

I came here today thinking that this symposium would be attended by many people from the embassies of developing countries; and it was on this assumption that I prepared my talk. However, as the Ambassador from Papua New Guinea is virtually the only person here in this category, I am a bit thrown off balance and at a loss as to how to continue with my talk. Also, as regards the questions from the audience, I find it hard to say anything definitive in my replies as situations differ from country to country. If you had specified the country or the place and had asked me "How is it in such-and-such a place?", I would have perhaps found it easier to talk, giving some concrete examples of the ways in which certain countries are dealing with their situations.

In talking about the internally-generated development of a culture, Prof. Cho has referred to the existence, within a traditional culture, of both favorable and unfavorable elements for modernization and has maintained that the most pressing issue for the people of developing countries is the choice they must make between these two elements. I think this is a very true observation. For certainly, no development can be expected if people just blindly stick to their traditional culture. The so-called Pig Culture in New Guinea, for instance, stands as a serious obstacle to modernization. Within this culture, pigs play an extremely important role in all aspects of human life, from law to marriage to mediation of quarrels. Pigs are held in such high regard and valued at such a high price that they are even used as bride price. This sort of custom is certainly an obstacle to modernization. But the decision to do away with it must come from the local people themselves and not in any way from outsiders. Unless they, themselves, come to make a conscious, intelligent choice, they will only end up imitating the West indiscriminately, destroying as they go along even the good aspects of their traditional culture simply because



they are not Western. This would result in serious trouble later on.

All in all, I think that much of their future depends on their fundamental educational policies. In regions where Christianity came in early, the missionaries initiated the people into education by teaching them the alphabet and so on. In such regions, steps toward modernization can be taken with relative ease. But then, there are the small islands with populations of no more than thirty thousand or much less. Given the fact that these islands also suffer from a scarcity of natural resources, we can see that there will be limitations and restrictions on their development.

I am sorry that I am not able to answer your questions in a more satisfactory manner. I fear the effect of indiscriminate generalizations — that unless I talk about each specific region with specific examples, what I say could be quite misleading to those of you who are not familiar with the actual life on these islands.

Aoyagi: Thank you very much, Prof. Hatanaka. Now we will have questions for Mr. Hogen.

Hara: We have six questions for Mr. Hogen. The first one is:

“Besides government assistance, is JICA thinking of private investment in this area?”

The second one is:

“I should think that the Japanese technical experts working in this region for the training and education of the people are somewhat handicapped in their efforts by the differences in culture, custom and social mores. What are your views on this observation?”

The third one is:

“I believe that there are many people in this region who want to come to Japan to study. Does JICA have any plans and programs for aiding them in terms of giving scholarships and so forth?”

The fourth question is:

“The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for dealing with South Pacific countries, was organized into department according to the old suzerain states. The same system continues. Doesn't this pose some difficulties in international cooperation?”

The fifth question is:

"It seems to me that Japanese aid to this region is not as carefully thought out nor as continuous as, for example, Australian aid is. Once aid is given, not much interest or care is shown as to its use and effect. Is this observation not correct?"

And the last question is:

"According to my understanding, Japan became a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1950. What has become of this? Is the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept related in any way with this?"

Hogen: Private investment does not belong to the competence of JICA. JICA can, under certain conditions, provide financial facilities on a limited scale. For instance, one Japanese may develop a certain mining company in a developing country. If he needs to build some infrastructure around his mine, let's say, to build a road — if this is necessary for his mining project and at the same time is useful for the local people, he can ask us for financial aid. He can even build a school for the children of the laborers with our financial aid. Furthermore, he can build a mosque in order to gather the labor force for his mining enterprise. In these cases, the rate of interest would be very low.

The second question deals with the various handicaps that Japanese technical experts might be experiencing on account of differences in culture and custom. Yes, certain handicaps do exist, not only in the Pacific region but in other places as well. There is the language problem, for one. But Japanese technical experts are carrying out their duties with such enthusiasm and devotion that they somehow manage to teach everything they want to teach to the native trainees. I think it is fair to say that, despite the handicaps, they are doing a very good job and that they have an excellent reputation in the region.

The next question is about students coming to Japan for training and studies. Customarily, Japanese government scholarships are given not directly to the students themselves but to their respective countries. In other words, they are given to those recommended by the

government of the recipient country. As most of the countries in the Pacific region are new countries having only recently obtained their independence, this is mainly an issue for the future. There are, however, already quite a few students training in Japan at the invitation of the Japanese Government, and their numbers are, of course, bound to increase. JICA does not give any scholarships.

Now on the fourth question. The five political departments of the Japanese Foreign Office are set up according to geographical order. That is the most expeditious way. As for economic cooperation with developing countries, the Foreign Office does have one special department, namely, the economic cooperation department which is functioning very well.

And now about the criticism that Japanese aid is not very carefully thought out nor very continuous — this is a question of follow-up. While admitting that there might have been cases of this in the past, I think it is a bit unfair to single out only a few cases and generalize from them. I think that on the whole our after-care is quite good. I say this because every year we send out teams of people around the world specifically for the purpose of investigating the effectiveness of our aid. We investigate the attitudes and responses of the people, the recipients themselves as well as the locals at large, toward our aid. We then study the reports very carefully. So we feel we are doing what we can. Of course things can always be further perfected, and we intend to continue to do so.

As for the last question, which is about Japan's membership in the Institute of Pacific Relations and its possible connection with the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept, I'm afraid that this is something on which I have no knowledge. I'm sorry but I am not able to give an answer.

Aoyagi: Thank you very much, Mr. Hogen. We have now heard the remarks and comments of all the speakers. I'm afraid we have gone well past our scheduled time, but before closing the symposium, I would like Mr. Sloan from the Canadian Embassy to give us one final, overall comment.

Sloan: I have prepared a question for Ambassador Nombri; but as I've been asked to give a short comment at the end, I will attempt to incorporate the substance of my question into my comment. I believe that as the only official representative of the northern Pacific area, it's incumbent upon me to make some sort of comments on the opinions presented at this symposium, given the Pacific cooperation movement between the countries of the western Pacific.

I feel that the speakers today, the comments of the speakers today, have attested to the importance of the growing ties between the countries of the Pacific region. We all see our relations from our own perspective, our own institutional interest. The fact that we all see them also because our relations exist across the Pacific, I think, attests to the importance of the ties that are growing in this area. And I would be remiss if I didn't mention the growing interest in the Pacific cooperation in Canada. This in part reflects the movement in Canada of the locus of economic power westward which in Japan you see especially in the development of resource relations between Japan and Canada. If you'll permit me to comment personally concerning the question of the development of institutionalized relations within and amongst Pacific countries, even in my short time in Japan, I feel that there have been very, very major advances made on the increasing comprehension amongst people involved in Japan and other countries in the Pacific area of the ties that exist between us. Ideas like Kantaiheiyo — Pacific Basin Cooperation, Pacific Community Concept — have all taken on an increasing importance for all of us. But at the same time, I think that if we look to the future, there are many, many questions that still have to be answered as to what direction we can best look at in the future development of relations in the Pacific. I think if we look at the question of the institutionalization of Pacific relations, which is what Prof. Kojima has spent so much time developing his very thesis on, I feel that he very clearly put forward the fact that economic arguments on the development of Pacific relations cannot be denied. At the same time, at the recent conferences — both the Canberra Conference and the conferences that have been taking

place in Tokyo and in other places — and also in discussions we had today, other questions have come up concerning political dimensions of the relations between the countries of the Pacific: the questions of development, the sociological problems, etc. as we deepen our ties. I think that as we move beyond mere bilateral or quasi-multilateral cooperation, we are going to have to look more and more at the questions posed mainly by the smaller developing countries in the area. I think conferences like today contribute a great deal to deepen the understanding amongst all countries of the Pacific area as to both how far we have come and how far we have to go.

Aoyagi: Thank you very much, Mr. Sloan. And now I would like to conclude the symposium with a closing address by Prof. Watanabe from the Graduate School of Public Administration.

Watanabe: It is a great pleasure for me to be able to say a few words now at the close of this symposium.

As you may well know, all symposiums and seminars seem to have to end just when the discussions are getting to the real interesting part. So too, with this symposium, with the restriction on our time, it is a great pity that we now have to close it just when we seem to be entering into the heart of the matter. However, through the discussions today, I think that we have come to understand, to comprehend, that what we often simply refer to as the Pacific region, or the Pacific Basin region, is in fact a region rich in diversity. In this sense, we may say that this is not just the end of this symposium but rather a beginning for the next symposium. My hopes are particularly with those young scholars who are present here — that they may continue to develop their interests in such matters as culture, development, peace, welfare, cooperation and so forth, that came up in the discussions today.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to the members of the panel, who have given their precious time to come here today. I am also deeply appreciative of the fact that so many of the audience have stayed through those long hours with their full attention on the discussion. It is my sincere hope that the interest generated here today

will stay and grow with us. Lastly, I would like to thank the interpreters, and the people in the organizing committee, who have given their time and efforts to make this symposium possible. Thank you all again for your participation.