

THE NORTH CHINA INCIDENT
THROUGH THE LENS OF
THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL*

< PART III >

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III The Politics of Expansion

The Game of the Third Mobilization

The previous section has dealt with the game of the second mobilization, which resulted in the official statement of July 20, and the decision to send three home divisions to North China.

During the period of July 21 to 29, the decision of the second mobilization was cancelled and hereby another round of the mobilization game still had to be played, which resulted in a final decision to dispatch the troops.

— July 21 — In protest against the Foreign Minister's unsuccessful opposition to the mobilization proposal on the previous day despite Ishii's request, Ishii and Kamimura tried to submit their resignation to the Minister, but they were dissuaded.⁽¹⁾

Returning to Tokyo from an inspection tour to North China, Colonel Shibayama and Major General Nakajima presented in the afternoon a report that there was no need to dispatch troops from Japan since the local agreement was being implemented by the Chinese.⁽²⁾ Colonel Shibayama had had this information sent from Dairen on July 15. So it was supposed to have reached the central decision-makers much earlier, but an official in charge of

Editor's Notes

- This part of the article was originally planned to be included in the fifteenth issue of *The Journal of Social Science*. Due to the editorial policy, this part appears in this issue.
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receiving the telegrams had kept it unreported.¹³¹ Then came a telegram from Major General Hashimoto of the North China Army, stating that a dispatch of troops was neither necessary nor desired.¹⁴¹ Thus the information encouraged those who hoped for the localization of the incident and helped Major General Ishiwara cancel the mobilization order again.¹⁵¹

In the afternoon, British Charge d'Affairs Dodds told Vice Foreign Minister Horiuchi that Chiang Kai-shek still hoped for negotiations to reach a peaceful settlement.¹⁶¹

In Nanking Chiang Kai-shek's military committee received at night Sung Cheh-yuan's telegram about the local agreement.¹⁷¹

Contrary to the favorable development for the peaceful settlement, the Communist elements were maneuvering to provoke both the Japanese and Chinese field armies to fight each other by setting off fire-crackers at night between them.¹⁸¹ In addition, Sung Cheh-yuan had ordered the 37th Division at Papaoshan to withdraw, but the Division did not receive the order.¹⁹¹ The Special Service Agency of the North China Army detected such information stated above, which was probably not available to the decision-makers in Tokyo at that time.

— July 22 — The Army General Staff could not form a consensus on mobilization. Colonel Muto still persisted in mobilization and defied Major General Ishiwara, saying, "Either you or I ought to resign!"¹⁰ At 1:00 p.m. the Army General Staff decided that mobilization would be postponed for the time being unless the Cabinet was determined to settle the North China problem completely.¹¹

General Hsiung Ping, Vice-Chief of the Chinese Central Army, arrived in Peiping to inform Sung Cheh-yuan of Chiang Kai-shek's instruction.¹² Chiang Kai-shek reportedly gave tacit approval to local settlement and at the same time ordered to continue necessary reinforcements.¹³ General Hsiung Ping's visit to Peiping, however, seemed only to encourage such hardliners as Chin Teh-chun and Feng Chih-an to take a firmer attitude.¹⁴ The General, it was said, took away Chin Teh-chun's wife as hostage.¹⁵

— July 23 — In the morning, Ishii, Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau, Colonel Shibayama, Chief of the Military Affairs Section, and Rear Adm. Toyoda, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau agreed to a general principle of the

negotiations. Particularly, Ishii held an optimistic view that the local settlement would soon be probable.¹⁶⁹ In the meantime, Lt-Col. Wachi of the North China Army, who had arrived on the previous day, reported to War Minister Sugiyama as follows:

Everyone in the Stationary Army, from the Commanding Officer to the soldier, sticks to non-expansion. Thus the 29th Army in Pinchin think they have won. This makes our officers and men on the front furious, accusing the Central Headquarters of its soft stance. The Central Army of the Nanking Government has entered the province of Hopei and broken the Umezu-Ho Agreement. Do not indefinitely stick to non-expansion. Now is the time to change the situation.¹⁷⁰

The War Minister replied that "...non-expansion of the incident means to avoid a total war, but not to endure the loss of prestige of our Imperial Army."¹⁷¹ Lt-Col. Wachi was one of the hardliners in the North China Army, and those who wanted to prevent him from meddling with the negotiations had called him back.¹⁷² Contrary to their intention, Lt-Col. Wachi worked on the War Minister and others as well.¹⁷³

— July 24 — In Peiping, the 37th Division of the Chinese Army, which had started withdrawing on July 22, began reinforcing instead of withdrawing.¹⁷⁴ To cope with this situation, the Commander of the North China Army ordered the chief of the Special Service Agency to have Sung Cheh-yuan implement the withdrawal.¹⁷⁵ But it seemed that Sung Cheh-yuan lost control of his army by that time and that Chin Teh-chun and Feng Chih-an were dominant.¹⁷⁶

Kao Tsung-wu, the head of the Asiatic Bureau of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, met with Japanese Counsellor Hidaka. Kao informed him of the meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, and of the intention of the Nationalist Government to acquiesce in local settlement.¹⁷⁷

— July 25 — Japanese Counsellor Hidaka met with General Chang Chun, the Governor of Szechuan, a friend and confidant of Chiang Kai-shek. The general, contacting Chiang Kai-shek during the talk, consented to the July 11th agreement. They agreed to the withdrawal of both armies according to the agreement. The Councillor thought that the settlement of the incident would be probable.¹⁷⁸ But Chiang Kai-shek anticipated that before long the

Japanese Government would present unacceptable demands to the Chinese Government, and "war would therefore be inevitable." He said to the U.S. Ambassador to China to the effect that "the concentration of forces and supplies in Korea and Manchuria in addition to what (had) already been put into Tientsin" made him believe that "Japan (was) preparing to force China to accept new demands far beyond the present local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge affair."⁶⁵ Furthermore, according to Wang Chung-hui, Minister of Foreign Affairs, "the Chinese Government was convinced that the Japanese Government must still have a major objective and had accepted the present truce merely as a means of bringing about a lull during which preparations might be made for the attainment of the major objective in North China."⁶⁷

In the meantime, Major General Kazuki, Commander of the North China Army notified Chang Tzu Chung that, to repair telephone lines, a small detachment together with one company of the troops to protect it would be sent to Langfang on the Peiping-Tientsin Railway. The Army's telephone lines were frequently disrupted by the Chinese.⁶⁸ Although Chang Tzu Chung, who was regarded as pro-Japanese, showed apprehension that trouble might occur between his division at Langfang and the Japanese soldiers, he accepted the notice, asking the Commander to send, if possible, a minimum number of soldiers.⁶⁹ The company, which arrived at Langfang station at about 4:30 p.m., was suddenly attacked at about 11:10 p.m. by Chang Tzu Chung's 38th Division.⁶⁹ Whatever the reason for this attack, it seemed to have shocked the North China Army and Central Headquarters because Chung Tzu Chung was pro-Japanese and his division had never got into trouble with the Japanese army.⁶⁹ To rescue the company two battalions were sent from Tientsin.⁶⁹

— July 26 — At about 1:00 a.m. Major General Kazuki ordered Major Hirobe's battalion to go to Peiping to protect the Japanese nationals there.⁶⁹

At 8:00 a.m. the Special Service Agency decided that the notice of the dispatch of the battalion would be delivered to the Chinese about half an hour before its arrival. For the Agency thought that, if they were informed well in advance, the Chinese might refuse the battalion to enter the city because of the Langfang incident.⁶⁹ At 11:30 a.m. the Commander sent to Colonel

Matsui, Chief of the Special Service Agency, a telegram concerning the demands to be delivered to General Sung Cheh-yuan. At the same time he informed the Central Headquarters of the incident, requesting permission to use force.³⁵ Then, the Commander received a telegraphic order from Major General Ishiwara, which said, "Chastise them completely. The General Staff will assume all the responsibilities including the address to the Throne."³⁶

At 2:30 p.m. the Commander ordered Colonel Matsui, by telegram, to deliver to General Sung Cheh-yuan the above-stated demands,³⁷ which were as follows:

1. The troops of the 37th Division in the Papaoshan and Marco Polo Bridge area must withdraw by noon of July 27 to Changhsintien area;
2. the troops of the 37th Division in Peiping and at Hsiyuan must withdraw by noon of July 28 to west of the Yungting River;
3. if you fail to implement these terms, the Japanese army will doubt your sincerity and will have to take a unilateral action.³⁸

At 3:30 p.m. Colonel Matsui and Lt-Col. Teradaira visited General Sung Cheh-yuan, but he failed to appear, pretending to be ill. General Chin Teh-chun, Mayor of Peiping, who met the colonel, reluctantly promised, after two hours of negotiations, to hand the letter to General Sung Cheh-yuan.³⁹

The notice that the battalion was to arrive at Kuanganmen at 4:00 p.m. was delivered to the Chinese officers there at about 3:50 p.m. with unexpected delay.⁴⁰ The battalion, which was delayed with preparation, arrived at Kuanganmen at about 5:50 p.m. Then the gate, which had been opened moments before by Japanese request, was closed and the Chinese soldiers were prepared to fight. Major Sakurai had it opened again. Then, an unidentified young Chinese, who was whispering with someone on the phone, said, "there's a call from Mayor Chin Teh-chun, I suppose."⁴¹ It was an order from Chin Teh-chun to close the gate.⁴² Then Major Sakurai managed to phone Lt-Col. Teradaira, who was still with Chin Teh-chun after the negotiation. Teradaira persistently requested Chin Teh-chun to open the gate, saying that it was the only way to avoid a clash between the two armies.⁴³ Thus General Chin Teh-chun ordered the gate to be opened.

At 7:00 p.m. the gate was finally opened and the battalion began to enter the city. However, soon after the first two trucks passed through the gate, they were fired at by rifles and machine guns.⁴⁶

At 10:20 p.m. the Commander of the North China Army, presuming that Hirobe's battalion had been destroyed, issued an order to the Army to launch an attack at noon of July 27.⁴⁵ But the time for the attack had to be changed because the ultimata delivered to the Chinese had already set the deadline for noon of July 28, and also because the Japanese nationals in Peiping would need some time to evacuate.⁴⁶ The Kuanganmen incident, it seemed, made the Commander of the North China Army decide to discard the non-expansion policy.⁴⁷

— July 27 — At 1:00 a.m. after being informed of the incident, Major General Ishiwara, Chief of the Operations Division, phoned Colonel Tanaka, Chief of the Army Affairs Section, and said anxiously that "There's no way but to mobilize home divisions. Any delay would cause a total disaster. Do it right away." Colonel Tanaka regarded blitzkrieg as the only way to locally settle the issue, and so did the War and Vice War Ministers.⁴⁸ The Chief of the Army General Staff and the War Minister decided on dispatching home divisions and on conferring a new duty on the Commander of the North China Army to cope with the situation.⁴⁸

At 8:40 a.m. an emergency Cabinet session was held. Naval Minister Yonai suggested to War Minister Sugiyama that it should be considered to send land troops to Shanghai and Tsingtao for the future. As the Cabinet Ministers, with the exception of both Service Ministers, were not at all informed of the range of the military operations, Prime Minister Konoye had Overseas Affairs Minister Otani ask the War Minister about it. The Naval Minister replied in place of the War Minister who kept silent, "The troops will advance to the Yungting River." The War Minister was annoyed and shouted, "You shouldn't talk about matters concerning the Supreme Command."⁵⁰ Although the Prime Minister was unsatisfied with the War Minister's attitude, he did not seem to press the matter any further here.⁵¹ The Cabinet agreed that mobilization would stabilize the Pingchin area, still maintaining the non-expansion policy.⁵² The Chief Secretary of the Cabinet delivered the following statement:

Both the Langfang and Kuanganmen incidents were the Chinese Army's military interferences with our Stationary Army's duties to secure the Peiping-Tientsin communications and to protect our nationals. Now the Army has been forced to take self-defense actions necessary to pursue these duties and to ensure implementation of the terms of the agreement... The Imperial Government has no territorial designs... The Imperial Government...still sincerely hopes that the reflections on the part of the Chinese will minimize the incident, and hereby an early settlement will be brought about.⁵³

In the meantime, at 11:30 a.m. General Sung Cheh-yuan notified that all of the demands by the Japanese would be carried out. But he seemed to have already been ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to resist the Japanese.⁵⁴

— July 28 — At 2:00 a.m. Colonel Matsui delivered to General Sung Cheh-yuan the notice of Commander Kazuki that the Army would take a unilateral action without waiting until noon.⁵⁵ General Sung Cheh-yuan said to both the Nationalist Government and to the nation through radio and newspapers, "The 29th Army is making an utmost effort to defend the nation, following the order of Nanking. We would like to ask for instruction from every circle."⁵⁶

— July 29 — Major General Ishiwara anticipated that the dispatch of troops from Japan would lead to a protracted total war, and hoped for a drastic political settlement through diplomatic negotiations with Nanking.⁵⁷

Meanwhile, as the Japanese began to launch an attack, Chiang Kai-shek declared in Kuling that "the Chinese will fight to the finish."⁵⁸ Thus, the Chinese Government was preparing to "undertake general hostilities towards Japanese troops," but at the same time, seemed to be "preserv(ing) as long as possible any channel through which negotiations might be conducted."⁵⁹

The description given above has uncovered several important points which resulted in the final decision to dispatch three home divisions and which also characterized its process.

First, both Colonel Shibayama's information, which came belatedly, and Major General Hashimoto's request did once fortify Major General Ishiwara's position, while Lt-Col. Wachi's information worked on the War Minister. The information about the Langfang and Kwanganmen incidents

from the Commander of the North China Army undermined Ishiwara's position, and consequently forced him to decide on the dispatch. In such a situation, where another game was played outside Japan, both the players' positions in the central game and the results of it tended to be largely affected by first-hand information from the spot.

Second, the Foreign Ministry received through various channels some information that Chiang Kai-shek had been prepared to negotiate with Japan. For example, British Charge d'Affairs Dodds informed the Vice Foreign Minister of Chiang Kai-shek's intention. Also Councillor Hidaka in Nanking received the same kind of messages from Kao Tsung-wu and Chang Chun.⁶⁰ Such information would have undoubtedly strengthened both the Foreign Minister's position and that of the Ministry if Foreign Minister Hirota had used it to persuade other players to go along the line of the negotiations. But there is no evidence to show this effect. The Foreign Minister did not think it to be his job to work directly on the War Minister and the military. He tried to have the Naval Minister do this job.⁶¹ Thus, unsatisfied with his stance, Ishii and Kamimura protested against him by handing in their resignation. Also the Prime Minister thought that he was unreliable.⁶² And so did other Cabinet Ministers.⁶³

Third, related to the second point, Prime Minister Konoye did not seem to take the initiative to coordinate or lead his Cabinet by himself. Since the Prime Minister had no organizational or bureaucratic capability of his own comparable to that of the Foreign Minister in gathering and evaluating information. It might have been one of the possible ways in collaborating with the Foreign Minister to strengthen his position. But he only complained about the Foreign Minister and grumbled that there was no one available in the Cabinet for consultation.⁶⁴ Like the Foreign Minister, Prime Minister Konoye did not deal directly with the War Minister. It was not the Prime Minister but the Overseas Affairs Minister who asked the War Minister in the July 27th Cabinet meeting about the range of the operations. It was not what was asked but who asked that could have influenced others. Thus, he failed to have his influence and stance felt in the Cabinet. Consequently, the War Minister could not understand what the Prime Minister had in mind.⁶⁵

Fourth, the Langfang and the Kwanganmen incidents were the

organizational outcomes of the North China Army, which arose under the following circumstances. As pointed out, Sung Cheh-yuan's leadership was seriously challenged by Chin Teh-chun and Feng Chih-an who were anti-Japanese. Furthermore, the Communist elements maneuvered to have both the Japanese and Chinese armies fight against each other, and the anti-Japanese elements disrupted the Japanese Army's communication lines between Peiping and Tientsin. For the Commander of the North China Army to dispatch the company to Langfang for repairing the disrupted telephone lines was an organizational standard operating procedure, although pro-Japanese Chang Tzu Chung feared that it might provoke his army. But it was Commander Kazuki's duty to ensure and protect the communications between Tientsin and Peiping. After the Langfang incident, the situation became so aggravated that the Special Service Agency deliberately gave the Chinese only a short notice of the battalion's arrival to Peiping in order to protect the Japanese nationals there. And there also seemed to exist a third party's maneuver as shown in the negotiations between the Special Service Agency and the Chinese officers at Kwanganmen. But Major General Kazuki's decision to dispatch a battalion to Peiping was his way as Commander of performing his job of protecting the Japanese nationals. As Major General Kazuki admitted later, he performed his duties and responsibilities only from the standpoint of operations and tactics without a definite principle concerning the China problem.⁶⁶

Fifth, Chiang Kai-shek seemed to acquiesce in the local agreement. At the same time, however, "the concentration of forces and supplies in Korea and Manchuria" despite the non-expansion policy announced by the Japanese Government caused him to suspect that Japan would soon force upon China unacceptable demands. The Langfang and the Kwanganmen incidents and the unilateral action of the North China Army were presumably viewed in this framework. Then the statement of the Japanese Government of July 27 seemed to undoubtedly compel Chiang Kai-shek to take that firm stance at Kuling on July 29.

Notes

- (1) Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 243. Kamimura, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

- (2) *Shina-Jiben Rikugun Sakusen* (hereafter *Shina-Jiben*), Vol. I, p. 209. See Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 243.
- (3) See Shinzo Inouye, "The North China Incident through the Lens of the Bureaucratic Politics Model," *The Journal of Social Science*, No. 14, International Christian University, 1976, p. 99.
- (4) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, pp. 210-1.
- (5) Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 243. Crowley, *op. cit.*, p. 337.
- (6) *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), pp. 237 and 248. See also the deposition of Horiuchi Kensuke in *IMTEF*, Vol. VI, p. 793.
- (7) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
- (8) Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 286.
- (9) *Ibid.*, pp. 277-81. Teradaira assumed that either Feng Chih-an or Chin Teh-chun deliberately withheld the order from the brigade commander at Papaoshan.
- (10) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 212. See also *Daibonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 454, See also Fujimoto, *op. cit.*, p. 227.
- (11) *Ibid.*
- (12) Imai, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
- (13) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
- (14) Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 353. Imai, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
- (15) *Ibid.*, p. 298.
- (16) Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 244.
- (17) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 212.
- (18) *Ibid.*, p. 213.
- (19) Harada, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-1. Major General Hashimoto of the North China Army was involved in sending Lt-Col. Wachi back to Japan. See Hata, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-4.
- (20) *Ibid.* See also Nashimoto, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
- (21) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 213.
- (22) *Ibid.*, pp. 213-4.
- (23) Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 292. Feng Chih-an exclaimed that it was not the Chinese but the Japanese that must withdraw. See *ibid.*, p. 298.
- (24) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-5.
- (25) Hidaka Memoir in Kamimura Shinichi, *Nihon Gaikosbi*, Vol 20, p. 128.
- (26) *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), p. 257.
- (27) *Ibid.*, p. 259.
- (28) Teradaira, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-6.
- (29) "Kazuki Kiyoshi Chujoyo Kaiso-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 540. *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 214.
- (30) *Ibid.*
- (31) *Ibid.* See also "Ishiwara Kanji Chujoyo Kaiso Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 306.
- (32) Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

- (33) *Ibid.*, p. 314.
- (34) *Ibid.*, pp. 315-6.
- (35) *Ibid.*, p. 306.
- (36) "Kazuki Kiyoshi Chujiyo Shuki," *Gendai-shi Shiryo*, Vol. XII (The China War IV), Misuzu Shobo, 1965, pp. 569-70.
- (37) Teradaira, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-7.
- (38) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 216.
- (39) *Ibid.* For details about the negotiations, see Teradaira, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-13.
- (40) *IMTFE*, Vol. V, p. 142. See Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 318. Major Sakurai, the military adviser of the Chinese 29th Army, told General Chin Teh-chun's secretary to come by 3:30. Sakurai intended to deliver the notice to the Chinese through the secretary. The secretary, however, did not appear. See Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 317.
- (41) Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 320.
- (42) *Ibid.*
- (43) *Ibid.*, p. 321. Teradaira said to Chin as follows:
 "Unless you promptly handle this matter, a clash between both armies will be inevitable... The Special Service Agency is concerned only with military negotiations, and it has not right to command the battalion. So once a clash has occurred, we cannot assume responsibility for it. We have already informed you of the purpose of the battalion to enter the city. The only way to avoid the clash is your sincere implementation. Please make up your mind immediately." (Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 321.)
- (44) *Ibid.*, p. 323.
- (45) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 217.
- (46) *Ibid.*, pp. 217-8. See also Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 329.
- (47) Ikeda, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
- (48) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 218.
- (49) *Ibid.*
- (50) Kazami, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
- (51) Reporting later to the Throne about this matter, Konoye tried to get the military checked through the Emperor. Konoye, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-5.
- (52) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 219.
- (53) *Ibid.*
- (54) *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), p. 282.
- (55) Teradaira, *op. cit.*, pp. 355-6.
- (56) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 225.
- (57) *Ibid.*, pp. 229-30.
- (58) *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), p. 294. See also *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 232.
- (59) *Ibid.*, p. 295.
- (60) It is unknown that Hidaka reported this information to the Foreign

Minister before the Langfang and the Kwanganmen incidents.

(61) Harada, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

(62) *Ibid.*, pp. 47 and 65.

(63) *Ibid.*, p. 46.

(64) *Ibid.*, p. 57.

(65) *Ibid.*, pp. 65-6.

(66) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 211.

IV The Politics of Peace Moves

As already pointed out here and there in the preceding chapters, there existed advocates of the early settlement of the issue and of the peace negotiations. During the entire period of this study, two games of peace moves are identified, although they were not necessarily played independently from the other games of non-expansion and expansion. One was Prime Minister Konoye's efforts, which was played through his private channels. The other was derived from Major General Ishiwara's efforts, which was, in contrast, played in the official channels.

Coalition Failed

Just after the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Prime Minister Konoye thought that there was no way but to talk directly with Chiang Kai-shek.⁽¹⁾ On July 11 when the statement of the dispatch of troops was announced, the War Guidance Section of the Army General Staff presented to Major General Ishiwara a proposal that Prime Minister Konoye, or Foreign Minister Hirota, should fly to Nanking to settle the issue.⁽²⁾ Although Major General Ishiwara gave in to the advocates of mobilization, he tried to put the issue through an informal channel. Thus he advised the Prime Minister to fly to Nanking to settle the incident.⁽³⁾ Iwanaga Yukichi, the president of the *Domei* Press and an intimate of Prime Minister Konoye, advised Konoye to the same effect.⁽⁴⁾ The Prime Minister was willing to launch such a diplomatic *démarche*.⁽⁵⁾

In order to sound out the intention of the Chinese Government, Prime Minister Konoye met Naval Minister Yonai on July 16 and tried to have him persuade Foreign Minister Hirota to do this job.⁽⁶⁾ The Naval Minister did not give him a favorable reply, advising him to directly talk to the Foreign Minister himself. He doubted the Army's leadership to control itself. On

July 17, through Harada, Konoye also tried to have *Genro* Saionji persuade Hirota to accept the task.¹⁷¹ On July 18 Kazami invited Ishii of the Foreign Ministry, an advocate of peaceful settlement, to the Prime Minister's official residence to hear his ideas about peaceful settlement.¹⁸¹ The Prime Minister sent Kazami to the Foreign Minister to ask him to fly to Nanking. Foreign Minister Hirota was not in favor of the Premier's idea, saying, 'I wonder if that would work.' On the one hand, he thought that such a diplomatic *démarche* would be unsuccessful because the military had no coordinated policy toward China.¹⁹¹ On the other hand, as a career diplomat he presumably believed that diplomatic negotiations were to be performed through the formal diplomatic channels and institutions.¹⁰⁹

Despite his illness, Prime Minister Konoye at one time showed such eagerness as to have Kazami make preparations for a trip to Nanking. Kazami set out to arrange a plane, which was however unsuccessful due to the Army's interference.¹¹¹ In the course of time, the Premier's eagerness withered both because of the unfavorable reactions of the Foreign and Naval Ministers and because of his fear that the military leaders could not command the whole army. Even if the peace talks were successful, the military, Konoye and Kazami feared, would not accept the results, which would disgrace both Konoye and Japan. Thus Kazami turned down Ishiwara's proposal.¹¹²

Yet the Prime Minister tried to contact the Nationalist Government, using his private channel. On July 24 he sent his private emissary, Miyazaki who was, he thought, acceptable to the Chinese Government.¹¹³ Hsu Shih-ying, Chinese Ambassador to Japan, sent a coded telegram about this mission to the Nanking Government two days before Miyazaki was to leave Kobe. Then came Chiang Kai-shek's telegraphic reply to meet him, which was intercepted by the military.¹¹⁴ Miyazaki, who had been closely watched over, was arrested on suspicion of espionage by a Military Police when he was about to be board a ship at Kobe.¹¹⁵ The Prime Minister had informed the War Minister of this mission, but not well enough. The Foreign Minister had not been consulted.¹¹⁶ In spite of this failure, Prime Minister Konoye unsuccessfully tried to make similar efforts several times later.

As described earlier, Prime Minister Konoye had such bargaining advantages that no one could compete.¹⁷ He was, as generally admitted, a good listener,¹⁸ but never a good persuader nor a coordinator. He never tried to defy the military, let alone persuade the War Minister in and out of the Cabinet sessions.¹⁹ Dissatisfied with the Foreign and War Ministers, Konoye complained to Harada about them on July 13, saying “The Foreign Minister hasn’t reported anything, and the War Minister is not reliable.”²⁰ As Konoye’s friend Marquis Kido suggested, Konoye seemed to run away from difficulties rather than try to overcome them.²¹ The Naval Minister was unfavorable to his proposal, so was the Foreign Minister. But Prime Minister Konoye did not try to persuade them by himself. Instead, he had Kazami and Harada do the job. The results might have been different, mainly because it is who persuades that often counts. Thus, although there were advocates of peace, such as Ishiwara and Ishii, he did not even form a coalition between them. What he did in order to contact the Nanking Government for peace talks was to send his private emissaries, avoiding conflicts with the military and evading cumbersome persuasion and troublesome bureaucratic procedures through formal diplomatic channels. He was not a man who could form a coalition for peace overtures with a man like Ishiwara. Ishiwara was such a man that could say, “Win or lose, I don’t care about it. When I’m worrying about the nation’s destiny, a victory of a trivial battle doesn’t matter... Japan’s defeat in North China doesn’t have to do with the nation’s destiny....”²² Therefore, without forming a coalition for peace in the decision-making system, Prime Minister Konoye’s efforts would not have been successful even if his private emissary had opened a channel for direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Belated Peace Moves

Despite his approval of the dispatch of the troops, Major General Ishiwara adhered to his idea that a protracted total war, which Japan would never be able to win, had to be avoided by all means. He could not facilitate a consensus in the General Staff, nor could he successfully persuade Prime Minister Konoye to have peace talks with Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, he first tried to put the issue on a different channel by contacting the Navy.

And, for the issue to be hooked on the official channel, the Emperor had to be involved in the game.

— July 30 — Major General Ishiwara visited Vice-Admiral Shimada Shigetaro, Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff, and presented his draft proposal for settling the issue. He said that:

From the standpoint of operations, an early settlement of the issue is necessary. In order to facilitate a consensus in the Army and to help the Government confirm its determination, we have drafted a general plan of operations. This has already been explained to the War Minister. Since the Chief of the Army General Staff desires to have it submitted to the Emperor, I would like to ask your opinion about it.⁽¹⁾

In answering the Vice-Admiral's questions, the Major General said, "Since there is no hope of defeating China, we have no alternative but to seize proper opportunities to settle the matter. Now is the best occasion since we have captured Peiping and Tientsin." The terms for settlement were: (1) "to relinquish all the Japanese political rights and interests throughout China, which (was) the only way to cultivate the Japan-China friendship and to improve trade between them; (2) Manchukuo must be recognized."⁽²⁾ In the afternoon the Navy replied "No objection to submitting it to the Emperor."⁽³⁾

Then, Major General Ishiwara met Captain Fukutome Shigeru, Chief of the Operations Section of the Naval General Staff, and expressed his hope:⁽⁴⁾

The best time for peace is now, since Peiping and Tientsin have been captured. But the Army General Staff cannot reach an agreement. The War Minister seems still to be undecided. I would like to have the Naval Minister persuade him.⁽⁵⁾

At 4:00 p.m. the Chief of the Army General Staff, Prince Kan'in submitted the "Outline of a Plan of Operations in China" to the Throne. The Emperor asked, "How far are you going?" "From the point of operations," replied Prince Kan'in, "we will advance to the line of Paoting."⁽⁶⁾

At 4:30 p.m. the Emperor met Prime Minister Konoye, who had been summoned from a session of the Diet, and said, "If the north-eastern part of the Yungting River has been subdued, you might as well cease military action." Prince Konoye replied to the effort that he would strive for settling

the matter right away.¹⁷⁾ Then the Prime Minister met individually with the War and the Foreign Ministers, informing the War Minister of the Emperor's grave concern about the situation.¹⁸⁾

— July 31 — In the course of giving a lecture about the plan of operations in the Imperial presence, Major General Ishiwara explained:

From the point of operations, we cannot use more than four divisions. With this force we can advance only to the line of Paoting at best, not any further. There is a pressing need to seize an opportunity to stop the fighting before advancing to that line.¹⁹⁾

The Emperor agreed with the Major General.

Colonel Shibayama, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, visited Ishii to ask if there was any way of having the Chinese make a cease-fire proposal. The Emperor's words seemed to have affected the leaders of the Army in favor of a peaceful settlement. Ishii explained his overall proposal for adjusting the Japan-China relations, to which Colonel Shibayama agreed.²⁰⁾

In the meantime, in Nanking Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei and Kao Tsung-wu, the head of the Asiatic Bureau of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, met with each other. Despite his strong-worded statement of July 29, Chiang Kai-shek hoped to somehow adjust the Japan-China relations. Thus, he seemed to have instructed Kao to facilitate Prime Minister Konoye's determination for peace.²¹⁾

— August 1 — In the afternoon, Ishii, Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, Colonel Shibayama, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, and Captain Hoshina, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Naval Ministry, met to discuss Ishii's proposals for cease-fire and overall adjustment of the Japan-China relations.²²⁾ Ishii explained that, as both governments officially announced firm determination, it would not be wise to directly place the matter on the official diplomatic channels. Therefore, he thought that Funazu Shinichiro, the Chief Director of the League of the Japanese Textile Industry in China, who happened to stay in Tokyo, would be the right one to deliver the proposals to Kao Tsung-wu who hoped for peace and knew Funazu well.²³⁾ Both Shibayama and Hoshina agreed with Ishii, and Shibayama promised to form a consensus

in the Army along this line.¹⁴

— August 2 — The Prime Minister, the War, Naval, and Foreign Ministers approved of initiating the informal peace overtures.¹⁵ This was kept secret lest the hardliners in the Army should interfere with it.¹⁶

— August 3 — The proposals drafted by the Asian Affairs Section of the Foreign Ministry began to be discussed at the levels of sections and bureaus concerned.¹⁷

— August 4 — In the afternoon Vice Foreign Minister Horiuchi and Vice War Minister Lt-General Umezu had a talk about the drafts, and the Vice War Minister made some modifications.

In the evening Captain Hoshina, Colonel Shibayama, and Kamimura made the proposals more concrete.¹⁸

At 9:30 p.m. Funazu left for Shanghai with the outline of the proposals explained by Ishii as no definite ones were made. At the same time a telegram was sent to Consul-General Okamoto in Shanghai, informing him of Funazu's mission. The telegram instructed him to the effort that as the meeting was expected to be regarded as Funazu's initiative, the diplomatic officials there should not be concerned with it.¹⁹ Funazu had sent a telegram to Director Tsutsumi of the League of the Japanese Textile Industry in China to ask him to go to Nanking and arrange a meeting with Kao Tsung-wu.²⁰

— August 5 — The drafts were discussed and amended at the levels of the Vice-Ministers and the Sections concerned.²¹

— August 6 — In the evening "Overall Adjustment of Sino-Japanese Relations" was made:

1. China shall secretly agree that it will not call the matter of Manchukuo into question hereafter.
2. An anti-Communist pact shall be concluded between Japan and China.
3. China shall strictly control the anti-Japanese and make the Act of Friendship with Japan thoroughly observed.
4. The Shanghai Truce agreement shall be abolished.
5. Free flight of the Japanese planes shall be abolished.
6. Economic and trade cooperation between the two countries shall be improved.²²

In Shanghai, due to the Chinese army's reinforcements and due to night

maneuverings of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps having been intensified since the beginning of the month, anxieties and uneasiness had been mounting to such an extent Consul-General Okamoto ordered the Japanese nationals to evacuate into the Settlement. Furthermore, all the Japanese nationals along the Yangtze River were ordered to evacuate because of the information that the Chinese National Defense Conference had decided upon all-out resistance on this day.²³

— August 7 — Before dawn ‘‘Sino-Japanese Cease-Fire Terms’’ were decided upon by the Foreign, War, and Naval Ministers.

1. All the military agreements such as Tangku Truce, Umezu-Ho, and Doihara-Ching agreements shall be abolished.
2. A certain range of a demilitarized zone shall be set up.
3. The Hopei-Chahar Political Council and the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council shall be abolished. The Nanking Government shall discretionally administer in these areas.
4. The force of the Japanese Stationary Army shall be reduced to that prior to the incident.
5. When a cease-fire agreement has been reached, Japan and China irrespective of the past relations, shall enter into a New Deal to materialize friendly relations between the two countries.²⁴

The ‘‘New Deal’’ meant economic aid to China and abolition of extraterritoriality, both of which were to be disclosed in the course of negotiations.²⁵

Only a few in the Army and Navy were involved in the formation of these proposals in order to avoid opposition. Therefore, the Foreign Minister sent a telegraphic instruction to Ambassador Kawagoe who returned to Shanghai after a month’s absence, stating that these be kept in strict confidence even to the Army and Naval attachés, and that the ambassador be advised not to meet Funazu.²⁶ But Ambassador Kawagoe met Funazu and told him that he himself would take care of the matter.²⁷

In the meantime, Tsutsumi met Kao in Nanking and informed him of Funazu’s hope. Kao immediately agreed, saying, ‘‘I promise to visit Mr. Funazu in the evening of the 8th or on the morning of the 9th.’’²⁸

— August 9 — In the morning Kao came to Shanghai and met with Funazu. Kao said that, although Nanking was dominated by the hardliners, Chiang Kai-shek seemed to hope to readjust relations between the two

countries.²⁹ Funazu had received "Sino-Japanese Cease-Fire Terms," but he did not show them to Kao as he considered it to be Ambassador Kawagoe's job. Funazu advised him to meet the ambassador.³⁰

At 6:00 p.m. Kao visited Ambassador Kawagoe. The Ambassador told him that the Japanese Government had decided to take a more generous attitude than ever before toward China. But it seemed that he failed both to present the cease-fire terms to Kao and to convey delicate *nuance* in Tokyo.³¹

At about 6:30 p.m. a Naval lieutenant Oyama and a seaman Saito, who were unarmed, were killed by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps on Monument Road west of Shanghai.³²

— August 10 — Because of the incident of the previous night, Kao had to hurry back to Nanking, saying to Matsumoto, "... I cannot help thinking that Tokyo should have taken that new attitude, at least, one or two weeks ago. Since the Oyama incident occurred last night, the situation has been getting worse. If the Chinese and the Japanese armies clash near Shanghai, diplomacy cannot do anything about it."³³

Thus, frustrated by the Oyama incident, the peace moves did not produce any fruitful results. However, they not only represented the efforts for peace on both sides, but also reflected typical aspects of the Japan's decision-making process.

First, the peace moves were one of the most promising events which might have led to official negotiations through semi-official channels. Although, faced by advocates of tough measures both in and out of his government, Chiang Kai-shek had to officially take a strong stance, he seemed to hope for negotiations as Kao Tsung-wu had implied. The Japanese decision-makers were ready to make a great concession to the Chinese, giving up most of the rights and interests in North China. But those who desired peace negotiations on both sides could not form a coalition mainly because of the Oyama incident. In Shanghai, the situation was rapidly getting worse to such an extent that the Japanese nationals began to evacuate to the Settlement. Under such circumstances, things might have been quite different, as Kao said, if Japan had taken the peace initiative one or two weeks earlier. But

the tardiness in taking a decision on the part of the Japanese Government, it seems, was a typical pattern of its decision-making system, and was concerned with the points below.

Second, the way in which Major General Ishiwara tried to achieve his desired results and to form a consensus in the Army, in particular in the General Staff, represented a typical way of persuasion or consensus formation in the Japanese decision-making system. Major General Ishiwara, first of all, won the Navy's favor, and then he had the Emperor informed of his plan of the operations through the Chief of Staff, Prince Kan'in. Thus he began the Emperor's initiative. The Emperor called the Prime Minister to inform him of his hopes, and the Prime Minister informed the War Minister of the Emperor's intention. Consequently, no one defied the peace moves seemingly initiated by the Emperor. Generally speaking, the Emperor seemed to feel inhibited from expressing himself, and he did so only when things began to take on a more or less decisive look. In addition, the way in which the Emperor got involved was what might be called *consensus formation through indirect persuasion* (or *indirect persuasion through the intermediary*). Therefore, it undoubtedly took some time to arrive at a consensus, and thus there was a tendency to miss opportunities.

Third, in connection with the second point, the Emperor's initiative structured the game in important ways. It made the government leaders decide to keep the peace moves in strict confidence, which meant both that only a limited number of the players were included in the game and that active advocates of tough measures were excluded. Furthermore, it seemed that some leaders who were not necessarily in favor of the negotiations had to, or at least pretended to, accept the initiative of the Emperor. Thus, the War and Vice War Ministers who represented the War Ministry accepted Ishii's peace terms only with an addition of several minor modifications.³⁴

Fourth, in such a delicate situation where official channels found it difficult to open direct negotiations, it was appropriate to have a civilian's collaboration like Funazu's before entering into official negotiations. This worked well as far as the central game was concerned. But, despite the Foreign Minister's instruction that no diplomatic officials be concerned with Funazu's mission, Ambassador Kawagoe took over his job. The

Ambassador, it appeared, failed to convey to Kao Tsung-wu a *nuance* which the Japanese Government had expected Funazu to. Had he showed Kao the drastic concession that the Japanese Government was prepared to make, the results might have been different although such a possibility would have been the slightest one due to the occurrence of the Oyama incident.

Notes

Coalition Failed

- (1) Konoye, *op. cit.*, p. 13. See also Konoye Ayamaro, *Heiwa eno Doryoku* (Efforts for Peace), Nippon Denpo Tsushin Sha, 1946, p. 5.
- (2) Horiba, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
- (3) *Ibid.* See also Harada, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
- (4) Yatsugi, *op. cit.*, pp. 381-3.
- (5) Harada, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
- (6) Ogata, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
- (7) Saionji thought it better for Konoye, rather than Hirota who was not trusted by the Chinese, to go to China. See Harada, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
- (8) On the same day, Major General Ishiwara failed to persuade the War and the Vice War Ministers that Prime Minister Konoye should go to China for peace talks. See Inouye (1976), *op. cit.*, p. 104.
- (9) Kazami, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-2.
- (10) Yatsugi, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-2.
- (11) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
- (12) Kazami, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-72. According to Kazami, the following happened in early August: Ishiwara phoned Kazami and said that Konoye should go to Nanking to talk with Chiang Kai-shek. Konoye thought it was a good idea, and was willing to go at once although he had a malady in his intestines. He was going to take a nurse and secretaries. The next day Kazami set to arrange a plane. But Konoye changed his mind mainly because he could not put the military under his control even if he succeeded in the negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. Then Ishiwara had Kawai Tatsuo, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Foreign Ministry, urge Konoye to go to China. (See Kazami, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-71.)

But the following evidence seems to show that what was described above happened in mid-July, contrary to Kazami's recollection. According to the Memoir of Harada, Konoye was ill in bed with an intestinal malady on July 13 when Harada met him. (See Harada, *op. cit.*, p. 32.) When Harada met him on August 4, Konoye was ill but not so bad. (See Harada, *op. cit.*, p. 59.) According to Ishii's book, it was July 13 or so that Kawai worked as an intermediary between Ishii

and Ishiwara to bring them together for an early settlement of the incident. (See Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 240. See also "Ishiwara Kanji Chujiyo Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 308.)

- (13) Konoye, *Heiwa eno Doryoku*, p. 5.
- (14) Matsumoto, *loc. cit.*
- (15) Harada, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-2.
- (16) *Ibid.*, p. 65.
- (17) See Inouye, (1975), *op. cit.*, pp. 167-9.
- (18) Yabe, *op. cit.*, p. 73. See also Nashimoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-1.
- (19) See Inouye, (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 160.
- (20) Harada, *op. cit.*, p. 35. On behalf of Konoye, Harada tried to improve the relationships between Konoye and the War and Foreign Ministers. See Harada, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 65-6.
- (21) Maruyama Masao, *Gendai-seiji no Shiso to Kodo* (Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics), Mirai Sha, 1970, p. 100.
- (22) Nashimoto, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

Belated Peace Moves

- (1) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, pp. 222-3.
- (2) *Ibid.*, p. 223.
- (3) *Ibid.*
- (4) They understood each other and were in good terms. See Fukutome Shigeru, "Hogo ni Kishita 'Teikoku Kokubo Hoshin'" ("Imperial National Defense Policy" Failed), *Bessatsu Chisei* (December 1956), pp. 176-8.
- (5) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 223.
- (6) *Ibid.*, pp. 223-4.
- (7) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 175. See also *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 245.
- (8) *Ibid.*, pp. 175-6.
- (9) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 224.
- (10) Ishii, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-6. Ishii and Shibayama had known each other for more than 20 years.
- (11) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
- (12) On July 17 Hoshina presented the Naval Minister with a proposal of direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. See *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 244.
- (13) Funazu was a China expert and served as a Consul-General in Shanghai, Tientsin and Tengting. See Kamimura, *op. cit.*, p. 104. Shimada Ikuhiko, "Funazu-kosaku nado" (Funazu's Activities During the Sino-Japanese War) in Nihon Kokusai-seiji Gakkai, ed., *Kokusai Seiji* (International Relations), Vol. 47, 1972, p. 111.
- (14) Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 246.
- (15) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 246.

- (16) Kamimura, *op. cit.*, p. 104. *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 246.
- (17) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 246.
- (18) Shimada, *op. cit.*, p. 114. See Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 247.
- (19) Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 247.
- (20) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 180. Shimada, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
- (21) Shimada, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
- (22) Gaimusho, ed., *Nihon Gaiko Nempyo narabini Shuyo Monjo* (A Chronological Table of Japanese Diplomatic History and Main Documents), Vol. II, Hara Shobo, 1965, pp. 367-8. See also Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 248. Concerning the first term, Ishii said that, according to reliable information before the incident, there was a sign in the Nationalist Government that it would be better not to press the matter of Manchuko. See Ishii, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-9.
- (23) Hata, *op. cit.*, p. 228. Chinese War Minister Ho Ying-chin, more or less pro-Japanese, resigned and anti-Japanese Chen Cheng became Deputy Foreign Minister. See *ibid.*, p. 229.
- (24) Gaimusho, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 368-9. See Ishii, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-8.
- (25) Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 248. Both proposals were Japan's great concessions, which meant to abandon most of the rights and interests that Japan had acquired in North China since 1933.
- (26) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 249.
- (27) Matsumoto, *loc. cit.* Kamimura, *op. cit.*, p. 110. Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 249. Ambassador Kawagoe was repeatedly instructed to come back to Shanghai, but he ignored it, waiting for Kao in Tientsin on his own initiative. When they met, they arrived at a general agreement of the settlement, between the two, without referring to the matter of Manchukuo. See Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 182.
- (28) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 180.
- (29) *Ibid.*, pp. 186-7.
- (30) Shimada, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
- (31) *Ibid.* See also Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 188 and Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
- (32) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 258.
- (33) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 188.
- (34) See Shimada, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-7.

V No Way Out

As briefly described in the previous chapter, the situation in Shanghai became so aggravating from the beginning of August that the Japanese nationals evacuated into the Settlement. Just when the Navy was about to reinforce its Landing Party of 2,500 vis-à-vis the Chinese army of about 120,000, the Oyama incident occurred on August 9.¹¹ But the city

authorities of Shanghai did not show any eagerness to settle the incident, nor could they control the Chinese army.¹²⁾ Thus, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident now developed into a new phase from which there was not way out, as we shall see below.

— August 10 — Both the Operations Sections of the Navy and Army General Staffs, and the Military Affairs Bureaus of the Army and Navy Ministries had a talk about the preparation for dispatching land troops. The Army admitted that the situation required the dispatch, but feared that it would inevitably spread the incident. The Army, however, could not flatly turn down the Navy's request mainly due to the July 11th agreement between the Army and Navy.¹³⁾

In the Cabinet meeting Naval Minister Yonai requested that preparation for the dispatch of land troops be made. To this request War Minister Sugiyama agreed. The Cabinet confirmed the policy of protecting the nationals in Shanghai, approving the dispatch.¹⁴⁾

After the Cabinet meeting, the War Minister called Major General Nakajima and Major General Ishiwara, Chiefs of the General Affairs Division and the Operations Division of the Army General Staff respectively, to discuss the dispatch of troops. Major General Ishiwara insisted that the dispatch be restricted to North China, and that the Navy take care of Shanghai and Tsingtao. "If Shanghai is endangered," he argued, "all the Japanese nationals should be repatriated. Pay one billion or two billion yen or whatever for the loss and damages. That would be cheaper than a war."¹⁵⁾ Mainly due to the July 11th agreement between the Navy and Army, however, Major General Ishiwara could not oppose the dispatch of a minimum force to protect the nationals.¹⁶⁾

In the meantime, Vice-Admiral Hasegawa, Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet, requested from the Chinese that the Peace Preservation Corps be immediately withdrawn, and that the military facilities in the demilitarized area be removed. As the Chinese reinforced the Peace Preservation Corps and set up positions around the Settlement, however, the Commander in Chief decided to reinforce the Naval force, ordering 1,000 men and some battleships near Sasebo to move to Shanghai.¹⁷⁾

— August 11 — In the afternoon, the naval reinforcements including

seven or eight battleships arrived at Shanghai. The sudden appearance of these ships undoubtedly had a great impact on the Chinese, especially on the hardliners.¹⁸¹

— August 12 — In the evening, the Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet requested the dispatch of troops, reporting the critical situation in Shanghai.¹⁹¹ Then by the request of the Navy, the Prime Minister, the War, Naval, and Foreign Ministers met with each other, and Naval Minister Yonai asked them to send land troops. The other ministers thought that there was no way but to submit to the request. The Emperor also thought it difficult to settle the issue by diplomacy.¹¹⁹

Concerning operations in Central China, the Army and Naval General Staffs agreed to cooperate. From the viewpoint of operations, Major General Ishiwara seemed to prefer bombing rather than the dispatch of land troops. But Colonel Muto encouraged the Navy to cooperate with the Army and argued that every measure should be taken to "chastise the outrageous China."¹²⁰

— August 13 — In the morning the Cabinet conference was convened, where the agreement of the previous night was officially approved. Thus the Cabinet decided to dispatch two divisions to Shanghai.¹²¹

In Shanghai Ambassador Kawagoe had been repeatedly instructed to go to Nanking, but did not follow the instruction, saying that it would not be helpful.¹²² At 4:30 p.m. hostilities opened between the two armies, and thereafter communications between Shanghai and Nanking were disrupted.¹²³

In Nanking Counsellor Hidaka visited Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui to request that the Peace Preservation Corps be withdrawn from the vicinity of the Settlement and that the military facilities near the Settlement be removed. But the Foreign Minister only talked abstractly about the effectiveness of the existing Shanghai cease-fire agreement and so on.¹²⁴

— August 14 — The Chinese air forces attacked the flagship of the Japanese Third Fleet, the Naval Landing Party, the Consulate, and so on.¹²⁵ In the afternoon, the Japanese Navy announced that "...the Imperial Navy has now been forced to take all the necessary and effective measures...." Then, the Naval air forces bombed the Chinese air bases in Kengchou, Nanchang, Kuangtê, Nanking, etc.¹²⁶

At 10:00 p.m. an emergency Cabinet meeting was held. War Minister Sugiyama unexpectedly proposed that the government make a statement concerning the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.¹⁹ "Now that the situation has become as such," said Naval Minister Yonai, "the non-expansion policy has gone and the North China incident has now changed to the China incident."¹⁹ But Finance Minister Kaya expressed his dissatisfaction in terms of the expenses.²⁰ And the Naval Minister condemned him without letting him finish his financial explanation.²¹ Foreign Minister Hirota was not in favor of the proposal, but he did not seem to strongly oppose it.²² Prime Minister Konoye kept silent as usual, listening to them patiently. The he approved of the War Minister's proposal since no Cabinet Minister objected to it.²³

— August 15 — At 1:10 a.m. the government announced the statement concerning the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which was as follows:

...Now that the Chinese despise the Empire...and since their outrageous actions have endangered the lives and property of our nationals throughout China, the Empire has come to the limit of its endurance. Thus, in order to chastise the brutal Chinese Army and hereby to demand the Nanking Government's reconsideration, the Empire has now no alternative but to take a resolute action....²⁴

According to Kazami who announced this statement, Prime Minister Konoye and Kazami himself expected the statement to facilitate local settlement, although it implied a positive military action.²⁵ The War Minister, who had submitted the proposal, did not expect the incident to spread.²⁶ He still thought that the "non-expansion" policy should be maintained in order to achieve an early settlement.²⁷ But it was now obvious that the incident changed its nature because of the hostilities opened in Shanghai, the Navy's interests involved, and since the decision to dispatch troops to Shanghai was taken.

Consequently, two days later, the Cabinet was to decide on "discard(ing) the existing non-expansion policy, and prepar(ing) all necessary measures for the war structure."²⁸

From the description above, we can identify several points which characterized the final phase, and also help in understanding the process in which the August 15th statement was made.

First, with the outbreak of the Oyama incident, the Navy's interests were at stake in Shanghai. One of the Navy's tasks was to protect the Japanese nationals there. In addition, the Naval Landing Party of 2,500 was in danger, faced with the Chinese army of 120,000. To repatriate all the Japanese nationals there, as Major General Ishiwara argued, meant to degrade the Navy's prestige. Therefore, Naval Minister Yonai requested the dispatch of land troops and took a positive stance which he had never taken before.

Second, Naval Minister Yonai could easily influence War Minister Sugiyama who thought that the Chinese despised the Imperial Army. In addition, the Naval Minister's tough stance encouraged the hardliners in the Army, such as Colonel Muto and probably Colonel Tanaka, and others, who in turn undoubtedly influenced the War Minister to such an extent that he himself took the initiative in announcing the August 15th statement.

Third, the Army did not turn down the Navy's request of the dispatch, and even Major General Ishiwara who was not in favor of it could not reject it mainly because of the July 11th agreement between Army and Navy. To dispatch the land troops to Shanghai, however, did not contradict the Army's interests, but rather promoted them. Therefore, there was no reason for the Army to oppose the Navy's request although the dispatch, the Army thought, would spread the incident. Thus, an alliance was formed between Navy and Army, and both General Staffs agreed to cooperate in the operations in Central China.

Fourth, Vice-Admiral Hasegawa reinforced the Naval force in Shanghai by sending the battleships there, which constituted governmental action. As the Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet, he had to protect the Japanese nationals and to aid the Naval Landing Party. The sudden appearance of the battleships in Shanghai, which was an outcome of the existing organizational procedures of the Navy, undoubtedly caused the Chinese air forces to attack the flagship and other Japanese facilities. Thus, the reinforcements of the Japanese Navy in Shanghai triggered the organizational procedures of both Japanese and Chinese forces.

Fifth, the Japanese Navy's action seemed to have confirmed the Chinese belief that Japan had by far greater objectives than the Marco Polo Bridge

Incident. Thus, as Kao Tsung-wu once said, any diplomatic efforts would have been futile at this stage even if Ambassador Kawagoe had successfully contacted the Nanking Government following the instruction of the Foreign Minister.

Notes

- (1) Hata, *op. cit.*, p. 229.
- (2) *Ibid.* See also Shimada, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-3.
- (3) See Inouye (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 164. An agreement was reached in November 1936 between the chiefs of both the Army and Navy General Staffs that, if an incident occurred in Shanghai, two divisions were to be sent there to aid the Naval Landing Party, and that the same applied to Tsingtao but only one division was to be sent in case of guarding just Tsingtao. This was set forth in the plan of ordinary operations. See "Nishimura Toshio Kaiso-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 482.
- (4) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 259.
- (5) Sato Kenryo, *Tojo Hideki to Taiheiyo Senso* (Hideki Tojo and the Pacific War), Bungei Shunjuu Shinsha, 1960, p. 77.
- (6) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 259.
- (7) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, pp. 258-9. See also Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 251 and Kamimura, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
- (8) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-3.
- (9) Kamimura, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
- (10) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 260. See Nippon Kokusai-seiji Gakkai, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
- (11) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 260.
- (12) *Ibid.*, p. 261.
- (13) Kamimura, *op. cit.*, p. 125. See Hata, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-1.
- (14) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 193 and Kamimura, *loc. cit.*
- (15) Hidaka Memoir in Kamimura, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
- (16) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-6 and *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 262.
- (17) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 262.
- (18) Kazami, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
- (19) Nippon Kokusai-seiji Gakkai, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
- (20) *Ibid.*
- (21) Harada, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
- (22) Nippon Kokusai-seiji Gakkai, *loc. cit.* See Kazami, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
- (23) Kazami, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
- (24) Gaimusho, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 369-70. See Kazami, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-4.
- (25) Kazami, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
- (26) *Ibid.*, p. 47.

27) *Shina-Jiben*, Vol. I, p. 263.

28) *Gendai-shi Shiryo*, Vol. IX, Misuzu Shobo, 1964, p. 34.

Conclusions

Since the characteristics of each phase or game have been pointed out in the last part of each section, we shall not repeat them here. Instead, we shall concern ourselves both with what characterized the entire period from July 7 through August 15 and with what seemed to represent some general patterns of the Japanese decision-making behavior drawn from the present study.

First, there existed the shared images among the players which significantly constrained them to behave within these images. They were a set of superiority complex over China and the Chinese, comprising (1) China was weak and inferior, (2) Japan was strong and superior, thus (3) if Japan took a positive stance, China would succumb, therefore (4) if (3) failed, it meant that China despised Japan without knowing her capability, consequently (5) China should be chastised and called for self-reflection. These images were shared by most of both military and civilian players, especially by the hardliners.¹¹⁾ These images were not derived from any rational estimates of the situation, but they were psychological and/or emotional phenomena. Major General Ishiwara and his War Guidance Section argued based upon the rational calculation and estimates of the situation that Japan would inevitably get bogged down into a protracted total war with China. But they could not persuade others because their argument was deviant from the shared images and because they failed to form a coalition with other like-minded players, which could have changed the shared images.

Second, the serious lack of leadership both in the Cabinet and in the Army division particularly during this period should be pointed out. The Army General Staff was almost paralyzed because of the lack of effective leadership. The Chief of the Staff, Prince Kan'in was not expected to effectively command the General Staff. Because he was an Imperial prince, and in addition was very old, every member of the General Staff seemed to keep his distance from him.¹²⁾ Thus, the Vice-Chief of the Staff, Lt-General Imai was to actually command and coordinate the General Staff, but, because of his

serious illness, everyone hesitated to consult him.¹³¹ Therefore, the actual responsibility to manage the General Staff fell on Major General Ishiwara, Chief of the Operations Division.¹⁴¹ An able man as he was, he could not persuade other division chiefs partly because he was an outsider and partly because he had deprived them of their divisional influence by reforming the General Staff.¹⁵¹ Thus, without the leverage of the Chief and the Vice-Chief of Staff, Major General Ishiwara could not successfully lead the General Staff.

Although the Prime Minister's leadership was institutionally restricted, the lack of Prime Minister Konoye's leadership was particularly due to personal factors. Despite his incomparable advantages, he failed to have his influence and intention felt directly or indirectly in the Cabinet. There is no evidence that he himself took the initiative in the Cabinet conferences. He usually had someone else speak on his behalf.¹⁶¹ Of course, it was institutionally difficult for any Prime Minister to be in good terms with the War Minister and thereby to coordinate the Cabinet,¹⁷¹ but Prime Minister Konoye did not try to work on the War Minister to improve their awkward relations.¹⁸¹ He did not try to put the Foreign Minister under his control, nor did he facilitate cooperative relations between them. Furthermore, he was not a man of responsibility and decision as a leader. When he was later pressed by Major General Ishiwara for a decision to withdraw the Japanese army from China and thereby to settle the incident, he said, "...I feel responsible for the China Incident as Prime Minister, but *I cannot make such a major decision* as Ishiwara has requested me to do."¹⁹¹

Third, it can be generally be said that those who argue confidently win the game. This assumption seems to have held true as far as such junior players as Colonels Muto, Tanaka and others who were actually in charge of drafting operations plans, gathering information, and forming a military budget were concerned.¹¹⁰ Just because of their particular positions of being in charge of making plans and of implementing policies, they could affect War Minister Sugiyama and Major General Ishiwara.

But the way in which players at higher levels tried to persuade others in order to get their desired results represented one of the typical and dominant patterns of the Japanese decision-making behavior, to which the above assumption did not necessarily apply. As exemplified by Ishiwara's peace

moves in chapter IV, what we called *consensus formation through indirect persuasion* (or *indirect persuasion through the intermediary*) seems to have been the dominant pattern. This may have been closely related to the lack of leadership in the decision-making system particularly during this period as described above. The senior decision-makers, it seems, did not try to directly persuade those whom they wanted to. Instead, Prime Minister Konoye and Foreign Minister Hirota, for example, tried to indirectly work on War Minister Sugiyama through Naval Minister Yonai. The Prime Minister also had other Cabinet Ministers do his job as in the case of the July 20th Cabinet session. Even Naval Minister Yonai tried to prevent the War Minister from being overridden by hardliners through the Foreign Minister.¹² We know that Major General Ishiwara and the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry tried to throw out the War Minister's mobilization proposal of July 11, using the leverage of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Ministry respectively.¹³

These examples suggest that *indirect persuasion through the intermediary* tended to be used either when persuaders hesitated to directly persuade others or when persuasion failed. The success of indirect persuasion through the intermediary presumably depended upon the condition that the intermediary who was to act as a persuader on behalf of the original persuader had to be superior to, and more influential than the persuadee. Therefore, when the intermediary at a certain level failed to persuade, successful persuasion might have been possible by turning to another intermediary at a higher level. Thus, how to get the Emperor involved in the game would have been one of the major factors for success, although he was customarily supposed to not get involved.¹⁴ This probably explains the contrast between Konoye's and Ishiwara's peace moves.¹⁵

Fourth, especially when the incident occurred and developed far away from home, it was extremely difficult for the central decision-makers to have accurate and current information which represented each development of the incident. Thus, each time first-hand information was brought about, it naturally affected each player's position and thereby turned the balance of the games. This trend was reinforced partly because senior decision-makers lacked leadership and had no specific plan to cope with the incident.

Furthermore, when the decision resulted from each complicated game, it was then inappropriate for the new situation. As we have seen, this had characterized the entire period of the North China Incident.

Fifth, generally speaking, it is usually very difficult or almost impossible in some cases for the central decision-makers to be able to oversee the army stationed far away from home. For one factor, the estimates of the situation by central decision-makers are often different from those by the field army directly facing the situation. For another, the decision or instruction often allows the implementer to act in his own way. In addition to these, such circumstances as referred to in the fourth characteristic, gave by far greater leeway to the North China Army to act on its own initiative. To fix the deadline on July 19 for the implementation of the July 11th agreement by the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was initiated by the Commander of the North China Army, although it was about to be implemented.¹⁶ And the deadline of July 19 was decided upon according to the organizational procedure of the North China Army, *i.e.*, the plan that strategic deployment of the army was to be complete by that date.¹⁷ On July 19 the North China Army announced that it would take a unilateral action starting on July 20. Commander Kazuki decided to dispatch one company to Langfang on July 25, and one battalion to Peiping on July 26. He also decided to forward the ultimatum to the Chinese on July 26.¹⁸ All these were the decisions and actions taken by the Commander of the North China Army to cope with the changing situations. And, needless to say, such actions also constituted governmental actions of Japan.

Sixth, various actions of the Japanese Government in the form of statements and military actions affected the Chinese to a significant extent. Above all, military actions according to the respective organizational procedure, such as the appearances of the Kwantung Army in Peiping on July 13, and the Korea Army in Tientsin by July 14, and of the battleships of the Third Fleet in Shanghai, together with "the concentration of forces and supplies in Korea and Manchuria" did confirm the image held by the Chinese that the Japanese Government had major objectives and would soon force China into unacceptable demands.¹⁹ Thus, these actions seem to have undermined other actions of the Japanese Government in the form of the

non-expansion policy and various diplomatic efforts, which otherwise might have changed the Chinese image of Japan.

(Jan. 14, 1978)

Notes

- (1) See Inouye, (1975), *op. cit.*, pp. 148-50.
- (2) "Ishiwara Kanji Chuiyo To-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 316.
- (3) *Ibid.*, p. 309.
- (4) Inouye, (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 166.
- (5) *Ibid.*, pp. 165-6.
- (6) *Ibid.*, pp. 167-9.
- (7) *Ibid.*, footnote 148.
- (8) See "Coalition Failed" in chapter IV.
- (9) Ikeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-4.
- (10) See Inouye, (1975), *op. cit.*, pp. 155, 165, 167. Inouye, (1976), *op. cit.*, p. 100.
- (11) See "Coalition Failed" in chapter IV.
- (12) Inouye, (1976), *op. cit.*, p. 96.
- (13) *Ibid.*, pp. 158-9.
- (14) *Ibid.*, pp. 97 and 99.
- (15) Konoye felt inhibited to use the Emperor as a leverage, and could never do this even if it promised a success. See Baba, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-5.
- (16) Inouye, (1976), *op. cit.*, pp. 95, 103, 107, 109 and 110.
- (17) *Ibid.*, p. 100.
- (18) See chapter III.
- (19) Inouye, (1976), *op. cit.*, pp. 97 and 99. See also chapter III.

北支事変—官僚政治モデルを通して（Ⅲ）

〈要 約〉

井 上 真 蔵

本研究で取りあつかった全過程を特徴づけた要因には次のようなものがあった。

第1に、プレーヤー間に共通したイメージがあり、プレーヤーはかなりこのイメージにとらわれて行動していた。そのイメージは中国と中国人に対する優越感の集合であり、特に強硬派の間には顕著にみられた。

第2に内閣および軍部における指導力の欠如が指摘される。特に軍部における指導力の欠如は、参謀本部の機能を麻痺させかねないほどのものであった。内閣における指導力欠如は、たしかに制度的な制約もあったが、近衛首相の場合は、ことにその性格に起因していた。

第3に、一般的に確信を持って論ずるものが、ゲームで勝ちを制している。このことは特に、実際に作戦計画を練り、情報を収集し、軍事予算を作成するジュニア・プレーヤーの場合に適合するように思える。

第4に、情報、ことに事態の進展を告げる確実な情報が、中央の政策決定者に伝わりにくく、そのため、リーダーシップ欠如とあいまって、決定がなされた時にはすでに新しい事態に適合しえない、ということになったのである。この点が全過程を通じて大きな影響を及ぼした。

第5に海外派兵の際には一般的にも、これを管理、統制することが困難である。加えて、支那派遣軍の場合は、独自の判断で行動すべき余地を与えられていた。しかも、派遣軍独自の判断も日本政府の行動の一部をなしていたのである。

第6に、声明、軍事行動などの日本政府の行動が、中国側にかなり影響を及ぼした。なかんづく、2,3の軍事行動は、中国側の対日観に大きな影響を及ぼし、不拡大政策や外交努力を水泡に帰せしめた。（森山昭郎訳）