

## ICU社会科学研究所主催・国際シンポジウム Peace Process and Reconstruction of Cambodia

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1980年代におけるカンボジア紛争は1991年10月のパリ和平合意およびUNTAC（国連カンボジア暫定統治機構，1992年3月設立）の活動によって一応の収束を見たが，この時，国連設立以来最大のPKO（平和維持活動）でもあったUNTACに日本が参加したことは，第二次大戦以後の日本が初めて経験した，東南アジアでの大規模な政治・外交・軍事的介入であった。特にそのPKOの対象地域が，東南アジアの一角であったことは，日本自身にとってのみならず，第二次大戦において日本の軍事的侵略行為の犠牲となった多くのアジア諸国の人々にとっても，戦後史を画する出来事でもあった。

UNTACは，歴史的，国際政治的に大変複雑な構造を持っていたカンボジア紛争をどうにか解決し，政治的秩序の形成に糸口をつけることによっ

て、一年余に亘るその事業を終えたわけであるが、それが比較的成功を収めたと考えられる原因は何だったのか。この国際シンポジウムは、その理由を多角的に分析し、将来起こりうる地域紛争解決の手がかりを見い出すとともに、国連、日本、アジア太平洋諸国（特にASEAN諸国）、ならびにこの地域の安定に大きな関係と関心を持つ米国の、それぞれの役割と有効な協力の方途を探ることを目的として開催された。

シンポジウムは、現役の駐日カンボジア大使や前駐カンボジア日本大使も含め、9名の専門家を迎えて、午前の部、午後の部(1)(2)の三部構成で進められた。講演と質疑応答は全て英語で行われた。各講演者の発言の要旨は以下の通りである。

## The Impact of U.N.T.A.C. and The Cambodian Issue on International Relations in Asia

David Wurfel

The Cambodian settlement is often described as a major consequence of the end of the Cold War in Asia. But more accurately it marked the end of the Sino-Soviet Conflict, in which the U.S. had sided with China. The decline of the USSR hastened the settlement. And the greatly enhanced role of the UN at that moment in history facilitated it. But after a respite, Cambodia, the supposed beneficiary, has continued to suffer.

The settlement in Cambodia has had profound implications for the roles of several states and of international organizations in the subsequent period. Sadly the longer term impact on the UN was not as happy as first expected. The concept of an *administrative* function for the UN was indeed a breakthrough, and was essential to the settlement. But it created expectations of a very intrusive role for the UN in other conflict situations which stretched UN peacekeeping beyond its organizational and financial capacities. Thus while UNTAC may serve as a model for a reformed UN in the 21st century, it is not likely to be repeated in the next decade. The political configuration of Cambodia was also rare--consensus among the Perm5. How soon is that likely to occur again? A more positive and general influence of UNTAC may be on the 19th century principle of 'domestic jurisdiction', completely discarded in Cambodia. This may contribute to its erosion in the fields of human rights and the environment, as well as armed conflict, though the present Cambodian government is trying hard to reassert it.

ASEAN seemed to have been eclipsed in the immediate aftermath of the settlement, but acquired a larger role in the longer run. Its independent efforts to bring peace in Cambodia prior to the entrance of the Perm5 had failed, but in the process it

acquired diplomatic experience and a vision of its future role. Even without the common threat of Vietnam, it was able to continue sufficient cooperation to launch ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). It has shown considerable leadership in Asian affairs, sometimes able to bring significant pressure on great powers. This is part of the answer to the question, In the multipolar world of Asian politics today, who leads?

The role of several states has been altered in the 1990s, partly as the result of the Cambodian settlement. For the Soviet Union it was the most public part of its bowing out of SE Asia. Russia, the successor state, has retained only a small fraction of the previous participation. Vietnam may also appear to have diminished its role, no longer able to control Cambodia or Laos, having lost its powerful patron, the USSR. But through an entirely new strategy, seeking capitalist style development with the help of multiple patrons plus membership in ASEAN, Vietnam may have found a new autonomy of action, and possibly an equally effective mode of protection from China. Potentially the US gained legitimacy through consistency by abandoning its curious alliance with the murderous Khmer Rouge. But the US showed surprisingly little leadership in the Cambodia settlement itself, and since has been unable to move Asia in directions opposed by other great powers.

Japan undoubtedly enhanced its international role through financial support of and political leadership in UNTAC, but not as much as first expected. The bruising national debate over 'PKA' and the very hesitant role of Japan's Self Defense Forces within UNTAC--ending with a hasty withdrawal--did not gain respect among allies. While the use of financial power for political influence was sometimes skillful, it was not always used to good purpose in post-UNTAC Cambodia.

Australia perhaps enhanced its role through the Cambodian settlement more than any other state, not only in making creative proposals that were sold effectively, but in its role within UNTAC, and in Cambodia subsequently. But, of course, this coincided with a wider and increasing commitment to Asia. Indonesia, which worked longest and hardest for a Cambodian settlement, could be put in a similar category.

Malaysia and Singapore gained economic, and thus political influence.

China, which now seems to see itself as the dominant power in Asia, both gained and lost as a result of Cambodia. It dropped the handicap of a murderous ally, the Khmer Rouge, and revealed in the process of contributing to the settlement that some of its aggressive actions in the past had indeed been--as stated--a result of fear of the USSR. These bolstered the credibility of China's stance. But at the same time China lost the glue of its alliance with ASEAN, the fear of Vietnam. And in the meantime China's own actions in the South China Sea have instilled fear.

In retrospect, the creation of UNTAC was probably the only way to achieve a settlement in Cambodia. Its immediate goal of a free election was achieved, which may also have contributed to a decline in hostilities. But poor Cambodia: international assistance for the removal of mines has been minimal; commitment to the protection of human rights by the UN and its members has waned. Corruption and the drug trade soars and the rape of the environment continues. Democracy has collapsed. The tools for intervention after the end of UNTAC were indeed much diminished, but in addition the international community seems to have lost interest in Cambodia -- one of the dangers of declaring UNTAC a success. The neglect is not benign. Neither the UN, regional organizations nor great power initiatives seem to be sufficient to sustain the kind of assistance and guidance needed by a people that has been through such a trauma as the Khmer.

## The Peace Process & Reconstruction of Cambodia: The Challenge to & Response from ASEAN

A.K.P.Mochtan

The Cambodian conflict was one challenge that ASEAN could not afford *not* to take up. The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was a blatant rejection to ASEAN's cardinal principles of non-intervention and sovereignty of states. The involvement of the major powers in the conflict (i.e. China and the former Soviet Union) contradicted ASEAN's aspiration to make Southeast Asia a free and neutral zone. Beyond these, the prolonged conflict in Cambodia brought grave humanitarian concerns through the displaced person and refugee issues. In sum, the Cambodian problem constituted a direct challenge to ASEAN's credibility, indeed its *raison d'être*.

ASEAN's response was immediate, although not always unified. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers first emergency meeting in Bangkok, January 1979, was a critical first step to demonstrate ASEAN's solidarity, and at the same time to project a common stance of denying legitimacy of Vietnam's unilateral act toward Cambodia. Albeit of limited success, ASEAN's early initiatives and firm commitment helped to keep the Cambodian issue alive in the international community's agenda.

ASEAN's greatest challenge was to effect concrete changes on the ground. Despite vigorous opposition, ASEAN failed to evict the Vietnamese from Cambodia, and also in allaying the specter of the Vietnamese threat upon its own members, Thailand especially. Several reasons may be discerned to explain such a situation. First, ASEAN had had no influence to exert either on Vietnam or China, and also to the conflict between them. The Chinese and Vietnamese recalcitrance on their respective positions exacerbated the situation further. Second, a corporate ASEAN policy was conspicuously missing. In fact, there were major differences regarding the main source of threat to the region: whether it was Vietnam or China. Third, there

were differences between ASEAN and other, non-ASEAN actors regarding the terms of settlement of the conflict, e.g. with China. Finally, the perpetual disputes among the Cambodian resistance factions also hampered ASEAN's actions. As a result, ASEAN's initial actions, i.e. between 1979-1984, was only partially successful.

ASEAN's consolidation, coupled with important changes affecting the major powers and local actors involved in the conflict, resulted in some limited breakthroughs in the peace-process during the period of mid-1984 to early 1989. The appointment of Indonesia as ASEAN's interlocutor provided Jakarta more flexibility to introduce several new initiatives, e.g. Cocktail Party and Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM I & II). These initiatives were useful to identify elements that would be required coincided with the unraveling of some of the key aspects pertaining to the conflict, e.g. rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China, the beginning of the quest for economic revitalization in Vietnam, the rise of a new and younger group of leaders in Phnom Penh. For its part, ASEAN was to be credited for its perseverance, in particular its insistence for a *comprehensive* settlement of the problem.

The peace negotiation gained momentum during late 1989 to the end of 1991, when the international community, specifically the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, became actively involved in formulating the blue print for peace. ASEAN continued to be involved in a significant way. However, it was obvious that it was the Perm-Five that had the decisive role, and that it was only the UN that had both the capacity and legitimacy to assume a transitional authority in Cambodia.

ASEAN's role and contribution during the actual peacekeeping operations (1992-1993) were therefore relatively modest. This, however, did not necessarily indicate that the Association was being 'diluted' by the presence and interests of the other powers. ASEAN's low-profile posture during UNTAC period was in fact a reflection of the Association's pragmatism, combining self-restraint and constructive participation.

The settlement of the Cambodian problem facilitated new opportunities for the expansion and deepening of intra-Southeast Asian cooperation. There is now real prospect for the formation of a "One Southeast Asia," presumably based on ASEAN's ideals and principles, hence making regionalism in Southeast Asia identical to 'ASEANization' of the region. The outcome of such a process is yet to be awaited. Suffice it to say, the Cambodian experience enhanced ASEAN's confidence in a number of critical areas: on its resilience, and especially important, the pertinence of its norms and values to Southeast Asia's need and conditions.



## Viet Nam's Perspective on Peace and Reconstruction in Cambodia: Issues and Concerns

Shaun Kingsley Malarney

A proper understanding of Viet Nam's perspective on peace and reconstruction in Cambodia must go back to Viet Nam's 1978 invasion of Cambodia and the dramatic consequences it had for its foreign relations. During the early 1970s, relations between the Vietnamese Communists and the Khmer Rouge were functional. After 1975, relations soured when the Khmer Rouge began exploiting the long-standing animosities between the Khmer and Vietnamese. Khmer attacks began on the Vietnamese border with tensions reaching a crisis point in December 1978. The Vietnamese then invaded Cambodia, overthrew the Khmer Rouge, and installed a Vietnamese-backed government. Prior to the invasion, Viet Nam had openly allied itself with the Soviet Union at the expense of its relations with China. The Chinese, long-time supporters of the Khmer Rouge, had long had tenuous relations with the Vietnamese and were infuriated by the invasion. They launched a brief border war against Viet Nam in early 1979, continued to supply the Khmer Rouge to fight the Vietnamese, and maintained hostile relations with Hanoi. The United States, almost ready to reestablish diplomatic relations with Viet Nam in late 1978, immediately broke off negotiations and strengthened its trade embargo against Viet Nam. The ASEAN nations' reaction ranged from the detachment of Indonesia and Malaysia to the openly anti-Vietnamese stance of Thailand. Despite the fact that Viet Nam had ended the genocide in Cambodia, Viet Nam found itself almost completely isolated internationally.

The process of peace and reconstruction in Cambodia began with Viet Nam's withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989. Unable to finance an inconclusive and unpopular war, Viet Nam recognized that the only way to end its international isolation was

to leave Cambodia and let the Hun Sen regime to stand on its own. This had become particularly apparent when the Soviet Union's financial troubles reached the point where they could no longer provide massive levels of aid to Viet Nam and Cambodia. Although the process took longer than they hoped, Viet Nam's withdrawal has led to dramatic improvements in its international position. Relations with China were normalized in 1992. ASEAN nations began actively trading with and investing in Viet Nam in the late 1980s, culminating in Viet Nam's admission into ASEAN in 1995. The United States abandoned its trade embargo in 1994 and officially reestablished diplomatic relations in 1995.

The main concern for Viet Nam now as it looks at the reconstruction of Cambodia is for a regime that does not threaten its security interests. Viet Nam has maintained good relations with the present Cambodian government and there are regular contacts between high-level officials. However, a number of problems remain. First, the borders between Viet Nam and Cambodia were arbitrarily and unclearly drawn by France during the colonial period and have yet to be completely clarified. This has led to tensions in some border regions as Vietnamese farmers have gradually pushed the border back into unpopulated areas of Cambodia. During the spring of 1996, an incident occurred in which Cambodian forces shot and killed several Vietnamese along the border. In many areas, the border is being fortified on both sides. Viet Nam and Cambodia also dispute their boundaries at sea where rich natural resources are said to lay. Another area of tension is over the Vietnamese who remain in Cambodia. Vietnamese have settled in Cambodia for centuries. Under the Khmer Rouge, Vietnamese in Cambodia were harshly persecuted, yet thousands of Vietnamese moved into Cambodia during the Vietnamese occupation. Many still remain in Cambodia where they face many difficulties. A recent Cambodian immigration law has also caused concern that it will be used as a pretext for expelling Vietnamese. Another point of concern is the existence in Cambodia, which the Vietnamese government tacitly considers to have unofficial approval, of armed groups dedicated to destabi-

lizing and overthrowing the Vietnamese government. One final cause for concern is that some Cambodian politicians continue to single out the Vietnamese as the source of their troubles and assert that Viet Nam is still intent on taking over Cambodia. Viet Nam watches with concern that the ethnic hatreds that flared under the Khmer Rouge do not flare again and bring instability to the region.

## Cambodia and the major powers

Leszek Buszynski

This presentation will focus upon the roles of the major powers that will not be covered by the other speakers, namely the US, the Western community and China. First, in relation to China, it will examine the development of Chinese policy towards Cambodia since the 1980s when it was under Vietnamese occupation. During the 1980s China's role in the Cambodian conflict was regarded ambiguously as the containment of a predatory and expansionist Vietnam was offset by the amorality of the means invoked. This entailed support for the *Khmer Rouge* as an instrument of pressure against Vietnam, a movement whose crimes against humanity became legendary. China's attitude towards Cambodia began to change in 1989 as the Vietnamese were preparing for a withdrawal of forces from that country. The strategic rationale for supporting the *Khmer Rouge* was removed once Vietnam had complied with ASEAN and Chinese demands and thereafter China accepted the lead of the UN Security Council in promoting a UN sponsored resolution of the issue. China's material assistance to the *Khmer Rouge* was terminated after the Paris Peace Accords were signed on 23 October 1991. Beijing then acted in support of the UN sponsored peace and reconstruction process to ensure stability in Cambodia.

For the United States, however, the Paris Peace accords brought new responsibilities and particular moral dilemmas that will need to be addressed. Throughout the 1980s the US was largely an observer of events in Cambodia though it acquiesced in the containment of Vietnam. The US had supported the non Communist *Khmer* factions financially to enable them to survive against the *Khmer Rouge*. First priority was the desire to see the Paris Accords succeed to bring stability to this country and to promote its democratization. Cambodia became a test case of the international community's efforts in peace building or the reconstruction of a country after its

devastation as a consequence of civil war. The UN Transitional Authority Cambodia [UNTAC] that was introduced under these accords was one of the largest such operations so far with 22,000 UN personnel and a budget of \$20 billion. In the wake of this operation the elections of 23 May 1993 were held which resulted in a sharing of power between Prince Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen of the Communist Party of Cambodia [CPP].

The objective of stability and democratization which has been strongly promoted by the West, however, has come into conflict with the principle of social justice in a way which has become obvious recently. The US accepted that stability in Cambodia would demand national reconciliation of the various factions including the *Khmer Rouge* and the establishment of an integrated government. How the integration of the *Khmer Rouge* in a Cambodian power sharing arrangement could be harmonized with the west's commitment to human rights and democracy was never satisfactory explained. In 1993 US representatives such as Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord claimed that the US would support the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to try the *Khmer Rouge* for its crimes but the need to terminate the existing conflict meant that the issue of justice was suspended. It was the Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans who in his assessment of the Cambodian situation declared that the Paris Accords should have included measures to deal with the issue of justice. Without a resolution of the crimes of the past, he stressed, there can be no rule of law. This point is important in view of Ieng Sary's recent defection as announced on 8 August 1996 and the royal pardon extended to him by King Sihanouk. The West is adopting the criterion of selective justice in prosecuting Serbian leaders for war crimes in Bosnia while turning a blind eye to Cambodia. Democratization cannot succeed under such circumstances.

## The Constrains of Cambodian Politics on the Peace process and the Reconstruction of Cambodia

Truong Mealy

### 1. *Paris Accords:*

- A brief review of the Paris Agreement on Cambodia

(The Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) which had as co-Presidents: **Indonesia**-President Suharto and **France**-President Mitterrand with participants from 17 other countries first held in 1989 and finalized with positive results in 1991)

The Paris peace agreement was signed on 23 October, 1991, providing a comprehensive political settlement with an important focus on human rights and economic rehabilitation and development by the world community to Cambodia which has suffered more than two decades of war.

The Cambodian armed conflict that the United Nations was called upon to help solve was a multifaceted war: a proxy war between rival defacto alliances of regional and great powers and also a fratricide war between armies of rival Cambodian political parties.

The agreement which reached positive results has gone through many long and difficult negotiations between external parties and internal parties to the Cambodia conflict.

The real negotiations started with those of Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk and Samdech Hun Sen, in France in 1987 and then, with all four parties to the conflict, in Indonesia, in Thailand and in Japan in the nineties:

a-FUNCINPEC: (French acronym) United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia headed by Samdech Sihanouk and His son;

b-SOC: State of Cambodia headed by Samdech Chea Sim and Samdech Hun Sen;

c-KPNLF: Khmer People's National Liberation Front headed by Samdech Son Sann;

d-KHMER ROUGH: Party of Democratic Kampuchea headed by HEMr. Khieu Samphan.

• The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) headed by H.E. Mr. Yasushi Akashi, a senior UN diplomat, Personal Representative of the Secretary General of the UNO, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

In his report called "Cambodia's new deal," William Shawcross wrote: "*What can be said for certain is that Cambodia has been given the best chance for peace it ever had -- thanks to the overall success of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia whose work began with the Paris Peace Agreement of October 1991 and ended with the adoption of a new constitutional monarchy on 24 September 1993.*"

*UNTAC was one of the largest, most intrusive, and most expensive United Nations peacekeeping operations ever. Its purpose had been to bring reconciliation, disarmament, rehabilitation and free election, and a new internationally recognized Government to Cambodia.*

*It did not succeed in all particulars. Nonetheless, for Cambodia, the UNTAC period was a social revolution that, with careful assistance, could transform the political landscape of the country.*

*The two outstanding successes of UNTAC were:*

*a)the general elections of May 23-28, 1993 and*

*b)the repatriation of 370,000 refugees from the Thai border camps".*

### Human Rights:

UNTAC did very well in providing human rights groups with:

- a protective cover for their emergence and initial developments in Cambodia;
- an introduction in favour of those newly formed Cambodian human rights groups to regional human rights NGOs;
- an overall human rights awareness to all Cambodians, civilians and officials through its TV, Radio, UN training programs etc...;
- corrective actions enabling the provincial officers of the UN human rights component to "hassle" local and regional Cambodian officials who were committing or sheltering violators, (*UNTAC was a "peacekeeping" not a "peacemaking" or a "peace-enforcing" mission*).
- the overseeing of the release of political prisoners and prisoners of war.

UNTAC was also able to regularly gain access to prisons and frequently curb or eliminate long term Cambodian penal practices that were not in conformity with the UN Standard Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

Besides, the UNTAC HumanRights component succeeded in establishing a continued UN presence in Cambodia in the area of Human Rights. This is a very positive step to help the growth and development of democracy in Cambodia.

But, having no or only little real enforcement powers, UNTAC could not do much or as much as it wished to prevent or to stop the "resolute noncompliance" by the armed Cambodian factions, in particular with respect to the refusal of the Khmer Rouge (KR) to abide by the Paris Peace Agreement (the refusal of the KR to canton its troops and to disarm themselves and to give UNTAC access to its zone made the comprehensive political settlement to the Cambodian conflict envisaged in the 23 October 1991 Paris Peace Agreement impossible to put into effect). Moreover,



UNTAC was also unable to put into practice the explicit remedial measures provided to the UN by the Peace Treaty concerning the removal of offending high ranking officials from all Cambodian armed political parties.

## ***2. The Constrains of Cambodian Politics:***

### **• Internal Constrains**

- **Human aspect:** Among many constrains which make the peace process and the reconstruction of Cambodia more difficult, one should not forget the importance of civic education and training given to the Cambodian population;
- **Political aspect:** Two decades of destructive war have made legal frameworks irrelevant and human code of conduct irrational.

### **• External Constrains**

- **Regional aspect:** Regional alliance has its own interests which are not in complete "conformity" with those of the global one;
- **Global aspect:** Due to the above facts, time was needed and a time frame for a peaceful settlement in Cambodia could only be set when all parties' interests were satisfactorily met: a comprehensive political settlement.

## ***3. Conclusion***

The constraints of Cambodian politics, caused by the deficiency of civic education and training among Cambodian population and their legal frameworks after long years of destructive war, which have made the peace process and the reconstruction in Cambodia more difficult and lengthy have also had some of their roots in the so-called "vested interest" of global powers.

## The Cambodian Issue and the UN's Role

- Political and Humanitarian Intervention and  
the Transitional Authority for Recovery -

Tatsuro Kunugi

The Cambodian issue in the recent history began with "Kissinger's Sideshow" which led to a series of events, *i.e.*, the fall of the Lon Nol regime in 1975, massacre of people by the Khmer Rouge (KR) and the Vietnamese invasion in December 1978.

Political handling of the case by the UN General Assembly in 1979 was a typical case of Cold War period. By rejecting India's proposal to keep a vacant seat, the KR's credentials were accepted, after Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, India's armed intervention creating Bangladesh and USSR's support of the Vietnamese invasion were adduced. This made subsequent task of UN, both political and humanitarian, more difficult than ever.

On the other hand, the General Assembly's appeal to the world for humanitarian relief to the civilian population received immediate response from a large number of NGOs which was subsequently much strengthened by ICRC, UNICEF, World Food Programme under the coordination of a special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for humanitarian assistance. Efforts by SRSG to apply an even-handed approach to relief operations inside and outside Cambodia and to try to separate politics from humanitarian action almost always encountered difficulties.

Coordination of humanitarian operations, however, marked some success in the following respects:

- a) letting the world know that hapless people were used as pawns in the political game and subjected to inhuman treatment, abuse and violence by the local armed elements concerned;
- b) promotion of political dialogue and understanding through the humanitarian path-

- way, taking into account that success in humanitarian operation may help mitigate animosities, and its failure aggravate the conflict;
- c) training, education and cultural programs for the refugees in border camps with the view to facilitating national reconciliation in future;
  - d) greater appreciation and promotion of concerted efforts by numerous NGOs in an organized fashion, which has since been followed by conscious efforts of UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR and other agencies in seeking greater reliance on NGO cooperation.

After a visit to the region in 1985, the Secretary-General began to exercise his good offices and formulated ideas for a settlement framework, which perhaps contributed to the first face to face talk of the 4 Cambodian parties in 1988 in Jakarta. Following P-5 meetings that started in January 1990, the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was established to maintain a cease-fire that took effect on 1 May 1991. Following the Paris Agreements of 23 October 1991, the UN Transitional Authority (UNTAC) was set up to supervise the cease-fire, the withdrawal of foreign forces; regroup, canton and disarm all armed forces of the Cambodian forces, and ensure a 70 percent level of demobilization; control and supervise the administrative structures, including the police; ensure the respect of human rights; and organize and conduct elections.

UNHCR as the lead agency successfully completed in April 1993 repatriation and resettlement of some 360,000 refugees. In June 1992, several governments pledged \$880 million for the reconstruction of Cambodia.

The "transitional authority" was wrongly compared to UN trusteeship that is explicitly impermissible as regards UN Member's territory (Art. 78 of the Charter). The Supreme National Council (SNC) was the "unique legitimate body and source of authority" and the exercise of its authority was delegated to UN to ensure implementation of the Agreements, including the holding of elections.

The KR did not register as a political party and took no part in the election. The

KR neither disarmed its armed forces nor gave UNTAC access to the areas of its control. These acts of non-compliance detracted from the success of UNTAC, which subsequently influenced the UN operations in Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Burundi. The KR's violation of the Paris Agreements created a new situation which should have been acted upon by the Security Council. Once a decisive moment is lost in police action in any society, a chain-reaction can sometimes overwhelm any remedial measures. The same consideration should apply to the well-established principle of imprescriptibility of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by KR leaders.

The concepts of "transitional authority" has a wide applicability to cases of temporary disintegration of order or "failed States" in which the UN as a political institution for peace and security has a legitimate interest in intervening. After all, global governance must start with national governance that requires law and order as well as administration of justice for human security and human development.

## The Role of Japan

Yukio Imagawa

### 1. Changes of Japan's diplomatic posture in Asia

Japan, after its defeat in the Second World War, took a characteristically passive diplomatic posture particularly in the political field and hesitated to take positive action to solve local political and military conflicts in Asia for more than 40 years. It was Cambodia's peace process which changed Japan's diplomatic posture from the passive one to the positive and creative one.

In December 1987, after nearly two decades of warfare between Cambodians, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, then head of three factions' anti-Vietnam coalition and Mr. Hun Sen, then Prime Minister of Vietnam-supported Phnom-Penh Government met in France at a small village called *Ferre en Tardenois*, some 120 kilometers northeast by east of Paris. They met for the first time to have direct dialogue towards their reconciliation. Thus the peace process in Cambodia took its first step at the initiative of Cambodians themselves. Considering this Sihanouk-Hun Sen talks to be a clue to the peace process in Cambodia, Japan commenced to follow the situation closely and endeavored to get information.

From the end of July to the end of August 1989 (this year was also the year of the end of the Cold War), France hosted at Paris, an international conference for Cambodia (PICC) under the cochairmanship of France and Indonesia to try to solve the intractable conflict in Cambodia. Japan, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, was asked to participate in the Conference and to co-chair with Australia the Third Committee which was to deal with the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and eventual reconstruction of Cambodia. Japan did so willingly. At that time I was Minister of the Embassy of Japan in France and was nominated as co-chairman of the Third Committee with Mr. Robert Merrillees who was then Assis-

tant under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Commerce of Australia. Mr. Merrillees and I gave each Cambodia party, especially Khmer-Rouge party, enough time and opportunity for them to express their opinion, and we waited very patiently their exhaustion of political propaganda. After a month's very severe discussions, only the Third Committee co-chaired by Japan and Australia could succeed to adopt official documents with consensus. It was a huge success for Japan's diplomacy. As both the First Committee which dealt with military matters and the Second Committee which dealt with political affairs could not achieve any conclusion, PICC was adjourned on 30 August 1989 and was reconvened on 21 October 1991. On 23 October 1991, the agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict (Paris Agreements) were signed by all the Cambodian delegates and representatives of 18 participating countries.

## 2. Japan's participation in UNTAC

According to the Paris Agreements, the period between the entry into force of the Agreements to the promulgation of new constitution was called the transitional period and from 15 March 1992, the date of arrival of Mr. Yasushi Akashi, special representative of UN Secretary General, UN's peace keeping operations(PKO) were deployed all over Cambodia.

Japan was strongly requested to participate in the PKO by the Cambodian side especially Mr. Hun Sen who did the utmost effort to persuade Japan's politicians when he visited Japan in March 1992, and by UNTAC especially Mr. Akashi. The question of whether or not to participate in the PKO caused political turmoil in Japan. After a long dispute in political circles, Japan finally decided to send military observers, engineer battalions, civilian policemen and election observers. It could achieve the international contribution in accordance with Japan's position in Asia. It was indeed a significant breakthrough in Japan's national and international policy to cope positively with political situation in Asia and other regions.

Throughout transitional period in Cambodia, Japanese diplomats did their best to support Mr. Akashi and UNTAC. At the initiative of myself who was Ambassador of Japan to Cambodia, in supporting UNTAC, a really unique consulting and coordinating body called Expanded PERM5 (EP5) or core group was formed with diplomatic representatives of PERM 5 countries, Indonesia, Japan, Australia and Thailand (later, Germany also joined). EP5 usually met once or twice a week but sometimes three times a day to discuss measures to assist UNTAC and exchange views on the peace process and cooperation, regardless of their political or ideological standpoint.

### **3. Japan's contribution to the reconstruction of Cambodia**

Japan, not only as top donor but also as leading donor, played an important role in the reconstruction of Cambodia. In June 1992, Japan held a ministerial conference on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia at Tokyo. It also chaired three meetings of International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) (September 1993 at Paris, March 1994 at Tokyo, March 1995 at Paris) and hosted a consultative group (CG) type meeting at Tokyo in July 1996. In these international conferences and meetings, a huge amount of aid for the reconstruction of Cambodia was pledged by many donor countries and international organisations.

According to the statistics of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), in the period between 1992 and 1995, multilateral agencies pledged 977 million US dollars and disbursed 380 million dollars (about 39 percent of the pledged amount). As for the bilateral donor countries, they pledged 1,312 million dollars and disbursed 967 million dollars (about 74 percent of the pledged amount). Japan who is top donor country to Cambodia, pledged 321 million dollars and disbursed 396 million dollars which is 23 percent more than the pledged amount.

## Prospects for New Security in Asia in the Next Millennium: assumptions, analyses, advocates & alternatives

Timothy M. Shaw

The post-bipolar world poses a range of challenges for students of "international relations" for both analysis & praxis in Asia & elsewhere, especially in terms of the emerging contours of the twenty-first century. The crucial connection between security & development is still too little understood, yet it is clearly central in contemporary transformations (East Asia) & transitions (Eastern Europe & Central Asia). In particular, links between economic & political liberalizations, markets & democracies, let alone states & economies are too little comprehended.

The current concern with "new" security issues in Asia as elsewhere constitutes but one attempt to "bring in" a range of novel factors which threaten in both short & long terms the stability of regional & global as well as local & national structures. Progressing from earlier interest in common & comprehensive security, the early-1990s concept of "human security" seeks to provide a broad framework which can incorporate a range of traditional & recent challenges to both development & order, communities, markets & states.

In particular, human development/security accepts the inevitability of both globalization & differentiation as well as regionalization; ie multiple levels & sectors of "threat" not just bipolar "realist" inter-state, nuclear stand-off. This parallels the proliferation of states & accompanying "worlds": the "South" is no longer homogeneous if it ever was. In particular, the rise of the NICs & near-NICs poses challenges to established non-aligned arrangements & related development assumptions, especially hegemonic homogeneous neo-liberal prescriptions for the "Third" World! The range of UN & related "global" conferences, commissions & reports in the current decade points to the inescapable & incremental "external" costs of privileging growth, shrink-



ing the state, expanding the market, disregarding the environment, ignoring basic needs & marginalizing the poor.

The accompanying "new" security matrix embraces transformed states, economies & strategic contexts: myriad actors, relations, issues, institutions & perspectives/responses. In particular, it privileges questions of regionalisms, civil societies, multiple threats (from economic & ecological to technological & viral, migratory & social ) & a problematic range of responses by both state & non-state actors alike.

The proliferation, internationalization & marginalization (and possible fragmentation) of the state in the "New" International Divisions of Labour & Power mean that "foreign policy" is no longer the prerogative of governments alone.

The rise of non-state actors in the global political economy, from companies to communities, NGOs to media, concentrated within national regional & global civil societies, is symptomatic of post-bipolar inter-(or rather trans-) national relations. Thus the "double movement" or "dialectic" of globalization & incorporation involves reactions like "alternative" conferences, concerns & coalitions, from informal sectors' survival strategies to green, human rights, indigenous, women's & youth activism.

The purported "Asian" model of fast, state-directed growth generates its own set of strategic issues, from inequalities & alienation (eg drugs & gangs) to competing jurisdictions & proliferation. In addition, Asia has some areas which display symptoms of the classic "African" syndrome: failed states, vibrant informal sectors, privatized security as well as basic needs etc. In short, forms of "anarchy" are not confined to the African continent but, through ubiquitous transnational processes - from drugs & migrations to cultures & resources - are apparent everywhere, including parts of the Asian continent, from urban crime to border trade.

Pressures on Asian regimes to "liberalize" generate their own sets of tensions around the (in)compatibility in sequences & speeds of economic & political liberalizations. To contain such tensions, forms of "Asian corporatism" are being imple-

mented which bring together dominant political, economic & strategic interests, sometimes extending to established elements from labour unions & civil societies. In the new millennium, then, distinctive forms of "Asian capitalisms" may be joined by innovative types of "Asian" corporatisms. If these fail, then there may be attempts to revive more overt forms of Asian authoritarianism with profound implications for sustainable development/democracy.

Human security concerns in Asia at the turn of the century include, then democratization, ecology, culture, employment, technology, urbanization etc as well as formal inter-state conflicts over resources, territory, weapons etc. Just as remarkable levels of economic growth have generated new social & security issues, so global & internal pressures for forms of liberalization will continue to throw-up novel threats to human development/security.

These pose challenges for both analysis & praxis. Will orthodox realist, interdependence & dependency perspectives survive or be superseded by more indigenous approaches? Will state & non-state policies be able to respond creatively to the new security & development environment? And finally, what scenarios are most likely to prevail: continued growth with regional cooperation? Or increased conflict & regional fragmentation? Democratization or corporatism? Anarchy or authoritarianism? The adoption of a new human security perspective at least broadens the range of possibilities as Asia enters the next millennium.

## Cambodia and the ASEAN

Francisco Nemenzo

The history of international relations is full of intriguing episodes, but few can match the dramatic transformation of Southeast Asia from a region of turmoil to a region of peace in the last five years. Prophets of doom cited it among the trouble spots where the nuclear holocaust could begin; today it is hailed as a model for conflict resolution. Cambodia marked the starting point for this transformation.

Dr. Mochtan discussed the ASEAN's role in the settlement of the Cambodian conflict. I would like to share my crude reflections on how the conflict revitalized the ASEAN. This association was formed by five reactionary governments in mortal fear of communism. But a year after its birth it almost died a natural death, when the Philippines and Malaysia broke off diplomatic ties. It got a second wind in 1976, when America's defeat in the Vietnam War rekindled their fears of a "domino effect," this reached paranoid proportions when the Vietnamese marched into Cambodia.

Setting aside their differences, the ASEAN governments backed up the bizarre coalition of Pol Pot, Sihanouk and Son Sann. One of them, Thailand, hosted their anti-Vietnamese guerrillas and allowed China and the US to channel their military aid to the Cambodian rebels. In response, Vietnam threatened to distribute the captured American weapons to the communist forces in the ASEAN.

Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia ignored the threat because their communist insurgencies had been crushed. But Marcos of the Philippines had reason to worry. The communist New People's Army was at the peak of its strength in the early 1980s. A shipment of armalites from Vietnam could have tilted the strategic balance in its favor.

With memories of that period at the back of our minds, it took some effort for the

left-wing activists of my generation to imagine that one day Vietnam would join the ASEAN, brightening up the prospect of becoming the structure for regional integration. It is just a matter of time before Burma, Laos and Cambodia will be inducted as full-fledged members.

Even after its revival at the Bali Summit of 1976, the member governments did not seem to take the ASEAN seriously. In the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, for instance, the ASEAN Section was a depository for unwanted diplomats. Only Singapore and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia showed much interest in keeping it alive.

ASEAN's initial attempt at economic integration -the so called "industrial complementation scheme" -broke down when the other members realized that Singapore alone would stand to benefit. Yet, today, the ASEAN Free Trade Association (AFTA) is making a headway, much better than NAFTA. Professor Wurfel gave the reason why: Its role in the Cambodian dispute provided the ASEAN the "diplomatic experience and vision of its future role."

But it also appears in the papers presented to this seminar that ASEAN's role in the settlement was, in fact, marginal. The crucial factor was the involvement of PERM 5 and the work of UNTAC. While it is true that the ASEAN made the first moves, these -as Dr. Mochtan put it- "failed to effect concrete changes in the ground".

That is understandable. ASEAN entered the scene as a partisan. It could not be a mediator, much less serve as a transitional authority. Vietnam and the Vietnamese-sponsored Phnom Penh regime had cause to distrust the ASEAN. As legitimacy to assume a transitional authority in Cambodia." The intervention of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council was indeed decisive. So was that of Japan, as the chief financier of UNTAC: the largest and costliest operation a UN agency has ever undertaken.

But I would have wanted a deeper analysis of the roles of individual countries in the settlement. Professor Malarney tried to do this with respect to Vietnam and Am-

bassador Imágawa with respect to Japan. Dr. Mochtan alluded to Indonesia as "ASEAN's interlocutor," although he did not explain what that means. Neither did he explain the Cocktail Party and JIM which Indonesia supposedly initiated.

I was hoping for an extensive discussion on the role of Thailand. Next to Vietnam, Thailand was the most directly involved. It provided refuge to the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF guerrillas. Chinese aid to the Khmer Rouge and US aid to KPNLF were coursed through Thai territory. Had Thailand closed its doors to the Cambodian rebels, the Vietnamese and Phnom Penh forces would probably have demolished their military formations.

How critical was the softening of Thailand's hard-line foreign policy under Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan in all this? When he adopted the policy of turning Cambodia (and Indo-China as a whole) from a killing field into a market place, wasn't that also the point when the rest of ASEAN changed their tune, paving the way for PERM 5 and UNTAC? What happened inside Thailand that would explain this change? How do we account for the sudden shift of its foreign policy?

In looking back at those decades of turmoil and visualizing the future of Southeast Asia, we should pay attention to the issues Professor Shaw raised. These are usually ignored by students of international relations, caught up as we often are in the study of nation states. We must recognize as the distinctive feature of our time the entry of non-state actors in international relations. The NGOs are raising a whole range of transnational issues we had hitherto overlooked. But, perhaps, this requires another whole-day seminar.