

THE NORTH CHINA INCIDENT
THROUGH THE LENS OF
THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL*

< PART II >

Shinzo Inouye* *

III The Politics of Expansion

The period from July 13 to 20, 1937, saw the decision game of the second mobilization, the resultant of which was the decision to dispatch three divisions to North China from within Japan. Focusing our attention on how each player affected the game, we shall try to identify several important points which will help us to interpret the resultant.

The Game of the Second Mobilization

— July 13 — In the morning, a telegraphic report by the New Commander of the North China Army, Major General Kazuki, reached to the Army General Staff and the War Ministry. It instructed that the North China Army should force the Hopei-Chahar Political Council to carry out the agreement and that, in case of need to use armed forces, the Commander would prepare the required disposition of the North China Army together with reinforcements so as to crush the Chinese 29th Army at a blow.¹ Moreover, this positive view anticipated the probable advance to Shihkiachwang and Tehchow in the future.² Major General Kazuki undoubtedly began to hold that idea on his way to Tientsin.³ Another information of illegal firing by the Chinese 37th Division reached the Central

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** The writer is a Research Fellow of International Relations, Social Science Research Institute, International Christian University, Tokyo.

Headquarters, which had already been informed of the northward movement of the massive Chinese Central Army and its affiliated armies on the previous day. Such information no doubt encouraged the advocates of drastic measures.⁴

Informed of some maneuvers in the Army General Staff to break the agreement, Naval Minister Yonai, before the Cabinet Conference, asked Foreign Minister Hirota to encourage the War Minister to stick to the local settlement, and not to be overridden by those with positive views.⁵ The War Minister understood this.

Then at the Cabinet Meeting, War Minister Sugiyama gave an explanation of the situation:

On the spot, the Chinese do not satisfactorily carry out the agreement. Illegal firings still continue. The Central Army has reportedly been moving northward. Thus, the Nanking Government's sincerity is doubtful. Also the field army on the spot doubts whether Sung Cheh-yuan sincerely hopes for a peaceful settlement. Even if he does, anti-Japanese sentiment in the ranks below that of the regimental commanders of the 29th Army has grown intense. The situation will never warrant optimism.⁶

Partly because he had been advised by the Foreign Minister to stick to the local settlement, and partly because he himself had never expected such a strong-worded appraisal from Commander Kazuki,⁷ he went on to say that:

Mobilization of troops within Japan will not only make a great impact on the rest of the world but would also provide a plausible excuse for a Chinese reaction, so we must be most careful. Although the mobilization orders were expected to have been issued today, they are to be given pending further confirmation of the situation.⁸

This view was supported by Foreign Minister Hirota, who said:

Yesterday the German Ambassador visited me and conveyed the information that the Nanking Government's policy is to avoid the spread of the incident. So the War Minister's explanation is quite reasonable.⁹

Thus the Inner Cabinet decided to wait for further confirmation of the situation, suspending for a while the orders for mobilization.

Meanwhile, Major General Kazuki's report not only encouraged those who wanted positive measures,¹⁰ but also got the advocates of the non-expansion policy to maneuver. The War Guidance Section of the Army General Staff, backed up by the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, presented the senior decision-makers with their opinion that the non-expansion policy should be strictly maintained and that the Tientsin Army should be so instructed as to adhere to this policy.¹¹ Based upon this view, "The Guidelines for Settling the North China Incident" were formulated at 8:00 p.m., including the stipulation that, in case of resort to force, prior authorization should be required. The "Guidelines" were then reported to the Emperor.¹²

How they were formulated deserves careful examination. Any plan, which was drafted usually at the section level, was then generally required to be submitted to inter-bureau meetings in order to arrive at a consensus before it was passed on to the higher levels. In the case of "The Guidelines for Settling the North China Incident," the War Guidance Section, together with the Military Affairs Section, tried to limit the number of players involved in the game by avoiding the formal procedures which, they feared, would mean the shelving of the plan.¹³ In addition, because the Army senior decision-makers felt it urgent at this moment to convey some consistent instructions to the North China Army and had no idea of altering the non-expansion policy. They wanted to get the guidelines decided immediately without any disturbance, and so had to exclude from the final stage those below the rank of division chief, most of whom were advocates of more drastic measures.¹⁴ Then the decision was reported to the Emperor. They naturally thought, it is assumed, that the advocates of strong measures would find it difficult to interfere once the guidelines had been addressed to the Throne. Then after the decision had been made as described above, it was cabled to the North China Army in the name of the Vice War Minister.

In the meantime, the Kwantung Army had started action on the evening of July 11, and part of it now appeared in Peking and another in Tientsin. The Korean Army also had been activated in the evening two days before.¹⁵

It was these actions that would jeopardize both local settlement and the non-expansion policy, as will be later explained.

— July 14 — Major General Nakajima and Colonel Shibayama, each on behalf of the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister respectively, were ordered to fly to Tientsin in order to ensure that the North China Army fully understood the guidelines drawn on the previous day, to appraise “the need for any reinforcements,” and to “prepare a firsthand evaluation of the situation.”¹⁶

Major General Kazuki received a letter from the Emperor dated July 11, which read that, deeply concerned about the spread of the Incident, the Emperor hoped the Commander would carry out a swift implementation of the agreement and would not react carelessly to Chinese provocation.¹⁷

— July 15 — The War Guidance Section submitted to the sections concerned the plan of “The Outlines for Guiding the North China Incident” drafted on the previous day, and presented it to Major General Ishiwara. The plan proposed that:

The general policy of non-expansion be firmly maintained. For this purpose, in case that the Chinese were found to be sincere in implementing the cease-fire agreement, troops should be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity. Even if the situation should become aggravated, the non-expansion policy should still be maintained. In case of a need to use force, however, decisive power be used from the beginning to bring as early a settlement as possible.¹⁸

On receiving this plan, Colonel Muto, Chief of the Operations Section, tore it up, saying, “Such an abstract plan is useless!”¹⁹ Having held extremely positive views from the outset of the incident, the Intelligence Division of the General Staff made the situational appraisal that Japan should settle the incident without delay by dispatching the required troops to North China as soon as possible.²⁰ This appraisal was submitted to the sections and divisions concerned. Thus within the General Staff, far from being reconciled, conflict of opinion was intensified.

Then in the evening, Mr. Ishii,²¹ Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau, who was himself an advocate of non-expansion and had also been influenced by the

War Guidance Section, presented the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau with a proposal²² which stated:

1. The Japanese Government shall approve the local agreement of July 11;
2. The Japanese Government shall demand that the Nationalist Government immediately cease military activities;
3. If the Nationalist Government accepts the above-stated demand, the Japanese Government shall halt further dispatches and also immediately withdraw reinforcements, awaiting implementation of the first term;
4. These terms shall be announced both within and without the country.²³

The chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau succeeded in getting approval for his proposal from the chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, and intended to submit it to the Cabinet on the following day.

In the meantime, arriving at Tientsin in the evening, Major General Nakajima and Colonel Shibayama communicated their instructions of July 13 to Commander Kazuki, saying, "It has been already reported to the Emperor."²⁴ The Commander argued, "If non-expansion was adhered to by all means, reinforcements should be restrained in order not to provoke the other side."²⁵ Major General Nakajima and Colonel Shibayama said in reply, "Reinforcements will be reconsidered since you deem the present strength of the Tientsin Army to be sufficient."²⁶ Immediately they tried to send a telegram that "no reinforcements need to be sent to North China," but Colonel Shibayama was advised by Lt. Colonel Ikeda not to send a cable from the Headquarters in Tientsin because it was sure to be leaked.²⁷ Whereupon the Colonel flew to Dairen and sent the telegram in code, *which never reached the top decision-makers*. As a matter of fact, the telegram was held, unreported to the senior decision-makers, by an advocate of expansion, a certain second lieutenant in charge of telegrams at the Army General Staff in Tokyo.²⁸

A part of the 20th Division of the Korean Army had already moved into Tientsin by this date, but the remainder was ordered to stay outside for the

time being.²⁹

In Kuling, Chou En-lai participated in the National Defence Conference as an official representative of the Communists from this date.³⁰

— July 16 — In the morning, British Chargé d'Affairs Dodds met with Vice Foreign Minister Horiuchi, and transmitted orally the information that Chiang Kai-shek was "ready to withdraw troops to their positions prior to the incident and terminate all troops movements in the affected area if similar action (was) taken by the Japanese Government."³¹

Advocates of strong measures were gaining influence. Returning from China, Major Kawamoto of the Chinese Section of the Army General Staff presented his situational report that the non-expansion policy was now construed by the North China Army as making peace at any cost, and he insisted that it was essential to deal decisive blow to the Chinese 29th Army.³² Based upon the positive views of the Operations Section, the Operations Division of the Army General Staff set forth its situational judgement that, while it was necessary to maintain the non-expansion policy, a deadline was to be fixed for the negotiations with the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, and that, if no sincerity to negotiate was recognized on the part of the Chinese, the root of the conflict in North China should be eliminated by chastising them with force.³³

These views had been largely affected by the information having reached by that time, which reported that the Chinese 29th Army had not withdrawn from the left side of the Yungting River and that the Chinese Central Army was concentrating in North China.³⁴ Moreover, the fixing of a deadline for the negotiations was undoubtedly a result of the plan that the North China Army was to complete its strategic deployment by July 19.

Around noon Major General Ushiroku, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, met with Ishii at the office of the Asian Affairs Bureau, and consented to the proposal which the chief of Naval Affairs Bureau had agreed to on the previous night. Major General Ushiroku returned to the War Ministry, and then telephoned Ishii to say, "The Army has already decided on the policy, so please forget what we've talked about."³⁵ Given the turning of situation in favor of the advocates of forceful measures, it was impossible for Major General Ushiroku, who was a moderate,³⁶ to

dissuade the advocates of tough measures in the War Ministry. The proposal of the chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau was not to be presented to the Inner Cabinet.

In the evening War Minister Sugiyama talked with Major General Ishiwara about setting a deadline for the negotiations with China.³⁷ Major General Ishiwara had not yet given his consent. He was waiting for "Shibayama's evaluation before issuing any new orders." Colonel Shibayama of the War Ministry had not come back from China, so his only ally was the War Guidance Section whose chief, Colonel Kawabe, was against setting a deadline for the negotiations.³⁸ Advocates of tough measures, encouraged by the information stated above, could argue that China was taking advantage of Japan by delaying the negotiations, and thus they were gaining considerable influence. Under such conditions, Major General Ishiwara was urged to make up his mind because July 19 was to be the day when the strategic deployment of the North China Army would be completed. And as the chief of the Operations Division, to make no decision implied to miss the opportune moment from the strategic point of view.

At about 8:00 p.m. Premier Konoye discussed with Naval Minister Yonai the questions of a basic settlement of the China issue and the sending of Foreign Minister Hirota to China. But the Naval Minister doubted its feasibility.

— July 17 — In the morning, after overnight deliberations, Major General Ishiwara complied with the War Minister's proposal, which was as follows:³⁹

1. To make the Hopei-Chahar Political Council implement the following demands by the deadline of the July 19:
 - a) A formal apology by Sung Cheh-yuan;
 - b) The dismissal of the chief of the 37th Division, Feng Chih-an, and punishment of those responsible for the incident;
 - c) Withdrawal of the corps from Papaoshan;
 - d) Sung Cheh-yuan's signature to the terms of settlement of July 11.
2. In case of unfulfilment of these demands by the date fixed above,

our army shall break off negotiations and chastise the 29th Army. For this purpose, required troops shall be mobilized in Japan when the time has expired, and dispatched to North China.

3. In case of the implementation of our terms on the part of the Chinese after the deadline, the 29th Army shall be withdrawn to the right side of the Yungting River.
4. In order to limit the issue to North China and thus settle it locally, the Imperial Government shall demand of the Nanking Government that it withdraw its armies to the prior positions, terminate anti-Japanese actions and the interference with the negotiations on the scene.⁴⁰

At 11:00 a.m., a Five Minister Meeting was held.⁴¹ War Minister Sugiyama stated on behalf of the Army that no more delay could be allowed for the negotiations between Japan and China due to the lack of sincerity on the part of the Chinese, and insisted that July 19 be fixed as a deadline for the negotiations both in Nanking and on the spot.⁴² Considering the probable consequences, Foreign Minister Hirota firmly expressed his opposition to the setting of a deadline for the negotiations with the Nanking Government, but he did not disapprove the negotiations with a time limit on the spot. He further stated that he would try to get an early reply from the Nanking Government to the demand for halting the northward movement of the Chinese Central Army.⁴³ Since both the Naval and the Finance Ministers supported the Foreign Minister's view, the War Minister complied. Thus the above proposal was adopted with the condition that item 1 be left to the discretion of the North China Army.⁴⁴ The Foreign Minister's stand, it is assumed, was affected not only by the information that the Vice Foreign Minister had received on the previous day from the British Chargé d'Affairs, but also stemmed from his propensity as a career diplomat.⁴⁵ The War Minister's stand, on the other hand, undoubtedly was a reflection of the atmosphere in favor of strong measures within the Army.

The Operations Section, without authorization by Major General Ishiwara, asked the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry to make preparations for mobilization. The chiefs of both Sections believed that it was necessary to

mobilize to strike the Chinese 29th Army in order to prevent the same kind of incident from recurring in the future.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the War Guidance Section had decided on the use of massive forces in order to attain an early settlement over the long term perspective; in case of failure, it anticipated an all-out war.⁴⁷

In the meantime, Chiang Kai-shek delivered an address at Kuling.⁴⁸ After his speech, Chiang Kai-shek gave directions to Yi Ting-yuan, Sung Cheh-yuan's representative in Peiping, who had been invited, and had him cable them to Sung Cheh-yuan and Chang Tzu-chung.⁴⁹

Receiving the instructions to fix the deadline from the Central Headquarters that night, Chief of Staff of the North China Army, Major General Hashimoto, thought them quite unsuitable since the Chinese negotiators were about to make a concession at that very moment.⁵⁰ To communicate the requests as they were, he feared, would have a drastic effect on the Chinese, so the Major General conveyed them in the form of normal requests.⁵¹ In addition, on his own initiative and responsibility, Major General Hashimoto modified the terms to make them more acceptable to the Chinese. For example, the requirement for punishment of Divisional Commander Feng Chih-an was replaced by that of Regimental Commander Chin Chen-chung, and so forth.

In Nanking, Councilor Hidaka called on Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui at 11:30 p.m. and strongly requested that, in order to restrict the issue to North China, the Nationalist Government withdraw its Central Army moving northward and not interfere with the negotiations on the spot.⁵²

— July 18 — At 11:00 a.m. a Five Minister Meeting⁵³ was held. Foreign Minister Hirota said, "Unhampered by the development of the incident so far, we should negotiate with China, with a view to maintaining peace based upon our vested interests, the three agreements (the Tangku Truce, Umezu-Ho, and Doihara-Ching Agreements), respect for territorial sovereignty and co-prosperity." This was acknowledged by the participants. Then the Prime Minister said, "Why don't we issue a statement on equal opportunity in North China?" The Foreign Minister was against this as he doubted whether it would be advantageous to Japan. Then the Premier added, "Why don't we withdraw the Kwantung and Korean Armies as soon

as the incident is settled?’’ This time, the War Minister did not agree since the future, he said, could not be fully anticipated.⁵⁴ At this Conference, the focus which had heretofore been on how to settle the issue locally seemed to be blurred and shifted. The Foreign Minister’s initiative, however, was taken as an effort to break through the stalemate of the negotiations. His proposal was not inconsistent with what the War Minister had been arguing so far, so it was approved. On the other hand, the Premier’s proposal was out of the question, although he seemed to have tried to tap others’ views on the probability of direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek which he had been considering.⁵⁵

In the deliberations on the mobilization and dispatch of troops, the Operations Section presented the Army Affairs Section with its plan authorized by Major General Ishiwara to the effect that it anticipated an all-out war and that, depending on the situation, the decision should be made between July 19 and 20 to dispatch three divisions to North China.⁵⁶ Major General Ishiwara was still undecided on this question since he was deeply preoccupied by the fear that Japan would become bogged down in a total war situation. Therefore he did his utmost to persuade the War and the Vice War Ministers, saying:

30 divisions can be mobilized at present. But we can allocate only 15 of them to China, so total war is impossible. However, probability of a total war is very high, if things are left as they are. Consequently, we’re at the edge of a bottomless swamp of war, just as Napoleon was with the Spanish War. Now we should resolutely withdraw all our troops to Shanhaikwan, on the border of Manchukuo and China. And then Premier Konoye himself should fly to Nanking and settle the basic issues between Japan and China by having a heart-to-heart talk with Chiang Kai-shek.⁵⁷

Then Vice Minister Umezu calmly answered:

We would like to. But have you talked about it with the Premier and have you made sure of his confidence to carry through negotiations? Are you going to give up the rights and interests in North China that have been acquired so far? And do you think Manchukuo will become

stable as a result?⁵⁸

Able man that he was, Vice Minister Umezu looked at the matter not from a strategic point of view or a long-term perspective as Major General Ishiwara did, but rather from the viewpoint of, to quote Hata's words, "a bureaucrat who persisted in rationality in any given situation."⁵⁹ Therefore, he thought it unacceptable to take the chance on the Premier's direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. To withdraw all the troops would be to abandon the interests and rights in North China. Above all, he and War Minister Sugiyama both doubted whether the Premier had the necessary willingness and confidence.⁶⁰ Thus, far from successfully persuading them, Major General Ishiwara was himself hard put to reply.

In Tientsin, at 1:00 p.m. Sung Cheh-yuan called on the Commander of the North China Army, Major General Kazuki, to make an apology, carrying out one of the terms agreed upon on the previous day. The visit of Sung Cheh-yuan, however, was announced to the Chinese as his welcome visit to the new Commander.⁶¹

— July 19 — In Nanking at 2:45 p.m. Tong Tao-ning, Chief of the Japanese Section of the Asiatic Bureau, called on Councilor Hidaka at the Japanese Embassy and handed him this *aide-mémoire*:

...It is therefore proposed that the two parties jointly fix a definite date on which both sides shall simultaneously cease all military movements and withdraw their armed forces to the positions occupied prior to the incident....

..., the Chinese Government is prepared immediately to enter into negotiations with the Japanese Government through regular diplomatic channels. The settlement of questions of a local nature susceptible of adjustment on the spot shall be subject to the sanction of the Chinese National Government....⁶²

This reply was clearly based upon Chiang Kai-shek's statement at Kuling on July 17. Unsatisfied with this, Councilor Hidaka inquired "whether it was intended as an answer to the Japanese *aide-mémoire* of July 17."⁶³ The young Chinese official, who had no authority other than to convey the *aide-*

mémoire, could not give a satisfactory answer although he implied the hope that this *aide-mémoire* would lead to a peaceful settlement.⁶⁴

At 4:00 p.m. Japanese Military Attaché Kita called on the Chinese Foreign Office and asked War Minister Ho Ying-chin to withdraw Central Government troops from Hopei, implying that a failure to comply with this request would result in the breaking off negotiations.⁶⁵ The War Minister's reply was that "that military precautions taken by the Chinese Government (were) for no other purpose than self defense" and that "if Japan (withdrew) her newly increased forces from Hopei the Chinese Government would consider making a similar move."⁶⁶

At 8:00 p.m. Chiang Kai-shek's address at Kuling on July 17 was announced simultaneously at Kuling, Nanking and Shanghai. He stated as follows:

...If finally we reach the stage where it is impossible to avoid the inevitable, then we cannot do otherwise than to resist and to be prepared for the supreme sacrifice...

...Whether or not there is the least vestige of any hope for peace between China and Japan depends upon the action of the Japanese Army. Even at the very last second before we abandon all hope of peace we would still be hoping for peace, we would still be seeking a solution through proper diplomatic channels.

The following four points will clearly show what our stand on this issue is: first, any kind of settlement must not infringe upon the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of our nation; second, the status of the Hopei and Chahar Political Council is fixed by the Central Government and we should not allow any illegal alteration; third, we will not agree to the removal by outside pressure of those local officials appointed by the Central Government such as the Chairman of the Hopei and Chahar Political Council; and fourth, we will not allow any restriction being placed upon the position now held by the 29th Army.

These four points constitute the minimum conditions possible as a basis for negotiations for any nation no matter how weak it may be....⁶⁷

At 10:00 p.m. the Commander of the North China Army announced that "the North China Army would take free action after 12 o'clock on July 20."⁶⁸ The Chinese firing at Yiwentzushan which resulted in casualties among the Japanese officers and mortar firings at night provoked the advocates of strong steps in the North China Army, and resulted in this decision.⁶⁹

At 11:00 p.m. as a consequence of the North China Army's statement, representatives of the 29th Army, Chang Tzu-chung and Chang Yun-yung, visited Chief of Staff, Major General Hashimoto, to sign the agreement for implementation which called for the prohibition of anti-Japanese acts and the suppression of Communist activities.⁷⁰

In Tokyo on the other hand, the Intelligence Division of the Army General Staff was demanding the use of armed forces. The information of the reply from the Chinese Government and of the Chinese firings at Yiwentzushan, helped to converge the divided opinions into a consensus for action. Chiang Kai-shek's statement was no doubt exactly what the advocates of drastic measures had wanted and turned the balance in their favor. That night, even the chief of the War Guidance Section, Colonel Kawabe, had to acknowledge that it was time for a decision.⁷¹

— July 20 — At 1:30 a.m. the Foreign Ministry, having been informed by Councilor Hidaka of the Chinese Government's reply on the previous night, held a meeting and thereupon announced that it was unsuitable as a reply to the Japanese Government's request and that there would be no hope for settlement of the issue unless the Nanking Government reflected on her actions, since the affair had been aggravated by her interference with the local settlement and by her dispatching of troops northward.⁷²

In the morning before an emergency Cabinet session, the chiefs of the Asian Affairs, Military Affairs, and Naval Affairs Bureaus discussed the issue of mobilization to formulate a joint policy recommendation for the Cabinet. Major General Ushiroku, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, insisted that mobilization was inevitable both due to the circumstances in his bureau and due to the domestic situation although he himself was against it.⁷³ The other chiefs were absolutely against it, and no consensus was reached. Then Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau Ishii requested that Foreign Minister Hirota oppose the mobilization proposal.⁷⁴

At 10:00 a.m. a Cabinet session began. War Minister Sugiyama requested that three divisions from within Japan be immediately dispatched in order to assure Chinese sincere implementation of the agreement and to make preparations ready against the Chinese Central Army.⁷⁵ The following was the discussion among the Cabinet Ministers.

Foreign Minister Hirota: In Nanking, Councilor Hidaka is negotiating with Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui, so I think we'd better wait for the reply. I don't disagree with mobilization, though.

Naval Minister Yonai: Our basic principal is the non-expansion policy and moreover the agreement has been already signed on the spot. So why mobilization?

War Minister Sugiyama: ...there's no sign that they would implement the agreement. In addition, Central Army and others are concentrating into Pingchin from various areas. We are urged to dispatch the reinforcements in order to protect our nationals and to defend the field army.

Anyway the dispatch of the reinforcements has been already acknowledged by the previous Cabinet Council.

Naval Minister Yonai: I understand it's for the purpose of self-defense. Do you intend to dispatch armed forces, if necessary, to Shanghai for self-defense and the protection of nationals?

War Minister Sugiyama: I know what you mean. We'll consider it when that happens. But now, as for the North China issue now in question, the dispatch of five divisions has been decided upon at the previous Cabinet Council. The situation is highly pressing. I would like you to leave the time for the dispatch to the judgement of the High Command. It would be irrevocable if we miss the time.

Prime Minister Konoye: I know what the War Minister said. Under these conditions, we'd better wait for the results of the talk between Councilor Hidaka and Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui, though a little awkward.

War Minister Sugiyama: All right. We'll wait.⁷⁶

Finance Minister Kaya and Communication Minister Nagai supported the War Minister.

In the meantime, Councilor Hidaka visited Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui in the morning, and confirmed that the *aide-mémoire* of July 17 was an answer to the Japanese request for "immediate cessation of provocative actions." The Foreign Minister only reiterated the points already explained by Tong Tao-ning on the previous day. Then the Councilor emphasized that they were too vague and also unsatisfactory.⁷⁷ Although at 3:00 p.m. Sung Cheh-yuan agreed to withdraw the 37th Division to the vicinity of Paoting, the Chinese army in the city of Lukowkiao had started firing at the Kawabe Brigade at about 2:30 p.m. and the Chinese army at the west side of the Yungting River concentrated firings at Yiwentzushan, causing some casualties on the Japanese side.

At 7:50 p.m. the Cabinet session was reconvened. Informed of the results of the Hidaka-Wang talk and the Chinese illegal firings, the Cabinet Council decided on the dispatch of three home divisions to North China on the condition that they be immediately demobilized if the situation turned for the better after the order was issued.⁷⁸ Then at 9:25 p.m. Cabinet Secretary Kazami made an announcement to the effect that the Government had decided to take proper measures for self-defense according to the prearranged policy, although no reference was made to mobilization.⁷⁹

The description presented above has shown us several important points which help to explain how the decision for the second mobilization was made. We shall now deal with them one by one.

First, Commander Kazuki of the North China Army had considerable leeway to act on his own way. This was mainly due to the fact that he realized that there existed a discrepancy in views between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff.⁸⁰ Therefore, when he heard the July 11th Statement in Seoul on his way to Tientsin, he considered that Japan was determined to fight with China.⁸¹ As he was not well-versed concerning the China issue, he was very much affected by the so-called "China experts" who advocated drastic measures.⁸² In addition, he viewed the situation not

from a long-term and strategic point of view, but from that of operations and tactics in which he thought he had confidence.⁸³ And as Commander, he wanted to avoid risking the North China Army at a time when Chinese illegal firings continued and the Central Army was moving north. Thus he sent that strong-worded report, which encouraged the advocates of drastic measures in Tokyo, and undermined Major General Ishiwara's position.

Second, particularly when the decision-makers had difficulty in assessing what was going away from home, the information from the scene did have great influence on them as stated above. In this sense, Colonel Shibayama's telegram, which was deliberately kept unreported to the decision-makers by the official of the Army General Staff, undoubtedly affected the game of mobilization in favor of the advocates of a hard line.

Third, the action of the Chinese Government, *i.e.*, the northward movement of the Central Army, was of course affected by the July 11th Statement of the Japanese Government. The dispatch of troops from Japan had been cancelled but was not announced. What affected the Chinese Government more than anything else, however, was the appearance of the Kwantung Army in Peiping and Tientsin on July 13 and of the Korean Army by July 15. These actions undoubtedly caused the Chinese action, because most of the Central Army began to move north *after July 13*.⁸⁴ It was only 2,000 affiliated troops of the Chinese Central Army that had moved to Paoting from northern Honan *by July 11*.

Fourth, together with these Japanese actions, what also affected the Chinese Government was the distorted information sent before July 16 from the Chinese Embassy in Japan, which reported that divisions of "not less than 100,000" and munitions had been sent from Japan to China and Korea.⁸⁵ This message and the above-stated Japanese actions made the position of Chiang Kai-shek extremely difficult, particularly after Chou En-lai began to attend the National Defense Conference on July 15. Now Chiang Kai-shek was pressed for a decision,⁸⁶ and he had to avoid the impression that he succumbed to Japan.⁸⁷ Then he delivered the address at Kuling on July 17, which was however directed only to the National Defense Conference, and not to the Japanese Government at that time.

Fifth, judging from the Japanese actions described above, Chiang Kai-shek

naturally considered the Japanese proposal for mutual withdrawal of troops unacceptable. However, Chiang Kai-shek personally was to acknowledge the agreement on the spot. Despite Chiang Kai-shek's intention, Tong Tao-ning, young official of the Asiatic Bureau, could not convey this *nuance* to Councilor Hidaka because he was neither in close touch with Chiang Kai-shek nor did he have the discretion to act on his own initiative. Neither did Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui who was not close to Chiang Kai-shek and was a pro-Anglo-American. Thus, Councilor Hidaka judged from their replies that China had no intention of negotiating, and reported to Tokyo to that effect.

Sixth, due to the stalemate in negotiations on the spot and due to the deadline by which deployment of the North China Army was scheduled to be completed, advocates of drastic measures could demand that the deadline of July 19 be fixed for the negotiations. Major General Ishiwara was placed in an agonizing position. His ally in the War Ministry, Colonel Shibayama, was in Tientsin and, in addition, Shibayama's request for cancelling the dispatch of troops did not reach the Major General. Then Major General Ishiwara had to approve the fixing of the deadline for the negotiations from an operational point of view.

He was still undecided. He believed that he had to avoid the risk of total war by all means. Both Prime Minister Konoye and Foreign Minister Hirota tried to feel out the sentiments of other Cabinet Ministers concerning the negotiations on an over-all adjustment basis, but others considered them to be unreliable and doubted their confidence and willingness to carry out negotiations. Therefore, Major General Ishiwara could not persuade Vice War Minister Umezu and War Minister Sugiyama to have the Premier negotiate directly with Chiang Kai-shek. Then came Hidaka's telegram, which provided the final impetus for the decision to dispatch three home divisions to North China.

(Continued)

Notes

1. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, pp. 442-3.
2. Boei-cho Boei-kenshu-sho Senshi-shitsu, *Shina-jihen Rikugun Sakusen* (The Operations of the Army in the China Incident), Vol. I, Asagumo Shinbun Sha, 1975, p. 180.
3. According to Ikeda Jyunkyu, Major General Kazuki was inspired by the

- expansionism of Major General Koiso Kuniaki, Commander of the Japanese Korean Army, and the general staff of the Kwantung Army. On the early morning of July 12 in Seoul, he told the press conference that "...we can not keep quiet any longer about the treacherous attitude and outrageous actions on the part of China. Announcing the statement both at home and abroad, we have now decided to take final measures to advance our righteous army in order to chastise the outrageous Chinese as well as to protect our interests and nationals in North China. As the Commander, I have already made up my mind and decided upon the tactics and operations to be followed. I would like you people to watch the Imperial Army's actions..." Ikeda, *op. cit.*, p. 93. Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 452. Hata, *op. cit.*, pp. 353-4.
4. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 184. The Chinese Central Army and other troops moving northward reportedly numbered 430,000. This was no doubt exaggerated. See *Daibonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, pp. 441-2.
 5. Yonai, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
 6. *Daibonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 442.
 7. Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 453.
 8. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 183.
 9. *Ibid.* See also Yonai, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
 10. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, pp. 182-3.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
 12. *Daibonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 443.
 13. According to Colonel Kawabe, the then Chief of the War Guidance Section, they could not get the plan approved no matter where they brought it up, and the situation was such that, if they tried to submit it to the meeting, the plan would take a month or two and would be consequently shelved. "Kawabe Torashiro Shosyo Kaiso Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, pp. 416-20.
 14. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 184.
 15. Yonai, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-7.
 16. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 184. See also Crowley, *op. cit.*, p. 333.
 17. *Ibid.*, pp. 180-1.
 18. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
 19. *Ibid.* See also Fujimoto, Haruki, *Ishiwara Kanji, Jiji Tsushin Sha*, 1974, pp. 227-8.
 20. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 194.
 21. Since the mobilization statement had been issued on July 11, Ishii tried to contact Major General Ishiwara privately on July 13 in order to form an alliance. Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
 22. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, pp. 193-4. See also Yonai, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
 23. *Ibid.*
 24. Kazuki, Kiyoshi, "Shina-Jihen Kaiso-roku Tekki" (The Reminiscences of the China Incident), *Gendai-shi Shiryo*. Vol. XII (The China War IV), Misuzu Shobo, 1965, p. 565.
 25. *Ibid.*, p. 535. See also "Nishimura Toshio Kaiso-roku," *op. cit.*, pp. 459-60.
 26. "Kazuki Kiyoshi Chujo Kaiso-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 535.
 27. Yatsugi, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 378. The following episode shows how those against local settlement maneuvered. According to Ikeda Jyunkyu, on about July 15 when a ceasefire agreement was about to be concluded, a member of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff telephoned the North China Army, saying, "Don't sign the agreement." Then Ikeda inquired whether it was an official order or not, and he found out that the official had acted without the authorization of his superiors.
29. "Kazuki Kiyoshi Chujiyo Kaiso-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 535.
30. *Hokusbi no Chian-sen*, Vol. I, p. 21.
31. *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), p. 187.
32. *Daibonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, pp. 448-9.
33. *Shina-jiben Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, pp. 194-5.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
35. Yonai, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
36. According to Kamimura Shinichi, the then Chief of the 1st Section of the Asian Affairs Bureau, Major General Ushiroku was pressed hard both by the Asian Affairs Bureau and by the War Ministry, and had to go back and forth between the Foreign and War Ministries many times a day. Kamimura, Shinichi, *Nihon Gaiko-shi* (The Japanese Diplomatic History), Vol. 20, Kashima Kenkyusho Shuppan-kai, 1973, p. 84.
37. *Shina-jiben Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 197-8.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
40. *Ibid.*
41. The participants were Foreign Minister Hirota, War Minister Sugiyama, Naval Minister Yonai, Finance Minister Kaya, and Home Minister Suetsugu.
42. *Daibonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 447.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 447-8.
44. *Shina-jiben Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 199.
45. Unlike other career diplomats, Hirota was neither a man of eloquence, nor a sociable man. However, he was experienced and well-versed in the conducting of negotiations, for which he considered the most important attribute to be perseverance. As to his style, the following book provides useful insights. Kitagawa, Koji, *Mokushite Yukan* (The Life of Hirota Koki), Kodan Sha, 1975.
46. *Shina-jiben Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, pp. 200-1.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
48. This statement was not announced outside the Chinese Government on this day, and did not yet constitute an action by the Chinese Government at this time.
49. Matsumoto, Shigeharu, *Shanhai Jidai* (The Memoir of A Journalist in Shanghai), Vol. III, Chuo Koron Sha, 1975, p. 154.
50. *Shina-jiben Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 200.
51. Hata, *op. cit.*, fn. 1 in p. 212.
52. Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
53. The participants were the Prime, Foreign, War, Naval, and Finance Ministers.

54. Tanaka, Shinichi, "Nikka-Jihen Kakudai ka Fukakudai ka" (The China Incident — Expansion or Non-Expansion), *Bessatsu Chisei*, Kawade Shobo, (Dec.) 1956, p. 221.
55. Influenced by Major General Ishiwaru and others, Premier Konoye began to consider direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek on about July 11.
56. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 201.
57. Tanaka, *op. cit.*, p. 221.
58. *Ibid.*
59. Hata, *op. cit.*, p. 257. See also Inouye, Shinzo, "The North China Incident through the Lens of the Bureaucratic Politics Model," *The Journal of Social Science*, No. 13, 1975, p. 143.
60. Tanaka, *loc. cit.*
61. Imai, *op. cit.*, p. 34. See also Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
This scheme was devised by Major General Hashimoto, who took into account the atmosphere in Kuling and Nanking.
62. *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), p. 211.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
64. Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
65. *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), p. 215.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*, 217-8.
68. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 203.
69. *Ibid.*
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 203-4.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
72. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, pp. 204-5. See also *Gaimu-sbo no Hyakunen*, Vol. II, p. 279.
73. Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 207.
76. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, pp. 453-4.
77. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 207.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
79. *Ibid.*
80. Inouye, *op. cit.*, p. 164.
81. Kazuki, *op. cit.*, p. 564.
82. *Shina-Jihen Rikugun Sakusen*, Vol. I, p. 211. Major General Kazuki did not seem to be an advocate of drastic measures, judging from the following facts. Vice War Minister Umezu sent a telegram to Colonel Ikeda of the North China Army, which said, "The New Commander is an advocate of non-expansion, so don't worry." Ikeda, *op. cit.*, p. 93. Commander Kazuki was, it seemed, affected by the Emperor's letter, for he then suggested to Colonel Shibayama that no reinforcements be sent if the non-expansion policy was to be observed. "Kazuki Kiyoshi Chujiyo Kaiso-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 535.
83. *Ibid.*
84. Hata, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-40.

85. *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), p. 191.

86. Snow, Edgar, *The Battle for Asia* (Japanese translation by Moriya Iwao),
Misuzu Shobo, 1956, p. 14.

87. Kamimura, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

北支事変—官僚政治モデルを通して(その二)

〈要 約〉

井 上 真 蔵

前稿に於いては1937年7月11日の華北派兵声明が、各プレーヤーの如何なる立場や利害関係から生じたかを主に分析してきた。また、この華北派兵という日本政府の行為が内外に与えた影響についても触れてきた。

本稿では、それ以後の第二次動員が如何になされたかという点に焦点が合わされる。刺激—反応—相互作用という従来の簡単なモデルによれば、7月11日の華北派兵声明が中国軍の北上をもたらし、さらに、これに対して第二次動員が決定されたと見ることができよう。しかし、より直接的には以下の官僚政治過程の特徴に十分な注意が払われなければならない。

まず、北支軍司令官は7月13日に強硬意見を中央に具申し、第二次動員ゲームに影響を与えるが、これは司令官の立場と自由裁量の余地が大であったという点によっている。彼は参謀本部と陸軍省との判断には相違があると感じていた。また赴任の途中、11日の声明を知り、日本政府が内地動員し中国に兵を進める決定をしたものと受けとったのである。さらに、中国軍の北上が伝えられる情勢の中で、兵力を有利に展開させることが司令官としての任務であった。

第二に、「援軍無用」という柴山軍務課長の電報が参謀本部の一電信員に握りつぶされたが、これは石原を始めとする動員反対者の立場を弱め、反対に動員支持者の立場を強化したのであった。これは最も顕著な「官僚政治」過程の例と云えるであろう。

第三に、前述の華北派兵声明にも増して、中国軍の北上を促したのは、

7月13日北京、天津に現われた関東軍の存在そのものであると云えよう。また15日までに朝鮮軍も北京、天津に現われていたのである。すなわち7月11日までに北上していた中国軍は約2千の中央軍傍系であり、その他は7月13日以後に北上を開始したからである。

第四に、上述の関東軍や朝鮮軍の行動と共に中国政府に影響を与えたものとして、在日中国大使館より7月16日以前に送られた誤った情報が挙げられる。それは、約10万の兵と大量の武器弾薬が日本本土より中国に送られたというものであった。7月15日より中共代表として周恩来も国防会議に参加しており、蒋介石としてはまず対内的に日本に屈服したという印象は絶対に避けねばならなかったのである。それゆえ、7月17日に蒋介石は廬山にて「最後の関頭」演説を行なったが、その時点でこれは日本政府に向けられたものではなく、公表されたのは19日になってからであった。

第五に、以上の様な情報に鑑み、日本政府の相互撤退案は蒋介石にとり受入れ難いものであった。しかし蒋介石個人としては、現地協定を認めるつもりではあったが、南京で交渉にあたっていた董道寧はこのニュアンスを日高参事官に伝えることが出来なかった。また王寵惠外交部長は親英米派でもあり、交渉をまとめる努力は窺えなかった。それゆえ、日高参事官は、中国側に交渉する意志なしとの旨を中央に伝えたのである。

以上が、この時期に見られた主な特徴である。石原作戦部長は依然として内地動員に反対であり、杉山陸相や梅津陸軍次官に中国との直接交渉を近衛首相や広田外相にやらせては、と説得にあたったが、両者を納得させるのに十分な理由を持ち合わせてはいなかった。つまり、閣議の様子から判断して、首相や外相には蒋介石との直接交渉の自信なしと見做されていたのである。加うるに、北支軍の兵力展開という組織ルーティーンの面と、一文字山への中国軍の射撃および上記の日高参事官の情報により、7月20日に第二次内地動員が決定されることになったのである。