

THE NORTH CHINA INCIDENT
THROUGH THE LENS OF
THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL*

Shinzo Inouye**

Introduction

The subject matter of the present paper is the North China Incident. From a macroscopic point of view, it can be considered as an inevitable result of Japanese "imperialism," which eventually led to the Pacific War. From a microscopic point of view, however, it was an outcome of interrelated decisions and actions of individual decision-makers who acted on behalf of the government. Whichever approach may be taken, it is safe to say that the North China Incident was one of the most significant events which aggregated to the Pacific War. Incidentally, there are excellent works about this theme, such as *Taiheiyo-senso e no Michi* (Vol. IV)¹ and *Nitchu-senso Shi*,² both of which fall in the second category. To the writer's regret, however, they have not systematically employed any specific framework of the foreign policy decision-making. The study of diplomatic history should be wedded to that of foreign policy decision-making.

* The pages assigned to the writer cover only the first half of the proposed study. The writer hopes to have the rest of it published soon on another occasion.

** Shinzo Inouye is an Assistant of International Relations, Social Science Research Institute, International Christian University, Tokyo.

1. Nippon Kokusai-seiji Gakkai, *Taiheiyo-senso e no Michi* (The Road to the Pacific War), Vol. IV (The China War II), Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1963.

2. Hata, Ikuhiko, *Nitchu-senso Shi* (The History of the Sino-Japanese War), Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1972.

The writer, who is interested in the foreign policy decision-making theory and its application, will address himself in the present paper to analyzing the North China Incident with the bureaucratic politics model,³ which conceives that "what happens is characterized as *resultant* of various bargaining games among players in the national government."⁴ This model, the writer believes, is highly relevant to the present case. First, the model has its advantage to analyze the actions of the pre-war Japanese decision-making system which Prof. Hosoya calls "truncated pyramid" system⁵, in which the decision-making process as a game becomes more prominent. Second, the model requires comparatively much, detailed information about the subject matter, and fortunately there exists such information as to meet the demands of the model. By applying the bureaucratic politics model to the North China Incident, the writer hopes to examine the validity of the model, *i.e.*, how deep and well it can cut the event, and also to find new insights and different interpretations which, otherwise, might be overlooked. In this respect, the purpose of this paper is two-fold.

-
3. The model employed here in the present paper was set forth by Graham T. Allison first in his "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The American Political Science Review* (September, 1969). It was then enlarged in his excellent book; *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*; Little, Brown and Company, 1971. The Organizational Process Model and the Governmental Politics Model presented in his book were refined as the Bureaucratic Politics Model by Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin. See Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Tanter, Raymond, and Richard H. Ullman eds., *Theory and Policy in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, 1972, pp. 41-79. Incidentally, the word "bureaucratic" connotes "bureaucracy." "Bureaucratic politics," however, by no means is identical with "bureaucracy," although they are very similar. Therefore, "bureaucratic politics" should be replaced by "governmental politics" which Allison originally called it, or by something else like "organizational politics." The writer will write about this matter in another article.
 4. Allison, Graham T., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Little, Brown and Company, 1971, p. 6.

The period of time that will be dealt with in this paper is about a month and half — July 7, 1937 to August 15, 1937.* During the period, the games of mobilization, peace moves, and abandoning the non-expansion policy were played by the players concerned who tried to get their desired results. The event that initiated the first of these games was the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which, the writer will point out, was an outcome of the organizational routines.

The central puzzle is why and how the North China Incident broke out at that time and why it could not be settled. In order to answer this question, *governmental* actions⁶ relevant to the incident will be identified, and each player's stands and stakes which aggregated to each specific action will be described. Incidentally, the purpose of this paper is not to analyze the interactions between Japan and China, but the actions of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and the Chinese Nationalist Government will be referred to insofar as they help us understand the actions of the Japanese Government concerning the North China Incident.

I The Marco Polo Bridge Incident and Organizational Routines

1. Some Signals

In early May 1937, Major General Kita Seiichi,** military attaché in Peking, Lieutenant Colonel Wachi and Ohashi, general-staffs of the

* In order to analyze what aggregated to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, events before that time will be naturally referred to.

** Throughout this paper names are given in the Japanese order, *i.e.*, with family names first.

5. Hosoya, Chihiro, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-making System in Japan," prepared for the 1972 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Dallas, Texas. See also Prof. Hosoya's "Tai Sankyoku Gaiko o ikani Susumeruka" (How to Shape Tri-polar Foreign Policy), *Chuo Koron*, July, 1973, pp. 101-7.
6. Accepting Allison and Halperin's definition, by governmental actions, we mean "the various acts of officials of a government in exercises of governmental authority that can be perceived outside the government." See Allison and Halperin, *op. cit.*, p.45.

Japanese North China Army were recalled to Tokyo and reported that the anti-Japanese policy by Chiang Kai-shek would continue until the retrieval of Manchuria. They recommended that, in case of the war with the Soviets, Japan should prevent the Nationalist Government from joining them, and that, if that failed, Japan should strike a first blow to crush the foundation of Chiang Kai-shek.⁷

In June, though not a sign of it was found in Peking, a rumor that the Japanese North China Army was planning another Mukuden Incident on the evening of July 7, was prevalent with some reality around Miyakezaka* in Tokyo.⁸ Taking heed to this rumor, Major General Ishiwara, Chief of the Operations Division of the Army General Staff, had a talk about this matter with Major General Ushiroku, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, and decided on dispatching Lieutenant Colonel Okamoto and Colonel Shibayama of the War Ministry on an inspection tour to North China.⁹ On his return to Tokyo on June 9, Colonel Shibayama reported that in North China "... propaganda against the Japanese Army has become fervent. Top officials in the 29th Army understand Japan but there is an active anti-Japanese sentiment among the soldiers below the middle class, two thirds of which are anti-Japanese advocates."¹⁰ On June 18, Lieutenant Colonel Okamoto returned to Tokyo with a report that "the North China Army has no intention to plot an incident, while there may be provocative actions by the Chinese, in view of the grave atmosphere between the two countries."¹¹

* This is where the War Ministry and the Army General Staff were located.

7. Tanaka, Shinichi, "Shina-jihen Kiroku" (The Document of the China War), Yomiuri Shinbun Sha ed., *Showa-shi no Tenno* (The Emperor in the History of Showa), Vol. XVI. Yomiuri Shinbun Sha, 1971, pp. 56-7.
8. Teradaira, Tadasuke, *Rokokyo Jiken* (The Lukouchiao Incident), Yomiuri Shinbun Sha, 1970, p. 47. See also "Kawabe Torashiro Shosho Kaiso Oto-roku" (Records of an Interview with Major General Kawabe Torashiro), *Gendai-shi Shiryo* (Modern Historical Materials), Vol. XII (The China War IV), Misuzu Shobo, 1965, p. 412.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 47. See also "Kawabe Torashiro Shosho Kaiso Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 412.
10. Boei-cho Boei-kenshu-sho Senshi-shitsu, *Hokushi no Chian-sen* (The Battle for Maintaining Peace in North China), Vol. I, Asagumo Shinbun Sha, 1968, p. 11.
11. *Ibid.*

Colonel Nagatsu, Chief of the Chinese Section of the Army General Staff, on his return to Tokyo on June 8, had reported "the New Life Movement under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek is changing into the general mobilization for the military state and they are so self-confident as to fuel anti-Japanese sentiments."¹²

Around the same time in June, there was also information coming into Tokyo that the Chinese were in a hurry preparing operations against Japan. Paying attention to this information, Major General Ishiwara and Colonel Muto of the Army General Staff sent Captain Imoto of the Operations Section to North China for inspection. According to Captain Imoto's memoir, he often felt imperiled by the Chinese officials' interference with his inspection and he was nearly arrested by Chinese soldiers when he was at the Marco Polo Bridge with Major Sakurai, Military Advisor of General Sung Cheh-yuan.¹³

From the summer to autumn of 1936, Kazami Akira went to China for inspection before he took office as Chief Secretary of the First Konoye Cabinet. Because of fervent anti-Japanese movement, he had to give up going to Peking and Changsha. Even a Chinese known as a pro-Japanese whom Mr. Kazami met at Hankow shouted they could not help fighting with arms to the last one if Japan should meddle in North China.¹⁴

According to Matsumoto Shigeharu of *The Rengo Press*, who was a close friend of Prime Minister Konoye, diplomatic negotiations between the two countries were totally impossible because of distrust, and the Chinese seemed to try to launch an all-out attack by taking advantage of any opportunity.¹⁵

As we have seen so far, some signals were perceived by the Army General Staff and the War Ministry, and others seemed to have reached Premier Konoye through Mr. Kazami and his friend Matsumoto. There were still other signals perceived by the North China Army and a military

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

14. Kazami, Akira, *Konoye Naikaku* (The Konoye Cabinets), Nippon Shuppan Kyodo Kabushiki Gaisha, 1951, p. 11.

15. Yabe Teiji., *Konoye Ayamaro*, Vol. I, Kobun Do, 1952, p. 397.

attaché of the Japanese Embassy in Peking as will be described below.

On July 3, General Feng Chih-an of the Chinese 37th Division met Major Imai, military attaché in Peking, and criticized that "the Japanese Army fired upon the street of the Marco Polo Bridge during the night maneuver of June 29. Such an illegal action should be refrained."¹⁶ On the same day, the Hopei-Chahar Political Council asked the North China Army to give them an advance notice of the maneuvers with blank cartridges.¹⁷ In reply to this request, the notice was delivered that night to the Hopei-Chahar Political Council that the Japanese Army would engage in night and day maneuvers with blank cartridges at the Marco Polo Bridge for four days starting July 6.¹⁸

On the evening of July 6, General Shi You-san of the Chinese Army hurried to Major Imai, informing of the outbreak of hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese armies at the Marco Polo Bridge. The Major asked him about that information source, but he somehow declined to give an answer.¹⁹ That night passed peacefully. But strangely enough, the following night saw a clash at the Marco Polo Bridge just as General Shi You-san had told.

It is unknown whether or not these messages were transmitted to Tokyo. Even if they did not reach Tokyo, at least Major General Ishiwara and others in the Army General Staff and the War Ministry must have sensed something very grave about the situation in North China, through the reports presented by Colonel Shibayama and others as described thus far.

2. No Smoke without Fire

It seems that there were probably some causes behind those signals

16. Imai, Takeo, *Shina-jihen no Kaiso* (Reminiscences of the China Incident), Misuzu Shobo, 1964, p. 6. At that time, Major Imai was instructed directly by the Army General Staff, as the Japanese Ambassador stayed in Shanghai since the Chinese Nationalist Government moved to Nanking.

17. Teradaira, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50. See also the deposition of Hashimoto in *International Military Tribunal for the Far East*, hereafter *IMTFE*, Vol. V, Yusho Do Shoten, p. 137.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, pp.52-3.

stated above. Just before the formation of the First Konoye Cabinet, the then Foreign Minister Sato launched a diplomatic *démarche* to deal with China on the basis of equality and reciprocity. This however did not ease anti-Japanese sentiment or dispel distrust resulting from a series of Japanese separation policies of North China which had been adopted since the Manchurian Incident. Specifically, the Suiyuan Incident plotted by Colonel Imamura and Major Tanaka of the Kwantung Army in 1935, which ended up in failure, resulted in giving military confidence to the Chinese and in fueling anti-Japanese sentiment.²⁰ In addition, the North China Army was doubly reinforced in May 1936 for the purpose of (1) defense against Communism in North China and (2) protection of the Japanese residents there, both of which were officially stated by the Army authorities on May 15.²¹ But another most important purpose was never disclosed. As a matter of fact, *this reinforcement was intended to prevent the Kwantung Army from meddling in North China, which was not of course notified to the Chinese Government or to the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.*²² As a result, it was taken as a Japanese intention to move into North China by arms not only by the Chinese but also by the Japanese and foreign residents there.²³ At first, the Army General Staff was to choose Tungchow, Peking, or Tientsin as the place for reinforcement from the military point of view. However, Vice War Minister Umezu, who was a doing man with influence, strongly objected against them on the ground that they were not suitable in terms of the Protocol of the Boxer Troubles in 1901. Thus the political opinion defeated the military

20. *Hokushi no Chian-sen*, Vol. I, p. 10.

21. Nippon Kokusai-seijo Gakkai, *Taiheiyo-senso e no Michi*, Vol. III (The China War I), Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1962, pp. 183-4.

22. "Ishiwara Kanji Chuiyo Kaiso Oto-roku" (Records of an Interview with Lieutenant General Ishiwara Kanji), *Gendai-shi Shiryo*, Vol. IV (The China War II), Misuzu Shobo, 1964, p. 304. See also *Taiheiyo-senso e no Michi*, Vol. III, pp. 184-5.

23. Boei-cho Boei-kenshu-sho. Senshi-shitsu, *Daihonei Rikugun-bu* (Army Division of the Imperial Headquarters), Vol. I, Asagumo Shinbun Sha, 1969, p. 375.

one, and at last Fengtai* was chosen as the location.²⁴ In other words, this reinforcement was nothing more than a resultant of the internal adjustment within the Japanese Army, *i.e.*, to have the North China Army check the Kwantung Army. Quite contrary to the Japanese intention to check the Kwantung Army, however, the reinforcement was taken by the Chinese as a clear signal that Japan would advance into North China by arms. This Japanese move, it is assumed, undoubtedly caused the Chinese to take a counter-measure.²⁵

Here it would be of some help to take a glimpse of the position of General Sung Cheh-yuan, the chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, whose Army was to have the first fight with the Japanese North China Army at the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7.

The Hopei-Chahar Political Council, taking a pro-Japanese attitude, was very often criticized by both the North China Army and the Nationalist Government.²⁶ A few months before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the North China Army tried to "compel General Sung Cheh-yuan to sign a contract for the construction by the Japanese of the Tientsin-Shihchiachwang Railway,"²⁷ while the Nationalist Government was making efforts to increase its influence in North China. Thus General Sung Cheh-yuan was quite in a fix. He was a sandwich pressed hard on both sides. So he retired in Western Shantung in May. It was taken that, pressed by the Nationalist Government, "Sung (was) avoiding discussion with Japanese of construction of the Shihkiachwang-Tientsin Railway," having decided "not to cooperate economically with the Japanese unless East Hopei (was) returned."²⁸ In late June, rumors were spread in Peking "of possible disorders being created by disgruntled Chinese or Japanese

* Fengtai is not far from Lukouchiao where the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out, and also it is where an incident took place on September 18, 1936, between Japanese and Chinese armies.

24. "Ishiwara Kanji Chujyo Kaiso Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 304.

25. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I. p. 375.

26. Matsui, Takuro, "Hate-naki Nitchu-senso no Hakkaten" (The Outbreak of the Endless China War), *Bessatsu Chisei*, Kawade Shobo, (December 1956) p. 202.

27. United States Government Printing Office, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1937, hereafter *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), Washington, 1954, p. 94.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

Nationals," which, according to the American Ambassador in China, seemed to be "primarily due to the uneasiness which (had) developed among local Chinese as a result of Sung's lengthening absence."²⁹ On June 21, the soldiers of the 29th Army were given an instruction as follows:

Informations available seem to show the Japanese Army's intention to take the Wanping garrison upon the pretext of maneuvers. As the situation has appeared to be very tense, the party in charge of patrol on the spot should be strictly vigilant 24 hours a day.³⁰

The Japanese maneuvers, coupled with the reinforcement of the North China Army, had undoubtedly caused them to take that measure. About these Japanese activities, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the United States, states in his memorandum:

(The Japanese armed forces) seem to have a passion for engaging in "maneuvers." They seem to derive special pleasure from "maneuvering" during the hours between midnight and daybreak . . . Foreign observers, even those most sympathetic to the Japanese, have been unanimous in the opinion that these activities of the Japanese armed forces, whether or not so intended, have been inevitably provocative.³¹

3. Organizational Routines Unchanged

Why did the above-stated signals fail to get the central players concerned and the North China Army to take any measure to cope with the changing situation? To put it more specifically, were the signals clear and strong enough for the central players to take the situation in China so seriously as to improvise any measure? The answer to this question, considering from the evidence set forth in the first section, seems to be a negative one. Then, why is it so?

As for the central players like Ishiwara and others, the signals, in the writer's judgement, probably influenced them to the extent that they

29. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

30. Teradaira, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-8.

31. *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), pp. 167-8.

recalled the officials of the North China Army to examine the situation and sent the officials of the War Ministry and the Army General Staff for inspection. These signals, however, did not give an impact strong enough to change their basic attitude or the basic military policy that the first strategic enemy was Soviet Russia, which, they perceived, posed a threat to Japan by enormously increasing its armed forces in the Far East.³² The writer's interpretation is that this foul-up resulted from their (1) placing priority on Soviet Russia, thus (2) handling the China issue without much seriousness, and (3) underestimating the Chinese, influenced more or less by the sense of superiority of the Japanese. Therefore, if Soviet Russia had sent those signals, things might have been quite different. Such being the case, even the Army General Staff scarcely thought of possibility of a war with China, and therefore had no definite plans of operations in case of the war with China except for those for protecting the Japanese nationals.³³

As already described, the North China Army did not have any plot against China. On the contrary, Major General Hashimoto Gun, Chief of Staff of the North China Army, had been instructed by the Army General Staff and the War Ministry to the effect that they should not pose a political or economic threat to the Chinese.³⁴ But in reality, the activities of the North China Army mentioned above did pose a threat to the Chinese. Then, was it possible for the North China Army to change or modify the activities which the Chinese considered so provocative, given the above mentioned signals? The North China Army, to quote Lieutenant Teradaira of the Special Service Section of the garrison troops, "could not stop the military review just because of the rumors."³⁵ The reason was that July was the time for the completion of the company drill and the second review was to begin on July 9.³⁶ According to Major General

32. The deposition of Tanaka Shinichi in *IMTFE*, Vol. V, p. 144.

33. "Ishiwara Kanji Chujo Kaisei Otoroku," *op. cit.*, p. 313. See also "Kawabe Torashiro Shosho Kaisei Otoroku," *op. cit.*, pp. 413-4.

34. The deposition of Hashimoto Gun in *IMTFE*, Vol. V, p. 136.

35. Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

36. Matsui, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

Hashimoto, the night maneuvers were the most active from April through October every year.³⁷ And these maneuvers were *not against the Chinese army, but against the Russian army in the Far East* which was equipped with heavy weapons. In order to avoid heavy damage which might be incurred by these Russian heavy weapons, nights or daybreaks had to be chosen for the maneuvers.³⁸ In addition, to quote Major General Hashimoto, "*these maneuvers had to be carried out, at least, a certain number of times based on a certain rule.*"³⁹ Such being the case, it was totally impossible for the organizational routines to be changed until they turned out to be inappropriate for the changing situation or the event took place. Now it is safe to say that the North China Army's maneuvers in accordance with the organizational routines, coupled with the Chinese reaction to them, produced the outcome, *i.e.*, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

If the North China Army had not been reinforced in order to check the Kwantung Army, if the Japanese night maneuvers had been called off, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident would not have broken out, at least, at that time or might have been put off. To sum up, the Incident resulted mainly from the internal political outcome in the Japanese Army, organizational routines of the North China Army, underestimation by the Japanese central players of the Chinese situation in comparison with that of Russia, distrust and miscommunication between Japan and China, and the Chinese reaction to the first two causes.

Needless to say, the first shot from either side directly caused the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. And from the available evidence, a third party, taking advantage of the grave situation, seems to have caused the Chinese 29th Army to fire the first shot, as they were very nervous about the Japanese night maneuvers.⁴⁰ Here we shall not deal with this matter

37. The deposition of Hashimoto Gun in *IMTFE*, Vol. V, p. 141.

38. Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

39. The deposition of Hashimoto Gun in *IMTFE*, Vol. V, p. 141.

40. Though there are various interpretations of the direct causes of the Incident, it seems highly probable from the available evidence that a third party had both the Japanese and Chinese armies fight. See Ikeda Jyunkyu, *Nippon no Magarikado* (The Turning Point of Japan), Chishiro Shuppan, 1968, pp. 105-12.

any further because we consider it more important and also more productive to describe and explain how the Incident was not settled but expanded through the games played by various players who tried to get their desired results.

II The Politics of Non-expansion

1. Different Faces of the Incident

As stated earlier, even the Army General Staff had no definite plans of operations in case of war with China. So, needless to say, the Konoye Cabinet had no such plans, either. These facts mean that there existed no concrete programs to cope with such a situation in any organization of the decision-makers. Therefore, the issue, first of all, required the central decision-makers to improvise a measure to cope with the event. Now let us follow how the incident initiated the policy game of non-expansion.

— July 8 — In the early morning, the first information of the outbreak of the incident was telegraphed to the Army General Staff by Major General Hashimoto Gun, Chief of Staff of the North China Army.⁴¹ At about the same time, the Foreign Ministry received this information, and the officials concerned with the problem were immediately called to the Office.⁴² War Minister Sugiyama informed Chief Secretary Kazami of the incident, and Kazami immediately told Prime Minister about it.⁴³ This was the way the players in each organization got the first information of the issue which started a decision game.

When they got the first information, what were the players' reactions upon the issue, *i.e.*, their perceptions of the issue which worked on their stands in the game in which they would participate?

"There happened an awkward thing," Colonel Shibayama of the War Ministry telephoned on that day to Colonel Kawabe of the Army General Staff.⁴⁴ On the contrary, "An interesting thing has happened!" was the first

41. *Hokushi no Chian-sen*, Vol. I, p. 18.

42. Ishii, Itaro, *Gaiko-kan no Issho* (The Life of a Diplomat), Taihei Shuppan Sha, 1972, p. 238.

43. Kazami, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

44. "Kawabe Torashiro Shosho Kaiso Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 414.

reaction of Colonel Muto, Chief of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff.⁴⁵ At his juncture, Colonel Muto had an intention to settle the North China problem, if necessary, by force.⁴⁶ Colonel Tanaka, Chief of the Army Affairs Section of the War Ministry, saw the issue in the same way as Colonel Muto did. The two chiefs had the same opinion that:

... the situation does not warrant optimism. To cope with it, there is no way but to resort to force. It is, therefore, necessary to increase the troops in North China and to strike a first blow at a good opportunity. Thus we can settle the issue...⁴⁷

Colonel Nagatsu, Chief of the Chinese Section of the Army General Staff, also advocated a military action against China.⁴⁸ So did Colonel Kasahara, Chief of the Russian Section of the Army General Staff.⁴⁹ However, the issue was quite an embarrassing thing to Major General Ishiware who thought that Japan and China should never fight with each other.⁵⁰

Then what was the reaction in the Foreign Ministry? According to Vice Minister Horiuchi, the incident was never anticipated.⁵¹ Though successive telegrams from the Embassy in Peking reported that the outbreak of the incident was due to the illegal fire by the Chinese, Foreign Minister Hirota, Vice Minister Horiuchi, Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau Ishii, and Chief of the European-American Affairs Bureau Togo, first recalled the Mukuden Incident by the Kwantung Army and then said, "They've done it again."⁵² Then they agreed to a policy of non-expansion and local settlement.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Daihonei-Rikugun-bu*; Vol. I, pp. 429-30.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 430. See also "Nishimura Toshio Kaiso-roku" (The Memoir of Nishimura Toshio), *Gendai-shi Shiryo*, Vol. XII (The China War IV), Misuzu Shobo, 1965, p. 461.

48. "Kawabe Torashiro Shosho Kaiso Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 414.

49. *Ibid.*

50. "Ishiware Kanji Chujo Kaiso Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, pp. 305-6.

51. The deposition of Horiuchi Kensuke in *IMTFE*, Vol. VI, Yusho Do, 1968, pp. 792-3.

52. Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

When Prime Minister Konoye heard the information from Kazami, he said, "Surely it wasn't a planned activity by the Japanese Army, was it?"⁵³ The Prime Minister thought the Japanese North China Army had eventually engineered it.⁵⁴ According to Chief Secretary Kazami, the Minister and the Vice Minister of the Navy also had a suspicion that the Army might have caused the event.⁵⁵

These were the reactions of several important players who would struggle with one another in the decision game. Strangely enough, no one doubted that the incident had been triggered by the Chinese. With these perceptions of the players' in mind, let us follow how they began the game.

The War Guidance Section of the Army General Staff, whose chief was Colonel Kawabe, drafted a plan of a non-expansion policy to which the War Ministry agreed.⁵⁶ In the morning Mr. Ishii, Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, Rear General Toyoda, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry and Major General Ushiroku, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry met at Mr. Ishii's office and agreed upon a non-expansion policy. In the afternoon, the Inner Cabinet decided upon a policy of non-expansion and local settlement of the incident. And at 6:42 p.m., Chief of Staff, Prince Kan'in sent a telegraphic order to the Commanding Officer of the North China Army, which read, "In order to prevent the spread of the incident, further resort to military force be refrained."⁵⁷

Before sending to Tokyo the first telegram of the incident, the North China Army had convened the staff meeting and decided to settle the issue locally and not to ask the Kwantung Army and others for reinforcements.⁵⁸ Then the North China Army began negotiations with the Chinese

53. Kazami, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

54. Ikeda, *op. cit.*, p. 112. See also Konoye Fumimaro, *Ushinawareshi Seiji* (The Politics Lost), Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1946, p. 10.

55. Kazami, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-9.

56. Horiba, Kazuo, *Shina-jihen Senso-shido-shi* (The History of Directing the China Incident), Jiji Tsushin Sha, p. 82.

57. *Hokushi no Chian-sen*, Vol. I, p. 18.

58. The testimony of Hashimoto Gun in *IMTFE*, Vol. V, p. 137. See also *Hokushi no Chian-sen*, Vol. I, p. 18.

29th Army.

While Tokyo and the North China Army made efforts to settle the incident locally, the Kwantung Army independently made a statement at 8:10 p.m., announcing that:

An event has now arisen in North China due to the challenge of the outrageous 29th Army. With much concern and great determination, the Kwantung Army will closely observe the development of the incident.⁵⁹

This statement, it is considered, evidently constituted an action of the Japanese Government, which was not authorized by the central decision-makers. Since this action was obviously directed to the Chinese Government, it is safe to assume that it influenced the Chinese public and officials in some way or another. The action must have confirmed a general image that Japan was determined to move into North China, and also must have caused some officials to perceive that the Japanese, and particularly, the Kwantung Army had engineered the incident.

Then how did the Chinese decision-makers perceive and react upon the issue? It is of course very difficult and, at the same time, not the subject matter of the present paper to examine their perceptions and reactions in detail. Nevertheless, it would be of some help to know a little about them in order to understand the development of the incident. As described in the preceding chapter, the chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was in a dilemma between the Japanese North China Army and the Nationalist Government, but never wanted a trouble with the Japanese.⁶⁰ Even if he thought that the incident was caused by the Japanese, he must have hoped for a peaceful settlement of the issue in order to preserve his position.⁶¹ Then how about the Nationalist Government? The first reaction of the Nationalist Government appeared in an oral protest made by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Japanese

59. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 42.

60. Ikeda, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

61. Nashimoto, Yuhei, *Chugoku no naka no Nippon-jin* (The Japanese in China), Dosei Sha, 1969, p. 170.

Embassy in Nanking. It protested "against 'attack by Japanese troops upon Chinese troops' and requested immediate cessation of hostilities."⁶² This Chinese action seems to have been affected partly by the perception "that the incident was clearly premeditated by the Japanese," which the American Counselor of Embassy in China was informed of by an official of the Chinese Foreign Office.⁶³ Chinese War Minister Ho Ying-chin seems to have already believed that "the Kwantung army, and especially Itagaki, Chief of Staff, in precipitating the incidents beginning July 7, midnight, had acted without sanction of the Japanese Government."⁶⁴

2. The Game of Mobilization

Now we shall examine how the July 11th Statement, or the Mobilization Statement, was made by the Japanese Government which comprised various players who saw different faces of the incident.

— July 9 — At 8:50 a.m. an extraordinary Cabinet Conference was held. At the Conference, War Minister Sugiyama proposed that "about three home divisions be sent, judging from the strength of the 29th Army and its anti-Japanese attitude."⁶⁵ The War Minister wanted to get a prior approval of sending troops before issuing an actual order of it. How did the other Ministers react to this proposal? Naval Minister Yonai objected against the proposal because he feared that it might give rise to a total war.⁶⁶ So he insisted that the incident be immediately settled locally.⁶⁷ Foreign Minister Hirota and the others were all against the proposal.⁶⁸ Prime Minister Konoye thought that, since dispatching troops to China would cause a grave influence internationally, he could not leave everything to the War Minister. Therefore he was absolutely against the dispatch of troops.⁶⁹ But there is no evidence that the Prime Minister expressed his

62. *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), p. 129.

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 129, 137-8.

64. *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), p. 138.

65. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 433.

66. *Taiheiyo-senso e no Michi*, Vol. IV, p. 8.

67. Ogata, Taketora, *Ichi Gunjin no Shogai* (The Life of a Serviceman), Bungei Shunjuu Sha, 1955, p. 24.

68. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 433.

69. Harada, Kumao, *Saionji-ko to Seikyoku* (Prince Saionji and the Political Situation), Vol. VI, Iwanami Shoten, p. 29.

own view during the Conference.

The extraordinary Cabinet meeting was followed by a Five Minister Talk which agreed upon the following points.

1. The incident was caused by an illegal Chinese action.
2. We firmly maintain a non-expansion policy. We hope that Chinese reflection should bring an early settlement of the issue.
3. If they would not reflect and instead endanger the matter, we shall swiftly adopt a proper measure.
4. Every Minister should be ready to attend an extraordinary Council at any time.
5. The Imperial Government considers as a policy for settlement, withdrawal of the Chinese Army, punishment of the Chinese responsible for the matter, Chinese apology, and future guarantee.⁷⁰

Incidentally, the policy of non-expansion and an early settlement of the incident had been requested by the Foreign Minister.⁷¹

In the deliberation on settling the incident which was held between the Army General Staff and the War Ministry, Colonel Tanaka of the War Ministry expressed an extreme opinion, *i.e.*, setting up a buffer zone contiguous to Manchoukuo. This view was shared with Colonel Muto of the Army General Staff.⁷² Colonel Kawabe of the Army General Staff, however, had a different opinion from theirs. He thought it necessary to forward very simple terms to settle the issue. Then he got allied with Colonel Shibayama of the War Ministry. Colonel Shibayama persuaded other members in the War Ministry and reached a conclusion that the Minister and Vice Minister of War had no objection to the terms, and that it would be proper to send a telegram to the North China Army in the name of the Vice Chief of Staff.⁷³ Then in the evening the telegram was sent by the Vice Chief of Staff which read:

70. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 433.

71. The deposition of Horiuchi Kensuke in *IMTFE*, Vol. VI, p. 793.

72. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 434.

73. "Kawabe Torashiro Shosyo Kaiso Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 417.

1. the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge;
2. guarantee for the future;
3. punishment of those responsible for the incident;
4. apology.⁷⁴

Thus advocates for moderate actions won, though tentatively. It was partly because they were buttressed by Major General Ishiwara and the atmosphere of the Inner Cabinet in favor of the non-expansion policy.

Meanwhile negotiations had been continued from dawn between the North China Army and the 29th Army. And the second in command of the 29th Army, General Chin Teh-chun, told Colonel Matsui, Chief of the Special Service Section of the garrison troops, that the Chinese Army in the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge would be withdrawn.⁷⁵ But at the same time, the Commander of the 29th Army, General Sung Cheh-yuan, received repeated telegrams from Chiang Kai-shek that ordered him to "proceed to Paoting and to direct operations from there."⁷⁶ As a matter of fact, Chiang Kai-shek told "a large gathering of officials at Kuling that he was despatching six divisions of troops to North China."⁷⁷ According to an information caught by the American Embassy in China, Chiang Kai-shek stated that "China would fight."⁷⁸ These actions implied his difficult position. He was pressed hard both by the advocates for war in the government and particularly by the Chinese Communist Party. He had been made to promise to hold the conference at the time of the Sian Incident, and was repeatedly pressed not to settle the incident locally by the Chinese Communist Party.⁷⁹ Under such circumstances the statement of the Kwantung Army disclosed on the previous day was just what the advocates for war wanted, and probably encouraged them to compel Chiang Kai-shek to take that stand.

74. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 434.

75. *Hokushi no Chian-sen*, Vol. I, p. 18.

76: Crowley, James B., *Japan's Quest for Autonomy*, Princeton University Press, 1966, fn. 53 in p. 329.

77. *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), p. 138.

78. *Ibid.*

79. *Taiheiyo-senso e no Michi*, Vol. III, pp. 329, 331 & 340-2.

With the negotiation going on between both armies on the spot, it would be too hasty to conclude that Chiang Kai-shek was determined to go to war with Japan. But we should not overlook the above-stated Chinese action which would have considerable effects on the Japanese Government as we shall see below.

— July 10 — The Army General Staff received an information from a military attaché in China that the Nationalist Army had begun to move north.⁸⁰ This information was judged by the Operations and the War Guidance Sections of the Army General Staff that both the Pinchin authorities and the Nanking Government were preparing for war, which would endanger the Japanese North China Army as well as Japanese nationals there. So they thought it necessary to send immediately required troops to North China, which, in their judgement, would have little probability for the Soviets to join the war.⁸¹ Thus the Operations Section considered it necessary to send three home divisions and air corps as well as some divisions from the Kwantung Army and the Korean Army. This was based upon Colonel Muto's idea that he had held since the outbreak of the hostilities.⁸² Although the War Guidance Section of the Army General Staff was against this step, it was supported by Colonel Tanaka of the War Ministry. The positive stands of Colonels Muto and Tanaka, it seems, resulted partly from their preferences,⁸³ and partly from *their positions which required them to "be officially responsible for implementing any mobilization plan of the government."*⁸⁴ Surprisingly enough, Lieutenant Colonels Takahashi and Watari of the Chinese Section of the Army General Staff, whose job was to gather and analyze military information about China and to plan military operations against China, had an optimistic view that China would easily give in only by mobilization of home divisions or at least a fight at Paoting.⁸⁵

80. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 435.

81. *Ibid.*, pp. 434-5.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 435.

83. As a general-staff of the Kwantung Army, Colonel Muto engaged in active maneuvers in North China, which ended up in failure as the Suiyuan Incident. From that time, to set up a buffer zone there was his objective.

84. Crowley, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

85. Horiba, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

Colonel Horiba Kazuo of the War Guidance Section of the Army General Staff, however, had quite a different plan. He insisted that no reinforcements be made, but firmly held that, if the development of the incident should require reinforcements, 15 divisions and 5.5 billion yen of the war expenditure would be necessary in order to settle the issue within six months.⁸⁶ This plan, however, was not seriously discussed by the members concerned because 15 divisions were half of the whole Army and the expenditure of 5.5 billion yen was considered nonsense.⁸⁷ Especially to Finance Minister Kaya, an expenditure of 5.5 billion yen was utterly absurd.⁸⁸ Contrary to Colonel Horiba's idea, Colonel Muto of the Operations Section thought a few divisions would be enough. And Colonel Tanaka of the War Ministry, explaining his plan, said to Colonel Horiba, "Aren't you taking Japanese Army for Chinese one?"⁸⁹

Major General Ishiwara, Chief of the Operations Division of the Army General Staff, highly appreciated Horiba's competence, and was, of course, in favor of Horiba's plan. Consequently, he was naturally surprised to find that the War Ministry advocating the forceful actions thought the expenditure of only three hundred million yen enough to defeat Chiang Kai-shek.⁹⁰ Major General Ishiwara was personally an advocate for the non-expansion policy, and was against the mobilization proposal as the chief of the Operations Division. The dispatch of troops, he feared, would get Japan bogged down into a total war with China. Conversely, to leave the matter as it was might endanger the Japanese nationals and the North China Army. And moreover, mobilization would take several weeks. He was pressed hard not only by his painful position but by his subordinates, especially by Colonel Muto who insisted that the dispatch of troops be necessary to protect the Japanese nationals. Finally he gave in to the Colonel and consented to his request on condition that the troops never be

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-4.

87. *Ibid.*, pp. 84-5.

88. Yatsugi, Kazuo, *Showa Doran Shishi* (The Personal History of Upheavals in Showa), Vol. I, Kabushiki Kaisha Keizai Oraisha, 1971, p. 388.

89. Horiba, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

90. "Ishiwara Kanji Chujiyo Kaiso Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 311.

used for war.⁹¹ Then at 6:00 p.m. he "officially advised the War Minister of the need to mobilize five divisions in Japan."⁹² Thus the development of the decision game encouraged the advocates for mobilization and turned the balance in favor of them.

In the evening War Minister Sugiyama phoned Chief Secretary Kazami and requested that an emergency meeting of the Inner Cabinet be held on the next day in order to decide upon an immediate dispatch of some troops.⁹³ Kazami at once informed Premier Knoye of the War Minister's request. The Premier told Kazami that he had no choice but to defer to the proposal. Then Kazami suggested to Premier Konoye that the representatives of the political circles be immediately called and be asked for cooperation, to which the Premier agreed.⁹⁴ This proposal was derived from consideration for the internal politics. In forming his Cabinet, Prime Minister Konoye had picked only two Ministers from the political parties, and he did it arbitrarily. Such being the case, the Cabinet did not get on well with the political circles. So he feared that the military would take advantage of, and incite them to be in favor of the positive measures. The Premier, therefore, thought it necessary to get their support as his bargaining advantage, or at least not to get them to take sides with the military in order to solve the issue.⁹⁵ That is why he agreed to the Secretary's proposal. The Prime Minister, however, seems to have failed to calculate the possible effects of the decision, which, contrary to his expectation, might fuel the war sentiments.

In Nanking, on the other hand, Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Shanghai, met before noon Wang Chung Hui, Chinese Foreign Minister, who had come back from Kuling after having met Chiang Kai-shek there. The Counselor and the Foreign Minister "expressed to each other the hope that the incident would be brought speedily to an amicable

91. Nashimoto, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

92. Crowley, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

93. Kazami, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

94. *Ibid.*

95. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-4.

settlement.”⁹⁶ According to the Domei’s report from Hankow, Chiang Kai-shek ordered four divisions of his army to prepare for an attack on the following day.⁹⁷ This information, coupled with the above-stated instruction of Chiang Kai-shek, contradicted the Foreign Minister’s talk. These incompatible facts seem to have implied that there existed different views in the Nationalist Government, and that the advocates for positive measures were gaining power though Chiang Kai-shek did not yet decide to fight.

The same held true of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council with which the Japanese North China Army was directly negotiating. The Hopei-Chahar Political Council would not consent to the withdrawal of the Chinese Army while they agreed to the rest of the terms for negotiation.⁹⁸ That was because they feared that the Japanese Army would advance to the Marco Polo Bridge after their withdrawal.⁹⁹ This attitude, it seems, was affected partly by the hawks in the 29th Army. At 2:00 p.m. the Japanese Navy intercepted a signal sent to the U.S. Navy by a U.S. Naval attaché in Peking to the effect that young officers under the command of General Sung Cheh-yuan, dissatisfied with the local agreement, decided upon launching an attack against the Japanese Army starting 7:00 p.m. that day.¹⁰⁰ This information implies that General Sung Cheh-yuan did not have an effective control of his army, and that he was placed in a very difficult and unstable position.

July 11 — At some time past eight in the morning, Major General Ishiwara called on Premier Konoye and asked him to “reject the mobilization proposal to be submitted by the War Ministry at the Inner Cabinet.”¹⁰¹ This fact implies that the Major General had failed to get his idea supported by the War Ministry, and that in order to get his desired result he had to put the issue on an informal channel. Also in the early

96. *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), pp. 135-6.

97. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 436.

98. *Hokushi no Chian-sen*, Vol. I, p. 18.

99. Imai, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

100. Teradaira, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-2.

101. Hirota Koki Denki Kanko Kai ed., *Hirota Koki*, Chuo Koron Jigyo Shuppan, 1966, pp. 258-9.

morning, an agent from the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry came to the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry to ask that the Foreign Minister should reject the mobilization proposal of sending three divisions which was to be submitted by the War Minister.¹⁰² This fact shows that the minority in the War Ministry, who were against the mobilization, had to resort to another channel. This action, the writer assumes, was probably taken by Colonel Shibayama of the War Ministry.¹⁰³

At 9:00 a.m. Mr. Ishii of the Foreign Ministry went to Tokyo Station to see Foreign Minister Hirota and asked him to reject the mobilization proposal, to which the Minister nodded.¹⁰⁴ And then, at the Foreign Office, Foreign Minister Hirota had a talk with his men, Vice Minister Horiuchi, Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau Ishii, and Chief of European and American Affairs Bureau Togo, and decided that the Foreign Ministry should reject the mobilization proposal.¹⁰⁵ By an order of Hirota, the Vice Minister invited Chargé d'affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Japan, Yang Yun-chu, to the Foreign Office and stated that an immediate local settlement was necessary, and that a telegraphic instruction had been sent to the Japanese Ambassador to China.¹⁰⁶

At 11:30 a.m. a Five Minister Talk began. War Minister Sugiyama submitted a proposal that some divisions from the Kwantung and the Korean Armies be sent immediately to support the North China Army, and that at the same time at least five home divisions be dispatched at once.¹⁰⁷ Naval Minister Yonai, usually very reticent and cautious in speaking partly due to a tacit agreement between Army and Navy not to interfere with each other, strongly supported the opinion of the Operations Section of the Naval General Staff and objected against the

102. Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

103. See fn. 44.

104. *Ibid.*

105. The deposition of Horiuchi Kensuke in *IMTFE*, Vol. VI, p. 793.

106. *Ibid.*

107. Ogata, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

proposal.¹⁰⁸ The Naval Minister feared that the dispatch of the troops might lead to a total war with China.¹⁰⁹ In spite of Admiral Yonai's objection, War Minister Sugiyama went on to assert that he could not tolerate annihilation of 5,500 men of the North China Army and Japanese nationals in Tientsin area.¹¹⁰ He also disclosed his belief that the dispatch of troops would bring about an early, local settlement of the incident.¹¹¹ Insofar as the dispatch was restricted to North China, the Naval Minister had no reason to oppose it any further.¹¹² Thus he reluctantly consented to the War Minister's proposal. The Naval Minister, however, did not forget to take the initiative to get an agreement that "this incident should never be another Mukuden Incident."¹¹³ Foreign Minister Hirota kept silent and Prime Minister Konoye did not express anything against the proposal.¹¹⁴ The Prime Minister feared that his objection against the proposal would lead to the War Minister's resignation and then to the Cabinet collapse, and that, in that case, no one could restrain the military.¹¹⁵ There is no evidence that Finance Minister Kaya, who was present there on account of the budget to be required by the dispatch of troops, objected against the War Minister's proposal.

At 2:00 p.m. the Five Minister Talk was followed by an emergency Cabinet meeting, where the mobilization proposal was approved without much argument on condition that the dispatch of troops be cancelled if it became unnecessary.¹¹⁶ The government also decided to call the incident "The North China Incident." At 6:25 p.m. just after the Cabinet session,

108. Kazami, *op. cit.*, p. 34. Hata, *op. cit.*, pp. 201, 203. According to Kazami, Prime Minister Konoye (if not, Vice Naval Minister Yamamoto) probably asked Naval Minister Yonai to take that action because the Prime Minister used to get others who shared his view to speak on behalf of himself. See Kazami, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

109. Ogata, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

110. *Ibid.*

111. Hata, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

113. Kazami, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

114. Hata, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

115. Harada, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

116. *Taiheiyo-senso e no Michi*, Vol. IV, p. 10.

the Prime Minister held a press conference and made an official statement of the government, which was proposed both to get a nation-wide support and to force the Chinese to consent to the settlement. Prime Minister Konoye announced as follows:

... In spite of the strained situation in Pingchin area threatening our nationals, we did not give up our hopes of a peaceful settlement and endeavoured at a local settlement based on the non-expansion policy. Disregarding the consent that they once gave to the peaceful settlement, the 29th Army abruptly made an illegal attack on us and caused considerable casualties on the night of July 10. They repeatedly reinforced the front, and moreover pushed forward armed preparations by advancing the divisions of Hsi Yuan southward and by ordering the Central Army to move, and so forth. They lacked sincerity to respond to peaceful negotiations and went so far as to totally decline the negotiations in Peiping.

In view of these facts, there is no room for doubt that the recent incident is entirely the result of anti-Japanese military action on the part of China

Thus the government, in Cabinet session today, decided upon necessary actions to be taken regarding the dispatch of troops to North China¹¹⁷

Prime Minister Konoye believed that China would give in if Japan should show positive attitude by declaring the dispatch of troops.¹¹⁸ In any case, the statement obviously constituted a formal action of the Japanese Government, which undoubtedly affected not only the Chinese decision-makers and public but also their Japanese counterparts. How it affected both sides, and the stands of the players which resulted in this action will be explained later.

Just after the Cabinet session, the War Ministry received a telegram from the North China Army that there was high probability for an

117. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 439.

118. Nashimoto, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

agreement to be reached.¹¹⁹ Hearing the decision to send troops, Major General Hashimoto, Chief of Staff of the North China Army felt that there existed profound discrepancy between the North China Army and Tokyo, and he got that telegram sent.¹²⁰ Receiving the telegram, Major General Ishiwara cancelled the mobilization plan, and instead, authorized the dispatch from the Kwantung Army and the Korean Army.¹²¹ Hopes for local settlement were spread in Miyakezaka.¹²² At 8:00 p.m. both Japanese and Chinese representatives on the spot arrived at an agreement, which was immediately reported to the Army General Staff.¹²³ At about 10:00 p.m. the five Ministers had a talk again. Then the Naval Minister inquired the War Minister about the mobilization. The War Minister replied that it would be possible to totally cancel the mobilization if the Chinese consented, in writing, to the Japanese demands.¹²⁴

Around midnight, the War Ministry broadcasted a talk, which said:

. . . a cease-fire agreement was concluded today in Peking. Yet, in view of the attitude taken thus far by the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, we doubt very much whether or not it was based upon their sincerity, and we can not put full confidence in it. We must anticipate that this agreement will be a mere scrap of paper in no time.¹²⁵

This broadcast was made by Lieutenant Colonel Amamiya of the Press Section of the War Ministry without authorization by his chief, Colonel Hata.¹²⁶ Though unauthorized by the senior players, it was another

119. *Taiheiyo-senso e no Michi*, Vol. IV, p. 10.

120. "Hashimoto Gun Chujo Kaisei Roku" (Records of an Interview with Lieutenant General Hashimoto Gun), *Gendai-shi Shiryo*, Vol. IX (The China War II), Misuzu Shobo, 1966, p. 323. Although the progress of the negotiation was cabled to Tokyo, Major General Hashimoto did not know at that time how things at home were developing. *Ibid.*, and see also *IMTFE*, Vol. V, p. 141.

121. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 439.

122. *Ibid.*

123. Matsui, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

124. Hata, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

125. Matsui, *op. cit.*, p. 204. See also Teradaira, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-5.

126. Teradaira, *op. cit.*, p. 224. See also Matsui, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

serious action of the Japanese Government, which also undoubtedly affected the other side to a considerable extent. This broadcast, in fact, encouraged the hawks in the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. They protested that:

It is Japan that lacks sincerity, and has already made an excuse of breaking the agreement. The non-expansion policy as well as the cease-fire agreement is nothing more than a measure to gain time to complete preparations for war.¹²⁷

Meanwhile in Nanking, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chen Chieh called on Mr. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy there at 4 o'clock. Pointing out the facts "regarding the reinforcement of Japanese troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area," Mr. Chen Chieh demanded that Mr. Hidaka "immediately cable the Japanese Government to order a cessation of Japanese military activities in North China."¹²⁸ Mr. Hidaka replied that "the reported movement of Central Government troops northward (had) given rise to apprehension on the part of the Japanese troops."¹²⁹ Though Mr. Chen Chieh assured Mr. Hidaka that Chinese troops had "no intention of provoking a war with the Japanese Army,"¹³⁰ he warned:

China does not tolerate any alien country arbitrarily increasing its garrison in China and infringing on her territorial sovereignty. If such action continues, . . . China will be forced to take defensive measures.¹³¹

3. Stakes and Stands of the Players Concerned

We have followed in the previous section how the July 11th Statement was made. We have briefly referred, here and there, to the stakes and stands of the players concerned, which resulted in the action of the

127. Matsui, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

128. *FRUS*, Vol. III (The Far East), p. 145. See also Gaimu-sho Hyakunen-shi Hensan linkai, *Gaimu-sho no Hyakunen* (A Hundred Years of the Foreign Ministry), Vol. II, Hara Shobo, 1969, p. 278.

129. *Ibid.*

130. *Ibid.*

131. *Ibid.*

government, *i.e.*, the Statement of Mobilization. Now we shall go into details about them.

Unlike the Army, the Navy was well under the control of Naval Minister Yonai and Vice Naval Minister Yamamoto, and the Naval Ministry and the Naval General Staff were comparatively well coordinated. This was, in the writer's judgement, partly due to their leadership, and partly due to the non-involvement of the Navy's interests in the incident. Insofar as the organizational interests were not involved, the Naval Minister could object against the mobilization proposal by the War Minister. Therefore he must have felt it unnecessary to go so far as to have a fight with the War Minister, and eventually consented to the War Minister's proposal, though reluctantly. The Naval Minister actually represented the Navy's interests as well as his personal interests. The following evidence, it seems, supports the writer's interpretation. On July 11 the Naval General Staff obtained the Army General Staff's approval of its proposal that, in case of need, the dispatch of troops be made to Shanghai as well as Tsingtao in order to protect the Japanese nationals there.¹³²

Although War Minister Sugiyama repeatedly presented the mobilization proposal, he was not an advocate for war with China. In fact, he felt that the incident was an awkward matter, as told to the New Commanding Officer of the North China Army, Major General Kazuki, who called on the War Ministry at 7:30 a.m. on July 11.¹³³ Then General Sugiyama gave no specific instruction other than to localize the incident based on the non-expansion policy.¹³⁴ Just after that when Major General Kazuki received more specific instructions by the Chief and the Vice Chief of Staff, and the Chiefs of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions of the Army General Staff, the Major General felt that there existed quite different views between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff.¹³⁵ War

132. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, pp. 438-9.

133. "Kazuki Kiyoshi Chujo Kaiso-roku" (The Memoir of Lieutenant General Kazuki Kiyoshi), *Gendai-shi Shiryo*, Vol. XII (The China War IV), Misuzu Shobo, 1965, p. 531.

134. *Ibid.*

135. *Ibid.* As for specific instructions, see *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, pp. 437-8.

Minister Sugiyama, in fact, had such an optimistic view as to report later to the Emperor that the incident would be settled in about two months.¹³⁶ He seemed to have an idea that only the statement of mobilization would suffice to settle the matter.¹³⁷ Since the War Minister had no accurate knowledge about the issue, it is not difficult to assume that he was easily influenced by his men like Colonel Tanaka, who shared the extreme view with Colonel Muto of the Army General Staff. Colonel Tanaka, Chief of the Army Affairs Section, had a considerable influence since the Section took charge of forming a budget.¹³⁸ Furthermore, the War Minister must have felt it reasonable and justifiable to stick to the mobilization proposal since it was his job to protect both the Japanese North China Army and the Japanese nationals in Tientsin.

We shall examine Major General Ishiwara's stakes and stand, which seem to have had a considerable effect on the game resulting in the July 11th Statement. His objective was to complete, first of all, the war preparations against Russia by enormously increasing the production of heavy industries. To this end, the Major General considered it absolutely essential to maintain peace for at least 10 years. Therefore, to have a fight with China should be by all means refrained.¹³⁹ About a month before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, he had said definitely in the Foreign Ministry, "Not a single soldier shall be sent to China as long as I am

136. Sugiyama Gensui Denki Kanko Kai ed., *Sugiyama Gensui Den* (A Life of General Sugiyama), Hara Shobo, 1969, p. 66.

137. Ogata, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

138. "Ishiwara Kanji Chujo Kaisei Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 316.

139. *Showa-shi no Tenno*, Vol. XVI, p. 28. "The five-Year Production Expansion Plan" approved by the Inner Cabinet on June 15, 1937 was based on Ishiwara's idea. *Ibid.*, p. 29. See also *Bessatsu Chisei* (December 1956), P. 135. Bureaucrats of the Finance Ministry, such as Kaya, Hoshino, Ishiwata, and Aoki, disagreed to the Plan which demanded 8.536 billion yen. Especially, Finance Minister Kaya and Commerce and Industry Minister Yoshino tried to restrict it by "The Three Principles of Finance and Economy," which implied that the budget was nothing more than a scrap of paper unless there was corresponding supply of materials. See Nashimoto, *op. cit.*, p. 179, and *Showa-shi no Tenno*, Vol. XVI, pp. 19-20.

alive.”¹⁴⁰ We have already pointed out that he was placed in a dilemma. But why did he have to comply with Colonel Muto’s demand for mobilization which was entirely contradictory to his objective? It is generally maintained that the information of a military attaché in Nanking compelled Major General Ishiwara to agree to the mobilization proposal.¹⁴¹ The writer will not try to contradict this interpretation but would like to point out the following problem that we should not overlook. Why did that information work on him so heavily as to cause him to misjudge the situation and to give in to Colonel Muto when no request for reinforcements was made by the North China Army? To answer this, Major General Ishiwara’s position in the Army should be taken into consideration. First, and most importantly, it was closely connected with the organizational reform of the General Staff which the then Colonel Ishiwara carried out in June 1936 in order to attain his objective stated above. He reinforced the Operations Division by establishing the War Guidance Section, and reprimanded the Intelligence and General Affairs Divisions of their jobs. As a result, the reform inevitably brought about enemies in these Divisions.¹⁴² Secondly, he had not served either in the Army General Staff or in the War Ministry before he was appointed Chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff in August 1935.¹⁴³ So he was simply an *outsider*. Lastly, he was the very man who had established a vicious precedent by the Manchurian Incident, *i.e.*, “rule of the higher by the lower,” which gave others a good reason to challenge him openly.¹⁴⁴ In such a situation, he had to assume actual responsibility to manage the General Staff because Vice Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Imai, was seriously ill. As already pointed out, however, his influence was in practice

140. Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

141. Hata, *op. cit.*, pp. 198, 239.

142. Ashizawa, Noriyuki, *Aru-Sakusen-Sanbo no Higeki* (The Tragedy of a General Staff), Fuyo Shobo, 1974, p. 135.

143. *Showa-shi no Tenno*, Vol. XVI, pp. 32-3.

144. When Major General Ishiwara of the Army General Staff once tried to check the Kwantung Army’s active maneuvers in Mongolia, Colonel Muto of the Kwantung Army would not obey him by saying calmly, “We are doing what you once did.” See Ikeda, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

restricted though he was an eminent strategist with strong leadership and competence. For example, he could not successfully persuade others or get their support at the Division meetings of the General Staff.¹⁴⁵ According to the then chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, Colonel Shibayama, many junior officers both in the War Ministry and in the General Staff, such as Colonels Muto, Tanaka, and Kagesa, Lieutenant Colonel Watari, Majors Yoshino and Kawamoto, who were *actually in charge of drafting operational plans and gathering information*, were all against the non-expansion policy of Major General Ishiwara.¹⁴⁶ Ironically enough, among his men was the strongest opponent, Chief of the Operations Section, Colonel Muto who had a definitely opposite objective¹⁴⁷ from Major General Ishiwara's. The Major General had only a few allies, *i.e.*, the War Guidance Section, his brain child, and the Military Affairs Section. Only in such an unfavorable situation, he got overwhelmed by that information, which turned out to be a little exaggerated, and reluctantly had to give in to Colonel Muto. Yet, he was still undecided. And then, knowing his unfavorable position in the Army, Major General Ishiwara tried to start another game by putting the issue on an unofficial channel. Thus he began to get in contact with Prime Minister Konoye, as already briefly referred to.

Now what were Prime Minister Konoye's stakes and stand? Although the Prime Minister in general was critically restricted in his influence institutionally,¹⁴⁸ Premier Konoye had some advantages in which no one

145. *Showa-shi no Tenno*, Vol. XVI, pp. 37-8.

146. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

147. Colonel Muto's objective was to fortify North China and Mongkiang area in order to make preparations for the war with Russia. See *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, P. 436.

148. Generally speaking, the Prime Minister stood institutionally "at the head of the Ministers of State" and had "general control over the various branches of administration." But in practice, the Prime Minister's power was seriously restricted in several respects. For example, the War Minister and the Naval Minister were not necessarily under the control of the Prime Minister, not to speak of both Chiefs of the General Staffs. Both Service Ministers were, in fact, intimidating the existence of the Cabinets by giving in their resignations if they wished.

could compete. He was a young Prince who was a remote relative of the Emperor and enjoyed great popularity in various circles, including the military, to say nothing of the public. Though his political acumen was still unknown, he was regarded as the hope of the political world. In fact, before the formation of the Konoye Cabinet, the then War Minister General Sugiyama said that the whole Army would support Prince Konoye.¹⁴⁹ Prince Konoye, however, sensed that to be well received by every circle meant that no one would actually support him, and that he might become a marionette of the military.¹⁵⁰ In forming the Cabinet he actually had to make a concession to the Army's demand that Baba be accepted as a Cabinet Minister.¹⁵¹ In order to further its interests the Army, it is assumed, could take advantage of his prestige and popularity. These might have been his disadvantages but they could be changed into the bargaining advantages if they were combined with another factor, *i.e.*, skill and will in using them as bargaining advantages. It is said, however, that the Prince lacked the will and skill and was not good at working on others in a political sense.¹⁵² This did not mean that he did not try to get his desired result. It was true that he made efforts to restrain the military. His maneuver, however, was not to do the job by himself, but to get others

149. Harada, *op cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 5. At that time, Lt-General Ushiroku, the then Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau proposed Konoye as Prime Minister, and so did General Terauchi. See Harada, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 311.
150. Baba, Kogo, *Konoye Naikaku Shi Ron* (The History of the Konoye Cabinets), Takayama Shoin, 1946, pp. 50-1. Kisha, Ikusaburo, *Konoye-ko Hibun* (The Secret Story of Prince Konoye), Koyasan Shuppan Sha, 1950, p. 5. Yabe, *op. cit.*, pp. 323-4.
151. At first, the Army demanded that Baba become Finance Minister. But he was very unpopular with the financial circle, so Konoye picked him as Home Minister. Yabe, *op. cit.*, pp. 381-2.
152. Showa Dojin Kai ed., *Showa Kenkyu Kai* (Showa Research Society), Keizai Orai Sha, 1968, pp. 256-8. Incidentally, it seems that even in the 1930's there was still a little room for the Emperor to assume leadership as shown in the February 26 Incident of 1936, if he wished. Yet, Premier Konoye hated to utilize the Emperor's leadership in order to get the Army under his control, which was totally inconsistent with his highest value, *i.e.* preservation of the national policy – the Emperor.

to do it on behalf of himself. That was his style.¹⁵³ Therefore it was not surprising that he was considered to be a man who was flattering, and readily giving way to the military.¹⁵⁴ Unless his will to use his bargaining advantages as such was perceived by other players, they by no means constituted his bargaining advantages. In this respect, what other players considered him to be was critically important. In considering his stakes and stand, we should not overlook the time factor. It was about a month after the formation of his Cabinet that the incident broke out. Time was not in favor of the Premier. It is, therefore, easily assumed that he was not well prepared to cope with the issue. What is more, his unpreparedness, it seems, was closely related to the facts that he had not been sufficiently experienced in actual politics, and that he had reluctantly accepted the second mandate to assume premiership.

Unlike Prime Minister Konoye, Foreign Minister Hirota had years of experience in actual politics not only as Foreign Minister but also as Prime Minister. In 1935 as Foreign Minister of the Okada Cabinet, he took the diplomatic initiative to normalize the relations with China by putting forward "The Three Principles." This active step, however, was possible only when the Army and the Navy supported it, or at least when they did not find their interests in opposing it.¹⁵⁵ Although the Foreign Minister in general was, in form and in practice, restricted in exercising his influence to guide the formation of Japan's foreign policy, the extent to which he could get his desired result depended considerably upon not only his competence but also upon what other players considered him. What they considered him was, of course, affected by both what he had done and what he was determined to do. It was the Hirota Cabinet of 1936 that restored the Imperial Ordinance of 1900 which required that both Service Ministers be restricted to general officers on active duties. As well known,

153. Konoye once told *Genro* Saionji about his view that, if a party Cabinet and parliamentary politics were not maintained, responsibility should be assumed by the militarists though it was very risky. Yabe, *op. cit.*, pp. 215, 381. See also fn. 108.

154. "Kawabe Torashiro Shosho Kaiso Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 416.

155. *Taiheiyo-senso e no Michi*, Vol. II, pp. 127-32.

it literally gave the power to overthrow the Cabinets to the military. Therefore Foreign Minister Hirota of the Konoye Cabinet was regarded as a man who readily gave way to the military¹⁵⁶. He had years of experience both as Foreign Minister and as Prime Minister and should have known what politics was, but he never tried to show his will and skill either in working on like-minded players or in forming an alliance in order to get his desired result. In this respect, he seriously lacked the bargaining advantages. The fact that both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister lacked will and skill in using them as bargaining advantages could partly explain why they could not form an alliance between them although Prime Minister Konoye had picked Hirota as Foreign Minister and both of them wanted an early settlement of the incident. Therefore all that Foreign Minister Hirota actually did was to reluctantly approve the mobilization proposal.

We have thus far described the process of the decision game and several important players' stakes and stands which aggregated to the outcome, *i.e.*, the July 11th Statement. And we have noticed that the decision was made not by the "rational" calculation of the players but by the "pulling and hauling" among them. We have also found that there were several important actions of both governments. For example, the Kwantung Army's action of July 8, which constituted an action game, seems to have confirmed the Chinese War Minister's perception that the Kwantung Army had engineered the incident, and to have encouraged the advocates for war in the Nationalist Government. Pressed hard by them as well as by the Chinese Communist Party, Chiang Kai-shek was driven to issue the order to dispatch the troops northward. This action of Chiang Kai-shek turned the balance of the decision game in favor of the advocates for mobilization. Then the players' stakes and stands described above produced the July 11th Statement.

156. Ishii, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-7. Colonel Kawabe of the Army General Staff once advised Foreign Minister Hirota that he should not completely obey the Army and instead should do what he thought right though it might be difficult as Foreign Minister. "Kawabe Torashiro Shosho Kaiso Oto-roku," *op. cit.*, p. 416.

The July 11th Statement, in fact, was a resultant of the Japanese internal politics in several important respects. Although Major General Ishiwara had competence and also will and skill in using them as bargaining advantages, he failed to make them effective, or could not form an alliance. Then he had to succumb to the advocates for mobilization due to the pressure both from them and from his position. The War Minister, who lacked confidence and knowledge about the issue, persistently presented the mobilization proposal on behalf of the Army which was naturally represented by those who argued confidently with influence. The Naval Minister had no reason to decline by all means the War Minister's proposal partly because the proposal had a plausible reason to save 5,500 soldiers of the North China Army from annihilation, and partly because the Navy's interests were not directly involved. Those who could make other players believe their argument reasonable and unrefuted did win the game. Neither the Foreign Minister nor the Prime Minister who comparatively had bargaining advantages argued confidently with influence, which was however restricted institutionally.¹⁵⁷ Due to the lack of knowledge about the issue, the Prime Minister had to comply with the War Minister.¹⁵⁸

The summary description presented above has not yet given a satisfactory answer to the puzzle why the July 11th Statement was necessary and had to be announced at that time when an agreement was to be concluded on the spot. As already described, Prime Minister Konoye feared that it would eventually lead to the Cabinet collapse if he objected against the War Minister's proposal. But why did he go so far as to officially announce the Statement? Was it impossible for him to keep it unstated? The Prime Minister, in fact, had two objectives. The first one was directed to China in order to settle the incident as already described. Affected not only by his lack of knowledge about the issue but also by others who argued confidently with influence, the Prime Minister believed that China would surely succumb if Japan should take a firm stance by

157. The fact that Major General Ishiwara gave in, the writer assumes, probably affected their stands.

158. Nashimoto, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

officially announcing the dispatch of troops. The second one, which seems more important, was related to the Japanese internal politics and also to the Premier's maneuvers. Since Prime Minister Konoye and his aides thought that the military had always taken the initiative in every event, the Prime Minister held an idea that he should first of all mobilize the public support so as to check the military and thus to settle the issue effectively. And what he actually did was to get the better of the military by issuing the Mobilization Statement of July 11.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, the Statement had to be announced at that very moment by all means.

Lastly we may as well briefly refer to the effects of the July 11th Statement. The Statement encouraged the advocates for forceful measures both in Japan and in China. We know about the action game which appeared as the broadcast of the Press Section of the War Ministry. The Press Section forced every newspaper to keep the news of the cease-fire agreement concluded on July 11. Consequently, all the newspapers of July 12 except for *Asahi* dealt with the local agreement very briefly, and instead wrote up the statement concerning the dispatch of troops to North China.¹⁶⁰ Both political parties, Minseito and Seiyukai, gave full support to the Government decision on the night of July 11 and the following day.¹⁶¹ Although the North China Army was comparatively well under the leadership of Major General Hashimoto Gun, there existed, it is said, such advocates for drastic measures as had delayed the reception and dispatch of the telegrams about non-expansion.¹⁶² Therefore, it is undeniable that the statement encouraged them and made the activities of the Japanese representatives on the spot very difficult. Meanwhile, the Statement of the Japanese Government was delivered to the conference at Kuling on July 12, getting the participants there excited.¹⁶³ Asked to participate in the National Defense Conference about that time, Chou En-lai said that the Chinese Communist Army would join the resistance to

159. Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

160. Hata, *op. cit.*, pp. 234, 236 and fn. 2 in p. 237.

161. *Ibid.*, p. 353.

162. Imai, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 32.

163. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

Japan if Chiang Kai-shek started it.¹⁶⁴ Opposing to many moderates, Feng Chih-an shared the view with the Communist Party and advocated the war with Japan.¹⁶⁵ In such a situation, Chiang Kai-shek reportedly consulted with top officials, such as Wang Ching-wei, Cheng Chien, Chen Cheng on the afternoon of July 12, and arrived at a conclusion that they prepare both for war and peace, and that in case of need they dare to fight.¹⁶⁶

164. *Ibid.*

165. *Ibid.*

166. *Daihonei Rikugun-bu*, Vol. I, p. 442.

北支事変—官僚政治モデルを通して

〈要 約〉

井 上 真 蔵

本稿は、太平洋戦争に至る過程での重大な事件の一つである北支事変をグレアム・アリソンにより提示された官僚政治 (bureaucratic politics) モデルにより分析し、新たな解釈の可能性とともに官僚政治モデルの有効性をも探求しようとするものである。対象期間は1937年7月7日より8月15日までであるが、スペースの都合により後半部は次回に譲りたい。

第一章では、蘆溝橋事件が主に組織過程の視点より考察される。事件勃発前より、参謀本部、陸軍省、北支軍は事件を示唆するようなシグナルを受けとっていたが、これらのシグナルの発生には、それなりの原因が存在したのである。間接的には、日本の行なった一連の華北分離政策がその原因であるが、直接的には、関東軍の華北進出を阻止するために北支軍が二倍に増強されたためと、昼夜を問わずの連日の演習によるためであった。そして、豊台が増強の場所選ばれたが、これは軍事的というよりはむしろ政治的な意図によるものであった。また北支軍の演習は対ソ戦に備えてのものであり、且つ7月が中隊教練の完成の時期にあたっており単に中国側のシグナルのために演習を中止するわけにはいかなかった。

このように、北支軍の増強は陸軍内部の政治的結果に他ならず、北支軍の演習も対ソ戦を目指してのルーティーンな行動にすぎなかった。しかし、中国側はそれを知る由もなく、日本軍の華北への進出と受けとったのである。その結果、前述のシグナルが現われたのであるが、それは石

原作戦部長等の注意を喚起したにもかかわらず、極東に於いて日本の脅威となったソ連を重視するあまり、変化する状況に対処させるまでにはいかなかった。要するに、日本陸軍の内的調整と北支軍のルーティーンな行動とが蘆溝橋事件をもたらししたものと言えよう。

第二章では、7月11日の華北派兵に関する政府声明が各プレイヤーの、いかなる反応、利害、立場から生じたかが分析される。参謀本部の武藤作戦課長、陸軍省の田中軍事課長は、これを機会に華北問題の解決を計り、動員案を強硬に支持したが、それは彼らの選好順位のみならず彼らが公的に動員案を実施する立場にあったことにも関係しているように思われる。また参謀本部の河辺大佐、堀場大佐、陸軍省の柴山大佐は動員案には反対であったが、武藤、田中両課長を始めとし、実際に情報、作戦起案を担当するジュニア・プレイヤーが動員案を支持した。このため、状況認識に欠く杉山陸相は実質的影響力を持つ彼らの意見を主張することになったのである。石原は作戦部長として動員案には絶対反対であったが、参謀本部をまとめることは出来ず、特に部下武藤の強い圧力のために、結局、動員案に反対するわけにはいかなかった。

海相は、華北派兵は全面戦争に至る虞があるため反対したが、北支軍と居留民を見殺しに出来ずとの陸相の主張には敢て反対は出来なかった。それは海軍としての利益が含まれていないせいでもあった。

外務省は動員に反対であったが、広田外相は閣議において十分にその意思を表明しなかった。近衛首相も絶対に反対であったにもかかわらず、反対は陸相の辞任を招き、延いては内閣の崩壊に至ることを恐れて結局は動員案を承認したのである。

以上の結果、11日の声明が生れたのではあるが、より直接的には首相のスタイルによるところ大であると思われる。状況認識を欠く近衛首相は中国に圧力をかければ問題は解決すると信じ、声明を出すことにより軍部の先手を取り問題を解決しようとしたのである。このような意味で7月11日の声明は日本政府内部の政治的結果であったと言えよう。