

# A STUDY ON THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS' ATTITUDE TOWARD FORMOSA\*

— from "Independence of Formosa" to  
"Liberation of Formosa" —

Akio Moriyama\*\*

## I

The writer of the present article is interested in the Formosan issue of today. Today, the Formosan issue is, as is often said, a principle matter for the Chinese Communist Party in its foreign policy. In connection with the Formosan issue, *The People's Daily News* stated that it was impossible to talk over the principle with the Chinese people.<sup>1)</sup> Therefore, there is a view on this matter to the effect that the Chinese stubborn attitude toward Formosa will last for a long time to come.<sup>2)</sup> However, there has been no work analyzing the reasons why the Chinese Communists consider the Formosan issue was a problem of fundamental importance for China. A tough volume of *The History of Formosa in International Politics* by Dr. Teh Tehn-chiau of Hosei University, for instance, completely

---

\*This paper was originally prepared as a report at the seminar of the Social Science Research Institute of ICU on February 10, 1973. An expanded version will be published as an occasional paper from the Social Science Research Institute.

\*\*The writer is an Assistant of International Relations, Social Science Research Institute, International Christian University.

lacks analysis on the Chinese Communists' attitude toward Formosa.<sup>3)</sup> Though there are many essays and articles touched upon the Formosan issue, only the impressions are told in those works.

Unsatisfied with these works, the writer makes a brief study on the historical background of today's Formosan issue. To understand the whole meaning of the Formosan issue, it seems to be necessary to consider the matter with the problem of the minority groups. In the 1940's, the Chinese Communist Party seems to have changed its attitude toward Formosa from "support for independence" to "a province of China" without any explanation. In the same period, the Chinese Communist Party also altered its future goal from formation of a federation of states in China to a single state as we see "People's Republic of China" of today. It is a question, if there was any connection between this policy change and the alteration of Formosan policy.

This is an attempt at a consistent understanding of the Chinese Communists' attitude toward Formosa, connecting the Formosan issue and the problem of the minority groups. Before making an analysis from this point of view, it might be necessary to touch upon the premises and the analytical framework of this brief study.

It is often said that China's foreign policy is based on Mao Tse-tung's Thought, which is an applied form of the Marx-Leninism to China. While the decision makers of China consider themselves as Marx-Leninists and employ Mao Tse-tung's Thought as their principle of behavior, it is obvious that such ideologies influence China's foreign policy greatly. However, neither the Marx-Leninism nor Mao's Thought is fundamentally a principle applied for foreign policy;

- 
- 1) *The People's Daily News*, February 19, 1964. Editorial.
  - 2) Shinkichi Eto and Tatsumi Okabe, "People's Republic of China: Principle of Foreign Policy Conduct" in their *China in the World (Sekai no naka no Chugoku)*, Tokyo 1969. pp. 104—107.
  - 3) Teh Tehn-chiau, *The History of Formosa in International Politics (Taiwan Kokusai Seiji-shi Kenkyu)*, Tokyo 1971.

therefore, the decision makers seem to have more operational principles of foreign policy, which are the actual guides of policy, based on concrete necessity, concrete environment, concrete problems etc.

The so-called "operational ideology"<sup>4)</sup> is rooted in the Marx-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's Thought, or the doctrinal ideology, but is "operationalized by taking into account the specific national, historical and psychological conditions"<sup>5)</sup> of China. Between the doctrinal ideology and the operational ideology, usually there is difference, and the two ideologies may conflict each other sometime. Conflict between the two ideologies, it can be said, usually dissolved by preferring the operational ideology, since it is based on concrete necessity.<sup>6)</sup>

Then, it is the question when the decision makers dissolve such a conflict. The writer assumes that the decision makers do not recognize the discrepancy and conflict between the doctrinal ideology until they may face the concrete problem. If the matter is not urgent for them, the decision makers seem to consider it only in an abstract sense. Only when the decision makers consider that the matter is urgent for them, the conflict comes into the mind. The more important a problem may be, the bigger conflict of the two ideologies is.

The Chinese Communist Party seems to have formed its fundamental image of international politics in the 1940's, while the Chinese Communists Party was on the rise at that time, and was gaining power in China, fighting against the Nationalist Government. Mao Tse-tung's article "On Coalition Government," for instance, was issued in this period. Therefore, the writer assumes that both Formosan issue and the minority problem were for the Chinese

---

4) See Tatsumi Okabe, "Problems in the Study of Sino-Soviet Conflict" in *The Journal of Social Science*, No. 5, ICU. September 1964. pp. 201—230. And also his *Foreign Policy of Contemporary China (Gendai Chugoku no Taigai Seisaku)*, Tokyo 1971.

5) *Ibid*, "Problems", p. 222.

6) Tatsumi Okabe, "China's Image of International Politics" in *International Affairs (Kokusai Mondai)*, No. 149. August 1972. pp. 38—51.

Communists those arisen in the process of nation building in China.

## II

On April 15, 1928, the Formosan Communist Party was established "under direct influence and support of the Chinese Communist Party," though it was named 'The Formosan Nation Branch of the Japanese Communist Party' because of Formosan situation within Japan's political-economic system.<sup>7)</sup>

According to the documents of the then Formosan Governor's Office, Police Department, there was another communist organisation named 'The Formosan Nation Branch of the Chinese Communist Party', which was established on October 18, 1928. This organization was, however, under direction of some leading members of the Formosan Nation Branch of the Japanese communist Party.<sup>8)</sup> Since the branch of the Chinese Communist Party did not have any direct relation with the Chinese Communists... it is even doubtful whether the Chinese Communists knew of its existence...., hereafter, the so-called Formosan Communist Party, the branch of the Japanese Communist Party is treated.<sup>9)</sup>

Accepting the instructions from the Communist International, Formosan members of the Chinese Communist Party, Lin Mu-chun and Hsien Hsueh-hung returned at the end of 1927 to Shanghai from Moscow, where they had studied. In the Thesis of 1927, "complete independence of the colony" and instructions of communist movements to both Korea and Formosa was determined as an important role of the Japanese Communist Party. Therefore, both Lin and Hsieh went to Tokyo one after the other to receive directions from the Japanese Communist Party. The two Formosan communists went back to

7) Chang Yu, ed., *Our Formosa (Women-te Taiwan)*, Shanghai, 1955. p.85.

8) "Arresting details of Tokyo Special Branch Members of Japan Communist Party Formosan Nation Branch", in Kentaro Yamabe ed., *Current History Materials: Formosa (Gendai-shi Shiryo: Taiwan)*, Vol. 2. p. 90. Also, see unidentified writer's "Principle of Party Organization in Formosa and its Conditions" in the same volume. p. 273.

Shanghai in February, 1928, with theses of organization and of policy issued from the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party. In this organizational thesis, it was written that the Formosan Communist Party should be a branch of the Japanese Communist Party for an adequate period, and also there were instructions to secure support from the Chinese Communist Party in the construction of the Formosan Communist Party.<sup>10)</sup>

Following this course, Lin and Hsieh held a meeting called "Active Elements Conference of the Formosan Communists" on April 13, 1928. At the conference, there were eleven in attendance, including a representative of the Chinese Communist Party, and they determined to have a "Construction Conference."<sup>11)</sup>

The Chinese representative was recorded under the name of "P'eng Ying," a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>12)</sup>

The Active Elements Conference is said to have been convened to settle the preparation for the construction of the party.

On April 15, in the French Settlement of Shanghai, the Construction Conference of the Formosan Communist Party was held. At the Conference, P'eng made a brief speech quoting the history of the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>13)</sup> Then, the nine in attendance, including P'eng and a representative of the Korean communists, discussed the principles of Policy, Organization, as well as those of the labour movement, farmer's problems, youth affairs, international affairs etc. Those discussions were under P'eng's direction. Lin Mu-chun was elected the Secretary General. Among 13 slogans written in the Principle of Policy, we see,

2. Cheer for Formosan People's Independence,
3. Uphold the Construction of the Republic of Formosa."<sup>14)</sup>

---

9) *Ibid.*, p. 90.

10) *National Movement under Japanese Rule*, Vol. 2. "Political Movement", Tokyo, 1969. pp. 589—595. "Arresting Details", op. cit. pp. 84—86.

11) "Political Movement" op. cit. pp. 589—595.

There is a dispute on the interpretation of the above slogans as to whether or not the Formosan Communist Party insisted upon independence because of its aversion to reactionary China under Chiang Kai-shek. Dr. Koh Se-kai, Assistant Professor of Tsudajuku University, evaluates the clear announcement of "Uphold the Construction of the Republic of Formosa" in his work, *Japan's Colonial Policy and the Taiwanese Resistance Movement*.<sup>15)</sup> Mr. Kentaro Yomabe, the editor of *Current History Materials: Formosa*, contrary to this interpretation, says that the term "independence" means the separation from imperialistic rule, and that the Formosan Communist Party opposed return to China under the reactionary regime of Chiang Kai-shek.<sup>16)</sup>

The dispute is made around the aims of the Formosan Communists. The problem, however, concerns the reason why the Chinese Communist Party approved such slogans, or the principles, since those were written under direct influence and assistance of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the establishment of the Formosan Communist Party itself. The principle, we may say, reflected the Chinese Communists' view toward the island of Formosa and its people.

The Chinese Communist Party considered the Formosan issue not a domestic affair but that of foreign policy, reflecting the history

---

12) *Ibid.*

Though Prof. Koh Se-kai identified this representative as P'eng P'ai, then member of the Central Committee and well known leader of the Farmers' movement, it is still obscure. It is unknown when P'eng P'ai went into Shanghai, escaped from the collapsed Hailufeng Soviet. See Hideo Yamamoto, "P'eng P'ai and Farmers Movement" in *Asian Economics (Aija keizai)*, IX—12, December 1968. pp. 100—117. And Shinkichi Eto, "The History of the Hailufeng Soviet" in his *The Political History of East Asia, (Higashi Aija Seiji-shi Kenkyu)*, Tokyo, 1968.

13) Ministry of Internal Affairs, Dep. of Security, "Arresting the Formosan Communist Party", resume in *Current History*, op. cit. pp.245—253.

14) *Ibid.*, and *National Movement*, op. cit. pp. 595—657.

15) Koh Se-kai, *Japan's Colonial Policy and the Taiwanese Resistance Movement (Nippon Tochi-ka no Taiwan)*, Tokyo, 1972. pp. 392—330.

of Formosa as a colony of China in the past. Since Formosa under China's rule before its cession to Japan was a sort of colony, the Chinese Communist leaders, who devoted themselves to the anti-imperialism struggle, considered the matter as an independence movement of the Formosans against Japanese imperialism. Up until early 1940's, the Chinese Communist Party did not assert the "recovery of Formosa", but declared its support for the "Formosans' independence movement" in its foreign policy. Even when the Chinese Communist Party instructed the Formosan Communists in the reformation of their party and reconsideration of the policies, revision of the principle was not included.<sup>17)</sup>

### III

The Chinese Communist Party denied its right of speech on the Formosan issue, because they considered that the island had been colony of the late Ching Dynasty and the Chinese Communists insisted on the people's liberation. At the first stage of the China war, Liu Shao-chi, then leader of the liberated zone, treated the problems of Korea and Formosa within foreign policy; only if, he wrote, as they hoped, support should be given to the independence movement of the Korean and Formosan peoples.<sup>18)</sup>

At the sixth plenum of the sixth term Central Committee in 1938, Mao Tse-tung made a speech, lately known as "On the New Stage". Though this speech is not enclosed in the present "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung", it was widely spread even in the area under the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Government) rule at that time. In this

---

16) *Current History*, op. cit., Exposition, p. xxvi.

Obviously, there must have been a dispute among the Formosan Communists as to whether or not belong to the Japanese Communist Party. See, Ong Jok-tik, *Taiwan*, Tokyo 1970. (New edition) p. 127.

17) Chu Chiu-pai, then member of the Central Committee, got in touch with the Formosan Communists in Shanghai. *National Movement*, op. cit., pp. 674—676.

speech, Mao disclosed the principle of the anti-Japanese united front, cooperating with suppressed peoples like the Koreans and the Formosans.<sup>19)</sup>

“The war of invasion of Japanese imperialism does not only endanger the Chinese nation but also harms all the Japanese soldiers and people, and suppressed peoples like Koreans and Formosans; therefore, to make the Japanese fail in the invading war, it is inevitable to have wide and common efforts among soldiers and peoples of the two great nations of China and Japan and suppressed peoples like Koreans and Formosans, and to construct a common united front of anti-invasion.”<sup>20)</sup>

Based on Mao's proposal, the Formosan people were categorized apart from each Chinese nation, Mongolians, Tibetans, etc. in a decision of the sixth meeting.<sup>21)</sup> The “Liberation of Formosa” was not included anywhere in the strategic goals of the Chinese Communist Party. The reason why not is explained by Mao clearly. In a dialogue with Edgar Snow, Mao said, “(Speaking of recovery of lost territories,) we do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend to them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Taiwan(Formosa).”<sup>22)</sup>

They do not include Formosa in the range of recovery of lost territories, giving as a reason, the fact that it was formerly a Chinese colony. This statement is very important in a sense that it

18) Seiji Imahori, “Nationalism and Class Struggle in the Yen-an Regime”, in *Asian Economics (Aija Keizai)*, XI—6. pp. 19—20.

19) There are some different texts of the “On the New Stage”. Present “Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung” only encloses the seventh chapter in revised form. See *Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Hokubo-sha edition, Vol. 6. Also see, Imahori, *Ibid.*, pp. 6—7.

20) *Collected Works*, *Ibid.*



is the only reference to clarify a ground for the independence.

Until 1943, to insist on the occupation of Formosa in the Cairo Declaration and in Mao's "On Coalition Government"(1945), the position was not altered. Only after 1945, the Chinese Communist Party began to appeal for the liberation of Formosa, insinting that the Formosan problem is a domestic affair of China, under a fundamental alteration of the policy toward Formosa. Therefore, it is an unacceptable interpretation, as Edgar Snow noted later to the above-mentioned Mao's statement, to say "it seems hardly likely that Mao intended to concede future 'independence' there."<sup>23</sup>

Then what caused the fundamental alteration of the Formosan policy of the Chinese Communist Party? This question will be discussed in the next section.

#### IV

In the 1940's, the Chinese Communist Party made another important change in its policy; that is of a goal of the state formation in the future, from "a federation of states" to "a unified single state". The writer's question is if there is any relation between this policy alteration and that of the Formosan policy. An interpretation made below, connecting these two problems, is only an attempt at a consistent understanding of China's policy toward Formosa.

In May, 1922, the Second National Conference of the Chinese Communist Party issued a declaration on its duties and goals. In this declaration, the future goal of the state formation was clarified;

"to construct the Federal Republic of China, unifying the

---

21) Imahori, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

22) Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* London 1937, London 1972 enlarged ed. p. 128.

23) *Ibid.*, p. 480.

Snow's interpretation is similar to that of Prof. Imahori on the minority problem, in his *Introductory Study of Mao Tse-tung's Thought*, "Minoriry Groups Policy".

Chinese mainland, Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkistan in a system of free federation.<sup>24)</sup>

It is quite different from the single multi-racial nation of today, at least in a system of free federation that was definitely expressed in the draft.

During the China War, Liu Shao-chi wrote a remarkable article in which he extended concrete policies to construct a liberated zone. In minority races policy, Liu admitted not only minorities' right of local autonomy but also the right of separation and independence, and guaranteed their freedom of armaments, and the right of the development of each group's own culture and religion.<sup>25)</sup> Such a minority policy should be considered as a mechanical copy of Soviet Russia's policy.<sup>26)</sup>

In this situation, the Chinese Communist Party established a single state in 1949. This complete alteration of state formation is, according to Prof. Seiji Imahori of Hiroshima University, a fruit of the sophistication of their nationalism, since in the Yen-an regime the problem was considered lacking class analysis in their artless nationalism.<sup>27)</sup>

Though Prof. Imahori says that the Chinese Communist in the period of the Yen-an regime had a position of bourgeois nationalism, the minority policy should be considered as a mechanical copy of policies in U. S. S. R., as has been mentioned. Otherwise, it is contradictory enough, when he says the Chinese Communists' Formosan policy clashed with the assertion of the Nationalist Govern-

---

24) Japan Institute of International Affairs, Dep. of China, ed. *Documents and Materials of the History of the Chinese Communist Party*, Vol. 1, Document No. 32. esp. pp. 141-142.

Also, Gen'ichi Suzue, *The History of the Chinese Liberation Struggle* (*Chugoku Kaiho Toso-shi*), Ishizaki Shoten, p. 95.

25) Imahori, "Yenan Regime", *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

The original version of Mao's "On Coalition Government" kept the same policy, though the present version in his "Selected Works" is revised. See *Collected Documents of New China*, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 1.

ment of the domination of Formosa based on bourgeois nationalism.

The matter is truly one of nationalism. However, it is not persuasive enough, only to speak of the change from "bourgeois nationalism" to "proletarian nationalism". Isn't the change caused in the nation building process of China? The writer should like to explain the problem from this view-point.

Liu's above-mentioned opinion on minority races is quite similar to that of Mao on "the problem of an international union of soviets". In the words Mao Tse-tung as said to Edgar Snow on July 23, 1936, we see that his opinion is that "such a world union could be successful only if every nation had the right to enter or leave the union according to the will of its people, and with its sovereignty intact, and certainly never at the 'command' of Moscow."<sup>26)</sup>

Mao's statement gives support to, as a matter of fact, the alliance of the sovereign states within a nation-state system. According to Prof. Tatsumi Okabe of Tokyo Metropolitan University, China's image of international politics is unique in the sense that maintenance or protection of a nation-state system is China's natural premise.<sup>27)</sup> It was a most important goal for the Chinese Communists to establish a "unified and rich new state of China", since China had been suppressed and invaded by 'imperialism' for a long time. Therefore, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have adapted "equality and reciprocity, mutual respect of territorial sovereignty" as a basis of its foreign policy from the start of People's Republic of China.<sup>28)</sup>

The rights of minority races within China, admitted in the past policy as in Liu's article, may weaken "a unified, rich new state

---

26) Koretada Sakamoto, *Minority Groups Problem and Frontier Districts of China (Chugoku Henkyo to Shosu Minzoku Mondai)*, Institute of Asian Economics, 1970. pp. 16-17.

27) Imahori, "Yenan Regime", *op. cit.*, pp. 20&30.

28) Stuart Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, Middlesex, 1969. p. 419.

of China". In other words, such a policy was based on consideration that language, culture, kinship, etc. were more important rather than adjacency, and interests of economic life and security. The policy alteration was, we may say, made in the period that the Chinese Communist Party had to make efforts in construction of a new state based on its vision, gaining power in China.<sup>31)</sup>

Then what caused the time lag of policy alteration in the issues of Formosa and the minority groups? Hypothetically, the writer understands that the Chinese Communists decided the policy alteration of the Formosan issue facing the concrete problem (the Cairo Declaration), but they did not realize that it should be followed by an alteration of the minority policy.

Although the Chinese Communists aimed Socialism based on a internationalistic vision, they had to follow the problem within the frame of a state. Therefore, the so-called "Theory of State" must be considered instead of the so-called "Theory of Revolution," or additionally. The Chinese Communist Party made a choice realistically, putting off the theoretical justification.

---

29) Okabe, "China's Image", *op. cit.*, p. 44.

30) *Ibid.*

Chinese accusation on the Soviet Russian theory of "limited sovereignty" in 1968, after the Czechoslovakian Incident, denied Lenin's Thesis of "bourgeois nationalism", saying the sovereignty shall never be limited by any powers. Prof. Imahori's interpretation is not applicable to this accusation. See, Lenin, "Draft of Thesis on the Problems of Nation and Colonies" in *The Collected Works of Lenin*, (Japanese edition) Vol. 31. pp. 139-143.

31) Prof. Okabe argues the Overseas Chinese problem from the same point of view. See, Toshio Kawabe ed., *Overseas Chinese in South East Asia*, Institute of Asian Economics. 1972. Chapter III.

## 「中国共産党の台湾に対する態度」

——「台湾独立」から「台湾解放」へ——

<抄>

森 山 昭 郎

今日、台湾問題は中国にとって原則的重要性を持つ問題だと言われる。たしかに、中国自身、繰り返しそう主張している。このような、中国の強い態度については、後にいくつもの説明が加えられている。それらの主張を要約すれば、「台湾は中国固有の領土であり、まづ日本帝国主義がこれを奪い、次に米帝国主義がこの島を中国から奪ったのであり、『反帝国主義闘争』に専心してきた中国共産党指導者にとって、台湾は『帝国主義侵略』のシンボルとなっている」ということになる。このような主張自身が事実と合致するかどうか議論の対象となりえようが、たとえ事実と合致しているとしても、1940年代前半頃までは「台湾独立」支援の発言を行っていた中共指導者が、それ以後「台湾は中国固有の領土である」と主張するにいたった理由の説明にはならないであろう。

中国共産党の台湾に対する態度は、もっとも早く、台湾共産党との関連において知られる。台湾共産党は日本共産党の支部として、1928年4月に創設されたが、その際日共は指導、援助する余裕を持たず、かわって中共が「直接の指導と援助」を与えたといわれる。中共側が台湾共産党のために起草したとされる文書中に、「台湾民衆独立万才」「台湾共和国の建設」などのスローガンが見られる。当時の中共にとって、「台湾独立」支援は議論の余地ない当然の態度だったように思われる。

毛沢東は後年、台湾がかつては清国の植民地であったとして、将来において独立すべきことを説いている（E・スノー『中国の赤い星』）。台湾が

独立すべき根拠を明確にしたものとしては、この発言がほとんど唯一のものと思われるが、台湾独立支援的態度は1940年代前半まで続き、毛沢東「連合政府論」（1945年4月）において初めて態度変容が明らかにされたのである。

この態度変容と、台湾の中国返還を定めたカイロ宣言との間には重要な関連があろう。また同じく40年代に、中共は将来の中国における国家形成の目標を、「連邦制」というソ連型モデルから、今日われわれが見る中華人民共和国型の「単一国家」モデルへと転じている。少数民族の自決権が否定されることになったわけである。

台湾問題、少数民族問題での中共の態度変容は、自らのヴィジョンに基づく新国家建設を目前の課題と見なすにいたった時期になされたと言えよう。いずれの場合にも、中共指導者は、理論的正当化をしないまま、現実的利益の観点から「革命の論理」よりも「国家の論理」を選ぶにいたったようである。

（1973年2月10日）