

The Struggle of the Muslim People in the Southern Philippines: Independence or Regional Autonomy?

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Since the 1960s, at least three Muslim armed movements have sought to establish an independent state in Mindanao, the traditional homeland of the Muslims in the southern Philippines.¹⁾ In pursuit of this goal, the armed conflict in Mindanao has killed more than a hundred thousand people and displaced millions of families from their homes since 1970. The conflict has gone through cycles of armed struggle, international diplomacy, mediation and peace negotiations but no definitive closure has been reached to date.

In this paper, I will first provide a brief background of the roots of the armed conflict and the persistence of the Muslim separatist project. I will next examine the viability of the program and demands of the three major armed Muslim movements and the responses by the government, taking into account the internationalization of the conflict. I will then conclude by analyzing some policy alternatives for addressing the armed conflict.

The Muslims in the Philippines: the Quest for the *Bangsamoro* Homeland²⁾

The Muslims comprise about five percent of the country's total population and constitute the majority in five out of the twenty three provinces in the southern Philippines (Mindanao) where they are mostly concentrated.³⁾ Islam took root in Mindanao some two centuries before the coming of Christianity with the Spanish colonial conquest in the fifteenth century.⁴⁾ In pre-Hispanic Philippines, Islamic culture and religion radiated from two centers of political power: the Sultanate in Sulu (1450 A.D.) and the Sultanate in Maguindanao, central Mindanao (1511 A.D.). Many of the key coastal trading centers in central and northern Philippines, including Manila, already had Muslim rulers and the Islamization of the country would have proceeded as a matter of course without the Spanish conquest.

Through "divide and rule" tactics pursued through military attacks, cooptation, and devious diplomacy, Spanish and later American colonial rule succeeded in putting an end to the political power of the two Islamic sultanates. Moreover, the Americans introduced a system of electoral democracy which produced a new generation of elected Muslim politicians from elite families. However, in the national scheme of politics the Muslim politicians played subordinate roles reflecting their far smaller political constituencies and bases of power.

A confluence of the following factors provided the conditions for the emergence of the armed separatist movements after the second world war: 1) the loss of traditional Muslim

homelands to waves of local and foreign corporate incursions and government supported Christian internal migrations to Mindanao; 2) economic backwardness of the Muslim dominated provinces in relation to the rest of the country; 3) difficult access of Muslims to government positions especially in the higher bureaucracies and career services; 4) the leadership provided by a new generation of university educated Muslim intellectuals and professionals in organizing the separatist movements; and 5) a vastly expanded network of international linkages that have supported in varying ways the Muslim struggle for autonomy or independence. All of these would revive and strengthen the consciousness of a cultural and religious identity increasingly seen as distinct from the majority Christian population.

The Armed Separatist Movements: New Conditions, New Leaders

The decade of the sixties and seventies saw the emergence of the two major Muslim armed movements, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) founded in 1969 and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1977. These decades marked the resurgence of militant nationalism in the Philippines led by university students and intellectuals, including many of the Muslim leaders who would figure prominently in the founding of both the MNLF and the MILF. Among the Muslim student and youth activists, three events in particular served as the defining moments for the hastening of their radicalization. First there was the “Jabidah Massacre” in 1968 in which 180 persons, mostly Muslims, who were being secretly trained by the Marcos administration to invade and occupy Sabah were all killed when they refused to follow the order to attack.⁵ Second, in response to this massacre of the mostly Muslim trainees, then governor of Cotabato province, Datu Udtog Matalam, founded the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) which sought the creation of an independent state in Mindanao.⁶ The third major event saw the mass killings of many Muslims in central Mindanao between 1970–1971 provoked by escalating economic, political and ethnic tensions between Christian and Muslim communities. Most of these attacks were perpetrated by paramilitary gangs oftentimes organized by Christian local officials with the support of factions of the military and police.

The armed separatist Muslim movements that emerged during the sixties and the seventies showed distinctive features. The leaders were university educated or professional Muslims in contrast with the older generation of Muslim leaders who were usually elected politicians. The two key leaders of this new generation were Nur Misuari and Salamat Hashim. Misuari was educated at the University of the Philippines and served as an instructor of political science in the same university while Hashim studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Both Misuari and Hashim co-founded the MNLF but Hashim would later break away from the MNLF and led the founding of the MILF. As such these new generation of leaders took a different career path from the traditional Muslim politicians but also had the appropriate social connections and skills to cultivate necessary linkages with the older leaders and politicians. For instance, the training of the first generation of MNLF fighters, referred to as the “Top 90” which took place in Pulau Pangkor, Perak, Malaysia was facilitated by the traditional Muslim politicians such as then Congressman Rashid Lucman, ex-senator Salipada Pendatun and then Governor Datu Udtog Matalam.⁷

Secondly, reflecting the internationalization of the armed struggle, these new leaders were able to develop enduring political and organizational bonds with various Muslim leaders and governments in the world. The founding of the MNLF and the MILF coincided with the resurgence of militant Islamic leaders and movements in the Muslim world who were prepared to provide both political and military support to Islamic struggles for independence in various parts of the world. For instance, the MNLF was granted special observer status as the official representative of the Moro people in the Philippines by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the world's largest organization of Muslim states. Among the OIC member states, Libya was a strong supporter of the MNLF and together with Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Pakistan, provided training grounds and weapons.

Salamat Hashim, the founder of the MILF, was able to establish excellent international connections with various radical Muslim leaders while based in Egypt and in the Middle East for several years. Hashim was also based in Pakistan between 1982 and 1987 and was responsible for sending as many as five hundred Muslims for religious and military training to the Afghan-Pakistan border.⁸⁾ Many guerrillas from the MNLF and MILF fought in the Afghanistan war against the Soviet occupation and in the process, forged lifetime solidarity linkages with various Islamic leaders and militants from different parts of the Muslim world.

Further reflecting the internationalization of the Muslim struggle, the third armed Muslim group, the Abu Sayyaf, (Bearer or Father of the Sword in Arabic) was founded in 1991 by Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani. He was a 1989–1990 alumnus of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's Afghan military academy and the name adopted by Janjalani's group was in honor of the Afghan institution's founder.⁹⁾ In one founding document, Janjalani claims that the Abu Sayyaf was established to "serve as a bridge and balance between the MILF and the MNLF" to counter charges that the group was another unwelcome faction in the Muslim struggle.¹⁰⁾ He also asserts that the group's ultimate goal is the "establishment of a purely Islamic government" and that the "... true and real objective of humanity is the establishment of justice and righteousness for all under the law of the noble Qur'an and purified sunnah." However, after the death of Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998, the Abu Sayyaf has become better known for its terrorist activities as it has engaged in a number of spectacular cases of international kidnappings for ransom, ruthless beheading of prisoners, indiscriminate bombings of public places and civilian targets, and operational linkages with Jemaah Islamiyah.

The Political Project of the Armed Groups: Vision and Reality

The difficulty of pursuing the political project of an independent Muslim homeland is dramatized by current demographic and political realities in the southern Philippines today. One hundred years ago, the Muslim population constituted about seventy six percent of Mindanao's total population. Today, it is down to only about twenty percent of the current population as a result of policies of internal Christian migration, corporate expansion, land grabbings and seizures, and family displacements from the armed conflict. Moreover, the Muslims are now in the majority in only five of the twenty three provinces in the southern Philippines (Sulu, 98%; Lanao del Sur, 93%; Tawi-Tawi, 92%; Basilan, 80%; and Maguindanao, 64 %).¹¹⁾ In addition, these Muslim-dominated provinces

do not constitute a single contiguous area and also represent various ethnic-linguistic groupings within the Muslim community with their own histories of differences and rivalries. For instance, part of the differences between the MNLF under Misuari and the Hashim-led MILF has to do with the different ethno-linguistic political bases of each movement. Thus, the Misuari-MNLF forces are strongest among the Tausug-Sama communities of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi while the MILF draws its support mainly from the Maguindanaons and Maranaos.

A potent basis for the region’s long history of resistance and resentment against the central government has been the economic marginalization of the Muslim-dominated provinces. As a region, the ARMM is the poorest in the country and its five constituent provinces are also the poorest both in Mindanao and in the whole country. In 2000, the incidence of poverty in ARMM was almost twice that for the country as a whole, with about sixty three percent of the population in the region considered to be poor compared with thirty four percent for the country as a whole.¹²⁾ In terms of human development indicators which combine measures for income, health and education, the ARMM provinces also have the lowest rankings among all provinces in the country (see Table 1).

Table 1: Poverty Incidence and Human Development Rankings

	Poverty Incidence % Year 2000	Human Development Index (HDI) Provincial Rank*
Philippines	27.5	
Metro Manila	5.6	
Sulu	92.0	77
Tawi-Tawi	75.3	76
Basilan	63.0	75
Lanao del Sur	48.1	74
Maguindanao	36.2	73

*HDI Rankings for the country’s total of 77 provinces with a rank of 1 showing the most desirable outcome. Source: *Philippine Human Development Report 2002*.

In pursuing its project of an independent *Bangsamoro*, the MNLF under Misuari stressed the geographic boundaries of the pre-colonial, traditional Moro homelands as the territorial base of this proposed entity which, however, now comprises mostly Christian dominated provinces. In recognition of this reality, Misuari therefore uses the concept of *Bangsamoro* to include the Muslims, Christians, and the indigenous highlanders in this area. To show that this political project is not only for Muslims, the MNLF has also sought the support of non-Muslim personalities and groups, particularly those who resent the political and economic marginalization of Mindanao by the Manila-based central government. In contrast, the MILF has officially sought a more Islamic identity for its movement with Islam as its official ideology. Thus, one of the main charges of Hashim against Misuari when he led his supporters to break away from the MNLF was that the leadership was being “manipulated away [by Misuari]

from Islamic bases, methodologies and objectives, and was fast evolving towards a Marxist-Maoist orientation.”¹³⁾

It is true that Misuari comes from a more secular educational background with his studies at the country’s premier state university and his active involvement in Marxist-oriented nationalist groups in the 1960s. However, it appears that the problems that eventually led to the breakaway of Hashim’s group had more to do with charges about Misuari’s personalistic and authoritarian style of leadership. It is also true that the MILF under Hashim is more self-consciously Islamic in its orientation but in practice it has also proven to be pragmatic in its politics. For instance, there are reports that the MILF has tactical working arrangements with the communist guerrillas in some Mindanao battle fronts. At the same time, the MILF, or at least some of its local commands, and the Abu Sayyaf have also linked up with various fighters of the Jemaah Islamiyah, the regional network of militant Muslim activists associated with Al-Qaeda.¹⁴⁾

Political Negotiations between the Government and the Muslim Movements

The original negotiating document for the peace process in the Southern Philippines goes back to the Tripoli agreement signed on December 23, 1976, between the government and the MNLF with the participation of the OIC and with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi playing the critical role. The most significant provision of the agreement sought the establishment of autonomy in the Southern Philippines comprising thirteen provinces. This agreement represented a major departure from the MNLF’s original goal of an independent Bangsamoro to one of autonomy within Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Marcos unilaterally implemented the agreement by creating two regional autonomous provinces comprising only three provinces out of the originally mandated thirteen provinces. Both the MNLF and the OIC strongly protested this move and in fact resulted in the OIC’s recognition of the MNLF as the “legitimate representative of the Muslim movement” in Southern Philippines and also granted it observer status. No further formal negotiations between the government and the MNLF took place till the ouster of Marcos in 1986 by a military mutiny and civilian uprising.

The Aquino administration that assumed power after the ouster of Marcos sought to address the Muslim struggle in Mindanao by creating an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) through an organic act passed by Congress. In August 1989, the Organic Act for the ARMM, Republic Act 6734, was passed but in the plebiscite that followed only four (Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao) out of the thirteen provinces voted to join the ARMM. In a later plebiscite in 2001, under the amended Organic Act one other province (Basilan) and one city (Marawi City) joined the ARMM. The MNLF boycotted all electoral exercises associated with the ARMM until 1996, arguing that the Tripoli Agreement mandating the creation of an autonomous region with 13 provinces be implemented.

Twenty years after the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, the government and the MNLF finally succeeded in negotiating a peace accord in 1996 through the mediation of the OIC with Libya and Indonesia playing the major roles. Under strong pressure from the OIC and Indonesia, Misuari and the MNLF agreed to accept the autonomy framework under the ARMM. Supported by the Ramos administration, Misuari subsequently was elected

as ARMM governor in 1996. However, Misuari's record as ARMM governor proved to be unimpressive. Facing severe budgetary constraints, lack of management skills, and corruption, Misuari failed to provide a credible leadership. He is now under detention in Manila facing charges of treason and rebellion when he led an abortive uprising against the government in 2001. Since 2001, the MNLF has also broken up into at least two factions: a pro-government group led by the so-called Council of 15 that took power in the ARMM in the elections after the abortive uprising by Misuari, and the loyalists of Misuari rooted mainly in the island provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. The Misuari loyalists figured in fierce armed clashes with government forces in the Sulu islands in February 2005, provoked by the killing of an unarmed Muslim family by government military units operating against the Abu Sayyaf in the same area.

Meanwhile, the MILF refused to recognize the ARMM and participate in its electoral exercises, focusing instead on building up its political and military strength. As claimed by one leading MILF cadre, the ARMM is a "total failure because it does not provide genuine autonomy and led to the disintegration of the MNLF."¹⁵ Not as beholden to the OIC as the MNLF, the MILF has been able to exercise a greater degree of independence and flexibility from this body while welcoming the OIC's concern with the situation in Mindanao. In 2000, the Estrada administration ordered an all-out war against the various military camps of the MILF, displacing in the process close to a million people. The new administration of Pres. Arroyo succeeded in restarting negotiations with the MILF with the signing of an agreement on March 24, 2001, to resume peace talks. After a ceasefire was agreed upon, Libya and later Malaysia facilitated a new round of peace talks between the government and the MILF. A monitoring force composed of personnel from Malaysia, Brunei and Libya was sent to the Philippines to oversee the ceasefire and formal peace talks hosted by Malaysia resumed in April 2005. The talks focus on three main substantive agenda: 1) security aspects relating to the cessation of hostilities and its implementing guidelines; 2) relief and rehabilitation of the conflict areas by accessing both local and international resources; and 3) ancestral domain claims. The ancestral domain claims is an extremely contentious issue since it would require reconciling conflicting traditions and practices on land ownership among Muslims, Christians, and the *lumads* (indigenous tribes living in various Mindanao provinces) and the historic claims to the Bangsamoro homeland.

The participation of Malaysia in a facilitator-mediator role is a major political opportunity in the negotiations because like the OIC in the GRP-MNLF talks, Malaysia has also strongly counseled the MILF to drop its secessionist project and work within the purview of Philippine law and government.¹⁶ Malaysia has material and political resources to influence the outcome of the talks. However, the MILF is also wary about too much reliance on OIC mediation in light of what it considers to be the failed outcome of the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement in 1996. In the process of preparing for the substantive peace negotiations in Malaysia, the MILF convened a three-day consultation assembly in June 2005 with tens of thousands of its mass supporters from all over Mindanao, an extraordinary event participated in by diplomats from the OIC, World Bank officials, and Philippine government representatives. This was an astute political move by the MILF to legitimize openly before its mass supporters its agenda of negotiations with the government as well as signal its readiness to activate international

support from both Islamic and non-Islamic sources.

American Intervention

In the aftermath of 9/11, American intervention in the heartland of Muslim Mindanao has introduced a new dimension to the armed conflict and peace process. The MILF and the Abu Sayyaf have been charged of coddling Islamic terrorists supposedly linked to Osama bin Laden's *Al Qaida* network through the *Jemaah Islamiyah*. While admitting that all kinds of Islamic visitors had access to its various camps in the past, the MILF denies any formal operational linkages with terrorists. In pursuit of its campaign against Islamic radical groups, the U.S. has provided counter-terrorist training and intelligence and increased substantially its military financial assistance to the Philippine military. In 2005, US foreign military financing for the Philippines almost doubled from US \$30 million to US \$55 million. The U.S. has also provided official development assistance to Mindanao and specifically allocated US \$30 million to the MILF conflict-ridden areas. However, the United States reallocated this development fund in mid-year 2004 to other areas, charging the government and the MILF of not making enough progress in their peace negotiations.¹⁷⁾

While increased American financial military assistance and training can help upgrade the Philippine military's poor resources and capabilities, this also risks undermining and derailing the country's protracted search for a political solution to the armed conflict with both the Muslim movements and the Communist guerrillas.¹⁸⁾ There are at least three pitfalls to American intervention in the internal armed conflict. First, it inflates the Philippine military's sense of power and confidence that the armed conflict could be defeated mainly by military means. Secondly, it polarizes public responses since American intervention has always served as a flashpoint for militant nationalist mobilizations. And finally, American intervention subsumes the local armed conflicts to the greater strategic interests of current U.S. policy in its war against terrorism, glossing over in the process the nuances and particularities of local movements long rooted in legitimate grievances. In the ongoing peace talks between the government and the MILF as facilitated by Malaysia, all the parties have so far avoided any direct participation by the United States even while the MILF has welcomed development assistance for the conflict-ridden areas from all quarters.

Conclusion

The Muslim struggle in the country has reached a critical stage where a viable and acceptable alternative to outright independence and separatism will have to be decisively fleshed out. Given the unsatisfactory outcome of negotiations between the government and the MNLF and the many limitations of the current ARMM framework, what is the alternative? The way out is not to abandon the concept and practice of regional autonomy but to expand and deepen it whether in the framework of a shift to a formal federal system or a radical amendment of the existing organic act that created the ARMM.

A new concept and substantial practice of regional autonomy for the ARMM will have to address two key concerns: First, an innovative political leadership that is able to bridge and transcend the competing legitimacy claims of traditional Islamic leaders,

revolutionary leaders nurtured by the armed struggle, and politicians with electoral mandates. Secondly, the regional government must have full financial and budgetary autonomy.

The elected leadership of the ARMM government continues to face enormous political and financial constraints. As shown by the experience of past elected ARMM officials including that of Misuari, the regional government continues to be hobbled by limited budgetary allocations and the lack of support by the armed movements and their followers as well as elected local government officials who have their own independent bases of political and economic power. For instance, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides local government units with significantly increased shares of the national internal revenue allocations and enhanced taxation powers vesting them with greater financial autonomy compared with the ARMM government whose finances are largely controlled by the national government.

A World Bank-funded assessment of governance problems in the ARMM stresses this lack of financial autonomy thus:

“... although autonomous in name and in legal status, the ARMM regional government has almost no independent source of income and has little flexibility in budget management. It depends hugely on the National Government for financing of significant devolved responsibilities, including human development. In contrast, LGUs (local government units) in the region enjoy fiscal autonomy in management of their IRAs (Internal Revenue Allocations) ..., but have few mandated responsibilities for the human development sectors.”¹⁹⁾

In turn, the ARMM's dearth of financial and human resources has also severely deterred its ability to realize the mandates provided by the current organic act for the significant practice of Islamic laws and values as shown in the creation of Islamic (*shari'a*) courts at different levels and the full recognition and creation of *madaris* (Islamic religious schools). Many of the shari'a courts as mandated by law cannot be established and those actually existing courts lack judges.²⁰⁾ On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the traditional Islamic religious schools (*madaris*) remain as poor institutions with little resources and competence for combining the teaching of Islamic religious values and the secular subjects and skills required to succeed in the broader society.

Current proposals for a shift to a federal system will therefore have to contend with the need for special arrangements such as an asymmetric federalism for regions like that of Muslim Mindanao.²¹⁾

Notes:

- 1) The roots of the Muslim armed struggle to protect their original homelands date back to the anti-colonial resistance against Spanish and American colonial rule. This paper focuses on the developments since the 1960s.
- 2) The concept and vision of a *Bangsamoro* was popularized by Nur Misuari, the founding chair of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The term “Moro” was originally used by the Spaniards to refer to the local Muslim population in the Philippines. In its colonial and post-colonial usage, it was a term of derision but the MNLF appropriated and elevated it as a badge of honor and identity marker for the local

- Muslims. The MNLF refers to the Bangsamoro people as comprising the Muslims, the Christians and the Highlanders living in Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan.
- 3) *Philippine Yearbook 2002* (Manila: National Statistics Office), 243.
 - 4) In this paper, Mindanao and southern Philippines are used interchangeably. Both refer to Mindanao island proper, together with the smaller island provinces of Palawan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Basilan.
 - 5) Only one of the trainees, Jibin Arola, a Muslim, survived the mass killing on Corregidor Island, the secret training ground of the abortive operation.
 - 6) The MIM did not last long as an organization since Marcos was able to pacify and co-opt Matalam in 1971.
 - 7) Salah Jubair, *Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny*, third edition (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IQ Marin SDN BHD), 151.
 - 8) International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 80, "Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process," (Singapore/Brussels, 13 July 2004), 4. See also Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 89–119.
 - 9) International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 80 "Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process," 22.
 - 10) Samuel K. Tan, *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle*, revised edition (Diliman, Quezon City: Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, 2003), 96.
 - 11) 1990 Census of Population and Housing as reproduced in Miriam Coronel Ferrer, ed., *Peace Matters: A Philippine Peace Compendium* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1997).
 - 12) "Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," The World Bank (November 2003), 17.
 - 13) Salah Jubair, *Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny*, third edition, 155.
 - 14) For an analysis of these linkages, see International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 80 "Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process"; and Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, (2003).
 - 15) Interview with Mr. Mohagher Iqbal, chair of the MILF peace panel, Cotabato City, Maguindanao, 18 July 2004.
 - 16) For an analysis of Malaysia's role in the GRP-MILF peace talks, see Soliman M. Santos, Jr., "Malaysia's Role in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front," (Penang, Malaysia: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network, Peace and Conflict Research Report, No. 2, 2003).
 - 17) "US getting impatient over slow peace process," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 7 July 2004, A2.
 - 18) For an analysis of the peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the communist movement, see Temario C. Rivera, "In Search of Peace: Political Negotiations between the Government and Armed Movements in the Philippines," in *Evolving Concepts of Peace-Building: From Asian Experiences*, edited by Kazuo Takahashi (Tokyo: International Christian University, 2005), 83–108.
 - 19) "Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." The World Bank (November 2003), 36.
 - 20) For an assessment of the problems of the *shari'a* courts in the Philippines, see Isabelita Solamo-Antonio, *The Shari'a Courts in the Philippines: Women, Men and Muslim Personal Laws* (Davao City: Pilipina Legal Resources Center, Inc., 2003).
 - 21) The most systematic work on constitutional rethinking and innovation to accommodate an Islamic system in the Philippines is provided by Soliman M. Santos, Jr., *The Moro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001). For a draft proposal including a constitution of a federal republic of the Philippines, see Jose Veloso Abueva, "Charter Change for Good Governance: Towards a Federal Republic of the Philippines with a Parliamentary Government," (Marikina City, Philippines: Citizens' Movement for a Federal Philippines and KC Institute of Federal-Parliamentary Democracy, 2005).