

Political Islam, “Islamic Militancy” and the Gender Question

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“Militant Islam derives from Islam but it is a misanthropic, misogynist, triumphalist, millenarian, anti-modern, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, terroristic, jihadist, and suicidal version of it. Fortunately, it appeals to only about 10 percent to 15 percent of Muslims, meaning that a substantial majority would prefer a more moderate version. Nevertheless, this “totalitarian ideology” even with “only” 10 to 15 percent (roughly 100 to 150 million persons world wide) “regards itself as the only rival, and the inevitable successor, to Western civilization”. ...It’s a mistake to blame Islam, a religion 14 centuries old, for the evil that should be ascribed to *militant Islam*—a totalitarian ideology less than a century old. Militant Islam is the problem, but moderate Islam is the solution.”

—Daniel Pipes, interview with Janet Tassel, “Militant about ‘Islamism’: Daniel Pipes Wages ‘Hand-to-hand Combat’ with a ‘Totalitarian Ideology,’”

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Introduction

In this age of religious resurgence and fundamentalism of many types, it is important to be clear about the “adjective” that is often used to label a religious movement. In the case of Islam, one often hears terms or labels such as “Militant Islam,” “Islamic Fundamentalism” or “Fundamentalist Islam,” “Political Islam,” “Moderate Islam,” “Islam Hadhari” etc. Therefore let me begin with clarifying the usage of the two terms that are employed in this essay.

“Political Islam” here refers to the doctrine or movement which contends that Islam possesses a theory of politics and the state: a theory that, forever valid, gives rise to an obligatory model that remains ever ready for direct, literal implementation. Political Islam is a modern phenomenon consisting of a variety of Islamist movements whose main objective is to mobilize Muslims for the purpose of attaining or retaining political power. They started to emerge after First World War. Political Islam represents only one of several intellectual and political manifestations of the interplay between religion and politics in the Muslim world.¹⁾ Most of these groups or movements championing “political Islam” are driven by the imperative of reviving the public role and political status of Islam. “Political Islam” is a multi-faceted phenomenon and its institutional and public

expression spans an array of movements—from those that engage in political violence to those with politicized *dakwah* (missionary) and social reform agendas. Some of the proponents of political Islam have been referred to in various academic discussions and the relevant literature as “political Islamists” or just “Islamists,” and “neo-fundamentalists.” “Fundamentalism” and “fundamentalist” are also labels which have gained currency in the recent academic literature that examines the deep nexus and, expressing it, the various ensuing localized, on-the-ground relationships between certain Islamist or Islamic revivalist movements and challenges of modernity.

The term fundamentalism came into common usage in the second decade of the twentieth Century, with the publication of a series of pamphlets called “The Fundamentals” which appeared between 1910–1915 in the USA and through a series of subsequent conferences of the World’s Christian Fundamentals Association of 1919. These fundamentalist doctrines were put forward by hard-line Protestant theologians in America who were determined to halt what they regarded as the drift towards liberalism in religious belief in their society. Fundamentalist attitudes can be found throughout human history, but especially in the modern period, with most religions exhibiting them at some point or other in their development, and increasingly so as they gain power.²⁾ George Marsden defined fundamentalism in its heyday as “militantly anti-modernist Protestant evangelicalism.”³⁾ There are also parallels in all religious traditions, from local reformers whose influences are limited, to those who gave rise to new religious institutions and traditions.

Political Islam, ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ and Muslim Fundamentalists

Fundamentalists are not necessarily in opposition to modernism as a whole, especially its technical and pragmatic aspects, although in different ways most of them resist change or what we might call modernity. Indeed, Muslim fundamentalists, for example, have proved themselves masters of some of the technology and the organizational sophistication that we often identify with modernity. They have also shown great interest in science and its relations to religion that often exceeds that of religious liberals.

Muslim fundamentalists do not reject the technological trappings of modern life—indeed sometimes they eagerly embrace it—but they do define themselves in opposition to certain aspects of modern culture, especially scientific naturalism, modern and critical interpretations of the sacred or religious texts, and perceived changes in moral values. In their oppositional posture Muslim fundamentalists detach themselves from certain trends in modern culture, and they also commit themselves to battle against those trends. They also make claims to carry on a “traditional and/or authentic” life of piety as, putatively, it was lived in the formative age of Islam, and they accordingly understand themselves to be going back to the fundamental teachings of formative Islam. Islamic fundamentalism is a creature of modernity as well as a reaction to it. Most Islamic fundamentalist movements seek to revive or establish “true” Islam in society through some kind of political means. This is often expressed in claims of the “obligatoriness” of establishing what its ideological advocates understand as an “Islamic state.”

In this context, Ayubi argues that political Islam is a new invention, one that:

does not represent a “going back” to any situation that existed in the past or to any

theory that was formulated in the past. What it keeps from the past is the juridic tradition of linking politics and religion. But even then, it seeks to transform the formalistic and symbolic link that the jurists had forged between politics and religion into a *real* bond. Furthermore, political Islamists want to reverse the traditional relationship between the two spheres so that politics becomes subservient to religion, and not the other way round, as was the case historically.⁴⁾

Militant Islamism is just one form of political Islam, one that adopts violent methods to achieve its political objectives. Most examples of this tendency are provided by smaller organizations, sometimes splinter groups from a larger Islamic fundamentalist movement. One example is the *Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra* a militant Islamist organization involved in the killing of the Egyptian Minister for Religious Affairs in 1977 and later also of President Anwar Sadat (and which, in time, would count among its offspring, through Osama bin Laden's close associate Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the universally feared al-Qaeda faction or movement). The *Front Pembela Islam* group that was involved in attacking some churches and setting fire to night-clubs in Indonesia is another. Other examples of radical Islamist militant groups are the *Hizbollah* and *Hamas* in Lebanon, *Hamas* and *Islamic Jihad* in Palestine, the *Jemaah Islamiyah* in Indonesia, and the *Kumpulan Militan Malaysia* (KMM) in Malaysia.

The focus in this essay will be upon only those political and fundamentalist Islamist movements that do not have recourse primarily to violent means to promote their version of Islam or to install their model of an "Islamic state" or Islamic government. Political Islamist groups or movements such as the *Muslim Brotherhood* (*Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) in Egypt and the Islamist political party PAS (*Parti Islam Se Malaysia*) in Malaysia are two examples of such political Islamist movements. They subscribe to what may be termed "core" or "generic" fundamentalist doctrines of the kind outlined above, yet they participate in the democratic political processes such as nominating candidates to contest periodic general elections, whether they be of a substantive or merely a "window-dressing" character, to elect parliamentary governments. This present discussion focuses on the variety, and strategic form, of political Islam in Malaysia where the fusion of secular and Muslim politics has become a prominent feature of national political life since the early 1980s.

Political Islam in Malaysia

Over the past three decades Islam has emerged as a potent political force in many Muslim societies, one offering an avenue for protest politics and an alternative to the secular political orders that often were heritage of the postcolonial state's formative colonial past. Malaysia's political Islamist movements are no exception, differing little in their ideological constructs and their social and political aspirations from most other such Islamic movements throughout the Arab and Middle-Eastern region. In Malaysia Islam occupies a special position, politically and constitutionally, despite the fact that it is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country. The Malaysian Federal Constitution enshrines Islam as a central feature of Malay identity; this key feature of Malaysian life emerged as a result of negotiation, at times even contestation, from the indigenous Malay community and its political leaders in the years immediately preceding the achievement of political

independence (*merdeka*) from British colonial rule.

The rise of political Islam in the Muslim world has certain and specific consequences for Muslim female members of those societies. Over the past two decades the experience of Muslim women has shown that all forms of political Islam seek to organize the practices of all aspects of social life. They often pay overwhelming attention to the family as a social unit, and to issues such as veiling, segregation of the sexes, and the imposition of extreme penalties for moral crimes such as adultery and drunkenness. Muslim fundamentalist movements often insist that many social and political changes must be made so that a “true” or “pristine” Islam can be restored. Where the assertion of male Muslim ascendancy and autonomy in other directions—in the public life of the state, and internationally beyond its borders—is often limited, even thwarted, large numbers of excluded and marginalized Muslim men turn instead to the assertion of their leadership within personal relations in the domestic or family realm; and to the affirmation of what they understand as proper Islamic moral values by the forceful imposition, in Islam’s name, of what they see as still valid but long scorned moral truths upon the bodies, minds and lives of their dependent womenfolk.

In the case of Malaysia, the politicization of Islam was a consequence of the spread of fundamentalist Islamic movements within the Islamic opposition party, among students and in the activities of social movements for Islamic religious intensification and renewed orthodoxy (*dakwah*). It was also a product of the “Islamization policies” implemented by the UMNO-led Malaysian federal government led by the UMNO party, in large measure driven by the UMNO’s ever escalating competition against the Islamist party PAS for support and votes from within the nation’s majority Malay community. This “Islamization agenda” was implemented along with an array of economic development policies under the administration of Dr. Mahathir Mohammad during the slightly more than two decades of his premiership (1981–2003). The Barisan Nasional government’s (or specifically its dominant component, the UMNO’s) need to legitimize itself among the nation’s majority Muslim constituents against the Islamist challenge mounted by the main opposition political party, PAS, shaped the formulation and drove the implementation of the federal government’s multi-pronged “Islamization” policies. As noted below, a number of these policies and many of these newly-created “Islamic laws” resulted in a notable curtailing of the human and citizenship rights of many Malaysians, but especially of contemporary Muslim women.

As the contestation for power between UMNO and PAS escalates, issues such as the Islamic state, the enforcement of the punitive *hudud* law punishments, discrimination against women, and growing constraints upon freedom of expression and freedom of religion (including freedom within religion and freedom from religion and the arbitrary assertion of religious authority) began to enter the public sphere and into the consciousness of many Malaysian “civil society organizations.” This engagement with the new assertiveness, especially in the legislative and juridical areas, of “political Islam” became more pronounced and urgent as they grappled, often while many in the UMNO remained nonplussed and politically paralysed, with impact of the radical and far-reaching Islamization initiatives of the Islamist PAS governments in the two economically underdeveloped and culturally very conservative Malay-majority east coast states of Kelantan and Trengganu. [PAS exercised executive power, based on predominance in

the local legislature, in Kelantan from 1959 until 1978 and again from 1990 until the present, and in Terengganu from 1959 to 1961 and again from 1999 to 2004; the impact of this PAS challenge was felt not only in those two keenly contested states but throughout the rest of peninsular Malaysia including the states under the BN governments.]

Since the 1980s, the continuing demand for an Islamic social order—vaguely upheld as the “solution to all our problems” by many who felt excluded from the benefits of Malaysia’s rapid economic development, or sidelined by the unevenness and perceived inequity of the spread of its opportunities—has led to intensifying conflict at a number of levels: at the political and social levels, between various segments of the religious authorities, and between conservative and progressive women’s groups. The rivalry for “Islamic legitimacy” between UMNO and PAS, with their competing agendas for Islamic intensification and institutional elaboration, produced an “Islamization race” that resulted in an acceleration of the process of the politicization of Malaysian Islam rather than any raising or refinement of the quality of the fruits of this runaway Islamization. The efforts of the two parties to “outdo one another as Muslims to do good” produced, not as the Qur’an envisages, any improvement in the quality of outcomes but only a heightening of the speed, and at times even recklessness, of mindless (or insufficiently mindful) intensification and politicization of the religion’s most regressive features. Its bid under the leadership of Dr. Mahathir Mohammad to “out-do” PAS served only to compromise the secular and pluralistic foundations of the 1957 Federal Constitution.

On gender relations and women’s rights both PAS and UMNO have adopted the narrow perspectives of global Muslim fundamentalist movements. UMNO-led government in all but two states of the Federation in peninsular Malaysia have gradually initiated changes and amendments in the Muslim Family Laws and in the *Syariah Criminal Offences Acts* or comparable legislation. Undertaken since 1984, these amendments have often been consistent with the neo-traditionalist views held by the Islamist ideologues of the rights and duties of Muslim women in matters of marriage and divorce. While UMNO contends that PAS is committed to establishing an Islamic state in Malaysia based on the thinking of proponents of a “conservative and extremist” Islam, the policies and actual initiatives of the UMNO itself have not differed greatly from those favoured and advanced by PAS in these same areas. In various state jurisdictions the UMNO has promoted “Islamization” policies which have had the net effect of curtailing human and citizenship rights of many contemporary Muslims, especially women. In its enthusiasm to uphold Islam, or to prevent PAS from presenting itself as the sole party keen to do so, the UMNO and UMNO-led state governments have pioneered the drafting and enforcement “Islamic laws” which have undermined gender equality among Malaysian Muslims.

The Islamization policies promoted by UMNO have not produced an enlightened or progressive Islam, mainly because the personnel appointed by the UMNO to staff the expanding Islamic affairs and religious administration departments and research institutions have not differed, in their basic outlook and “mindset,” from the PAS *ulama* (religious leaders and experts) whom they were supposed intellectually to counter and corner, embarrass and expose. The UMNO appointees to these new offices simply could not do the job asked of them, nor was it ever likely that they might: because they did not differ in their basic approach from that of the Islamists, but remained intellectually fearful of and subservient to them; and because they never began to understand what it

was they needed to know, and have command of, as Muslims in order to provide any plausible, effective alternative to the ideological hegemony of the entrenched conservative and neo-traditional Islamist scholars. Products of a similar, often even identical, training and education, *ulama* from opposite sides of the party-political divide are very similar in attitude, worldview, and their approach to a wide range of contemporary social issues and political questions. They differ little in their social formation, religious socialization, and Islamic sensibilities, and they draw upon the same sources of neo-traditionalist Islamic thinking.

In the context of law-making, *ulama* of both stripes draw upon, and wish now unmodified to apply to current social realities, the same historical *fiqh* [law and jurisprudential reasoning] as did their scholastic predecessors of centuries ago, without recognizing the need to engage critically with the implications of the very different historical and cultural context from which the classical *fiqh* emerged, in which it took shape, and which it reflects and ultimately ossifies. It is this version of Islam, that of the technical practitioners of and archaizing legalistic establishment, that continues to be hold political sway today, over the Muslim populace generally and, especially, over the minds and imagination of fearful, conventionally-minded politicians. Under their narrowing and inhibiting influence, the critical role of modern interpretation consistent with the vast changes within of Muslim society over the last century and more has been overlooked.

In the area of the derivatively British “common law” jurisdiction, Malaysian politicians have never dared to create a forward-looking Law Reform Commission of the kind that is, and has long been, commonplace in most modern nations living under legal systems of the same historical origins. In exactly the same way, the cause of Islam, and the creation of forms of modernity grounded in the Islamic civilizational tradition, have been blighted and arrested by the failure of Malaysia’s national political leadership within the UMNO to create—with a far-reaching scholarly mandate, and substantial institutional and social autonomy—and thereafter support a Sharia’h Law Reform Commission. Without such a Commission, there is no prospect that the direction of Malaysia’s ever intensifying Islamization initiatives will, especially in the legal area, display anything other than an ever more regressive character, and become ever more restrictive in their effects.

Meanwhile, in the absence of any such Islamic Law Reform Commission and any high-level official commitment to its purposes and project, Malaysian government initiatives will continue to be fertile in producing contradictions and inconsistencies between the claims of the governing party to create a modern, benign and moderate Islam and its actual practice. There is a need for Malaysian Muslims, from the central councils of government and the UMNO party downwards and outwards, to consolidate a conception of Islam that is compatible with modernity and encourages pluralism and democracy.

The implication here is clear: the nation’s Malay Muslim leaders within the UMNO must be open to, and must embrace with commitment, those contemporary interpretations and understandings of the teachings of Islam that allow for change in the face of evolving time, the contraction of space, and the widening reach of human experience, or, in short, the Muslim experience of globalization. The old Muslim aspiration to moral universalism and historical inclusiveness must be enlarged and

urgently updated, commensurate with the broad impact upon the worldwide *ummah* (community of Muslims) of globalizing processes. Recognition of, and a readiness to have intelligent recourse to, the historicity of texts and doctrines are crucial for the success among Malaysian Muslims of this project.

Political Islam and Gender Rights: Problems and Challenges

A concrete example of these dilemmas is to be found in the area of gender relations and their regulation. The derogation of Muslim women's rights in contemporary societies is, in significant part, a consequence of implementing neo-traditionalist readings of the classical *fiqh* (Islamic legal scholarship and juristic thought). Grounded in the patriarchal ideology of pre-Islamic Arabia, the *fiqh* model of gender relations was carried forward, if in a modified form, into the Islamic era and thereafter, within legalistic scholarship and its increasingly frozen or ossified forms, into the modern and contemporary eras. There is extensive debate on this question of the pre-Islamic origins of these deep templates of gender relations in the literature.⁵⁾ Suffice to say here that neo-traditionalist and fundamentalist Muslims interpretations reject gender equality and instead put forward the complementarity of gender rights and duties. Hence, they hold the view that women as wives must seek permission from their husbands if they want to leave the home for any purpose, and especially if they intend to seek work or employment outside the home. Because men are entrusted with major responsibilities as heads of household and breadwinners, they are regarded as superior in degree to women, whose central duty is to be obedient and pious wives. Muslim women must also accept that it is the right of Muslim males to enter into polygynous marriages (regardless of the first wife's feelings and in defiance of her preferences, without her consent); and, in consequence under this same dispensation, husbands are allowed to beat their recalcitrant or "disobedient" wives so long as such treatment does not incur any physical injury. [The questions of how this threshold is to be located and measured, what is to be done to prevent its transgression, and the question of emotional as distinct from physical injury and abuse are left largely unaddressed in the relevant sources and ensuing discussions.]

In fact in Islamic culture, family life seems to be viewed very much from a strictly patriarchal point of view—family life is sacrosanct and raised above everything else. The origins of much to do with sex, women and the family in the Islamic culture will probably have to be traced back to the nomadic realities of Arabia before and around the time of the emergence of Islam. It must also be noted that, unlike some other cultures, the Arab-Islamic culture regards sex as one of the desirable and legitimate pleasures of life (and even of the afterlife as well); but it emplaces such activities and pleasures in a markedly patriarchal rather than an egalitarian social and moral context.

There is no sense of guilt surrounding sex in Islam, nor a call to torture the body or to scorn or suppress its desires (as in say Christianity)—only a need to ensure its "hygiene" (hence the elaborate rituals for washing and cleanliness) and to regulate its requirements into certain standards that may integrate it wholesomely into the community. In Islamic culture too women are believed to be sexually active, even aggressive—so giving rise to the Islamic concept or version of the *femme fatale*, whose evident sexuality provokes men, makes them lose their self-control, and so succumb to temptation and ever-ramifying disorder (*fitna*).⁶⁾

Sex, evidently, is considered so powerful an urge for both men and women that, when alone together, a man cannot and a woman will not resist the temptation of *shaitan* (the “devil”), who will always be the third party present at such moments of ostensibly dyadic isolation. Furthermore, in this derivatively Arab-Islamic culture, these temptations and the promptings upon them of the *shaitan* being so strong, internal moral restraints and controls must be weak and incapable of being trusted. So emphasis and reliance are placed on “external” rather than on “internal” moral constraints and enforcement—on imposed precautionary safeguards, rather than on autonomous “internal prohibitions” or moral scruples that the conscientious individual may feel and be relied upon to heed. Hence the ensuing result: rather than expecting the man to be socialized into and trained in self-control, the preferred solution is instead to hide the woman’s body as a source of physicality and temptation, and to seclude her as much as possible from men, except within the marriage relationship.

Possessed by, often perhaps even obsessed with, this underlying view, contemporary Muslim fundamentalist, neo-traditionalist, and political Islamists make further claims for the control and regulation of women, women’s bodies and their presence in public space. For them, the veiling of women and strict gender segregation are mandatory rulings. Under the administration of the PAS party government in Kelantan, for example, men and women have been required under legislation introduced incrementally during the 1990s to use separate check-out lines at supermarkets and to occupy different segregated areas in public spaces such as meeting halls, cinemas and sports stadiums, while all women in public places such as markets must cover their hair and faces suitably. These rulings and other differences in rights and duties between men and women do not, these ideologues assert, mean inequality or injustice. In fact, the Islamists argue, if correctly understood, these differences are the very essence of justice—their idea of justice, which they claim is also that of Allah and Islam. This is so because *shari’ah* rulings reflect and are congruent with the Divine blueprint for society, and hence are also in line with human nature—weak, incapable of self-control, susceptible to temptation in the case of men, and a potent, irresistible source of temptation in that of women.

Conclusion

In a rapidly modernizing and changing Muslim country such as Malaysia, the question of gender, religion and society is a complex and multi-layered phenomenon. Under these conditions, gender discrimination arises from an ahistorical reading or interpretation of religious texts subscribed by political and fundamentalist Islamic movements. In the political arena, competing parties seeking to legitimize themselves often lay claim to an “authentic” Islamic identity by promoting, according to their own chosen views and preconceptions, an agenda for the “Islamization of state and society.” Unfortunately, the dominant intellectual and interpretive resources that they draw upon in these endeavours are those of a decidedly neo-traditionalist variety. Political elites within what was originally a “secular,” or at least a not an avowedly Islamist, party felt the need to prove their village level Islamic credibility and hence the strength of their “Islamic identity” as they were compelled to respond to the domestic resurgence of political Islam embodied in the challenge of the Islamist party PAS. Their response to PAS and its agenda of thoroughgoing neo-traditionalist Islamization was to implement a counter-Islamization

agenda of their own: an ensemble of Islamization policies—originally intended to be markedly different from those of PAS but which in time came to constitute just a pale imitation of the same regressive blueprint and recipe. Intellectually outgunned and confused, the UMNO's *ulama* offered compromises and half-measures that were deemed appropriate and unproblematic but which in essence only echoed and capitulated to the presuppositions of PAS's more rigorous agenda of neo-traditional institutionalization.

The struggle for Muslim women's rights, equal treatment and the eradication of discrimination against women (particularly under Muslim family law) has to be fought on two main broad fronts: (i) a struggle against the biases or discrimination emanating from a "universal" legacy of patriarchy entrenched in society generally, and (ii) challenging forms of discrimination that have emerged from recent adoption of or amendments to certain Islamic rulings and laws which are often discriminatory, even misogynist, in nature.

While academics debate issues of analytical precision in using the term "fundamentalism," women's groups and movements in many countries (both in the West and East) need and have already begun to address substantive issues related to the rise of contemporary religious fundamentalism and the problems and threats thereby posed to women. Prominent among these issues are the question of women's human and citizenship rights and an analysis of why, in its various cross-cultural manifestations, the fundamentalist project is always targeted towards undermining the diverse efforts of women's movements for rights, social equality and justice.

By 1995, when the Women's World Conference was convened in Beijing, a number of women's groups and organizations had already been formed in various parts of the Muslim world in response, at least in part, to the emergence and rise of religious fundamentalist forces in their respective countries or societies. Some examples of such organizations are the *Collectif 95 Maghreb Égalité* (established in early 1995) in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria; the *Shirkat Gah Women's Resource Centre* in Pakistan; and later the *BAOBAB for Women's Human Rights* in Nigeria (established after Beijing in 1996).

These women's groups now confront many types of "Islamist fundamentalism." But often these fundamentalist forces are international in ambition, scope and reach; inter-linked with one another in various multifaceted ways, they frequently operate in mutually reinforcing, transnational movements, sometimes even across cultural or religious lines of separation. For example, at the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population & Development (ICPD) an alliance was formed among conservative forces identified with various religions (e.g., the "Cairo Consensus" between Egyptian Muslim groups—Al Azhar and the *Muslim Brotherhood*—with the Vatican and an array of other anti-abortion forces aligned against progressive coalitions of human rights and reproductive rights activists).

In November 2002, an international organization called *Women Living Under Muslim Laws* or WLUML convened a major international meeting in London on the subject of "Warning Signs of Fundamentalisms." The main objectives of this conference were (a) to identify the generic features of fundamentalisms (especially religious fundamentalisms), and (b) to strengthen analysis of and thereby informed resistance to these fundamentalist trends by pooling information about fundamentalist movements. The ultimate objective was to create strategies for women's groups across countries in an effective effort to

counteract and challenge such fundamentalist forces both within and outside their own home countries.

These efforts have been encouraging, even rewarding. But at this early stage they leave unanswered the most important question that still confronts contemporary Muslim women: can reformist and/or progressive Muslim women's groups and movements become an effective countervailing force to Islamic fundamentalism and political Islam?

Notes:

- 1) For an excellent examination of the writings, thinking, and intellectual discourse of the leaders and movements of 'political Islam' and 'Islamic fundamentalism' in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Tunisia, see Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991).
- 2) See the principal work of the Fundamentalism Project by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Their other four volumes are: *Fundamentalisms and Society* (Chicago: Chicago University Press; *Fundamentalisms and the State* (1993), Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993); *Accounting for Fundamentalisms* (Chicago: Chicago University, 1994) Press; and *Fundamentalism Comprehended* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995). For 'Islamic fundamentalism' see W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1988); Youssef Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boston: Twayne, 1990); and Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
- 3) George Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
- 4) Nazih Ayubi, op. cit., 3.
- 5) See among others Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*, (New haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Ziba Mir-Hosseini, "The construction of gender in Islamic legal thought: strategies for reform" in Nik Noriani, ed., *Islamic Family Law and Justice for Muslim Women* (Kuala Lumpur: Sisters in Islam Publications, 2003); Kecia Ali, "Progressive Muslims and Islamic jurisprudence: the necessity for critical engagement with marriage and divorce law" in Omae Safid, ed., *Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003).
- 6) Cf. Fatema Mernissi 1985, and Fatnah Sabah 1989.