

The U.S.-ROK Alliance in Transition: The Post-Cold War Redefinition and Beyond ¹⁾

Sakata Yasuyo

1. Introduction — the Alliance at Fifty

The United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance was forged in October 1953, as a result of the Korean War. The United States was reluctant to conclude a bilateral treaty alliance, but for South Korea, it was a matter of survival. The alliance, it can be said, was a product of tough diplomacy by the South Korean president Syngman Rhee. Despite the origins of the alliance, the United States and the Republic of Korea have strengthened their ties and the alliance has become one of the essential elements of security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asia region.

The U.S.-ROK alliance today faces many challenges. The global Cold War has ended, but the last vestige of the Cold War era, the North Korean problem, remains on the Korean Peninsula. The renewed North Korean nuclear crisis since October 2002 has made the security situation more acute. Furthermore, the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 and the Iraq War of 2003 has brought upon the world and alliances new tasks. The United States seeks the “transformation” of alliance relations in the new security environment. ²⁾ Countering terrorism, non-proliferation and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has increased its importance on the global security agenda. Upon the United States’ request, the ROK has dispatched its forces to Iraq since April 2003, though not without controversy. Domestic consensus in South Korea has also been changing. The death of two schoolgirls in an accident involving an United States Forces in Korea (USFK) armored vehicle in June 2002 triggered anti-American sentiment, especially among the younger generation. The accident also led to the election of the liberal Millenium Democratic Party candidate Roh Moo-hyun with a close margin of 2.3% against the conservative Grand National Party candidate Lee Hoe-chang, as president in December 2002. ³⁾

Amidst the changing security environment, the U.S.-ROK alliance, in its fiftieth year, embarked on a joint effort to transform the alliance with the “Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative” (FOTA) since April 2003. ⁴⁾ This includes the long-awaited realignment of the USFK. The two countries have agreed to relocate the United States 2nd Infantry Division outside the Demilitarized Zone. The 2nd Infantry Division is known for its “tripwire” role that insured automatic commitment of U.S. forces to Korea in case of a North Korean attack. Also, in January 2004, the decision was made to completely relocate Yongsan Headquarters to south of the Han River. The relocation will take some years, according to plan, but if it is successfully carried out, the foundations of a new posture for the USFK and a new alliance will be established.

The present process is driven mainly by the Bush Administration’s post-9.11 global defense posture review, that is, the “Rumsfeld Review” under the Department of Defense (DoD). ⁵⁾ It is also driven by political considerations — to deal with the surge

of anti-American sentiment triggered by the death of the schoolgirls in June 2002. Conservatives in the United States also countered with calls for withdrawal of the USFK, when South Korean demonstrations occurred in late 2002, and the American flag was torn apart. It should also be understood, however, that the present FOTA process is a culmination of a redefinition process of over ten years since the end of the Cold War. As a result of the process in the 1990s, it can be said that the U.S.-ROK alliance has been redefined in its strategic objectives for the post-Cold War period, but the process, in particular force realignment was not completed. The post-9.11 Rumsfeld Review and other political factors have provided a new strategic environment and speeded up the process, often at a pace too fast for the South Korean side, but both sides have managed so far to cope with the changes. In this article, I will shed light on the post-Cold War redefinition process, and then examine the present status of the alliance and its future.

2. Post-Cold War Redefinition –the KIDA-RAND Study

Based on the 1989 Nunn-Warner Amendment (to the Fiscal Year 1990 United States Defense Authorization Act), the DoD announced plans to reduce and realign forces in the Asia-Pacific, as the *East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI)* in 1990 and 1992.⁶⁾ *EASI* aimed to rationalize the military burden in accordance with the end of the Cold War and to realize the “peace dividend” that the United States Congress demanded. Under *EASI*, USFK were to be reduced in phases, and its role would gradually shift from a leading role to a supporting role in South Korean defense. In the first phase, about 7,000 USFK personnel (mainly from Headquarters) pulled out in 1992, but the second and third phases were suspended due to the emergence of the North Korean nuclear issue in the early 1990s.⁷⁾ Deterrence and defense against the North Korean threat remained the primary mission of the U.S.-ROK alliance. However, if the North Korean threat is reduced or disappears, the rationale of the alliance would become vague. The alliance would have gone adrift, if force reductions continued without adjustment of alliance objectives in the changing post-Cold War security environment. It is in this context that the process of redefining the U.S.-ROK alliance was initiated.⁸⁾

At the U.S.-ROK summit in July 1991, both sides agreed to continue relations toward the 21st century even after unification. The 23rd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in November noted the importance of setting “the long-term course for future security cooperation for the common interests of the two countries in the Asia-Pacific region, looking toward the twenty-first century.”⁹⁾ At the 24th SCM in October 1992, a joint study regarding the future of the alliance was recommended to the Policy Review Subcommittee (in the SCM).¹⁰⁾ Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) (under the ROK Ministry of National Defense), and RAND Corporation (U.S.) conducted the study from 1992 to 1994, and its results were submitted to the 26th SCM in October 1994. Receiving the report, United States Secretary of Defense William Perry and the Republic of Korea Minister of Defense Rhee Byoung-tae confirmed the “importance of maintaining a continuing security relationship into the future,” and that “future study proposals will be developed for consideration by the two governments.”¹¹⁾

The KIDA-RAND study, entitled “The ROK-US Security Cooperation Toward the

21st Century,” recommended that the alliance must redefine its objectives if it is to continue into the post-Cold War era.

“The United States and the Republic of Korea recognized that close cooperation rather than ‘going their own ways’ is necessary not only for improving the mutual interests of the two countries, but also for securing the peace and stability of the Northeast Asia region... the US and the Republic of Korea should *redefine* (italics added) the roles and missions of the ROK-US alliance which was established to defend against a Cold War regime.”

Furthermore, the future role of the U.S.-ROK alliance was posited as follows: “After the North-South military confrontation ends, (the alliance) should supervise the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula, and in doing so, should contribute to peace and security in Northeast Asia. Also, the alliance should make a contribution to peace-keeping activities of the United Nations and guarantee economic prosperity of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition the alliance should make a positive contribution to the regional stability and the balance of power in connection with a possible multilateral security cooperation in the region.”¹²⁾ The abridged version of the joint study led by Young-koo Cha (KIDA) and Jonathan Pollack (RAND) was published as *A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-Korean Security Cooperation* in late 1995, in which future options and recommendations for the alliance were elaborated.¹³⁾ According to one of the co-authors, the study served as a conceptual “foundation” for the redefinition of the alliance and played a “vital role” in the ensuing process.¹⁴⁾

According to the KIDA-RAND study and other related documents, such as ROK Defense White Papers, the alliance during the Cold War was a “threat-oriented” alliance in which countering and balancing against the North Korean threat was its primary mission. In the post-Cold War environment, countering the North Korean threat would still be a primary objective, but the alliance should be adjusted according to how inter-Korean relations develop and how the North Korean threat, and the surrounding environment changes. The KIDA-RAND study calls this a “situation-driven long-term plan” in which the alliance should be adjusted “gradually” taking into account, in particular inter-Korea relations.¹⁵⁾ If inter-Korean relations improve and the North Korean threat is reduced, the alliance should change from a “threat-driven” alliance to a (inter-Korea) “integration-driven” alliance, and furthermore, after Korean unification, transform into a “profit-driven” alliance that would promote mutual interests, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁶⁾

As for responsibility-sharing or division of roles and missions, bilateral relations would change from a patron-client relationship to a more mutually beneficial relationship or “comprehensive strategic partnership” as the KIDA-RAND study called it. In the course of “gradual transition,” ROK would take the “leading role” in the defense of Korea, with the United States playing a “supporting role,” but in regional defense and security, the United States would play a “central role.”¹⁷⁾ This meant that in regional security, South Korea would play a supporting role with other allies and partners such as Japan, Australia, Southeast Asian countries.¹⁸⁾ The alliance vision can be summarized

as follows.¹⁹⁾

Chart 1 ROK-U.S. Alliance's Vision for the 21st Century (1995)

	Security Environment (Inter-Korea relations)	Division of Roles	
	→ Role	Korea Defense	Regional Defense
Threat-driven alliance	North-South Confrontation (North Korea military threat remains) → Deter North Korea threat Maintain stability in Northeast Asia	U.S.-led, ROK support (Koreanization of Korea defense promoted)	
Unification-driven (integration-driven) alliance	North-South peaceful coexistence (North Korea military threat substantially reduced, diminished) → Promote unification Regional stability and prosperity in NE Asia, Asia-Pacific Multilateral security cooperation (UN PKO, etc.)	Korea-led, U.S. support (Koreanization of Korea defense completed)	U.S.-led, Korea support (with other allies and partners)
Profit-driven alliance	North-South unification → Security of Unified Korea Regional stability and prosperity in NE Asia, Asia-Pacific Multilateral security cooperation	Korea-led, U.S. support	U.S.-led, Korea support (with other allies and partners)

In sum, the KIDA-RAND study recommended that the alliance change from a “peninsular alliance” that would be focused on Korea defense to a “regional alliance” that would be responsible not just for Korea, but for areas outside of Korea. In that new alliance the United States and ROK would take more mutually responsible roles, and the ROK would increase its regional defense role.²⁰⁾

Although the recommendation was made to redefine the alliance, the North Korean nuclear problem became the main concern in 1994–1995, so the redefinition process became low-key. The Nye Initiative froze the American force level in the Asia-Pacific at approximately 100,000, and focused on the redefinition of the United States-Japan alliance, which culminated in the 1996 United States-Japan Joint Security Declaration. Unlike the U.S.-Japan process in which top leaders were actively engaged, the U.S.-ROK redefinition process continued at the working-level. The directions recommended by the KIDA-RAND study were acknowledged in the public statements and policies of the two countries in the latter-half of the 1990s. For example, the DoD’s 1995 *East Asia Strategic Report* (or “Nye Report”) mentioned that the U.S.-ROK alliance should continue

for “the long-term,” implying the continuance of the relationship beyond the North Korean threat and after unification.²¹⁾ President Kim Dae-jung supported the continued presence of USFK even after unification,²²⁾ and the United States acknowledged and supported Kim’s statements in the 1998 DoD *East Asia Strategic Report (EASR)*.

The *EASR* basically confirmed the KIDA-RAND study objectives as follows: “The U.S. military presence will continue to support stability both on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the region after North Korea is no longer a threat.” In addition, the alliance and the USFK will “continue to contribute to the residual defense needs of Korea and assist in the integration of the two Koreas as appropriate.” Furthermore, “after reconciliation, and ultimately, reunification, the United States and Korea will remain deeply committed to mitigating regional sources of instability” in the Asia-Pacific region, such as heavy concentrations of military force, unresolved territorial disputes and historical tensions, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means to deliver them.”²³⁾

In the annual SCM Joint Communiques the United States and the ROK also confirmed that they will “continue to share democratic values and security interests *even after immediate threat to stability has receded* (italics added)” and the alliance will serve to “bolster peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.”²⁴⁾ Discussion on the “long-term development” of the alliance were to be conducted through “periodic working-level security dialogues” as agreed upon at the 31st SCM in 1999.²⁵⁾ During 2000-2001, joint study was done on U.S.-ROK combined defense postures and conditions for long-term presence of USFK, and a more detailed study was scheduled from 2002 on the future of the alliance and USFK force posture.²⁶⁾

3. 9.11 and After: FOTA and Force Realignment

As examined above, it can be said that the U.S.-ROK alliance has already been “redefined,” but not completely. The rationale of the alliance has been changed to “regional stability” including those beyond the North Korean threat, but the force structure must be adapted to new objectives, if the redefinition is to be completed. As Victor Cha and Chaibong Hahm noted, although the United States and ROK governments have publicly supported the continuation of the alliance and the USFK even after reunification, making public political statements and implementing those statements are a different different.²⁷⁾

Fundamental change was called for after the 9.11 terrorist attack on the United States in 2001. The death of the Korean schoolgirls in 2002 also promoted the process. At the 34th SCM in December 2002, both sides agreed to start the “Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA)” and engage in “policy-level discussions” to “develop options for modernizing and strengthening the alliance.”²⁸⁾ In light of the “redefinition” process of the 1990s, the FOTA can be understood as the long-awaited opportunity to finally complete the process — that is, to progress with the force realignment that had been suspended for over a decade.

However, there are differences as well. The 1990s process envisioned a “gradual” transition, in accordance with changes in inter-Korea relations, but for the Bush Administration, the post-9.11 global war against terrorism and post-Iraq War needs took precedence over local conditions, i.e., inter-Korean relations. The U.S. now desires a

more rapid adjustment of the force structure, that is, a fundamental “transformation” in line with the ongoing global military posture review. Furthermore, integrating RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) technology, such as new long-range high precision systems and intelligence collection systems, the United States now focuses on building mobile, rapid-reaction forces that can be flexibly deployed.²⁹⁾ Thus, the USFK, which is a heavy, ground-based force of about 37,000 troops designated only for South Korea becomes a major target of the global review.

In February 2003, in a comment to *U.S. News and World Report*, top aides to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld contended that advances in military technology, along with the improved capability of South Korea’s Army, make it possible to reduce United States ground forces without jeopardizing South Korea’s security. The United States would emphasize Navy and Air Force long-range strike weapons, relying on South Korea to bear a greater burden, including along the fortified DMZ. A senior American defense official said, “This is probably something we’ve neglected taking a hard look at for at least 10 years.”³⁰⁾

Thus a new round of talks began. Preliminary meetings of the FOTA were held on February 27-28, 2003, immediately after the inauguration of President Roh Moo-hyun on February 25. The first official FOTA meeting was held in April 2003. Unlike the SCM, which is a defense meeting, the FOTA meetings have been held in a “2-plus-2” format, similar to the U.S.-Japan security process, in which defense and diplomatic officials participate. Although defense officials take the primary role, the participation of diplomatic officials indicate the “comprehensiveness” of the alliance review process.³¹⁾

In the 1st FOTA meeting, both sides agreed on the following two points as basic principles for the bilateral review: (1) the need to adapt the alliance to the new global security environment and to take into account the ROK’s status as a prosperous democracy; and (2) the need for both countries to invest in an enduring alliance. This meant that the role of the ROK forces in defense of the Korean peninsula would be “expanded,” and U.S. forces’ contribution to “regional stability” would be “enhanced.”³²⁾

These principles were confirmed by top-level leaders and set the direction for the FOTA process. At the summit in May 2003, Presidents George Bush and Roh agreed to “modernize” the U.S.-ROK alliance and build a “more comprehensive and dynamic alliance relationship for continued peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.”³³⁾ In June, defense ministerial talks were held, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Minister of Defense Cho Yung-kil took note of the FOTA process and agreed to continue “enhancing, shaping and aligning” the alliance to meet the “challenges of the 21st century security environment.”³⁴⁾ In a speech in late May, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz emphasized the American commitment to improve the U.S.-ROK alliance and to “sustain a strong alliance over the long run by reducing unnecessary burdens on both sides” so to ensure that the alliance remain “relevant into the future.”³⁵⁾

With the aim of modernizing and enhancing the alliance for the future, what kind of force structure is envisaged? After almost a year of FOTA consultations, the United States and the ROK have worked out a basic blueprint, though there are still many details to be worked out. The FOTA aims to realign the USFK, and adjust and enhance the U.S.-ROK combined defense posture in which the ROK will expand its

role. The American side has pushed for rapid change, while the ROK side desired a more gradual change, considering the precarious situation surrounding the North Korean nuclear problem and the financial and military costs it will have to bear for the transition. The ROK side has accepted the “realignment” of USFK, including the relocation of United States 2nd Infantry Division, though reluctantly.³⁶⁾ The U.S. hoped to obtain an overall agreement of USFK relocation by the 35th SCM in autumn 2003, but agreement was not concluded by then, and talks continued. Nevertheless, some progress has been made.

At the 2nd FOTA meeting in June 2003, both sides agreed to begin work on implementation plans regarding the following: capability enhancement of the U.S.-ROK combined defense, relocation of Yongsan Garrison, transfer of USFK military missions to ROK Forces, and realignment of USFK.³⁷⁾

USFK Realignment and Base Consolidation: In March 2002, the United States and the ROK had already agreed on the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), which envisaged major reductions and realignment of bases in a span of about ten years.³⁸⁾ FOTA study integrates the LPP, but envisages an expanded version of the plan. The LPP did not include Yongsan Base relocation, a contentious issue, but in the FOTA, Yongsan relocation was agreed upon. Also, relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division out of the DMZ, another contentious issue, was agreed upon.

In the FOTA plan, the U.S. aims to integrate and consolidate the USFK base structure into key hubs south of the Han River. At the 2nd and 3rd FOTA meetings, a two-phase relocation plan was announced. In the first phase, American forces north of the Han River, including the 2nd Infantry Division, will be consolidated into Camp Casey (Tongdujŏn) — Camp Red Cloud (Ŭijŏngbu) area north of the Han River. Phase one is scheduled to be implemented in 2004–2006, although political factors are likely to delay the plans. In the second phase, American forces north of the Han River would move to key hubs south of the Han River, to be located in the Osan (American Air Force Base) -P’yŏngtaek (Camp Humphreys) area. The Taegu-Pusan area (including Camp Hialeah) is considered to be another hub for contingency-response (including prepositioning of wartime stockpiles). However, no schedule is set for phase two. This phase includes the sensitive issue of 2nd Infantry Division relocation, and would be pursued “taking careful account of the political, economic, and security situation on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia,” as agreed upon at the Bush-Roh summit in May 2003. It was also agreed to maintain a United States military rotational training presence north of the Han River even after phase two is completed.³⁹⁾

Yongsan Relocation: Relocation of the Yongsan Garrison had been an issue for over ten years.⁴⁰⁾ The issue was revived by the Bush administration that desired early relocation. USFK Commander General Leon J. LaPorte proposed plans to redeploy 6,000 of the 7,000 personnel in Yongsan to the south of the Han River, and for some 1,000 personnel and the United Nations Command (UNC), Combined Forces Command (CFC), USFK headquarters, would remain in Seoul.⁴¹⁾ But details over land area could not be worked out, so agreement (due at the SCM in November 2003) was postponed. It was at the 6th FOTA meeting in January 2004, that agreement was finally announced to completely relocate Yongsan Headquarters, including the UNC, CFC, USFK command, south of the Han River by the “end of 2006.” The ROK

Government is to bear the financial cost of the relocation, estimated to be about US\$3 billion. Tasks remain, however, such as working out an overall agreement, obtaining legislative approval and procuring land.⁴²⁾

Force Enhancement: Regarding the enhancement of the U.S.-ROK combined forces, Commander General LaPorte announced a Force Enhancement Plan in late May 2003. This is a US\$11 billion investment plan to improve CFC capabilities over a three-year period in more than 150 items. Near-term enhancements include upgrades to intelligence collection systems, increased numbers of improved precision munitions, rotational deployment of the United States Army's newest Stryker unit to improve responsiveness, and additions to the Army's pre-positioned WRSA (War Reserve Stock for Allies) to increase readiness. Addition of PAC-3 units (upgraded system of Patriot missiles), replacing old USFK helicopters with AH-64D Apache Longbow multi-role helicopters, introduction of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits (including guided smart bombs) are also in the plan.⁴³⁾

Transfer of DMZ Missions: The transfer of USFK missions to the ROK forces is a measure which aims for ROK to eventually take full responsibility of the Demilitarized Zone. At the 3rd FOTA meeting in July, both sides agreed to completely transfer Joint Security Area missions to the ROK Forces by the end of 2004 to 2005, but the measure was postponed at the 4th meeting in September, due to caution on the ROK side. The ROK did not desire a rapid change of the "tripwire" role of the USFK in the area, but they may take over missions at a later stage. Transfer of key missions was discussed in July, and the 35th SCM Joint Communique in November stated that "ten missions" were to be transferred in the coming years.⁴⁴⁾

Command Relations: Adjustment of command relations is another issue. The U.S. and ROK forces cooperate under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) structure (since 1978).⁴⁵⁾ An American four-star general (who also heads the UNC and USFK) is the CINCCFC (Commander-in-Chief of the CFC), and a South Korean four-star general is Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Operational control of the ROK forces are held by the CINCCFC, but peacetime operational control has been returned to the ROK in 1994. The issue of wartime operational control remains. In the FOTA, the United States and the ROK agreed that the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) in South Korea and the United States form a consultative group to conduct the study of ROK-US combined command relations in the mid-to-long term, and report the results to the SCM in 2005.⁴⁶⁾

Future Role of USFK: The future role of the USFK remains to be seen. The present FOTA focuses on USFK realignment and base consolidation in the context of Korean defense, but not on new missions or size. U.S. officials have commented on the possibility of USFK "reduction," but due to domestic concern in South Korea regarding the withdrawal of USFK, especially from the conservatives,⁴⁷⁾ the ROK government and military has been cautious about comments on "reductions."⁴⁸⁾

Both governments, especially the ROK side, has also been cautious about the prospect of new "regional" roles for the USFK outside the Korean peninsula, since this would be something completely new for the USFK and the alliance — one which would require a clear "redefinition" of roles and building domestic consensus in South Korea. The present mission of the USFK is to deter and defend against a North Korean

attack. But what about roles beyond the North Korean threat, that is, a broader regional role for the USFK? Experts have considered the desirability of regionalizing the USFK, that is, the deployment of USFK for missions outside the Korean peninsula.⁴⁹⁾ The present Bush Administration's global military posture review has provided momentum to this issue.

There has been speculation regarding the reduction of USFK. Although denied by the American and South Korean governments, it has been reported by Associated Press that the Bush Administration, according to some senior U.S. officials and experts, desire to cut about one-third of the current level of 37,000 troops. It is envisaged that a lighter, realigned USFK, if successfully realized, could serve as a "expeditionary" force that can be deployed in the Asia-Pacific region.⁵⁰⁾

According to experts, the Pentagon's new strategy for lighter, mobile forces in Asia will focus on air and naval power, in which Japan and Guam would be the major hub bases, and bases in South Korea would be lighter forward operating bases. The United States will increase its pre-positioned equipment at air and sea hubs in southern Korea, so forces can be rapidly reinforced if conflict occurs.⁵¹⁾ The two heavy armored brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division, an expert says, may be substituted with intelligent brigades utilizing more high-precision weapons. In this context, the expert notes that combined deterrence against the North Korean threat will not be lessened but may actually be enhanced even if troops are cut.⁵²⁾

Furthermore, a realigned USFK may also serve as a "regional force" for deployment outside Korea, and it is implied in the FOTA process. At the 1st FOTA meeting, the United States and the ROK have stated that the "ROK-US alliance must be developed in ways to best contribute to security on the Peninsula *and beyond* (italics added). Accordingly, both parties agreed in principle to expand ROK forces' role in defense of the Peninsula and to *enhance US forces' contribution to regional stability* (italics added)." At the 2nd meeting, the two sides confirmed that "both sides agreed on the importance of *structuring of U.S. forces in a manner that further promotes regional stability* (italics added)." ⁵³⁾ Also, at the 35th SCM, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Minister of Defense Cho Yung-kil "reaffirmed the continuing importance of *strategic flexibility* (italics added) of the USFK."⁵⁴⁾ These reflect the desires of the U.S. side for a broader regional role for the USFK but at present, the ROK side is reluctant about discussing the issue, since this would imply a completely new role for the alliance. President Roh Moo-hyun has said that "if USFK was acting as a deterrent to North Korea till now, from now on, it will seek regional solidity as a new stabilizer in Northeast Asia," expressing support for a broader regional role for the USFK.⁵⁵⁾ But what this exactly means is yet to be known.

It was reported in the media (though unconfirmed) that in the FOTA meetings, the United States and the ROK discussed the idea of expanding USFK into a regional defense force for Northeast Asia, which would include areas, for example, from Russia to Taiwan.⁵⁶⁾ Along the same line, an article on plans to realign the United States Pacific Command ran in the media. An American journalist, quoting American "military officers," noted that this revision is part of the Rumsfeld Review to make United States forces in Asia more responsive to regional contingencies from "Korea to Australia." In the plan, command elements in South Korea, including the UNC, USFK, CFC, EUSAK (Eighth United States Army) are "most likely" to be dismantled, and the position of the

four-star general who commands UNC, USFK and CFC, will be abolished. The United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) will also be dismantled, and a new operational corps headquarters led by a three-star lieutenant general will be established. The corps headquarters in Japan will likely take operational control of the 2nd Infantry Division and other Army combat formations in Korea to form one operational force, which would focus less on ROK defense and more on deployments elsewhere in Asia. Allied governments in Asia, particularly Seoul and Tokyo will be consulted before final decisions are made, but both allies have shown reluctance.⁵⁷⁾ American military authorities commented that this is not an official position, but it would certainly affect the next stage of U.S.-ROK FOTA talks on command structures and the future direction of USFK realignment.⁵⁸⁾

4. Conclusion — The U.S.-ROK Alliance as a “Regional Alliance”?

The U.S.-ROK alliance, now fifty years old, has embarked on a new round of readjustment in an attempt to adapt the alliance to a new security environment. The post-Cold War “redefinition” process from a “peninsular” to a “regional alliance” continues with new momentum in the post-9.11 environment under the Bush Administration. The new round of global consultations with United States allies since December 2003 will further promote the realignment of the U.S.-ROK alliance in conjunction with other regional alliances, especially the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The alliance is at a historical juncture. “Is this the beginning of the reconfiguration of the alliance? Or is it the first step in the dismantling of the alliance?” As Scott Snyder of the Asia Foundation noted, there are still many unknowns.⁵⁹⁾ In recent years, China has deepened economic and diplomatic ties with South Korea, and the so-called 386 generation increased their voice in South Korea. They are more “independent-minded,” and some advocate, for example, a more neutral position between the United States and China.⁶⁰⁾ If left to its own forces, the alliance may certainly drift into irrelevance, especially after the North Korean threat is gone. But the path for reconfiguration is also in the making. If the FOTA process is implemented successfully, the U.S.-ROK alliance will be able to build the foundation for a broader “regional alliance.” Needless to say, however, there are still many tasks ahead.

In order to progress with transformation of the alliance into a regional alliance, regional security goals and missions needs to be defined. If not, it would be impossible for the redefinition to be completed. As South Korean expert, Kim Sung-han of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security stresses, “If the nature of regional security is defined vaguely under a mutual defense treaty, substantial confusion may occur with Korea being expected to cooperate in various disputes.”⁶¹⁾ One major issue in regional security would be how to deal with China. For example, will the U.S.-ROK alliance respond to a Taiwan Straits crisis? The United States would desire that option. However, it would be problematic for South Korea. While relations with the United States are indeed very important, the ROK would also be reluctant to take action that would aggravate its relations with China.⁶²⁾ Another more immediate issue is how to deal with North Korea, in new, more coercive venues such as the Bush Administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI is part of an American-led global effort to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and North Korea is

one major target. Eleven members including Australia and Japan are participating in interdiction exercises, but South Korea has not participated.⁶³⁾

Does the U.S.-ROK alliance have a future as a “regional alliance”? If we go back to the original goals of the alliance, regional security can be found. In the preamble of the 1953 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, both sides desired “further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of *a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area* (italics added).”⁶⁴⁾ A “more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area” is yet to be established. Thereby, a major task remains for the United States and the ROK in the 21st century.

Considering the United States and the ROK’s political and economic status, the U.S.-ROK alliance would be an essential element of a regional security system in the Asia-Pacific area. The first Bush Administration, in the early 1990s successfully placed South Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance in its “Pacific Community” concept based on shared values such as democracy and market economy, and promoted EASI force reductions.⁶⁵⁾ The Clinton Administration proposed its own “Pacific Community” idea and the DoD’s EASR posited the U.S.-ROK alliance as one of the important alliances in the Asia-Pacific and called for enhancing and upgrading the alliances.⁶⁶⁾ The present Bush Administration has yet to elaborate an overall comprehensive strategy on the Asia-Pacific security structure and alliances. In this sense, a conscious effort by both the United States and the ROK must be taken to maintain and adapt the alliance so that it can contribute effectively in building a broader regional security structure.

More than ten years ago, when the redefinition process for the post-Cold War period started, Cha Young-koo of KIDA outlined a possible scenario, the “Framework for the ROK-U.S. Military Alliance in 2010.” By 2010, he envisioned U.S.-ROK military relations that has changed from a “tactical partnership” to deter a North Korean attack to a “strategic partnership” to safeguard peace in Northeast Asia. The alliance structure will undergo fundamental changes as follows.

The U.S. ground force in South Korea reduced to a symbolic level (a few thousand), but the U.S. naval force in the Asian Pacific region might be transferred to South Korea, and U.S. Air Force in South Korea transformed into a regional strategic air force. By then, the operational control (OPCON) of the combined force will have already been transferred to South Korea. ROK-U.S. operational cooperation will take a form comparable to the present U.S.-Japanese operational cooperation. The ROK-U.S. CFC will no longer play the role of a war-fighting headquarters, but of a joint operational coordination headquarters. Staffing of the DMZ will be under the sole jurisdiction of South Korean forces. The UNC in South Korea will be dismantled, and the present armistice will be replaced by a peace agreement between the two Koreas.⁶⁷⁾

This scenario is similar to what seems to be envisaged in the KIDA-RAND study and the present alliance review. The only difference is that inter-Korea relations did not improve as it was assumed in the scenario, but the United States is pushing for change due to changes in the global security environment.

Therefore, a much more conscious effort on both sides is necessary to work out a suitable adjustment process and timetable for both sides. As Cha noted in 1990, it is “extremely difficult” to chart a future course for the alliance, and the 2010 scenario is a “matter of conjecture.” But, he goes on to say that “as long as such relations are valued,” it is “imperative to analyze the present strategic environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula and map out the ROK-US military alliance for the next century.”⁶⁸⁾ The redefinition continues and both sides need to engage each other for the long term and elaborate a common vision for the future alliance in the 21st century.

Notes:

- 1) This article is based partly on the author’s paper “Beikan dōmei no shōrai: Reisengo no saiteigi o fumaete” presented at the 2003 Higashi Nihon Kenkyū Taikai, Ajia Seikei Gakkai, held at Kanda Gaigo Daigaku, Chiba, Japan, May 24, 2003. The author also discussed this issue at the “Roundtable: Security Issues in Contemporary Northeast Asia,” the Seventh Asian Studies Conference Japan, Sophia University, Ichigaya Campus, June 21-22, 2003.
- 2) Regarding the global alliance consultations, see “Statement by President,” White House, November 25, 2003; “Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture,” Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., December 3, 2003, at <http://www.defenselink.mil>.
- 3) Yi Sukchung, “Kanbei dōmei no tsugi no aojashin ga motomerarete iru,” *Chūōkōron* 188:6 (2003:6), 124-133. Opinion polls indicate South Korean opinion toward the United States is divided. The South Korean newspaper *Chungang ilbo*’s opinion polls in December 2002 indicated that 36.4% of respondents had a negative image of the United States, while only 13 % held a positive image. In June 2003, polls showed some improvement (27.6% answered “negative,” 25.4% “positive,” and 46.9% “in the middle,” out of 1,032 persons polled). *JoongAng Ilbo*, June 11, 2003, at <http://news.joins.com>. I thank Professor Susumu Kohari of Shizuoka Prefectural University for this information. For a comprehensive study, see Eric Larson, Norman Levin, et.al., *Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S.* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004).
- 4) The FOTA was agreed upon at the 34th annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) (defense ministers meeting) in December 2002.
- 5) Ralph Cossa, “Everything is Going to Move Everywhere ...but not Just Yet!” *Comparative Connections* July 2003, Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/03020overview.html>.
- 6) United States Department of Defense, *Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century*, April 1990, July 1992.
- 7) Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, *ROK-US Alliance and USFK* (May 2002), 42-43; Yasuyo Sakata, “The Emerging Concept for a ‘Pacific Community’ and U.S.-ROK Relations: Present and Future,” in Chae-jin Lee and Hideo Sato, eds., *U.S.-Japan Partnership in Conflict Management: The Case of Korea*, (Claremont, CA: The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, 1993), 90-95.
- 8) According to the author’s interviews in Seoul the ROK side initiated this process.
- 9) Joint Communique, 23rd Annual U.S.-ROK SCM, November 21, 1991, at <http://www.mnd.go.kr>. Regarding the redefinition process, see also Sakata Yasuyo, “Arata na wakugumi o mōsaku suru Kanbei anzen hoshō kankei: Kankoku kokubō hakusho no bunseki o chūshin ni,” *Kaigai jijō* 43:11 (1995:11), 86-91.
- 10) According to Cha Young-koo (KIDA), who led the joint study, the 24th SCM in 1992 had “profound importance in setting the new direction of ROK-U.S. military relations.” Ch’a Yōnggu, “Kanbei anzen hoshō taisei,” in Okonogi Masao, ed., *Posuto-reisen no Chōsen hantō*, (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūjo, 1994), 55.
- 11) Joint Communique, 26th Annual U.S.-ROK SCM, October 7, 1994.
- 12) The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense Press Release, “The ROK-US Security Cooperation

- Toward the 21st Century,” October 1994.
- 13) Jonathan D. Pollack and Young Koo Cha, *A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-Korean Security Cooperation* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995).
 - 14) Author’s interview with General Cha Young-koo, Deputy Minister for Policy, Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, January 30, 2004.
 - 15) The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense Press Release, “The ROK-US Security Cooperation Toward the 21st Century.” The KIDA-RAND study posits possible phases in inter-Korea relations as follows: “Status Quo”->“Accommodation and Integration”->“Post-Unification,” Pollack and Cha, *A New Alliance for the Next Century*, 36-39.
 - 16) Pollack and Cha, *A New Alliance for the Next Century*, 71.
 - 17) The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense Press Release, “The ROK-US Security Cooperation Toward the 21st Century.”
 - 18) The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper*, 1992–1993, cited in Sakata, “Arata na wakugumi o mosaku suru Kanbei anzen hoshō kankei,” 88, 90.
 - 19) Based on the chart in Sakata, “Arata na wakugumi o mosaku suru Kanbei anzen hoshō kankei,” 90.
 - 20) The KIDA-RAND study provides four alternatives: “robust peninsular alliance,” “reconfigured peninsular alliance,” “regional security alliance,” and “political alliance”(without U.S. military presence). Both KIDA and RAND preferred “robust peninsular alliance” in the “status quo” phase, “regional security alliance” in the “accommodation/integration” and “post-unification” phases of inter-Korea relations. See especially chapters 3, 4 and 5 in Pollack and Cha, *A New Alliance for the Next Century*.
 - 21) United States Department of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1995*.
 - 22) “Kim stresses security posture in Northeast Asia with Presence of U.S. Forces,” *Korea Times*, March 17, 1998.
 - 23) United States Department of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998*.
 - 24) See for example, Joint Communique, 31st ROK-US SCM, November 23, 1991.
 - 25) *Ibid.*; *Nihon Keizai Shinbun* (Tokyo), January 18, 2000.
 - 26) Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, *National Defense Policy, 1998–2002* (December 2002), 84 [in Korean].
 - 27) Victor Cha and Chaibong Hahm, “Beikan dōmei no mirai,” in Funabashi Yoichi, ed., *Dōmei no hikaku kenkyū: Reisengo chitsujo o motomete*, (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 2001), 56-57.
 - 28) Joint Communique, 34th Annual U.S.-ROK SCM, December 5, 2002.
 - 29) Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, “Remarks at the IISS Asian Security Conference,” May 31, 2003 at <http://www.defenselink.mil>
 - 30) Mark Mazzetti, “Rethinking a Defense Relationship,” *U.S. News and World Report*, February 17, 2003, 28.
 - 31) At the 1st FOTA meeting, Lieutenant General Cha Young Koo, Deputy Minister for Policy of the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Shim Yoon Joe, Director General, North American Affairs Bureau of the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Richard P. Lawless, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Affairs, and Christopher LaFleur, Special Envoy of the United States Department of State led the delegations from both sides. Joint Statement on “The Future of the ROK Alliance Policy Initiative,” April 9, 2003, at <http://www.mnd.go.kr>
 - 32) *Ibid.*
 - 33) Joint Statement between the United States and Republic of Korea, May 14, 2003, at <http://usinfo.state.gov>.
 - 34) Participants were, from the Republic of Korea side, Ambassador Han Seung-joo, Deputy Minister for Policy Lieutenant General Cha Young-koo, and from the U.S. side, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, United States Department of State Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman, Commander of the Pacific Command Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander of the United States Forces in Korea General Leon J. LaPorte, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia-Pacific Richard P. Lawless. “U.S. and Republic of Korea hold defense ministerial talks (Washington D.C.),” June 27, 2003 (ROK MND).
 - 35) Wolfowitz, “Remarks at the IISS Asian Security Conference.”

- 36) The relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division was especially controversial among South Koreans, since this was not mere reduction. For example, Premier Goh Kun publicly opposed the removal of the “tripwire” division. *Korea Herald*, March 7, 2003.
- 37) Joint Statement on “Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative,” June 5, 2003. (ROK MND).
- 38) At the 33rd SCM in November 2001, the United States and the ROK signed the Letter of Intent regarding the LPP and signed the agreement in March 2002. According to the USFK “Korea Master Plan for 2010,” the United States aims to consolidate USFK military facilities into three nodes and seven hubs, and the LPP is part of the Master Plan. Under the LPP, the United States will return approximately 33,000 acres which includes twenty-eight bases and facilities and three training fields, and the ROK will grant use of 1,300 acres of new land, and provide for nine replacement facilities, use of selected ROK training facilities by 2011. American facilities will be halved from the current 60,000 acres to 26,000 acres (from forty-one bases to twenty-three bases). Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, USFK Commander, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 March 2002, 20-21, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2002/Schwartz.pdf>; *ROK-US Alliance and USFK*, 74; *Korea Herald*, March 30, 2002. Song Yöngsön and Shin Pömch’öl, “Zaikun churyu Beigun no genzai to mirai,” in Honma Hiroshi, et.al., *Kakkoku-kan chii-kyötei no tekiyö ni kansuru hikakuron kösatsu*, (Tokyo: Naigai shuppan, 2003), 212-214.
- 39) Joint Statement on FOTA, June 5, 2003, Results of the 3rd Meeting of FOTA, July 22-23, 2003 (ROK MND); *Digital Chosun ilbo* (Japanese edition), June 5, 2003, and July 24, 2003, at <http://chosun.com>. Creation of a consolidated “Korean Maneuver Training Center” by 2008 is planned. Statement of General Leon J. LaPorte, USFK Commander, before the 108th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, 12 March 2003, 20, <http://armedservices.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-03-12laporte.pdf>.
- 40) Yongsan relocation is a measure to alleviate the burden on downtown Seoul. Relocation plans were agreed upon in 1990, but due to security concerns arising from the North Korean nuclear issue, and financial burden on the ROK government, the plan was shelved. Cha and Hahm, “Beikan dömei no mirai,” 59.
- 41) *Korea Herald*, June 4, 2003.
- 42) *Japanese JoongAng ilbo*, January 16, 2004, <http://www.japanese.joins.com>; *New York Times*, January 18, 2004.
- 43) “USFK Force Enhancement Initiatives,” May 31, 2003 at <http://www.usfk.or.kr>; Robert Karniol, “Seoul, US to realign basing of troops,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, June 11, 2003, 5; *Korea Times*, June 2, 2003.
- 44) Missions such as truce village guarding duty, countering possible North Korean special forces infiltration by sea, facilitating search and rescue works, decontamination of biochemical and radioactive materials in rear-echelon areas, countering duty for North Korea’s long-range battery fire is under consideration. *Korea Times*, September 3, 4, 2003; Joint Communique, 35th SCM, November 17, 2003.
- 45) *ROK-US Alliance and USFK*, 50-51.
- 46) “Joint Statement on FOTA,” April 9, 2003, “Result of the 3rd Meeting of FOTA,” July 22-23, 2003 (ROK MND). Victor Cha supports full transfer of operational command authority to South Korea and establishment of “a joint-planning headquarters with two independent militaries led by the ROK JCS and the USFK operating under a mutually agreed defense guidelines, “similar to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Victor Cha, “Focus on the Future, not the North,” *Washington Quarterly* 26:1 (Winter 2002-03), 100-101. Kim Changsu of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) recommends the following: prepare now for a transfer of all the delegated authorities currently exercised by CINCCFC, as a major step leading to a transfer of war-time operational control; consider an option in which a ROK general exercises a temporary operational control during joint exercises, in conjunction with USFK reductions and relocations. Kim Changsu, “The ROK-US Alliance and Future Security Cooperation,” presented at “The Mandate for Leadership: Priorities for the President” (session: “Challenges on the Korean Peninsula and the ROK-US Partnership), sponsored by the Heritage Foundation, KIDA, Korea-U.S. Exchange Council, February 20-21, 2003 (Plaza Hotel, Seoul).
- 47) Talk of force reductions evokes the memories of the 1970’s when the public equated the Nixon and Carter administrations’ force cutback plans as tantamount to abandoning the ROK. *Korea Times*,

- November 28, 2003.
- 48) Major General James N. Soligan, USFK Deputy Chief of Staff, in a response to questions from Korean reporters hinted at the possibility of “reductions” by saying that what is important is not the number of soldiers but the system, and that U.S. and ROK should make a “political” decision on the issue. *Korea Herald*, April 26, 2003. In June, Lieutenant general Charles Campbell, USFK Eighth Army commander also mentioned the possibility of partial reduction of forces at a ROK MND Military History Institute seminar in Seoul. In September, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld publicly commented that there are studies being conducted with regard to USFK reductions, and stressed that “capabilities,” not numbers of troops, is the key, implying the possibility of reductions. *Digital Chosun ilbo*, September 24, 2003. At the U.S.-ROK summit in October 2003, however, President Bush assured President Roh that no decision has been made on USFK reductions. *Digital Chosun ilbo*, June 26, 2003, September 24, 2003, October 20, 2003.
 - 49) Regarding the future USFK postures, maritime-oriented options, ground force-oriented options, and combinations, have been proposed. See for example, Michael O’Hanlon, “Keep U.S. Forces in Korea after Reunification,” *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 10:1 (Summer 1998), 13-19; Robert Dujarric, *Korean Unification and After: The Challenges for U.S. Strategy* (New York: Hudson Institute, 2000), 56-58; William Odom, “The U.S. Military in Post-Unified Korea,” *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 12:1 (Summer 2000), 7-28; Byung-joon Ahn, “Toward a Regional Alliance for Unification and Stability: A Test of Engagement,” in C. Fred Bergsten and Il Sakong, eds., *The Korea-United States Economic Relationship* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, March 1997). For recent work, see Michael Finnegan, “The Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Challenges and Opportunities,” Working paper for presentation at the Asia Foundation, Seoul, February 24, 2003; Cha, “Focus on the Future, not the North,” 98-100.
 - 50) *Digital Chosun ilbo*, October 19, 2003. The American analyst Guy Arrigoni (Defense Intelligence Agency) noted at a conference in Seoul that the realignment may lead to a reduction of 10,000-15,000 troops, similar to earlier plans in the DoD’s *EASI*. *Digital Chosun ilbo*, June 12, 2003.
 - 51) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy Andy Hoehn’s comments. *Washington Post*, June 9, 2003. See also the critical review by Kurt Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, “New Battle Stations?” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2003), 96-99 Views regarding the future size of the USFK are still under consideration, and will depend on how the U.S. judges the strategic value of Korea. To realign U.S. forces overseas, it is reported that the so-called Rumsfeld doctrine envisages four categories – strategic bases, hubs, forward operating bases and forward operating locations. Within these options, Kim Sung-han, professor at Institute of Foreign Affairs and Security notes that if Korea becomes a “strategic base” of the United States, approximately 6,000 troops may withdraw, and up to 15,000 may leave if Korea becomes a “forward operating base.” Lee Chul-hee, A matter of time before some U.S. troops go,” February 2, 2004, *JoonAng Daily*, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com>.
 - 52) Comments by Cornell University, professor, Suh Jae-jung, *Korea Times*, November 28, 2003.
 - 53) Joint Statement on FOTA, April 9, June 5, 2003.
 - 54) Joint Communique, 35th SCM, November 17, 2003.
 - 55) *Korea Times*, April 21, 2003.
 - 56) *Japanese JoongAng ilbo*, October 10, 2003.
 - 57) In addition, a new billet for an Army general of the United States Army Pacific at Fort Shafter will be established to take control of Army forces in the Pacific. Richard Halloran, “Reshaping the Pacific Command,” *Korea Herald*, January 30, 2004. The DoD has officially stated that the Halloran article represents “an opinion” and not “authoritative fact.” The USFK also commented that “there is no plan to dismantle” the commands in Korea, and “any change” will be coordinated directly with the ROK government, and stressed that any media report concerning the future of the commands are “speculation.” “Pacific Command Reshaping,” February 5, 2004, USFK, at <http://www.usfk.or.kr>. Ideas for integrated commands, such as the “Northeast Asia command,” have been proposed by military experts in the past. See for example, Richard Bogusky, “The Impact of Korean Unification on Northeast Asia: American Security Challenges and Opportunities,” *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 10:1(Summer 1998), 69-70; Michael J. Finnegan, “The Security Strategy of Unified Korea and the Security Relations of Northeast Asia,” *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 11:2 (Winter 1999),147; Dujarric, *Korean Unification*

- and After*, 62-63, Odom, "The U.S. Military in Post-Unified Korea," 27. For more recent discussion see Victor Cha, "Focus on the Future, not the North," 100. Seong Ryoul Cho, "The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 15:2 (Fall 2003), 90-92.
- 58) In the Korean Master Plan for 2010, USFK Commander Schwartz proposes creation of a "Northeast Asia Regional Simulation Center" north of Seoul by 2008. It would have the capability for Joint and Combined simulations and exercises, and provide a "multi-lateral focus" for USFK and ROK power projection capabilities. Thus this Center would have the potential role of a Northeast Asia regional training center. Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, USFK Commander, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 March 2002, 20.
- 59) *New York Times*, December 26, 2003.
- 60) The term "386 generation" refers to Koreans in their thirties, educated in college in the 1980s, and born in the 1960s. On South Korean views on China see for example Victor Cha, "South Korea: Anchored or Adrift?" in Richard Ellings, Aaron Friedberg, and Michael Willis, eds., *Strategic Asia 2003-04: Fragility and Crisis*, (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), 116-120; Scott Snyder and Ah-Young Kim, "China-ROK-US Relations and Regional Security in Northeast Asia," *Comparative Connections* Special Annual Issue (July 2003), <http://www.csis.org/pacfor>.
- 61) With regard to naval cooperation, Kim says it would be desirable for ROK to limit the scope of cooperation to the Northeast Asian area surrounding the Korean peninsula and not extend it to Southeast Asia. Kim Sung-han, "Anti-American Sentiment and the ROK-US Alliance," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 15:2 (Fall 2003), 125-126.
- 62) For discussion on the China factor, see for example Narushige Michishita, "Security Arrangements after Peace in Korea," in Masashi Nishihara, ed., *The Japan-U.S. Alliance: New Challenges for the 21st Century*, (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), 50-52; Cha, "South Korea: Anchored or Adrift?," 116-120; Cha, "Focus on the Future, Not the North," 95-96, 100; Yasuyo Sakata, "Security Issues on the Korean Peninsula and the China Factor: Opportunities and Challenges," presented at the conference on "The Rise of China Revisited: Perception and Reality," Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, December 10-12, 2003.
- 63) At the 8th International Sea Powers Symposium, hosted by the Republic of Korea Navy, USFK commander General LaPorte advocated that the "navy of the future must join in the effort to interdict WMD delivery," and implicated that it should be the ROK Navy's future role to participate in PSI. *Korea Times*, August 6, 2003.
- 64) Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, signed October 1, 1953, entered into force November 17, 1954. Some have noted the need for revision of the MDT in order to make it compatible with broader regional missions. Cho, "The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea," 102.
- 65) James A. Baker, III, "America in Asia: Architecture for a Pacific Community," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1991/92), 17; Sakata, "The Emerging Concept for a 'Pacific Community' and U.S.-ROK Relations," 88-90.
- 66) United States Department of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998*.
- 67) Cha Young-koo, "The Future of ROK-U.S. Military Relations," in William J. Taylor, Jr., Cha Young-koo, and John Q. Blodgett, eds., *The Korean Peninsula: Prospects for Arms Reduction Under Global Détente* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 107-108.
- 68) Cha Young-koo, "The Future of ROK-U.S. Military Relations," 108.