Group Conversion as Reconstructing Identity

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Daily spheres in the so-called 'globalizing' world subsume numerous worldwide events. The "oil shock" of the 1970s in Japan is an early example, that made Japanese realize the impact of remote countries on their daily lives. Decisions by Middle Eastern countries resulted in the rapid rise of the price of paper. Even elementary school children knew the reason why their favorite weekly comic magazines reduced the number of pages.

Nowadays, it becomes more evident that unconscious and lower-level decisions, behaviors or preferences have practical influence over other countries. The import of cheap products is such a case. Responding to Japanese fondness for Asian furniture, production of cheap rattan furniture increased in Southeast Asian countries. The low price is undoubtedly based upon cheap labor, which includes children as an important part of the labor force. Another example illustrates the practical influence of ideas and concepts among developed (wealthy) countries. The town of Sialkot in the Panjab region of Pakistan is famous for exporting hand-made footballs for most professional players all over world, but it was announced that child labor played a central role in this industry. Anticipating the report would harm the image of the sports industry, FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football Association) funded projects and promoted campaigns to protect children against child labor. Consequently, the child labor in Sialkot was replaced by female labor, at the same time, domestic work and gender roles are being transformed in the region. These examples show that abstract ideas and images can be an impetus to economic and social changes in different places.[1] As Anthony Giddens suggested, "Globalization is essentially 'action at distance'; absence predominates over presence, not in the sedimentation of time, but because of the restructuring of space." [2]

Globalization is a dialectic process of local tradition and world integration. Garrett notes "Each unit is couched within the frame of the whole so that, willy nilly, action must be referenced against the coordinate of 'the world,' and not simply against limited geopolitical segments".[3] Modern Western industrial society diffuses throughout the world, destroys "traditions" in each region, and causes serious identity crisis of the people living there. Seeking their own standpoint, people reconstruct their tradition. The reconstructed traditions deny old traditions but preserve selected characteristics of their predecessors and improve in the sense that they can deal with the contemporary situation. Miyanaga's explanation about the interaction of world integration and local tradition is worth quoting at length:

> This situation is also typical of globalization, under which nation states play a tricky role. Their legitimacy depends on the regional tradition,

> but, at the same time, it is their imperative to join the world economic integration to improve their domestic economy. Local traditions must be respected, but must also be re-defined in a new economic and political perspective. The trouble is that the world economic integration disembeds local, traditional cultures, and renders them as a tremendous fragmentation to the rest of the world. Today's information society generates a multi-dimensional flow of information worldwide rather than promoting unity or integration.[4)]

This paper analyzes religious conversion as a process by which people seek the locus of their social identity. An example is taken from a group conversion in the late twentieth century Japan, from contemporary hidden Christianity to Shinto. The tradition of hidden Christianity, which descends from the Catholic converts in the sixteenth century, is vanishing, but at the same time, these people hold strong sense of being hidden Christians, or, at least, of being the descendants of hidden Christians. The identity of hidden Christians is so strongly connected to their social settings that drastic change is needed to reconstruct their identity. Facing various impact from the wider world on the lives, the social network, the way of living, and the mode of thought, hidden Christians feel that their group identity does not properly fit into the contemporary context. The people utilize religious conversion as a way to reconstruct their identity. The new identity is referenced against the new framework of the wider world. After providing basic information about hidden Christians in Japan and discourses about Japanese-ness, the group conversion will be analyzed in detail.

Kakure (*Kakure Kirishitan*): Terms and Their History

The term *Kakure* in this article refers to the descendants of Japanese Catholics of the sixteenth century and seventeenth century who choose to be hidden Christians despite of the religious freedom in Japan.[5)] *Kakure* is an abbreviation of *Kakure Kirishitan*. Literally, *Kakure* means hiding, and *Kirishitan* is an old Japanese pronunciation of Christian or Christianity. The prohibition of Christianity by the Tokugawa government after the "Christian Century in Japan" [6)] forced Catholics to go underground for more than two hundred years. Although the freedom of faith was gained in the late nineteenth century and some hidden Christians returned to Catholic churches, others followed their ancestors' way, did not reconcile with the returned Catholic missionaries, and became *Kakure*.

One reason for their remaining hidden was the conflicts with missionaries. Hidden Christian belief and practice had come to be different from the "authentic" Catholicism due to the long isolation. Hence, to "correct" *Kakure* religion was the first task of MEP (the Société des Missions Étrangeres de Paris), which played a central role in re-establishing Catholic faith in Japan in the nineteenth century and which was famous for its strict interpretation and application of Catholic doctrine. From the missionaries' point of view, ancestor worship was one of the most heretical elements observed among *Kakure*. They rigidly prohibited idol worship and ordered Japanese converts to abandon their Buddhist altars and some sacred objects handed down from generation to generation. On the contrary, continuity with their ancestors was one of

the strongest concerns of *Kakure*. *Kakure* religion had already been indigenized into the Japanese religious complex. Countless corrections made by missionaries hurt their pride of being successors of the Catholic faith from the sixteenth century. Moreover, what agonized *Kakure* the most was the missionaries' insistence on salvation apart from their ancestors. Missionaries concluded that many rituals and teachings were not valid and that the *Kakure* who were baptized in the wrong way were not even "Christians." [7] Without offering any means to save the dead ancestors, missionaries preached *Kakure* to return to the "true" Christianity and to get personal salvation. From the *Kakure*'s point of view, return to Catholicism meant to seek personal salvation leaving their ancestors in hell. In other words, it was the betrayal to their ancestor. Hence, the discontinuity with their ancestors was one of the most critical reasons to refuse Catholicism.[8]

Another reason was the persecution of Christianity in that region and popular understanding of Christianity in Japan. The movement towards returning to Catholicism began at the very end of the Tokugawa period. In this time of confusion and chaos, the movement activated strong persecution against hidden Christians. The largest was the fourth Urakami persecution. In 1867, residents of Urakami, a village near Nagasaki, expressed their faith in Christianity by rejecting Buddhist priests from their funeral service. Sixty-four Christians were arrested right after the event and 3,384 Christians, the entire residents of the village, were exiled the next year. More than 600 villagers had died in exile by the time the Meiji government withdrew sanctions and allowed exiles to return to their homes in 1873.[9] It should be noted that the new government was not really willing to remove the ban on Christianity at that time and that the strong impetus to the religious freedom was the international protest against the Christian situation in Japan.[10] Generally speaking, ordinary people viewed Christianity as a heretic and evil religion. Even after 1873, Christians had to struggle with prejudice and discrimination. In local social settings, *Kakure* had been so strongly discriminated against that they hesitated to come out as Christians in the hostile atmosphere. Consequently, many hidden Christians became *Kakure*. No change was observed among them because they just remained hidden. Eventually, the existence of *Kakure* was not known outside the region.

Group Identity and Locality

A group can subsume various identities, which are shaped in the interaction with "others." People apply various identities according to contexts. Identity in the local context may differ from identity in wider context. It occurs especially when the person is situated in the periphery like *Kakure* living on a remote island. The way of living is a matter of fact and no explanation is needed in the local context, but when people feel eyes on them from outside, their ideas and practices tend to be presented with some explanations, modifications, or decorations under the heading of "local tradition."

Arguing political ideology, Imamura describes modernity as a swaying process between two poles, namely, particularistic nationalism and universalistic cosmopolitanism.[11] The former often takes the shape of an unifying force towards the nation-state. This notion can be well applied to the modernizing process of Japan. Japan revitalized the emperor system and demonstrated herself as homogeneous nation in her modernizing

period. The image of homogeneity remained long after World War II. The flourishing of *Nihonjin-ron* (theories about Japanese-ness) contributed to form an image of national identity. Whether Japan is described positively or negatively, 'Japan is unique,' 'Japan is homogeneous,' 'Japanese society is characterized by harmony and consensus,' and 'Japanese society is group oriented' were the four major themes of *Nihonjin-ron* until recently.[12)]

Kelly proposes a dual model of postwar Japanese society as "increasingly homogeneous" and "persistently diverse." He proposes simultaneous process of standardization and differentiation. With reference to the dual model, Kelly argues the tension between modernity and tradition and divides the tradition into two categories, namely, "backward boonies" to be assimilated into modern society and the "native folk" to be preserved as testimony to a moral society.[13)] Kelly's analysis is challenging in denying a homogeneous image, but at the same time, his model puts emphasis on mainstream discourses. The division of "native folk" and "backward boonies" also emphasizes the centrality of Japan. The criterion of the division is their adaptation to the mainstream discourses. If the region cannot offer a suitable image of locality, it will fade out, and if a region succeeds to fit itself in the mainstream discourse, they can promote their local identity as "native folk."

Recently, the concern for homogeneity and centrality has been replaced by a focus on diversity in Japan. The most striking appeals come from ethnic groups such as Okinawans, Ainu, and Koreans. They are positive and creative movements, show the reality of diversity and deny the old framework.[14)] The contemporary situation is characterized as lacking central legitimizer for the evaluation. Everyday life is a process of collecting information, seeking appropriate criteria, and continuous re-evaluation of everything. For example, when people watch a television program which features a specific region, they learn the frameworks and discourses to present local cultures and they apply them ad hoc to their own culture.

The conversion of *Kakure* deserves attention as an example that shows what happens when people enlarge their social world beyond the given "society." It is right to see *Kakure* as "vanishing minority," [15)] but vanishing itself was their positive choice to deal with changing social settings, networks, ideas, and new 'audience.' *Kakure* live in seriously depopulating and aging districts and their keen concern is to invite people from outside or preventing people from moving out. Therefore, the evaluation from outside is more important and critical to their everyday life. They are highly conscious about how people outside will look at them. In this sense, the conversion is the attempt to change their group identity. Moreover, the abandonment of their religion was to improve their lives in the island by setting the people free from the burden of community.

The following sections examine a particular *Kakure* group. Examination of their three-fold identities will clarify that the conversion made their identity acceptable to the world beyond their immediate living environment.

Case Study: *Kakure* of Goto Islands

Kakure are only reported in Nagasaki prefecture, and they are most numerous in Goto and Ikitsuki. Goto is a group of islands 200km west of the city of Nagasaki. Most

Kakure communities are located in secluded and poor areas. *Kakure* communities used to consist of *Kakure* only and the religion formed the basis for their social lives. The basic unit of the religious milieu is not the individual but the family. The number of *Kakure* is ambiguous, and is estimated around 30,000 people in the middle of twentieth century.[16] However, during and after the Japan's high economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s, *Kakure* decreased rapidly. Now their numbers are estimated as less than 2,000 and there are few groups holding *Kakure* as their community religion.[17] The group examined in this article live on a tiny island of thirty five households. This island was settled by two groups of people with slightly different *Kakure* heritages. All households with one exception used to be *Kakure* and were divided into two groups. One group, which consisted of five households, abandoned *Kakure* and moved to Shinto in the mid-1980s. This paper focuses on the other group, which abandoned *Kakure* in 1993.

Among *Kakure* group on this island, Christian prayers, calendars, sacred objects and rituals are handed down from generation to generation. The characteristics of *Kakure* are syncretism, absence of doctrinal base, emphasis on ritual, and ancestor worship.

Syncretism

Their religious world is highly mixed with Shinto, Buddhism and Japanese folk belief systems. This syncretism is promoted by their tradition of hiding their Christian belief behind other religious traditions. Since *Kakure* pretended to be Buddhists in Edo period, and more recently, they utilized Shinto as the front of their Christian faith, most *Kakure* except religious officials are more familiar with Shinto than with Christianity.

The absence of a doctrinal base

Kakure lack the discourse to represent their religion. From *Kakure*'s point of view, to understand their religion is to memorize lines of prayers, to practice rituals properly, and to calculate the date of liturgy with their special traditional calendars. Traditionally, watching and listening to the elders' conduct was the only source of learning. It used to be prohibited to take jottings, so they learned by memory and later made notes privately at home. In the course of learning, one should refrain from asking the meaning of the lines, rituals and the religion itself. Since the prayers were handed down orally from generation to generation and since some of them were based on prayers in Latin, it was hard to understand the meaning of prayers. It might be true that asking questions was prohibited because no one could answer, but at the same time, keeping the ancestors' way became more important than to seek the meaning. If *Kakure* quest after the meaning of the religion, they would possibly end up by using the teaching of Catholicism. That would put the identity of *Kakure* in question because *Kakure* are the Christians who claim to be different from Catholics.

A *Kakure* chief elder carefully avoided this dilemma. In studying *Kakure* prayers, he read the Christian Bible and the Psalms for reference and found the original version of some *Kakure* prayers. Knowing the apparent mistakes in the *Kakure* version, he had never corrected any lines but followed the "mistaken" version of the prayer. To follow the ancestors' way was the core of the religion from his viewpoint.

Emphasis on ritual

The lack of doctrine inevitably resulted in putting importance on rituals. Proper performance of rituals is one of their central concerns and the religious practice itself becomes the core of the religion.

Ancestor worship

Kakure are highly conscious of their ancestors' effort to bequeath the religious heritage in difficult situation. Having mixed up with Japanese religious sentiment, ancestor worship is the basis of the group cohesion and legitimizes their continuity.

When the conversion took place, the population of the island could be divided into three groups according to their life history: minors under twenty years of age, adults from thirty years of age to sixty-four years of age, and elders over sixty-four years of age. Since the young left the island after high school, there were no residents in their twenties. The high economic growth began when adults became old enough to work, hence, most of them left Goto to get salaried jobs. They returned to Goto to take the responsibility of taking care of the old parents after the long absence, but many of them had some prospect of leaving the island again after the passing of their parents. Most elders had no experience of living outside the Goto Islands except during World War II. Since many of them did not have children living in the island, they prepared to leave there in case of their needing support. Therefore, most people of every generation had prospects for moving out.

In 1993, they decided to abandon *Kakure* heritage and moved into Shinto. The direct impetus was the resignation of the chief religious leader from his post. Religious officials exclusively conducted *Kakure* rituals and the religious knowledge was a prerogative for them. This resulted in a heavy burden on the officials and not many candidates for religious leadership were available. Consequently, neither finding a successor to his post nor prolonging his terms of office was successful. The conversion eventually took place after a series of public and private discussions. They voted for the final decision for the abandonment of *Kakure* and they agreed to continue in Shinto. Moving to Shinto was natural for them because Shinto was the primary means of hiding the *Kakure* religion.

The separation between *Kakure* officials and others was relevant to this decision. The religious organization consisted of a chief religious leader, an administrator of baptism, several lesser officials, and common *Kakure.* The chief religious leader took the heaviest responsibility. He safeguarded the preserved church calendar, transposed the dates of the calendar from its solar form to the lunar form, and conducted all twenty-seven annual ceremonies as well as all the rites of passage except baptism for every member of the group. The chief religious leader followed the taboos much more strictly than any other members. Since most taboos were related to the activities of fishery or agriculture, he had a difficult time to make the religious duty compatible with his job. Though leaders were paid for conducting individual rites of passages in recent years, the payment was not enough to compensate for the absence from the job and they were paid little for conducting annual ceremonies. In the past when an age-grade system operated effectively on this island, conflict between subsistence and

religious duties had been not problematic because the latter were administered by the retired. However, since depopulation and ageing of this island in recent years did not allow such division of labor, even other officials could not take over the position of chief religious leader in 1993.

A *Kakure* woman who moved into the island by marriage from a Catholic family on a neighboring island told her impression of *Kakure* religion. She attended annual ceremonies, her baptism, funerals, and memorials for the dead. She felt *Kakure* strange because all the core elements were left to religious leaders exclusively. Because of their "hidden" nature, officials secretly performed rituals concerning Christianity in a different room and she only attended feasts or Shinto rituals. Common *Kakure* like herself could not be concerned with the Christian part of the religion. Except for her own baptism, she had never seen Christian-like *Kakure* rituals. Religious matters were also delegated to the elders at the family level. Though both her husband and her father-in-law were equal in the sense that they were representatives of their household, her family followed the opinion of the parents concerning the religious affairs. She understood that *Kakure* was a religion for the household or the community as a whole, not for individuals.

One of their critical problems was the lack of discourse to explain *Kakure* religion and its legitimacy. Despite their "hidden" nature, the people, history, culture and the location of *Kakure* used to be well known facts in this region. Those who lived in this region shared knowledge about *Kakure* to some extent. However, people living outside do not know anything about "contemporary hidden Christians." Hence, if *Kakure* is to presented to the mainstream Japanese, the essence and contents of the *Kakure* religion, the reason why they remain as "hidden," and their relationship to Roman Catholics and other aspects of their religious activities must be manifested.

The need for the explanation occurs from three reasons. First, the modernizing process forced them to confront the people outside. As noted above, most have prospects of leaving. In other words, most of them need to prepare for moving out. Because few Japanese outside the region know the religion, *Kakure* would have to explain their religion. Second, because adults stayed away in other regions for a long time, they are already strangers to a certain extent, and some of them return with wives who are ignorant of *Kakure*. Since it was the role of women to prepare for rituals and to entertain the participants, *Kakure* have to convince women of the significance of *Kakure* religion. Third, as contemporary Japanese, they are aware that the "ordinary" way to introduce a religion is mainly through teaching. However, *Kakure* have already lost their doctrinal base and evangelization is unknown. Presenting *Kakure* as descendants of the medieval Catholics is possible, but they cannot provide convincing reason why they continue hiding under the existing freedom of belief. If they use the Christian discourse, they part with their own choice of being apart from Christianity.

Moreover, a "proper" religion other than *Kakure* was needed from a more practical reason. *Kakure* religion is essentially a closed system. Entry is by birth or marriage. No one can maintain his/her membership outside the community. Moving out from the community means that neither to live nor to die as *Kakure* is possible.

Three-fold Identity and Reshaping the Identity

Kakure in this island have a three-fold group identity, *Kakure*, *Itsuki* the settlers, and *Hiraki* the pioneers. These identities are entangled with each other. Detailed information will show what part of their identity was not proper for presenting outside.

Kakure, the contemporary hidden Christians

Their ancestors settled this island in the late eighteenth century and all the residents have hidden Christian heritage. It was essential and natural for them to be born into the island, to live on the island, to gain membership of island society, and to die as hidden Christians as their ancestors did. From the time of their settling in this region until recently, they were discriminated against. Since it was the period of persecution against Christianity, exposure of their secret faith would have brought serious trouble. Hence, *Kakure* were a political threat to the region. In addition, the hostility was activated during World War II, when Christians faced not only renewed persecution, but also suspicion about their identity as Japanese. In recent years, some people have expressed uneasy feeling whether others might have contempt for religion without doctrine and might label *Kakure* irrational and strange.

Itsuki, descendants of immigrants to Goto Islands

Holding negative connotation *Itsuki* literally means to come and settle somewhere, implying that someone is stuck in the place where they have moved in. Their ancestors were immigrants from mainland Kyushu in the late eighteenth century. They responded to the recruitment of settlers by a lord of Goto, who sufferd from the shortage of farmers. Thousands of farmers immigrated officially and unofficially and many hidden Christians were among them. Since it was believed that all hidden Christians in Goto Islands had already been exterminated long before the period of immigration, to be a *Kakure* practically meant to be an *Itsuki.* From the viewpoint of indigenous Goto residents, who were already suffering from poverty at that time, such large numbers of immigrants posed an economic threat. Eventually, *Itsuki* settled in uninhibited places and endured far poorer lives than the indigenous. The negative connotation of *Kakure* and *Itsuki* were entangled with each other and provided the reason for the enduring severe segregation and discrimination against them. The conflicts remain even today, and the people have ambivalent feeling about the *Itsuki* identity.

Hiraki, pioneers of the island

Unlike these two identities, the term *Hiraki* has positive connotations. *Hiraki* literally means to open something. Since they were expelled from the area used by indigenous residents, they pioneered many uninhabited places to settle down in the Goto Islands. The island is no exception. Moreover, from the 1950s to the 1960s, they worked in fishing and public works projects, both of which were realized successfully through the cooperation of all members of this island. Every islander is proud of these achievements.

Though the *Hiraki* identity is a paraphrase of *Itsuki* identity, the connotation is totally different. First, while the *Itsuki* identity refers to a historical event and nothing can be done about the immigration, they can renew the *Hiraki* identity even today by their own activity of pioneering. The referential point shifts from their history of pioneering their island to more recent events, such as their success in fishing and in building infrastructure after World War II. Second, *Hiraki* identity does not emphasize conflicts among people. The cohesion and co-operation of the people as pioneers is the central concern. *Kakure* identity subsumes internal conflict. There is a gulf between the elders, who feel their responsibility to hand down their religious heritage and the younger generation, which does not attach heavy importance to the religion. At the same time, *Itsuki* identity is connected with rivalry relationship with indigenous Goto residents, who were persecutors of Christianity. Only the *Hiraki* identity is suitable for promoting positive group identity.

Shifting Identities

People of this island emphasize cohesion and historical continuity as the virtue of the island. They claim that they partially maintain their religious tradition by converting to Shinto because Shinto is the religion by means of which they hid Christianity. As we have seen, *Kakure* in the island have several identities relating to each other. All of them are valid as long as they live in Goto, i.e., their position in the given society had been prescribed. However, apart from the local contexts of Goto Islands, each of these identities has different implications. *Kakure* is associated more to the romanticized Christian century than to the poor and discriminated history of the people but religion without doctrine does not meet the images expected from the outsiders. *Itsuki* and *Hiraki* are reduced to their literal meanings. Since the people have prospects for moving out and need to draw people from outside, they are conscious of their self-image from the outsiders' viewpoint. Knowing both connotations of the identities in and out of Goto, their abandonment of *Kakure* religion is their attempt to reconstruct their identity choosing *Hiraki* identity and represent themselves under it.

It should be noted that they are reducing the practical network within the island. Despite their emphasis on the group's cohesion, the collaboration and cooperation is decreasing. First, the conversion was decided in order to release the elders and housewives from the burden to the community, which resulted in less collaboration and less communication. Second, by converting to Shinto, the rites of passage are reduced from community ritual to a family ritual. Funerals and memorial ceremonies were held in the island before the conversion. The former was conducted by both *Kakure* officials and Shinto priests and the latter was usually held only by *Kakure* officials. Since there is no authentic Shinto shrine on the island, priests used to be invited from the neighboring island. Neighbors and relatives living in the island helped in preparing rituals and attended them. After the conversion to Shinto, many rituals are conducted by Shinto priests in the neighboring island. People cannot attend rituals so freely as when they were held in the island. In other words, they find excuses not to be involved in the rituals of other families. Also, if the guests are treated at the neighboring island, there is no need to prepare food and places for the rituals on the island, hence, there is no need for collaboration. The effort to promote a positive

group identity leads to the reduction of the actual local interaction which affords them to interact with the wider world.

Featherstone notes that globalizing society requires us to understand social life without the term 'society.'[18] In modern times, society with obvious boundary and internal consistency were presupposed when analyzing peoples' lives. However, nowadays, global representations transcend the boundary of society and pile the pressure directly on people's actuality in local settings. *Kakure* people feel the pressure and they reconstruct local social practice according to global contexts. Although local society is a locus of activity, people adapt themselves to and appropriate various elements from the wider world, namely, global contexts. With respect to *Kakure*, while they utilize *Hiraki* identity to preserve the image of internal consistency, they, at the same time, reduce social interaction in reality. The reduction of the social obligation and social interaction inside the group allows them to enlarge networks beyond the old boundaries of society. The conversion from *Kakure* to Shinto is their attempt to reduce group cohesion as well as to preserve their group identity.

Notes:

1) Kevin Bales, *Disposable People: new slavery in the global economy*, (California: University of California Press, 1999); Roger Sawyer, *Children Enslaved*, (London: Routledge, 1988).
2) Anthony Giddens, "Living in a Post Traditional Society," Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, eds., *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, copyright in 1988), 96.
3) William R Garrett and Roland Robertson, "Religion and Globalization: An Introduction," Roland Robertson and William R. Garret eds., *Religion and Global Order*, (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1991), ix-xxiii.
4) Kuniko Miyanaga, "Updating the Classics," *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford*, Volume 30, No. 2, 1999, (http://www.kuniko.com/September_1.html).
5) Miyazaki Kentaro, the leading scholar in the field of contemporary hidden Christians, describes the usage and connotation of *Kakure Kirishitan*. Miyazaki Kentaro, *Kakure Kirishitan no Shinko Sekai* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1996), 30-34. For other helpful studies of *Kakure*, see Stephan Turnbull, *The Kakure Kirishitan of Japan: A Study of Development, Beliefs and Rituals to the Present Days*, (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 1996); Ann Harrington, *Japan's Hidden Christians*, (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1993); Christal Whelan, "Loss of the Signified Among the Kakure Kirishitan," *Japanese Religions*, (Vol.19, Nos.1&2, 1993).
6) Charles Ralph Boxer, *The Christian Century in Japan*, 1549–1650 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951).
7) This dilemma is expressed effectively by a historical novel of Mihara Makoto in *Nanji ra Kirishitan ni Arazu: Chikugo Imamura Kirshitan Oboegaki* (Fukuoka: Imamura Kirishitan Shiryokan, 1991).
8) The conflict between missionary theology and Japanese religious sentiment was not unique in *Kakure* context but more evident among Protestant missionaries. Mark Mullins observes as follows: "the gospel preached by most missionaries included the teaching that there is no hope for those who die without faith in Christ." Mark Mullins, *Christianity Made in Japan*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), 135.
9) Takagi Keiko, *Takagi Sen'emon Oboegaki no Kenkyu*, (Tokyo: Chuo Shuppansha, 1993); Francisque Marnas, *La "Religion de Jésus" (Iaso-Jakyō) Ressuscitée au Japon*, (Delhomme et Briguet, Éditeurs, Paris, 1896).
10) Gonoi Takashi, *Nihon Kirisutokyo Shi*, (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1990), 261-270.
11) Imamura, Hitoshi, *Kindaisei no Kouzou*, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1994), 197.
12) Benedict, Ruth, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: patterns of Japanese culture*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

company, 1946); Suzuki Daisetz Teitaro, *Zen and Japanese Culture*, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1970, originally published in 1964); Nakane Chie, *Japanese society*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, originally published in 1967); John Toland, *The Rising Sun: the decline and fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945*, (New York: Random House, 1970); Isaiah BenDasan, *The Japanese and the Jews*, (translated by Richard L. Gage, New York: Weatherhill, 1972); Doi Takeo, *The Anatomy of dependence*, (translated by John Bester, Tokyo: Kodansha International, distributed by Harper & Row, New York, 1973, originally published in 1971); Takie Sugiyama Lebra, *Japanese Patterns of Behavior*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976); Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan as Number One: lessons for America*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979); Tsunoda Tadanobu, *The Japanese Brain: Uniqueness and Universality*, (translated by Oiwa Yoshinori, Tokyo: Taishukan, 1985, originally published in 1978).

13) William Kelly, "Finding a Place in Metropolitan Japan," Andrew Gordon ed., *Postwar Japan as History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 189-238.

14) Oguma Eiji, *Tan'itsu Minzoku Shinwa no Kigen: 'Nihonjin' no Jigazou no Keifu*, (Tokyo: Shin'yosha, 1995). Oguma Eiji, *Nihonjin no Kyokai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chosen Shokuminchi Shihai kara Fukki Undo made* (Tokyo: Shin'yosha, 1998).

15) Christal Whelan, "Japan's Vanishing Minority: The Kakure Kirishitan of the Goto Island," *Japan Quartery*, Vol.12, No.4 (October-December, 1994), 434-449.

16) Tagita, Koya, *Showa Jidai no Senmpuku Kirishitan* (Tokyo: Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkokai, 1954), 1-4; Kataoka Yakichi, *Kakure Kirishitan* (Tokyo: Shibundo, 1966), 41-44.

17) More details of *Kakure* of this island and their conversion can be found in Takasaki Megumi, *Jikozou no Sentaku: Goto Kakure kirishitan no Shudan Kaishu*, (Tokyo: International Christian University, 1999); Megumi Takasaki, "The Process of Abandoning the Hidden Christian Heritage in Contemporary Japan," Stephen Turnbull, ed., *Japan's Hidden Christians 1549–1999*. (Sally: Japan Library, 2000); Takasaki Megumi, "Kakure Kirishitan no Kaishu ni Miru Chiho no Hen'yo," unpublished dissertation, International Christian University, 1998).

18) Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash eds., *Global Modernities* (London: Sage Publication, 1995), 2.