

Middle Class Politics: The Philippine Experience*

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Introduction

This study provides an overview of middle class politics in the Philippines in the context of the country's experience of formal democratic rule since independence, the authoritarian interregnum and the restoration and consolidation of democracy.

In both academic and political circles in the Philippines, the middle classes have not been as systematically studied as the elites (landlords and big business) and the peasantry on the assumption that they constitute an insignificant segment of the population. During the last three decades, this assertion has taken root with the lack of any sustained economic growth in the country in contrast with that of East Asia and the more robust economies in Southeast Asia.

However, in the country's political history, the middle classes have in fact played important political roles in varying conjunctures since the declaration of independence in 1946. There are a number of important factors that account for the political role of the middle classes in the country on a scale seemingly out of proportion to their actual numbers. First, an educated middle class highly concentrated in Metro Manila and later

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in the major urban centers emerged as early as the American colonial period due to a combination of a number of factors. Manila's role as a center of the export and import trade in the country spawned a lot of diverse professional and technical services. In this context, American colonial policy introduced a system of mass public education and initiated the Filipinization of the civil service which opened up new opportunities for employment as professionals in the civil service. Thus, by the twilight of American colonial rule in 1939, one author estimates that those employed as professionals (accountants, engineers, lawyers, physicians, and college professors) teachers and government civil servants including those performing clerical tasks constituted 18 percent of the labor force in Manila.⁽¹⁾

By the fifties, an education boom at the tertiary level was sparked by the remarkable economic growth that took place during the initial period of exchange controls and import-substitution which saw the manufacturing sector growing at an average of 12 percent per year. This period of economic growth resulted in the proliferation of numerous colleges and universities providing relatively cheap tertiary education, albeit of very uneven quality.

As economic growth slowed down and later stagnated in the ensuing decades, the relatively large sector of college-educated individuals with middle class outlooks who could not find stable and satisfying jobs proved to be a potent factor for the political activism of this segment of the middle classes. A second factor for the significant political presence of the middle classes lies in the country's legacy of a formal liberal democratic system which allowed for a far greater space in articulating and organizing middle class interests of various kinds. Thus, the country's history of regular electoral contestations, free media and formal guarantees of civil and political rights have also served to develop the political skills and confidence of key fractions of the middle classes. It is interesting to note that not even the authoritarian rule of Mr. Marcos was able to effectively stifle the activism of civil society organizations even while many were

forced to go underground at the height of martial rule. A third factor that has enhanced the role of the middle classes in waging political actions has been the development and growth of the new and old middle class fractions outside of the direct control of the state. This has been historically rooted in the development of a relatively weak state in the Philippines vis-à-vis powerful economic elites that initially developed with a large degree of autonomy from the state. Unlike in the economies of the NICs of both East and Southeast Asia where the state exerted a more direct and pervasive control over economic activities, there developed in the Philippines a more autonomous private economic sector which was able to capture or strongly influence various agencies of state power.⁽²⁾

While the developments discussed above have served to condition the politics of the middle classes in the Philippines, it must also be made clear that there is no distinct and predictable role associated with middle classes. In actual historical circumstances, middle class political propensities and practices can range from right-wing conservatism and radicalism to liberal and left-wing political causes.

Middle Class Politics at Varying Conjunctures since Independence

To understand better the major manifestations of middle class politics in the Philippines, three broad political periods will be examined in the country's post-war history. The first coincides with the period of formal liberal democratic politics from the declaration of independence in 1946 to 1972. The second covers the period of authoritarian rule by Marcos from 1972 to 1986. And the third examines the post-Marcos period from 1986 to the present.

For the three periods, it is significant to note that there are common features and tendencies associated with middle class politics and social behavior. First, all of the major oppositional political projects and movements during these three periods had middle class leaderships. In turn these oppositional movements relied strongly on

constituencies of university students and college educated professionals as their initial base of political support even while such projects self-consciously aimed at organizing other social classes and sectors for their ultimate political goals. Second, these major organized political movements led by middle class personalities have been invariably influenced by the following ideologies: Marxist-Communist, conservative and radical schools of Christianity, syncretic versions of liberal-pluralist views, and in particular in the Southern Philippines, Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. Third, there has been a significant rate of out-migration whether as permanent residents (mainly to the United States, Canada and Australia) or overseas contract workers (Middle East, Japan, Southeast Asia and Europe) particularly by the educated fractions of the middle classes.

Middle Class Politics during the Period of Formal Liberal Democracy, 1946-1972

During the postwar period underpinned by a formal liberal democratic system, middle class involvement in politics ranged from conservative to moderate and radical projects. Among the educated progressive middle classes during this period, the most compelling political issue focused on fleshing out a nationalist and democratic alternative political program to what was then perceived as a government run by the country's most powerful dynastic political clans largely subservient to American political and economic interests in the region. In the context of the economic downturn that overtook the manufacturing growth in the fifties, two major oppositional political responses emerged. The first was Marxist-Maoist inspired and gathered strength with its militant youth-student organizations in the sixties and climaxed with the launching of a new communist party in 1968. Of the 13 founding members of the new communist party, 10 came from middle class families and the founding chairman, Jose Ma. Sison, while born into a landed clan worked as a university professor.⁽³⁾ Moreover, during the formative years of the new party the overwhelming majority of the party's initial core of cadres were university students and intellectuals from middle class families. The guerrilla movement

founded by the new party in 1969 also gained its momentum with cadres recruited from militant student and youth organizations. Under the direct influence of the new party, several sectoral and people's organizations were formed in the sixties and seventies and most of these were also led by cadres with middle class backgrounds.

The second significant oppositional political response to the crisis of the sixties and seventies centered on a grouping of parties and organizations directly inspired by Christian reformism and radicalism. These church-based movements also emerged as a direct response to what was then perceived as the developing hegemonic political threat posed by Marxist-inspired organizations.⁽⁴⁾ Among the Catholic-based organizations, the influence of the social activism of the papal encyclicals of the sixties was significant with much of the initial political guidance coming from Jesuit priests and theologians. One concerted attempt to develop a formal national political party anchored on principles of Christian social democracy was exemplified by the founding of the Christian Social Movement in the sixties and later the National Union of Christian Democrats. A more radical version of Christian activism also emerged under the influence of Marxism, Maoism and the liberation theology of Latin America and would take organizational root with the founding of the Christians for National Liberation in the early seventies. Like the Marxist-inspired parties and organizations that were formed during the sixties, the church-based reformist and radical movements were also led and staffed by middle class professionals and college graduates.

A third strand of middle class politics during the fifties and sixties is seen in the reformist liberal activism of professionals and business entrepreneurs who founded citizen's parties for good government or sought to safeguard and reform the electoral process. The best example of a middle class organization best known for its continuing project of monitoring electoral processes and results is the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). Founded in 1951 under American auspices, the organization has succeeded in institutionalizing itself as the country's unofficial guardian of electoral

contests, particularly of the counting of votes, and has involved in the process many leading professionals, church and business personalities. Middle class liberal activism during this period was also dramatized by the mobilization of political support for many independent candidates during the election in 1971 for members of a commission to draft a new constitution.

The decade of the fifties and sixties also marked the second wave of out-migration of substantial number of Filipino professionals to the United States.⁽⁵⁾ Most of the professionals who immigrated to the United States at this time were nurses and medical doctors. During this period, Filipinos constituted the biggest number of nurses in the United States while the medical doctors were the second biggest group of migrant doctors, next only to those from India. The pre-war and post-war wave of migrations have in fact made the Filipino community in the United States the fastest growing group of immigrants from Asia. This "brain drain" first to North America and later to various countries of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe is one of the enduring proclivities of the educated Filipino middle class.

During the liberal democratic period, middle class political activism made its most dramatic impact with the popularization of a nationalist consciousness and political program articulated through both Marxist revolutionary idioms and Christian social activism. Moreover, by propagating the nationalist program through the use of *Pilipino*, the national language, these political movements advanced immensely the acceptability of a common language of every day discourse. In light of the practice of the elites in using English as the official means of communication and the traditional hostility of other major ethnic linguistic groupings to the use of *Pilipino*, this political popularization of the national language by nationalist and revolutionary organizations was an important contribution to national consciousness and identity.

Finally, reflecting their structural weakness as a political constituency, the middle-class led political movements during this period deliberately sought and cultivated

systematic linkages and coalitions with other social classes and sectors, primarily those of the peasantry and agricultural workers, and the urban poor and industrial workers. Whether as a product of conscious ideology and strategy or a pragmatic political response, these political and organizing efforts by the middle class-led political movements and parties largely defined their political credibility and organizational strength.

Middle Class Politics during the Authoritarian Rule of Marcos, 1972-1986

During the authoritarian rule of Marcos, middle class politics needs to be situated in the context of the struggle against the dictatorship. Shaped by the earlier alignment of political forces during the sixties, the organized involvement of middle class fractions against authoritarian rule was mediated through three basic political forces: 1) the Marxist-Maoist inspired organizations under the leadership of the new Communist party and the much smaller independent Marxist-socialist organizations; 2) the Christian-rooted political movements and parties with the more militant ones adopting variations of Christian social democratic ideologies; and 3) the organizations propelled by liberal democratic ideologies such as KAAKBAY (Movement for National Independence and Sovereignty) headed by the well-known liberal oppositionist politician, the late senator Jose W. Diokno. Along the same mold were organizations such as MABINI and the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) made up of human rights lawyers opposed to the dictatorship.

In the southern part of the country in Mindanao, middle class opposition to authoritarian rule took on a special dimension due to the special religious ethnic factor. Among the ethnic Muslims, middle class participation in the struggle was principally mediated through the originally separatist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) whose leadership also included many university educated intellectuals and students including its founding head, Nur Misuari, who once taught at the University of the

Philippines.

A unique process of middle class radicalism took place during the period of authoritarian rule with the politicization of the military. As an institution, the military in the Philippines has an officer corps made up overwhelmingly of recruits from middle class families. By the early eighties, the protracted war with the communist-led guerrillas and the separatist Muslim armed parties in the context of the cronyism and lack of professionalism of the top loyalist Marcos generals had demoralized the younger battle-hardened officer corps. Spearheaded by the class 1971 graduates of the Philippine Military Academy, a reformist faction identified with then Secretary of National Defense Enrile developed within the military. This would later constitute the nucleus of the mutinous faction that ignited the February uprising. Unlike other processes of middle class activism whose success usually required systematic linkages and coalitions with other social classes and sectors, the middle class military officers were in control of an institution that could propel them into power without any need for a social and political base.⁽⁶⁾ Fortunately for the Aquino administration that replaced the authoritarian rule of Marcos, the seven coup attempts launched by military rebels all failed. But at the same time, the politicization of the military, like in most transitions to democratic rule, became the most de-stabilizing problem that the first two post-Marcos administrations (Aquino and Ramos) had to address.

In terms of the composition of the middle classes, another important feature of authoritarian rule under Marcos was the rapid expansion of the state bureaucracy. With its direct intervention and control of various aspects of the economy, the Marcos administration created several government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs). In 1975, employment in GOCCs totalled 41, 250; by 1984, employment in these same government corporations reached 134, 453, an increase of 226 percent. During the same period, the entire government civil service also experienced a 145 percent increase from 533, 284 in 1975 to 1, 310, 789 in 1984 (Civil Service Commission 1986). Among the

civil servants, public school teachers at varying levels proved to be the most responsive to the anti-dictatorship struggle and a number of both aboveground and clandestine militant organizations emerged from their ranks.

In 1983, the assassination of oppositionist senator Benigno Aquino Jr. who was returning from political exile in the United States provided a decisive turning point in the struggle against authoritarian rule. Aquino's murder took place in the context of an intensifying economic crisis and more than a decade-long struggle against the dictatorship by communist-led armed guerrillas in the countryside and several legal and clandestine organizations in major cities and town centers all over the country. The assassination of the well-known opposition leader further fractured the remaining elite support for the dictatorship and opened up new opportunities for coalitional politics among various parties and organizations of different political persuasions. With the emergence of a far broader and more determined opposition, many sectors traditionally cowed by the dictatorship were emboldened to join open actions of defiance against authoritarian rule. Thus, during the twilight years of the authoritarian regime some of the most vivid open protests erupted in the very centers of high commerce and finance involving the professionals, white collar workers, and the anti-crony business personalities.⁽⁷⁾

Through four days of military mutiny and a people's uprising from 22-25 February 1986, the struggle against the dictatorship climaxed with Mr. Marcos fleeing to Hawaii under American auspices.⁽⁸⁾ It has become fashionable to refer to the four days of mutiny and uprising in February 1986 as the "middle class revolution" that signalled the end of the dictatorship. It is of course true that many of those who played leadership roles during the uprising, particularly in the EDSA⁽⁹⁾ part of the confrontation, were professionals and middle class personalities including the mutinous military officers and the ubiquitous priests and nuns. It is also true, however, that in other areas of the popular uprising, in particular the Mendiola area in the vicinity of the presidential palace, left-

wing organized labor organizations had a pronounced political presence. What needs to be explained more carefully is the genuinely popular nature of the uprising that galvanized the participation of the people from all walks of life, rich and poor alike.⁽¹⁰⁾

In the struggle against the authoritarian rule of Marcos, middle class leadership was pervasive among all opposition groups across ideological and political lines with the exception of the political parties led by anti-Marcos politicians from conservative, long established political and economic clans. It was difficult, however, to construct stable coalitional linkages among various groups of competing ideological outlooks and political strategies. For instance, the assassination of Aquino provided excellent opportunities for coalitional politics against the dictatorship. In another sense, however, by pushing the Marcos administration into a politically defensive stance, this same event opened up the democratic space that allowed smaller, less ideological opposition groups to be less dependent organizationally on the much bigger political formations. On the whole, the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship showcased the political strengths and weaknesses of the middle classes in their political practices as class fractions. As a source of political leadership, the middle classes, especially its most educated segment, have indeed responded to all kinds of political projects, whether as technocrats of the Marcos dictatorship, cadres of revolutionary parties, or army coup leaders. But it is this same flexibility and contradictoriness which stress the limitations of the middle class as a constituency for political action.

Middle Class Politics during the Post-Marcos Period since 1986

With the restoration of formal democratic rule following the popular ratification of a new constitution and the holding of elections in 1987, the electoral system once again became the main arena for legitimizing political contestations in the country.⁽¹¹⁾ The transition to democratic rule, however, has been extremely contentious and protracted. Reflecting the problem of a politicized military, the Aquino-led successor administration

to authoritarian rule had to weather no less than seven coup attempts in its first four years in office. It took the next administration under former General Ramos, elected as president in 1992, to successfully conclude a political settlement with the military rebels in 1995 and a peace accord with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996. Following the Ramos administration, the Estrada presidency elected in 1998 has yet to work out a political solution vis-a-vis the local communist-led challenge, now more than thirty years in armed opposition. Moreover, the government continues to face another armed challenge from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a breakaway armed party from the MNLF, and the *Abu Sayyaf*, a small separatist Muslim armed group but more prone to non-conventional forms of armed engagement including the taking of civilian hostages.

For many middle class-led organizations and middle class personalities, the opening up of democratic space and the restoration of electoral contests in the post-Marcos period signalled a serious reexamination of strategies and tactics for political practice and contestation. Many have opted to explore the opportunities and possibilities provided by the democratized conjuncture, in spite of all its faults and weaknesses. The passage of the Local Government Code in 1991 further provided incentives for NGOs and smaller, new political parties to contest political power at the local levels of government. With the revival of the electoral process, much of the more moderate strand of middle class activism centered on the revival and strengthening of NAMFREL as the electoral watchdog particularly during national elections.

In taking advantage of these new arenas of organizing and mobilizing, many developmental NGOs and people's organizations (POs) have formed political networks to support progressive candidates or work out coalitions with the existing political parties. More recently, these networks have formed new political parties in response to the party list system, resulting in the first set of elected party list candidates in the lower house of Congress in the 1998 national elections. Another tendency has been reflected in

simply maximizing the political and organizational reach of developmental and advocacy NGOs and people's organizations but uncoupling this effort from any armed political movement. A good example of this is the political activism that has animated the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), the country's biggest single developmental NGO.⁽¹²⁾

These new possibilities for political action and strategy sparked by the transition to a more open polity highlights the most crucial aspect of policy debates across all political and ideological spectrums: does the newly opened up political space provide enough opportunities to pursue fundamentally transformative socio-political projects without resorting to armed struggle? In its various manifestations, this contested claim has been one of the reasons for the internal debates that have bedeviled the armed communist movement in the country since 1986, leading to serious organizational splits.⁽¹³⁾ In response to the restoration of formal democratic rule, all of the oppositional formations and parties influenced by Christian social activism have embraced the electoral system as the legitimate arena for political contestation. Following the successful peace negotiations concluded with the government in 1995, the once clandestine military rebel formations have also come out in the open. With the active participation of personalities with military backgrounds in electoral contests, a new generation of soldier-politicians has emerged in fact.

One important area for further understanding middle class behavior lies in their participation in the phenomenon of contract labor overseas. In the search for better work opportunities abroad, Filipinos have served as overseas contract workers in significant numbers. One study shows that "the number of processed Filipino contract workers increased twenty-fold over a 16-year period, from just over 36,000 in 1975 to almost 700,000 in 1991" (Cariño 1992:6). During a 12 year period from 1895 to 1996, statistics from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency show that an average of 600,000 Filipinos left the country as overseas contract workers. From 1986 to 1994, the average

dollar remittances of these overseas workers constituted 17 percent of the country's annual exports.⁽¹⁴⁾

The extent of middle class participation in the overseas Filipino workers (OFW) phenomenon is indicated by data on their educational backgrounds. Using data from the 1995 Census of Population, one author calculates that of those with at least some college background, 22 percent had served as OFW. The same data show that of those with at least a college degree, 16 percent had been OFWs (Jackson 1997:44). One other study completed in 1983 also reveals that over 50 percent of the Filipino migrant workers surveyed had completed college, or had at least taken some college subjects (Gibson 1983).⁽¹⁵⁾ An important aspect of the OFW experience that needs to be systematically studied lies in the way this process has reconstituted identities and transformed the social, economic, and political positions of the workers and their families.⁽¹⁶⁾ For its political implications, it may be argued that the OFW phenomenon has provided a safety valve that undercuts the social basis for political activism and militancy. On the other hand, it may have also produced a new generation of community leaders with political skills and more diverse resources and more receptive to progressive political projects and less tolerant of the traditional ways of doing things.

Another significant arena of middle class politics lies in the support for charismatic religious movements, in both their Catholic and Protestant variants. While not new in the country's cultural and religious tradition, these charismatic movements took on a special fervor starting in the mid-eighties with the founding of El Shaddai, the biggest Catholic charismatic movement claiming a card-carrying membership of half a million.⁽¹⁷⁾ Among the Protestant groups, the most influential are the Jesus is Lord Fellowship and Jesus Miracle Crusade. Spawned during periods of economic and political crisis, these movements have thrived due to their ability to address some popular need or longing, either ignored or unattended to by established institutions including the government.

An important indicator of middle class support for these religious movements can be

inferred from the socio-economic profile of the regular listeners of radio station DWXI which regularly airs the El Shaddai programs. During the Monday to Friday airings of El Shaddai's programs, one survey reveals that 40 percent of the regular listeners belong to Class C which is the equivalent of the middle classes in the classification scheme used by consumer research organizations in the country.⁽¹⁸⁾ Showing organizing and mobilizing skills and the sophisticated use of mass media, these religious movements have started to showcase their ability to influence political contests. For instance, during the last presidential elections in 1997, the El Shaddai through their leader Brother Mariano "Mike" Velarde, endorsed Estrada, the presidential winner, while the other movements supported other candidates.

With the restoration of elite democratic rule in the post-Marcos years, much of middle class activism has veered toward open, legal and electoral means of struggle. The political opening, however, has taken place in the context of continuing economic malaise and the government's inability to negotiate a political settlement with two protracted armed challenges: the communist-led guerrilla movement and the separatist Muslim movement in the south. Since the period of independence, middle class leadership of various kinds of political organizations, movements and parties have been pervasive and significant. A more open political arena is no doubt congenial to the exercise of political leadership over various kinds of organizations by middle class fractions, especially of its most educated sectors. But the working out of successful coalitional political arrangements between the middle classes and other classes and sectors to achieve long-term socio-political ends is a more difficult process.

As shown in past historical conjunctures, middle class fractions can provide the leadership for almost all kinds of political projects. They are politically important not because of their numbers or cohesiveness, certainly absent in the Philippine context, but because of their possession of technical competencies and political-organizational skills, highly prized by both the elites and oppositional movements of the disadvantaged

classes. Organically linked to any group or movement, these competencies and skills can have an impact far beyond the physical numbers of its middle-class partisans and practitioners.

Notes

- (1) See Daniel F. Doeppers, *Manila, 1900-1941: Social Change in a Late Colonial Metropolis* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1984), p. 53.
- (2) For systematic arguments about this thesis, see Paul D. Hutchcroft, "Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder," *World Politics* 43:3 (April 1991), pp. 414-50; and Temario C. Rivera, *Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family and State in Philippine Manufacturing* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1994).
- (3) For background historical material on the new Communist Party of the Philippines, see Jose Ma. Sison, *The Philippine Revolution: The Leaders View* (New York: Crane Russak, 1989); Gregg R. Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); and Francisco Nemenzo, "Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement," *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia*, edited by Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani (Hampshire, England: Gower, 1984).
- (4) Philippine-Church state relations are analyzed in the following books: Wilfredo Fabros, *The Church and Its Social Involvement in the Philippines, 1930-1972* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1987); Robert L. Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Mario V.

Bolasco, *Points of Departure: Essays on Christianity, Power and Social Change* (Manila: St. Scholastica's College, 1994).

- (5) The first cycle of migration to the United States took place under American colonial rule during the twenties and thirties involving primarily cheap labor for the plantations of Hawaii and California and canneries of Alaska. During this period, the labor-migrants were mostly young men from the rural areas of Luzon . The third wave of migration to the United States occurred during the seventies and eighties involving this time the parents and immediate relatives of the professionals who had immigrated after the war (the second wave of migration) and had become citizens of their adopted country.
- (6) Various aspects of the politicization of the military are analyzed in the following works: *The Final Report of the Fact Finding Commission (pursuant to R.A. No. 6832)* October 1990. This was the report of the presidential commission created by Pres. Aquino to conduct a fact-finding investigation of the 1989 military rebellion and the involvement of military and civilian officials and private persons in this failed project. *Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy* (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1990); and Felipe B. Miranda, "The Military: At the Crossroads of Politicization," *Duet for EDSA 1996: Looking Back, Looking Forward*, edited by Lorna Kalaw Tirol (Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc., 1995), pp. 63-87.
- (7) See for instance, Ma. Cynthia Banzon Bautista, "The Protest Movement and White Collar Workers of Makati after the Aquino Assassination," *U. P. Department of Sociology Paper*, Series No. 1, 1985.
- (8) For a comprehensive analysis of the rise and fall of the Marcos dictatorship, see Aurora Javate De Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw Tirol, eds., *Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People's Power* (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, Inc., 1988).

- (9) EDSA stands for the initials of the highway named after Epifanio de los Santos, a historian of the Philippine revolution against Spain. The major part of the people's uprising in February 1986 converged at a portion of EDSA which runs between the two major military camps where the rebellious factions of the military launched their mutiny against Marcos.
- (10) Seeking a more culturally nuanced explanation for the participation of workers and the urban poor in the popular uprising, Michael Pinches deploys the notion of *communitas*. This captures the extraordinary sense of camaraderie generated by the event while explaining the management of shame in its contradictory aspects of resistance and accommodation to the established order. See his "The Working Class Experience of Shame, Inequality, and People Power in Tatalon, Manila," *From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines*, edited by Benedict J Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares (Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991), pp. 166-186.
- (11) For an assessment of developments ten years after the formal restoration of democratic rule in 1986, see Lorna Kalaw Tirol, ed., *Duet for EDSA 1996: Looking Back, Looking Forward* (Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc., 1995).
- (12) Various aspects of the activities of NGOs, and peoples organizations and their relations with the state are analyzed in: Marlon A. Wui and Ma. Glenda S. Lopez, eds., *State-Civil Society Relations in Policy-Making* (Quezon City: The Third World Studies Center, 1997); and Miriam Coronel Ferrer, ed., *Civil Society Making Civil Society* (Quezon City: The Third World Studies Center, 1997).
- (13) For a discussion of the problems that have beset the communist-led armed revolutionary movement in the country since 1986, see Joel Rocamora, *Breaking Through: The Struggle Within the Communist Party of the Philippines* (Metro Manila: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1994); and Patricio N. Abinales, ed., *The Revolution*

- Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics After 1986* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1996).
- (14) calculated from the *Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1995* and the *POEA Employment Info Series 1* (1) 1993.
- (15) Katherine D. Gibson, "Contract Labour Migration from the Philippines: Preliminary Fieldwork Report" (Department of Human Geography, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University), cited in Benjamin B. Cariño, "Migrant Workers from the Philippines," *Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy*, edited by Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992).
- (16) Some studies that address the various aspects of this phenomenon include: Anne-Marie Hilsdon, "The Good Life: Cultures of Migration and Transformation of Overseas Workers in the Philippines," *Pilipinas*, No. 29 (Fall 1997), pp. 49-62; R. Pertierra, ed., *Remittances and Returnees: The Cultural Economy of Migration in Ilocos* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1992); and Noel D. Vasquez, "Economic and Social Impact of Labor Migration," *Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy*, edited by Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992), pp. 41-67.
- (17) For a study of El Shaddai, see Grace R. Gorospe-Jamon, "The El Shaddai Prayer Movement: A Study of Political Socialization in a Religious Context" (Ph.D. dissertation, the University of the Philippines, 1999).
- (18) Survey findings by the Asia Research Organization and cited in Grace Gorospe Jamon, "The El Shaddai Prayer Movement: A Study of Political Socialization in a Religious Context". This same survey shows that 56 percent of the regular listeners of the radio station belong to Class DE, the equivalent of the low-income and poor social classes.

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中間階級の政治 — フィリピンの経験 —

〈要約〉

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フィリピンの中間階級は数の上では比較的少ない（全人口のうち推計10～12%で、都市部、主に大都市マニラに非常に集中している）が、1946年の独立宣言以来様々な時代において重要な政治的役割を演じてきた。彼らは、疑いもなく、保守から中道までの、そしてリベラルから急進的さらには革命的な運動にわたる様々な政治プロジェクトにおいて、指導的役割を提供してきた。

この研究は、1) 1946～1972年のリベラルデモクラシーの期間、2) 1972～1986年のマルコスによる権威主義的支配、3) 1986年の民主的統治の回復から現在まで、という三つの時代における中間階級の政治的役割を考察する。

これら三つの時代に対して、本研究は中間階級の政治と社会行動に関連する三つの共通する特徴及び傾向を特定する。第一に、これら三つの時代を通じて、全ての主要な反体制的政治プロジェクト及び運動は中間階級に指導されていた。第二に、中間階級出身の人物によって指導されたこれらの主要な組織的政治運動は明らかに次のようなイデオロギーによって影響を受けてきた。すなわち、マルクス主義的共産主義、キリスト教の保守的及び急進的諸派、自由主義的多元主義の諸見解の混合版、及び、特にフィリピン南部において、イスラム教原理主義と急進主義である。第三に、定住者として（主にアメリカ合衆国、カナダ、オーストラリアへの）であれ、或いは海外契約労働者（中東、日本、東南アジア及び西ヨーロッパ）としてであれ、かなりの人口流出があり、とくにそれは中間階級の教育を受けた層であった。

権威主義的支配の時代には、軍部の政治化とともに、中間階級の急進主義と

いう独特な経過を見た。軍部の政治化された諸派閥はアキノ政権に対して多くのクーデタを指導し、失敗に終わった。

全体として、様々な政治プロジェクト及び政治運動において、中間階級の政治的リーダーシップが大きな勢力を持っていることが明らかになった。それは、中間階級が持っている政治組織力と技術的能力のためである。これらの政治組織力と技能的能力はエリートや不利な条件におかれた階級・地域の反体制的運動から高く評価されている。