Global Public Goods and Peace and Security in Asia †

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The search for security and prosperity in Asia-Pacific continues apace. International relations in the Pacific have lacked the institutional structures in which the Euro-Atlantic partnership is embedded. The multilateral structure across the Atlantic has also firmly anchored an American presence in Europe. The strategic rationale for US presence in the Pacific has never been as stark and simple, and the cultural and political divides across Asia-Pacific are deeper and more variegated. The security order of the region is caught between an anachronistic Cold War framework and embryonic, untested regional approaches. Equally, though, the conceptual apparatus of security analysts is also caught between an anachronistic 20th century framework and newly arising but as yet inchoate approaches. In this paper, as part of the effort to develop these propositions, I test the approach of global public goods borrowed from economics. I will first recapitulate its meaning, then seek to apply it to the security architecture of Asia-Pacific from within the traditional security paradigm, and finally test its utility against evolving concepts of security in the new millennium.

Global Public Goods (GPG)

I shall follow Inge Kaul fairly closely in my usage of the concept of global public goods.[1] She distinguishes between private and public goods in terms of their tradability

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in markets. The transaction of private goods is governed by the price mechanism, the operation of which can result in the transfer of ownership of the good concerned. Private goods are therefore excludable and rival in consumption. By contrast, public goods, like a street sign or air, are neither excludable nor rival. Rational behaviour by private actors encourages free-riding on public goods precisely because they are non-excludable and non-rival: why pay for something if it is going to be provided by another actor and you cannot be prevented from enjoying its benefits for free? In turn, however, this can lead to problems of over-use (the so-called tragedy of the commons), under-use or under-supply. The solution to these problems lies in some form of collective action mechanisms, in the absence of which we risk producing outcomes of 'public bads' like environmental degradation. Finally, she defines global public goods (GPG) as 'public goods whose benefits reach across borders, generations, and population groups';[2] regional public goods are confined to particular regions. To say that peace is indivisible is to say that it is a GPG: If peace broke out we would all enjoy its benefits as no one group or region could be excluded.

2. The Traditional Security Architecture of Asia-Pacific

2.1 The End of the Cold War

One axis of the Cold War consisted of the mutual hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers; the second axis was a transcendental conflict that divided the world into two groups of states. The Cold War conflict was a global struggle centred on and dominated by two superpowers who were able to structure the pattern of international relationships because of a qualitative discrepancy in military capacity and resources. And the conflict was transcendental because it involved a clash of ideologies: the existence of a strong Marxist and capitalist state that could not accept permanent relations with each other, believing instead in the eventual destruction of the other. The ideological conflict is over and the mutual deterrence structure of the Cold War period is

now obsolete.

The framework for the world order resting on superpower rivalry was adopted at Yalta in 1945. Reflecting the two theatres of the Second World War, that order had two geographical components: Europe and Asia-Pacific. The principal elements of the European order included: [3]

- The maintenance of Soviet strategic and political dominance over Eastern Europe;
- The perception by West Europeans that the overwhelming and proximate power presence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe was a threat to their security;
- The wish of the West Europeans to maintain a visible and structured alliance with the United States for the maintenance of security that was no longer attainable through the purely European balance of power;
- The reinforcement of alliance ties by common interests and values of other kinds which helped to absorb the strains caused by differences in policy and interests; and
- The acceptance of the solution of the problem of German power—which had caused two world wars—by the physical division of Germany along the Cold War axis.

The Yalta-based order for Europe has crumbled, but not for Asia-Pacific. NATO enlargement and the air strikes on Serbia symbolically rubbed Russia's nose in the dirt of its historic Cold War defeat. In Asia-Pacific, by contrast, walls have not come tumbling down, Korea is still divided, empires have not dissolved nor come apart, and armies have not gone marching home.

There is a greater variety of political systems in Asia-Pacific, ranging from robust and explosive democracy in India and fragile democracies in Bangladesh, Nepal and the Philippines and something less than full democracies in many other countries, to communism in three countries. In addition to enduring low-intensity insurgencies, many countries are characterised by socio-economic fragility and regime brittleness. The disparities in social and economic indicators are greater in Asia.

Internal developments in the former Soviet Union had immediate and far-reaching consequences for Eastern Europe but lacked a similar resonance in the Asian communist countries. Communism in Eastern Europe was installed and maintained by the barrel of Soviet Red Army guns. Its durability in Asian countries flows partly from its fusion with nationalism. Hence the domino effect of the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union on the satellite regimes in Eastern Europe in contrast to the capacity for independent survival of the Asian communists.

European achievements in arms control and disarmament have not been matched by comparable movement on Asian-Pacific fronts. We may be witnessing an upwards trajectory in military spending once more, from South through Southeast to East Asia. Arms buildups reflect the existence of more multiple sources of threat to the peace and stability of Asia-Pacific than of Europe. The kaleidoscope of cultures, cleavages and conflicts in Asia-Pacific does not permit a simple intercontinental transposition of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

2.2. The Lead Players in Asia and the Pacific

The structure of power relations in the Asia-Pacific region is more fluid and complex than in Europe, resting on five powers: America, China, Japan, Russia and India.

As part of the Cold War struggle, both bloc leaders had been prepared to underwrite the security and stability of their respective camps. That is, they were symmetric hegemons who bore the costs of the trans-alliance security as a public good. In the trans-Atlantic security architecture, this was embedded in NATO. The collapse of the old order necessitated a triple change in NATO in membership (enlargement), geographic scope (expansion eastwards) and role (from defence of Western Europe against a Soviet attack to the more diffuse peace maintenance in Europe). The war in Kosovo in 1999 validated all three changes. But because there was no comparable single Cold War dividing line

across Asia and no rival multilateral military organisations in Asia-Pacific, the end of the Cold War has had a somewhat more confusing impact on the security GPG here. Russia has faded from the scene as a security guarantor (or public good provider) for members of its alliance.

2.2.1. The United States

The situation with regard to the United States is anything but clear. It has no peer competitor as a provider of public goods in the world at large, across the Atlantic and across Asia-Pacific. It is in no position to impose Pax Americana. But equally, no major world problem can be settled by working against the United States. Washington will remain reliant on coalitions whose membership may shift from issue to issue and region to region, but whose core will consist of NATO allies, Japan and other 'like-minded' democracies.

The United States is the *de facto* guarantor of the Asia-Pacific security order, and Okinawa is the geopolitical epicentre of the US military presence in East Asia. If allies are prepared to accept responsibility for the defence of home territories to the best of their abilities against the backdrop of a strategic 'over-the-horizon' US military presence, then a continued US commitment to the peace and security of Asia-Pacific will meet US interests and disposition. More important than a resident US military presence is a credible surge capacity by such means as prepositioning of equipment and prior agreements with potential host governments for launching and sustaining US military operations.

Like Europe, Asia-Pacific is caught between the desire to keep the US fully engaged in the region to underwrite stability and prosperity, and the search for a sharper and autonomous regional identity. Most regional governments do acknowledge that the Pacific security framework established by the United States has been an important shield behind which they have pursued their search for peace and prosperity. In their view, the

continued strategic engagement of the United States will remain the cornerstone of Asian-Pacific security. It is not that the regional governments trust or love America the most. Rather, they fear America the least. An important reason for this is that most analysts do interpret the US military role in the region as providing a GPG—regional security—rather than in pursuit of national security at the price of regional order.

2.2.2. *Japan*

The two potential intra-regional stabilising powers—subsidiary regional public goods (RPG) providers—are China and Japan. The United States is the biggest, richest, most productive, most innovative and the best balanced economy in the world. Japan is the world's largest single source of surplus savings, the world's biggest capital investor and aid donor, and the world's leader in the organisation and technology of manufacturing. America is the most universal and Japan the most singular of modern societies.

Japan was one of the chief beneficiaries of the Cold War, during which Washington allowed Japanese exporters generous entry into its markets in return for a strategic partnership in an Asia dominated by two communist giants. The larger geopolitical circumstances were such that Washington acquiesced in an undervalued yen, non-reciprocal open markets to Japanese exports, technology transfers to Japan, and an abdication of responsibility for defence and foreign policy to the US. The disparate and sometimes conflicting US-Japan interests have been held together by a complex, multidimensional and growing web of relationships. A militarily resurgent Japan would send ripples of anxiety around many Asian-Pacific countries even in the absence of any indications of hostile intent. Turning apprehension into reassurance will depend ultimately on whether neighbours view Japanese contributions to regional security as being a GPG or a self-interested aggrandisement.

2.2.3. China

The pivot of the Asia-Pacific security order in the foreseeable future will be the China-Japan-US triangle. The Chinese argue that a political role for China is welcomed by Asian-Pacific countries as a counter to US military muscle and Japan's economic dominance. Sinologists argue that China acts on the adage that one mountain cannot accommodate two tigers: Beijing's policy is described as one of restraining Japan and constraining India, its only serious Asian rivals.[4] A core element of Chinese nationalism, reinforced by the NATO attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, is its 'self-image as a victimised developing nation'.[5] Two alternative scenarios may be postulated:

- Sino-Japanese rivalry, with the US as the balancer which deters China and restrains Japan; [6]
- Sino-US bipolarity, with China dominating the mainland and the US controlling the seas. In this scenario, Japan essentially plays second fiddle within the alliance with Washington.[7]

Sino-US relations struck rough seas in 1999-2000 that left the rhetoric of a strategic partnership of 1998 as a fading memory. China was disillusioned by the firming of the US-Japan alliance, the prospects of a TMD system for Northeast Asia and Clinton's (passing) inability to cut a deal on the terms of China's WTO membership. Washington was rocked by charges of sustained and successful Chinese spying on US nuclear secrets, Beijing's failure to control North Korean missile capabilities and continuing export of proliferation-sensitive material and equipment to Pakistan, and apparent reversals on human rights. China denounced the NATO air strikes on Serbia as illegal aggression on a sovereign state. The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was interpreted as a deliberate attempt to weaken and humiliate China. In Beijing's view, China remains the principal obstacle to US hegemony in Asia, hence the US determination to undermine

China.

Western perceptions of China tend to oscillate between the extremes of confrontation and fascination. Contemporary interpretations of China as the emerging superpower produce two opposite lines of analysis. The benign view sees China taking its rightful place in the management of regional and world order. The more pessimistic assessment worries about China's potential for mischief as an ascendant and assertive power. China at war would be a regional public bad, probably also a global public bad. Peace cannot be maintained in Asia without accommodating China's interests. But nor will it be durable if based principally on a policy of appeasement. The trick will be to strike the right balance between containment and appeasement. Asian-Pacific governments remain keen to integrate China more fully into open regional and global trading arrangements, to 'domesticate' it into the Asian family of nations.

2.2.4. Russia

Russia has not been an active player in Asia-Pacific, being too preoccupied with internal affairs to worry much about its proper role in Asia-Pacific. Yet Russia is a Eurasian country, with almost 60 percent of its total territory lying in Asia. It could yet exert significant influence in the region either through economic-political recovery, or through total collapse. Russia as a failed state would be tantamount to a Somalia with nukes at the heart of the Asia-Pacific region: a global public bad and a regional public disaster. Powers rise and fall as part of the unfolding process of history. One of the intriguing gaps in the theoretical literature of International Relations is indicators that would help us to identify a disappearing great power *while it is disappearing*.

The former Soviet Union's Central Asian republics have been detached from Europe. While some neighbours might serve as conduits for importing instability into Central Asia, most are worried about the spillover effects of any failed state. The volatility, instability and religious ferment around the Central Asian crescent also highlight the

shifting locus of fundamentalist terrorism from the Middle East to Southwest Asia.

2.2.5. India

India has consequently become a frontline state in the global fight against international terrorism. Its identity as an Asian-Pacific (as distinct from Asian) country is still evolving. Four years ago, I argued that India was neither powerful enough to bully, rich enough to bribe nor principled enough to inspire.[8] Now India is a self-declared possessor of nuclear weapons, has achieved impressive economic growth rates for several consecutive years, is being increasingly acknowledged as an emerging powerhouse in information technology, and has been visited by many world leaders. Nevertheless, India is still distracted by the Kashmir dispute and restricted by Pakistan to being a subcontinental power, it has little of substance in bilateral relationships with the other two Asian giants China and Japan, its per capita income level is still firmly in the middle range of the developing countries' average, and its international influence is well below the peaks attained during the golden age of the 1950s under Jawaharlal Nehru.

2.3. Incipient Regionalism

Kaul notes that the United Nations is 'an intermediate GPG': 'one required to produce such final GPGs as peace and security or global justice and balanced development'.[9] Obviously the same holds true of regional organisations *a la* regional public goods. The political infrastructure to sustain peace and prosperity in Asia-Pacific includes the network of dialogue and consultations already in existence. The most substantial forum is ASEAN, including the post-ministerial conference with dialogue partners and, more recently, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The ARF is still in its infancy. It is well placed to serve as the consolidating and legitimating instrument for regional security initiatives and confidence building measures. It is on public record as supporting such measures as the UN arms register,

exchanges of unclassified military information, maritime security cooperation, regional peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and non-proliferation. When we consider how painfully difficult it has been for Europe, a well-established economic and political entity, to manage the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, our expectations of the ARF as a conflict management institution must remain modest. Asia is both more diverse than Europe and lacks the ballast and texture of the theory, history and practice of European cooperation and integration.

Yet in one respect two of the Asian-Pacific subregions, namely Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, have managed to achieve what Europeans have been talking about for decades, namely a nuclear-weapon-free zone. NWFZ are integral components of the mosaic of international action on the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons. By maintaining the momentum for the continued stigmatisation of this weapon of mass destruction, NWFZ sustain the structure of normative restraints on the acquisition, multiplication, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. They help to embed and institutionalise the global nonproliferation norm at the regional level. Where there is a prospect of the deployment of nuclear weapons in new and sensitive areas, a NWFZ can institute a safe corridor between the nuclear weapons of contending rivals. Thus they take away nuclear weapons from any future security architecture being contemplated for the region concerned. Although such zones have been proposed for South Asia and Northeast Asia, their prospects cannot be said to be very bright.

From a GPG perspective, there are two pertinent comments. First, there is an abundance (over-supply) of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, with the resulting public bad of heightened tension and prospects of devastation on a mass scale. Second, the absence of an appropriate regional organisation as an intermediate GPG makes the realisation of a GPG outcome—a NWFZ which is both non-excludable and non-rival, with benefits being shared by all in the region (and beyond)—that much more difficult. Both the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, like Latin American before and

Africa more or less contemporaneously, were helped greatly by having the South Pacific Forum, ASEAN, the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as the initiating, negotiating, endorsing and legitimating organisations.

Unlike the security sector, the pace of regionalism as an intermediate GPG has picked up somewhat on the economic front. The winds of market integration have been blowing across Asia-Pacific even through the financial crisis, perhaps to some extent fanned by it. Approved measures include a deepening of tariff cuts with a view to eliminating most import charges by 2002, a dismantling of barriers to foreign investment in agriculture, manufacturing and fisheries by 2003, and a pruning of the exemption list. Nevertheless, ASEAN has no ambitions for a customs union or single currency. Regional institutions and sentiment are conspicuously lacking in Northeast Asia.

At the ASEAN and ARF gatherings in Thailand in 2000, there were four significant developments. First, ASEAN decided to institute a new troika mechanism consisting of past, present and designated successor chairs. The troika will help to articulate common ASEAN positions on international issues and respond to emergencies between summit meetings. Second, there was an overdue acknowledgment of cross-border commonalities in such areas as human resources, information technology, education, social safety nets, and NGO networks. Third, a new framework of cooperation was adopted under the formula of 'ASEAN plus 3', meaning China, Japan and South Korea. This links the two sub-regions of East Asia more closely together than the more amorphous ARF. Finally, the ARF ministerial meeting was historically important in inducting North Korea into the organisation as its 23rd member. The two Koreas thus now have an institution to go to and an audience to speak to, the only one outside the politically highly charged UN forum, for voicing grievances and soliciting support. Slowly, hesitantly—perhaps too slowly and hesitantly—embryonic regional institutions in Asia are starting to take on the functions of public goods providers.

2.4. *New Economic Order*

In the quarter century from 1972 to 1997, the East Asian economies produced the fastest rise in incomes for the biggest number of peoples in human history. The economic success was attributed to several factors: sound economic management by relatively stable political regimes which ushered in rapid structural change, an industrious and increasingly well-educated workforce, and high rates of savings and investment by instinctively thrifty peoples. This was backed by the adoption of a managed-market strategy of economic development which struck a balance between the interventionist and the free market state. Flushed with economic success, Asia's long-serving leaders grew in self-confidence and stature to the point where they lectured the West on decaying values, political institutions and social cohesion.

In an article that has gained retrospective respectability, Paul Krugman argued that the 'Asian miracle' had no clothes: it was based on massive inputs of capital and labour, not on efficiency gains.[10] The bubble burst with a currency crisis that began in Thailand in July 1997. No one predicted the ferocity of the market reaction to Thailand's problems or the severity and spread of contagion to the rest of the region. As market players responded to the herd instinct, the contagion spread quickly to Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong and South Korea. The Asian malaise seemed to have laid waste to the Asian miracle.

The affliction that hit Asia was a crisis of governance, reflecting institutionalised patronage and corruption, weak central banks and lack of transparency, accountability and teeth in regulatory arrangements. As well as providing a vivid illustration of the costs of 'crony capitalism'—where profits are made not through the free interplay of market forces but as a result of access to credit lines and purchasing orders through political patronage—the Asian crisis reinforced the benefits of competitive markets, transparent and effective regulatory institutions, an efficient and corruption-free bureaucracy, and the rule of law.

The outbreak of the crisis reflected failures of policy and governance at the national level; its continuance for a prolonged period was an indictment of regional institutions and great-power economic leadership. Created to be the chief vehicle for regional economic cooperation, APEC made no contribution at all to the solution of Asia's first economic crisis since its birth. When the crunch came, the institutional identity of APEC and ASEAN proved to be far too embryonic and fragile, much too dependent still on the personal preferences and policies of the leaders at the top.

In addition, however, the international response to the Asian crisis highlighted deficiencies in the architecture of global economic management as well. IMF prescriptions were contested on five fronts: for the 'moral hazard' of interfering with market forces by rescuing international creditors from the consequences of bad investment decisions; for being excessively contractionary; for the rigid application of doctrinaire remedies developed in response to a different mix of policy failures in the entirely different context of Latin America where government deficits had been the roots of the crisis; for eroding economic sovereignty; and for ignoring the social and political contexts and repercussions.[11] A Japanese economic policy adviser in Jakarta remarked caustically that 'IMF prescriptions are desk theories based on statistical figures'.[12]

In other words, some of the intermediate GPGs at the international level were found to be wanting, hence the exacerbation of the regional public bads during the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the underlying fundamental strengths of regional economies— budget surpluses, flexible labour markets, low taxation, low inflation, high domestic savings rates, emphasis on education and training, and a strong work ethic—meant that their recovery and renewal was a matter of when, not whether. But the crisis did highlight the need for well-functioning regional and international markets as regional and global public goods, respectively, since everyone enjoys their benefits or suffers from their lack.

3. New Security in the New Millennium

3.1. Global Governance

Asia cannot be quarantined from developments taking place elsewhere. The shift away from traditional concerns to new approaches is a worldwide phenomenon in security studies and policies. The business of the world has changed almost beyond recognition over the course of the last one hundred years. There are many more actors today, and their patterns of interaction are far more complex. The international policy making stage is increasingly congested as private and public non-state actors jostle alongside national governments in setting and implementing the agenda of the new century. The multitude of new actors adds depth and texture to the increasingly rich tapestry of international civil society. They also lead to the establishment of ever-more rules and regimes through multilaterally negotiated agreements which take on the character of GPGs, in that once they come into existence, they are non-excludable and non-rival.

In today's seamless world, political frontiers have become less salient both for national governments whose responsibilities within borders can be held to international scrutiny, and for international organisations whose rights and duties can extend beyond borders. The gradual erosion of the once sacrosanct principle of national sovereignty is rooted today in the reality of global interdependence: no *country* is an island unto itself anymore. Ours is a world of major cities and agglomerations, with nodes of financial and economic power and their globally wired transport and communications networks. Cumulatively, they span an increasingly interconnected and interactive world characterised more by technology-driven exchange and communication than by territorial borders and political separation.

The meaning and scope of security have become much broader. The number and types of security providers have grown enormously and the relationship between security providers has become more dense and complex. As well as armed terrorism, for example,

states have to contend with eco-terrorism and cyber-terrorism. All three are cross-border phenomena of global scope and ramifications—that is, they are global public bads—requiring active collaboration among the defence and constabulary forces, law-enforcement authorities and non-government groups and organisations. Kaul notes that the traditional class of GPGs were either matters external to countries, such as the natural commons; or 'at-the-border' issues like trade tariffs and military security. Today's global agenda deals with issues that cut across and dart between borders, requiring behind-the-border policy convergence: clean air, health, financial stability, knowledge management, etc.[13] Globalisation means that disease can no longer be confined to national, or even continental, borders. Public health within countries, not to say in aeroplanes, has thus become a GPG. Thus do the new security agenda and GPGs converge.

3.2. From National Security to Human Security

The shift from the 'national security' to the 'human security' paradigm is of historic importance. The object of security changes from the state to the individual; the focus changes from security through armaments to security through human development; from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security. The fundamental components of human security—the security of people against threats to life, health, livelihood, personal safety and human dignity—can be put at risk by external aggression, but also by factors within a country including 'security' forces. Over the course of the 20th century, 30 million people were killed in international wars, 7 million in civil wars and an additional 170 million by their own governments.[14]

The traditional, narrow concept of security leaves out the most elementary and legitimate concerns of ordinary people regarding security in their daily lives. It also diverts enormous amounts of national wealth and human resources into armaments and armed forces, while countries fail to protect their citizens from chronic insecurities of hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment, social conflict and

environmental hazards. The annual mortality correlates of Afro-Asiatic poverty—low levels of life expectancy, high levels of maternal and infant mortality—run into several million. Annual deaths—preventable killings—even on this scale cannot be accommodated within the analytical framework of 'national security'; they can in 'human security'. To insist on national security at the expense of human security would be to trivialise the concept of security in many real-world circumstances to the point of sterility, bereft of any practical meaning.[15]

The narrow definition of security also presents a falsified image of the policy process. The military is only one of several competing interest groups vying for a larger share of the collective goods being allocated authoritatively by the government. Environmental and social groups also compete for the allocation of scarce resources. Rational policy-makers will allocate resources to security only so long as its marginal return is greater than for other uses of the resources.

Human security gives us also a template for international action. Canada and Japan are two countries that have taken the lead in attempting to incorporate human security in their foreign policies. A practical expression of this was the Ottawa Treaty on landmines: the first to impose a ban on an entire class of weapons already in widespread use. The Convention was a triumph for an unusual coalition of governments, international organisations and NGOs. Such 'New Diplomacy' has been impelled by a growing intensity of public impatience with the slow pace of traditional diplomacy. Many people have grown tired of years of negotiations leading to a final product that may be accepted or rejected by countries.[16] They look instead for a sense of urgency and timely action that will prevent human insecurity, not always react to outbreaks of conflict.

3.3. Non-Government Organisations (NGOs)

In recent major diplomatic landmarks like the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines, the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, and humanitarian

interventions in Kosovo and East Timor, the impact of NGOs on international public policy has been very evident. The consequence of the rise of NGOs as significant policy-influencing actors, animated by the desire to curtail and abolish public bads and spread public goods, is to tilt the balance away from hard to soft security.

There are four broad reasons for the rise of NGO influence. With the end of the Cold War, new issues like human rights, environmental degradation and gender equality came to the forefront of public consciousness. These are issues on which NGOs enjoy many comparative advantages over governments in terms of experience, expertise and public credibility. Second, the global scope and multilayered complexity of the new issues increased the need for partnerships between the established state actors and proliferating NGOs. Third, the opportunities provided to NGOs have expanded enormously as a result of modern communications technology that enables people to forge real-time cyberspace communities on shared interests, values and goals. Finally, people with special skills and expertise have increasingly been drawn to work for and with NGOs, thereby muting some of their earlier amateurishness.

The expanding worldwide networks of NGOs embrace virtually every level of organisation, from the village community to global summits; and almost every sector of public life, from the provision of microcredit and the delivery of paramedical assistance, to environmental and human rights activism. Much of the UN's work in the field involves intimate partnerships with dedicated NGOs.

This is not to imply that states are being replaced by NGOs and international organisations. Nor does it mean that all NGOs are angels. Instead we must confront, address and redress the problem of unelected, unaccountable, unrepresentative and self-aggrandising NGOs. They can be just as undemocratic as the governments and organisations they criticise, and represent single-issue vested interests such as the gun lobby. By contrast, most industrialised-country governments are multipurpose organisations trying to represent the public interest by the choice of the voters. In many

developing countries, societies are busy building sound national governments as the prerequisite to effective governance: good governance is not possible without effective government.

But it does imply that national governments and international organisations will have to learn to live with the rise of NGOs. Indeed those who learn to exploit the new opportunities for partnership between the different actors will be among the more effective New Age diplomats.

3.4. Human Rights and 'Humanitarian Intervention'

NGOs have been especially active, often intrusive and sometimes even obtrusive on human rights. A right is a claim, an entitlement that may neither be conferred nor denied. A human right, owed to every person simply as a human being, is inherently universal. Held only by human beings, but equally by all, it does not flow from any office, rank or relationship. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is the embodiment and the proclamation of the human rights norm.

While Rwanda stands as the symbol of inaction in the face of genocide, and the tragedy of Srebrenica 'will haunt our [UN] history forever',[17] Kosovo raised many questions about the consequences of action when the international community is divided in the face of a humanitarian tragedy.[18] What happens when the different lessons of the twentieth century, encapsulated in such slogans as 'No More Wars' and 'No More Auschwitzes,' come into collision?

Who decides, following what rules of procedure and evidence, that mass atrocities have been committed, by which party, and what the appropriate response should be:

1. To respect sovereignty all the time is to be complicit in human-rights violations sometimes;

2. To argue that the UN Security Council must give its consent to humanitarian war is to risk policy paralysis by handing over the agenda to the most egregious and

obstreperous;

3. To use force unilaterally is to violate international law and undermine world order.

The UN Security Council lies at the heart of the international law-enforcement system. The justification for bypassing it to launch an offensive war remains problematic, and the precedent that was set remains deeply troubling. The sense of moral outrage provoked by humanitarian atrocities must be tempered by an appreciation of the limits of power, a concern for international institution-building, and a sensitivity to the law of unintended consequences.

4. The United Nations as an Intermediate GPG

It used to be said during the Cold War that the purpose of NATO was to keep the Americans in, the Germans down and the Russians out. Does Kosovo mark a turning point, changing NATO into a tool for keeping the Americans in, the Russians down and the United Nations out?

International organisations are an essential means of conducting world affairs more satisfactorily than would be possible under conditions of international anarchy or total self-help. The United Nations lies at their legislative and normative centre. If it did not exist, we would surely have to invent it. Yet its founding vision of a world community equal in rights and united in action is still to be realised. The global public goods of peace, prosperity, sustainable development and good governance cannot be achieved by any country acting on its own. The United Nations is still the symbol of our dreams for a better world, where weakness can be compensated by justice and fairness, and the law of the jungle replaced by the rule of law.

Success that is sustained requires us all to make a greater commitment to the vision and values of the United Nations, and to make systematic use of the UN forum and modalities for managing and ending conflicts. People continue to look to the United

Nations to guide them and protect them when the tasks are too big and complex for nations and regions to handle by themselves. The comparative advantages of the UN are its universal membership, political legitimacy, administrative impartiality, technical expertise, convening and mobilising power, and the dedication of its staff. Its comparative disadvantages are excessive politicisation, ponderous pace of decision-making, impossible mandate, high cost structure, insufficient resources, bureaucratic rigidity, and institutional timidity. Many of the disadvantages are the product of demands and intrusions by 189 member states who own and control the organisation, but some key members disown responsibility for giving it the requisite support and resources. For the United Nations to succeed, the world community must match the demands made on the organisation by the means given to it.

5. Conclusion

The old world order has faded. The new world order is not yet set. The contours of Asia-Pacific are changing. The optimistic scenario postulates continuing strengthening of cooperative security relations embedded in such regional institutions as APEC and the ARF. Enhanced interdependence through increasing intra-regional flows of people, goods and services will foster and nest a growing sense of community. The pessimistic scenario is of intensified volatility, turbulence and conflict beyond the managerial capacity of the embryonic regional institutions. The prophets of doom fear the re-emergence of old power-political rivalries, or else the rise of new security threats rooted in energy, food and water scarcity.

From a GPG perspective, what is pertinent is the disconnect between the global scope of the policy challenges facing us and the territorial jurisdictions within which we are still bounded in formulating the bulk of our policy responses. The United Nations represents the idea that unbridled nationalism and the raw interplay of power must be mediated and moderated in an international framework. It is the centre for harmonising

national interests and forging the international interest. In the area of hard security, only the UN can legitimately authorise military action on behalf of the entire international community, instead of a select few. But the UN does not have its own military and police forces, and a multinational coalition of allies can offer a more credible and efficient military force when robust action is needed and warranted. What will be increasingly needed in future is partnerships of the able, the willing and the high-minded with the duly authorised. What we should most fear is partnerships of the able, the willing and the low-minded in violation of due process. In the new security agenda, similarly, no other organisation comes close to matching the mobilising capacity and legitimating authority of the United Nations.

Notes

(1) Kaul. pp. 296–315. See also Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern.
(2) Kaul. p. 298.
(3) DePorte. pp. 243–44.
(4) Malik.
(5) Bessho.
(6) Christensen. pp. 81–118.
(7) Ross. pp. 49–80.
(8) Thakur. 1997.
(9) Kaul. p. 306.
(10) Krugman.
(11) Thakur. 1998.
(12) Quoted in *Japan Times*, 26 May 1999.
(13) Kaul. pp. 298–99.
(14) 'Freedom's Journey', survey in *The Economist*, 11 September 1999.
(15) For an attempt to apply the human security concept to the Asia-Pacific region, see Tow, William T., Ramesh Thakur and In-taek Hyun.
(16) Matthews, p.176. Matthews was writing in the context of environmental negotiations.
(17) Annan. para. 503.
(18) See Schnabel & Thakur.

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地球公共財とアジアにおける平和と安全保障

〈要　約〉

ラメシュ・タクール

　この論文は、20世紀の冷戦時代を反映する従来の安全保障パラダイムから離れることによって、地域の平和と安全保障を分析する新しいアプローチを開拓しようとするものである。経済学から借りてきたこの新しいアプローチは、平和と安全保障を地球公共財とみなす。最初の部分で、本論文は「地球公共財」を、例外なしに誰もが享受できる万人の利益として定義する。

　第2節では、アジアー太平洋地域が、2つの地理的な構成要素を持っていた従来の安全保障構造という文脈において、考察される。第二次世界大戦の後に発達したこの安全保障体制は、ソビエトの脅威を封じ込めようとしていたヨーロッパー大西洋間の協力関係を反映するようになった。このヨーロッパの安全保障体制がすでに崩壊した一方で、アジアのそれは本質的にそのまま残存している。そのことは、旧ソ連と東ヨーロッパで起こった広範囲にわたる政治的経済的変化が、アジアの共産主義諸国には及ばなかったということを示している。そして、ソ連と東ヨーロッパの共産主義を崩壊させたドミノ効果が、アジアにおいては見られなかったことを示している。アジアでは共産主義体制がまだ存在している。さらに、ヨーロッパではかなりの程度の軍備管理と軍備縮小が達成されたが、アジアー太平洋地域では軍備が拡大された。

　本論文はこの節で、この地域における権力関係の構造を考察し、安全と安定性という地域の公共財を確保する上で重要な5つのプレーヤー（アメリカ合衆国、中国、日本、ロシアとインド）の各々を分析する。さらに、これらそれぞれの大国の観点からこの地域の主要傾向を浮き彫りにする。非核地帯構想 (NWFZ) と

地域の経済協力は、安全保障を地球公共財たらしめている特定の主要な地域的構成要素の一つである。本論文は、南アジアと北東アジアにおける NWFZ の見通しは厳しいと指摘する一方で、経済的地域協力に関してはより楽観的である。アジアの経済危機は、地域の及び地球公共財に対して、よく機能している地域市場の重要性を強調するために引き合いに出されている。

　本論文の第 3 節では、グローバル・ガヴァナンス、人間の安全保障、NGO の役割、人権と人道的干渉に特に注目することによって、新しい千年紀にグローバライゼーションがもたらした新しい問題と関係を探求する。このますます複雑化し多様化している世界においては、自然の共有財 (natural commons)、貿易関税、軍事安全保障という伝統的な地球公共財が、きれいな空気、健康、財政的安定性、知識管理などへ変容することが要請されている。第 4 節では、国連が、中間的な地球公共財であるということが確認される。従って、国連は平和、繁栄、持続可能な発展とグッド・ガヴァナンスという地球公共財を促進するための形態と利点を備えているのであり、国連のヴィジョンと価値へのよりいっそうのコミットメントが要請されている。