Loving Disability: "Patriotism" in Postcolonial Hong Kong

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In this postcolonial age, it is common to expect indigenous people to glorify the moments of decolonization and condemn previous colonial regimes in the name of nationalism. This logic follows from the general experience and belief that colonialism is inherently bad and humiliating. The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) adopted a similar narrative in the 1980s and applied it to the former colony of Hong Kong, promoting the idea that fellow countrymen (*tongbao*) from the colony should embrace the nation/homeland (*zuguo*) when they were finally able to free themselves from the shackles of colonialism.

However, at the same time that this celebratory narrative prevailed in official announcements and patriotic discourses in mainland China, a darker narrative emerged from popular media. Ever since Hong Kong's return to China was decided in 1984, foreign reports have expressed fears of political restrictions after 1997 by emphasizing the PRC's poor human rights records and reminding the public of the miserable fate of the political dissidents during and after the notorious Tiananmen incident of 1989. These stories portray the handover of Hong Kong to China as a re-subordination of the local people to another, perhaps more evil, empire. Unlike the conventional narrative of decolonization, which associates nationalism with liberation of the people, in this anti-PRC narrative nationalism implies political censorship and total submission of the individual to the governing state. In both narratives, however, the nation is understood to be equivalent to the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

For the local people of Hong Kong, nationalism is a relatively new vocabulary. In the 1940s and 1950s, many migrants who escaped from the war with Japan and later from persecution by the CCP fled to Hong Kong. A large number of such migrants then settled in Hong Kong because they felt that it was a place where they could retain their wealth without being whirled into the politics of the mainland. To these early immigrants and their children, the nation of China signified chaos and deprivation. Hong Kong textbooks and government documents first referred to them as refugees. This description stresses their experience of temporary status in Hong Kong. Beginning in the 1970s, subsequent to their economic success and accumulation of wealth, these Hong Kong residents started to develop a strong local identity as "Hong Kongers" distinctive from both Britain and China. Hong Kong represented a place where they could afford to pursue dreams of getting rich and to forget about politics. It was not until the 1980s when the Sino-British declaration sealed the fate of Hong Kong that these Hong Kong residents had to face the reality that Hong Kong could no

longer be a permanent political refuge and that they had to reestablish their bonds with their nation/homeland (*zuguo*) again.

Hong Kong provides an interesting case study for postcolonial society. Many critics have argued that decolonization was only a transfer of ownership and did not grant the population sovereignty. Regardless of whether this statement is true or not, the experience of colonialism has provided space for the local population to articulate their differentiation between the homeland and the political entity controlled by the CCP, and to express alternative imaginings of "citizenship," which includes the "othering" of their nation/homeland (*zuguo*) for its lag in progress compared to the city. To some extent, Hong Kongers' sense of belonging as Chinese (*Zhongguoren*) has increased since the 1990s. Nevertheless, they continue to be harsh critics of the mainland government and maintain a sense of superiority, of being a different kind of Chinese. Hong Kongers' imaginings of the mainland and their critical attitudes toward it present a challenge to the integrity of the concept of "China" and the meaning of being a "citizen of China" (*Zhongguo gongmin*).

This essay analyzes how the nation has been represented in history textbooks and popular discourses in Hong Kong since the 1980s, when Hong Kong's retrocession was decided. It takes up the historical interpretations of 20th century China and Hong Kong in several secondary school history textbooks since the late 1980s, using examples drawn from three Chinese History textbooks and one History textbook. In the last part of this essay, I will explore how Hong Kongers born in the 1970s who have received secondary school history education in Hong Kong view China and their relationships with the nation after the return of Hong Kong to China.

I. Chinese History Textbooks

Hong Kong's secondary school curriculum consists of two separate subjects: "History" and "Chinese History." [1] According to Flora Kan and Edward Vickers, two scholars of Hong Kong secondary school history education, the division between the two subjects can be seen as partly as "a consequence of the predominance of English as the medium of instruction in local schools," and partly "the result of a desire on the part of Hong Kong's colonial administration to conciliate local nationalist sentiment." Before the retrocession, more than half of the secondary schools in Hong Kong were Anglo-Chinese schools in which all subjects were taught in English except for Chinese language and Chinese History. Chinese history was separated out of the History subject because it would make more sense to Chinese students to learn it in Chinese. Moreover, in the 1950s the colonial government felt that bringing Chinese history in the official curriculum could provide a more objective viewpoint offer an alternative to the anti-British and Communist elements that featured prominently in mainland textbooks.[2] Although after 1997 many Anglo-Chinese schools began to change to Chinese as the main language of instruction, the division between the two history subjects remains.

In some schools, Chinese History is a mandatory subject in lower-forms, from Form 1 (seventh grade) to Form 3 (ninth grade). The curriculum is organized chronologically, from antiquity to the present. Twentieth-century is usually covered in Form 3, after students learned the dynastic history in Form 1 and Form 2. When the students enter

upper-forms (Form 4 and Form 5), a vast majority of them focus either on arts (*wenke*) or science (*like*). In order to graduate from secondary school, students have to take a standardized Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE) in Form 5. Chinese History is one of the elective arts subjects for these upper-form students. The students who choose Chinese History as one of their elective subjects encounter twentieth century China a second time in Form 5. The textbooks for the Form 5 level students are more comprehensive and follow the examination syllabus guidelines put out by the Curriculum Development Committee of the Education Department set up in 1972. In theory, though, the curriculum for the lower forms is very similar to the one for the upper forms.

In this section, I will focus on three Chinese History textbooks published in the 1980s and the 2000s: (1) *Xinbian Zhongguo Lishi* (1984) published by Ren Ren and Ling Kee Publishing Company, which was one of the most popular textbooks used among lower-form students in the 1980s; (2) *Tanjiu Zhongguo Lishi* (2004) published by Manhattan Press; and (3) *Tansuo Zhongguoshi* (2006) published by Ling Kee Publishing Company. The latter two are Form 5 textbooks used by secondary schools today. In the comparison of their treatment of the concept of nation, I will concentrate on three aspects—the mission statements, the descriptions of the "War of Resistance" (World War II/the Pacific War) and the depiction of Hong Kong.

A. Objectives

As Kan and Vickers have argued, the colonial situation of Hong Kong is peculiar in that the colonizers did not try to instill a sense of British superiority among the colonized population, because they were not ready to build a politicized sense of local or British belonging, and because they were afraid of angering the Chinese government.[3] Bernard Luk, who has done research on the postwar curriculum of Chinese Studies in Hong Kong, shows that in the 1950s, the Education Department of the Hong Kong government appointed a Committee on Chinese Studies to review the pedagogic approaches to the teaching of Chinese language, literature, culture and history. The committee strongly "identified moral education as one of the major needs" of education in Hong Kong.[4] As evidenced in Chinese History textbooks from the 1950s to the 1980s, one of the main themes in history textbooks was the moral assessment of political leaders in dynastic history. Another factor contributing to the concentration on dynastic history was the political turbulence in the Mainland since the end of World War II. The Education Department was not ready to deal with such controversies in its curricula.

Qian Mu, a history scholar who migrated from China and served as the principal of the New Asia College (which later became a college of the Chinese University of Hong Kong), was one of the first Chinese History textbook authors. He authored and edited *Xinbian Zhongguo Lishi* (published in 1984) with his student, Sun Guodong, who later became a renowned historian himself. According to historian Lin Xiaoqing, Qian "used history to build a greater identification between his personal experience and historical moral experiences."[5] His belief in the discipline of history as a form of moral training for individuals is reflected in the textbook. The preface of *Xinbian Zhongguo Lishi* (hereafter as *Xinbian*) states, "the objective of Chinese history education

is to point out the flaws and merits of politicians so that students can learn to cultivate themselves."[6] In *Xinbian*, the authors further argue that Chinese History is where one can find "successes, failures, gains and losses" in events, "wisdom, stupidity, honesty and debauchery" in people, and "stability, chaos, prosperity and degeneration" in regimes. The role of history teachers is to analyze and point out these changes, so that "learners can broaden their knowledge" (*zhang jianshi*) and "improve their spiritual being" (*zheng xiu yang*). To these scholars as well as to the publishers of *Xinbian*, the biggest function of Chinese history education was to help individuals to become better moral beings through learning about the past. Nevertheless, the concepts of the nation (*guojia*) or citizenship (*guomin/gongmin*) were not mentioned.

As the return of Hong Kong was decided, the task of reconstructing a nationalistic history of China and Hong Kong became an urgent political and cultural task for the postcolonial Hong Kong government. In the 1990s when the return of Hong Kong came closer, some patriotic framers of Chinese History education felt that Hong Kongers' love for the nation should not be restricted to "culture" and thus proposed that Chinese history education be politicized. Ever since, identifying one's Chineseness as cultural or ethnic heritage became insufficient for the larger political agenda. In secondary school Chinese history textbooks, we see a change in the contents, with heavier emphasis on learners' sense of belonging to the PRC and more details of the achievements of leaders in the Communist Party. However, this inculcation of love for the nation was only partially successful.

Unlike earlier Chinese history textbooks authored or co-authored by one or two renowned scholars in the field, the textbooks published in the 2000s were put out by committees.[7] *Tanjiu Zhongguo Lishi* (hereafter *Tanjiu*) published by Manhattan Press in 2004 adheres closely to the "one-China" principle in its objectives. It states in the Preface: "History education not only functions to guide students to learn about the nation's history and culture, so that they can develop a sense of identification (*rentong gan*) and belonging (*guishugan*), it also should [help students] cultivate the skills of thinking and self-learning, so that they can become lifetime active learners and national citizens (*guomin*) equipped with analytical skills. After the handover of Hong Kong to China, Chinese History has important meanings in cultivating young people's recognition of their national citizen's identity (*rentong guomin shenfen*)."[8]

In contrast to *Xinbian Zhongguo Lishi* published in the 1980s which associates the study of Chinese history with the development of an individual sense of moral judgment, in *Tanjiu* the objective of history education is to cultivate one to be a "responsible national citizen" (*guomin*) of the nation. Another Form 5 level Chinese history textbook, *Tansuo Zhongguoshi* (hereafter *Tansuo*), published by Ling Kee in 2006, echoes this theme. The authors quote from *Guoshi Dagang*, a prominent history textbook published by Qian Mu: "A national citizen (*guomin*) who claims to be more educated than average people should have some knowledge of his/her country's history, and should maintain a kind of humanistic feeling (*wenqing*) and respect." Then, it continues with the authors' own words: "this new curriculum also emphasizes that students should increase their understanding of the nation's circumstances (*guoqing*), and through which they can develop national/ethnic feelings (*minzu qinghuai*) and cultural belonging, as well as become responsible citizens (*gongmin*)."[9] This kind of mission statement

placed in the front pages of the new textbooks conforms to Vickers's comments on the use of nationalistic history education, which is to be "pressed into service by politicians and scholars to bolster or, sometimes, to invent a national identity for the inhabitants of their states, and to foster among their population a sense of patriotic loyalty." [10] In these textbooks, the nation (*guojia*) and belonging (*rentong*) are consistently emphasized. Both generations of textbooks focus on political history and represent China as a continuous homogenous civilization, but while in the 1980s history education is regarded as a form of moral training for the individual, in the 2000s the emphasis shifts to responsibility and citizenship.[11] The change coincides with the amendments the Curriculum Development Committee made in the 1997 curriculum guide for Chinese History, which states that the aim of history is to "build a sense of belonging to China and the Chinese race." [12] They also exemplify how the Hong Kong government used the Chinese history curriculum to promote patriotic feelings after 1997.

B. Depictions of the War of Resistance (World War II)

The War of Resistance has always been depicted as a heroic defense against the invasion of the evil empire of Japan. In both generations of textbooks, the complexity within and between state and society is never interrogated. "Japan" only appears to represent actions committed by the military, and other dimensions of war, such as the conditions of the homefront, anti-war discourses and the cultural effects of warfare, are not included.

In *Xinbian*, the reasons for Japan to go to war are reduced to the greed and jealousy of the Japanese. The authors contend that these character flaws can be traced back to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905 or even further: "After [the Japanese] won Russia, they immediately wanted to swallow (tunping) China's Northeast. After the success of the Northern expedition [in China to drive out the warlords], Japan was more jealous (*jizhi*) of China and invaded the Northeast." [13] Besides the general character flaws of the "nation" of Japan, no other reasons and backgrounds were given for their intention of going to war and the rise of the militaristic state.

In *Tanjiu*, the authors explain that the reason for Japan's ambition to expand was partly a result of its lack of resources and disadvantages in geography. The textbook also briefly describes the increase of population and industrialization in the late nineteenth century which prompted Japan to develop international markets and search for raw materials. Because China had plenty of resources, it became the target of Japan. In its narrative, since the late nineteenth century, after the modernization of the Meiji period, Japan had already begun its aggression towards China: "In the first Sino-Japanese War ended in 1895, Japan occupied Taiwan, and controlled the southern part of Manchuria and swallowed Korea. These military victories strengthened Japan's ambition." Later, the militaristic officials who promoted the idea of conquering China gained power after the world depression, which badly affected Japan.[14]

In *Tansuo*, the "background of Japan's invasion of China" reads as follows: "As early as the Sino-Japanese War, Japan already occupied Taiwan. After the First World War in 1914, Japan further occupied Shandong. And until the 1930s, Japan continued to invade China …" The authors mention that Japan faced the internal problems of economic depression and unemployment in the 1920s and 1930s, but also highlight the

"ambition" (*yexin*) and "jealousy" (*jizhi*) of Japan. As in the other textbooks, the authors also depict Japan as watching over China, trying to use it as a stepping-stone for conquering (*zhengfu*) the world. When China's power started to grow, it tried to prevent China from unifying by taking advantage of the chaotic state during the split between the Nationalists and the Communists.[15]

Comparing the two generations of textbooks, the depictions of Japan's aggressive "character" are similar, but the later textbooks also pay more attention to economic factors and the rise of militarism, underlining the growth of state power of Japan beginning in the late nineteenth century. However, none of the versions differentiates the Japanese military state from the people. Even in *Tanjiu* and *Tansuo*, the nation of Japan is depicted as one entity with unified sentiments. By attributing human characteristics to a nation and not including alternative voices in the history textbooks, the authors mislead students into thinking that the nation is representative of the people and oversimplify the concepts of nation and agency.

As for the events of the war, *Tanjiu* has a summary at the beginning. "In 1895, Japan occupied Taiwan, and then it stepped into Northeast, Shandong and Inner Mongolia. In 1931, they [the Japanese] used the excuse of the "918" incident to invade the three provinces in the Northeast and set up a puppet state of Manchukuo.[16] Following that, they began to further swallow Northern China."[17] The selection of events indicates that the rise of Japanese militarism can be traced back to the Russo-Japanese war and the annexation of Taiwan in 1905. Even though there was a gap of twenty-six years, these events at the turn of the century are portrayed as almost immediate precedents of Japanese aggression in the 1930s.

Furthermore, the chronology of the Sino-Japanese war (and World War II) in all three textbooks begins with several attacks made by Japan beginning in 1931, including the occupation of Manchukuo and the incidents of "918", "128"[18] and "77"[19]. The use of dates to represent war incidents or battles serves as easy reminders for later generations to commemorate these incidents of heroic resistance and thus mobilize nationalistic sentiments. Today, some of these dates are marked on the official calendar for people to celebrate China's "victory" in the War of Resistance. This type of narrative and glorification of resistance evidences the importation of the standard PRC interpretation into Hong Kong textbooks.

The descriptions of these early events in the textbooks lead to the argument that China was forced to join the war as a reaction to the immoral acts of Japan. In *Tanjiu*, the authors state, "In July, 1931, the Chinese farmers and the Korean farmers started a conflict in Wanbaoshan, Changchun, because of water supply. Japan, using the excuse of protecting its migrants, ordered the shooting of Chinese farmers, and led to the death of hundreds of people." In the next paragraph, the section describing the "918" incident states, "On September 18, 1931, the Kanto Army of Japan bombarded a section of the South Manchurian Railway near Liu Tiao Hu in Shenyang, and blamed it on the Chinese army. Using this as an excuse, it invaded Shenyang."[20] The "128" incident is also described as an event instigated by the Japanese. The authors contend, "In January 1932, Japanese monks burned a factory after a conflict with Chinese workers in Shanghai, and the Japanese consulate used the excuse that the monks were assaulted and sent out an ultimatum to the Shanghai Municipal government …" Despite

the compliance of the Shanghai government with the demands, according to the authors, the Japanese army still bombarded Zhabei and Wusong. All these descriptions are one-sided and portray Japan as unreasonable and vicious in character, fabricating excuses to invade China. At the same time, the descriptions turn China into a passive victim in the first stage of the war.[21]

However, in all Chinese History textbooks, the image of Chinese soldiers as courageous resisters became more prevalent after the war officially began. The Chinese people consistently appear as brave soldiers holding out for a long time or fighting off their enemies despite challenging circumstances. In *Tanjiu*, the authors repeated praise the Chinese people's perseverance (*yili*) and determination (*juexin*) in the war.[22] After its account of the "Nanjing Massacre," where the authors report that 300,000 Chinese died in six weeks and that many innocent people were looted, raped and killed, they exclaim, "The Japanese army use brutal tactics to harm the Chinese common people, hoping that this would undermine the morals of the [Chinese] army and people so that China would surrender soon after, but in fact it solidified the determination of our nation's people (*guoren*) to resist."[23] The authors imply that such atrocities were no doubt deliberate acts of the entire Japanese army to induce China to surrender. They also shape the narrative of the incident so that it fits well into the overall patriotic description of the Chinese, even though there is no evidence that the majority of the Chinese people were aware of the incident and were motivated by it.

In both generations of textbooks, the description of the Sino-Japanese war ends with a glorification of Chinese victory, with little mention of the Allies or the war in Europe. In *Xinbian*, although the authors do not give reasons for China's victory, they praise highly the bravery of the Chinese troops fighting in a disadvantaged environment. Moreover, they state that because of China's "performance and bravery in the war," the international world became "greatly impressed with China and gained a "new understanding of the 'Chinese people' (*Zhonguo minzu*)."[24] As a result, the unequal treaties were revoked. This also represented the end of the era of humiliation.

Tanjiu differs subtly in these descriptions of the victory. China's "victory" is attributed to (1) The unity of all people (*guomin*) and their determination to resist; (2) the United Front and the willingness of the Nationalists and Communists to put aside their hostility; (3) the strategy of prolonging the war—trading space for time; (4) the advantage of China's size; and lastly (5) the help received from the allies.[25] In *Tansuo*, the reasons were almost identical to *Tanjiu* except for the fourth reason. Instead of highlighting the large size of China, it focuses on the limitations of Japan, including its lack of soldiers, resources, and the long distance of traveling required of the Japanese to fight on.[26]

In both generations of textbooks perseverance, unity, bravery and wisdom of the Chinese people are listed as the keys to the nation's survival. The allies' role is only supplementary in the victory and the battles in Europe are not mentioned at all. War is legitimized as an instance of national heroism. Moreover, the War of Resistance is described as instrumental for China to boost its international image. But there is a slight difference between the accounts of the 1980s and 2000s. In *Xinbian*, the victory was attributed to the superiority of the Chinese nation/race (*minzu*), but in the new textbooks, the unity of the citizens (*guomin*) and the willingness of party leaders to put

away differences are seen as the primary reason for the victory.

Overall, all three textbooks oversimplify agency and interpret the Sino-Japanese war as one of oppression. The conceptualization of the enemy is exploited to make the victimized and glorified images of China stand out. The images of China and Japan are inscribed in the dichotomy of us and other, and victim/victimizer in the language. The victimization of the Chinese began with Western aggression and imperialism and ended with Japanese invasion and Chinese's victory in resisting it. In *Tanjiu* and *Tansuo*, the authors further reduce the history of war to the spheres of nationalist conflicts and justice. The earlier reference to China's victimhood in recounting the war suggests the nationalistic co-optation of the war to symbolize China as the wounded nation. And as in all moral tales, in the end, it is the "hero" who perseveres and wins.

C. Hong Kong

In the overall narrative of Chinese History textbooks used today, the beginning of Western aggression witnessed the takeover of Hong Kong territories by the British after the Opium War. The return of Hong Kong represents a watershed that put an end to the history of humiliation. However, Hong Kong is a non-existing entity in *Xinbian* and other textbooks published in the 1980s. No reference to Hong Kong can be found.

It was not until 1997 that Hong Kong history was integrated into Chinese History textbooks. The retrocession of Hong Kong and the increasing interests in local identity and history among the general public probably pushed the Curriculum Development Committee to consider the inclusion of Hong Kong history in the Chinese History curriculum. Nevertheless, as Flora Kan points out, Hong Kong history is usually "treated as peripheral to Chinese History, and merely serves to enhance students' interest and give them a sense of the relevance of Chinese History." [27] In the textbooks, the contents dealing with Hong Kong are still negligible. Hong Kong is intertwined with narratives of wars and politics, and students are encouraged to imagine themselves as citizens of mainland China. The only inclusions are in the last part of the textbooks, which narrate the signing of the Sino-British declaration and the retrocession of Hong Kong. A similar treatment is given to the retrocession of Macau.[28] Incorporating the "return" of Hong Kong and Macau in the last chapter symbolizes the grand finale of twentieth-century Chinese history. By excluding any other parts of Hong Kong history, these textbooks authors also help construct a monolithic discourse of China through their silence about internal tensions and local histories.

II. History Subject Textbooks

While a harmonious "China" is emphasized in most Chinese History textbooks, capitalist development is the grand narrative in History textbooks. The History curriculum, which focuses on world history, is generally taught in English.[29] In the 1990s, the History subject began to incorporate local history and recent history not dealt with ever before. Form 1 to Form 3 focus on a general education of history from antiquity to contemporary history. Form 4 and Form 5 are devoted to Asian History and World History in the 20th century respectively.[30] Like the Chinese History sub-

ject, History textbooks also attempt to construct the history of Hong Kong as a homogeneous, progressive discourse through the erasure of certain histories, but in opposite ways. While the Chinese History textbooks exclude Hong Kong till its retrocession, the narrative of Hong Kong history is told as a linear progression from a fishing village to an international prosperous city. Critiques of capitalism and urbanity, and themes such as exploitation, unequal distribution of wealth and rural everyday life, are silenced in this historical narrative.

Journey Through History: A Modern Course, published by Aristo Educational Press in 2000, is one of the most popular English textbooks taught in lower-form History classes. It consists of three books, which are devoted to Ancient and Medieval Times, Transition to Modern Times, and Twentieth Century respectively. In the following, I focus on Book 3, which has four chapters: "International Conflicts and Threats to Peace in the 20th Century," "Growth and Development of Hong Kong in the 20th Century," "Major Achievements in the 20th Century," and "Mini-Research on an Aspect of 20th Century." The author, Nelson Chan, has a Bachelor of Arts degree and Certification in Education from the University of Hong Kong.

A. Japan and World War II

Although the portrayal of Japan as an aggressive nation in History textbooks is similar to Chinese History textbooks, victimization and suffering of the Chinese people are not highlighted. Chan introduces twentieth-century Japan as follows:

> Party rule began in Japan in 1918. Yet there was not such a tradition in Japan. Many party leaders were corrupt … Many Japanese supported the army and navy chiefs. These people said that expansion could solve the problems facing Japan. They also stated that Japan should build strong armed forces and adopt expansionist policies to strengthen Japan's position in the world. We call them militarists, and their idea militarism. In 1931, the militarists sent an army to attack Manchuria in China and took it in 1932. Their power rose. The militarists ended party rule and ruled Japan during 1932–1945.[31)]

No elaborations were given as to what problems Japan was facing in the early twentieth century. The text also implies that "many Japanese" were in favor of expansion and supported "militarism." This treatment of Japan as a nation is quite similar to that in the Chinese History textbooks.

One chapter is devoted to the history of Hong Kong, entitled, "Growth and Development of Hong Kong in the 20th century." It begins with the statement that beginning paragraph, it states, "Under British rule, Hong Kong developed into an entrepot in around 1900, and then it continued to grow in the early 20th century."[32)] Then, it jumps to a section called "The Japanese Occupation (1941–1945)." There are four subsections: The first one is "How Japan occupied Hong Kong." The larger picture of China is not described. The description of the Sino-Japanese War, which resides in the chapter, "International Conflicts and Threats to Peace in the 20th century." It begins with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which occurred on the same day as its invasion of Hong Kong: "Japanese soldiers started to attack Hong Kong on December

8, 1941. In eighteen days, Hong Kong fell. From Christmas Day, Japan ruled over Hong Kong." The next subsection is "Life Under Japanese Occupation" which briefly highlights four topics: food rationing during wartime, forced repatriation [of Hong Kong residents] to China, issuing of military notes, and Japanization of Hong Kong.[33] The length of each topic is less than four descriptive sentences, with no analysis. The general depiction is that Hong Kong people suffered much during and after the war. None of these aspects is mentioned in Chinese History textbooks, where there is nothing about Hong Kong in this period and very little about civilians.

Unlike the Chinese History textbooks, this textbook does not mention Chinese people's heroic role in the war. Instead, the third subsection, "End of Japanese Occupation," starts with, "On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and then another one on Nagasaki three days later. Japan finally surrendered. This ended Japan's occupation of Hong Kong." This interpretation is in stark contrast to Chinese History textbooks, which depict the role of the Americans and the Allies in the "victory" of the war as supplementary to Chinese people's bravery, perseverance and unity. The United States' intervention is described here as the only reason for how the war ended. This explanation in *Journey* aligns more closely with history textbooks published in Britain or the United States than the Chinese History textbooks in Hong Kong. Moreover, it does not use the term the "War of Resistance" in the text. In fact, the chapter only refers the Pacific War as "Japan's occupation," and "Second World War" is only used earlier in other chapters to refer to the European side of the war.

The section on the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong concludes with "Effects of Japanese Occupation," which states, "Hong Kong people had a hard life. Thousands of them died of starvation and many of them were forced to leave Hong Kong." Moreover, the text continues, many Hong Kong people lost money because they were forced to exchange their money for military notes but could not redeem the money after the war.[34] This is also is a narrative of victimization, but unlike the Chinese History textbooks, there is almost no mention of these Hong Kongers being Chinese. China is entirely absent in this narrative of war. The author chooses to take a Hong Kong-centered perspective on the issue of World War II.

B. Postwar Development in Hong Kong

The following section, "Hong Kong's Growth and Development since 1945," gives a summary of Hong Kong's transition from an entrepot to a manufacturing center, and finally to an international financial center, with one and a half page of text accompanied by illustrations. Two main factors that "helped Hong Kong develop into a manufacturing center" in the 1950s were the Chinese civil war, which induced people to migrate to Hong Kong with "capital" and "technical knowledge," along with others who were "willing to work for low wages"; and the Korean War, during which Britain forbade Hong Kong to trade with China and thus forced Hong Kong to industrialize. Besides these brief mentions, there is nothing about the PRC or the British government in this section. No details are given about the wars aside from their positive influence on Hong Kong's economy.

The textbook then states that in the 1970s, because of competition from industries

in Singapore, Taiwan and Korea, rising production costs and restrictions on trade, Hong Kong had to adapt to the new circumstances and turn itself into an international financial center. This section also lists the main categories of Hong Kong's "social developments" during the 1950s to 1980s, which were education, housing and social welfare. The social problems and political turmoil in Hong Kong during those periods, such as the riots in the 1960s, receive no attention in the textbook.

C. Post-1949 China-Hong Kong Relations

The last section of the chapter is "Hong Kong's Contributions to China." The author states: "Under British rule, Hong Kong was closely tied to the mainland. However, the only contributions to China were the Anti-Qing movement and the war against Japan during 1937–41."[35] In regards to the Anti-Qing movement, the author argues that Hong Kong was a good place for the revolutionary movement led by Sun Yat-sen at the turn of the century because it was not under Qing rule and it gave the revolutionaries a hiding place. Here, "China" is associated with Sun's revolutionary movement, implying that the Qing government was clearly not "China." The representation of the Qing parallels that of Japan during World War II; both are foreigners invading "Chinese" territories. Under the topic of "Anti-Japanese Effort, 1937–41," the authors state, "Until Hong Kong fell to the Japanese in late 1941, local people helped Chinese refugees with food and shelter through local organizations."[36] The migrants from China are depicted as "refugees" who received help from "local people." The temporary status of "refugees" set these migrants from China apart from the "local people," who are undefined in the textbook. This use of the term "refugees" who received aid from Hong Kong also underlines the differences of these people from the immigrants since the 1950s because the latter were "productive" migrants with money or skills, which were conducive to the capitalistic development of the city. In contrast, nothing about migrations to Hong Kong is noted in the Chinese History textbooks.

The second subsection, "China's Contributions to Hong Kong," has two topics: "Provision of things (including daily necessities and raw materials, and water)," and "Economic contributions." The economic contributions were the policies under Deng Xiaoping's economic reform [*gaige kaifang*]. The special economic zones set up at that time attracted many industrialists to move their production lines to China and increased the trade with China by a factor of twenty. Following this subsection is a two-page summary of the process of retrocession, which, like the description in Chinese History textbooks, concludes the history of Hong Kong.[37] The content does not include anything beyond the return of Hong Kong. Nor does it give any details of Chinese history in the 20th century.

Unlike the Chinese History textbooks, which downplay the importance of Hong Kong or include Hong Kong to help create a nationalistic past, the History textbook narrative emphasizes independent economic and social advancement in the twentieth century. The post-war period is described as one of development and achievement of the local people. The description implies that the success of Hong Kong is brought by British colonialism. It does not cast any moral judgment on the British government. In both Chinese History and History textbooks, Hong Kong does not appear as a subject in its own right, but is either submerged into the Chinese nationalist narrative and

represents as the shame of colonialism, or is displayed as an example of triumphal capitalism brought by colonialism.

III. Memories of History and Public Perception of the "Nation"

Although most secondary schools widely use the textbooks described above in history classes, they do not represent the general perception of China among Hong Kong residents who have received such education. The following section is based on the results of a survey that I conducted between September 2006 and February 2007. The survey focuses on three main themes: memories of history classes in secondary school, knowledge and attitudes of modern Chinese historical events, and feelings towards China and Hong Kong. In total, I have collected over fifty responses from different age groups. The responses I include in this paper are from respondents who were born in 1970 or after. All of them have received either all or part of their secondary education in Hong Kong. I also conducted about ten email and in-person follow-up interviews. Most of these respondents came from middle or upper class backgrounds and attended Anglo-Chinese secondary schools.

Across generations, respondents express the impression that the Chinese History subject is dry and requires heavy memorization of facts. Compared to the subject of History, which a few questionnaire respondents describe as "fun and lively" or "interesting," Chinese History is generally regarded quite negatively, including comments such as "hard to understand" and "boring and unengaging."

To most of the respondents who received secondary education before the mid-1990s, Chinese History is associated with dynastic history and not with twentieth-century history, because at that time in many of the junior levels the curriculum of Chinese History ended either at May Fourth or World War II. Many teachers did not teach it or went through it quickly. In contrast, students currently in secondary school have a better understanding of historical events in the twentieth century, but the turbulent decades after 1949 do not leave remarkable traces. About half of the current Form 2 or Form 3 students said that modern Chinese history is chaotic and the leadership in the PRC government until very recently has not been effective.

Although the Chinese History curriculum became increasingly nationalistic after 1997, students' perceptions of China disrupt the narratives of the textbooks, as exposed in the gaps of their memories of the past and their understanding of their identity. When asked how they see China, 90% of the respondents regardless of age said that China "still" has many problems even though it is improving. Mostly the respondents are very dissatisfied with corruption and bureaucratic red tape. Others pointed out that there is a lack of democracy and unequal distribution of wealth.

Information gathered from the questionnaires and the interviews show that most respondents see Deng Xiaoping's economic reform as a very positive dramatic event. One respondent, a management executive of a soda company in Hong Kong said that she believes China has been moving from a closed-up (*fengbi*) nation to one open to international trade and influence.

The ones who attended secondary school in the 1980s generally view China's situation as better than before. When I asked them "better" in comparison to which period, most of them only vaguely answered "back then" or a few decades ago, indicating

a long period of stagnation and backwardness before Deng's economic reforms. What is ironic in their perceptions of China is that they strongly feel that economic disparity in China is a serious social problem, but they do not attribute the disparity to reform and unequal development towards capitalism under Deng.

A subtle difference is evident between people who were born in the 1970s and those born in 1990s. The 1970s generation did not learn about China from secondary school history textbooks, which only briefly mentioned post-1949 Chinese history. Many of them mainly learned about contemporary Chinese history from their relatives who came from China, or through media reports and encounters with mainlanders in Hong Kong or China. When I asked interviewees about the Cultural Revolution, while most respondents born in the mid-1980s or after can give a ballpark time frame of 1960s and 1970s, the ones who were born in the 1970s have blurred views. The soda company manager even said it was something that "happened a long time ago" and is not relevant to her. The reluctance to comment on Maoism or policies under earlier periods of Communist China could be a result of ignorance and/or an overall indifference toward history. One can also argue that there is a general amnesia about post-1949 Chinese history among Hong Kongers who were born in the 1970s or the 1980s, and the contents of the Chinese History and History textbooks helped perpetuate this loss of memories.

The respondents born in the 1990s who have taken Chinese History tend to have better historical knowledge of post-1949 events, and one or two who are studying for the HKCEE can recite the years of major events. However, according to an Anglo-Chinese school history teacher whom I interviewed, the secondary students today also share a strong aversion towards Communism. She said, "Although most of them cannot explain what Communism means, they tend to see Communism as 'outdated.'" A few respondents born in the 1990s also commented that they find China backwards (*luohou*) and dirty. Thus, even though these secondary school students have more knowledge about the PRC than the earlier generations, they still maintain a very strong local identity and an awareness of a different history and lifestyle the mainland. In contrast, according to that teacher, many of her students show great enthusiasm for the recent history of Hong Kong, such as the Hong Kong-Guangzhou strike in 1925–26 and the riots in 1967.[38] Unfortunately, these controversial topics are not included in any history textbooks.

Another frame of reference these respondents use to measure success is Hong Kong. These younger generations living in Hong Kong continue to believe in Hong Kong's superiority. The inferior status of the nation/homeland induces Hong Kongers to desire a separate status from the PRC. In other words, the alternative to colonialism has never been desirable. As Ackbar Abbas argues, Hong Kong has taken advantage of its colonial status, turning itself into a global city and outstripping its homeland in finance and democratic politics.[39] Although there can be no denial that Hong Kongers generally enjoy greater bureaucratic efficiencies and material comforts than their mainland counterparts, underlying this view is an adoption of a Western model of capitalistic progressive narrative. Many believe that Hong Kong is still ahead of China. Although quite a number of respondents say that they do not think Hong Kong has a high status in the world anymore compared to twenty years ago, or its

high status now is just restricted to the economic sphere, they continue to think that Hong Kong is a cleaner, safer and more comfortable place than China.

Sense of Belonging

However, most Hong Kongers do have strong sentiments about being Chinese. To the question "Do you consider yourself a subject of the PRC?," most respondents regardless of age acknowledge being Chinese, but a fair number of respondents qualify their answers by saying that it is a political fact, or reply that "we cannot say that we are not." But when asked whether they are patriotic, some say that they love Chinese civilization, history, culture and customs. Many students also join study tours organized by their schools to visit cities in China. Here, Chineseness is signified as membership in an ethnic group (*minzu*) or as culture, not as citizenship in a nation. In a way, this echoes the idea of China represented in Chinese History textbooks published before the 1990s, when the concept of the nation-state was not yet introduced and history was taught to cultivate students' moral well being. At the same time, beginning in the 1990s, Hong Kongers began to cope with the gaps between their identity as Hong Kongers and as citizens of the PRC. Rather than seeing Hong Kong identity as contradictory to the larger Chinese identity, they believe there is a way of merging these two identities, as Hong Kong scholar Lau Siu-kai argues, "It is also likely that, despite all sorts of conflicts, the Hong Kong identity and the larger Chinese identity will become increasingly complementary inasmuch as claiming the Hong Kong identity not only does not involve denying one's Chinese identity, but also acts to reinforce it." [40)]

Furthermore, we also see some subtle changes in the nationalistic feelings of the younger generations. This is most evident in their reactions towards Diao Yu Tai.[41)] Respondents born in the 1970s generally see this as a contemporary territorial issue fought over by China, Taiwan and Japan, and remain neutral. Several said that since it is mainly an issue about land claims, it is not as important as other World War II related issues such as the Yasukuni Shrine, the Nanjing Massacre or textbook falsification, which involve deaths and war crimes during the war. In contrast, the 80% of the respondents born in the 1980s and 1990s view Diao Yu Tai as Chinese territory, despite the fact that the sovereignty of the territory is still under dispute. Secondary school students who responded to my questionnaire did not learn about Diao Yu Tai through textbooks, since neither History nor Chinese History textbooks mentioned the islands. However, three of them elaborated and said that this is a matter damaging the intactness of China, indicating their increased sense of national belongings and protectiveness of national territory.

While there have been anti-Japanese demonstrations throughout China in the past few years, the Chinese government is very cautious about responding to the protesters. When I was in Guangzhou in 2005 when widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations took place throughout China, the authorities censored news from Hong Kong on these events, which were seen as potentially threatening to political stability. For many students born in the 1990s, although they think that the emotions of most protestors could have been toned down, they feel that their protests are justified and the government should act on the people's behalf to negotiate with Japan. Two of them

said that they were dissatisfied with the passivity of the mainland authorities on the issue. These students are more patriotic than the generations before them, but yet in more critical ways than the authorities expect them to be.

Another way of showing their concern for China is through helping China's economy. Renita Wong shows that many Hong Kongers in their teens and twenties came to represent themselves as modern Chinese who were constructed as "free subjects" under British colonial discourse of liberalism, and such discourse in turn has inspired many of them to engage in development projects of China after 1997, so that they can "open" it up from the outside.[42] She argues that China-development is a space in which individual Hong Kongers' ambivalent desires about going 'back' and staying 'out' were accommodated. Their love for China is built upon their belief that China is an underdeveloped country while Hong Kong is a city in the First World. Furthermore, identification as "first world" arises from pride in capitalistic development, consonant with the narrative in the History textbook. Nevertheless, they mix their local pride with a love for China, "othering" the homeland as backward and in need of help. Overall, Hong Kongers' "love" for China has increased in the past two decades, but their view towards the nation differs greatly from what the government or education curriculum developers expect.

Conclusion

My essay has shown that in Hong Kong secondary schools, the history of China and Hong Kong is taught in two contradictory grand narratives, appearing in Chinese History textbooks and History textbooks respectively. While the main themes of Chinese History education have not changed much over the past twenty years, after retrocession more emphasis is put on learners' identity as Chinese citizens rather than moral cultivation. History textbooks, in contrast, continue to endorse a Western capitalistic definition of progress, placing Hong Kong's status above that of its homeland because of Hong Kong's development under British colonialism. As the result of the survey shows, however, even though secondary students today tend to have more nationalistic attachments towards China and acknowledge their identity as Chinese, they are not passive recipients of history education. Many find alternative ways to demonstrate their love for the nation, as represented by their criticisms of the Chinese government's stands on the Diao Yu Tai incident, as well as their enthusiasm for development programs in China. This is both a result of the hybrid history education they receive in school, and of more access to information through a variety of channels beyond secondary school education.

Notes

1) For details on changes in history education curricula, see Flora Kan, *Hong Kong's Chinese History Curriculum from 1945: Politics and Identity*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007) and Edward Vickers, *In Search of Identity: The Politics of History as a School Subject in Hong Kong, 1960s–2005*, (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, Comparative Education Research Center, 2005). This essay differs from those works in its focus on the cultural representations of nation in history textbooks.

2) Flora Kan and Edward Vickers, "One Hong Kong, Two Histories: "History" and "Chinese History" in the Hong Kong School Curriculum," *Comparative Education*, 38, no. 1, (Feb., 2002), 74–75.

3) Edward Vickers, Flora Kan, and Paul Morris, "Colonialism and the Politics of 'Chinese History' in

Hong Kong's Schools," *Oxford Review of Education*, 29, no. 1, (Mar., 2003), 95–111.

4) Bernard Luk, "Chinese Culture in the Hong Kong Curriculum: Heritage and Colonialism," *Comparative Education Review*, 3, no. 4 (1991), 664–5.
5) See Lin Xiaoqing, "Historicizing Subjective Reality: Rewriting History in Early Republican Early China," *Modern China*, 25, no. 1 (1999), 3.
6) *Xinbian Zhongguo Lishi*, (Ren Ren and Ling Kee Publishing Company, 1984), 5.
7) The backgrounds of these committee members are not clear, but some of the contents are very similar to textbooks published in the mainland.
8) Liang Yiming, Luo Weiru, Xie Weijie and Ye Xiaobing, *Tanjiu Zhongguo Lishi*, (Hong Kong: Manhattan Press Ltd., 2004), Preface.
9) Chen Hanshen, Huangzhiwen, Lu qiming, Fan Guoji, Weng Jiangcheng, Peng Yaojun, Bu Yumin, Chen Jianhui, Guo Daliang and Chen Jierong, *Tansuo Zhongguoshi*, 5, (Ling Kee Publishing Company, 2006), Preface.
10) Vickers, *In Search of Identity*, 4.
11) Not all the textbooks published in the 2000s have the same kind of prefaces, however. Xin Linian, published by Hong Kong Educational Publishing Company in 2004, for example, does not have a preface but an "explanation" which gives general guidance about the history syllabus and ways that the textbook can be used.
12) Curriculum Development Council (1997), Chinese History Syllabus, (Forms 1–3), (Hong Kong, Education Department), 8.
13) *Xinbian*, 108
14) *Tanjiu*, 192–3.
15) *Tansuo*, 74.
16) The "918" incident, generally known as the Mukden incident in Eanglish, refers to the sudden Japanese invasion of Northeast Army in Shenyang on September 18, 1931 after a section of the Japan-owned South Manchuria Railway was dynamited. This gave an excuse for the Japanese military to invade China. As a result of that the provinces Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang fell into the hands of the Japanese.
17) *Tanjiu*, 190.
18) The "128" incident refers to the invasion of Shanghai's Zhabei district on January 28, 1932. Before the incident, Shanghai residents boycotted Japanese goods and the Japanese government demanded the Shanghai government to apologize, compensate for the losses, and stopped anti-Japanese demonstrations.
19) The "77" incident symbolizes the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese military found a soldier missing after a rehearsal near Lu Qiu Chao in suburban Beijing. The military wanted to do a search of the towns, but the Chinese military refused. After that the Japanese military began its formal attack.
20) *Tanjiu*, 194.
21) By pointing out how the war is narrated in mainstream textbook, I am not suggesting that Japanese should be treated more sympathetically or downplaying the harm of violent invasion here. I am merely trying to trace what students in Hong Kong secondary schools learn about World War II in textbooks.
22) *Tanjiu*, 202, 205, 208.
23) *Tanjiu*, 203.
24) *Xinbian*, 123.
25) *Tanjiu*, 208–213.
26) *Tansuo*, 94.
27) Kan, *Hong Kong's Chinese History Curriculum from 1945: Politics and Identity*, 128.
28) *Tanjiu*, 215–217; *Tansuo*, 77–83
29) The linguistic medium of instruction has been a topic of debate.
30) The World history text, "Exploring World History" for F. 5 entitled "Conflicts and Cooperation in the 20th Century World," published by Ling Kee, (2004), includes nothing about China.
31) Nelson Chan, *Journey Through History: A Modern Course*, Book 3, (Aristo Educational Press, 2000), 10.

32) Chan, 92.
33) Chan, 93–94.
34) Chan, 94–97.
35) Chan, 110.
36) Chan, 111.
37) Chan, 112–115.
38) Many of the interests could be stimulated by recent social movements against the demolition of the Star Ferry Pier, the Queer Pier and the reconstruction of old districts, as well as the increasing public concern over maintaining "collective memories." For details, see the discussion on "In Media Hong Kong."
39) Ackbar Abbas, *Hong Kong*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 5–6.
40) Lau Siu-kai, *Hongkongese or Chinese: The Problem of Identity on the Eve of Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty over Hong Kong*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997), 27.
41) In 1874, Japan took Okinawa from China. However, the Diao Yu Tai, a group of islands, still remained under the administration of Taiwan, a part of China. After being defeated by Japan in the Sino-Japan War, China ceded Taiwan to Japan under the Shimonoseki Treaty. As a part of Taiwan, the ownership of Diao Y tai passed to Japan at that time. Taiwan was returned to China at the end of World War II in 1945 based upon the 1943 Potsdam Declarations. The Japanese government accepted the terms that stated "… that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, shall be restored to the Republic of China." However, Japanese have maintained that the Dao Yu Tai should not be included in these treaties.
42) Renita Yuk-lin Wong, "Going "Back" and Staying "Out": Articulating the Postcolonial Hong Kong Subjects in the Development of China," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 11, no. 30, (2002), 141–159.

Suevey—history education (3-9-07)

My name is Angelina Chin, a teaching fellow at Pomona College, CA. I am currently conducting a research on secondary school education and national identity in Hong Kong. I need to collect 50 or more questionnaires from people who have attended secondary school in Hong Kong. I sincerely hope that you could help my research by participating in this survey. Thank you very much for your cooperation. (All personal will be kept confidential.)

我是陳欣欣，現時在美國加洲 Pomona College 任教。我正在進行一項關於香港中學教育及國籍身分的研究，需要收集 50 份或以上的問卷回應。此問卷的對像是在香港曾就讀過中學的人仕。希望你能參與此問卷調查。謝謝！（一切所提供之個人資料會保密，只作研究員作參考）

For inquiries, please send email to:
如有任何查詢，請發電郵到以下地址：
angelina.chin@pomona.edu

Please answer the following questions:
請回答下列問題：

1. Year of Birth (Choose 1)
   出生年代（選一）

   before 1935　1935–39　1940–44　1945–49　1950–54　1955–59　1960–64
   1965–69　1970–74　1975–79　1980–84　1985–89　1990–94
2. What is your education level?
   你的教育程度是：中學（　）大專（　）大專以上（　）
3. Where do you live now?
   你現在的居所在哪裡？
4. Did you attend secondary school in Hong Kong?
   你曾在香港就讀中學嗎？
5. Till which grade did you study in Hong Kong?
   在香港讀書至哪年級？
6. Which secondary school did you attend?
   你就讀的是那一間中學？
7. What type of school was that? Did it have religious affiliation? Was it public/private?
   你就讀的中學有宗教背景嗎？是公立學校還是私立學校？
8. Did you ever take “Chinese History” subject in secondary school? Which grade?
   你有修讀「中國歷史」嗎？是哪一年級？
9. Did you ever take “History” (taught in English)? Which grade?
   你有修讀以英文教授的 “History”「歷史」嗎？是哪一年級？
10. Do you remember what your “Chinese History” or “History” classes were like in secondary school?
    你對中學的「中國歷史」或「歷史」課程有甚麼印像？

11. Do you remember which “Chinese History” textbook did you use?
你記得在中學「中國歷史」課是用哪本教科書嗎？
12. Do you remember what you learned in secondary school “History” or “Chinese History” classes about 20th century China?
你記得在中學「中國歷史」課或「歷史」課中所學過關於二十世紀中國的東西嗎？
13. Do you remember what you learned in secondary school “History” or “Chinese History” classes about World War II?
你記得在中學「中國歷史」課或「歷史」課中所學過關於第二次世界大戰的東西嗎？
14. Do you remember what you learned in secondary school “History” or “Chinese History” classes about Japan?
你記得在中學「中國歷史」課或「歷史」課中所學過關於日本的東西嗎？
15. Do you remember what you learned in secondary school “History” or “Chinese History” classes about Hong Kong?
你記得在中學「中國歷史」課或「歷史」課中所學過關於香港的東西嗎？
16. What is your definition of “patriotism”?
你認為甚麼是「愛國」？
17. Do you think your secondary school Chinese History teacher(s) was/were patriotic?
你覺得你的「中國歷史」科老師愛國嗎？
18. Besides “History” or “Chinese History” class, where did you get your knowledge of history?
在歷史課以外，你從甚麼地方獲得歷史知識？
19. Do you think you have solid general knowledge of 20th century Chinese History? Why?
你認為你對二十世紀的中國歷史有不錯的認識基礎嗎？為甚麼？

What is your impression or knowledge of the following issues?
你對以下的項目有何印像或認識？

20. Yasukuni Shrine
靖國神社
21. Nanjing Massacre
南京大屠殺
22. Japanese Textbook Revision
日本教科書竄改
23. Diao Yutai
釣魚台
24. Do you consider yourself Hong Konger?
你覺得自己是香港人嗎？
25. Do you consider yourself Chinese?
你覺得自己是中國人嗎？
26. Do you love China?
你愛國嗎？
27. Do you know of anyone close to you who is patriotic? If yes, who is it?
你身邊有愛國的朋友或親戚嗎？如有，是誰？

28. What's your view of the mainland?
你對中國大陸有何看法？
29. What do you think about the Chinese Communist Party?
你對中國共產黨有何看法？
30. Do you support Taiwan independence?
你支持台灣獨立嗎？
31. Are you aware of the anti-Japanese protests in China?
你有沒有留意在中國（大陸？）的一些反日示威行動？
32. What do you think about those protests? Do you agree with the protesters?
你對那些行動有何看法？你認同他們的行動嗎？
33. Do you consider Hong Kong as part of China?
你覺得香港是（中國？）大陸的一部分嗎？
34. Do you think Hong Kong plays an important role in the world?
你覺得香港的國際地位高不高？
35. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up in-depth interview? (If yes, please leave your name and contact information.)
你願意接受進一步的訪問嗎？（願意的話請留下姓名及連絡方法）

—END 問卷完—