

# The “Japan Sea Era”: Imperialism and Regional Identity in the 1930s

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## INTRODUCTION

This essay deals with the responses by local urban areas along the northern part of the Japan Sea coast of Honshu to the establishment of the Japanese puppet state of Manchuria in 1932 and the subsequent potentials for trade. Its focus is on how these previously neglected areas of Japan saw Japanese imperialism as a catalyst for their own development; how the images and discourses of future greatness spurred a form of regional imperialism that was inwards-looking and commercial in nature, but which also created support for the national-level external and militaristic expansionism amid the local-level rhetoric of “*Nihonkai Dakkyaku*,” or “Escape from the Japan Sea.”

Against the background of central government deliberations concerning which ports to assign first-ranked shipping lines to, and the desires of the industrial centers of Kansai and the Pacific coast for cheap shipping, this paper examines how imperialism was perceived by regions in terms of local rather than national or international politics. While much of the focus is on Kanazawa, the largest city on the Japan Sea coast, attention is also paid to Toyama, whose 1937 expo was a direct response to the development of Manchurian trade, and to Niigata, where the opening of the Jōetsu line from Tokyo in 1931 provided an added catalyst for development. Tsuruga, whose proximity to the Kansai region spurred development, and Sakata, to the north, a commercial center and trade port since the Edo period, will be briefly looked at as well in order to provide some degree of universality.

Very little attention has been paid to the development of regional modern Japan in the English-language historiography.<sup>1)</sup> One notable exception is Michael Lewis’s study of Toyama, which focuses on the far from smooth relationship between Toyama prefecture and the central government. In particular, in chapter five, “Local Imperialism and the Chimera of Progress,” he discusses the discourses regarding the expansion of empire. However, his primary focus there is on the rhetoric of the Russo-Japanese War, and the ideology of the 1930s is secondary. In addition, Lewis mainly looks at the jingoistic media response, and does not inform us of the extent to which such views were common among the local leaders.

Lewis’s focus on the region, however, is one of very few works that give it its due. Particularly in the major historiography, by focusing on the dominant discourses of formation of the Meiji state and the growth of imperialism, which portrays Japan as a collective ideology, the role and importance of regional identity is overlooked. Much of the research regarding the region is designed to show the penetration and reach of

central government policies, or contrast between the countryside and the city. For example, T. Fujitani, in *Splendid Monarchy*,<sup>2)</sup> refers to the various ways in which the Imperial institution was perceived in regional areas such as Niigata, but does not discuss the underlying reasons for such differences in perception in regional terms. Fujitani instead refers to “folk ideas” as a catalyst for popular perception of the imperial organ but does not elaborate on the significance of regional identity in forming these ideas.

This contrast between national identity and “old localisms” is also addressed by James Baxter in his study of Meiji Restoration Kanazawa. However, while old localisms may have been supplanted or over-ridden to some extent by the centrally-based ideas of the nation-state, they nevertheless did not vanish entirely, but adapted into new ones that drew their strength from memories of the old. As Louise Young notes, “It is easy to lose sight, in this larger picture, of the ways in which imperialism also stimulated the growth of plural identities within the national fabric.”<sup>3)</sup> While Young acknowledges that “support for troops defending the empire was articulated increasingly in local pride and loyalty, giving a distinctly local cast to the imagined community of nation,”<sup>4)</sup> detailing how local war heroes were feted by their home regions, this is in fact used not to show the diversity of response but the homogeneity. While she notes that at a “discursive level, the two fields [of national and local] overlapped; the language of mobilization interwove appeals to region and nation,”<sup>5)</sup> her study on Japan’s reaction to Empire in the 1930s does in fact stop short of any detailed examination of the role of local identity in the forging of Japan’s “Total Empire.” It is this lacuna that the present paper attempts to redress in a small way, by focusing on the reactions of the major Japan Sea coast centers to the creation of Manchuria and the potential it offered them, through trade and commerce, to thrive and develop in the name of Empire.

### **The Effects of Japanese Imperialist Expansion on Local Rhetoric**

In early 1932, the organisers of the Kanazawa City “Great Industry and Tourism Expo” faced a serious problem. The Shanghai Incident had erupted a few weeks earlier, and among the first army units to be sent from Japan was the Kanazawa-based Ninth Division. The battles were tough, and the local newspapers were full of reports from the front lines, carrying reports of war dead and casualties. The mood of the city was somber. As Mayor Yoshikawa Ichitarō noted, it was hardly the time to be reading casualty reports in the morning paper and then seeing dancing girls at the expo in the evening.<sup>6)</sup>

This essay therefore takes as one of its central themes the response of the expo organisers to the significant military and imperialistic events of early 1932: the Shanghai Incident of late January through March, and the formal founding of the State of Manchukuo in early March. Both events had a profound effect on Kanazawa, located as it was on the Japan Sea coast directly opposite Manchuria, and desperate for a way to overcome its “back of Japan” industrial backwardness. Examining the local responses to national policies, what Young has termed the “local cast to imagined community of nation,” allows us to see exactly what these local identities are, how they associated themselves with the concept of Empire, and how they both

fed off and supplied Imperial ambitions in the 1930s. The discourse surrounding the Kanazawa Expo of spring 1932 gives us a very clear look at these ideas, happening as it did directly after the events in Shanghai and Manchuria, in a city that saw itself as intimately intertwined in their outcome, and moreover a city that had a very clear historical consciousness of gradual decline and weakness since the Meiji era.

As Yoshimi Shun'ya notes,<sup>7)</sup> against the background of Imperialist expansion after the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, expos became devices to confirm the Imperialist position of Japan with regard to its distance from the colonies. As Imperialistic rhetoric, expos were used as military propaganda devices to justify Japan's expansion into Asia. The two principal events of Japanese Imperialism in 1932, the Shanghai Incident and the creation of Manchuria, had two very different effects on the feelings of the population back home. While the creation of Manchuria was welcomed on several levels: as an outlet for Japanese population expansion, a new trade market, a friendly neighbor in an increasingly unfriendly region; the reaction to the fighting in Shanghai was almost uniformly militaristic in tone. Stories such as the "Three Human Bombs," who were presented as having gallantly sacrificed their lives to blow open an important gateway, were mythologized through the media, treated as national heroes and their lives made into dramatic motion pictures seen around the country. One of the most gung-ho places was Kanazawa, home of the Ninth Division of the army, who saw the bulk of the fighting.

The local media took a central role in spreading militarism in Japan, as has been frequently noted by other researchers. In Kanazawa, the two major newspapers competed with each other in coverage of the events of the day, with the Minseitō-affiliated *Hokuriku Mainichi* focusing on the new nation of Manchuria, and the Seiyūkai-connected *Hokkoku Shinbun* taking a more overtly militaristic stance. The *Hokuriku Mainichi*, influenced by the ideas of its first chairman, Nagai Ryūtarō (later Minister of Colonization under the 1932 Saitō cabinet), preferred to champion the cause of trade with the new nation of Manchuria as a panacea for Kanazawa and the Hokuriku region's ills. In contrast, the *Hokkoku Shinbun's* favourite catch-cry was "*Gunkoku no Haru*," or the "Military Country Spring." The *Hokkoku Shinbun* even went so far as to directly petition the city government to change the name of the expo from "Industry and Tourism" to "Industry and Military." While this option was rejected, the media adopted militarism as an unofficial third theme of the expo, and the bulk of its reporting was focused on the militaristic and imperialistic themes of the expo.

Local expos were a common event in the Japan of the late 1920s. Many of them were themed around remembering the Taisho period, or commemorating the coronation of the new Emperor Showa. As the effects of the Depression deepened, their role as stimulators of local industry and economy were also emphasized, and it was against this background of economic boosterism that Kanazawa City decided to hold an expo as well. In addition, to take advantage of the growing tourism industry and to promote itself as an industrial center, for the first time "Tourism" would be a second theme of a regional expo. However, the events of early 1932 added a third, unofficial theme: Empire.

And nowhere was this new theme more clearly visible than in the enlarged Defence Pavilion. Designed originally to exhibit the latest in scientific warfare

technology, the focus of the exhibits changed radically after the Shanghai Incident brought the realities of wartime sacrifice to the local populace. Now it was the heroic deaths of locals that were brought to the forefront, with the prime exhibits being scenarios of the deaths of Major Hayashi and Major Kuga. Kuga in particular, though originally from Saga Prefecture, was lionized as a local—and indeed, as a national—hero, with no fewer than seven films made about his suicide. For Kuga did not die in battle. He was captured by the Chinese, while unconscious, and released after the end of hostilities. Then he went to the scene of his capture, drew out his pistol, and shot himself, in one of the defining acts of modern Japanese militarism.<sup>8)</sup>

The personal effects of dead soldiers of Kanazawa, such as Kuga's blood-stained Will addressed to his father, were purposely exhibited in order to bring forth "tears of remembrance," and "create in the people a sense of patriotism and loyalty"<sup>9)</sup> through the somber display. This emphasis on the personal over the general, the regional over the national, created a propaganda space in which local regional feelings were co-opted into deepening national patriotism, and through these created links of local and national loyalty, thus bringing the popular consciousness into line with the Army's ambitions.<sup>10)</sup>

The other significant change to the design of the expo was the enrichment of the Manchuria-Mongolia Pavilion.<sup>11)</sup> The Manchuria Pavilion was the joint operation of the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Guangdong Bureau, two organizations that were very keen indeed to spur Japanese interest in the continent. However, what is interesting about the media rhetoric concerning the Manchuria Pavilion is that, while undoubtedly Imperialist in tone in that it saw Manchuria as a resource to be used, it was almost entirely free of overtly militaristic tones. This was in stark contrast to the Defence Pavilion rhetoric, which was highly militaristic, but less concerned with pure Imperialist ideas of land and resources. The expansionist, imperialist rhetoric of the Japan Sea region towards Manchuria was largely peaceful in nature, an extension of the ideas of the Taisho Democracy period.

The role of the media in creating an idealized vision of the city's future was strongly linked to rhetoric concerning imperialism. As the region's leading newspaper, the *Hokkoku Shinbun* remarked, "If after the prosperity of the West we can look forward to the prosperity of the East, particularly Japan, then Manchuria must be the field in which the Japanese people flourish."<sup>12)</sup> Thus Manchuria's development, in the words of a *Hokkoku Shinbun* editorial, was "to be determined by the effort of the Japanese people (this is probably not something that should be made public knowledge internationally) ... The development of Manchuria is a guarantee of the prosperity of the Hokuriku region ... Whether for industry or tourism, the future international attitude towards Manchuria is vital for the Hokuriku ... This is the reason why the Tourism and Industry Expo will succeed."<sup>13)</sup> The imperialistic jingoism of the media is obvious, as is the linking through regionalism with the expo, the media recreating the expo as a propaganda device for regional views of imperialism.

Manchuria, in the words of the *Hokkoku Shinbun*, was the land of infinite riches which Hokuriku people were destined to open up. For this reason, the Manchuria Pavilion was designed to show "correct concepts of Manchuria, and the rightness of our lengthening national path"<sup>14)</sup> into the land. To that end, The Manchuria Pavilion,

the focus of most attention out of the colonial pavilions, was largely given over to displays of soy production, building products, hops, salt, glass, cloths, and a lump of coal one and half metres tall. In addition, panoramas and models laid out before the visitors the precise nature of the new Japan Sea Era, with relief maps showing Manchuria and Japan and trade routes and ports shown in lights. *The Hokkoku Shinbun* referred to Manchuria as “the world’s treasure-house” and “the lifeline of our nation,” referencing the phrase of Matsuoka Yōsuke that Manchuria was economically and militarily Japan’s bulwark against Soviet and Western—and Chinese—aggression.<sup>15)</sup>

Manchuria was “waiting for the bold expansion of our northern [Hokuriku region] people” who would “develop its endless riches,”<sup>16)</sup> and the Manchuria Pavilion was designed to ensure just that. It was an unashamedly commercial operation—a gigantic advertising booth for empire. As the *Hokkoku Shinbun* noted, “The encouragement of industry is, along with the strengthening of defensive capabilities, one of the two great wellsprings of national prosperity.”<sup>17)</sup> Thus the local ambitions for economic development were clothed in the more noble rhetoric of patriotism, and the establishment of trade ties with Manchuria was seen as a patriotic act as well as a boon to local commerce. Empire, for the Hokuriku region, was all about economics and trade.

The reason for this was, above all, Kanazawa’s location at the center of the Japan Sea coast and its rank as the most populous city there. To emphasize this, an editorial from the *Hokkoku Shinbun* invoked Mencius’ ideas of location, people, and timing as the fundamentals to national prosperity: “According to Mencius, there are three things that make a country great: usefulness of location, harmony of the people, and the timing of heaven. ... As far as place goes, in terms of Mencius’ usefulness of location, Kanazawa is a large city facing the Japan Sea most closely connected to Manchuria, so is blessed with a useful location. The harmony of her people is also shown in the way her citizens have come together to make this expo a success.”<sup>18)</sup> Thus in addition to the “timing” of the creation of Manchukuo, the success of the expo was proof of the “*hito no wa*” (harmony of people). And, of course, the “*chi no ri*” (location) as the closest city to Manchuria gave Kanazawa opinion leaders reason to hope that they could finally break free of the lag in modernization they had suffered since the Meiji period.

### **Port and Trade Opportunities on the Japan Sea Coast**

The most notable response to the formation of Manchuria among the Japan Sea coast cities was the idea that this would put an end to their isolation and lack of modern development. In order to examine these ideas more closely, the discourses surrounding the presentation of Manchuria and Empire in the 1932 Kanazawa City Great Industry and Tourism Expo, which opened the month after Manchuria was officially declared an independent nation, provide a particularly clear example of how localisms were both influenced by and in turn influenced the ideology of the greater nation-state, providing an “imagined community” not only of nation but of region, and emphasizing the importance of the region within the nation.

Ideas about creating a Japan Sea-based trading bloc had been fermenting since the




Figure 1: Major Japan Sea Era trade routes, late 1930s.

turn of the century, and notably after the Russo–Japanese War focused everyone’s attention on the Japan Sea and the proximity of the continent. However serious local debate on the subject—as opposed to overly jingoistic journalism—had to wait until it was made practical by the formation of Manchuria, and, notably, the opening up of the Jilin–Hoeryōng line (Jilin in Manchuria to Hoeryōng in Korea), connecting the capital of Xinjiang with the port of Najin on the northern Korean coast. This would enable goods to be shipped directly to Japan Sea ports rather than being taken down to Dairen on the Guangdong Peninsula and shipped via Shimonoseki to Kobe. As noted by several city councillors at the end of 1932, the opening of the Jilin–Hoeryōng line promised the rapid development of trade with the far shore, and Kanazawa, as the closest city, would grow dramatically as the center of Japan–Manchuria trade. In fact, as one councillor put it, Kanazawa Port would become the “lifeline” (*seimeisen*) of Kanazawa in the same way that Manchuria was the lifeline of Japan. In this way, local ambitions were linked with national goals in the form of an Imperialistic Regionalism that was to drive much of the Japan Sea prefectures in their quest for parity with the Pacific coast.

The debates in Toyama showed similar ambitions to become a trading port and

industrial center, and in fact—helped in part by its cheap hydroelectric power—Toyama succeeded where Kanazawa did not. However, its ambitions were fueled not by memories of past glories, but of past repression: it had been a satellite domain of the Maeda for most of the Edo period, and so in the Meiji era, when rule from Kanazawa was replaced with rule from Tokyo, there was little fundamental change in position.<sup>19)</sup> Kawagoe, another former castle town near Tokyo, suffered similar decline to Kanazawa in the early modern period. Despite the promotion of traditional industry and efforts by such groups as the Seinenkai to revitalize the city, Kawagoe ended up having to depend on its position as part of the Greater Tokyo industrial sphere.<sup>20)</sup> Mito, on the Pacific coast north of Tokyo and the second-largest castle town in the Kanto region, like many regional centers of the time, was also acutely aware of its position, both potential and actual. “Inter-Urban Rivalry” (*toshi-kan kyōsō*) was common among regional centers, and was a very important spur for development. In Mito’s case, its potential for industrialization was severely curtailed when the government monopolized the tobacco industry, one of its former traditional industries.<sup>21)</sup>

The relationship between Manchuria and the Hokuriku was seen as vital to a new dawn for the region. Thus on the day of nominal Manchurian independence, March 1, the *Hokkoku Shinbun* was able to say that “our region, long robbed of the speed of development isolated on the north, is now changed by fate, tasting a rebirth of glory shining in the new sunlight.”<sup>22)</sup> This was emphasized in the expo by the frequent use of panoramas and dioramas, showing Manchuria and the Japan Sea spread out beneath the visitors as a panoptic presentation of imperial power. The sociologist Yoshimi Shun’ya has linked the use of panoramas in expos with the idea of the Foucauldian “gaze” of power, in which, like a panopticon, the viewer sees all, and by seeing all is placed in a position of power.<sup>23)</sup> When the objects so viewed are representative of a conquered empire, the significance of the panorama as a representation of imperial power becomes apparent. For the Kanazawa Expo, the use of panoramas also reinforced the intimate geographical connection between the Hokuriku and Manchuria, with models of the Japan Sea with potential trade routes shown in red neon, providing a clear visual reminder of the key themes of the Manchuria discourse: Empire meant prosperity and glory for the region.

The next question to consider, however, is to what extent this message was received by the people of Kanazawa. To do that, and put the local into a more regional context, we need to look at the development of Japan Sea Era ideas over the rest of the 1930s. Without a port, no amount of hype and propaganda would work. Thus the link between port development and the arrival of new industry was in fact the prime motivation behind the development of Japan Sea Era ideas. An examination of the goals of the major centers of the Hokuriku reveals a common denominator: the creation of a new trade route would lead Pacific coast industry to relocate along the Japan Sea coast in order to take advantage of the new markets in the continent. Each city competed to be granted the status of Designated Government Shipping Line.

On the Korean side, matters were simple. Najin, promoted heavily by Ishihara Kanji,<sup>24)</sup> was to be the principal port, with Ch’ōngjin and Ŭnggi as secondary ports. It

was also a way to avoid dependence on the Soviet port of Vladivostok, by completing the line from the capital of Manchuria south through Korea. The strategic value of Najin had been recognised since the Russo-Japanese War, but serious port-building did not begin until April 1933, a five-year plan with a budget of over twenty-five million yen. However, the effects of the new port and in particular the opening of the Jilin-Hoeryōng line<sup>25)</sup> had a profound effect on the discourses of identity along the Japan Sea coast cities.

The excitement about the forthcoming “Japan Sea Era” was by no means limited to the regions facing the continent. For example a fourteen-part series in the *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun* in November 1933 attests to the interest shown in the Pacific belt, and listed the hoped-for benefits of developing ports along the Japan Sea coast. The first and foremost of these was the distance. From the capital of Manchuria, Xinjiang, to Tokyo via Tsuruga was only 2,111 km as opposed to 2,887 km via Pusan, and 2,961 km via Dairen. The main ports of the Japan Sea coast were listed as, from west to east, Sakai (Shimane), Miyatsu, Maizuru (Kyoto), Obama, Tsuruga (Fukui), Nanao (Ishikawa), Fushiki (Toyama), Niigata (Niigata), Sakata (Yamagata), Tsuchizaki, Funakawa, and Noshiro (Akita), for a total of twelve ports in all considered suitable for developing for the Manchurian trade. However, the series lamented that even Niigata, its merits “recognized even by foreigners for one of the five great ports [treaty ports] of Meiji, is now decayed to little more than a regional port” due to the way Tokyo was developed as the political capital and Osaka as the commercial capital, and the way the transport corridors and railroads developed between the two.

But just as changes in the transport network had spelled the doom of Niigata and the other ports of the Japan Sea, so further changes could restore them. The new “Japan-Manchuria Block” would level out the discrepancies in industrial development between *Omote* and *Ura*, the “front” Pacific coast and “near” Japan Sea coast, the existence of which was even a concern among the major cities. Thus the image of Hokuriku as seen from the major cities was much the same as its own self-identity. The *Osaka Mainichi* series describes it as “in contrast to the bright and energetic front of Japan (*Omote Nihon*), the Japan Sea coast, which used to be as conservative and depressed as the impression gained from the term “Back of Japan” (*Ura Nihon*), is looking forward to the glorious plans to build the three ports, and has suddenly begun lively activity and we can hear a powerful tune from the wind and waves of the Japan Sea in harmony with this.”<sup>26)</sup>

Each city along the coast was eager for development, not least because of the windfall of central government money that designation as a government shipping route would bring.<sup>27)</sup> From the 1920s the rivalry between the port cities grew intense, particularly between Tsuruga, nearest to Osaka and Kobe, and Niigata, which with the opening of the Jōetsu line in 1931, was now on the direct route between the continent and Tokyo. As Yoshii Kenichi has shown, much of the rivalry was driven by the competition between the various private shipping companies, notably the Tsuruga-based Kita-Nippon Steamship Line, which was one of the first groups to popularize the phrase “*Nihonkai Jidai*” (Japan Sea Era).<sup>28)</sup> Almost every single city along the Japan Sea coast of Honshu sent representations to Tokyo to try and extract money from the central government. However, it was clear that not all cities and

ports were equal, and in fact the necessity for a major port on the Japan Sea coast itself was a matter of much debate. In the end Tsuruga, because of its proximity to Osaka and the natural advantages of its harbor, was chosen as the primary government-designated route, with Fushiki in Toyama prefecture and Niigata being chosen as supplementary routes. Niigata immediately protested this, and was eventually allowed to join Fushiki as a supplementary port.

There was still powerful opposition, from the Ministry of Finance among others, to the idea of spending large sums of money on ports on the other side of Japan. One of the most enthusiastic proponents, on the other hand, was the military, who had long had their eye on the Japan Sea coast as the shortest route to ship men and materials to potential war zones in northeast Asia. Ishihara Kanji, who was backing the development of Najin for just that reason, was, along with War Minister Araki Tadao, eager to support development of Japan Sea ports, but in 1933 the military was not yet powerful enough to ignore the politicians. However, calls for the national defence were a sure-fire way of arm-twisting, along with dark warnings from the Minister of the Interior about the potential for civil unrest in the Japan Sea regions if nothing was done. So a compromise was agreed on: the three ports previously designated as government shipping lines—Tsuruga the main part, with Fushiki and Niigata as secondary—would continue to be developed with central government assistance, but nothing extra would be done. However, in 1938 the situation changed again, with the central government designating the Tokyo–Niigata–Najin–Xinjiang route as the main one, with the southern route through Osaka as the secondary route. However, the Niigata route was primarily used for shipping migrants to Manchuria, and Osaka was still the main trade port. Therefore, even the designation of Niigata as a central shipping port had little impact on its development, serving as it did simply as a staging-post for emigration. Even at its peak, trade along the Japan Sea coast was a tiny fraction of all Japan–Continent trade, and in the end ports like Niigata found their main use in shipping colonists and soldiers to Manchuria rather than importing raw materials for use in local factories.

### **Historical Consciousness and Urban Development**

Nevertheless, excitement about the new Japan Sea Era continued unabated among the Japan Sea coast cities. And it is this excitement, rather than the realities of government-regulated commerce, that gives us an insight into how the region viewed itself among the growing empire, particularly in its quest for “*Ura-Nihon dakkyaku*” (literally “Escape from the Back of Japan”), a movement that was dedicated to removing the stigma of being known as the back side to Japan. Central to this was the development of Manchuria and the “*Nihonkai kosui-ka ron*” (Japan Sea Lake Theory), whereby the Japan Sea became in essence an ‘inland sea’ of the Japanese Empire. This was a very popular idea among the Japan Sea coast regions, and was the basic driving force behind much of regional consciousness at the time. It was primarily expressed as a desire to attract industry, which would give a boost to the economy and population of the *Ura Nihon* regions. How each region expressed its desire for growth, however, was closely related to its historical consciousness, and often expressed in terms of local pride: not just the desire to grow, but the feeling that such

growth was a natural offshoot of its history and culture.

The Mayor of Niigata, for example, hearkened back to the days when its port was designated one of the five foreign trade Treaty Ports back in 1868,<sup>29)</sup> emphasizing its traditional roots as a gateway to overseas trade. Writing in a thick 1939 compilation of essays about the importance and benefits of the Japan Sea economy,<sup>30)</sup> he noted that Niigata was “already very prosperous, an industrial city centered around its port” back in the Eiroku period (1558–1570). This hearkening back to Niigata’s commercial prosperity was echoed by the Governor of Niigata, who noted the port dated back a thousand years as a shipping port for Echigo rice and in its heyday in the Edo period it had “three thousand ships a day.” The choice of Niigata as one of the five Treaty Ports was also a sign of “recognition by the realm.” However, as the Governor made clear, what the city and region was really after was industry. He noted that “Niigata, bathed in the light of the era” was “worthy of a careful look as the center for Japan Sea trade, with its plans for a population of a million, its application of urban planning, its rapid growth as an industrial town, as well as its promotion of export industries and luring of factories.”<sup>31)</sup> Industry was key to growth, transport was key to industry, and the growing Empire in Asia was a catalyst that would bring maritime trade and transport back to the Japan Sea.

Similar ambitions were expressed in most of the major cities of the Japan Sea coast. Sakata, for example, was long a major trading port for the *kitamae* traders that plied the Japan Sea in the Edo period. Its wealthy merchants, led by the rich Honma family, gave it a very different flavor to the military castle town of Tsuruoka nearby. At the mouth of the Mogami River, it was a central dispersal point for almost all trade in the region. In the Meiji period it thrived on the sardine trade, but the coming of the railroad, like in many Japan Sea port cities, had a drastic effect on its prosperity. Now goods flowed the other way, via rail to the Pacific coast. Sakata port became largely devoted to importing coal, salt, and other raw products for the prefectural hinterland, and exporting the local rice crop. By the end of the 1930s, however, Sakata’s port was largely used for shipping colonists to Manchuria, drawing on the ready supply of impoverished Tohoku farmers. This was claimed by the mayor as a positive thing, but while shipping migrants out may have brought government subsidies, these did not directly affect the region’s prosperity. Sakata’s visions were of becoming a large industrial city, based on its cheap labour—it was especially well provided with the “female workers needed in light industry.”<sup>32)</sup> In Sakata’s case, central government imperialist policies overwhelmed its personal desires for development. But the pattern is seen elsewhere along the Japan Sea coast, in other cities that had more luck.

One such city was Toyama, which hoped to use its cheap hydro power (and cheap workers) as a main lure for industry. Connected with the development of Higashi-Iwase (near Toyama city) port and Fushiki (near Takaoka city) port, it was eager to act as a gateway to the riches of Manchuria, which would be shipped to Toyama, processed using Toyama’s cheap electricity, and then distributed around Japan. Toyama’s visions of greatness through empire began in the 1890s, with the build-up to the Sino–Japanese War, as well as the predicted opening of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. However, despite the efforts of people like Fujii Nōzō, whose 1891 “*Fushiki*

*Chikkō-ron*” argued that Fushiki was perfectly placed to trade with Europe via Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian,<sup>33)</sup> at this early stage it was largely the province of over-enthusiastic journalists trumpeting local patriotism. This was also, as Lewis has suggested,<sup>34)</sup> a way to attack the central government’s lack of attention to the region. However the tone is modified after the Unification with Korea, to accommodate a more commercial viewpoint. As the Prefectural Governor, Hamada Tsunenoshige, noted in 1913, the Japan Sea was now ripe for making into Japan’s “Garden.” Amidst the WWI boom, and the Siberian Expedition of 1918, the focus was on setting up shipping links between Toyama and the continent, notably Vladivostok and northern Korea.<sup>35)</sup> The Hokuriku Steamship Line was set up in 1920, with twice-weekly runs to the U.S.S.R. and Korea from Fushiki and Nanao, the latter in Ishikawa prefecture. After the formation of Manchuria, interest in the possibilities of trans-Japan Sea trade peaked once again, with the sending of delegations of business and political leaders across on fact-finding missions. This interest reached its zenith with the 1936 Japan–Manchuria Great Industrial Exposition, dedicated to the concepts of trans-maritime trade and prosperity, and the benefits to the local region through such.

Fukui prefecture also shared the same vision. The Mayor of Tsuruga, the principal port in the prefecture, made an impassioned plea to patriotism when he linked the “peaking wave crest of our fortunes based on the great founding spirit of our nation advancing into the continent thanks to the power of the Imperial Army” to a shift in national focus from the Pacific to the Japan Sea coasts. Tsuruga, called “the best port on the Japan Sea coast” in Fukumoto Nichinan’s *Kaikoku Seidan*<sup>36)</sup> in the late nineteenth century, was long one of the main ports on the coast, and its proximity to Kansai, together with its natural harbor, made it a natural place to develop one of the major ports on the Japan Sea coast. The city of Fukui too made much of its industrialization and suitability as a regional center, but aside from a rather remote port of Nanao on the Noto Peninsula, Ishikawa prefecture in general and Kanazawa city in particular were largely silent. Kanazawa Port was never completed, and the city’s dreams of becoming the Kobe of the Japan Sea coast never materialized.

One factor that was blamed at the time was the attitude of the locals. The year after the Kanazawa Expo, in 1933, the chief writer of the *Hokkoku Shinbun*, Kamoi Haruka, noted that Awagasaki, near the port of Kanazawa, would one day have tall buildings standing on the dunes “like Manhattan in New York.” It is a representative example of the confidence that the civic leaders expressed regarding Kanazawa’s future. However, as Kamoi noted in the Kanazawa Chamber of Commerce monthly in 1935, the problem still remained the “happy-go-lucky” (*hiyorimi-shugi*) ideas of the “conservative” populace, who refused to be stimulated by the examples of Tokyo and Osaka industrial growth. Like skyscrapers built on sand, the dreams of prosperity failed to become a reality. Despite hope from the various mayors and other civic leaders, Kanazawa had, as it were, missed the boat as regards the development of overseas trade.

Despite this, as Kanazawa’s decline became more and more acute, the concept of a “Showa Hyakumangoku” and of a “Japan Sea Era” that would lift Kanazawa back into prominence became increasingly important facets of regional rhetoric. The Kanazawa Chamber of Commerce was one of the main promoters of trans-Japan Sea

trade, setting up a consultation center<sup>37)</sup> and running frequent articles in the “Kanazawa Chamber of Commerce Monthly” designed to assist potential merchants in dealing with the continentals. For example, on several occasions they published articles detailing the likes and dislikes of Manchurians in terms of colors, numbers, designs, and so forth.<sup>38)</sup> However, without a decent port and the ability to attract industry, these ambitions would go nowhere. Thus Kanazawa’s social construct of Empire was focused increasingly on creating opportunities at home in order to take advantage of opportunities abroad. As Kanazawa’s decline became more and more an issue, the ideas of the “Showa Hyakumangoku”<sup>39)</sup> and of a “Japan Sea Era” that would lift Kanazawa back into prominence were important facets of regional rhetoric.

These issues were taken seriously at the highest levels in Kanazawa politics. In the 1935 budget explanation plan, Kanazawa city councillor Kagaya Gengo pointed out that:

Development of the Pacific coast cities has reached its limit, but with the formation of the country of Manchuria and the development of the Japan Sea Era ... Kanazawa is the center of this Japan Sea Era, one of the main cities on the Japan Sea coast ... Greater Kanazawa cannot develop as a city without its door facing the Japan Sea. What is more, Japan is running out of places to develop ... If you were to ask where must we look for to find the Japanese Empire’s development, [the answer is] in Manchuria, the Manchuria that we as a nation have poured our lives and our resources into, and the closest city to that Manchuria and its vast natural resources of northern Manchuria is Kanazawa.<sup>40)</sup>

Kanazawa mayor Kataoka Yasushi later noted in 1935 that “the new trade routes opening now with Korea and Manchuria along the Japan Sea coast [... mean ...] the former capital of the million [*koku*] fief Kanazawa is now overflowing with energy and vitality, and poised to dominate the Japan Sea Era as a new city ... its future as an industrial city is now assured.”<sup>41)</sup> The new Kanazawa to be created, the “*Showa no Hyakumangoku*,” as the local edition of the *Osaka Asahi Shinbun* put it,<sup>42)</sup> was to be the “capital” of the Japan Sea coast region. As Kataoka said in 1936, “The directions in Manchurian and Korean development and the expansion of cities through the natural trends in recent economic society are creating an unprecedented stimulation of this city and its environs.”<sup>43)</sup>

In 1935 and 1936, when amalgamation of neighboring towns and villages gave Kanazawa both open land to expand industry onto, and a port, the *Hokuriku Mainichi Shinbun* proclaimed “the restoration in name and fact (*meijitsu tomo*) of the million [*koku*] fief” and cast the city’s growth in a distinctly military light by noting “in this moment of national emergency, when citizens are on edge, the people of Kaga, proud of their million [*koku*] fief ancestors, are standing at the vanguard of the great spirit of amalgamation and harmony ready to continue to progress strongly towards the building of a great city, which is not only the result of the depth of public-spiritedness but is also the [sound of] bold martial trumpets marching towards the realisation of a new life and co-prosperity.”<sup>44)</sup>

Hope for a bright new future was also to be found among the children. When the

port-town of Kanaiwa was integrated into Kanazawa city, the *Hokkoku Shinbun* ran a series of quotes from local schoolchildren.<sup>45)</sup> While the editors would have been selective in their choices, the comments are still indicative not only of the degree of penetration of the current ideas, but their dissemination methods. As one boy stated, “According to the newspapers and people, Kanazawa is going to develop into a commercial and industrial city dealing with Manchuria.” Another comment said that “Yokohama and Kobe were once poor fishing villages. When we become Greater Kanazawa I think we will greatly help the development of our Great Japan and trade with Manchuria and other foreign countries as a great trade port on the Japan Sea.”

However this ambition, while strong among the civic leaders and the children, was rather more lacking among the people who most needed it—the merchants of Kanazawa. Long accustomed to regular patronage from the samurai class under the Maeda, the merchants of Kanazawa were slow to embrace modern Westernised ways of commerce. Department stores were rare, and seen more as exhibitions of modern lifestyle or places to escape the gloomy everyday world than serious shopping venues.<sup>46)</sup> The Chamber of Commerce gave frequent workshops and seminars on how to arrange window displays, how to use the new neon signs, how to light up shop interiors, but despite their efforts, it was hard to find a modern-style shop where customers would browse and select at leisure.<sup>47)</sup> The miserly, xenophobic attitude of shopkeepers and merchants was also criticised: they were considered to be concerned only with short-term gain rather than long-term profit, and would cheat any non-local visitors—a definite public-relations problem at the time of the expo. This was an issue that was frequently discussed by the civic leaders, the richest businessmen, and the editorials of the major local newspapers. Termed the “*hyakumangoku-kibun*,” or “million-*roku* feeling,” in a direct reference to the city’s former wealth and stability, it was considered to be the main stumbling block to Kanazawa’s rebirth. One particularly vocal critic was Monda Hide, the director of the Kanazawa Cottonflower Spinning Factory. While he praised the warmth and quality of the people, he also lamented that “this *hyakumangoku* feeling is what is holding Kanazawa back. As one who loves this city, I must reluctantly point out that people here are far too disinterested in industrial or commercial or artistic endeavors.”<sup>48)</sup> One of the solutions attempted was an appeal to patriotism and nationalism, wrapped up in local pride and ambition.

In a series of essays written for the Kanazawa Chamber of Commerce in 1927,<sup>49)</sup> members of the urban elite, in discussing ways to energize the city, decried what they termed the conservative, apathetic “*hyakumangoku* feelings” of the general populace. In the call for papers, we can see that there was a great deal of concern that Kanazawa be the “capital” of the Hokuriku in fact as well as name. However, as they noted, “The idea that we could compare ourselves to Nagoya is already just a dream.” In fact, Kanazawa was being overtaken by upstart “newly-developed fishing villages.”

A professor at the Fourth Higher School blamed “the veneration of the feudal government” and said that this feeling “must be done away with ere any decent progress be made: drunk on past glories (*hyakumangoku kibun*), lacking stimulation added to this the strongly conservative, hidebound views of today, and we find that although once we were seventh or eighth in national ranking, we are now thirteenth

and show no signs of slowing; soon we may reach twentieth or even lower.” The decline of Kanazawa was thus perceived by the urban elite as exacerbated by its people’s character, derided at the time as overly reliant on others and lacking self-motivation: factors stemming from its wealth and security during the Edo period. The creation of grand projects, such as the expo, or urban planning, or trade with Manchuria, was seen as a spur that would stimulate the local population, in the same way as the construction of Heian-kyō.

Thus the historical consciousness of Kanazawa was both a weakness and a strength when it came to urban development. However, in other cities that did not share Kanazawa’s sense of decline, it was put to better use. Unlike Kanazawa, the historical consciousness of Niigata and Toyama was in both cases a positive one. Niigata’s hearkening back to its early designation as an international trade port, and Toyama’s long desire to assert its independence from its larger neighbor Kanazawa meant that for both cities change and industrialization faced less resistance from a populace feeling that things were better in the “good old days.” Unlike Kanazawa, Toyama succeeded in transforming itself into an industrial city and port. For that reason, it may be of interest to look briefly at the visions of Empire, and in particular Manchuria, as revealed in the 1936 Toyama City Japan–Manchuria Great Industrial Exposition.

### **The View from Toyama, 1936**

As a further staging-post to the period of growing imperialism, an examination of the discourses and representations of Manchuria and the local region in the *Nichi-Man Dai Sangyō Hakurankai*<sup>50)</sup> provides an interesting way to compare and contrast ideas of the same region with those of the earlier Kanazawa expo. The Toyama expo, as can be seen from its name, made the trade connection between Hokuriku and the continent a central focus from the very start. The recent opening of the Takayama line from Toyama to Nagoya meant that Toyama was now able to position itself as the Japan Sea gateway for the Tōkai region, as well as having good links to both Tokyo and Osaka.

Held for fifty-five days, from the 15th of April to the 8th of June 1936, the expo was designed to show off the modern city of Toyama to potential investors. In that respect it was similar to Kanazawa’s expo, held as it was after the completion of major infrastructure (although in Toyama’s case this included the modern port of Higashi-Iwase and the Toyama Airfield). However, the expo site itself was also intended as a showcase of modern town planning. Sited on land reclaimed from the Jinzū River, it was designed to become part of the modern cityscape after the expo closed.<sup>51)</sup> The site itself was part of the city’s desire to present itself as the central city of the Japan Sea coast.

The mayor’s comments, broadcast on the radio as part of the expo publicity, reflect the ambition behind the expo.

Now that the public safety of Manchuria is assured, and public order is being established by the people and the government, the development of northern and eastern Manchuria is being promoted, and the building of the port of Najin in

northern Korea, as well as the important ports of Ch'öngjin and Ünggi, have been called at last to their crucial role, the Sea of Japan is now but a lake, and the opposite coast from Hokuriku has become the closest point of contact, we can look forward to the arrival of the so-called Sea of Japan Era through our Empire's trade and industry. Thus our Hokuriku region is now truly the front door of the Empire, and moreover Toyama prefecture stands in the center of Hokuriku, and possesses the superlatively good ports of Fushiki and Higashi-Iwase.<sup>52)</sup>

Here he clearly notes the close relationship between imperialism and local growth, and his use of the phrase “front door” (*omote genkan*) shows the hope that the backward and ignored *Ura Nihon* would be able to develop into another *Omote*. In connection with other calls to rename the region “*Uchi Nihon*,” or “inner Japan” the stigma attached to the common name for the region was of serious concern to its residents. Rhetoric common to regional promotion of the Japan Sea coast is also found in the many speeches at the opening and closing ceremonies: developing city, industry, transport infrastructure, and its closeness to Manchuria. This emphasis on transport suggests that its lack, rather than any other factors, was seen as the principal factor behind the region's lack of development: most rhetoric concerning the Hokuriku region's geographic position emphasized its isolation. Another common phrase of political rhetoric at the time was variations on the “*kyokoku icchi*” (together as one for the nation) theme of national unity, often as “together as one for the city” or prefecture. This type of adaptation of popular phrases is seen in many major civic projects that required some form of effort or sacrifice from the citizens. In Kanazawa it was used to smooth the municipal amalgamation of late 1935 and early 1936; in Toyama at the same time it was used to smooth over Takaoka citizens' objections to the expo being held in Toyama city.

According to the official record of the expo, its main results were its “very significant contribution to Japan–Manchuria friendship” through its displays of Japanese and Manchurian industry, and its “great improvement of city scenery and facilities and its promotion of urban planning.”<sup>53)</sup> Thus it killed two birds with one stone: improving local conditions by using the rhetoric of imperialism. Indeed, the “industry” aspect was in some ways an after-thought. While the official record states that no one is actually sure where the name came from, it was clear that the original impetus had been to celebrate transport ties and friendship with Manchuria, and these were most suitably expressed as industry.

For Manchuria was the central focus of the expo, in a very literal sense. One of the two Manchuria pavilions, the Japan–Manchuria Commemoration Pavilion,<sup>54)</sup> was built astride the main boulevard, so that visitors entering from the front gate and proceeding to the main hall passed under and through its arches. Designed to be bigger than any previous Manchuria pavilion, the main Manchuria Pavilion cost over ¥60,000 and was more than twice the size of the Kanazawa one, at nearly 550 m<sup>2</sup>, and, like almost all “ethnic” pavilions of the time, done up in faux-native style. Girls in Manchurian costume served as guides, and the office upstairs was ready to take all questions about Manchurian trade opportunities. The pavilion was also, like the Kanazawa one, sponsored by the Guangdong Bureau and the South Manchurian

Railroad, this time with the added support of the Manchurian government.

Inside, a large panoramic model of Manchuria showed the location of cities, transport, and resources—iron, coal, soy, and pasture land—laid out before the visitors like a banquet. This is typical of the way Manchuria was presented in the 1930s, but what is of interest about the exhibits inside is the greater focus on Manchuria as an outlet for Japanese emigration rather than pure trade, in line with the increasing central government emphasis on migration. One notable exhibit featured a display of life-size figures of children from all five races<sup>55)</sup> that were supposed to make up Manchuria who showed, in the words of the official record, a “bright and happy setting that paints a lovely scene of boys and girls playing together in peaceful racial harmony ... the children of Manchuria, living in complete equality and peace are ... daily building a paradise,”<sup>56)</sup> a display of pure propaganda that would perhaps affect even the most cynical. Whatever Japan’s real intentions towards its puppet state, it was essential that the relationship be portrayed as peaceful and honorable in order to lure Japanese colonists. The presentation of Manchuria as a land of riches, with modern cities—one exhibit was a diorama of the new capital, with its Stage One Urban Planning project just complete, showing how modern and developed it was—where Japanese could find a new life in creating the Kingly Road Paradise (Ōdō Rakudō).

Unlike the Kanazawa Expo’s Manchuria Pavilion, which was hastily augmented after the creation of the new nation, Toyama’s was able to be planned from the start to promote trade and migration. The differing degrees of development of port facilities were also a factor, but another key one was the greater interest in Toyama in overseas trade. While Kanazawa’s interest in Manchuria, stimulated by its expo and by the events of the time, was short-lived, Toyama’s was deeper-rooted and ultimately far more successful through the development of its ports and the relocation of such giant factories as Nichi-Man Aluminium, the largest in the country, to take advantage of the region’s cheap electricity and the imports of bauxite from Manchuria. Toyama’s expo shows a city much more confident in its future. Rather than a desperate effort to attract industry to slow the gradual decline of a once-powerful city, Toyama’s expo was designed as a way to focus national attention not on the city’s need for industry but rather on its potential to promote trade and imperialist ideals. It was a celebration of peacetime imperialism at its height.

## Conclusion

By 1937, as Japanese soldiers were on their way to Nanjing, and Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro was saying “I believe that the Empire desires peace for East Asia, and wish it to grow on a foundation of world peace based on bilateral cooperation with China”<sup>57)</sup> when he set forth the National Spiritual Mobilization Law, the rhetoric of empire was giving way to that of war. Kanazawa, whose industrial output was based on peacetime industries, felt the brunt of wartime economic reorganizations harshly. China, a major market for its silk and cloth, was now cut off. Even Manchuria was now closed.<sup>58)</sup> Its failure to develop heavy industry and its reliance on trade with the continent were two factors that meant that despite earlier hopes for trade and glory, serious Imperialist expansion after the China War began had a

perversely detrimental effect. Local identities were increasingly tied in with overtly nationalistic rhetoric, and while the local press gave detailed accounts of regional responses to the war, the language used is devoid of any regional patriotism, and simply parrots the same type of rhetoric used elsewhere: bland statements like “we fully support the government decisions and while promising to prevent any unravelling of civilian [duty] will work together for the unity of the nation”<sup>59)</sup> that could come from anywhere in the country.

While support for the Imperial polity was expressed in ever-more glowing terms, there was no longer any suggestion of local gain. Amid orders that the fall of Nanjing was not to be celebrated with parties as it would “be inappropriate for civilians in a time of war,”<sup>60)</sup> such selfish ideas as local development were severed from the Imperialistic discourse and left to find their own way.<sup>61)</sup> While Niigata’s trade share with Manchuria increased dramatically during the Asia–Pacific War, it was only as the major ports of the Pacific coast were being systematically destroyed by Allied bombing and mine-laying campaigns. The relatively safe Japan Sea offered just about the only safe haven for importing vital raw supplies to the homeland, and it was not enough. Gradually isolated from her colonies, Japan was faced with the threat of mass famine by the end of the war. The Japan Sea Era’s brief period of hope for regional prosperity was over.

Each trumpeting their suitability for development into a major trading port, the various regions of the Hokuriku sought to attract industry and population, and thus to shake off the stigma of “*Ura-Nihon*.” The rhetoric was particularly clear in the former million-*koku* castle town of Kanazawa, which phrased the ideals of the Japan Sea Era in terms of a rebirth of its former glory. A key factor in Kanazawa’s case was also the use of the rhetoric of Imperialist glory to stimulate the populace, and turn them into the type of citizen needed to create a modern industrial city, part of a modern industrial nation. This adaptation of national goals to further regional interests formed a type of “Imperialist Regionalism” in which peripheral regions supported Imperialist goals not solely through patriotic fervor but through pragmatic economic motives.

This on-going process illustrates the continued importance and reinvention of regional identities in discourse and decision making at the local level, even in one of the periods most associated with Japanese totalitarianism. Regional attitudes along the Japan Sea coast towards the empire and the colonies were at heart peaceful, built as they were on the growth of maritime trade. That this trade was only made possible by the militaristic side of imperialism was an irony seemingly ignored by local politicians and commentators, and there is no sense even in later examples of the coming full-scale war that would ruin most of their dreams. However, local identities that were boosted and given hope by imperialism were ironically swamped by nationalism as the war situation escalated. Local imperialism was predicated on peaceful expansion through trade, or at least heavy-handed coercion of the locals. As the military, which had a dim view of capitalism anyway, increased its hold over the country, the discourses of local patriotism and support for the imperial endeavor were easily and subtly transformed into the discourses of full-blown militaristic nationalism. The effect of Imperialist endeavors on regional Japan was thus presented as a regional goal, primarily to help lift the Japan Sea coast out of its long stagnation. In the

commercial air of the expos and trade ports, Imperialism was presented as largely separate from pure militarism, a largely benign, rather paternalistic, duty that was also an opportunity for a neglected region to share in the development of modern Japan.

#### Notes

- 1) This does not include research on Japanese farming or agriculture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which are focused more on issues such as the class gap between tenant farmers and landowners and other class issues or the rural/urban divide. In these cases the issue is not so much region-center as rural-urban. However, in terms of inter-urban relationships, either between regional centers or between regional centers and major centers, there is far less discussion in the literature.
- 2) T. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
- 3) Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 157.
- 4) Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 157.
- 5) Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 161.
- 6) *Hokuriku Mainichi Shinbun*, 1932-02-24.
- 7) Yoshimi Shun'ya, *Hakurankai no seijigaku*, (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1992), 214.
- 8) The principal after-effect of Kuga's suicide on the Japanese militarist ethos was the concept of death before dishonor. As Eguchi Keiichi is careful to point out, in the Russo-Japanese War becoming a prisoner was not thought of as a humiliating shame. Kuga had originally been reported as "killed in action," but in April the full story was made public, and Army Minister Araki Tadao announced that "Soldiers go to the battlefield in order to win or to die. Major Kuga displayed the highest level of martial spirit and chose the path of death. This is equal to a great and heroic death in battle, and I expect his death to be treated equally to battlefield deaths." This was the turning point that marked the idea that a Japanese soldier should choose death before capture. See Eguchi, *Jūgonen sensō no Kaimaku*, Shōwa no Rekishi, 4, (Tokyo: Shōgakukan), 1988, and Louise B. Young, *Japan's Total Empire*.
- 9) *Hokuriku Mainichi Shinbun*, 1932-04-08.
- 10) Popular consciousness before the Shanghai and Manchurian incidents was distinctly anti-military. In fact, a survey commissioned by the Army noted with annoyance that the people of the Hokuriku region tended to be rather too self-interested and xenophobic, had a tendency to listen to left-wing propaganda, materialistic, and, in the case of Kanazawa, "Militaristic thought is steadily being eroded," (Motoyasu Hiroshi, ed., *Kanazawa Kenpeitai bunsho: Manshū Jihen zengo no shakai undō* [Kanazawa: Ishikawaken shakai undō-shi kankō-kai, 1987]). See also Nakajima Kinji, "Manshū Jihen-ki no jūgo katsudō to minshū: Ishikawa-ken Imonkai setsuritsu o meguru jōkyō," (Master's Thesis, Kanazawa University, 1988).
- 11) Hereafter shortened to "Manchuria Pavilion" since that was the focus of the vast majority of its contents and all the discourse surrounding it.
- 12) *Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1932-04-05.
- 13) *Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1932-04-06. Note that the sentence in parentheses was part of the original.
- 14) *Hokkoku Mainichi Shinbun*, 1932-04-08.
- 15) See Eguchi, *Jūgonen sensō*, 23. Also, in English see Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, for discussion on the "lifeline" issue and the general attitude of the Japanese public towards Manchuria. Population worries, loss of export markets due to anti-Japanese feeling in China, and the need to ensure a steady supply of raw materials all influenced Japanese attitudes towards Manchuria. However there was a considerable amount of variation within the country, and in the Hokuriku region the main connection between 'lifeline' rhetoric and Manchuria was economic—an almost literal "lifeline" of trade routes.
- 16) *Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1932-03-10.
- 17) *Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1932-04-12.
- 18) *Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1932-04-06.
- 19) The most detailed English-language study on Toyama's development in the Meiji-Showa eras is

- Michael Lewis's *Becoming Apart: National Power and Local Politics in Toyama 1868–1945*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
- 20) Kawagoe is discussed in Katō Chikako, “Toshika to ‘Taishō Demokurashii,’” *Nihon rekishi*, no. 464, (April 2001), 160–186. The change to an “urban image” connection with the Tokyo area is from page 175.
  - 21) Mito is discussed in chapter one of Ōishi Kaichirō and Kanazawa Fumio, eds., *Kindai Nihon toshi-shi kenkyū*, (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2003).
  - 22) *Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1932-03-02.
  - 23) For example, see Yoshimi, *Hakurankai no seijigaku*, 266. For discussion of the role of panoramas in Meiji-period Japan, see Hosouma Hiromichi, “Panorama-kan kara hakurankai e,” in Hashizume Shunya, ed., *Nihon no hakurankai*, (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2005), and Hosouma Hiromichi, *Asakusa Jūnikai: Tō no nagame to ‘kindai’ no manazashi*, (Tokyo: Seidosha, 2001).
  - 24) See Yoshii Kenichi, *Kan Nihonkai chiiki shakai no henyō*, (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 2000). See pages 265 and 266 for details of Ishihara’s involvement. Ishihara was concerned about the military and strategic aspects, in line with his Final Global War (*sekai saishū sen*) ideas—to ensure a secure supply of materials for the war with the United States that he saw as inevitable.
  - 25) The line was first proposed at the time of the Russo–Japanese War, in order to be able to send troops to Manchuria as quickly as possible—and expose them to Russian naval activity for the shortest period.
  - 26) *Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun*, “Nihonkai jidai” serial, part 2. Online at <http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/sinbun/>.
  - 27) The 1896 Law on Promoting Maritime Routes (*Kōkai Shōrei Hō*) allowed the government to distribute development funds for certain routes that were to be developed for overseas trade. See Fukumoto Nichinan, *Kaikoku seidan* (Tokyo: Nihon Shinbunsha, 1892), Online at National Diet Library Digital Archives <http://www.dap.ndl.go.jp/home/>, 38. In its first year, for example, Niigata received ¥50,000 for a mail route that included Vladivostok (Toyama-gaku Kenkyū Gurūpu, *Kan Nihonkai: Sono arata na chōryū* [Toyama: Kita Nihon Shinbunsha, 2000], 101).
  - 28) See Yoshii, *Kan Nihonkai chiiki shakai no henyō*, chapter 12, for a detailed look at the actions of the various shipping companies and local municipalities in promoting Japan Sea shipping routes. However, Yoshii’s focus on the shipping routes and trade volumes means that relatively little weight is given to the self-concepts of the region and the importance of local patriotism.
  - 29) While the 1858 Treaty of Friendship and Trade (Ansei Treaty) required the opening of the five ports of Kanagawa (Yokohama), Nagasaki, Hakodate, Hyogo (Kobe), and Niigata, delays by the Shogunate meant that Niigata was not actually opened until November 1868, nine years after Kanagawa, Nagasaki and Hakodate.
  - 30) Nichi-Man Kōgyō Shinbun, ed., *Nihonkai keizai*, (Osaka: Nichi-Man Kōgyō Shinbun, 1939).
  - 31) *Ibid.*, 146.
  - 32) *Ibid.*, 143. These would generally be workers in silk-reeling factories and the like.
  - 33) See Toyama-gaku Kenkyū, *Kan Nihonkai*, for a brief discussion of Fujii’s ideas in this book. Fujii’s political and commercial activities are also covered extensively in Lewis, *Becoming Apart*.
  - 34) Lewis, *Becoming Apart*, chapter five.
  - 35) Fukai Jinzō and Yonehara Hiroshi, eds., *Furusato Toyama rekishi-kan*, (Toyama: Toyama Shinbunsha, 2001), 388.
  - 36) Fukumoto Nichinan, *Kaikoku seidan*, 1892, (National Diet Library Digital Archives <http://www.dap.ndl.go.jp/home/>). Fukumoto was a journalist for the “Nihon” newspaper before becoming a Diet member in 1908.
  - 37) See, for example, *Kanazawa shōkō kaigisho shohō*, June 1932. One of the primary concerns was to prevent people who had dreams of overnight success in Manchuria from getting too carried away. The illusion that Manchuria was a rich nation waiting to be exploited, while perhaps beneficial for rural migration, ended up encouraging frivolous speculation. The Kanazawa Chamber of Commerce blamed this on “overdosing on propaganda-medicine” (*senden-yaku no kikusugi*) as much as domestic economic issues.
  - 38) For examples see *Kanazawa shōkō kaigisho shohō*, December 1932 and June 1935. An article on

- dealing with Manchurians also appeared in July 1935, detailing gift-giving, the rudeness of bare feet, their “two-facedness” (*ura-omote aru tokusei*), and suggesting that the best way to motivate Manchurian workers was to pay them a bare minimum with bonuses for good work. However, a significant proportion of the market in the continent was Japanese colonists and expatriates. For example, the “Direct Sales Fair” (*sokubai-kai*) the city held in Seoul in 1935 was a success because “Japanese residents of Keijō (Seoul) are interested in Kanazawa products .... It is finally definite that Kanazawa products are perfectly suited to Japanese living in Korea, and so advances in that direction are getting more and more promising.” (*Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1935-06-02)
- 39) The term “Showa Hyakumangoku” was coined by the *Osaka Asahi*’s Ishikawa Edition, in its issue of 1936-04-02. However, the concept itself is slightly older.
  - 40) *Kanazawa City Council Proceedings* [Kanazawa Shika: Kaigiroku], (Kanazawa: Kanazawa shiyakusho), 1935-2-21.
  - 41) *Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1935-12-16.
  - 42) *Ōsaka Asahi Shinbun*, 1936-04-02.
  - 43) *Hokuriku Mainichi Shinbun*, 1936-04-01.
  - 44) *Hokuriku Mainichi Shinbun*, 1935-12-15.
  - 45) *Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1935-12-16.
  - 46) *Kanazawa shōkō kaigisho shohō*, August 1931. The report noted, “Modern people’s desire for strolls is an addiction: the so-called *gin-bura* (Ginza Strolling). Working inside at a desk all day, they look for a release out of the home; their psychological center is the *sakari-ba* (entertainment areas),” and then went on to quote from an American Department of Commerce report, noting that “what people buy in department stores is riding in elevators, going into beautiful western-style lavatories .... What they are putting the emphasis on is looking” rather than shopping.
  - 47) The traditional shop with a reception/showroom at the front, where customers would sit, and be shown samples brought in from the storage areas was still the mainstay in Kanazawa. Since the showroom areas were “living” areas, raised off the ground and floored in wood or *tatami* mats, it was said that Kanazawa lacked modern-style shops where one did not need to take ones shoes off.
  - 48) “Kanazawa o ikasu zadankai,” *Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1930-09-19.
  - 49) “Ika ni shite Kanazawa o hatten seshimuru beki ka,” in *Kanazawa shōkō kaigisho shohō*, January 1927. The intellectuals and urban elite who submitted articles were Hamanaka Harumine, economics editor of the *Hokkoku Shinbun*; Tanaka Rikuo, researcher in geology at the Fourth Higher School; Matsuyama Yasutami, professor at the Fourth Higher School; and Sakai Muneyoshi, factory director of the Kanazawa Cottonwood Spinning Mill.
  - 50) Toyama was one of a total of eight expos between 1932 and the end of the war that had “Manchuria” in their name, with three in 1932 alone. Many more of course, like Kanazawa, featured specialist Manchuria Pavilions. “Manchuria,” along with the other spoils of empire, was a set item in the presentation of power that the expos represented.
  - 51) Kanazawa was not able to do this for two reasons: the remoteness from the city center of suitable land, and the fact that being a tourism expo as well, it was considered better to hold it next to the city’s major tourism landmark, Kenrokuen (known as Kenroku Kōen at the time).
  - 52) Toyama City, ed., *Toyama-shi shusai Nichi-Man Dai Hakurankai-shi*, (Toyama: Toyama Shiyakusho, 1937), 53.
  - 53) *Ibid.*, 2.
  - 54) This was designed to symbolize bilateral fraternization and was more of a design element than an actual exhibition space, though it did house a few smaller exhibits—such as a bird’s-eye-view model of the shortest route between the two countries (naturally, through Toyama).
  - 55) Normally given as “Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Manchurian and Mongolian,” here Japanese and Korean were considered the same (Japanese) and Russian was added.
  - 56) *Ibid.*, 390.
  - 57) *Kanazawa shōkō kaigisho shohō*, September 1937.
  - 58) *Kanazawa shōkō kaigisho shohō*, December 1937.
  - 59) *Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1937-07-19, reporting on Kanaiwa town, the location of Kanazawa’s port.
  - 60) *Hokkoku Shinbun*, 1937-12-08.

- 61) For example, while a few of the visions for Kanazawa's development given by the newly-elected council members in December 1937 argue for the development of trade and industry links with Manchuria, most stressed the importance of crossing party boundaries to form a cooperative whole in the time of war.

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