

Changes in Urban Residence Patterns in Tokyo during the Meiji Era and their Significance

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1. Introduction

By analyzing the changes in central Tokyo (known as Edo during the feudal period) from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, this essay examines issues that are now regarded as both commonsensical and inevitable in Japan.¹⁾ Specifically, this essay questions the following phenomena: a strong preference for single family housing and residential land ownership (no matter how small the lot) and the intensive destruction and reconstruction of buildings in urban areas. Both of these common practices, I argue, derive from the surprisingly modern concept of evaluating land as an “asset.”

2. Residence in Edo²⁾

One of the strongest characteristics of Japan's early modern cities, nearly all of which were castle towns (*jōkamachi*) was the side-by-side co-existence of different status-defined communities. That is, cities were segmentalized into areas for retainers and domain lords (*bukechi*), areas for temples and shrines which included priests and monks' living spaces (*jishachi*), and areas for commoners (*chōninchi*), all of which surrounded a lord's castle.³⁾ This segmental characteristic of castle towns is especially easy to notice in the patch-work maps (*kiriezu*) that were used as portable guides during the early modern period. Besides the blue color for water and green for vegetation, these maps also color-coded the three major kinds of residential areas as follows: white for retainer and domain lord areas, red for temple and shrine areas, and gray for commoner areas (see **Figure 1**). In the city of Edo, Japan's largest city and one of the largest cities in the world at the time, nearly 70% of the total area was occupied by retainers and domain lords with the remaining 30% been nearly evenly divided between areas for commoner and for temple and shrines.⁴⁾

Though there was far more area for retainers and warriors, it was in the commoner areas that the change to the modern era was most intensive and exhibited constantly changing residential patterns. While the expropriation of retainer and domain lord areas and some temple and shrine areas by the new government brought about the replacement of their inhabitants following the 1868 Meiji Restoration, the commoner areas were handed down to their residents almost automatically because their “right of exclusive possession” (*senyūken*) was officially approved as “right to ownership” (*shoyōken*).⁵⁾ Moreover, the commoner areas were smaller than retainer and domain lord areas in Edo at the ratio of three to seven, but the commoner population was




Figure 1: A portion of an 1861 patch-work map or *kiriezu* of Shibaguchi area just south of central Edo. The all-white areas were occupied by warriors (*bukechi*), the dark grey (actually red) areas are temple and shrine lands (*jishachi*), and the light gray blocks are the commoner districts (*chōninchi*). (万延2年「芝口南西久保愛宕下之図」部分)

larger by the almost opposite ratio. From the beginning of the Meiji period, commercial activities that had been limited to the commoner's quarters became the driving force behind Tokyo's economic and physical development. Because the significance of these centrally located commercial activities continues, and appears to be even increasing, as a driving force behind the recent economic revival of Tokyo, I believe it is important to examine how these one-time commoner areas changed during the transition from the early modern to modern periods.

The Urban District (*chō*)⁽⁵⁾

The above mentioned patch-work maps suggests that how a city is depicted provides us with important clues for understanding what kind of socio-spatial structure a certain city has. In addition to the citywide perspective provided by the patch-work maps, there are also a number of smaller cadastral maps (*kokenzu*) that survive from the early modern period. These cadastral maps provide a detailed view of the spatial organization of Edo's urban districts or *chō* (see **Figure 2**). Moreover, because the Tokugawa shogunate originally ordered the drafting of such maps, these detailed depictions of neighborhoods throughout Edo also suggest the manner in which and the depth to which the shogunate's authority extended within the city, and perhaps help explain why the Tokugawa regime managed to last for over 250 years.

Essentially, a single district or *chō* is depicted on one cadastral map. As with the village (*mura*) in rural areas, the urban district (*chō*) was the main local community



Figure 2: An example of *Kokenzu* (*Kanpo Kokenzu*), drafted in 1744. (日本橋・大伝馬町 1 丁目, 寛保 4 年)

and also acted as the basic administrative unit of cities throughout Japan during this period. As suggested by remaining places names, such as *Daiku-chō* (Carpenters District) and *Kajiya-chō* (Blacksmiths district) in the central part of Japanese cities, these urban districts were originally organized as a permanent residential place for a group of artisans or merchants in the same occupation at the beginning of the Edo period, and formed the newly planned districts of the Tokugawa's rapidly expanding castle town in the early seventeenth century.

Generally speaking, each district was centered on a street that was lined by ten to thirty residential lots (*machiyashiki*), atop which stood one or two-story wood buildings (see **Figure 3**). Among these buildings, those facing the street and mixing retail and residential functions were called *omotedana* (also frequently referred to as *machiya*). As I discuss later, beginning around the late-seventeenth century, most of the *omotedana*




Figure 3: A model of the *chō*. (retouched image from *Shōsetsu Nihonshi* [詳説日本史], Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2003)

were built and inhabited by land-tenants (*jigari*). The other kind of buildings occupied the back lots behind the *omotedana* and were called *uradana*, whose cramped quarters did not allow for storefronts. Coterminous with the space of the lot (*machiashiki*), these buildings were home to as many as twenty households and acted as the elemental unit of all governing activities within Edo and other castle towns.⁷⁾ It was, for instance, down to the lot level that censuses, surveys, and notifications about new laws were carried out.

As can be seen in the early-seventeenth century *Edo meishozu byōbu* (see **Figure 4**),⁸⁾ many of Edo's urban districts originally had a high degree of social homogeneity due to their being founded by artisans who typically worked in, lived in, and owned their own lots. From around the late seventeenth century, however, this situation had dramatically changed with the influx of wealthy wholesale merchants from Osaka, Kyoto, and provinces in the Kanto region.⁹⁾ Originally having earned their wealth by selling textiles, and other such high quality goods, these merchants eventually opened stores in central Edo and began using their wealth to finance loans to daimyo lords and high-ranking officials of the Tokugawa regime. By the nineteenth century much of the land in Edo, especially in the central area around Nihonbashi, had been bought up by these immigrant merchants. Having bought lots of Edo, these merchant subsequently rented out either the land to "land-tenants" (*jigari*), who owned their own building atop the rented lot, or rented out both the land and the building to "building-tenants" (*tanagari*). Thus, by the nineteenth century, much of land in Edo's commoner areas was actually owned by non-resident owners who lived elsewhere in



Figure 4: *Edo meishozu byōbu*: the date of scenery (景観年代) is presumed to be the early and middle Kan'ei period (1624–44). The *machiya* at the corner nearby *Nihon-bashi*, drawn in the center, is for the trade of lacquer works. (『江戸名所図屏風』出光美術館蔵, 部分)

the city or altogether in another city or region. In fact, by the late-eighteenth to early-nineteenth centuries, the row upon row of shophouses (*machiya*) along Nihonbashi Avenue (*Nihonbashi dōri*), depicted in great detail in the *Kidai shōran* scroll painting, were mostly operated by land-renting wholesale and intermediate merchants.¹⁰⁾

Yamori

Such changes in land ownership and residential patterns also posed numerous difficulties for the governing structure of the city because they radically changed the character of one of Edo's fundamental social and administrative units, the urban districts. In early modern Japan, the administration of an urban district was carried out by the landowning residents of that same district who were also officially recognized as being of 'property-holder' or *iemochi* status that is, the Tokugawa shogunate only formally recognized these commoners or *chōnin*, a term which retained its primary meaning of owing a lot with residential buildings (*ieyashiki* or *machiyashiki*).¹¹⁾ All other residents as well as non-resident or absentee landowners were excluded from district administration.

In response to changes such as the increase absentee landowners, a unique intermediary position of *yamori* developed to fulfill the various administrative needs of landowners and renters. A *yamori* was a caretaker who acted as both a resident agent for a non-resident landowner and as a surrogate administrative leader within an urban district.

During the early modern era in Japan, there were just three categories of people in terms of their usufruct rights to land and buildings in urban areas: property-holders, land-tenants, and building-tenants. The *yamori* was not categorized as having such usufruct rights. The position of *yamori* was originally created by non-resident or absentee landowners, who were fundamentally charged with performing the administrative duties of their district. These absentee landowners began commissioning an inhabitant of the same urban district to manage their lot. During the first half of the nineteenth-century in the central part of Edo, for instance, only about ten percent of the residential lots were actually occupied by their owner. In place of these landowners, however, there were 833 *yamori* for 1,010 lots, and the total number of *yamori* in the city of Edo reached nearly 20,000.¹²⁾

In addition to the requirement that district administration be carried out by property-holders who actually resided in the district, it was from among these property-holders that a district headmen, or *nanushi*, representing upwards of five districts, was chosen. An unsalaried but prestigious title, the district headmen were charged with among a number of duties communicating and negotiating with officials in Edo's City Magistrate Office (*Machibugyō-sho*). Owing to a decreasing number of resident property-holders, a number of documents from the early eighteenth century show that the Tokugawa shogunate began to allow *yamori* to undertake a number of district responsibilities such as the notification of official proclamations or the conducting of district surveys. Extant residency registries (*ninbetsuchō*), for example, also list residents by urban district and residential lot that often only named the supervising *yamori* with no mention at all of the landowner who actually owned the lot.¹³⁾ These and other documents clearly suggest that, while the multitude of renting commoners in Edo may have indirectly paid their rent to a nominal landlord, it was the everyday presence of the supervising *yamori* with whom they had the most contact.

Through the buying of lots by non-resident merchants from Osaka, Kyoto, and other regions, the commoner areas lost their previous correlation between property-holding status and residency. As these land purchases continued, the number of *yamori* increased in order to manage these lots, which brought them into positions of district administration. As noted above in addition to their initial duties of overseeing the lots of their property-holding employers, the *yamori* also began increasingly to represent their employers and the districts. Recent research has revealed that, from the late eighteenth century, the *yamori* also gained greater independence from their employing property-holders. For example, a *yamori* living in and overseeing a corner-lot in *Ise-chō* (north Nihonbashi) made his employer withdraw the demand for his removal with the support of his tenants and all the other *yamori* in the district.¹⁴⁾ In another instance, after buying a new property, a landowner proved unable to remove the resident *yamori*.¹⁵⁾ By the nineteenth century, the *yamori* generally began to exert greater control over district administration, and the position of *yamori* itself became a well-established and licensed occupation (*kabu*) throughout Edo.

Situation during the last days of the Tokugawa Regime

The changes in the decades before the 1868 Meiji Restoration were tremendous.

During the Tenpō Reforms (1841–1843), the Tokugawa regime introduced extreme measures to reduce land rents (*chidai*) and building rents (*tanachin*) in Edo to their mid-eighteenth century level as part of a larger attempt to suppress the lavish spending of commoners and control the rampant inflation. Following these reforms, land and building rents both were reduced by 12% and 13% respectively.¹⁶⁾ As a result, land lost much of its value as an investment due to the difficulty of generating stable and consistent profits from rents that were always in jeopardy of total loss from Edo's frequent fires. At least, in the decades just before the Meiji Restoration, the main purpose of owning lots was not to earn money by renting them to tenants.¹⁷⁾

If possessing urban property did not generate profits for its owners, then why did wealthy merchant houses (*ōdana*) like Mitsui continue to own and buy lots in Edo's urban districts? The main reason is that, in the Edo period, the ownership of a lot also served as an important symbol of status and prestige among commoners. Moreover, wealthy merchant houses needed to own many lots to offer as collateral in large commercial transactions with domain lords and the Tokugawa authorities.¹⁸⁾ Accordingly, wealthy merchant houses such as Mitsui continued to own between 80 and 100 lots throughout the city and continued to buy new lots or acquire lots from smaller defaulting merchants throughout the economic and social upheavals of the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁹⁾

3. The Impact of the Meiji Government's New Landowning Regime

As described above, land was not regarded as a target for investment in Tokyo at the beginning of the Meiji Restoration. Accordingly, prior to the reforms of the new Meiji government, land-tenants (*jigari*) were able to reside stably on the same lot for a uncertain period of time, usually more than one hundred years.

In 1873, however, the new government promulgated the Land Tax Reform (*Chiso kaisei*), which drastically shifted a landowner's tax burden from the lot's frontage width to an assessment based on the total area of land.²⁰⁾ In part, this reform reflected the new government's desire to remove *yamori* from their middleman role in the administration of the city and replace them with a system run directly by government employees. For example, residence registries (*ninbetsuchō*), which had been based on urban lots (*machiyashiki*) and were frequently managed by a *yamori*, had since begun to be organized through new lot numbers (*chiban*) assigned to all areas regardless of their former boundaries and status distinction; retainer and domain lord areas (*bukechi*), temple and shrine areas (*jishachi*), and commoner areas (*chōninchi*).²¹⁾

Furthermore, the restrictions on rents since the Tenpō Reforms were abandoned altogether under an August 1872 proclamation by the Grand Council of State (*Dajōkan*).²²⁾ Thereafter, the government left the setting of rent rates entirely to the negotiation between each landowner and their tenant. Unfortunately, previous research on land ownership has focused mainly on agricultural villages, tenant farmers, and absentee landlords, leaving the issue of tenancy and property in Japan's cities largely untouched.²³⁾ Therefore, while few details are known about the subsequent negotiations of rents or the changing numbers of tenants owing to the Land Tax Reform, it is certain that landowners began making efforts to earn greater profits from their urban properties.

“Earthquake Dealing” (*Jishin baibai*)

Despite changes in laws and regulations, it remained difficult for landowners (*jinushi*) to earn profits from their land for another reason—rent collection. Owing that owners did not necessarily rent land for profit, it is perhaps not surprising that landowners had not developed a reliable system of rent collection. Moreover, an urban district’s collective social system often forgave tenants who were from time to time unable to either pay on time or in full (for further details see below). For this reason, with the change in laws, enterprising landowners began to take steps toward creating a system of regular and reliable rent collection.

The first problem that they encountered was how to deal with the *yamori*. Although *yamori* had been relinquished of their semi-official administrative duties for the city from 1869 onward,²⁴⁾ they still performed various functions, such as notifying residents about new public proclamations and acting as the primary collectors of rent well into the Meiji era. Landowners, however, did their best to reduce their reliance on these *yamori*. Because the *yamori* lived for years amongst the same tenants in tightly knit communities, they often found it very difficult to force their poorest tenants to pay rents regularly and in full. For this reason, the collection rate had been generally low during the entire Edo period.²⁵⁾ Also, because the income of *yamori* derived more income from the sale of their tenant’s nightsoil than from the salary they earned for collecting their tenants’ rents, they remained largely unaffected by their employer-landowner’s most obvious means of penalization—a deduction in their salary.²⁶⁾

Following the 1873 Land Tax Reform and the austerity policies demanded by the so-called Matsukata Deflation (1881–1885), however, land became a target for the investment of assets, and new more reliable methods of collecting rents were developed. For example, Mitsui initially tried a strategy of hiring only *yamori* whose collection rates were high, but eventually the company’s directors decided to establish their own subsidiary rent-collection agency (*sahai-jo*) to which the company’s tenants were obliged to directly pay their rents on a fixed day of every month.²⁷⁾

Following this slow but steady process of reducing the role of the *yamori*, Tokyo’s landowners also began to distinguish between the kinds of their land and building tenants and to pressure them to pay higher rents or face the threat of eviction. Nonetheless, even four decades after the Meiji Restoration, it was still widely recognized that buildings were more valuable than land in Tokyo (see **Figure 5**).²⁸⁾ Therefore, it remained socially unacceptable for landowners to give eviction notices to land-tenants who had invested heavily in their buildings, such as the many venerable merchant families living and operating their businesses for over one hundred years on the same lots in central Tokyo.

Despite such circumstances, Tokyo’s new urban planning projects served the interests of landowners by encouraging the creation of a new real estate management business (*fudōsan-gyō*). In accord with new fire prevention regulations, in the mid-1870s the Tokyo prefectural government (*Tōkyō-fu*) ordered that wood buildings along several main streets in central Tokyo be reconstructed with fireproof stucco or brick walls and required the replacement of all shingle and thatch roofing with fireproof materials for the area of the Outer Moat.²⁹⁾ Landowners like Mitsui, for example, took advantage of these projects to demand their tenants to improve their buildings or




Figure 5: Examples of *jigari*-buildings in the 1880s. (明治 18 年刊行『東京商工博覧絵』部分)

move out and even extended this expectation to tenants living outside the fireproofing zone demarcated by the prefecture.³⁰⁾

In addition, landowners took advantage of the inequities built into the new civil code (*minpō-ten*) that was promulgated in 1896 and 1898. Based on the liberal philosophy written into the French and German civil codes, the provisions of Japan's civil code did not weight the particular circumstances of the individual parties involved. As such, in lease contracts disputes, the courts did not take into consideration the power relationships between leaseholders, landowners, and building owners (*ōya*), and their respective land and building tenants.³¹⁾

The Civil Code provided two kinds of rights in drawing up a contract for leased land: surface rights and lending rights. The actual situation was, however, that most landowners preferred the latter method of contract because the duration of a contract based on lending rights was less than twenty years and required the approval of the landowner in order to sublet the property. In fact, a lease agreement formulated and used by Mitsui reveals that they limited the duration of their contracts to only five years and, if Mitsui requested their removal, buildings had to be taken off the land within 180 days.³²⁾ Taking advantage of people's unfamiliarity with such contracts, many landowners persuaded their tenants to sign new contracts and repeatedly increased their rents. When tenants refused to meet such demands, landowners declared a breach of contract and demanded them to vacate the property immediately.³³⁾

Although it is difficult to grasp the entire picture, the Tokyo District Court alone handled 392 instances of dispossession related to such rapacious practices between 1906 and 1908, and the number of disputes in this period is thought to be lower than

in other years.³⁴⁾ In response to the sudden disappearance of long-established stores dating well back into the Edo period, contemporary newspapers began calling these egregious evictions “earthquake dealing” (*jishin baibai*).³⁵⁾


4. “Earthquake Dealing” and the Restructuring of Space and Society in Tokyo

As described above, during the Edo period, land could not be a target for investment due to the administrative role played by the urban district (*chō*) and the existence of the *yamori*. In the meantime, large merchant houses continued to accumulate land for the purpose of proving their social prestige and status and to use as guarantee in large commercial transactions. After the new government’s reforms in the 1870s, land acquired value as an asset because there were no longer restrictions on rents and the new government’s basic policy on taxes was shifted from lot frontage to the area of lot as a whole. Under such circumstances, the significance of owning land changed drastically. Meanwhile, when the new government officially allowed the general use of land in all commoner areas after 1868, many large merchant houses subsequently became, and remain so today, large urban property holders based on their Edo possessions. In addition, some real estate corporations like Mitsui and Sumitomo continued to use these properties as an effective means to accumulate capital.³⁶⁾

At the same time, many tenants who had long occupied and used the land suffered due to the sudden increase in their rent and frequent loss of the right to tenancy (that is, they were evicted). This suffering was felt even more sharply by building tenants. For instance, while land tenants eventually gained some protection under the law, building tenants had to wait for decades before laws were enacted to protect their tenancy rights. In the meantime, “earthquake dealing” often forced the tenants of buildings along central Tokyo’s backstreets and alleys to relocate to the urban periphery, thereby contributing to Tokyo’s urban sprawl.³⁷⁾ As a result of “earthquake dealing,” people of the urban lower-class who had been living in *uradana* along the back alleys of Edo (see Figure 3) then congregated in slums in Tokyo’s new suburbs.

The rampant increase in “earthquake dealing” also discouraged land-tenants from investing in large amounts of money to build high-quality buildings. Moreover, as the possession of land gained even more social prestige, land-tenants saw an equivalent erosion of their social status. According to a 1910 report that describes the conditions of buildings along following the Tokyo City Improvement Projects (*shiku-kaisei jigyo*), a number of shoddy pseudo-Western buildings appeared along the widened *Nihonbashi* Avenue (the most prominent street in Tokyo at the time) to create an uneven and unsightly townscape (see **Picture 1**).³⁸⁾ Although often explained as the result of the diligent efforts of some long-established shop owners and a new rising mass culture, this transformation should also be seen in light of the earthquake-dealing’s destruction of the mixed local communities in the city center.³⁹⁾

On the other hand, and in contrast to building tenants, a noteworthy fact is that central Tokyo’s land-tenants proved to be both politically and socially more adept and dealing with the changes with which they were confronted. As mentioned above, many land-tenants in central Edo were relatively wealthy wholesale or intermediate merchants, who chose not to own the land on which their businesses thrived because



Picture 1: Nihonbashi dōri after the urban planning project (*Shiku-kaisei keikaku*) in the 1900s: a traditional machiya is sandwiched between pseudo-Western, shoddy buildings.

they did not find a positive reason to do so. In Edo, the basic social and administrative unit of the urban district (*chō*) shaped (and at times hindered) how various social and economic activities could be undertaken. Following the Meiji Restoration, though, the identity among land tenants of belonging to a particular district in the commoner areas was gradually replaced with a broader mindset of being a true-born “*Edokko*” (Edoite or Tokyoite) and of being a “*Nihonbashi* merchant.” While government officials and the very wealthy, that is, those directly and indirectly involved in “earthquake dealing,” continued to oppose all things “Edo,” a look at the charter for the “*Nihonbashi Club (Nihonbashi Kurabu)*” (see **Picture 2**) epitomizes this emergent local mindset and its potential as a source of identity from which to oppose their disinvestment from the city center.⁴⁰⁾ Moreover, it is possible to see a direct correlation between the establishment and activities of these groups and the progress of city redevelopment projects.⁴¹⁾

Furthermore, from the 1890s, the founding and activities of land-tenant unions began to exert considerable influence city politics, specifically, through both local and national elections. Until that time, much of the national government’s revenue had been based on the land tax, which was naturally levied on landowners. But in response to the enormous financial burdens of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and later the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), in 1896 the national government imposed a business tax (*eigyō-zei*) and in 1904 instituted an extraordinary special tax (*hijōji tokubetsu ze*), which by increasing the tax burden on wealthy merchants also

started in the year of the great earthquake. Although, directed by the wealthy entrepreneur Shibusawa Eiichi, there is every possibility that much of the planning and direction for this suburban community came from the land tenant merchants of Nihonbashi area.⁴⁴⁾ Thus, as Tokyo expanded outward, the old land-tenant merchants of the city center continued to play a significant role in the formation of the city's new suburbs.

Notes

- 1) This paper is based on the following chapter of my dissertation: "Meiji Tokyo ni okeru shakuchi-nin undō no toshi-shi-teki igi [明治東京における借地人運動の都市的意義]," *Kindai ikō-ki no Edo to Tokyo ni kansuru toshi-shi-teki kenkyū* [近代移行期の江戸・東京に関する都市史的研究], (Doctoral dissertation: Tokyo University, 2006), 231–283.
- 2) This section provides essential background information for the main part of this essay, which focuses on the changes in urban residence during the Meiji era. I am greatly indebted to the scholarship of Yoshida Nobuyuki, Iwabuchi Reiji, and Tamai Tetsuo, whose research is cited below.
- 3) For a more detailed discussion of these characteristics of Japan's early modern cities please see Yoshida Nobuyuki, "Jōkamachi no kōzō to tenkai [城下町の構造と展開]," *Toshi shakai shi* [都市社会史], (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2001), 87–117.
- 4) Miyazaki Katsumi 宮崎勝美, "Edo no tochi: Daimyō, Bakushin no tochi monndai [江戸の土地—大名・幕臣の土地問題]," *Nihon no kinsei 9, Toshi no jidai* [日本の近世 9: 都市の時代], (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1992), 130.
- 5) See, for instance, Matsuyama Megumi, "Kakunai-kakugai no settei keii to sono igi [「郭内」・「郭外」の設定経緯とその意義]," *Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai keikakukei ronbunshū* [日本建築学会計画系論文集], No. 580, (Tokyo: AIJ, June 2004).
- 6) For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Yoshida Nobuyuki 吉田伸之, *Kinsei toshi shakai no mibun kōzō* [近世都市社会の身分構造], (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1998) and Tamai Tetsuo 玉井哲雄, *Edo: Ushinawareta toshikūkan o yomu* [江戸—失われた都市空間を読む], (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1986).
- 7) It is difficult to know the exact number of residents per lot in Edo. However, some extant maps from former landowners depict both the external form and position of buildings in each of their lots. This offers an important clue in knowing how many households occupied the building. See, for instance, Tamai Tetsuo 玉井哲雄, *Edo chōninchi ni kansuru kenkyū* [江戸町人地に関する研究], (Tokyo: Kinsei fūzoku kenkyūkai, 1977), 84.
- 8) Held by the Idemitsu Museum of Arts, Tokyo.
- 9) While most of these outside merchants came from the Kansai region (Mitsui is typical of this), gradually some merchants from the Kanto region began to also buy lots in Edo. See, for instance, Iwabuchi Reiji 岩淵令治, "Bakumatsu Kantō gōshō no Edo machiyashiki tahata kōnyū kokoroe sho [幕末関東豪商の江戸町屋敷・田畑購入心得書]," *Ronshū kinsei* [論集きんせい] 19, (Tokyo: Kinsei-shi kenkyūkai, 1997).
- 10) Held by the Museum of East Asian Art, Berlin. For a more detailed discussion of this scroll please see Asano Shūgō 浅野秀剛 et al. eds., *Ōedo Nihonbashi emaki—"Kidai shōran" no seikai* [大江戸日本橋絵巻—「熙代勝覧」の世界], (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2003).
- 11) *Ieyashiki* is the important general idea to grasp the Japanese urban residency in early modern period. The *ieyashiki* located in commoner areas were typically called *machiyashiki*. See, for instance, Tamai, *Edo chōninchi ni kansuru kenkyū*, 16–22.
- 12) Yoshida Nobuyuki 吉田伸之, *21-seiki no Edo* [21 世紀の「江戸」], (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2004), 19.
- 13) Yoshida Nobuyuki 吉田伸之, "Omotedana to uradana [表店と裏店]," *Nihon no kinsei* 9, 316–322.
- 14) Iwabuchi Reiji 岩淵令治, "Kinsei chū-kōki 'Edo no yamori no chōjū' no jitsuzō [近世中・後期江戸の「家中の町中」の実像]," *Toshi to shōnin-geinōmin* [都市と商人・芸能民], (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1993), 214–222.
- 15) Iwabuchi, *ibid.*, 224–231.

- 16) Katakura Hisako 片倉比佐子, “Edo no chidai tanachin [江戸の地代店賃],” *Edo Tokyo gaku e no shōtai* [江戸東京学への招待] 3, (Tokyo: Nihon hōsō shuppan kyōkai, 1996), 63.
- 17) Few details are known about the rates and fluctuations in the lending of lands and buildings in Edo before the nineteenth century. For a rare mention of this topic, see Yoshida Nobuyuki 吉田伸之, *Kinsei kyodai toshi no shakai kōzō* [近世巨大都市の社会構造], (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1991), 332–333.
- 18) For a more detailed discussion of the definition of *ōdana*, see Yoshida Nobuyuki 吉田伸之, *Kyodai jōkamachi Edo no bunsetsu kōzō* [巨大城下町江戸の分節構造], (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1999), 20–23.
- 19) Yoshida, *21-seiki no Edo*, 19.
- 20) In Japan’s early modern cities, landowners in commoner areas were in principle not obliged to pay taxes on their land. Instead, the tax was imposed on the right to street frontage, as distinct from the land itself. See, for instance, Takijima Isao 滝島功, *Toshi to chiso kaisei* [都市と地租改正], (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2003).
- 21) Kitahara Itoko 北原糸子, *Toshi to hinkon no shakai-shi: Edo kara Tokyo e* [都市と貧困の社会史—江戸から東京へ], (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1995), 227–252.
- 22) *Dajōkan fukoku* [太政官布告] No. 240, August 27, 1872 [明治 5 年 8 月 27 日, 第 240 号].
- 23) For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Ōishi Kaichirō 大石嘉一郎 et al. eds, *Kindai nihon toshi-shi kenkyū: Chihō toshi karano saikōsei* [近代日本都市史研究—地方都市からの再構成], (Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2003), 3–20.
- 24) *Tokyo shishi-kō, Shigai-hen* [東京市史稿, 市街篇] Vol. 50, (Tokyo: The Metropolitan Government, 1961), 800.
- 25) For a more detailed discussion of the collection rate by yamori please see the following: Morita Takako 森田貴子, “Meiji-ki no Tokyo ni okeru fudōsan keiei no kindai-ka: Mitsui-gumi o jirei ni [明治期の東京における不動産経営の近代化—三井組を事例に—],” *Shigaku zasshi* [史学雑誌], 110-6, (Tokyo, 2001), 64–66.
- 26) Yoshida, *21-seiki no Edo*, 27.
- 27) Mitsui bunko shiryō [三井文庫史料], *Shakuchi shakka shō shoshiki kaisei no ken* [借地借家証書式改正ノ件] 史料番号：追 1775.
- 28) See, for instance, *Hōritsu shinbun* [法律新聞], June 15, 1908 [明治 41 年 6 月 15 日号].
- 29) Ishida Yorifusa 石田頼房, *Nihon kingendai toshi keikaku no tenkai: 1868–2003* [日本近現代都市計画の展開], (Tokyo: Jichitai kenkyūsha, 2004), 42–45.
- 30) Morita, “Meiji-ki no Tokyo ni okeru fudōsan keiei no kindai-ka, 62.
- 31) See, for instance, Suzuki Rokuya 鈴木禄弥, *Shakuchi shakka-hō no kenkyū* [借地・借家法の研究] 1, (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1984), 88–97.
- 32) Mitsui bunko shiryō, *Shakuchi shakka shō shoshiki kaisei no ken*, 史料番号：追 1775.
- 33) See, for instance, *Dainihon teikokugikai-shi* [大日本帝国議会誌], vol. 7, 1696–1697.
- 34) *Hōritsu shinbun* [法律新聞], February 10, 1909 [明治 42 年 2 月 10 日号].
- 35) See, for instance, *Tokyo mainichi shinbun* [東京毎日新聞], March 24, 1908 [明治 41 年 3 月 24 日号].
- 36) See, for instance, Suzuki Hiroyuki 鈴木博之, *Nihon no kindai 10: Toshi e* [日本の近代 10：都市へ], (Tokyo: Chūō kōron shinsha, 1999), 168–179.
- 37) Nakagawa Makoto 中川理, *Jūzei toshi: mō hitotsu no kōgai jūtakushi* [重税都市—もうひとつの郊外住宅史], (Tokyo: Sumai no toshokan shuppanyoku, 1990), 73–75.
- 38) *Kenchiku zasshi* [建築雑誌], August, 1909 [明治 42 年 8 月号].
- 39) Hatsuda Tōru 初田亨, *Hankagai no kindai* [繁華街の近代—都市・東京の消費空間], (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2004), 113–117.
- 40) For a more detailed information on this topic please see the following: *Nihonbashi kurabu enkakushi* [日本橋倶楽部沿革誌], (Tokyo: Nihonbashi kurabu, 1938); *Nihonbashi kurabu hyaku-nen* [日本橋倶楽部 100 年], (Tokyo: Nihonbashi kurabu kaihō iinkai, 1991).
- 41) *Hōritsu shinbun* [法律新聞], April 20 (the extra), 1908 [明治 41 年 4 月 20 日号外].
- 42) *Shinshū Nihonbashi-ku shi* (the last volume) [新修日本橋区史 下巻], (Tokyo: Nihonbashi kuyakusyo, 1937), 167–173.
- 43) It was only in 1921 that the government finally approved the legislation which allowed land-tenants

to request contracts with durations of several decades. For a detailed discussion of this topic please see the following: *Nihon no tochi hyaku-nen* [日本の土地百年], (Tokyo: Taisei shuppansha, 2003), 59–63. This book does an excellent job of explaining changes in the Japanese real-estate laws from the 1870s to the early 1990s.

- 44) *Ichihara Motomuō* [市原求翁], (Tokyo: Nihonbashi-ku kyōikukai, 1928), 98–105.