

The Imposter Branch of the Hatakeyama Family and Japanese-Chosŏn Korea Court Relations, 1455–1580s

Kenneth R. Robinson

A Japanese monk named Inshi Ryoŏshin traveled to Chosŏn Korea in 1473 as the Vice-Envoy of the Shogun Deputy Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu. While in the capital, Ryoŏshin submitted a personal letter to the Board of Rites (K. *Yejo*), the ministry responsible for managing diplomatic interactions. He provided Korean officials with information about the Ōnin War (1467–1477) being fought in Kyoto, praised Yoshikatsu’s successes at peace-making amid the battles, and explained why Yoshikatsu had been named Shogun Deputy (J. *kanrei*), the highest appointive post below the Shogun.¹⁾ Yoshikatsu also communicated with the Board of Rites through the official letter of introduction presented by his Envoy. And in addition to trading, he asked for construction materials that would be used at a temple.²⁾

However, Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu never drew a breath. He was an imposter identity constructed for trading in Chosŏn,³⁾ and sent four missions between 1470 and 1480.⁴⁾ Neither his father Yoshitada nor his younger cousin Yoshinari lived either, and they also traded in Chosŏn, from 1455 to 1460 and from 1460 to 1474, respectively.⁵⁾ And still more Hatakeyama missions appeared from 1548 until the Japanese invasion of Chosŏn in 1592.⁶⁾ While Korean elites knew that the later Hatakeyamas were the handiwork of Tsushima islanders and thus somewhat less than authentic, their predecessors seem not to have suspected or realized that any one or all three of the earlier Hatakeyamas were designed. Those craftsmen most likely lived in the port city of Hakata or in Tsushima, or in both places.

The Hatakeyama family that lived on Honshu was but one of several families associated with the Muromachi Bakufu which were appropriated for imposter identities. They were an especially good choice as a model. Related to the Ashikaga and eligible for the Shogun Deputy post, family heads of the main branch were some of the most powerful men in Kyoto and in the Bakufu.⁷⁾ A second branch incorporated into the identities of the imposter Hatakeyama, the Noto branch, served as governors of Noto province. However, neither of these branches seems ever have to sent a mission to Chosŏn. Except for the Shiba,⁸⁾ none among the other Bakufu official families with whom the court interacted seem to have sent their own missions, either.

The King of Chosŏn recognized these several families associated with the Muromachi Bakufu as “Bakufu officials” (K. *koč’h’u, taeshin*; J. *daijin*). This diplomatic status placed the officials below only shoguns and kings in the court’s tightly calibrated

ed reception procedures, and provided perquisites unavailable to Japanese contacts assigned to lower diplomatic statuses. For example, the King bestowed reception upon Bakufu officials without a prior review of their letters of introduction. That is, the court considered them representatives of the Shogun (K. *t'ongshin*; J. *tsuōshin*). Further, according to written regulations, while the Chosōn court limited the volume of goods which Japanese of lower reception grades could transport to Hansōng, the capital, for official trade, the court did not impose similar limits upon Bakufu officials.⁸⁾ Seeking to take advantage of this status, imposter Bakufu officials dispatched numerous missions during the Ōnin War and, treating the Chosōn government as a supply depot, asked for large amounts of cotton and other cloths, Buddhist sutras, and temple construction materials.¹¹⁾ In other words, a Hakata elite or a Tsushima islander could conduct far more trade and, presumably make more profits during one mission at the Bakufu official status than at his own diplomatic status.

Most of the goods which Japanese traded in Chosōn were southeast Asian products such as spices, dyes, and medicines obtained in Ryukyu, Hakata, and possibly elsewhere in Kyushu. In exchange, Japanese acquired cotton, silk, other cloths, and foodstuffs. Korean pottery, including tea wares, may also have been popular. Another reason why Japanese sailed as frequently as possible to Chosōn was that the Ming court forbade official trade that was not conducted through a shogunal tribute mission. Just a few hours away in Chosōn were opportunities available year-round.

Privileges and purposes such as these encouraged the reconstitution of the Hatakeyama. Sponsors of the identities active in the mid-fifteenth century operate and trade within the regulations for Bakufu officials until 1474/12, when the Chosōn court introduced the ivory tally system to prevent further missions from imposter Bakufu officials. Subsequently, they and sponsors in the mid-and late-sixteenth century searched for ways to remove the Hatakeyama from the ivory tally system. A family history of the imposter branch of the Hatakeyama will tell of men who never lived, their interactions with Korean kings and court officials, and reactions of the Chosōn court to imposter trade.

The Main Branch and the Noto Branch of the Hatakeyama

The branches of the Hatakeyama that unknowingly provided the models for the imposter Hatakeyama lived originally in the Kantō area. After several family members were killed in a dispute with the Hojō̄ in the early thirteenth century, the lineage was renewed through the marriage of the family head's widow to the first, illegitimate son of the Ashikaga family head. As the Ashikaga constructed the Muromachi Bakufu in the mid-fourteenth century, they included the Hatakeyama among collateral families eligible for appointment as Shogun Deputy and appointed the family head to the governorships for Kawachi, Kii, Etchū, and Noto provinces.

In 1408, the Hatakeyama family head passed the appointment to the Noto governorship to his younger brother. With that new Governor, Mitsunori, began the Noto branch of the Hatakeyama. This branch did not supply Shogun Deputies, however,

because eligibility remained with the main branch.

Matters grew complicated for the main branch from mid-century. Mochikuni, the heirless family head, adopted as his son and successor a child, Masanaga. Soon, though, one of Mochikuni's ladies bore him a son, Yoshinari. After retiring in 1450, Mochikuni tried to transfer the succession to Yoshinari. However, the Hatakeyama succession became enmeshed in wider disputes, including succession contests in other elite families. (The Noto branch supported Yoshinari.) (See Genealogy 1.) Competition between the brothers escalated into armed conflict in the 1460s as Masanaga chased Yoshinari through nearby provinces. Masanaga continued to fare far better than his brother, and served as Shogun Deputy at four different times between 1464/9 and 1487/8.¹⁰ I shall return to Yoshinari and his own activities in the 1470s and 1480s below. Against this too brief summary of the main branch and the Noto branch of the Hatakeyama will emerge the composition and activities of the imposter branch.

Genealogy 1: The Main Branch and the Noto Branch of the Hatakeyama during the Fifteenth Century

Motokuni (<i>Uemon-no-suke</i>)		
	[Main branch]	[Noto branch]
	Mitsuie (<i>Saemon-no-kami</i>)	Mitsunori (<i>Shuŕi-no-daibu</i>)
	Mochikuni (<i>Saemon-no-kami</i>)	Yoshitada (<i>Shuŕi-no-daibu</i>)
Masanaga (<i>Saemon-no-kami</i>)	Yoshinari (<i>Uemon-no-suke</i>)	Yoshiari (<i>Jibu-no-shou</i>)
	Motoie (<i>Danjo-no-shohitsu</i>)	Yoshimune (<i>Saemon-no-suke</i>)

Sources: Imatani Akira, "Hatakeyama-uji," in Imatani Akira and Fujieda Fumitada, eds., *Muromachi Bakufu shugoshokka jiten, ge*, (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu oŕaisha, 1988), 270–272; Higashiyotsuyanagi Fumiaki, "Noto Hatakeyama-uji," in Ōyama Takeshi and Owada Tetsuo, eds., *Sengoku daimyo keifu jinmei jiten: Saigoku hen*, (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu oŕaisha, 1986), 61.

Genealogy 2: A Genealogy of the Imposter Branch of the Hatakeyama

the founder of Tokuhonji			
	Yoshitada	=	Mochikuni
Yoshikatsu			Yoshinari
(<i>Sakyo-no-daibu</i>)			(<i>Ukingo-no-kami</i>)
		Yoshiaki	= Haruhide
		(<i>Ukingo-no-kami</i>)	(<i>Hyoŕ-no-kami</i>)

Legend: = signifies a relationship as brothers, the elder brother being to the left.

The Imposter Branch of the Hatakeyama, 1455–1480: Yoshitada, Yoshinari, and Yoshikatsu

Yoshikatsu was one of three imposter Hatakeyama who traded in Chosŕn between 1455 and 1480. His father Yoshitada had initiated contact in 1455, his younger cousin Yoshinari in 1460.¹¹ (See Genealogy 2.) The designers of these identities mixed and matched the names, genealogies, personal experiences, government posts, and court titles of men in the main branch and the Noto branch of the Hatakeyama, and crafted these contacts in ways that enabled diplomatic and trade relations to continue for

many years. The most important elements were the contacts' family names and government positions. The family name reminded Korean officials of the Hatakeyama's position in the Bakufu as Shogun Deputy, and the political status determined their diplomatic status and reception procedures. All three of these Hatakeyama served as Shogun Deputy.

Among the more than one-half dozen Bakufu families appropriated and reconstituted for imposter trade, Hatakeyama missions arrived most often. Working through Yoshitada, Yoshinari, and Yoshikatsu, the designers and sponsors crafted a Hatakeyama branch. They formed two lines of succession, linked family members, and established succession patterns. The imposter branch worked parallel to the two Hatakeyama branches from which the identities were drawn. But the activities of the imposter branch never precluded or prevented other Hatakeyama from seeking diplomatic relations with the King of Chosŏn.

As noted, the first imposter Hatakeyama mission, sent by the Shogun Deputy Hatakeyama Yoshitada, reached Hansŏng in late 1455.¹²⁾ The imposter branch Yoshitada was the elder uterine brother of Mochikuni.¹³⁾ Shogun Deputy missions, which presumably were Hatakeyama missions traveling under the name of Yoshitada, traded several more times through 1460. No further Yoshitada missions are recorded after this year.¹⁴⁾

Although Korean officials were unsuspecting, the Shogun Deputy Hatakeyama Yoshitada would have attracted attention in Kyoto. The Yoshitada who could circulate in Kyoto was the son of Mitsunori, the founder of the Noto branch. He succeeded to the family headship and to the Noto governorship after Mitsunori's death. In 1455, the year when the imposter branch Yoshitada initiated diplomatic relations with the King of Chosŏn, the Noto branch Yoshitada retired and passed the family headship to his grandson.¹⁵⁾

Even more problematic, Hosokawa Katsumoto served as Shogun Deputy from 1452/11 until 1464/9, or throughout the entire period that Yoshitada traded in Chosŏn. The Shogun Deputy before Katsumoto, though, was Hatakeyama Mochikuni. And as Shogun Deputy in 1443/6, Mochikuni met with Korean envoys visiting Kyoto.¹⁶⁾ This embassy having been the last to reach the Japanese capital before the introduction of imposter Bakufu officials to the King of Chosŏn, "Hatakeyama" and "Shogun Deputy" probably was a combination recognizable to court officials.¹⁷⁾ Perhaps this memory in Chosŏn and knowledge elsewhere of that memory led to the selection of Hatakeyama as the first family to be deployed for an imposter trade mission under the name of a Bakufu official. As for Mochikuni, he died in 1455/3, almost nine months before the Korean king received Yoshitada's envoy.¹⁸⁾ Yoshitada of the Noto branch died in 1463;¹⁹⁾ Yoshitada of the imposter branch died in 1465.²⁰⁾

The imposter branch Yoshitada was a composite of the two Honshu branches. His adult given name matched that of his contemporary in Noto. But the court title which he sported, *Shuŕi-no-daibu*, had been bestowed upon Mitsunori, not upon the Noto branch Yoshitada. The imposter Yoshitada also claimed the Shogun Deputy post for

which the Noto branch was not eligible. And genealogically, the imposter branch Yoshitada was the uterine brother of Mochikuni. But the Noto branch Yoshitada was Mochikuni's uncle. Further, the imposter Yoshitada was the uncle of the imposter branch Yoshinari, whose name matched that of a member of the main branch. The family of the imposter branch Yoshitada thus differed significantly from the family of the Noto branch Yoshitada. (Compare Genealogy 1 and Genealogy 2.)

The next Hatakeyama to send missions was Yoshinari. His first contact with the Chosŏn court occurred in 1460, when the Korean king received his envoy and the envoy of Yoshitada together. Like Yoshitada, Yoshinari's profile also combined features from the Honshu branches. As did his predecessor, Yoshinari held both the Shogun Deputy position and the governorship of Noto province. He also held the governorships for Yamashiro, Kawachi, Kii, and Etchu provinces, government posts that the Bakufu distributed to the main branch.²¹⁾ Four more Yoshinari missions reached Chosŏn through 1474/7.²²⁾

The Chosŏn court understood Yoshinari to be the son of Mochikuni, the nephew of Yoshitada, and the younger cousin of Yoshikatsu. As noted already, the main branch Yoshinari also was the son of Mochikuni. However, unlike Yoshinari of the imposter branch, he did not have a uterine brother. Moreover, he was never appointed Shogun Deputy. (Again compare Genealogy 1 and Genealogy 2.) And although early in his career he held the governorships for Kawachi, Kii, Etchu, and Yamato, again unlike the imposter branch Yoshinari, he is not known to have held the governorship for Noto.

Yoshinari also approached the court for assistance in rebuilding a temple. In 1474, he sought help for Tokuhonji, a temple that his grandfather had established but which had burned in the fighting. But the court refused his entreaty.²³⁾ The name chosen for this temple, Tokuhonji, derived not from the grandfather of the imposter branch Yoshinari, but from the father of the main branch Yoshinari. That father, Mochikuni, assumed the religious name Tokuhon upon taking the tonsure in 1454. An imposter identity thus was asking for materials for a temple that did not exist and that was founded by a grandfather who never lived. This was the last appearance of Yoshinari.

Korean officials did not know that the lifecourses of the two Yoshinaris differed remarkably in the 1460s and 1470s. While the imposter branch Yoshinari bragged about his peaceful, religious pursuits amid the wars then consuming much of Japan, the main branch Yoshinari remained committed to defeating his adoptive brother Masanaga. As briefly described above, Yoshinari and Masanaga each had at different times been announced by Mochikuni as the successor to the family headship. They continued to vie for the headship after their father's death in 1455. In 1460/9, as their skirmishes neared Kyoto, the Shogun banished Yoshinari from the capital. Several military defeats followed, and by 1463 Yoshinari was roaming homeless through nearby provinces. Meanwhile, Masanaga was appointed Shogun Deputy in 1464/9 through the support and machinations of Hosokawa Katsumoto, and held the office until 1467/1. As H. Paul Varley writes, "The goal [the family headship] for which

both Hatakeyama contenders were fighting so desperately had become, in terms of real power, meaningless; for the Hatakeyama were no longer masters of their own fate.”²⁴⁾

The Hatakeyama did not control their identities, either. The economic and political destitution of the main branch Yoshinari in the mid-1460s made sharp contrast with the imposter branch Yoshinari’s position in 1465 as Shogun Deputy. Further, the imposter branch Yoshinari’s claim to the Shogun Deputy post in 1465 conflicted with the appointment of Masanaga, who was the Shogun Deputy at that time.

The next Hatakeyama to deal with the Chosŏn court was Yoshikatsu, the elder cousin of the imposter branch Yoshinari. Also the Shogun Deputy, Yoshikatsu sent his first mission in 1470. Hoping to leave a good impression, he presented to the Korean king such rarities as a water buffalo and sweet honey.²⁵⁾ The envoy returned to Japan with sutras and various cloths.²⁶⁾

Like his predecessors, the Shogun Deputy whose envoys met with Korean kings and high-ranking officials in the early 1470s could not claim in Kyoto to be the Shogun Deputy. In Yoshikatsu’s case, Hosokawa Katsumoto’s second stint began in 1468/7 and ended when he died on 1473/5/11. The post remained vacant for seven months, until Masanaga served for one week in the twelfth month. No one occupied the post for the next four years.²⁷⁾

Yoshikatsu’s second mission, which included Ryoŏshin, arrived in 1473. The Envoy was the Abbot of Tentokuji, a Zen temple in Noto province. This mission followed a common practice in Japanese-Chosŏn court interactions. Provincial governors asked the Chosŏn court to provide sutras or other materials for temples in their provinces. Yoshikatsu asked for assistance in building a sutra depository at Tentokuji, where he would place the *Koryŏ Tripitaka* volumes (K. *ilbu*) that King Soŏngjong had released in 1470.²⁷⁾ However, there was no Tentokuji in Noto province in the late fifteenth century.²⁸⁾ As the imposter branch Yoshinari would do for Tokuhonji in 1474, an imposter identity sought materials for a temple that did not exist.

Soŏngjong received Yoshikatsu’s next mission in 1474/12. The timing of this audience requires explanation. Two months earlier, in 1474/10, the Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimasa had exposed two imposter Bakufu officials.²⁹⁾ To prevent further abuses, Yoshimasa proposed that an identification system for shogunal envoys and envoys of Bakufu officials be implemented. Two months later, Soŏngjong instituted a different system founded not in Japan but in Chosŏn. He entrusted with the shogun the right halves of 10 ivory tallies numbered respectively 1 through 10. Each tally was inscribed on one side with the phrase *Chosŏn t’ongshin* (J. *Choŏsen tsuŏshin*) and on the other side with the Chinese reign year equivalent to 1474. Most important, Soŏngjong required all envoys of shoguns and of Bakufu officials to obtain an ivory tally from the shogun and present that patent in Chosŏn.³⁰⁾ Soŏngjong received the envoy of Yoshikatsu about one week after instituting the ivory tally regulation. This mission thus could not have been bound by the addition to the court’s access control system.

Hereafter, though, Hatakeyama missions were to pass through the Shogun. The

Chosŏn court had endowed the King's diplomatic equal with a means to oversee departures for Chosŏn, a power over western elites which the Ashikaga, the office of the Shogun, and the Muromachi Bakufu had never developed. Until a detour could be devised, the ivory tally system discouraged the allocation of financial and material resources for missions likely not to achieve recognition. The ivory tally system also rendered such dispatches even more dangerous, for it increased the possibility of exposure in Japan and the unpredictable consequences that might follow.

And yet, Yoshikatsu squeezed another mission into Chosŏn in 1480. That the envoy did not present an ivory tally is clear from the usage in 1482 of tally number one by Yoshimasa's envoy.³²⁾ Serving again as the Shogun Deputy, he associated himself with the "leader of the Western army" (J. *saishu*) in the Ōnin War, Yoshimi. He sited himself and his relations with the King of Chosŏn in the Shogun's tributary relationship with the Emperor of Ming China. And he hinted at problems with the introduction of the ivory tally identification system. But this mission sought something more important than trade.

In his letter Yoshikatsu referred first to that recent embassy. It seems that the envoy had not been able to return through the Inland Sea because of the war and instead had proceeded along the western coast of Honshu. Encountering bad weather, the ship sailed off course, as far north as "the country of the northern barbarians" (J. *hokuteki-no-kuni*).³³⁾ Only "last year" did he learn of the envoy's whereabouts. A ship was immediately dispatched to bring the envoy and the King's letter and gifts to Kyoto. Concerned about the letter and the gifts, Yoshikatsu asked Soŋjong to tell him the contents of the letter so that he could relay the information to Yoshimi.³⁴⁾

The Shogun Deputy then mentioned two shogunal tribute missions to China. The first had recently returned to Japan; the second would soon be departing. However, the author of the letter was careful not to use wording other than "leader of the Western army" to identify Yoshimi. It was the associations with the embassy to Chosŏn and the tribute missions to China that expressed his status as Soŋjong's diplomatic equal in Japan.

In that first shogunal tribute mission, Ryoŏshin served as Vice-Envoy. According to Yoshikatsu, while returning from China the ship carrying the monk strayed off-course and landed at Cheju island. Discovering the Japanese, islanders bound Ryoŏshin and others and marched them to a nearby government office. However, Ryoŏshin died while in the charge of Cheju officials. At this point in the letter Yoshikatsu climbed to diplomatic high ground. He reminded the court that shipwrecked people were to be protected and returned (alive, it went without saying) to their home country. Thus, he could not understand why officials in Cheju did not report Ryoŏshin's appearance to the Board of Rites, particularly as the monk had visited Chosŏn in the past.

Hashimoto Yu- suggests that the embassy returning from Chosŏn to which Yoshikatsu referred was the 1474 embassy whose envoy Soŋjong had entrusted with the ivory tallies. Yoshikatsu, or rather his handlers, wanted to leave the impression that the ivory tallies had been lost. He then deployed this loss as the excuse for seek-

ing reception without an ivory tally.⁴¹⁾

Wanting information about the contents of Soŋjong's letter to Yoshimasa helps explain the dispatch of the Hatakeyama mission and the themes, including the dangerous Inland Sea passage and the Chinese tribute system, deployed in Yoshikatsu's letter. Through that carefully worded letter, Yoshikatsu's handlers probably hoped to nudge the King of Chosoŋ into issuing another set of tallies and entrusting that set with their envoy. Had Soŋjong done so, the difficulties of using this second set would have struck its holders eventually. How would they dispatch a second embassy after Yoshimasa had used his first tally and his envoy convinced the court of that embassy's authenticity? The various tactics utilized in this Yoshikatsu mission demonstrate the importance for some in western Japan of imposter Bakufu officials.

That importance also informed the earlier revival of contact in the Yoshitada line in 1470 after 10 years of inactivity. At that time, the conflagration in Kyoto had made it easier for sponsors to prepare and dispatch these imposter trade missions.⁴²⁾ Further, upon his bestowal of recognition, the King of Chosoŋ inaugurated a form of trade succession similar to and also significantly different from trade successions conducted by or through Japanese assigned to the lowest diplomatic status. In the latter pattern, a Japanese contact returned the personal seal which had been bestowed upon his predecessor and requested and received a seal in his own name. For a Bakufu official, though, trade succession occurred automatically, because access and reception did not require possession of a personal seal.

Two lines within the imposter branch of the Hatakeyama, the Yoshitada-Yoshikatsu line and the Yoshinari line, now were interacting with the Chosoŋ court. By establishing parallel succession tracks the sponsors (whether one group or two) of the Yoshikatsu and Yoshinari identities increased the frequency of contact in Chosoŋ and the volume of trade and amount of profits in both Chosoŋ and Japan. Those lines might have continued trading in Chosoŋ had Yoshimasa not exposed the trading practice which the imposter branch of the Hatakeyama embodied and the court not instituted the ivory tally system.

Even as late as 1480, then, the Chosoŋ court still may not have identified the Hatakeyama as imposter Bakufu officials. And the court twice missed opportunities to meet Bakufu officials in the late 1470s. In late 1476-early 1477 and again in early 1479, for example, the court prepared embassies to Japan. On both occasions, "Hatakeyama-dono" was among the men to whom Soŋjong's envoys were to deliver gifts.⁴³⁾ But neither of these embassies reached Kyoto, and the court thus did not collect up-to-date information about politics in Kyoto and elsewhere in Japan. Meanwhile, Yoshikatsu missions stopped arriving because they could not obtain tallies from Yoshimasa or from the Chosoŋ court. Other imposter Bakufu officials not directly implicated in 1474 also stopped sending missions. The ivory tally system was working well.

The Hatakeyama and the Chosŏn Court, 1548–1580s

The imposter branch of the Hatakeyama suddenly reappeared in 1548. The year before, King Myoŋjong had permitted Japanese to resume trade following a destructive pirate attack in 1544 and the severing of relations. One of the purposes in renewing contact through imposter Bakufu officials, trade, did not differ from those of earlier generations.⁴⁴⁾ By 1552 at the latest, Korean officials strongly suspected that Tsushima islanders were responsible for the Hatakeyama missions at minimum. Kings and court officials understood thereafter that they were dealing with imposter Hatakeyama contacts representing interests in Tsushima.

The dispatch of imposter Bakufu officials also worked toward purposes which reminded Korean elites that Tsushima islanders all but subsisted on their trade in Chosŏn and Japan. These later Hatakeyama contacts, for example, added negotiating for trade privileges to their diplomatic portfolio and endeavored to increase trade opportunities for Tsushima islanders. Their missions contributed to the belief among some, if not many Korean officials that “Japanese have many deceptions and their words lack credibility.”⁴⁵⁾

When Myoŋjong unlocked the door to trade in 1547, he opened that door less widely than it had been in the past. The court reduced the number of trade ships allotted the Governor of Tsushima each year and prohibited the usage of personal seals issued more than 50 years earlier.⁴⁶⁾ How many people and identities were denied diplomatic privileges by the latter restriction, and how many trade ships per year were thus eliminated, is unclear. The elimination of those personal seals enhanced the value of Bakufu officials and that diplomatic status, for these identities did not require seals for access. None of the articles in the 1547 agreement, though, referred to Bakufu officials, which may have contributed to their revival in 1548.⁴⁷⁾ Interaction through Bakufu officials offered the potential of loosening the new rules of contact and replenishing Tsushima islanders with trade ships.

That first Hatakeyama envoy, apparently as Yoshitada’s representative, arrived in 1548 with a shogunal envoy and without an ivory tally. This breach prompted Myŋjong to not bestow diplomatic recognition and to bid the envoy return home.⁴⁸⁾ This mission may have been testing whether the ivory tally regulation remained in effect and if Yoshitada still was a viable identity, and at the same time may have been seeking a route to Chosŏn that did not pass through the holder of an ivory tally. This gambit of accompanying a shogunal envoy thus offered the possibility of becoming an accepted, regular practice. However, shogunal escort proved insufficient for bypassing the ivory tally requirement.

The planners learned quickly. Two years later, in 1550, the Hatakeyama envoy presented four forms of identification: an ivory tally; a letter from the Shogun; a letter of introduction from Hatakeyama; and an access permit (K. *munin*).⁴⁹⁾ The tally requirement met, the King bestowed reception according to regulations current in the mid-fifteenth century. That reception protocol presumably continued to extend to the amount of goods a Bakufu official’s envoy could transport to the capital. If so, trade

conducted through Bakufu officials still exceeded, at least on paper, the volume of trade permitted Japanese of lower diplomatic statuses.

Hatakeyama also made a request of the court. He wished to be issued a “small tally” (*J. shofu*; *K. sobu*) which he could present instead of a shogunal tally. The court turned down the petition. Had the King and his officials approved, they would have liberated a Bakufu official from the ivory tally regulation and established a precedent for access and reception. Similar to Yoshikatsu’s enlistment of Japanese tributary relations with Ming China in 1480, these attempts in 1548 and 1550 at recasting access control policies would not have been necessary had tallies been easily available. The problem of obtaining an ivory tally raises the questions of why this (and the 1548) mission was a Hatakeyama mission, how the tally presented in 1550 came into the hands of the sponsors, and what number tally did the Envoy carry.

The answers are not yet known. But in 1503–1504, the Shogun Ashikaga Yoshizumi asked the King of Chosŏn for a new set of ivory tallies. Hashimoto suggests that the court replied favorably. Tallies numbered 1 and 2 were available to the Ōtomo, who administered an important port area in Hakata, in the first half of the 1520s; a tally numbered 4 was in the hands of the Ōuchi in 1542–1543 and in 1562 with the Moŕi, after the Ōuchi’s demise.⁵⁰⁾ And in 1552, an imposter Bakufu official presented a tally numbered 3.⁵¹⁾ The issuance for Yoshizumi can be confirmed: in 1550, court officials referred to the requirement that envoys of shoguns and Bakufu officials carry the left half of an ivory tally.⁵²⁾ Assuming that the Chosŏn court fully followed procedures outlined at the time of the Shogun’s request, this set differed from the tallies produced in 1474. The court inscribed into each tally the Chinese reign year in which they were issued and entrusted the left halves with Yoshizumi’s envoy.⁵³⁾ Korean officials thus could easily distinguish the new patents from the first set.

Still, the network through which the tally used in 1550 passed remains shrouded. Hashimoto also suggests that elites in western Japan sought to move closer to the shogunal power that enabled interaction through an ivory tally, regardless of who actually held a tally or tallies.⁵⁴⁾ That specific form of shogunal power attached to whomever the King of Chosŏn recognized diplomatically as Shogun, but, conversely, was moot without royal recognition. A separate, personal tally for Hatakeyama would have distanced these missions from whatever complications attended an approach to the holder of an ivory tally or the repetitive use of a single tally by one or more imposter Bakufu officials.

Back in Hansŏng, Hatakeyama’s Envoy died in the capital. Even as Korean officials were making plans for his burial, the quick-thinking Vice-Envoy asked the court to bestow a post in the Chosŏn military bureaucracy upon the Envoy’s nephew so that he could mourn at the grave every year. More to the point in, fulfilling the requirement that post recipients offer their respects to the King every year, the military post would provide an annual opportunity for trade. As with personal seals, Japanese had pursued this manner of access since the mid-fifteenth century. However, the court turned down the petition.⁵⁵⁾ The Vice-Envoy returned to Japan without the Envoy, without a

personal tally for Hatakeyama, and without a new military post.

A third mission reached Chosŏn in 1552.⁵⁶⁾ Korean officials became suspicious of Hatakeyama, and for a very simple reason. This Envoy had served in recent missions. Stated the Censor-General (K. *Saganwoñ*) bluntly,

The true character of the Japanese (K. *Waenu*) is one of deceit. They know only profiteering by deception and do not understand integrity (K. *shinuĩ*).

. . . Recently, the Envoy and the Vice-Envoy of the Shogun of Japan, the Envoy of Ōuchi, and the Envoy of Hatakeyama have come [to Chosŏn]. At each mission we have strongly doubted [the envoys' authenticity]. We believe that the envoys were Tsushima Japanese who secretly obtained tallies (K. *puhoñ*) and came [to Chosŏn]. They deceive our country and seek only profits.⁵⁷⁾

Several years later, in 1560, a member of the Hatakeyama tried yet again to free the family, and thus the sponsor of Hatakeyama identities, from the ivory tally system. In addition to the request for a new form of identification, Hatakeyama Yoshikata sought to add a second line of access and trade for the family.⁵⁸⁾ He asked the court to reward his “younger brother Haruhide” with a personal seal for having returned a Chosŏn government seal (K. *inshin*) stolen by pirates, an act which added to the merit Haruhide had earned a few years earlier when he warned of approaching pirates. And for himself, this time Yoshikata sought a seal to replace the ivory tally. He justified the request thusly: “Every time I send an envoy, I must receive an ivory tally from the shogun and then (the envoy may) come, and I am concerned that the tally could be lost (en route). I request to receive a copper seal (J. *doĩn*).”

Again, an imposter identity received as a Bakufu official was asking the Chosŏn court to release him from an identification system that had been established to prevent trade missions by imposter Bakufu official. The irony probably was not lost on Korean officials. As they had done in 1550 and 1552, Myoñgjong and his officials refused the petition for a separate means of access. But, the investment of imagination paid off as Myoñgjong bestowed a personal seal upon Haruhide.

This success rippled in several directions. First, Myoñgjong and his officials revived the practice of issuing personal seals. Second, Tsushima elites added one more ship to the number that could be sent each year. Third, as in the mid-fifteenth century, the Chosŏn court assigned that seal recipient to the lowest diplomatic status. Fourth, the court released a seal to a contact that was a relative several generations removed from Yoshinari of the imposter branch.⁵⁹⁾ And fifth, the court granted not a personal request but a request on behalf of someone of a lower diplomatic status.

Haruhide's success in gaining regular access through the return of Chosŏn government property provided a model for another imposter identity, Noritada, the Governor

of Iojima (E. Iwo Jima). In 1562 and 1565, Noritada returned Korean weapons and military manuals. He requested a personal seal in 1562 and both a seal and a nominal post in 1565. As the Board of Rites noted on the second occasion, Noritada sought trade privileges through meritorious deeds. Both attempts failed, however.⁶⁰ The warning of a Korean official in 1560 after learning that Haruhide would return a government seal thus rang true: if the court rewards a Japanese on this occasion, who can predict what they will try next?⁶¹

Yoshikata finally achieved his goal in 1563 when, through the good offices of an imposter shogun, the court released him from the ivory tally regulation.⁶² That year, Myoñjong bestowed personal seals upon ten Japanese contacts.⁶³ Whether Yoshikata received his personal seal separately or among these ten, though, is not clear. Regardless, the Haruhide issuance seems to have become a precedent. And as kings and court officials reached that decision to revive trade through personal seals, they probably entered the piracy of 200 years earlier and of the past 20 years into their calculations.

With the imposter shogun's success in gaining the release of the Yoshikata seal, a calculus of seal request and issuance can be confirmed in Chosŏn court policy of this time. A Japanese elite could gain the release of a personal seal for a contact of a lower diplomatic status, but not for himself (or, theoretically, for someone of his own diplomatic status). Such considerations might also have informed the refusals to the Governor of Iojima. Further, in freeing this Bakufu official from the ivory tally regulation the court constricted to the Shogun successful requests for revision of this policy. The "Shogun" continued to negotiate on behalf of Bakufu officials even after the Muro-machi Bakufu had its tent folded in 1573, as when the king bestowed a personal seal upon Kyoñgoku Haruhiro, another imposter identity, in 1581.⁶⁴ Leaders in Tsushima understood well how to improve their chances as the court made foreign policy decisions.

As they replenished trade opportunities the So family in Tsushima distributed personal seals such as those provided the Hatakeyama brothers and military post appointment notices to islander elites.⁶⁵ For example, the So allowed the Tateishi, a retainer family related by marriage, to use the Hatakeyama seals between at least 1573 and 1586. The Tateishi also traded through a third imposter Bakufu official identity.⁶⁶ The successes of the Shogun and Yoshikata were successes for the So.

In early 1573 Yoshikata negotiated again with the Chosŏn court. He raised issues that the So had broached earlier with the King of Chosŏn through the Hatakeyama and through an imposter Shogun in 1562–1563 and again in 1567.⁶⁷ In short, Yoshikata was continuing negotiations most likely initiated by the So.

The Bakufu official presented five requests. First, Yoshikata asked the court to allow Haruhide and nine other Japanese contacts to each send two trade ships each year, as per the regulations of one century earlier. Second, he sought diplomatic recognition for Norizane and seven other Japanese. These eight identities probably were the same eight to whom the court had refused to provide personal seals and trade

privileges in 1563 and in 1567, when the court chose not to recognize “the so-called Norizane” and seven others. Third, he forwarded another request for a military post appointment. Fourth was a request that a small temple affiliated with Kenninji trade for objects that would improve its facilities. (Kenninji was a Rinzaï Zen temple in Kyoto that had been close to the Ashikaga.) And fifth, Yoshikata did not forget his family. Planning ahead for future trade, he introduced at least the next generation by asking for a falcon for his son(s) and grandson(s) (*J. shison*; *K. chason*).⁶⁸⁾

This time, Yoshikata negotiated only for Japanese whom the court already had or hopefully would assign to the lowest diplomatic status. In other words, Yoshikata practiced the representational request that the court had accepted one decade earlier. The result of each request this time is not known with certainty. But Yoshikata, and the Sō, apparently failed to expand trade privileges for the nine personal seal recipients, to gain trade privileges for the eight that the court had refused a few years earlier, and to obtain another military post appointment.

Haruhide and Yoshikata continued trading into at least the mid-1580s, but little is known about these missions. Their activities came to a halt, though, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s armies invaded Chosŏn in 1592. When court officials introduced new diplomatic and trade regulations in 1609, they closed the door to imposter Bakufu officials and their offspring.⁶⁹⁾

Conclusion

The Hatakeyama who traded in Chosŏn were like many other Japanese, imposter and otherwise, who dispatched missions in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They held administrative posts in the provinces or positions in the Muromachi Bakufu. They contributed to the chaos of the Ōnin War. They supported Buddhist institutions, asked Korean kings for Buddhist sutras, and selected monks to be their envoys. And they traded across generations, even passing a character, *yoshi*, from father to son. But like other imposter identities, members of the imposter branch of the Hatakeyama did not exist outside of Japanese-Chosŏn court diplomacy and the interests of the Japanese elites involved in the creation and dispatch of their missions. Stated differently, the Hatakeyama could trade in Chosŏn but they could not trade in Japan.

The diplomatic matrix through which Bakufu officials traveled after 1547 enabled the Sō to channel their voice and their interests through an identity whose markings qualified him for a higher diplomatic status, a higher level of reception, and a broader range of interactions. Imposter shogunal missions performed a similar role. Seeking to satisfy various interests, the Hatakeyama and their envoys were not shy about telling falsehoods and half-truths or pressuring the court, especially where a sponsor could not make such statements or act in such a manner under his own name. To paraphrase Cornelius J. Kiley, disparity of diplomatic status permitted the exercise of complementary diplomatic functions.⁷⁰⁾

Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu and his immediate relatives stand out for their large number of missions compared to other imposter Bakufu officials and for not being detect-

ed by Korean elites. On the other hand, Yoshiaki and the Buddhist monks who spoke for him (and for the So, and possibly for others, as well) often achieved what Japanese elites in the western provinces could not during the second half of the sixteenth century. Following upon the trade restrictions imposed in 1547, his success in negotiating the issuance of a personal seal to a contact that would be assigned to the lowest diplomatic status prompted requests for more personal seals. The issuances in 1563 and 1567 significantly increased the number of identities through which Tsushima islanders could trade with the Chosŏn court, the number of trade opportunities available for islanders each year, and the volume of trade that has islanders could conduct in Chosŏn and in Japan. Hatakeyama Yoshikata, unknown though he must have been in much of Japan, has been overlooked in the histories of Japanese foreign relations and Japanese-Chosŏn court relations in the late sixteenth century.

Notes

- 1) Shin Sukchu, *Haedong chegukki*, (Keijo: Choŏsen soŏkufu, 1933), 127a–128b (Hereafter as *HC*); *Soŏngjong shillok* 34: 1a–b [1473/9/2].
- 2) *Soŏngjong shillok* 33: 17b–18a [1473/8/25]; *Soŏngjong shillok* 7: 12a [1470/8/21].
- 3) Ihara Kesao, “Chuŏsei Fukoŏji no ichi koŏsatsu: Nagano-ken shi shoŏn ikoŏchoŏsa hoŏkoku 5,” *Shinano*, vol. 40 no. 3 (1988: 3), 206–207; *Soŏngjong shillok* 6: 29a [1470/7/19]; *Soŏngjong shillok* 33: 17b–18a [1473/8/25]; *Soŏngjong shillok* 50: 12b–13a [1474/12/24]; *Soŏngjong shillok* 119: 3a–b [1480/7/5]. There may have been a fifth Hatakeyama trade mission in 1485. (*Myoŏngjong shillok* 7: 41b–43b [1548/3/18].)
- 4) Hashimoto Yu, “Chuŏsei Nitcho kankei ni okeru oŏjo daijinshi no gishi mondai,” *Shigaku zasshi*, vol. 106 no. 2 (1997: 2), 58–60.
- 5) Kenneth R. Robinson, “Policies of Practicality: The Chosŏn Court’s Regulation of Japanese and Jurchen Contact, 1392–1580s,” unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1997, 380–385.
- 6) See Imatani Akira, *Muromachi Bakufu kaitai katei no kenkyu*, (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1985), 75–87.
- 7) *Zenrin kokuhoki*, in *Zoku gunsho ruiju*, dai-30, jo, zatsu-bu, (Tokyo: Zoku gunsho ruiju kanseikai, 1925), 351; *Sejong shillok* 52: 23a–b [1431/5/20]. As Shogun Deputy, Shiba Yoshimasa sent a letter addressed to the Chosŏn court, and not to the King, in 1409. The Korean veritable records identify this mission as a shogunal mission. (*Zenrin kokuhoki*, in *Zoku gunsho ruiju*, dai-30, jo, zatsu-bu, 351; *T’aejong shillok* 18: 48b [1409/12/17]; *T’aejong shillok* 19: 4a [1410/1/19].
- 8) *HC* 111a, 114a.
- 9) See Ono Koji, “Honpoŏmomen kigyoŏseiritsu no katei (2): Chuŏsei seni kogyoŏshi no issetsu,” *Shigaku zasshi*, vol. 51 no. 9 (1940: 9), 229–265.
- 10) H. Paul Varley, *The Ōnin War: History of Its Origins and Background, with a Selective Translation of ‘The Chronicle of Ōnin,’* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 86–96; Higashiyotsuyanagi Fumiaki, “Noto Hatakeyama-uji,” in Ōyama Takeshi and Owada Tetsuo, eds., *Sengoku daimyo keifu jinmei jiten: Saigoku hen*, (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu oŏaisha, 1986), 58–59.
- 11) *Sejo shillok* 2: 49b [1455/12/9]; *HC* 40a; *Sejo shillok* 20: 24b–25a [1460/5/15].
- 12) *Sejo shillok* 2: 49b [1455/12/9]; *HC* 40a.
- 13) *HC* 40b.
- 14) *Sejo shillok* 9: 13a [1457/9/27]; *Sejo shillok* 11: 1a [1458/1/1]; *Sejo shillok* 12: 9a [1458/4/12].
- 15) *Hatakeyama keizu*, 389–390; *Ryo Hatakeyama keizu*, 395; Imatani Akira, “Hatakeyama-uji,” in Imatani Akira and Fujieda Fumitada, eds., *Muromachi Bakufu shugoshokka jiten, ge*, (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu oŏaisha, 1988), 270–271.

- 16) *Nanpo* kiden, in *Kaitei shiseki shu*an, dai-san satsu, (Tokyo: Kondo-shuppanbu, 1900), 57.
- 17) Hashimoto, “Chu
sei Nitchokankei ni okeru ojo daijinshi no gishi mondai,” 68.
- 18) “Seiwa Genji, Yoshie-ryu, Ashikaga shiryu, Hatakeyama,” in *Kansei cho*shu shokefu, (Tokyo: Eishinsha shuppanbu, 1922), 248.
- 19) Higashiyotsuyanagi, “Noto Hatakeyama-uji,” 63.
- 20) *HC* 40a.
- 21) *Sejo shillok* 20: 24b [1460/5/14]; *Sejo shillok* 20: 24b–25a [1460/5/15]. The Yoshinari letter began with a phrase that indicated the author’s knowledge of contemporary Choson: “Choson of the Flying Dragons,” or, in Korean, *yongbi samhan*. In the late 1440s, court officials completed the compilation of the *Yongbi och’on ka*, a collection of paeans to Yi So
nggye, the founder of the Choson government. For Yi Songgye and dragon symbolism, see Peter H. Lee, *Songs of Flying Dragons: A Critical Reading*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 109–115.
- 22) *Sejo shillok* 37: 31a [1465/12/15]; *Sejo shillok* 38: 10a [1466/1/26]; *Yejong shillok* 4: 27b [1469/3/6]; *HC* 39b–40b; *So*
ngjong shillok 45: 1a [1474/7/3].
- 23) *So*
ngjong shillok 45: 1a [1474/7/3]; *Songjong shillok* 46: 2b [1474/8/6].
- 24) Varley, *The Onin War*, 85–96. The quotation is from page 85.
- 25) *So*
ngjong shillok 6: 29a [1470/7/19].
- 26) *So*
ngjong shillok 7: 12a [1470/8/21].
- 27) Takayanagi Mitsutoshi and Takeuchi Rizo, eds., *Nihonshi jiten, dai-ni han*, (Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 1974), 1095.
- 28) *So*
ngjong shillok 33: 17b–18a [1473/8/25]; *Songjong shillok* 7: 12a [1470/8/21]; *Songjong shillok* 34: 1a–b [1473/9/2].
- 29) Ihara, “Chu
sei Fukoji no ichi kosatsu,” 206–207.
- 30) *So*
ngjong shillok 48: 18a–b [1474/10/27].
- 31) *Zenrin kokuhoki*, in *Kaitei shiseki shu*an, dai-21 satsu, (Tokyo: Kondo-shuppanbu, 1901), 59–61; *So*
ngjong shillok 50: 8b [1474/12/15].
- 32) *So*
ngjong shillok 140: 5a–b [1482/4/9]; *Songjong shillok* 141: 6a–b [1482/5/12].
- 33) In 1482 the “King” of “Ezogachishima,” a country said to be north of Japan, attempted to initiate diplomatic relations with the King of Choson. (See Kenneth R. Robinson, “The Jiubian and Ezogachishima Embassies to Choson, 1478–1482,” *Cho*senshi kenkyukai ronbunshu, no. 35 [1997], 69–74.) Could this reference to a country north of Japan also have been intended to prepare the court for this Ezogachishima mission?
- 34) *So*
ngjong shillok 119: 3a–b [1480/7/5].
- 35) *So*
ngjong shillok 119: 3a–b [1480/7/5].
- 36) Hashimoto Yu
 makes this point by noting the difference in the way this Yoshimi’s adult given name was printed in the *Songjong shillok* and the way that Ashikaga Yoshimi wrote his adult given name. (Hashimoto, “Chusei Nitchokankei ni okeru ojo daijinshi no gishi mondai,” 67.)
- 37) This was the term by which the Chinese and Choson courts referred to the emperor’s and the king’s diplomatic other in Japan. “King” (C. *wang*; K. *wang*: J. *o*) was the term inscribed in the seals bestowed upon King T’aejong and Ashikaga Yoshimitsu when they accepted tributary relationships with the Emperor of China.
- 38) *HC* 127a–128b.
- 39) Varley, *The Onin War*, 133.
- 40) *So*
ngjong shillok 120: 6a [1480/8/11]. The tribute mission departed Kyoto in 1476. (“Ken Chosenkoku sho,” in *Zenrin kokuhoki*, in *Zoku gunsho ruiju*, dai-30, jo, zatsu-bu, 366–368.) While returning to Japan, their ships indeed landed on Cheju island in mid-1478. And Choson officials reported the matter to the court. (*Songjong shillok* 94: 26b–27a [1478/7/26].) Eventually, the embassy continued on to Japan. The envoys arrived in Kyoto on 10/29 of that year and presented the emperor’s letter and return gifts on 11/2. (*Inryoken nichiroku*, in *Dai Nippon bukkyo* zensho, [Tokyo: Bussho kankokai, 1912], 854–855 [1486/5/29].)
- 41) Hashimoto, “Chu
sei Nitchokankei ni okeru ojo daijinshi no gishi mondai,” 69.
- 42) Hashimoto, “Chu
sei Nitchokankei ni okeru ojo daijinshi no gishi mondai,” 67.
- 43) *So*
ngjong shillok 75: 6a–7b [1477/1/8]; *Songjong shillok* 100: 8a–9a [1479/1/20].

- 44) Robinson, “Policies of Practicality: The Chosŏn Court’s Regulation of Japanese and Jurchen Contact, 1392–1580s,” 380–385.
- 45) *Myŏngjong shillok* 32: 28a [1566/2/18].
- 46) *Myŏngjong shillok* 5: 19b–20b [1547/2/13].
- 47) Nakamura Hidetaka, *Nissen kankeishi no kenkyū ge*, (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1969), 185. Hereafter as *NSKK*, 3:.
- 48) *Myŏngjong shillok* 7: 41b [1548/3/18]; *Myŏngjong shillok* 7: 41b–43b [1548/3/18]; *Koŕgenji ryaku engi*, 4a (Shiryōhensanjo collection, Tokyo University).
- 49) This paragraph and the next are from *Myŏngjong shillok* 10: 53b–54a [1550/7/6] and *Myŏngjong shillok* 10: 83a–b [1550/9/13].
- 50) Hashimoto Yu “Muromachi-sengoku-ki no shoŕgun kenryoku to gaikoŕken: Seiji katei to taigai kankei,” *Rekishigaku kenkyū no.* 708 (1998: 3), 5–6, 16 note 17; *Myŏngjong shillok* 10: 83a–b [1550/9/13].
- 51) *Myŏngjong shillok* 15: 58a–59a [1553/11/30].
- 52) *Myŏngjong shillok* 10: 83a–b [1550/9/13].
- 53) Kim Kuksoŕng, *Ujoŕng soŕsaeng munjip*, in *Hanguk yokdae munjip ch’ongso* 62: *Choŕng Munik kong munjip-Ujoŕng soŕsaeng munjip*, (Seoul: Kyoŕngin munhwasa, 1994), 423–424.
- 54) Hashimoto, “Muromachi-sengoku-ki no shoŕgun kenryoku to gaikoŕken,” 7.
- 55) *Myŏngjong shillok* 10: 94a [1550/12/9]; *Myŏngjong shillok* 10: 96b [1550/12/17].
- 56) *Myŏngjong shillok* 13: 34a [1552/5/4].
- 57) *Myŏngjong shillok* 13: 49a–b [1552/6/28].
- 58) This paragraph and the next are from *Myŏngjong shillok* 26: 9b–10a [1560/2/21]; *Myŏngjong shillok* 26: 28a–b [1560/5/12]; Yu Huich’un, *Miam ilgi ch’o*, (Keijo: Choŕsen sofokufu, 1938), 444–445 [1573/4/1]; and Tashiro Kazui and Yonetani Hitoshi, “So-ke kyuzo-toشو to mokuin,” *Choŕsen gakuho*, no. 156 (1995:7), 46–47. Yoshikata also asked that a military post be bestowed upon that nephew of the envoy who had died in Hansoŕng. The court did not grant this request.
- 59) *Sejo shillok* 38: 10a [1466/1/26]; *Soŕngjong shillok* 45: 1a [1474/7/3]; Kyuŕshu-shiryōkankokai, ed., *Choŕsen sosa kuninami no shokei oboe*, (Fukuoka: Kyuŕshu-shiryōkankokai, 1955), 16 (Hereafter as *CSKSO*). Yoshinari and Yoshikata bore the same court title: *Ukingo-no-kami*, of the junior fourth rank, lower. Hatakeyama Akitaka, of the main branch and a contemporary of Yoshikata, bore the court title *Saemon-no-kami*. (*Hatakeyama keizu*, 391.) *Kingo* was the Chinese name for the *Emon-fu*. Thus, the titles of Yoshiaki and Akitaka were from the same office, and were of the same rank.
- 60) *Myŏngjong shillok* 28: 43a–b [1562/11/29]; *Myŏngjong shillok* 31: 111b–112a [1565/12/27].
- 61) *Myŏngjong shillok* 26: 9b–10a [1560/2/21].
- 62) Tashiro and Yonetani, “So-ke kyuzo-toشو to mokuin,” 50–52; Murai Shoŕuke, *Chuŕsei Wajinden*, (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993), 157–158.
- 63) *Myŏngjong shillok* 29: 71b–72a [1563/9/28].
- 64) *CSKSO*, 45; “Chosŏn kukwang Yi So pongbu,” dated 1581/12/[no date], in *Zoku zenrin kokuhoŕki*, in *Kaitei shiseki shuŕan, dai-21 satsu*, (Tokyo: Kondo-shuppanbu, 1901), 29–30; Tanaka Takeo, ed., *Zenrin kokuhoŕki — Shintei zoku zenrin kokuhoŕki*, (Tokyo: Shuŕeisha, 1995), 351, 359.
- 65) Nakamura Hidetaka suggests that Tsushima elites came to monopolize Japanese trade in Chosŏn through this practice. (Nakamura Hidetaka, *Nihon to Choŕsen*, (Tokyo: Shibundo, 1966), 171–172.) However, a Tsushima monopoly would suggest that Hakata elites no longer could trade in Chosŏn or that they could trade in Chosŏn only through identities controlled by the So. Both scenarios are difficult to accept given the long participation of Hakata elites in the Chosŏn trade.
- 66) *CSKSO*, 16, 18, 23, 28, 44, 50, 85; Suzuki Tozo, ed., *So-shi kafu ryaku*, (Tokyo: Toŕkyodo-shuppan, 1973), 38, 41, 45; Tashiro and Yonetani, “So-ke kyuzo-toشو to mokuin,” 52.
- 67) *Myŏngjong shillok* 29: 71b–72a [1563/9/28]; *Myŏngjong shillok* 34: 34a–b [1567/5/17]; *Myŏngjong shillok* 34: 34b [1567/5/19]; Nakamura, *NSKK*, 3: 207–213; Murai, *Chuŕsei Wajinden*, 156–157.

- 68) Yu Huich'un, *Miam ilgi ch'o*, 444–445 [1573/4/1], 449 [1573/4/4]; *Soñjo shillok* 7: 18b [1573/4/4]; *Myoñjong shillok* 29: 71b–72a [1563/9/28]; *Myoñjong shillok* 34: 34a–b [1567/5/17]; *Myoñjong shillok* 34: 34b [1567/5/19].
- 69) *Chuñgjoñg kyorin ji*, (Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1974), 4: 1a–2a.
- 70) Cornelius J. Kiley, "Estate and Property in the Late Heian Period," in John W. Hall and Jeffrey P. Mass, eds., *Medieval Japan: Essays in Institutional History*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 110.

Appendix: Ryošhin's Letter to the Board of Rites

Inshi Ryošhin, the monk who represented Yoshikatsu as Vice-Envoy in 1473, also was a medical specialist and perhaps even a poet. Among other gifts which he presented to the Chosoñ court was a medical text, one which eventually found its way back to Japan. His experience in an earlier shogunal tribute mission to China may have contributed to his selection for service in the name of an imposter Bakufu official. Being from Noto province was another useful attribute when representing the Hatakeyama.¹⁾

Ryošhin presented his letter on the day of the Envoy's audience with the Board of Rites, probably 1473/9/1.²⁾ This meeting occurred about one week after the audience with Soñjong. In the letter, which was accepted probably by the Minister (K. *P'anso*?, senior second rank) of the Board of Rites, Ryošhin related Yoshikatsu's activities to date during the Ōnin War, genealogy, and bureaucratic service.³⁾ The Board of Rites then forwarded the communication to Soñjong.

This letter is available in at least two Korean sources, the *Haedong chegukki* and the *Soñjong shillok*, the veritable records for Soñjong's reign. The text in the *Soñjong shillok* is entered under the same date affixed to the text preserved in the *Haedong chegukki*, 1473/9/2.⁴⁾ Although these versions are not identical, the differences are not significant. Historians have linked the addition of Ryošhin's letter to the *Haedong chegukki* to the information presented therein. Nakamura Hidetaka attributed inclusion to the concise descriptions of Hatakeyama family matters and the fighting in Kyoto,⁵⁾ Tanaka Takeo to the description of the Ōnin War.⁶⁾

Ryošhin's letter also may be found in a Japanese compilation from the Tokugawa period, the *Zoku zenrin kokuho*. This compilation is a continuation of an earlier collection of letters that Japanese had sent to and received from foreign elites.⁷⁾ How the compilers came upon Ryošhin's letter is unclear, but the *Haedong chegukki*, which was widely available in the Tokugawa period, is a probable source. Yet, the text preserved in the *Zoku zenrin kokuho* also differs from the two versions in early Chosoñ-period sources. I translate below the version of the letter preserved in the *Haedong chegukki*. I have chosen this version because the letter's inclusion in this text probably predates inclusion in these two other sources.

"The Letter Presented by Ryošhin,
Vice-Envoy of Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu,
on the Day of the Audience with the Board of Rites"

On this occasion, I will relate the basic origins of the great war being fought in Japan. Hosokawa Ukyo-no-daibu Minamoto Katsumoto⁸⁾ and Yamana Saemon-no-kami Minamoto Mochitoyo⁹⁾ share the same clan name as the Shogun.¹⁰⁾ Bakufu officials for several generations, their families have been close to the shoguns and have held powerful positions. Like Lian Po and Lin Xiangru of Zhao, their dispute escalated into war because both families quarreled over power and were on bad terms for many years.¹¹⁾ The country was divided in half, and the number of troops concentrated in the capital was beyond count. The Shogun frequently issued edicts for peace, but both leaders felt that the army with the most troops would win Japan. As the power of the armies gradually increased the country grew more difficult to govern, and finally the entire country fell into a great war.

Katsumoto's army is called the Eastern army, Mochitoyo's the Western army. The names for these armies are based on their respective bases in the eastern and western sections of the capital. The camps of

the two armies are extremely close to each other. They were about to launch the first assaults so to decide the winners and the losers. Suddenly, Katsumoto devised a strange strategy for his army and abruptly surrounded the shogunal palace.¹²⁾ In this way, he entered our military camp from the rear. He immediately deepened ditches and raised ramparts, and would not allow the Shogun's palanquin or the Shogun to leave. It was as if Mochitoyo had lost his ships in the middle of the river.

Although men who had sided with Mochitoyo threw away their armor and loosened their bowstrings because of this and sought to surrender to the Shogun's army, Katsumoto considered them a fifth column and would not accept their surrender. People in the Western army who became incensed and counted Katsumoto among their enemies increased by twice ten thousand over past times. Although this might seem like disloyalty to their lord, they could not live without fighting. If men in the Western army were truly prepared in their hearts to turn against their lord, even if there were one million soldiers among them, they could not escape Heaven's punishment. They will wait years and face their ruin.

Is the Western army not guilty of this? It is said that Zhao Dun was guilty of killing his lord although he did not cross Jin's border.¹³⁾ In this situation, now, those armies still have not left Kyoto and are fighting day and night. The streams of blood cause wooden pestles to float. The sounds of war drums have called the country to battle for seven years already. Everyone, from the shoguns and lords to the commoners, has experienced one hundred difficulties and one thousand hardships, and the country day after day is exhausted. Why should words be sufficient to describe this? Even if the morning sun does not disappear, naturally, the glow from the Western Army's campfires halts the brightness.

Men who at the beginning of the war belonged to the Western army and now have surrendered to the Eastern army are six or seven out of ten. But I have yet to hear of men who began in the Eastern army and then joined the Western army's gang. That is, this is the principle by which Heaven makes victorious the people chosen to be so. If matters continue as they are now, the Western army will be crushed within no more than one or two years.

At first, Hatakeyama Sakyo-no-daibu Yoshikatsu¹⁴⁾ followed his younger cousin Hatakeyama Uemon-no-kami Yoshinari¹⁵⁾ and joined the Western army. Last spring, the Shogun secretly sent him a letter. Without waiting a moment, Yoshikatsu accepted the invitation (to join the Eastern army). As a result of this (switch to the Shogun's army), the toll barriers in the four provinces of Echizen, Etchu, Noto, and Kaga have already been opened, and travel has become calm naturally. In Kyoto, the delivery of food is no different from peaceful times. People have said that because the merit for bringing tranquility to these northern provinces lies in the actions of Yoshikatsu alone, he was appointed Shogun Deputy.

The draft above is in base and unpolished language and the writing is difficult to understand. Ashamed, my back is wet with perspiration. Although this letter is not appropriate for your perusal, the interpreter is only able to communicate through daily conversation. Perhaps such important matters as this are difficult to express in spoken language. For this reason, I have written this broad outline and humbly present it to you.¹⁶⁾

Respectfully submitted [to the King by the Board of Rites] on the second day of the ninth month of the year Soŋghwa 9.¹⁷⁾

- 1) *Soŋjong shillok* 33: 17b–18a [1473/8/25]; *Boshi nyūmin ki*, in *Zoku shiseki shuān, dai-1 satsu*, (Kyoto: Rinsen shoten, 1984 reprint), 18; *Kōkoku meiden zenpen*, in *Asada Sohaku, dai 99*, (Tokyo: Meicho shuppan, 1983), Ge: 6a (205); Matsushita Kenrin, *Isho Nihon den*, in *Shinano shiryō, dai-9 kan*, (Shinano: Shinano shiryō kankōkai, 1970), 102–104; Wang Tiece, “The Reception of Ming Medical Texts in Japan,” paper presented at the conference “Tools of Culture: Japan's Technological, Medical and Intellectual Contacts in East Asia, 1100–1600,” University of Oregon, September 10–14, 1997, 7.
- 2) Nakamura Hidetaka, *Nissen kankeishi no kenkyū, jo*, (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1965), 345. (Hereafter as Nakamura, *NSKK*, 1.)
- 3) See Takahashi Kimiaki, “Gaiko-girei yori mita Muromachi jidai no Nitcho-kankei,” *Shigaku zasshi*, vol. 91 no. 8 (1982: 8), 75–79.

- 4) *HC* 127a–128b; *Soŋgjong shillok* 34: 1a–b [1473/9/2].
- 5) Nakamura, *NSKK*, 1: 346.
- 6) Tanaka Takeo, tr., *Kaito shokokuki: Choŋenjin no mita chuŋsei Nihon to Ryuŋkyu*, (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1991), 418.
- 7) *Zoku zenrin kokuhoki*, in *Kaitei shiseki shuŋan, dai-21 satsu*, 1–2; *Zoku zenrin kokuhoki*, in *Zoku gunsho ruiju, dai-30, jo, zatsu-bu*, (Tokyo: Gunsho ruiju kansaikai, 1925), 380–381.
- 8) Hosokawa Katsumoto, 1430–1473/5/11. His court title was of the junior fourth rank, lower.
- 9) Yamana Mochitoyo, 1404–1473/3/19. He is more commonly known to historians by his religious name, Soŋen. The *Haedong chegukki* and *Soŋgjong shillok* texts cite this court title as *Sae-no-kami*, both editions of the *Zoku zenrin kokuhoki* as *Uheie-no-kami*. *Sae-no-kami* probably was a mistake for *Saemon-no-kami*. Both *Saemon-no-kami* and *Uheie-no-kami* were posts of the junior fourth, lower rank in the Emon-fu, or Gate Guard, which was established in the Taiho Code of 702. Soŋen held two court titles during his career, *Saemon-no-suke* and *Uemon-no-kami*. His father Tokihiro and four later family heads also held the latter court title. The former court title was of the junior fifth rank, upper, the latter of higher rank, at junior fourth rank, lower. (*Yamana keizu*, in *Gunsho keizu-bu shu, dai-2*, [Tokyo: Zoku gunsho ruiju kansaikai, 1985], 404; *Yamana kafu*, in *Gunsho keizu-bu shu, dai-2*, [Tokyo: Zoku gunsho ruiju kansaikai, 1985], 409.) The Emon-fu was the only of the five capital guards to “retain its military function after 1050.” (William Wayne Farris, *Heavenly Warriors: The Evolution of Japan’s Military, 500–1300*, [Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1995], 260; Sasayama Haruo, “Heian zenki no sa u konoefu ni kansuru koŋatsu,” in Sakamoto Taro Hakase kanreki kinenkai, ed., *Nihon kodaishi ronshu, ge*, [Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1962], 608–610.) Whether the Emon-fu’s history made court titles from this office more prestigious in the Muromachi period is a question that requires further research.
- 10) The clan name was Minamoto, the shogun Ashikaga Yoshimasa. Here, Ryoŋshin displayed an awareness of the Chosŋn court’s diplomatic protocol as he referred to Yoshimasa as *kokuo* (K. *kukwang*), or King.
- 11) *Shi ji* 81: 1a–6a.
- 12) The text reads *kuŋnai*. In the *Ōnin ki* it is written that Katsumoto surrounded the *Gosho*. (*Ōnin ki*, in *Gunsho ruiju, dai-20 shu, gassen-bu*, [Tokyo: Zoku gunsho ruiju kansaikai, 1929], 386.) H. Paul Varley translates the latter wording as “the shogunal palace.” (Varley, *The Ōnin War*, 173.)
- 13) *Shi ji* 39: 28b–29a.
- 14) Yoshikatsu’s court title, Minister of the Left Sector of the Capital, was of the junior fourth rank, lower. Ōuchi Norihiro held this title until his death in 1465. The shogun then bestowed the title upon Ōuchi Morihiko, Norihiro’s son and successor, by 1469/7/9. Morihiko died in 1494. (*Daijoŋn jisha zoŋiki*, in *Yamaguchi-ken shi, chuŋsei-hen, 1*, [Yamaguchi: Yamaguchi-ken, 1996], 202 [1469/7/9]); *Ōuchi keizu*, in *Gunsho keizu-bu shu, dai-7*, [Tokyo: Zoku gunsho ruiju kansaikai, 1985], 426.) The Hosokawa held the Minister of the Right Sector of the Capital title, a title which indicated “primary jurisdiction over Kyoto.” (Mary Elizabeth Berry, *The Culture of Civil War in Kyoto*, [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994], 45.) In Chinese and Korean court structures, left appointments were superior to right appointments. In this sense, then, Yoshikatsu showed Korean officials a title of greater prestige.
- 15) The court title of the imposter branch Yoshinari was of the junior fourth rank, lower. The real Yoshinari bore the court title of *Uemon-no-suke*, which was of the junior fifth rank, upper. (*Hatakeyama keizu*, in *Gunsho keizu-bu shu, dai-2*, [Tokyo: Zoku gunsho ruiju kansaikai, 1985], 390.)
- 16) The *Soŋgjong shillok* text does not include this “paragraph” or the note that follows. Both versions of the *Zoku zenrin kokuhoki* include this “paragraph” and the Korean dating that follows.
- 17) Soŋghwa 9 correlates to 1473.

Table 1 Imposter Shogun Deputies and Sitting Shogun Deputies

Imposter Shogun Deputies	Date	Sitting Shogun Deputies	
		Sitting Shogun Deputy	Period of Service
Hatakeyama Yoshitada	1455	Hosokawa Katsumoto	1452/11/16–1464/9/21
Hatakeyama Yoshinari	1465/12	Hatakeyama Masanaga	1464/9/23–1467/1/8
Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu	1470/7	Hosokawa Katsumoto	1468/7/10–1473/5/11
Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu	1473/8	vacant	(Katsumoto resigned on 1473/5/11)
Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu	1474/12	vacant	
Hatakeyama Yoshikatsu	1480/7	Hatakeyama Masanaga	1477/12/25–1486/7/19

Note: The dates for periods of service are from Takayanagi Mitsutoshi and Takeuchi Rizo, eds., *Nihonshi jiten, dai-2 han*, (Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 1474), 1095.

Table 2 Profiles of Members of the Main Branch of the Hatakeyama

Name	Dates	Posts	As Shogun Deputy	Court Title and Rank
Motokuni	1357–1406	Shogun Deputy Governor of Echizen, Etchu, Kawachi, Kii, Owari, Yamashiro, and Noto provinces	1398/6/20–1405/7/20	<i>Uemon-no-suke</i> , Junior fifth rank, upper
Mitsuie	1372–1433	Shogun Deputy Governor of Kawachi, Kii, Etchu, Ise, section of Yamato, and Yamashiro provinces	1410/6/9–1412/3/16 1421/8/18–1429/8/24	<i>Saemon-no-kami</i> , Junior fourth rank, lower
Mochikuni	1398–1455	Shogun Deputy Governor of Kawachi, Kii, Etchu, section of Yamato, and Yamashiro provinces	1442/6/29–1445/3/24 1449/10/5–1452/11/16	<i>Saemon-no-kami</i> , Junior fourth rank, lower
Yoshinari	1437 (?)–1490	Governor of Kawachi, Kii, Etchu, section of Yamato, and Yamashiro provinces		<i>Uemon-no-suke</i> , Junior fifth rank, upper
Motoie	?–1499	Governor of Kawachi, Kii, and Etchu provinces		<i>Danjo-no-shohitsu</i> , Senior fifth rank, lower

Table 3 Profiles of Members of the Noto Branch of the Hatakeyama

Name	Dates	Post	Period of Appointment	Court Title and Rank
Mitsunori	1372–1432/6/27	Governor of Noto province	1406–1432	<i>Shuūri-no-daibu</i> , Junior fourth rank, lower
Yoshitada	?–1463/8/21	Governor of Noto province	1432–1455	<i>Shuūri-no-daibu</i> , Junior fourth rank, lower
Yoshiari	?–1440 (?)			<i>Jibu-no-shou</i> , Junior fifth rank, lower
Yoshimune	?–1497/8/20	Governor of Noto province	1455 (1478?)–1497	<i>Saemon-no-suke</i> , Junior fifth rank, upper

Table 4 Profiles of Members of the Imposter Branch of the Hatakeyama

Name	Dates	Post(s)	Shogun Deputy as of	Court Title and Rank
Yoshitada	?	Shogun Deputy	1455	<i>Shuūri-no-daibu</i> , Junior fourth rank, lower; <i>Uemon-no-suke</i> , Junior fifth rank, upper
Motokuni	?	?	?	?
Yoshinari	?	Shogun Deputy Governor of Yamashiro, Kawachi, Kii, Etchu, and Noto provinces	1465, 1466, 1474	<i>Ukingo-no-kami</i> , Junior fourth rank, lower
Yoshikatsu	?	Shogun Deputy	1470, 1473, 1474, 1480	<i>Sakyo-no-daibu</i> , Junior fourth rank, lower
Yoshikata	?	?	?	<i>Ukingo-no-kami</i> , Junior fourth rank, lower
Haruhide	?	?	?	<i>Hyoē-no-kami</i> , Junior fourth rank, lower