

Local Collaboration and Urban Transport Policymaking in Thailand

タイにおける地域協働と都市公共交通政策の策定

A Dissertation Presented to
the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences,
International Christian University,
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

国際基督教大学 大学院
アーツ・サイエンス研究科提出博士論文

December 4, 2023

PHOLSIM, Suriyanon
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ABSTRACT

This study examines factors affecting the functionality of local collaborative actions to advocate for transport policy in Thailand and analyzes how different collaborative approaches impact transport policymaking. This study identified two different types of coalition—vertical and horizontal coalitions and drew a framework of policy brokers analysis, which applied advocacy coalition framework to investigate those local coalitions advocating for transport policy in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, Phuket, and Bueng Kan. This research applied qualitative case study as the key methodology to address two main research problems: (1) *why is some local collaborative action more functional than others to advocate for transport policymaking?* and (2) *how does the variety and role of relevant policy actors in vertical and horizontal collaborations impact the capacities of those coalitions to advocate for transport policymaking?* This study deployed the CAQDAS Technique, which ATLAS.ti was applied to analyze qualitative data collected from documentary research and interviews with 39 informants who are critical actors in the collaborative systems of those selected cities.

The results revealed that the functionality of horizontal coalitions to achieve transport policymaking relies on seven factors: coalition policy brokers, political factors, financial factors, collaboration from multiple local alliances, local government roles, coalition unity, and abilities to integrate relevant external events. Further, this study also offers three theories for ACF and policymaking literature, including (1) the roles and resources of policy brokers are key to the success of vertical and horizontal collaborative policymaking to advocate for transport policies, (2) the multiplicity of local partners is more necessary to horizontal than vertical coalition, and (3) different degrees of financial autonomy, political strategies, and unity of coalition lead to different levels of functionality for horizontal coalition to run for transport policymaking. This study encourages scholars to further falsify and verify these three theories by employing this study's designated policy broker analysis framework in other policy areas.

Keywords: Collaborative Policymaking, Transport Policymaking, Policy Brokers, Advocacy Coalition Framework, Thailand

DEDICATION

**I DEDICATE THIS DOCTOR THESIS TO MY BELOVED FAMILY AND
IMPORTANT PEOPLE IN MY LIFE**

MY FATHER, SOMBAT PHOLSIM,

WHO IS NOW RESTING IN HEAVEN AND THE MOST IMPORTANT
PERSON WHO INSPIRED ME OF BEING A GOOD CHILD AND
FAMILY MAN

MY MOTHER, WASSANA AEUNGNANTHASIRIKUL,

WHO ALWAYS SUPPORT ME WITH HER PURE LOVE

MY GRANDFATHER, SOMSAK MEEHAR, AND

GRANDMATHER, PRANEE MEEHAR,

THE HEART OF OUR FAMILY

MY LOVELY YOUNGER SISTER, WILAIWAN JANTHAWONG

WHO I TRULY LOVE WITH HOPE FOR HER GOOD FUTURE

MY BELOVED PARTNER AND HER FAMILY, THUNYATHORN AREEAUE

WHO SPARKLES THE LIGHT WHEN I FACE THE DARKNESS,
HER ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT DURING STUDY
IS VITAL FOR THE SUCCESS OF THIS THESIS

AND

MY ROLE MODEL ADVISOR, YUSHI INABA SENSEI,

WHO IS VERY KIND, SMART, AND OPEN-MINDED
HIS COMMITMENT, KINDNESS, AND INVALUABLE SUPPORT HELPED
ME TO OVERCOME ALL THE OBSTACLES OF MY DOCTOR THESIS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDC	Andaman City Development Corporation
ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework
AEEI	Association of Eight Economic Institutions
ATFCO	The Alliance of Twenty-Four Chinese Organizations
ART	Autonomous Rapid Transit
ARFA	Area-based Research Funding Agency
CDC	City Development Corporation
CMCB	Chaing Mai City Bus
CMCD	Chiang Mai City Development Corporation
CSE	Chiang Mai Social Enterprise
EAT	the Expressway Authority of Thailand
FTLFB	the Fifth Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge
GMS	the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation
KKFD	Khon Kaen Future Decades Foundation
KKCC	Khon Kaen Citizen Council
KKTT	Khon Kaen Think Tank
KKTS	Khon Kaen Transit System
LRT	Light Rail Transit System
MOAC	Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
MOF	Ministry of Finance

MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOT	Ministry of Transportation
MRTA	Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand
NCPO	National Council for Peace and Order
OTP	Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning
PAO	Provincial Administrative Organization
PSB	Phuket Smart Bus
PKCD	Phuket City Development Corporation
SAO	Subdistrict Administrative Organization
SRT	State Railway of Thailand
RTC	Regional Transit Corporation

KEY OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Collaborative Action refers to a set of individuals, groups, or organizations from multiple sectors working collaboratively to achieve their collective goals.

Collaborative Policymaking is a policymaking process where individuals, groups, or organizations from multiple sectors have mutually organized joint efforts and resources to advocate for a particular policy problem and/or to reach their common policy goal. Collaborative policymaking in this study focuses on transport policy advocated by local joint efforts in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, Phuket, and Bueng Kan, Thailand.

Horizontal Collaboration refers to a collaborative system where resources are locally mobilized and collective goals are driven by cross-sectoral efforts among multiple local partners such as municipalities, local firms, academics, civil society, and community organizations. Horizontal collaboration identified in this study includes the cases of Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities.

Vertical Collaboration refers to a collaborative system where resources are hierarchically mobilized, and collective goals are driven by cross-sectoral efforts, mainly among political, bureaucratic, and civic sectors. Vertical collaboration identified in this study is the case of Bueng Kan City.

Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a framework to clarify how policy is changed and learned by advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem. ACF assumes that policy change is influenced by the coalition's learning process or their belief modification and relevant events which are external to a policy subsystem. Therefore, policy subsystems, policy advocacy coalitions, belief systems, and external events are fundamental to the ACF.

Policy Subsystem refers to a set of actors who are involved in dealing with a policy problem and seek to influence policy. Therefore, a policy subsystem deals with a particular policy issue, and it usually includes one or more policy advocacy coalitions that seek to influence a particular policy problem. The policy subsystem operationalized in this study is the transport policy subsystem.

Policy Advocacy Coalition refers to a group of actors who share common beliefs and act in coordinated ways to advocate for their desired policy within a policy subsystem.

Beliefs refer to the ACF three-tier beliefs structure, including (1) *deep core beliefs* are the broadest level, which reflects general normative, individual philosophy, human nature, or social value; the deep core beliefs are difficult to change; (2) *policy core beliefs* are application of coalition's deep core beliefs to develop policy solutions, as such policy core beliefs reflect the policy position that coalition aims to address; policy core beliefs are more susceptible to change but take over a decade; (3) *secondary beliefs* reflect instrumental or strategies that coalitions applied to advocate for their policy proposal such as financial, public opinion, or regulations; the secondary beliefs are most susceptible to change.

External Events refer to the activities or events which are external and influential to a policy subsystem. The external events could be advantageous or disadvantageous to advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem, depending on the abilities of those advocacy coalitions to integrate relevant external events.

Successful Coalition refers to a coalition whose policy proposals eventually get approval from the government after years of advocating for those policy proposals. Although those policy proposals might not yet be implemented but, approval from the government that authorized those proposals is the key indicator to the success of policymaking advocated by a coalition.

Unsuccessful Coalition refers to a coalition whose policy proposals do not get approval from the government. Although they have advocated for years and tried to influence decision-makers, but they are still unable to set their policy proposal on the agenda.

Dominant Coalition refers to a powerful coalition whose roles, duties, and power have long dominated the policy subsystem. Further, the dominant coalition also locates in a stable position within a policy subsystem to stabilize their policy position. The dominant coalition in the transport policy subsystem operationalized in this study includes the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Interior.

Novel Coalition refers to a new or rival coalition that seeks to influence the policy and compete with the dominant or other opposing coalitions in a particular policy subsystem to set their desired policy on the agenda.

Policy Brokers refer to an individual, group, or organization who involves and represents the coalition's policymaking and acts as a strategic actor who manages coalition strategies that bring the coalition's desired policy to be captured by the policymakers, with the hope for a future return.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Study Background

There is no light rail transit (LRT) in other parts of Thailand, except in Bangkok Metropolis. Public transportation and traffic are also critical problems in Thailand that have long remained unresolved. Particularly disparities in the quality and inclusion of transport services. However, the current movement of local coalitions across Thailand has run their joint effort to advocate for the improvement of urban transportation services; those efforts were triggered by a local private coalition in Khon Kaen City that mobilized resources and local networks to advocate for LRT policymaking by the development of Thailand's first municipal corporation and city development corporation located in Khon Kaen City. The establishment of these new local entities has inspired local private sectors throughout Thailand to mobilize their joint efforts and mutually fund the operations of policy advocacy for LRT initiatives in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities.

Khon Kaen is the first city in Thailand where a municipal corporation and local think tank were established. The city development corporation was first developed in 2015 called "*Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKTT)*," later in 2017, Thailand's first municipal corporation called *the Khon Kaen Transit System (KKTS)*, was also established after the Municipal Law was enacted over 69 years ago. The KKTT and KKTS are formed by local joint efforts among public, private, and civic societies to run campaigns for the LRT development in Khon Kaen City. It is also the first regional city in Thailand that seriously demanded for the development of the LRT system to be located in a regional city outside Bangkok Metropolitan. Experiences of local collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen have also been replicated in other parts of Thailand, especially the roles of city development corporations. As a result, city development corporations have been established in 18 cities—including Chiang Mai and Phuket, to advance transport infrastructures and public services in their cities.

This study focuses on how those emerging collaborative system run their joint efforts to achieve their collective goals. The main interest of this research is specifically located on how those coalitions advocate for transport policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities. However, these cities are structured with similar collaborative systems where city development corporations run by local private alliances is critical influence on policymaking. But, the achievement of transport policymaking in those cities is varied.

One part is because the public transport affairs, especially mega transport infrastructures, are highly centralized to the state. Therefore, enormous interests associated with the development of transport infrastructures are hardly rendered from the state to regional cities. Therefore, for a local coalition to achieve transport policymaking, the resources of policy actors and strategies of local coalitions are critical factors in handling with challenges from the centralized state. Strategies of the local advocacy coalition in Khon Kaen City is well-known as a successful case in the policymaking of the LRT. Although there have been local joints efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai and Phuket, but those coalitions are unfunctional and unable to influence LRT policymaking. This leads to an interest of this study, which aims to investigate *why some local coalitions—although under the same set of institutional arrangements, have yielded a different result in the policymaking of LRT.*

Local joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities represent horizontal collaborative actions where actors and resources are locally mobilized. Further observation related to different forms of collaborative actions was also found in the case of Bueng Kan City where their joint efforts represented as vertical collaborative actions to advocate for mega transport policymaking. Bueng Kan, as a newest and small city in Thailand, reveals its rapid growth of mega transport infrastructures—international bridge, expressways, and airport initiatives, facilitated by political network associated with local coalition. Although local joint efforts in Bueng Kan are structured with different scales of partners and institutions, their coalition is lively functional to set transport policies due to their ability to reach the policymaking center. Therefore, to advance the knowledge boundaries of collaborative policymaking, this study also aims to investigate what factors or conditions that strengthen the capacities of vertical and horizontal coalitions to achieve transport policymaking. The author hopes that the findings from this research will offer new theories to advance the knowledge boundary of recent policymaking literatures

and provide practical solutions to advance local joint efforts among multiple sectors in regional cities across Thailand.

1.2. Study Objective

1. To examine factors affecting the functionality of local collaborative actions to advocate for transport policymaking in Thailand.
2. To analyze different collaborative approaches and their influences on urban transport policymaking in Thailand.
3. To provide recommendations to improve local collaborative governance in Thailand.

1.3. Research Significance

1.3.1. Theoretical Contributions

- This study offers a new theoretical framework of policy broker's analysis to examine how the roles of policy brokers are relevant to the success of policy advocacy coalitions under different collaborative policymaking models. This framework would broaden the recent theory of policy change argued in the ACF, especially the argument related to how policy changes are also exercised by the roles and resources of policy brokers.
- This study also theorizes the relationship between the relevance of partner multiplicity and its influences in different collaborative policymaking models of vertical and horizontal coalitions. This theorization would offer more precise causal relationships or conditions related to how and why some advocacy coalition is more functional than others in advocating for a particular policy issue.
- This study also offers a new methodological analysis for the application of ACF research to investigate different collaborative policymaking systems of vertical and horizontal collaborations.

1.3.2. Practical Contributions

- This study provides practical solutions for local governments and local firms to work together to advance their public infrastructure initiatives throughout Thailand.
- The author has been working with local staff in Khon Kaen and Bueng Kan Cities for years. Therefore, the results from this research would reveal practical and helpful recommendations to advance their joint operations in other policy fields.

- Thailand has little experience and knowledge of municipal corporations. Findings of joint efforts among municipal and city development corporations from this study would offer practical lessons for municipalities in Thailand to find how to strengthen cross-sectoral and inter-municipal collaboration in their cities.

CHAPTER 2

COLLABORATIVE ACTIONS AND POLICYMAKING

This chapter clarifies theories of collaborative governance and Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which are fundamental theories applied to investigate collaborative policymaking in this research. Moreover, the final part of this chapter also identifies existing gaps in recent policymaking literature and the discussion on how this dissertation would address those gaps and broaden the boundaries of ACF and collaborative policymaking studies.

2.1. Collaborative Governance Theory

2.1.1. *From Government to Governance*

The state has long dominated decisions related to public services and policymaking. At its earliest shape, policymaking and service delivery are centered to the government sector, where bureaucracy is the key mechanism to deliver public services and decide how policies should be managed. As such, the earliest form of public administration is labeled as “*rigid administration*,” where the values of the public sector are scientific—strict tools and fixed rules of management based on state laws. Therefore, the *only government* is legitimate and privileged to manage public services based on its hierarchy and authorities entitled by state laws (White, 1900; Storing, 1965: 43-45; Morgan & Shinn, 2014: 3-12; Sorrentino & Sicilia & Howlett, 2018: 277-293).

The second governance shape evolved in the 1970s when society and the economy were more complex and capitalized. As such, the New Public Management (NPM) is introduced into the government to handle challenges and difficulties influenced by capitalized markets (Hood, 1991 & 1995). The NPM has signified the pragmatic and paradigmatic breaks from the traditional rigid administration and government monopoly in public services to the marketized approach of public services, which public duties are open

to the private sector through market approaches such as contracting and bidding (Stoker, 2006: 4-5; Laegreid, 2015: 542-543; O'Flynn, 2007: 353-366; Bryson, Crosby & Bloomberg, 2014: 446-447). Although the NPM aims to maximize the efficiency and performance of public management by introducing a market approach into the public sector (Hood, 1991:4-5 & 1995: 93-110; Funck & Karlsson, 2020: 347-375; Pollitt, 1995:133-154), but the NPM is still *unable* to cope with wicked problems in the bureaucratic state due to the closed-system dealing beneath the public-and-private partnership (Ansell & Gash, 2008: 543-375; Ansell, Sorensen, & Torfing, 2020: 950). Additionally, the NPM reflects its flaws in public sector reforms due to its inability to cope with transparency, legitimacy, and efficiency issues in public service management. Therefore, the NPM has been condemned for the devaluation of public accountability, interest-centric particularity, pork-barreling, citizenship, and non-transparency (Dan & Pollitt, 2014: 1305-1332; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015: 664-672), loose and multi-faceted concept (Laegreid, 2015; Christensen, Laegreid, Roness, & Rovik, 2007), and Emperor's New Clothes—*changing only the language but underneath, the old problems remain* (Hood, 1995).

As a result, the transformative shape of new public governance has emerged since the beginning of late 1990 called “*collaborative governance*,” where public policymaking and services are inclusive and open to multiple actors—not only the private or market sector, to participate in public affairs and exercise their power through *collaborative efforts*—an expanding range of other NPM's public-private partnership¹ (Morgan & Shinn, 2014: 3-12; Osborne, 2018: 225-231 & 2010; Hood, 1991; Pierre, 2005: 446-462; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Greenwood, Singer, & Willis, 2021). Collaborative governance indicates the *connection* between government and society (Kettl, 2005), where all existing sectors—public, private, civil, academic, nongovernmental, nonprofit, or voluntary sectors, are jointly engaged in policymaking and governing public affairs. Therefore, collaborative governance promotes *values co-creation* that all existing institutions could be a *co-producer* of public services through collective action, sharing resources, and interdependence (Sorrentino & Sicilia & Howlett, 2018: 277-293; Howlett & Kekez & Poocharoen, 2017:487-501; Morgan, Larsen, Bao, & Wang, 2014: 40-54; Pestoff, 2019; O'Leary, 2015: 87-100).

¹ A clear clarification regard to Agranoff and McGuire (2003: 34) noted that “*public*” means hierarchy and bureaucracy and “*private*” means the markets. Public-private partnership is based on central authority and a single strict goal of the public sector while collaborative actions could not be guided by a single organizational goal (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003: 34-38).

Frederickson (2016: 236) further clarifies that collaborative governance reflects "*the lateral and inter-institutional relations in administration in the context of the decline of sovereignty, the decreasing importance of jurisdictional borders, and a general institutional fragmentation,*" or what Frederickson called the *end of geography*, whereby roles of bureaucratic agencies in services provision and policymaking are less clearly defined in all types of political jurisdictions—cities, provinces, states, and nation-states. Therefore, economic, social activities, and public services and policymaking, are increasingly multijurisdictional and cross-sectoral (Frederickson, 2007 & 2016: 236). As such, collaborative governance could generally refer to a group of institutions or actors that may come from and beyond the government who share responsibilities, common ground or similar beliefs, and common goals to address public issues. Collaborative governance also reveals changing roles of the government in steering new approaches to policymaking and public affairs management by getting things done through other means rather than the government's authority (Stoker, 1998: 17-28). Therefore, collaboration has become a critical part of recent public service worldwide and understanding collaborative action requires multi-dimensional viewpoints to explore events and interrelations between involving actors in certain collaborative systems.

2.1.2. Collaborative Governance

Recently, studies revealed multiple approaches to investigate collaborative governance. Some scholars deployed the *actor-centric approach* and came up with two different modes of governance—the state-centric model (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Dryzek & Dunleavy, 2009) and network governance (Torfing and Sørensen, 2007), in which the strengths and weaknesses of the state are in their primary analysis. Other scholars examined modes of governance based on the *process-oriented approach* and argued that there are two basic shifts in the states' governing roles (Peters & Pierre, 2014: 29-30); first, the shrinking roles of the state as an actual service provider and second, the changing roles from command and control of the regulatory state to the enabling state which relies on voluntary and cooperative actions rather than coercions.

Although the roles of the state in policymaking and service provision are changing and becoming more flattened, but scholars have asserted that *hierarchy is still very much alive* (Kooiman, 2003; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2013; Frederickson, 2016; Laegreid, 2015). Kooiman (2003) identified roles of hierarchy in collaborative governance as "*hierarchical*

governance,” which involves structural procedures of hierarchical steering and controlling, particularly the top-down nature. Hierarchical governance is a broader concept of societal interactions—which is the intervention, as Kooiman noted that “*these interventions are the most vertical and formalized ones. Governing entities influence the behavior of the other actors participating in these interactions, even involuntarily and often with sanctions attached. These interventions are common to all spheres of societal life, as well as to the hierarchical way of governing interactions.*” Kooiman clarifies that bureaucracy is viewed as a structure that contains governing actions and hierarchy is a form of governing interactions of top-down nature. As such, hierarchical governance is common in all domains of individual and societal life, not only in bureaucracy but also in organizations of churches, temples, or the market sector. Therefore, hierarchical governance is generally reflected through interventions from its structural procedure.

Therefore, *cross-boundary, interdependency, mutuality, and public interest* which are regarded as theoretical foundations of collaborative governance (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Greenwood & Singer & Willis, 2021: 15; Emerson & Nabatchi & Balogh, 2012: 3; Wanna, 2008: 3-8), could be horizontally and hierarchically organized (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003 & 2002; Agranoff, 2012; McGuire, 2006; Piña & Avellaneda, 2018; Rubado, 2019). As a result, this study draws two different models of collaborative actions—vertical and horizontal collaborations, to investigate local joint efforts to advocate for transport policymaking in Thailand. However, the key challenges are defining and clarifying differences between vertical and horizontal collaboration.

According to Agranoff and McGuire (2003: 21-22) clarified that horizontal collaboration “*emanates from the array of public and private interest that often must be locally mobilized...includes the interlocal resources held by nongovernmental organizations, private agencies, and area local governments.*” Therefore, the primary characteristic of identifying horizontal collaboration is associated with the resources and actors that should be locally mobilized. Furthermore, Kooiman (2003) also suggested that those actors associated with joint efforts of the horizontal collaboration “*...participate more or less equally...*” As such, horizontal collaborative action is generally structured by joint efforts and resources that are locally mobilized where all associated participants are equal. No one dominates others in horizontal collaboration.

As a result, this study defines horizontal collaborative actions as ***“a collaborative system where participants and resources are locally mobilized, and cross-sectoral efforts are organized among local actors who want to address public issues or common goals that could not be achieved by a single actor.”*** These actors usually involve local authorities, firms, academic, voluntary groups, civil society, and community organizations whose collaborative actions are organized at the local level. Similarly, Kessa et al. (2021:64) also clarify that horizontal collaboration emerges at the same level in joint actions, and it could be classified into two types—*interlocal and intersectoral*. Therefore, collaborative actions at the local level, such as inter-municipal or cross-sectoral collaborations among local actors who share resources to run the city development initiatives, are considered a horizontal model of collaboration.

On the contrary, the vertical model of collaborative governance is highly associated with hierarchical steering and collaborative actions among intergovernmental layers where resources and actors are hierarchically mobilized. As noted by Agranoff and McGuire (2003), *“the city government operates within the policy and regulatory frameworks of state and federal government while gaining access to available resources.”* Therefore, vertical collaboration reflects top-down hierarchical and intergovernmental relations between lower and upper tiers—national and regional agencies, or what Ashworth et al. (2009) called the *“concept of compliance.”* As such, the vertical collaboration shows interactions of multilevel collaborative actions in the public sector, which Rubado (2019: 23) refers to as a *“variety of interactions among different levels of government within a hierarchy.”*

This study defines vertical collaborative governance as ***“a collaborative system where resources and participants are hierarchically mobilized, and cross-sectoral efforts occur particularly among political, civic, and public sectors to address targeted public issues or achieve common goals of public services and policymaking.”*** Therefore, vertical collaborative governance is usually structured by cross-sectoral arrangements between political and public sectors, with sometimes the legitimacy from civil sectors needed to carry out particular challenging policies and public services. Furthermore, although horizontal collaboration denotes resources and cross-sectoral collaborative actions that are locally mobilized at the local level, but the local authorities could also be involved in the vertical collaboration by performing as a central liaison between local and higher tiers in implementing policies or running their own development initiatives (Rubado, 2019: 27; Carr, Gerber & Lupher, 2007).

This study illustrates three factors that applied to differentiate between horizontal and vertical collaborations, including resource mobilization, actor relation, and autonomy. Resource mobilization in vertical and horizontal collaborations shares different tracks of their resources. Vertical collaboration reveals a hierarchical or multilevel track of the resources they employ to advance the city, while sources of horizontal collaboration derive from the mobilization among local partners. As such, mobilizing resources of vertical collaboration is associated considerably with dealing or resource allocation negotiation between the political and public sectors (Rubado, 2019), while sources of horizontal collaboration could come from multiple sectors such as local firms, municipalities, contributions from civil society or charities. Therefore, they are varied in terms of mobilizing resources.

Actor relations in horizontal collaboration is a local joint action between actors in the same territory, core duties in policymaking and implementation are delivered and managed by local actors. In contrast, vertical collaboration is a collaborative action between tiers of government where relations are shaped by hierarchy or what Kessa, Sadiq, and Yeo (2021: 62) call “*multi-interconnections among different levels of government hierarchy*” since core activities are operated between local, regional, and central actors. Finally, autonomy—which is the level of independence, is different between vertical and horizontal collaboration. In a vertical setting, the collaboration actions operate under regulatory frameworks and political guidelines exerted by government agencies and hierarchy (Ashworth et al., 2009). In contrast, collaborative activities in the horizontal setting are more autonomous because engaged local actors share equal status and are independent of each other.

This study applied two different models of collaborative actions to investigate how vertical and horizontal collaborative efforts influence the achievement of transport policymaking. This study assumes that these two different models relied on different sources of power and strategic approaches to achieve transport policymaking, which has long been centralized to the state. Therefore, findings from cross-case analysis of functional factors located in vertical and horizontal coalitions to advocate for transport policymaking in Thailand would open up new debates and broaden boundaries of knowledge in recent collaborative governance and policymaking literature.

2.2. Collaborative Actions and Policy Advocacy Coalition

2.2.1. Policy Advocacy Coalition

The conventional approach of policy analysis has most relied on the “*stages heuristic*,” which breaks the policy process into sequential steps starting from agenda setting to policy alternation. This model offers scholars in pursuit of rigorous hypotheses and simplifies policymaking into concrete stages and manageable procedures for policymakers and legislators across several institutions of government (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994: 176-177; Gültekin, 2014: 47-48). Although the stage heuristic model has predominated in policy studies but, critics over decades have revealed its serious limitations, including its incapability to generate the scientific theory, legalistic and top-down emphasis, and lack of casual and actor-centric frameworks to clarify policy changes (Nakamura, 1987: 142-154; Sabatier, 2007: 7; Nowlin, 2011: 41; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994: 176-178).

The stages heuristic also has no linkage of empirical hypothesis-testing across stages since the model identifies a specific policy cycle in a sequential process starting from one stage to another. Nevertheless, the empirical investigations disclose that deviations from the sequential step frequently occur, such as policymaking may occur by bureaucrats from discretion and vague regulation or agenda settings, and policy alternations may be affected by interim reflection and program evaluation during the implementing process (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994: 176-177). Therefore, the stage heuristics is unable to provide clear empirical hypothesis testing across the policy process. As Nakamura (1987) also noted, the stages heuristic model is perceived as a “*textbook approach*,” which just simplifies policymaking stages but is insufficient for theoretical falsification. Additionally, although stages heuristic provided critical contributions to the basic understanding of policymaking but Sabatier (1991: 147) asserted that this model had “*outlived its usefulness and must be replaced*.”

As a result, various frameworks have proliferated and been applied to advance the knowledge boundaries of recent policy studies, such as the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), Institutional Analysis Development (IAD), and Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). These frameworks offer alternative approaches to investigate rational, institutional, and casual relations of policymaking, policy learning, and policy change. They also offer a clearer framework that concerns theoretical falsification and broader contexts of policymaking analysis than the stages heuristic model (Ostrom, 1990 & 2007: 21-64;

Sabatier, 1991; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Schlager & Blomquist, 1996: 651-672; Nowlin, 2011: 41-60; Kingdon. 2013).

Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a prevailing concept in recent policy literature since it provides a multidimensional analysis of internal and external events that affect policy change. It also offers clear casual relations to clarify how advocacy coalitions learn and modify strategies in achieving their policy agenda. The ACF is basically a collaborative-oriented theory that examines the process of policymaking, remarkably on how joint efforts of multiple actors, internal modification of coalition, and external events influence policy changes (Weible & Sabatier, 2007; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier & Weible, 2019). Originally, the ACF was developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins Smith and originally published in *Policy Sciences* in 1988 (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988) before it has been revised several times to advance theoretical frameworks till the present day. Initially, most ACF applications were primarily applied to environmental and energy policy studies such as water policy, forest management, and climate change (Weible & Sabatier, 2007:123-124). However, recent studies have widely applied ACF into multiple fields, particularly in public health policy, education, and political systems (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 126; Sabatier & Weible, 2019).

Application of the ACF to empirical research could help scholars to clarify *how policies are changed* and how those changes are influenced by events internal or external to the advocacy coalition. Generally, the ACF assumes that policy change is a result from internal modification of belief systems and external perturbations that influence strategies of subsystem actors in particular policy subsystems. Therefore, policy learning of those subsystem actors to modify their beliefs and integrate external events are critical conditions to the stability of advocacy coalitions to keep their policy positions stable in a policy subsystem.

The foundations of ACF to clarify the policy process rely on five key elements: *policy subsystem, advocacy coalition, three-tier belief structure, policy learning, external events* (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Weible & Sabatier, 2007; Sabatier & Weible, 2019; Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Weible, Ingold, Nohrstedt, Henry, & Jenkins-Smith, 2020; Pierce & Hicks & Peterson & Giordono, 2017; Pierce & Peterson & Hick, 2020). First, a *policy subsystem* includes a set of actors who are involved with a policy problem and seek to influence policy. Usually, a policy subsystem includes one or more policy advocacy

coalitions that seek to influence a particular policy problem. Second, *policy advocacy coalition* is a group of actors who share similar beliefs and act in coordinated ways to advocate for their desired policy within a policy subsystem. Therefore, ACF assumes that people participate in politics to translate their beliefs into actions or policies (Cairney, 2015: 485-486; Pierce & Peterson & Peterson & Hick, 2020: 65). As such, the ACF argued that each advocacy coalition has the function of “*three-tier belief structure*” including deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary beliefs (Cairney, 2015: 485-487).


The *deep core beliefs* are the broadest level and most span in policy subsystem which reflects general normative, individual philosophy, human nature, or social value. Further, the deep core beliefs are difficult to change. Next, *policy core beliefs* are essential policy position that reflects the application of the coalition’s deep core beliefs to develop policy solutions that the coalition aims to address. Policy core beliefs are more susceptible to change compared to the deep core beliefs, but it takes over a decade for policy beliefs to be changed. Finally, *secondary beliefs* are instrumental or strategies that coalitions apply to advocate for their policy positions, such as financial, public opinion, or regulations and it is the secondary beliefs that are most susceptible to change. Those three-tier beliefs are a critical framework of the ACF to clarify how and why a coalition comes to engage and compete within a policy subsystem. Because the belief system is one of the critical arguments which ACF assumes that modification of those beliefs will largely influence the policy change.

Regarding the policy change, ACF identifies two levels of change: *major and minor changes*. The major change is a modification of policy core beliefs which is most difficult to change. The minor change is influenced by the modification from secondary beliefs which usually occurs through the coalition’s learning process to keep their positions in a policy subsystem. Most observed policy changes are minor alteration of the belief system, which usually occurs in secondary beliefs, while major policy change is less frequent (Henry, Ingold, Nohrstedt, & Weible, 2014: 301). *Policy learning* is another critical part in which ACF argues that policy change is also influenced by coalition learning. As noted by Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1993:42), policy-oriented learning refers to “*enduring alternations of thought or behavioral intentions that result from experience and which are concerned with the attainment or revision of the precepts of the belief system of individuals or of collectives.*” Therefore, policy learning is about how coalition learn to modify secondary beliefs and translate external events into their strategies to compete with rival coalitions in a subsystem

(Pierce & Weible, 2016: 22-23; Pierce, 2017: 13-46; Mintrom & Norman, 2013: 169). The policy learning in the ACF also emphasizes four explanatory factors—attributes of forums, conflict between coalitions, attributes of stimuli, and attributes of actors.

Finally, the *external events* are factors or events that influence interactions, positions, strategies, or behaviors of advocacy coalitions or actors in a policy subsystem. Generally, there are two types of external events—stable and dynamic events. Stable parameters external to the policy subsystem are mostly related to fundamental socio-cultural values or constitutional rules that are relatively stable over time. More dynamic external events are generally associated with political and economic changes or policy decisions from other policy subsystems that could also influence a certain policy subsystem. These two types of external events could create long and short-term opportunities or constraints that also influence a particular policy subsystem. In summary, these external events could create opportunities or constraints to those advocacy coalitions of a policy subsystem, which depend largely on their coalition's abilities to alter their beliefs and integrate those external events to strengthen their coalition's strategy.

Figure 1 Diagram of the ACF



Source: Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1999) in "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment." See also Cairney (2020) in "The Advocacy Coalition Framework"

As described in the above Figure, the broad concept of ACF views policy changes are influenced by two internal modifications within the coalition and external events, which those coalitions take advantage to keep and advance their positions in a policy subsystem (Cairney, 2015: 489). Therefore, policy change results from how endogenous and exogenous events are exercised by existing coalitions in certain policy subsystems (Weible, Sabatier & McQueen, 2009; Theodoulou, 2013: 126). Those advocacy coalitions in a policy subsystem could generally be divided into two types—*dominant coalition and novel or rival coalition*. Dominant coalitions have long dominated and stabilized their policy positions within a policy subsystem and remain powerful in mobilizing and stabilizing resources to keep their coalition in a stable position. A novel or rival coalition is those coalitions who seek to influence policy and exercise their power to translate their beliefs into a policy subsystem.

ACF views policy change as a long learning and time-consuming process that requires at least ten years or more to understand dynamics within a policy subsystem (Weible, Sabatier & McQueen, 2009: 122; Theodoulou & Kofinis, 2013: 352). As such, ACF assumes that a policy subsystem is stable over time unless there is a significant shift within a policy subsystem or critical events have occurred by the changes from those stable parameters and external events. Therefore, policy learning and belief adjustments play critical functions towards the explanation of how certain coalition is able to translate their beliefs into a policy subsystem.

The ACF has progressively prevailed in empirical policy research, which indicated its theoretical improvement and acceptance by policy scholars. Although the ACF has been criticized for its origins of theoretical foundation, which was largely grounded from Western countries but, recent ACF studies have revealed its applicability of the ACF into multiple political systems outside the Western countries (see also Henry, Ingold, Nohrstedt, and Weible (2014)) such as policy process in authoritarian regimes (Li & Wong, 2020; Li & Weible, 2021), Asian countries (Kim, 2012; Ohno, Hirayama, Mineo, Iwata, & Inasawa, 2021; Pholsim & Inaba, 2021 & 2022), or the third world countries (Nwalie, 2019). Therefore, the ACF has become one of the mainstream frameworks in policy analysis literature.

In comparison to those mainstream and recent policy analysis frameworks such as Multiple Stream Framework (MSF), New Institutionalism, or Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD), the ACF is more suitable for clarifying dynamic of policy change. Although the MSF is able to clarify why some problems are highlighted by decision-makers over others and assumes that policy changes depend heavily on policy entrepreneurs who couple their problems with preferred solutions when policy windows are opened and turn into a policy agenda (Kingdon, 2013: 163). However, the MSF focuses much on individual approaches—manipulators and those who get manipulated; policy entrepreneurs and those policymakers (Zahariadis, 2007: 70). Further, the individual approach is insufficient for theorization because individual motivations are influenced much from the contextual factors that shape individual actions (Mintrom & Norman, 2013: 164-165). Therefore, the MSF has been commonly criticized for its insufficiency in taking an institutional approach into account (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg & Huß, 2016; Zohlnhöfer & Rüb, 2016). While the ACF is well-recognized for the influences of internal beliefs and contextual or external events that shape individual actors in a policy subsystem.

Like the ACF's subsystem idea, the IAD assumes that policymaking and decisions occur in the *action arena*, which includes actors and three tiers of action situation (Ostrom, 2019: 22 & 2013: 173-184)—*operational, collective-choice, and constitutional levels*. It clarifies how rules affect individual behaviors. However, rules are not self-formulating or self-enforcing but human made and enforced them in certain situations. Therefore, shared *meaning* among participants when rules are formulated will reveal what actions are required, allowed, or constrained in a situation (Ostrom, 2007: 36-37). These rule configurations are structured action situations, and IAD assumes policy changes and choices of the individual strategies depend on how they perceive these rules which mainly rely on available information and perceived costs and benefits (Ostrom, 2013: 175 & 2007, 37-39). Although IAD has widely been applied in multiple policy fields it is weak to identify where the action arena starts and stops (Ostrom, 2019: 33 & 2013: 177), lacks a rigor framework to analyze multi-level or nested rules in action arena (Ostrom, 2019: 24) since there are nested structures of rules within rules, within still further rules in several levels (Ostrom, 2005: 58), and the focus on rules-in-use is also challenging to be tested because these rules are not written down, and it is not simply observed by survey; in some setting, it is not even recognized as rules by participants (Ostrom, 2019: 39 & 2013: 181). Therefore, overwhelmingly focusing on the influence of rules or institutions that shape policy outcomes

is insufficient, and functions of belief translations and concentration on contextual events from the ACF would offer a more prominent explanation for policy change.

Although new institutionalism is helpful to examine the entire political and policy systems, particularly how individuals behave under a certain rule, as rational actor, to maximize their personal interest—utilitarianism (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013: 28-29; March & Olsen, 1984: 736; Sabatier, 2007; 8-9), Peter (2019: 79) argued that it is weak in predicting policy changes because of its inability to connect theory to complex empirical observations of individual behavioral understandings and the relationship between institutions described in theory and those structures that individuals are empirically familiarized share tiny relation, which gives the trouble to test a theory (see also March & Olsen, 1984: 742 & 747). Further, individual preferences and incentives must be stable for the theory to be testable. Still, they are neither stable nor exogenous (March & Olsen 1984: 739), which makes theory-testing more challenging because preferences evolved through multiple combinations of information, education, indoctrination, and experience (DiMaggio, 1998: 701; Ferris & Tang, 1993: 6-7). Although ACF has no firm theory to clarify policy actors but its framework is open for policy scholars to apply the theory of rational choice to clarify how subsystem actors influence advocacy coalition and policy change such as the roles of policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom & Norman, 2009: 657-658), policy marketer (Petridou & Mintrom, 2021:952-953) or *policy brokers* (Ingold & Varone, 2011).

2.2.2. Policy Brokers

The emergence of collaborative governance works of literature has highlighted the importance of *brokers* who manage coalition strategies and foster connections among diverse groups of stakeholders to influence decision makers in particular policy and collaborative systems (Weir, Rongerude, Ansell, 2009: 459). Although policy scholars have highlighted the critical roles of policy brokers in the policy process and suggested that research on policy brokers would offer significant theoretical contributions to ACF and policymaking literature. (Ingold & Varon, 2011; Kingiri, & Hall, 2012; Kingiri, 2014; Lu, 2015;Rodrigues et al, 2020; Howlett et al, 2017; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017; Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015; Fossheim & Andersen, 2022), but the methodological framework and theories of policy brokers have remained understudied (Ingold & Varone, 2011; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009; Howlett et al., 2017; Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015). Therefore, this part aims to conceptualize the definition and roles of policy brokers in policymaking literature.

Originally, the ACF has identified three types of policy actors—principal actor, auxiliary actor, and policy broker (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993 & 2017; Ingold & Varone, 2011). The principal actors are participants who constantly engage in the policy subsystem as a core actor to run their preferred policies. Auxiliary actors are the participants who sporadically present or engage in collaborative actions. While policy brokers are key participants of the coalition and position between the policy subsystems to mediate conflicts between coalitions. However, policy scholars have highlighted the importance of policy brokers and their limited theory in policymaking literature. Although some scholars have integrated the idea of policy brokers in different policy areas such as studies of policy brokers in biotechnology policy (Kingiri, & Hall, 2012; Kingiri, 2014), energy policy (Howlett, Mukherjee, & Koppenjan, 2017), environmental policy (Smith, 2000), automobile policy (Diaz-Kope, Lombard, & Miller-Stevens, 2012), fishery policy (Aslinda et al., 2018), highway policy (Lu, 2015), public finance (Dressel, 2012), physical education and sport policy (Phillpot, 2013), or science, technology, and innovation policy (Rodrigues, Sobrinho, & Vasconcellos, 2020). Still, policy scholars share different perspectives to define policy brokers.

This study defines a policy broker as ***“an individual, group, or organization who involves with associated coalitions in particular policy subsystem. Policy brokers represent advocacy coalition whose resources could manage coalition strategies and influence policymakers to reach acceptable solutions and achieve their targeted policy, with hope for the future returns.”*** As such, the general traits of policy brokers are those actors whose resources and capacities are able to shape coalition strategies and influence policymakers. They are actors who are willing to invest their time, resources, and reputation to advocate for the desired policies in the hope of future returns (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Phillpot, 2013). Furthermore, the definition of policy brokers in this study reveals two locations that they could be able to locate *inside* and *between* the coalition. This means policy brokers have two functions: *bonding and bridging roles*. They perform as a leading actor who represents and bond to the coalition and those who bridge other coalitions to seek acceptable solutions or policy outcomes (see also Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015: 479). Therefore, policy brokers are strategic actors whom partners must recognize as coalition representatives to manage strategies and handle multiple challenges from competing coalitions to reach acceptable solutions and achieve policy outcomes (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2020: 1062).

However, defining policy brokers as an actor who advocates for certain policy for future gains makes the interpretation of policy brokers clouded with the policy entrepreneurship in the Multiple Stream Framework (MSF). Nonetheless, scholars asserted that policy brokers differ from policy entrepreneurs (Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015: 475-478). This study argues that they both are similar in terms of they are an interest-driven actor and they both shape policy decisions, but their roles and relevance in the policy process are varied in four points:

First, *individual goal* between policy entrepreneurs and brokers are varied. They both are interested-driven actors because policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs invest their time, efforts, resources, and reputation to run for a particular policy issue with the hope of future returns, but their goals in policymaking process are different. Policy entrepreneurs seek to influence decision makers and promote significant policy problem to maximize their self-interest as noted by Christopoulos and Ingold (2015: 476) “...*policy entrepreneurs are said to act in a rather self-interested and strategic way...trying to promote their interests so that the final outcome reflects their policy preferences...*” Therefore, the goal of policy entrepreneurs in the policy process is to shape policy that maximizes their self-benefits. On the other hand, the goal of policy brokers in policymaking process is more normative-oriented and rely on normative beliefs that must be empirically ascertained through “*the logic of consequence*”—maximization for good consequence or common goals of a coalition (Sabatier & Weible, 2007:194 see also Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015:477-478). Therefore, policy entrepreneurs are primarily a *self-interested individual* in the policy process who act on a politically profitable opportunity and manipulate those opportunities to their advantage while policy brokers are a *coalition’s interest-oriented individual* who acts on long-term work motivated by shared beliefs and seek stability or acceptable solution within the policy subsystem.

Reasons to engage in the policymaking process differ between policy entrepreneurs and brokers—self-interest is a critical goal for policy entrepreneurs to engage in the policymaking process while common policy core belief and a certain level of self-interest are goals of policy brokers to engage in the policymaking process. Therefore, policy entrepreneur thinks of their self-interest first while policy brokers concerned on the common goals of the coalition first as they represent the coalition. Policy brokers—although they are interested-driven individuals but, those interests are the “*second effect,*” meaning that common goals of the coalition are the first prioritized as the primary duty for those brokers

to achieve. Then, policy brokers would later be advantageous after the common goals of the coalition have been achieved. They will see how to take advantage from the achievement of the coalition since brokerage roles allow them to realize their own benefit and the self-benefit is varied depend on type of policy brokers (Ingold & Varone, 2011: 322). Therefore, policy brokers focus on two levels of benefits—*collective benefits of coalition and self-benefit*.

The second point is about *representation*. Policy brokers are positioned as an agency of coalition to deal with challenges, strategies, and decision-makers—being recognized as coalition brokers (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2020: 1062). Therefore, policy brokers possess a recognized representation function to advocate for the desired policies of their coalition. Policy entrepreneurs could be anyone in or off the government and represent no one—they could represent themselves and their team to manipulate those decision-makers, coupling problems and solutions for their self-interest. Therefore, policy brokers need to be recognized by the coalition as their agents, and they need to be transparent while seeking stability and policymaking. As noted by Christopoulos & Ingold (2015: 479), “*Brokers seek stability and compromise they need to be transparent and recognized; on the other hand, entrepreneurs may engage in opportunistic action and strategic relationships that are most effective if partially concealed from other actions in the network.*”

Third, *decision-making* or the ability to decide is another critical point to clarify the roles of policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs could *autonomously* make decisions to take benefits from the focusing events by themselves because the MSF’s focusing event has “*temporal order,*” that opportunity windows will open for a short period and can close quickly. Therefore, policy entrepreneurs must make decisions quickly to take advantage of the temporal opportunity windows (Zahariadis, 2007: 68-69; Theodoulou, 2013: 127-129). On the contrary, the decision-making of policy brokers is not dependent on an individual like policy entrepreneurs, but policy brokers need to rely on collective decision that are mutually reached by associated partners of a coalition (Ingold & Varone, 2011: 321). Therefore, the abilities of policy brokers to alter strategies or adjust the secondary belief of the coalition to take advantage from relevant events and opportunities need a collective decision from coalition.

Fourth, *roles and positions in the policy subsystem* are varied between policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs. Policy Brokers are actors *within* a particular policy subsystem, while policy entrepreneurs could be individuals *within or outside* a certain policy subsystem

who try to manipulate and couple problems to their interests through expected policy alternatives proposing in each policy subsystem. Therefore, the position or boundary of a policy entrepreneur is broader than policy broker. Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen (2020) also pointed out that policy brokers could be policy entrepreneur because they both could be part of a coalition or independent from it, but on a different level. *Policy brokers are at coalition level*—they play brokerage roles within a policy subsystem. *Policy entrepreneur is at policy subsystem level*—they manipulate those subsystem actors inside and outside a certain policy subsystem. In comparison, policy brokers process recognized duties to reach coalition goals and mainly deal with internal modification of advocacy coalition and strategies to convert external events to the coalition’s advantage. Mintrom and Norman (2009) clarified that policy entrepreneurs could be applied to ACF as “*translator of shocking events*” to benefit coalition. As noted, “*Within the advocacy coalition farmwork, change is anticipated to come from both endogenous and exogenous shocks. But, to have political effect, those shocks need to be interpreted and translated. This process of translation is directly equivalent to the process of problem definition...Policy entrepreneurs typically display skills needed to do this kind of translations and definitional work...*” Therefore, policy brokers could function as policy entrepreneurs to translate or convert those internal and external shocks to benefit the coalition. While policy entrepreneurs find it difficult to function as policy brokers due to awareness of coalition representation and normative beliefs among partners.

However, the ACF and MSF share different perspectives to see how policy is formulated. The key flaw of MSF is it sees policymaking as a result largely influenced by the roles of policy entrepreneurs who influence decision-makers. While ACF, as noted by Hill and Varone (2021:101), “*In the ACF approach, the outs of a given policy-making process do not depend on individual action, but on the interactions between actor’s coalitions.*” While the MSF focuses on the individual influence of policy entrepreneurs who is a critical actor in shaping policy decisions, the ACF focuses more on collective actions and strategies or translation of coalition beliefs to influence policy decisions. Therefore, ACF reminds policy scholars that policymaking processes also involve a large number of actors or organizations—those advocacy coalitions who seek to influence policy decisions, not only the role of individual policy entrepreneurs (Petridou & Mintrom, 2021: 951).

This study identifies roles of policy brokers are critical to the success of policymaking and research on policy brokers would broaden the theory of ACF and clarify

how policy change could also be directed by those policy brokers. Jenkins-Smith, Nohrestedt, Weibel, and Ingold (2018) also suggested attracting points for the future research agenda of the ACF study: *first*, they suggest future study to develop a hierarchy for coalition resources, identifying a typology of political resources that focuses more on formal legal authority who make policy decision, public opinion, information, mobilizable troops, financial resources, and skillful leadership: *second*, they also encourage scholars to examine venues and forums within policy subsystems and use the ACF for comparative public policy research to systematically compare policy subsystems, coalition behavior, and policy processes across political systems: *third*, and more importantly they argue that ACF policy actors are needed to be further investigated on types of policy actors, including auxiliary and principal coalition actors, and policy brokers, because *exceptional actors* often play a critical role in the policy subsystem: and *fourth*, they suggest future study to focus on *nascent* and *mature* policy subsystems because the study on nascent subsystems could yield insights about initial conditions of policy subsystem characteristics, the process of coalition formation, and roles of policy actors in agenda-setting. This study draws a new policy brokers analysis framework to investigate the roles and relevance of policy brokers in different collaborative policymaking systems in Thailand, where local efforts seek to influence decision-makers on transport policy which has long been dominated by the state. Although the ACF is the most suitable framework to clarify how policy changes and why some coalitions succeed in advocating for their desired policy. Nevertheless, the ACF also has some limitations and critical points which have long been understudied. The following section will clarify the theoretical gap of ACF in recent policy literature and how the theoretical interest of this study could address those gaps and broaden the knowledge boundary of ACF literature.

2.2.3. ACF in Recent Empirical Research and Limitations in Policy Literature

ACF has been developing for over 35 years after its first development in 1988 by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith in the *Policy Sciences* (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988). Since then, the ACF has been integrated into multiple policy fields, resulting in its theoretical and methodological improvements to clarify how policy changes. However, the majority of those ACF studies were mainly grounded on the empirical evidence of the Western countries and advanced states and it rarely founded ACF research applied into transport policymaking. Henry, Ingold, Nohrestedt, and Weible (2014) investigated how ACF has been applied in recent empirical studies outside of Western Europe and North America.

They examined 224 papers from ACF-based studies and revealed that the ACF had been mainly applied to the environment, energy, education, and public health policies, but no studies applied the ACF to the transport policy sector (Henry et al., 2014:3). Although this study has time constraint which focused only publications during 1999-2013, which there still have few studies applied ACF into transport policy (Stich & Miller, 2008; Lu, 2015; Pholsim & Inaba, 2022), but the findings from this study reflect the methodological and theoretical gap of the ACF in transport policy subsystem.

Recently, the ACF has been increasingly integrated by those policy scholars who applied different methodologies and theoretical frameworks to clarify policy processes in recent empirical research. One of those recent studies conducted by Dolk and Penning-Rowell (2021) applied ACF to investigate the public debate related to the policy choices on Australian flood insurance policy called the Natural Disaster Insurance Review (NDR). The public debate has been raised after the flood during 2010-2011, particularly on the availability and affordability of private insurance for those risking households from flood damages. This study aims to clarify whose roles are the dominant coalition in this flood insurance policy and examine the influence of public inquiry on policy choice. This study found that flood insurance in Australia is a market-based system in which availability, affordability, and insurance coverage are mandated by the private market. As such, this study found that the insurer or insurance industry is a dominant coalition whose resources and power are highly influential and well connected to the government, while those consumer and flood-damage-risking households are novel coalitions with limited resources to influence policy decisions. As a result, recommendations on NDRI and the benefits of those risking households remained unresolved. This study also found critical roles of NDRI's public inquiry into two phases: the inquiry establishment—the government initial intentions, and the post-inquiry period—findings dissemination and response to those NDRI recommendations. They argued that public inquiry literature is the remaining gap in the ACF theory (Dolk & Penning-Rowell, 2021: 1177) that needs more empirical investigation because the relevance of public inquiry, forum, and venue would also influence policy change. In empirical section of single case and cross-case analysis of my study also revealed the importance of public inquiry and city-wide consensus deployed by the local advocacy coalition in Khon Kaen City. Those approaches were applied and played the most critical parts in capturing the interests of the national government on their LRT proposal.

Another interesting study was conducted by Li and Wong (2020), who applied ACF to investigate birth control policy in China. This study examined the stability and changes of China's one-child policy during 1980-2015, written in Population and Family Planning Law (PFPL). The policy of one-childbirth control remained stable until 2013; the policy was more relaxed in some localities allowed couples to have two children, in case one of the parents was the only child. Officially, in 2015 the Communist Party of China Central Committee officially legalized couples to have two children and amendment of the PFPL. This study seeks to clarify why birth control policy changed in 2013 and 2015 by using the ACF. The authors argued two reasons to integrate ACF in their study: first, the ACF was mainly developed and tested in the western countries that have different political systems from authoritarian regime in China; second, ACF helps scholars to understand China's policy process where the state has no opposition coalition. This study found that the stability of the birth control policy during 1980-2013 was influenced by the dominant coalition including research professionals and those lobbied Party leaders who have access to the government, despite they encountering resistance from minority coalitions—researchers and legal professions, but the dominant coalition was able to manipulate the total fertility rate information to defend their policy core belief (Li & Wong, 2020: 654).

However, in the early 2010s, the dominant coalition faced internal challenges from the minority coalition on the accuracy of the fertility rate that was decreasing and external challenges from the shortage of labor market. Resulting in the government's relaxation of the one-child birth control policy in 2013 and the promotion of the two-child policy in 2015 to facilitate the fertility rate. This study identified three factors are key to the changes of child-birth control policy in 2013 and 2015 (Li & Wong: 2020: 656): first is the external challenges from labor shortage and social value on childbearing preference; second, internal challenges from new challenging information about fatality rate research by minority coalitions and critiques on birth control policy; third, advocacy strategies of minority coalition who deployed their expertise and target different policy venues to influence decision makers.

Another ACF research conducted by Wiley, Searing, and Young (2021) applied the ACF to the regional budgetary crisis in the U.S. State of Illinois which the General Assembly of Illinois State was unable to pass the balanced budget, particularly the budget impasses of the federal pass-through funds and funds with state origins which will be used for essential public services. This study examined how advocacy coalition applied their resources to

leverage policy venues and handle with external events when the traditional approach was found unproductive in unravelling the budget impasses. This study found that three resources—*financial resources, leadership, and information*, are critical factors to influence the selection of coalition strategies (Wiley, Searing, & Young, 2021: 416-421). Information and abilities of coalition leader to understand and message problems in the right ways are primary factors to strengthen the capacities of a coalition to shift their policy venues. As the problem attached to the budget impasses, financial resources help advocacy coalitions to decide whether which particular legal venues, such as assembly and court, should be an option for them to pursue.

Although scholars have asserted that the ACF is a useful framework to the study of policy analysis (Pierce & Peterson & Hicks, 2020: 64-86) but the framework itself has multiple limitations which need further development. First, the ACF overwhelmingly examines coalition and policy changes while ignoring the *historical and social conditions* where policy alterations are made (Fischer, 2003). Second, the methodological analysis and applicable framework are mainly applied to environmental and energy fields and grounded on the pluralist states in Western countries (Pierce & Hicks & Peterson & Giordano, 2017; Cairney, 2015). Third, the most critical point is that the ACF lacks an *institutional point of view* and *bounded rationality* that should be subsumed in operations of the belief systems to advance methodological framework and understanding of policy changes (Cairney, 2015: 495-496 & 2012: 215-216). Therefore, the ACF mainly focuses on how coalition belief changes and learns to modify their strategies, but it is less concern on the individual, institutional, and social contexts where those modifications take place in a policy subsystem.

Moreover, policy actors who are involved in the policymaking process are also critical context to policymaking research. ACF classifies three types of policy actors based on their roles in policymaking—*principal actor, auxiliary actor, and policy broker* (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993 & 2017; Ingold & Varone, 2011; Jenkins-Smith, Nohrestedt, Weible, & Ingold). The principal actors are participants who constantly engage in the policy subsystem as core actors to run their preferred policies. Auxiliary actors are the participants who are sporadically present or engage in collaborative actions. While policy brokers are key participants of the coalition and position between the policy subsystems to mediate conflicts between coalitions. However, the framework of these policy actors analysis in ACF literature is understudied, especially the roles of policy brokers (Ingold & Varon, 2011).

Policy scholars have highlighted the critical roles and attentions of policy brokers in the policymaking process (Kingiri & Hall, 2012; Kingiri, 2014; Howlett, Mukherjee, & Koppenjan, 2017; Lombard & Miller-Stevens, 2012; Aslinda et al., 2018; Lu, 2015; Rodrigues, Sobrinho, & Vasconcellos, 2020). However, methodological analysis and theories of policy brokers have remained understudied for almost 35 years since it is first discussed in the ACF theory (Ingold, 2011; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009; Howlett, Mukherjee, & Koppenjan, 2017; Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015). Therefore, scholars encouraged the application of ACF theory, which focus more on the roles of policy actors and their functions in particular policy subsystem (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrestedt, Weibel, & Ingold, 2018). According to Ingold and Varon (2011:1) suggested that ACF applications should pay special attention to policy brokers when clarifying the policy change, especially in a political subsystem where multiple participants seek to influence policy.


A more critical standpoint is that the ACF does not account for the roles of *power* in policymaking. Mainly the power of associated policy actors and coalitions to advocate for their policy agendas since a power imbalance between policymakers and those who advocate for policies always occurs (Schlager, 1995). Scholars assumed this gap occurred because the ACF lacks concentration on historical and social conditions where policy alterations are made in the first place (Fischer, 2003). Furthermore, shared beliefs and relations among policy advocates alone are insufficient to explain policy change because policymaking involves mobilizing finance, social capital, and political resources to exercise these powers in policymaking (Weir, Ronggerude, & Ansell, 2009; Hamilton, 2002). Therefore, the critical issue of the ACF is its inability to clarify which sources of power coalitions deployed to set their strategies and how certain policy actors exercise their power to achieve policymaking.

2.3. Theoretical Interest of the Study

This study applied the ACF to investigate how local advocacy coalitions in Thailand run their joint efforts to advocate for their desired transport policy. Therefore, the primary focus of this research is at the stage of policymaking, not policy implementation or outcomes analysis. The focus of ACF theory in this study involves policy actors and the capacity of advocacy coalition analysis under the transport policy subsystem. Although the ACF identifies traits and roles of three relevant policy actors—principal actor, auxiliary actor, and policy broker, that could impact the capacities of advocacy coalition in policymaking, but the methodological analysis to investigate the roles of those policy actors and their influences

on policymaking remain unfulfilled (Ingold & Varon, 2011; Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015). This is because the ACF undervalued the roles of policy subsystem actors attached to advocacy coalitions. As a result, the ACF has no clear methodological framework to analyse how certain types of policy actors and their resources could shape the capacities of advocacy coalitions and yield the results of policymaking. Therefore, the main theoretical interest of this study is to clarify how roles of certain policy subsystem actors influence the capacities of advocacy coalitions to achieve their collective goals. To offer more precise theoretical and casual relations, this study focuses on the relevance of *policy brokers* under different collaborative systems of vertical and horizontal coalitions as detailed in the following figure.

Figure 2 Collaborative Policymaking and Theoretical Interest of this Study



Sources: Adapted from Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1999) and Cairney (2020)

This study argues that the ACF lacks clear assumptions on the influence of powers that could strengthen or weaken the capacities of a coalition to advocate for policymaking. As such, the ACF cannot clarify how the coalition exercises its powers or what types of power that coalition deploys to advocate and achieve policymaking. Therefore, this study assumes that understanding sources of coalition power and the roles of policy brokers could address remaining theoretical gaps and broaden knowledge boundaries of the ACF theory related to how policy changes and why some coalitions succeed in policymaking over others.

Furthermore, the original idea of policy brokers elaborated in ACF is unclear and lacks analysis of historical and social conditions when policy alterations are made (Fischer, 2003). It also discounts institutional view and bounded rationality that should be subsumed in operations of coalition belief systems (Cairney, 2015: 495-496). Therefore, this study

applies institutional perspectives to the investigation of the coalition's power and policy brokers analysis through the classification of two different advocacy coalitions—*vertical and horizontal coalitions*. This study assumes that the operationalization of ACF to investigate the roles of policy brokers and the coalition's power in those two types of advocacy coalitions would offer clear clarifications on how the roles and resources of policy brokers would strengthen the coalition's capacity and influence the success of policymaking in each type of coalition.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter clarifies the main research interests and methodology applied in this study. Furthermore, this section also elaborates on the development of the research framework and background of theory building applied to investigate local joint efforts in selected case studies. The final part of this chapter explains the operations of analytical methodologies of the research, including case selection strategies, city profiles of the selected case studies, data collection, and data analysis approach, which the author applied the CAQDAS technique—*computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software*, which integrate ATLAS.ti as primary software for data analysis.

3.1. Research Interests and Theory Building

3.1.1. Problem Statement

The nature of transport policymaking is predominantly retained to the power of central government, particularly the mega transport infrastructures. In Thailand, the transport duties, especially mega transport systems such as railways, airports, and national highways, are highly centralized. The local governments are entitled to be responsible mainly for small rural roads and managing public buses. However, there has been an emerging local movement that runs their joint efforts to advance urban transport systems across Thailand, which is the emergence of the “*City Development Corporations (CDC)*” and the formation of Thailand’s first municipal corporation (MC). These two new entities were first created in Khon Kaen City based on joint efforts among multiple local sectors—municipality, local firms, academic sector, and civil society. Later, the CDC was expanded to 18 cities throughout the country, as inspired by Khon Kaen City. These new local entities aim to advance multiple issues related to city development, but in regional core cities—such as Chiang Mai or Phuket, their primary agenda is to improve the urban transport systems, especially city bus and the light rail transit (LRT) initiatives. However, operations of such

mega transport systems are highly centralized by the national authorities. Therefore, the main problem statement of this research seeks to address ***“How do local collaborative actions impact urban transport policymaking in Thailand?”***

3.1.2. Research Question and Theory Building

As the main problem of this research stated in the earlier section, this study includes two main research questions that aim to clarify how local collaborative actions influence transport policymaking in Thailand:

The First Research Question: As pointed out earlier, the city development corporation and municipal corporation are two new local entities that pave new pathways for local reform in Thailand. Since 2015, 18 cities have equipped these local entities running their joint efforts to advance the city. However, the roles of these local coalitions are varied, as well as their performances in urban transport policymaking. Although these cities share similar collaborative bodies of city development corporations, their performances and coalition capacities are different, especially in a city that advocates for the LRT initiative. Some local coalitions are highly functional in running their joint efforts for LRT policymaking, while others fail to manage their collaborative efforts and are unable to handle challenges from a centralized state. Therefore, the first question of this research which aims to address is : ***why is some local collaborative action more functional than others to advocate for transport policymaking?***

To address this research question, the author selected the potential cities that share similar traits of city development corporations to advocate for LRT initiatives in their city, including Khon Kaen City, Phuket City, and Chiang Mai City. These cities are well-recognized as a highly performed category of city development corporation assessed by the Area-based Research Funding Agency (2022:4-10). Those cities are structured with the city development corporation as a key part of local joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking. However, the achievements of LRT policymaking among those cities are varied.

Therefore, the author draws a potential proposition regarding the first research question that the different degrees of collaboration—financial autonomy, political approaches, and unity of local coalitions lead to different performances of transport policymaking among horizontal coalitions in those cities. In other words, ***“a city with higher financial autonomy, political strategies, and unity of coalition, is likely to perform more***

functional than a city with limited resources and disconnected.” This proposition initially reveals that a city with higher financial autonomy, highly connected to the political arena, and highly unified among local partners is likely to function better than a city with limited financial resources, non-approaching to politics, and a fragmented coalition.

The Second Research Question: Most collaborative policymaking research revealed that a variety of engaged actors is a critical element to the functionalities of collaborative actions to achieve policymaking. However, initial empirical investigations from those three selected cases—as a horizontal collaborative model, in comparison with other cities in Thailand such as Buriram City, Suphanburi City, Bangkok City, and Bueng Kan City—as a vertical model reflects possible alternative justifications challenging to the argument of the multiplicity of partners engaged in collaborative policymaking. Although it is true that a variety of actors is critical to collaborative action, but this conclusion comes from the studies which have no conceptual clarification on specific forms of collaborative actions to investigate the real world. However, this study applied a specific analytical framework to investigate those relations between a variety of actors and their influence on transport policymaking. Therefore, this study classifies two precise types of collaborative policymaking—vertical and horizontal collaboration. This leads to the second research question, which aims to investigate: *how does the variety and role of relevant policy actors in vertical and horizontal collaborations impact the capacities of those coalitions to advocate for transport policymaking?*

Earlier studies necessitated the importance of partner multiplicity in collaborative actions—the more diversified actors, the more functional collaborative actions but this study offers alternative justification and assumes that a variety of engaged actors is highly critical for *horizontal* collaboration while it is less critical to *vertical* collaborative actions, especially in transport policymaking. Further, an application of ACF’s actor-centric framework to collaborative policymaking also reveals the critical roles and influence of “*policy brokers*” in managing joint efforts to achieve policymaking. Leading to another viable proposition for theory building to address the second question: “*A variety of local partners is highly critical for a horizontal collaborative policymaking, while in vertical collaboration, a variety of engaged partners is less critical than resources that policy brokers processed or accessed to set policy on agenda.*”

In conclusion, it is not only the diversity of actors that are key to the functionality of local collaborative policymaking but the roles and resources of policy brokers are also highly influential to functionalities of collaborative policymaking, especially in transport policymaking. A city without policy brokers and sufficient resources to strengthen the capacity of coalition would face multiple challenges that hinder the powers of their joint effort. On the other hand, a city with policy brokers who have powerful resources, although associated with a limited number of partners, could also function very effectively in policymaking.


3.2. Research Framework

“*Capacity to collaborate*” is a preliminary condition for multiple actors to structure a coalition advocating for their common policy goals. However, “*capacity to create*” is a critical condition for those advocacy coalitions to mobilize resources and get what policy agendas they meant to address. Therefore, policy advocacy in several policy fields has normally revealed two types of advocacies. One is an advocacy coalition that has a high capacity to collaborate but inadequate capacity to create or is unable to run joint efforts to achieve policymaking. Another is those advocacy coalitions that have both capacities to collaborate and create their joint effort strategies to achieve desired policymaking. This study classifies two types of collaborative policymaking, which are vertical and horizontal collaborative models, and assumes that these two collaborative models would offer precise justification related to factors strengthening or weakening the capacities of each advocacy coalition to manage their joint effort strategies and achieve transport policymaking.

This study applied the *Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)* and assumes that relevant policy actors, sources of power, and external events are key conditions that influence the capacities of those advocacy coalitions. However, the conditions of resources, external events, and policy actors, diversely influence capacities in each type of advocacy coalition. Therefore, the classification of two collaborative policymaking—vertical and horizontal coalitions, would offer a clearer path to examine *how* and *why* some advocacy coalition is more functional than others, even if their coalitions are structured with similar collaborative entities. Therefore, the roles of policy actors, resources, and external events are considered primary variables that influence the capacities of each type of advocacy coalition to advocate for their targeted policymaking.

This study has drawn a new framework of policy brokers analysis to investigate those two policy advocacy coalitions, which advanced from the remaining gaps of ACF theory. This model primarily aims to compare the capacities of different advocacy coalitions to run their joint effort for transport policymaking. The model assumes that the capacities of advocacy coalitions to set their targeted policies rely on sources of power, external events, and roles of policy brokers. *Sources of power* are key resources or leverages that advocacy coalitions deploy to strengthen their internal coalition capacity and manage their coalition strategies to achieve policymaking. Sources of power could be politics, finance, authority, international collaboration, or civil powers that strengthen the capacities of policy brokers and local joint efforts to reach the center of policymaking power where key decisionmakers are located and the ultimate decisions are made. *Point of power* represents a specific model of collaborative actions where sources of coalition powers are mobilized, enacted to influence, and carried out operations of collaborative actions (Huxham, 2003: 406-408). Some coalitions may be more powerful at the beginning point of constructing power. This study classifies two different points of power—vertical and horizontal. Therefore, points of power rely much on how advocacy coalitions mobilize resources or what the origins of their coalition power are.

Figure 3 Research Framework



Moreover, the critical process of policymaking is set at the “*center of power in policymaking*,” where political dynamics and final decision related to the approval of policy

is located. This model assumes that the closer the coalition cloud gets to the centre of power, the higher possibilities for them to set their desired policy on the agenda. Therefore, the capacity to move points of power close to the center of policymaking power relies much on the roles of policy brokers, sources of power, and their abilities to take advantage of “*external events*” to strengthen their coalition strategies. To leverage or take advantage of external events effectively, the coalition needs to exercise their sources of power and leverage from policy brokers to get its position closer to the centers of policymaking power. As long as the coalition gets closer to the centers of power, this model assumes that they would have more chances to achieve their pet policies over others.

3.3. Case Study Approach

This study is grounded on qualitative case study research since “*case studies allow researchers to focus in-depth on a “case” and to retain a holistic and real-world perspective*” (Yin, 2018: 5). Generally, there are two types of case-based research—single and multiple case studies. While the single-case approach is capable for holistic analysis of an individual case and could represent a critical test of theoretical propositions, the potential of embedded multiple-case approach lies in comparative analysis, which is highly capable of theoretical replication and generalization. Yin (2018: 54) argued that “*evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall multiple-case study is therefore regarded as being more robust.*” Therefore, this study employs an embedded multiple-case approach (Yin, 2018; 46-47; Flick, 2020:113-120) as the key methodology since it is the most suitable and effective methodology to address research questions stated in this study related to *how* and *why* collaborative actions could well function to advocate for transport policymaking (Yin, 2018; Flick, 2020).

Further, conducting research in all academic fields, especially qualitative case study, should be scientific and reliable or at least meets the minimal standards of each field so that those studies should broaden the theory in an appropriate and scholarly acceptable manner. Scholars have defined a particular set of standards called “*scientific criteria*” to advance the qualities of the research to be more reliable and scientific. These scientific criteria include five main principles (Sabatier, 2019: 5; Cairney, 2015:492-493): (1) *replication*—methods of data acquisition and analysis should be appropriately presented to the public and other scholars should replicate this methodology; (2) *empirical falsifiability*—finding and conceptual frameworks should be logically clarified and consistent and give rise to

empirically falsifiable hypotheses; (3) *proposition's generality*—propositions should be as general as possible and obviously address relevant problems; (4) *casual process*—the study should explicitly define the casual process; (5) *evaluation*—the method, concepts, or findings, should be subject to criticism, evaluation by experts, and empirical testing.

Sabatier (2019: 5) further noted that scientific research should “*be clear enough to be proven wrong,*” meaning that scholars must clearly define methods and frameworks that could be replicated, empirically falsified, and criticized by the public. Therefore, when the author defined the research framework and conducted this research, the author was always aware that all framework and methodological analyses of this study must be clear. As such, the author decided to apply the case study approach because it is most suitable for investigating the research problems. The case study approach is also qualified to those five principles of scientific criteria (see also Yin, 2018: 54-57), especially the multiple-case study research, which generally includes two or more cases that are undertaken to investigate and teste relevant conditions whether the same findings might be replicated or conflicted with a clearer conclusion. As noted by Yin (2012: 8), “*the cases in a multiple-case study...might have been selected either to predict similar results (direct replications) or to predict contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (theoretical replications)...*” Therefore, the case study approach is highly scientific and reliable.

The case study approach is extremely capable of theory generalization, particularly an analytical generalization (Yin, 2012: 18-19 & 2009: 38-39; Eisenhardt, 1989: 532-550; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007:25-32). The case study offers the researcher an approach to generalize and theorize the findings through lessons learned and theoretical frameworks developed from the evidence and reality from the cases to create a logical framework and informed relationships among conceptual attributes or sequential events that could be applied to other situations. Eisenhardt (1989: 535) asserted that the case study approach “*can be used to accomplish various aims: to provide description, test theory, or generate theory.*” Therefore, the case study approach is a logical methodology for theory building and offers practical methods to theorize findings from case studies.

3.4. Case Selection Strategies and Introduction of the Selected Cases

This study employed a multiple-case study in which each case is embedded with units of analysis related to different collaborative contexts situated in each city. According to Yin (2018: 49) suggested that case selection should be guided by the study propositions.

Therefore, the author first decides on the case that is directed by the study propositions mentioned in an earlier section. Later, the researcher draws four criteria to assess the academic and operational standards of those cases for the theoretical and operational possibilities before conducting the study. Those criteria include quiring experts, unusual cases, nationally important cases, and operational criteria.

This study draws two propositions related to the functionality of local coalitions to achieve their desired transport policymaking in Thailand. The first proposition indicates that a “*city with higher financial autonomy, political approach, and unity of coalition, is likely to perform more functional than a city with limited resources and disconnected.*” Therefore, the author investigated potential cases and came up with three cities guided by this proposition, including *Khon Kaen, Phuket, and Chiang Mai*. Generally, Khon Kaen is a well-represented case of a functional collaborative action to advocate for urban transport policymaking, while Phuket and Chiang Mai are weaker in running local joint efforts advocating for transport policymaking. Those cases are selected to investigate why some collaborative setting is more functional than others and what strengthen and weaken their joint capacities.

Another proposition implies that “*a variety of local partners is highly necessary for a horizontal collaborative policymaking, while in vertical collaboration, a variety of engaged partners is less critical than resources that policy brokers processed or accessed to set transport policy on the agenda.*” To address this proposition, cities with different collaborative models, partner arrangements, and sources of power—*Khon Kaen City and Bueng Kan City*, are selected to assess the roles of relevant factors and their influences on coalition capacities to achieve policymaking. In Khon Kaen City, multiple actors are organized and engaged in local coalition, while fewer partners are associated with local joint efforts in Bueng Kan to advocate for transport policymaking. The different types of resources used to run their joint efforts are also distinct in the Bueng Kan and Khon Kaen cities. Further, those cities also represent different models of collaboration, which are both functional in transport policymaking. Khon Kaen City represents horizontal policymaking where locally mobilized coalition and Bueng Kan City portrays vertical collaborative action and emphasizes intergovernmental levels (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003: 20-22).

Table 1 Overview of the selected case studies

Selected Cases	Collaborative Entities				Type	Policy Focus
	Municipal Company	City Development Corporation	Cross-Public Sectoral Collaboration	Cross-Public-Political-Sectoral Collaboration		
Chiang Mai	-	✓	✓	-	HC	transport (LRT)
Phuket	-	✓	✓	-	HC	transport (LRT)
Khon Kaen	✓	✓	✓	-	HC	transport (LRT)
Bueng Kan	-	-	✓	✓	VC	transport (Bridge, Airport)

Note: HC means horizontal collaboration, VC means vertical collaboration

Another critical strategy of case selection is to assess theoretical and operation possibilities to conduct the research from those selected case studies, which relies on four criteria including (1) *quiring experts*—by quiring the recommended and suitable cases from experts who are knowledgeable and specialized in this research interest: (2) *unique or unusual case*—the cases that would be selected must be the extremely astonishing and exemplary case: (3) *nationally important case*—meaning that the selected cases could indicate emerging issues that are nationally important, and (4) *operational criteria*—the author defines two types of operational criteria so that conducting research in the real situations should be highly practical including operational possibilities of the research project and the theoretical standards.

The first criterion is *querying experts about candidates for the cases*. The author has been working with the National Research Funding Agency for Area-based Development Research (Program Management Unit on Area-Based Development), the Ministry of Higher Education, and professors specializing in local governance in Thailand. Therefore, quiring those experts about potential case candidates is very helpful for the stage of initial screening. The author discussed with experts about the initial cases of eighteen cities in Thailand where there has been launching a new city development corporation as a primary candidate for case selection. As a result, those four selected cases are also highly recommended by scholars to investigate and address the research problems mentioned in this study.

The key indicator to deciding the cases is also grounded on *unusual attributes* and *the national relevance* of the case. Those four selected cases of Khon Kaen, Bueng Kan, Phuket, and Chiang Mai represent the cases that are unusual and nationally important on the issues of transport policymaking. The unique or unusual case means those selected cases should be well-represented in each local collaborative model that runs their joint effort to advocate for transport policymaking, particularly the successful and unsuccessful cases. Khon Kaen and Bueng Kan represent functional cases in running local joint efforts for transport policymaking, while Chiang Mai and Phuket are unfunctional coalitions. Furthermore, these cases also reveal their nationally important attributes, particularly for municipal reform and collaborative transport policymaking because there has been an establishment of Thailand's first municipal corporation and city development corporation to advocate for local-own railway initiative, which never existed before in the regional part of Thailand. Therefore, those selected cases are both unique and nationally important.

Finally, the selected cases should be aligned with two operational criteria that the author sets as primary conditions to conduct this research in Thailand under time constraints and the pandemic crisis, including managerial and theoretical standards. Managerial criteria concern accessibility to data sources, time constraints, pandemic crisis, state regulations related to COVID-19, and limited financial resources to conduct research fieldwork. These are primary concerns for the operation possibilities. Another critical issue is theoretical criteria, in which the author examines the qualities of those selected cases on *replication*, *generalization*, and *representation* of the cases related to the two theoretical propositions mentioned in the study as their critical potential for theory building. Khon Kaen, Phuket, Chiang Mai, and Bueng Kan are highly qualified for those scientific criteria. They are the cities where the author has been working with local coalitions in various policy fields. Therefore, these cities are accessible for data collection and use fewer resources to run the fieldwork. Furthermore, cross-case analysis among these cities would potentially contribute to theory building, especially the theorization associated with different collaborative models, roles of policy actors, and their impacts on transport policymaking.

3.5. Introduction of Selected Cases

3.5.1. Khon Kaen City

Khon Kaen is the regional core city located at the center of the Northeastern Region of Thailand. It is also the most affluent regional city because there are many commercial

zones, big department stores, and the hub of industrial logistics of the region. Furthermore, Kho Kaen is a center of regional healthcare services since there are international healthcare centers and hospitals located in the city where citizens from Lao and Myanmar travel to take services. Khon Kaen is normally perceived as the city of education where the most prestigious and biggest university in the region is located, called the Khon Kaen University—a top-ten university in Thailand and the top-rank university of the Northeastern Region. Therefore, economic prosperity in Khon Kaen is driven by multiple facets, especially universities, health services, and local industries. Further, Khon Kaen is not well-known as a touring city compared to Chiang Mai and Phuket cities, but it is well known in terms of the regional economic, health, and educational hub of the northeastern region.

3.5.2. Chiang Mai City

Chiang Mai is one of the well-known traveling destinations located in the North Region of Thailand. It is also the most regional prosperous city due to the capacity of the city to attract national and international tourists and industries into the town. Like Khon Kaen City, Chiang Mai is also a regional hub of health and educational services because international-standard hospitals and leading university, such as Chiang Mai University, are located in the city to serve local people, international tourists, and retired foreigners. Furthermore, international visitors are key to the growth of the city since Chiang Mai relies on the travel industry, especially Chinese, Korean, and Japanese. Although Chiang Mai is well known as an international touring destination, but the public transportation serving people and tourists is poor, which mainly relies on an on-demand local transport service called “*the red truck*.” This local transport service has raised multiple issues related to the development of public transport infrastructure in the city because local people still benefit from the red truck system.

3.5.3. Phuket City

Phuket is one of the globally well-known travel destinations located in the southern part of Thailand. The economy is mainly driven by service and travel industries since tourists around the world, especially from China, Russian, Australia, and Germany, have come to Phuket both for short-term and long-term stays. Furthermore, the cost of living in Phuket City is higher than in other cities due to the number of international visitors and the island geography. Phuket has always been ranked at the top for its largest number of international tourists. Therefore, local business and travel industries largely benefit from the numbers of

domestic and international tourists. Although Phuket is a global travel destination, the urban traffic conditions and transportation system are poor; there is only a city bus service with limited capacities to carry passengers. Further, on-demand taxi service is also doubled expensive compared to other cities. Therefore, the most convenient transportation for visitors relies on private and rental car services. This is one of the reasons why the local coalition wants to improve their public transportation in Phuket.

3.5.4. Bueng Kan City

Bueng Kan is the newest city located in the Northeastern Region of Thailand. It has been promoted as the latest city since 2011, dividing itself from Nongkhai City. The city is also surrounded by the Mekhong River and mountainous landscape. Moreover, Bueng Kan is a boundary city located next to the Bolikhamzai City of Lao PDR that could easily connected to Vietnam and China. The economic structure of Bueng Kan is driven by natural touring and agriculture industries, especially rubber production. Bueng Kan is the largest rubber-producing city in the Northeastern Region and the top-eight highest rubber-producing city in Thailand. The majority of rubber from Bueng Kan is also exported to China. Although the level of economic prosperity is lower than Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket, the mega transport infrastructures are rapidly growing, such as airport, inter-city expressway, and international cross-border bridge. These expanding transport infrastructures strengthen the capacities of local industries in Bueng Kan to prosper in national and international markets.

3.6. Data Collection

The application of qualitative research is about handling data from multiple sources such as direct observation, interviews, archival records, documents, participatory observation, or physical artifacts. However, this study relies on three data sources: *participatory observations* during field operations, *open-ended interviews*, and *documentary research*. Data collection strategies are directed by objectives and propositions presented in this study as in the following Table.

Table 2 Approaches applied to collect data in each city

Case Study	Interview	Documentary Research	Participatory Observations
Khon Kaen	✓	✓	✓

Chiang Mai	✓	✓	-
Phuket	✓	✓	-
Bueng Kan	✓	✓	✓

The author runs fieldwork interviews during the COVID-19 pandemic widely spread in Thailand. Therefore, social norms and state laws related to COVID are the most challenging issues for data collection and interactions with key informants during interviews. Although the majority of informants were interviewed on-site and face-to-face, but some informants were also interviewed online through Zoom, mainly those informants from the Khon Kaen Municipality and the KKTS. Other informants in Chiang Mai, Phuket, Bueng Kan, and national agencies were on-site interviewed. Those key informants are diversified, including heads of national, regional, and local agencies and chief executives of local firms, city development corporations, and presidents and executives of the chamber of commerce, university professors, and members of local civil societies involved in LRT initiatives. The total number of key informants interviewed in this study is 39 persons, which includes political, bureaucratic, academic, private, and civic actors who are key actors in transport policymaking attached to local coalitions in each city, as detailed in the following table. All personal data of those informants is confidential; only position, affiliation, and abbreviation would be revealed in this study as shown in Table below.

Table 3 Key informants interviewed in Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, Phuket, and Bueng Kan


Case Study	Key Informants
Chiang Mai City	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mayor of Maehia Town Municipality (1) • Vice Mayor of Chiang Mai City Municipality (1) • Head and members of a local civic organization called “<i>Kheaw Suai Hom</i>” Organization (4) • CEO of Chiang Mai Social Enterprise (1) • CEO of Chiang Mai City Development Corporation (1) • Former President of Chiang Mai Chamber of Commerce (1) • Professor at Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University (1)
Phuket City	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mayor of Phuket City Municipality (1) • Chief Executive of the Phuket’s PAO (1)

Case Study	Key Informants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President and Executives of Phuket Chamber of Commerce (4) • CEO of Phuket City Development Corporation (1)
Khon Kaen City	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mayor of Khon Kaen City Municipality (1) • CEO of Khon Kaen Transit System (KKTS) (1) • Co-Founder of Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKTT) (2) • President of Khon Kaen Chamber of Commerce (1) • Head of Civil Society called “<i>Khon Kaen’s Next Decade Organization</i>” (1) • Private Sector Representatives (5) • Professor at College of Local Administration, Khon Kaen University (2)
Bueng Kan City	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor of Bueng Kan Province (1) • Chief of Bueng Kan Governor Office (1) • Heads of regional and local authorities (2) • Bueng Kan Chamber of Commerce (1) • Local businesses representative (2)
Central Agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minister of Transportation (1) • Deputy Minister of Interior (1)
Total Informants	39 key informants

After finishing each interview, the author operated an additional technique called “*take-home report*” to ensure no crucial details were missing. The take-home report is a process of writing a short statement on the same day after finishing each interview. The report includes three critical parts: *personal observations, key messages or events noted by informants, and drawing initial conclusions or assumptions from each interview*. Writing the take-home report helped the author to recall important events and information from the interview backward and resulted in having more time for additional review or compiling additional details related to those critical events and information, which are new issues that the author had never known before. This process is useful for gaining insightful data and ensuring that no essential data will be missing in the next step of the data analysis process. All take-home reports are stored in Notion software and converged into the *Memo* function

on *Atlast.ti* when running data analysis. All data collection approaches, and case study database development deployed in this study are shown in the following figure.

Figure 4 Summary of data collection approach



3.7. Data Analysis Approach

Data analysis is the critical step to draw logical conclusions. The most challenging task of qualitative research is designing data analysis methodologies that should be most reliable to generalize theory and draw scientific conclusions. This study embraced four scientific principles of qualitative data analysis elaborated by Yin (2012: 126-137), including *using multiple sources of evidence, developing a case study database, maintaining a chain of evidence, and being cautious of the data from social media or archival records*. These four principles would enhance the construct validity and reliability of case study research in both data collection and analysis phases.


As a result, this study applied the CAQDAS technique—*computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software* (Friese, 2022; Bringer & Johnston & Brackenridge, 2006: 245-266; Yin 2012:166-167), which multiple data sources and evidence collected from fieldwork would be compiled to the *Notion* software to build the case study database and maintain chain of evidence in a retrievable way to trace evidentiary backward. Moreover, this study also applied qualitative data analysis software—*ATLAS.ti 23*, to analyze all data collected from the fields and draw logical conclusions of cross-case analysis. Therefore, the case study database from *Notion* will be converged to *ATLAS.ti 23* to run coding operations, quoted reference sources, and data analysis. Therefore, *ATLAS.ti 23* and *Notion* are primary softwares the author applied to analyze data in scientific, systematic, and reliable ways.

3.7.1. Data Analysis Framework

All processes of data analysis are elaborated in the following figure, which reveals six sequential processes of data analysis methodology conducted in this study: (1) *running field operations* in Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, Phuket, and Bueng Kan cities by conducting interviews with those key informants mentioned earlier; (2) *textual and non-textual data*

entry, which all data files such as audio records of interviews, transcribed files from interviews, take-home reports, fieldwork photos, official letters, and other documentary sources would be undertaken into Notion to create case database; (3) *data processing and encoding, data analysis*, all data files from Notion would be refined and processed into ATLAS.ti 23 to encode and create quotations; (4) *data analysis*, all memos, quotations, and codes generated by the author will be analyzed and drawn into logical relations among factors founded from data processing on ATLAS.ti 23; (5) *tentative conclusion* will be summarized and reaffirmed with those cited pieces of evidence on ATLAS.ti 23 if there is a rival theory (if any) and re-affirm possible alternatives to reject those rival theories.

Figure 5 Overall process of data analysis




This study applies three techniques of data analysis, including pattern matching, drawing logic models, and cross-case analysis. Pattern matching defines a correspondence between empirical patterns of case studies—or an *observed pattern*, and predicted results made before conducting the data collection, whether those patterns are found similar or dissimilar (Yin, 2012: 175-178; Trochim, 1989: 355-366; Marquart, 1989: 37-43). As noted by a leading scholar of pattern-matching logic, Trochim (1989:356) elaborated that “...*pattern matching involves an attempt to link two patterns where one is a theoretical pattern and the other is an observed or operational one...*” Further clarification given by Hak and Dul (2009:663) also exemplified that “...*pattern matching is comparing two patterns in order to determine whether they match...or do not match... Pattern matching is the core procedure of theory-testing with cases. Testing consists of matching an “**observed pattern**” (a pattern of measured values) with an “**expected pattern**” (a hypothesis), and deciding whether these patterns match (resulting in a confirmation of the hypothesis) or do not match (resulting in a disconfirmation)...*” Moreover, Yin (2012: 175) and Marquart

(1989) also asserted that the application of pattern matching to case study research could strengthen the internal validity and construct validity of the case study.

Logic modeling indicates a *causal explanation* of specific events. Its core approach is to identify the causal effect of a complex chain of events to show how those phenomena take place. Therefore, observed variables applied in the case study must be analyzed in a *sequential pattern* to show how those variables lead to the potential consequences. This casual pattern could be revealed in “*repeated cause-effect-cause-effect patterns*” in a way that the outcome of the pattern from an earlier stage could turn into a new causal event for the next stage (Peterson & Bickman, 1992:165-176; Yin, 2012: 186-194). To develop a particular logic model is to draw the transition from one casual event to another. The general approach to drawing a logical model is based on the concept of “*arrows between the boxes.*” Each arrow explains how a casual event (in one box) transits from one stage to another or produces a certain sequent event (in the following box). Therefore, the logic model offers a suitable approach to address key problems stated in this research of “*how*” and “*why*” certain event leads to sequential outcomes. As such, developing the logic model needs to capture both *direct effects* and *contextual conditions* that yield the consequences. Furthermore, a logic model is generally a result of CAQDAS, especially through the coding data that is interpreted from interviews, raw data, or fieldwork (Flick, 2018:520-535; Creswell & Creswell,2018: 179-212). Therefore, integration of ATLAS.ti 23 software in this study is highly capable to build a logical model, particularly following the paradigm model of Strauss and Corbin (Strauss & Corbin, 1998: 127; see also in Flick, 2018: 458-459)

Figure 6 The Paradigm Model



See Strauss & Corbin (1998) and Flick (2018)


Cross-case analysis is the nature of multiple-case study research. The main technique of cross-case analysis applied in this research is to examine *within-case patterns* across those four selected cases in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, Phuket, and Bueng Kan. The researcher initially analyses within-case patterns of each individual case; at this stage, the author would acknowledge initial findings and later conclude each case related to “*how*” and “*why*” such a phenomenon happened. After analyzing findings from each case, the *cross-case analysis* would be applied to evaluate those tentative findings about replicative logics across the case—literal or theoretical replications (see also Yin, 2012: 55 & 196-197). In other words, analyzing the similarities and differences to theorize the findings from each case.

3.7.2. Data Analysis Technique

As mentioned above, the CAQDAS technique is the main data analysis strategy applied in this study; *ATLAS.ti 23* and *Notion* are the primary computer-assisted software applied to all stages of data analysis. The author classified techniques of data analysis using *ATLAS.ti 23* into three main stages: *data processing*, *data analyzing*, and *analyzed-data translating*. Those stages could be divided into five sequential steps, including transcription of interview data, development of project database, encoding, pattern matching and logic modeling, and single-case and cross-case analysis, as detailed in the following Figure.

Figure 7 Overview of Data Analysis Technique

5-Step Process of Data Analysis Technique Using ATLAS.ti 23



The data processing stage is a pre-analysis procedure in which all data are managed and cleaned. Data processing includes two processes, which are (1) *transcribing and* (2) *developing a project database*. All data collected from the interviews are recorded on the

recording machine and those files were compiled and stored on the Notion before it will be processed into the transcription. Data collected from the interviews is required to be transcribed into Microsoft Word before it will be processed on the project database and encoding stages on ATLAS.ti. After finishing the transcription of interview data, those files will be further compiled on the project database created for each single case study. The stage of developing the project database relies on the software function of the *document group* on ATLAS.ti, which is very useful for handling multiple sources of evidence and files into a systematic sort before those files will be processed into the data analyzing stage.

The data analyzing stage includes two critical processes: (1) encoding codes and quotations and (2) drawing relationships between the codes. Codes include quotations that support or are relevant to a code. The author encoded all evidence found on transcribed files; the total number of quotations is 903. In the encoding process, the author simultaneously grouped those quotations into various code categories classified based on the research framework prepared for the next stage of drawing logic relations between codes. The stage of drawing the relationship between the codes—*the coding framework*, is based on the research framework applied to investigate those selected cases, in which all relevant codes are analyzed through pattern matching and logical modeling through ATLAS.ti functions of *Co-occurrence analysis* and *Networks*. The co-occurrence analysis is very applicable for pattern matching between observed patterns and expected patterns, especially the pattern of functional and unfunctional advocacy coalitions. The network function is used to draw a logical model and identify a relationship between codes.

The analyzed-data translating stage is a process of interpreting and concluding the study results. It includes two processes—*single-case and cross-case analysis*. The single-case analysis aims to clarify the within-case pattern of each case, while cross-case analysis is applied to evaluate those single-case findings related to the replicative logics across the case—literal or theoretical replications, to theorize the findings. Single-case and cross-case analyses are done through two functions of ATLAS.ti—*Co-occurrence analysis and Networks*. Co-occurrence analysis investigates the connection between codes that exist or are co-related to each other within a particular situation. In this study, the Co-occurrence function applied to evaluate the correlation of factors or events that facilitate and hinder capacities of advocacy coalitions. Network function applied to draw explanatory relations and logic models that offer casual relations to identify how and why those factors or events lead to the potential consequences.

CHAPTER 4

COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE AND URBAN TRANSPORT POLICYMAKING IN THAILAND

This chapter is divided into two parts. The initial part clarifies how intergovernmental relations in Thailand have been constructed between national and local governments. The beginning of this chapter elaborates on the evolution and key issues of local governance and decentralization in Thailand, especially the problems related to local autonomy and re-centralization issues from the unstable political system in Thailand. The second part clarifies the nature of transport policymaking in Thailand, which has long been centralized to the national agencies. The final part of this chapter also identifies the recent movement of local collaborative actions that run their joint efforts to advance urban transport services in Thailand.

4.1. Intergovernmental Relations in Thailand

In 2023, the local governments in Thailand have been functioning for over 126 years since the first establishment of the local authority called “*Sukharphibarn Krungthep*” in Bangkok in 1897. After the political revolution in Thailand on June 24, 1932, by the People’s Party or “*Khana Ratsadon (in Thai)*” who transformed the state regime from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, democratization was largely advanced because this revolution led to the declaration of the first Thailand Constitution in 1932—which aimed to democratize and modernize political and government reform in Thailand (Singsamron, 2016; Dhiravegin, 2010 & 2011). The 1932 Constitution not only led to the first national election held in 1933 but it also led to the creation of the *Siam’s National Public Administration Act* declared in 1932, which divided the structure of the national administration system into three-tier structures influenced by France, including national, regional, and local government levels. In relevance to local government reform, there was

the first promulgation of the Municipal Law in 1933 , the Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) promulgated in 1955, and the Subdistrict Administrative Organization (SAO) Law declared in 1956 (Puang-ngam, 2012; Dhiravegin, 2011). However, these local government bodies were *not autonomous* and closely monitored by the central government. The local executives of PAOs and SAOs were not from the direct election of the residents, and their duties were also limited. Therefore, local government in this era was regarded as the embryonic phase and the delegated agency of central and regional governments.

Not until the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution, which was the first constitution that necessitated the decentralization and endorsed the local autonomy of local government in Thailand (Dhiravegin, 2011; Mala,2017; Tanchi, 2014). Following the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution, the decentralization and local government in Thailand were widely reformed because this constitution led to the promulgation of multiple local government laws, including the *Decentralization Promotion Plan* declared in 1999, which extremely transferred duties and authorities to the local government and ensured that the local autonomy would constantly transfer to the local government, *the Local Officials Management Law* promulgated in 1999, and particularly the *Local Council and Executives Election* promulgated in 2002, which endorsed that those members of local councils and executives of municipality, PAOs, and SAOs, must be directly elected from their residents (Puang-ngam, 2012, 141-148).

In summary, the author classified the development of local government in Thailand which reveals different paths and evolution of intergovernmental relations between central and local governments into four periods (Lertphaitoon, 2007; Dhiravegin, 2010 & 2011; Puang-ngam, 2012; Tanchai, 2014; Mala, 2017; Pholsim, 2020; Charoenmuang: 2022a & 2022b): (1) local government as a delegated agency of the state (pre-1932), (2) bureaucratic-centric local government or bureaucratic polity (1932-1996), (3) decentralization and local government reform (1997-2015), and (4) the early phase of local governance (2015-now).

(1) Local government as a delegated agency of the state (pre-1932)

The first wave of national public administration reform in Thailand began in the era of King Rama V (1853-1910), who sought to modernize the state through multiple strategies, especially the abolition of obsolete traditions such as the slave system, crawling tradition to respect to the higher class, military reform, and national tax reform. It is King Rama V who employed the “ministry” system to the state's administrative system. He also applied a

“*Regional Governing System (RGS)*” called “*Mondhon-thesaphibarn (in Thai)*” which generally strengthened the regional authority and centralized power to the state. The RGS was a four-tier governing system including city (or province), district, subdistrict, and village: the city was ruled by the city governor, a sheriff ruled the district, the subdistrict was ruled by a subdistrict headman, and the villages ruled by the village headman (Dhiravegin, 2010 & 2011).

The initial shape of the local governing body in Thailand was built through the “*Local Sanitation Agency (LSA)*” or what they called “*Sukharphibarn.*” Originally, there were only two agencies of the local sanitation unit, which were the Bangkok Local Sanitation Agency or “*Sukharphibarn Krungthep*” established in 1897 and the Tharchalorm Local Sanitation Agency or “*Sukhaphibarn Tharchalorm (in Thai)*” formed in 1905 located in Samut Sakhon Province. However, in 1918, there was the promulgation of the Local Sanitation Agency Act, which resulted in a larger number and expansion of these LSAs established in fifty-five cities throughout Thailand (Dhiravegin, 2010: 283; Puang-ngam, 2012: 142). These local sanitation agencies were allowed mainly for sanitary duties, especially cleaning the city, maintenance of public lights, and garbage disposal.

The primary goal of establishing those local sanitation agencies was only to keep the city clean; the state was not intended to promote democracy, civic education, or decentralization. Further, these local sanitation agencies had no autonomy; instead, they followed commands and instructions of the state (Lertphaitoon, 2007:122-136). Officers who worked in these LSAs were the city governors and sheriffs who were dispatched and appointed by the central government, not elected by their residents. Therefore, the duties and officers of these local sanitation agencies had no autonomy to manage themselves freely. Their functions were mainly directed by the central government, and they were monitored and commanded closely by the central bureaucrats. Therefore, the first phase of developing the local government system in Thailand emerged through the *Sukharphibarn*, or the LSAs, which act as delegated agencies of the state.

(2) The bureaucratic-centric local government (1932-1996)

The second wave was the greatest political reform that began in 1932 through the People’s Party Revolution on June 24, 1932. This revolution was the most significant shift in the political system of Thailand, which changed the state regime from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. The main reasons behind this revolution were to

democratize and modernize the state to be more functional since its old administrative system was overcentralized, the absolute monarchy regime was also weak, and the governing structure of the state was unable to cope with domestic political conflicts and the global economy regression (Mektrirat, 1997; Dhiravegin, 2010).

The People's Party Revolution in 1932 led to the promulgation of the first constitution of Thailand in 1932, resulting in the first Thailand national election held in 1933. The 1932 Revolution also led to the promulgation of the "Siam National Public Administration Act" in 1933, which reformed the new state's governing structure divided into three tiers, including the national, regional, and local government levels, following the ideas of centralization, deconcentration, and decentralization. It also led to the creation of the "*Municipal Management Act*" declared in 1933, which officially promoted those former LSAs into the municipality (Suvanmongkol et al., 1994: 22-23; Puang-ngam, 2012: 143). However, mayors of municipalities, under this law, still did not come from the direct election of residents but from the selection among members of the municipal council. Their authorities were limited, and they were closely monitored by regional and central governments.

One of the significant impacts of the 1932 Revolution was an enlargement of bureaucratic power in managing the state because after the revolution was successful, the political awareness of the citizens was low, and the capabilities of the political institution were positioned lower than the power of those bureaucrats, especially the high-class regular and military bureaucrats. Therefore, the power to decide policies and manage public affairs was preserved mainly by the bureaucrat. As Dhiravegin (2010: 27) noted that "*...The result (of the People's Party Revolution in 1932) was that after the revolution, those regular and military bureaucrats took power and replaced the old system under the circumstance that the political awareness of Thai people was low and political institution capacity was lower than those capacities of the bureaucrats. Therefore, after the 1932 revolution, power related to state policymaking was retained only by the bureaucrats. It was the period of "Bureaucratic Polity" which signified the politics of bureaucrats, by bureaucrats, and for the bureaucrats...*"

Later, in the era of Prime Minister Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram, who was one of the leaders of the People's Party Revolution, had reformed the LSAs system throughout the country and promulgated the "*Provincial Administration Law*" in 1955, which led to the

creation of “*the Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO)*” to take responsibility in the whole areas especially in rural cities where there were not yet established municipality and the LSAs to take responsibilities. However, the chief and executives of PAOs under this law were appointed and dispatched from central and regional governments, not from the election (Puang-ngam, 2012: 144). The government also declared the “*Subdistrict Administrative Organization (SAO) Law*” in 1956; still, those executives of the SAOs under this law were not from direct election of residents, but subdistrict headman and village headmen were appointed as SAO executives by their position. Although, there was a revision of the SAO Law in 1994, which regulated that members of the local council must be directly elected by residents. This version of SAO also led to the expansion of more than six thousand SAOs located throughout Thailand in 1995. Still, those SAO executives were selected among the members of a local council, not the direct election of residents.

(3) Decentralization and local government reform (1997-2015)

The third wave of local government reform resulted from the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution, which was regarded as “*the Constitution of the People*” because this constitution was authorized by participation and referendums from the citizens across the country. Therefore, the 1997 Constitution is regarded as the people's constitution and the most participatory and acceptable constitution for Thai citizens ever. This constitution necessitated the citizens' liberty, basic human rights, and political participation. More importantly, it was the first constitution of Thailand that officially endorsed the “*local government*” into the main section stated in the constitution and promoted local autonomy and decentralization reform in Thailand. Therefore, the 1997 Constitution was the origin of the local autonomy in Thailand, which clearly stated about restricted interventions of central and regional governments— *the local government shall have the local autonomy to work freely without unnecessary interventions from central and regional governments.*

The 1997 Constitution led to the significant reform of the local government structure because the Local Sanitation Agency (LSA) system was officially terminated in 1999, and all 980 LSAs were promoted into municipality (Lertphaitoon, 2007: 139). More importantly, there was the declaration of the *Decentralization Promotion Act* in 1999 led to the important advancement of managerial, local officials, and financial reform of the local governments. After the Decentralization Promotion Act was declared, there were three national plans to modernize decentralization in Thailand (Mala, 2017: 351-352), including the National Plan

for Decentralization Promotion in the First Phase (2000-2007), the National Plan for Decentralization Promotion in the Second Phase (2008-2013), and the National Plan for Decentralization Promotion in the Third Phase (2015-2019). All these plans were meant to reform decentralization, advocate for local autonomy, transfer authorities, and advance local governments' managerial and financial capacities.

Moreover, in 2002, there was the promulgation of the *Act on Local Election of Local Council Members and Executives*, which led to significant changes in the local election system where the local council members and the executives of all local government types—PAOs, Municipality, and SAOs, must be directly elected by their residents. Therefore, in *the 1997 Constitution* and particularly after the promulgation of the Decentralization Promotion Act, the local government system had largely been reformed and enlarged their authorities with higher political and administrative affairs.

(4) Early phase of local governance (2015-now)

There has been a new wave of local reform in Thailand since 2015 through the development of collaborative efforts among local government and the private sector to run urban development initiatives. Mainly through the experiences of local joint efforts in Khon Kaen City, where there was the creation of Thailand's first city development corporation (CDC) in 2015 called "*Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKTT)*." The KKTT was formed based on collaborative efforts among twenty local firms who jointly gathered their personal fund of 200 million bath to support the operations of KKTT as a local think tank to incorporate with the local governments in running their joint efforts for the development of light rail transit (LRT) project, other urban transport systems and economic development initiatives in Khon Kaen City (Pholsim & Inaba, 2022; Wongthanavas, Dhaweesangsakulthai, Pholsim, 2021).

Moreover, in 2017, there was the most significant advancement of local governance reform due to the establishment of Thailand's first municipal corporation over 70 years after the promulgation of this municipal law in 1953. The first municipal corporation was officially established in Khon Kaen City, called "*Khon Kaen Transit System (KKTS)*." The KKTS was established based on a joint effort between five neighboring municipalities—*Khon Kaen City Municipality, Sila Town Municipality, Mueangkao Subdistrict Municipality, Samran Subdistrict Municipality, and Thapra Subdistrict Municipality* (Pholsim, 2020: 137).

These five municipalities jointly assembled a fund of 5 million bath to establish the KKTS to directly advocate for the LRT initiatives that those municipalities had driven for years.

These emerging two local bodies—*the KKTT and KKTS* in Khon Kaen City, have been working together and sharing their resources, expertise, and network to run multiple urban development initiatives, especially LRT policymaking and other environmental and economic development projects. Moreover, the capabilities of these KKTT and KKTS have been well-known as “*the Khon Kaen Model*” because the model channels ways for local governance reform in Thailand. Experiences of the KKTT have also been modeled by another eighteen cities throughout the country. Recently, there have been twenty city development corporations established in eighteen cities across Thailand—some provinces have two entities, which was learned from Khon Kaen City (Wongthanasu, Dhaweesangsakulthai, Pholsim, 2021).

Since 2015, the movements of local collaborative efforts, particularly the roles of local private alliances, have been widely growing into the affairs of local policymaking and public management throughout the country. Expanding roles of local firms in local governance strengthens the financial and managerial capacities of local governments to advance their city more effectively and handle critical issues that local government alone is unable to achieve. Therefore, these emerging local collaborative bodies—*city development corporations and municipal corporations*, are at an embryonic form situated in the local governing system in Thailand, which reflects the shift from government-centric to governance-oriented relations. However, Thailand still has little experience and knowledge to deal with these emerging new local bodies. As such, those local joint efforts are needed to investigate further on how to advance and organize appropriate working relations between multiple local partners attached to the new local collaborative system. Therefore, this study is theoretically and practically useful to advance collaborative policymaking literature and practical solutions to improve local collaborative actions in Thailand.

4.2. Relations Between the Central and Local Governments in Thailand

The local autonomy principle was first endorsed in Thailand by the 1997 Constitution or “*the Constitution of People*,” as discussed earlier. However, since there has been coup d'etat many times by military overthrowing the governments, the constitution has also been revised several times as well. Eventually, Thailand is the state where there have been revisions and new promulgations of the constitution more than twenty times since the first

Thailand Constitution was promulgated in 1932. Although the local autonomy has remained in the constitution, the monitoring details have always been modified and re-centralized. The original local autonomy endorsed by the 1997 Constitution stipulated in Articles 282, 283, and 284 about local-self-government that “...*the state shall authorize local autonomy based on the principle of local self-government of the citizens... The monitoring of local government shall be only for the necessary matters to protect local and public interests...those monitoring matters shall not intervene in the local self-government principle... The local governments shall have local autonomy in policymaking, management, human resources, finance and budget, and their own authorities...*” Therefore, this constitution extensively strengthened local government autonomy with restricted interventions from central governments only for the necessary matters of protecting local interests. Furthermore, local governments were able to make policy, administer officials, and managing local budget freely without monitoring or control from the central government.

However, the recent 2017 Constitution—the twentieth constitution of Thailand, in Article 250, stipulates that “*local governments shall have the local autonomy in management, public services, and supporting finance and education affairs. The monitoring of local governments is constrained, except only for the necessary matters to protect the local and public interests, against the corruptions, and enhance public expenditure efficiency.*” Therefore, although the local autonomy has remained in the constitution, the level of autonomy was degraded. In the 1932 Constitution, there were no stipulations about monitoring local financing and budgeting, but the 2017 Constitution recentralized those monitoring duties and allowed the central government to monitor and intervene in local finance *if* to enhance the efficiency of local public expenditure, which they could easily deploy this excuse. Furthermore, the 2017 Constitution also allows the upper-tier government to intervene in the local governments in cases they *assumed corruption*. The term corruption is broad and politically manipulated since the term corruption broadly involves political, financial, and all dimensions of managerial affairs of local government, which now could be easily monitored by the central and regional government if those affairs assumed corruption.

Therefore, since the ending of the 1997 Constitution, the autonomy and authorities of local governments have constantly been re-centralized to the state. Roles of upper-tier governments—central and regional agencies have always been strengthened in monitoring the local governments, especially the budgeting, taxing, and managing the contracts (Puang-

ngam, 2012: 140-141; Patthamasiriwat, 2010: 165-203; Wongthanavasut et al., 2014: 52-56). Although, in principle, the relationship between central and local governments is independent, but in reality, the central government could monitor local government in two ways—direct and indirect monitoring (Puang-ngam, 2012: 140-141; Lertphaitoon, 2007: 390-409).

- **Direct monitoring power**, the minister and governor have the authority to dissolve local councils and dismiss local executives in cases they found improper or corrupted manners. The local councils of PAOs, municipalities, and SAOs could be dissolved based on the approval of the Minister of Interior in case the governor of each province reported to the Ministry of Interior. The executives of local governments could be dismissed if their behaviours are assumed *immoral* and *disqualified* for being mayors or chief executives in which the sheriff of each district would report to the governor, and the governor then approve the dismissal based on the sheriff's guidance report. Furthermore, some local development initiatives also need direct approval from the Ministry of Interior, such as joint efforts between municipalities to establish the municipal corporation, as in the case of Khon Kaen, which need direct authorization from the Ministry of Interior. Therefore, the upper-tier governments—*regional and central authorities*, still have direct power to monitor and control local governments.
- **Indirect monitoring power**, the government could indirectly monitor and control local governments particularly through budgeting and contracting approaches. The local governments receive grants from the central government. The majority of local government's income comes from nationally allocated tax subsidiaries and granting of central government—more than 48.97 % is allocated tax subsidiary and more than 41.08 % is granting of central government, only 9.95 % is self-generated income of local governments (Parliamentary Budget Office, 2021). This granting system is divided into two types—*general and special grants*. A general grant is a budget that local government can spend freely based on their demands, while a special grant comes with specific purposes directed by the central authorities, such as delegated functions where the local government could not use this special grant for other purposes. Therefore, special granting is a great tool to monitor and control local governments because the use of this grant must be allied with the central purposes and closely monitored by the Provincial Office of Finance and approved by the Ministry of Finance. Contracting is also another indirect approach to managing the

affairs of local government. In principle, the local government has the authority to contract freely. However, the central government could indirectly control local contracting through the specification of requirements and standards specified by national laws of the Government Procurement and Inventory Management Law 2017 and the Code of Ministry of Finance on Government Procurement and Inventory Management 2017. All official contracting of local governments must comply with the requirements stated in these laws. Therefore, these central laws constrain local government's managing and contracting affairs.

Although the local governments in Thailand have been endorsed with local autonomy by the Constitution but there have been multiple challenges about local governments' monitor and control in direct and indirect ways. The roles of upper-tier governments—central and regional agencies have remained powerful in monitoring local governments, and many functions have been centralized for decades, such as railways, medical services, and mega transport and infrastructure development. To enhance the capacities of local government and inter-municipal collaboration in Thailand is to keep the upper-tier level aloof, as in many advanced local governing states (Hulst and van Montfort, 2011). Therefore, seeking an appropriate interrelationship between central, regional, and local governments is a meaningful research agenda to advance local government capacities in Thailand.

4.3. Nature of Urban Transport Policymaking in Thailand

Transport policy generally involves three dimensions: *infrastructure investments, pricing instruments, and regulations* (Rimmer, 1987: 1570-1571; Berg, Deichmann, Liu, & Selod, 2017: 466). Infrastructure investment involves the construction of new transport infrastructures such as railways, roadways, seaports, or airports. Pricing instruments involve developing incentives to offer attractive services to customers and support affordable or inclusive transport services such as tax, subsidies, fare reductions, or cost recovery of public transport. Regulations involve measures, rules, or mechanisms set by the government that directly influence, restrict, or facilitate public transport services. The development of these transport policies could facilitate growth and social inclusion if those policies are well-designed by responsible authorities and stakeholders. However, the duties of those transport policies are normally restricted to the central armatures, especially the mega transport infrastructure investment. While the local government—although involved closely with stakeholders, remains with general duties to manage micro-transport service.

As in the case of Thailand, although the local government has been working for more than 126 years, but Thailand has remained an *over-centralized state* (Puang-ngam, 2012; Luangprapat, 2016; Tanchai, 2014), in which Bangkok is the center of power and growth. Majorities of public finances, economic growth, and advanced transportation systems are concentrated in Bangkok City. Resulted in the state-reliant nature of local government and large-gap inequalities related to public finance and social and economic imbalances between central and regional cities. Therefore, the local government has suffered from limited finance and regulatory constraints to deal with multiple issues related to social and economic gaps, especially transport infrastructure imbalances.

Recently, more than 95% of transportation in Thailand is dominated by the road network of all transport systems estimated total length of 202,000 kilometers, while the length of railways is 4,343 kilometers, the length of the coastline is 2,614 kilometers, and inland waterways is 1,750 kilometers (Asian Development Bank, 2011: 2) All responsibilities related to traffic planning and transport development policies are centralized under ministerial departments and state enterprises of the Ministry of Transport (MOT). Moreover, the policymaking and planning of public transportation developments must comply with the five national plans set by the government (Parliamentary Budget Office, 2019: 34-41) in which two master plans are set by the government: the *20-Year National Development Plan* and the *National Economic and Development Plan*, and three national plans are set by the MOT: the *National Transportation Plan*, *Thailand Logistics Development Plan*, and *Transportation Infrastructure Development Plan*. Therefore, all transport infrastructure developments launched by local and regional governments must comply with those national agendas.

The duties of transport infrastructure development are centralized to the Ministry of Transport, as discussed earlier. The road for example, responsibilities of road construction and maintenance are centralized mainly to the Department of Highways and Department of Rural Roads, affiliated with the Ministry of Transport (National Reform Council, 2016). The Revised National Roadways Act 2006 classifies roads into five categories—*motorways*, *arterials*, *highway concessions*, *collector roads*, and *local roads*. The Department of Highways is responsible for major three types of roadways including, motorways, arterials, and highway concession. These three roadways are the roads that connect Bangkok to other regions and the region-to-region routes. The Department of Rural Roads is responsible for the collector road, which is the roadways connecting between region-to-province and

province-to-province routes. Finally, local road—which is mainly the roadways connecting communities and subdistrict, is the directly responsible by the local governments. The construction of these five types of roadway networks must comply with the National Transportation Plan set by the MOT.

Table 4 Types and responsibility of the roadways and railways in Thailand

Types	Ministry of Transport			Local Government
	Department of Highways	Department of Rural Roads	MOT State Enterprises	
Roadways				
• <i>Motorways</i>	✓			
• <i>Arterials</i>	✓			
• <i>Highways concession</i>	✓			
• <i>Collector roads</i>		✓		
• <i>Local roads</i>				✓
Railways				
• <i>Railways</i>			✓	
• <i>Electric Railways</i>			✓	

Adapted by the author from *National Council Reform* (2016) and *Asian Development Bank* (2013)

Although those local government laws channel opportunities for them to run the railways duties but, local governments in Thailand have never been involved in launching of the railway services. Further, operating those railways duties requires extreme capacities of financial and political commitments. Therefore, there have never been found that local governments in Thailand operated the railway transit system but some advanced decentralized country such as Japan has revealed that the City Municipality of Toyama jointly operates the light rail transit—Toyama LRT, with the local firm or Toyama Light Rail Co.Ltd (Muro, 2009:24-31; Kriss, Miki-Imoto, Nishimaki, & Riku, 2021:5-8). Therefore, the capacities of local joint efforts become an integral part of those local coalitions who want to advocate for LRT policymaking.

The railways account for only 2% of all transportation sector in Thailand (Ministry of Transport, 2008), and the total length of railways is 2,012 Kilometres, of which only 211.94 Kilometres are electrified. All responsibilities of railways are centralized solely to the *State Railway of Thailand (SRT)*, except the electric railways in Bangkok, which are managed by the *Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA)*, and *Bangkok Mass Transit System Public Co., Ltd. (BTS)*. The SRT was first founded in 1895 by King Chulalongkorn and has remained the central operator of railway services in Thailand (Asian Development Bank, 2013:3). Furthermore, Thailand's railway transport compared with other East and South-East countries revealed that China, Japan, Indonesia, North Korea, and South Korea are superior countries where the railways electrification are highly advanced. Although Thailand has a higher length of total railways than South Korea, but the *electrified railway system* in Thailand is definitely underdeveloped than South Korea.

Table 5 Roadways and railways length of East and South-East Asian Countries

Country	Roadways (Km)		Updated Date	Railways (Km)		Updated Date
	Total Length	Expressways Length		Total Length	Electrified Length	
<i>China</i>	45.2 million	168,000	2020	150,000	100,000	2021
<i>Japan</i>	1,218,772	8,428	2015	27,311	15,430	2015
<i>Indonesia</i>	496,607	-	2011	8,159	565	2014
<i>North Korea</i>	25,554	-	2006	7,435	5,400	2014
<i>Burma</i>	157,000	-	2013	5,031	-	2008
<i>Thailand</i>	180,053	450	2006	5,012	211.94	2021
<i>South Korea</i>	100,428	4,193	2016	3,979	2,727	2016
<i>Vietnam</i>	195,468	-	2013	2,600	-	2014
<i>Malaysia</i>	144,403	1,821	2010	1,851	59	2014
<i>Mongolia</i>	113,200	-	2017	1,815	-	2017
<i>Taiwan</i>	43,206	73	2017	1,613	345	2018
<i>Cambodia</i>	47,263	-	2013	642	-	2014
<i>Philippines</i>	216,387	-	2014	509*	-	2017

Adapted by the author from CIA (2022) in "Country Comparisons—Railways."

Remark: statistics of railways length in the Philippines from the World Bank (2022), and Thailand from the Ministry of Transport (2021)

The electric railway is located only in Bangkok Metropolitan. Studies have shown that public transport development is a key indicator to reflect social and economic inequalities (Hulten & Schwab, 2000; Roller & Waverman, 2001; Calderon & Serven, 2004 & 2008). Therefore, the LRT system in Thailand has mirrored the great challenges of top-down transportation mandates and infrastructure imbalances between central and regional cities since there are no electric railways or the LRT system operates in other parts of Thailand except only in Bangkok City. Further, all railway duties are also centralized to the State Railway of Thailand (SRT) except the electric railway's routes, which the MOTs' affiliated public enterprises are in charge of, as shown in the following Table. The total length of railways in Thailand is 5,013.205 kilometers, of which only 211.94 kilometers are electrified. These electric railways serve people and facilitate economic growth only in Bangkok City and all electric routes are governed by state enterprises of the MOT— Bangkok Mass Transit System Public Co., Ltd. (BTS) and Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA).

Table 6 Types and total railway length in Thailand (as of 2021)

Types	Line	Authority	Length (Km)
<i>Electric</i>	Si Lom	Bangkok Mass Transit System Public Co., Ltd. (BTS)	14
<i>Electric</i>	Sukhumvit	Bangkok Mass Transit System Public Co., Ltd. (BTS)	55.8
<i>Electric</i>	Gold Line	Bangkok Mass Transit System Public Co., Ltd. (BTS)	1.88
<i>Electric</i>	Purple Line	Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRT)	23
<i>Electric</i>	Blue Line	Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRT)	47
<i>Electric</i>	Suvarnabhumi Airport Rail Link	State Railway of Thailand (SRT)	28.7
<i>Electric</i>	Suburb Red Line	State Railway of Thailand (SRT)	41.56

Types	Line	Authority	Length (Km)
<i>Train</i>	Eastern (Inter-city line)	State Railway of Thailand (SRT)	805.723
<i>Train</i>	Northeastern (Inter-city line)	State Railway of Thailand (SRT)	1,329.95
<i>Train</i>	Southern (Inter-city line)	State Railway of Thailand (SRT)	1,625.28
<i>Train</i>	Maeklong (Inter-city line)	State Railway of Thailand (SRT)	65.283
<i>Train</i>	Northern (Inter-city line)	State Railway of Thailand (SRT)	975.029
Total			5,013.205

Source: Ministry of Transport. (2021). MOT Data Catalog: Total Railway Length of Thailand (last updated 2021).

Although local governments are allowed to take railway services, but it requires enormous financial capacities, and they would have to handle multiple challenges from the central agencies of the MOT and MOI. However, the recent movement of local governments in advocating for the LRT system has emerged since 2007 and more prominently after the first Thailand's City Development Corporation (CDC) established in 2015 called the Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKTT) and the formation of Thailand's first municipal corporation in 2017 called the Khon Kaen Transit System (KKTS). This local coalition runs their campaign and demands the central government to operate the local-own LRT system, which totally relies on local self-financing and joint efforts between the KKTT and KKTS. After more than a decade of running joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking, the central government officially authorized the proposed LRT initiative in 2016, and MOI legitimately transferred the duties of LRT development to the KKTS in 2019.

The experiences of Khon Kaen City have encouraged eighteen other cities throughout the country to establish CDCs to work in parallel with local government. Moreover, this phenomenon in Khon Kaen also triggers the new wave of local governance reform in which the local government is more open to all existing sectors and facilitates them to advance the city altogether as co-producers of public service with the local government. Moreover, there are also new local firm movements across the country that established the

CDC with the hope of advancing their hometown cities. More importantly, the Khon Kaen model inspired other cities with the hope of driving the LRT system in their cities, including *Chiang Mai, Phuket, Phitsanulok, and Nakhon Ratchasima*. These are five pilot cities where the Office of Transport Policy and Traffic, the Ministry of Transport (MOT), primarily targeted to advance the LRT system and conducted the feasibility studies. However, LRT initiatives in four cities are dominated by the SRT, except only in Khon Kaen City where the LRT is governed by municipal corporations. Although local coalitions in Chiang Mai and Phuket have run their joint efforts for the LRT policymaking as a similar arrangement to Khon Kaen, but their collaborative action is more challenging.

Table 7 Five LRT pilot cities in Thailand

City	Started Year	Governing Body	CDC	Municipal Corporation	A local campaign to LRT	Approval of LRT
Khon Kaen	2007	Municipality	✓	✓	✓	✓
Phuket	2018	SRT	✓	-	✓	-
Chiang Mai	2018	SRT	✓	-	✓	-
Phitsanulok	2018	SRT	✓	-	-	-
Nakhon Ratchasima	2018	SRT	✓	-	-	-

Therefore, emerging trends of LRT policymaking in Thailand are prominently displayed through the movements of local governments and private coalitions in these pilot cities, especially joint actions between the CDC and municipalities. Recently, the new local governing body of the CDCs emerged in 18 cities throughout the country, and their roles mostly targeted advancing the smart city, public infrastructure, and urban transportation. More interestingly, some cities—such as Chiang Mai and Phuket have two similar entities of the CDCs, *Andaman City Development Corporation (ACDC)* and *Phuket City Development Corporation (PKCD)* in Phuket and *Chiang Mai Social Enterprise (CSE)* and *Chiang Mai City Development Corporation (CMCD)* in Chiang Mai. However, these local coalitions in Chiang Mai and Phuket have faced multiple challenges from centralized state to advocate for LRT policymaking.

Although movements of local coalitions to run their joint efforts for LRT policymaking have been challenged by centralized issues and relevant external events, but

there is only one city that successfully set its LRT initiative on the national government agenda, the LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City. After a decade of running their joint efforts, the central government endorsed the LRT initiative in 2016, and the MOT officially transferred the duties of the LRT to the KKTS in 2019 (Pholsim & Inaba, 2022: 1-14). While in other cities, the central government plans to halt the LRT initiatives in Chiang Mai and Phuket and alter into the bus transport—ART system, but the hopes of local people are still dreaming of the LRT. Therefore, they have mobilized networks and resources to fund the operations of CDCs to run campaigns for LRT policymaking.

This study focuses on how policy actors and relevant factors influence the capacities of those joint local efforts to advocate for transport policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities—which are considered as a horizontal coalition. Furthermore, this research also seeks to clarify how and why some of those coalitions are more functional than others in advocating for LRT policymaking. This study assumes that the roles and resources of policy brokers are critical to the functionality of those local coalitions to achieve transport policymaking. However, roles and types of policy brokers function differently in each collaborative policymaking model. Therefore, the empirical interest of this study is to investigate how policy brokers are critical in different collaborative actions, how they influence transport policymaking, and what relevant factors strengthen and weaken the capacities of those joint efforts to advocate for transport policymaking.

CHAPTER 5

THE CASE OF KHON KAEN CITY

5.1. Introduction

The local coalition in Khon Kaen is a leading example of an advanced local government movement where multiple local sectors have mobilized their resources and networks to advocate for LRT policymaking. The first movement of LRT was initially organized by indigenous business elites who ran businesses and saw the potential and opportunities to advance the city. As such, those local firms have run collaborative efforts since 2008 to campaign for the LRT initiative, which demanded that the LRT development in Khon Kaen should be fully responsible by the local government. After over a decade of running joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking, the proposal was eventually endorsed by the government in 2016. However, multiple challenges have remained due to the central authorities unwillingly rendering their duties to those local governments to launch the LRT initiative. As a result, although the LRT policymaking has been successfully approved by the government, but the policy has not been implemented since it was approved in 2016.

In 2008, the first batch of local business elites gathered their private partners and organized an informal round table to discuss problems and the potential to drive the city forward. They came up with the conclusion that the city needs to improve the public transportation system and develop an exhibition hall to attract big events and festivals to be organized in the city. Later, those local firms proposed the ideas to local and regional authorities to run campaigns for the LRT initiative, which were convincing to those municipalities in Khon Kaen City. Eventually, the local government and business elites have organized campaigns to run for LRT policymaking and jointly mobilized financial resources to strategize their local efforts to run for the LRT. This led to the formation of the two new local governing bodies, including Thailand's first municipal corporation and city development corporation located in Khon Kaen, to advocate for LRT policymaking.

These new local bodies are the key mechanism of the local coalition in Khon Kaen to advocate for the LRT initiative. The LRT in Khon Kaen is a special case because the local coalition demanded the national government that the project should be fully responsible to the local government, meaning that the LRT should fully rely on the self-governance of the local government. However, railway duties have long been centralized to the national authority, and although the law allows the local government to manage railway duties, but there is no local government to manage such railway services before in the history of Thailand. Therefore, local coalitions advocating for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen have faced multiple challenges from the state. The beginning of this chapter examines the experiences of local coalitions in Khon Kaen City that could successfully set LRT initiatives on national agendas but are still unable to materialize the project due to multiple challenges of centralized state and external events. The last part of this chapter also clarifies how and why the local coalition in Khon Kaen could run their joint effort to achieve the policymaking of LRT.

5.2. LRT Initiative in Khon Kaen City

Local efforts to advance transportation in Khon Kaen City have been organized for a decade. Local governments, both municipal and provincial levels, have attempted to improve public transport services since 2008 following the report of the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) that suggested the city to develop public transport services into five main routes. The Khon Kaen City Municipality and Khon Kaen Provincial Administrative Organization also ran feasibility studies in 2011 to find appropriate transport services without a final decision to implement the project. Until there were the movements of local private sectors who encouraged the city to address urban transport issues. In 2013, the local collaborative action, including multiple actors from municipalities, firms, universities, and civil society, officially started to dialogue on urban transportation solutions. As a result, the LRT was the key agenda the local coalition wanted to advocate.

Figure 8 Image of the intended LRT project in Khon Kaen City



Photo source: Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKT)

Figure 9 Image of the Khon Kaen Grand Station, which is located at the centre of the city



Photo source: Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKT)

The LRT initiative is the dream of local people, with hopes that it will transform the image, wellness, and economy of Khon Kaen into a more urbanized and advanced city. If the LRT project is being implemented, Khon Kaen will be the first regional city in Thailand that has an LRT system serving local people outside Bangkok Metropolitan. Furthermore, the Khon Kaen will be the regional role model of LRT policymaking of local governance because the project would be fully owned and managed by the municipality, not central

authorities. Therefore, if the LRT initiative be materialized in Khon Kaen, it would also signify the new reform of local self-government related to urban transport duties that inspired other local governments across Thailand. Although a local coalition in Khon Kan is highly active and unified in running their local joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking, they have faced multiple challenges from the centralized state.

One of those challenges is the plan proposed to launch the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City, which the proposal had been revised multiple times before it got approval from the government. The LRT plan proposed to the national government could be divided into **three versions**—original, revised, and approved plans. The first version of LRT includes five main transit routes covering the whole area of the city, as reported in 2008. This plan includes 82 stations and divides transit routes into red, yellow, pink, green, and blue lines; the total distance is 123 kilometers. The first version is regarded as the most inclusive and effective route covering every commercial, industrial, and living district of local people. However, this plan was rejected by the government and required to reassess its operations and required a further revision considering more details on recent technical and economic changes.

Table 8 The first version of the LRT proposal covered five transit routes.

Route	Distance (Kilometres)	Stations	Route Map
Route 1 (Pink)	7	12	
Route 2 (Red)	33	16	
Route 3 (Blue)	20	14	
Route 4 (Green)	27	21	
Route 5 (Yellow)	36	19	
Total	123	82	

Adapted from the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (2016a)

Furthermore, the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) ran a new feasibility study and reassessed the LRT initiatives in Khon Kaen City. The local coalitions reported the revised LRT proposal once again to the national government in 2015. This revised plan covered five similar routes, but the distances and LRT stations were modified, which differed from the original version. This revised plan extended the short distance of LRT transit routes into 124 kilometres and increased the number of stations to 93 stations. However, this plan was again rejected by the national government, and the plan was required further reassessment by central agencies related to appropriate cost and current technological and economic changes. Therefore, local coalitions were required to propose another revised LRT plan again to the government.

Table 9 Revised version of the LRT route

Route	Distance (Kilometres)	Stations	Route Map
Route 1 (Pink)	6	10	
Route 2 (Red)	23	16	
Route 3 (Blue)	22	19	
Route 4 (Green)	32	25	
Route 5 (Yellow)	41	23	
Total	124	93	

Adapted from the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (2016a)

Finally, the third plan was proposed to the government in 2016. The LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City was originally proposed to the government with five main routes like the previous version. However, the government allowed the city to launch only one route—the *Red Line*, directing from the northern to the southern part of the city. The government principally approved the LRT initiative, authorizing the municipality to take all responsibilities for the LRT development in Khon Kaen City, only with one route. This red line transit route includes 16 stations, and the total distance is 22.8 kilometers. Although this plan was officially approved by the government in 2016 but, the plan to launch the Red Line

route was required another further reassessment of economic, environmental, and technical issues and report to the government again before operations started.

Table 10 Approved plan of LRT's Red Line route

Station	Station Type	Route Map
1. Thar-Pra Station	On-ground	
2. Kud-Kwang Station	On-ground	
3. Third Bus Terminal Station	On-ground	
4. Pratoonam Station	On-ground	
5. Chalernsri Station	Uplift	
6. Big-C Station	Uplift	
7. Center Point Station	Uplift	
8. Central Plaza Station	Uplift	
9. Samleam Station	Uplift	
10. Thai-Samuth Station	Uplift	
11. Toyota Station	On-ground	
12. Srinakarin Hospital Station	On-ground	
13. Khon Kaen University Station	On-ground	
14. Lotus Extra Station	On-ground	
15. Nhong Kung Station	On-ground	
16. Ban Samran Station	On-ground	

Adapted from the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (2016b)

5.3. Local Collaborative Approach

As the first regional city that campaigns for LRT policymaking, Khon Kaen City has organized multiple strategies to run their joint efforts advocate for the local-own LRT initiative proposed to the national government. Although challenging with multiple hindrances of the centralized state, the local coalition in Khon Kaen City has successfully captured the interests of the national government on their local policy agenda. One of the most prominent approaches of their collaborative efforts is the development of new local joint organizations that have never been existed in Thailand before, including municipal and

city development corporations. Furthermore, collaborative actions from multiple stakeholders to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, especially the roles of local civil organizations, are also critical to the success of LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City. Therefore, this section will clarify how those local joint efforts in Khon Kaen are critical to the collaborative policymaking of LRT.

5.3.1. Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKTT)

The first movement of the KKTT could be traced back to 2008, when the local coalition began to research for solutions to advance traffic and economic growth in the city. Significantly, productive public transport services have long been lost from urban services in Khon Kaen. It is a local private sector that inspired the city to launch the LRT initiative with an envisioned image of social wellness and economic growth driven by urban railway services as the experiences of advanced countries where people are conveniently transit and benefit from the LRT. Therefore, local business elites publicly began to assemble their partners for the LRT officially in 2014. Later, multiple campaigns were run together with collaborations from local governments, local universities, business associations, and civil organizations in Khon Kaen City.

What makes the KKTT nationally well-known across Thailand is the contribution of local business elites who jointly mobilized the fund of 200 million baht to establish the KKTT in 2015. The KKTT was founded by 20 local business elites who are the young generation and were originally born in Khon Kaen City. This study refers to them as “*local elites*” because they are owners of big companies and dominate a major part of local business sectors in the city, particularly in real estate, commercial, transport, and automobile industries. However, those local business elites seriously come to take part in urban policymaking—through the KKTT, have channeled the new ways for local development countrywide. According to an interview with Mr.S, one of the KKTT co-founders mentioned one of the reasons motivated them to advocate for the LRT project is that:

“The project was initially driven from “sense of belonging”—the love of birthplace, that we—local people, have been facing many troubles in daily life—public transportation...we would like to solve and develop the growth of our homeland... and our goal is not only the LRT project but also trying to deliver a liveable city for generations.” (Source code: 254:1)

The primary goal of the development of the KKTT is to organize local joint efforts to materialize the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City. The KKTT is the first institutionalized local governing body initiated by the local private sector to unravel regulatory and financial hindrances related to the development of LRT in Khon Kaen. One of their key approaches is financial strategy. Each co-founder donated personal money to fund the operations of KKTT to advocate for LRT policymaking as well as other urban transport services. The KKTT is well recognized that national and local governments have limited financial capacities to organize LRT. Therefore, as local business elites specializing in finance and industrial strategies, those co-founders have invested their capital with the hope of strengthening the financial capacity of the city to advocate for LRT policymaking and other urban development initiatives. As Mr. N, former president of the Khon Kaen Chamber of Commerce and co-founder of the KKTT, identified financial constraints and relevance of the private sector towards the development of LRT in Khon Kaen City:

“We understand that the central government must be responsible for all 77 cities in Thailand. It is impossible for them to willingly allocate major resources to support only in Khon Kaen City. If they do so, other cities might be unwelcome, too. We are local people here and public sector is also another mechanism that could help. However, we could not do every task if the public sector does not support us. Collaboration for city development must come from multiple channels. (Source code: 246:9)

This interview reflects two points related to the roles of KKTT in LRT policymaking. First, those local business elites have long experienced multiple issues related to urban problems, and they would like to engage and invest their efforts to advance the city through their specialization and resources. Second, although the local private sector has the financial capacities and technical specialization to help local coalition advocate for the LRT, but they have no official authorities to carry out the duties of mega transportation infrastructure development *if* without the support or authorization from the public sector—mainly the local government. Therefore, the collaboration between private and municipal sectors is key to materializing the development of the LRT system in Khon Kaen City. Resources of private and municipal sectors strengthen the capacities of each sector to run local joint efforts advocating for LRT policymaking.

The organization of the KKTT is fully managed by twenty co-founders of local business elites. However, the KKTT itself has formed its local alliance with multiple associations from the academic, civic, and local public sectors. These partners include three main parties. The first batch is co-founders of the KKTT including (1) Chor-Thavee (2) Jompol Market Khon Kaen, (3) Bualuang Restorant, (4) Toyota Khon Kaen, (5) Chaimongkol Rice Factory, (6), Khon Kaen Fishing Net Company, (7) Farry Plaza, (8) Thaiphipat Hardware, (9), Warasiri Real Estate, (10) Warasiri Marketplace, (11) Tong-Jee-Toung Pharmacy, (12) Toyota Kaennakorn, (13) Raumthavee Company, (14) Piman Real Estate Group, (15) Leamthong Capital Company, (16), Siam Khon Kaen, (17) Faculty of Fine Arts, Khon Kaen university, (18) Khon Kaen Law Association, (19) Kosa Hotel, (20) Rajavadee Hotel as shown in following Figure.

Figure 10 Co-founders of the KKTT



Photo source: Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKTT)

The second group includes two main local associations which have long been active in Khon Kaen City, including “*The Alliance of Twenty-Four Chinese Organizations (ATFCO)*” and “*The Association of Eight Economic Institutions (AEEI)*.” The ATFCO involves mainly local businesses that are run by half Thai-Chinese owners. These owners are highly unified. Normally, local business elites in Khon Kaen are also born half Thai-Chinese. Another association, the AEEI includes eight local economic organizations that specialize in the local economy of Khon Kaen City including (1) Bank of Thailand’s North-

eastern Branch, (2) Association of Khon Kaen Banks, (3) Khon Kaen Chamber of Commerce, (4) Khon Kaen Industrial Association, (5) Khon Kaen Travel Industry Association, (6) MBA Alumni Association of Khon Kaen University, (7) Faculty of Business Administration and Accountancy, Khon Kaen University, and (8) Faculty of Economics, Khon Kaen University. These are eight organizations that specialize in the economic and industrial development of Khon Kaen City that allied with the KKTT.

Figure 11 Local business and academic alliances of the KKTT'



Photo source: Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKTT)

The third group is local civic organizations, which include “*The Khon Kaen Citizen Council (KKCC)*” and “*The Khon Kaen Future Decades Foundation (KKFD)*.” These organizations are the main civil societies that have been largely active in monitoring public sectors and also run multiple collaborative projects with public sectors to advance the city. The KKCC includes more than 150 community organizations and is involved with municipal affairs that are relevant to the well-being of local people. They also generally engaged in local policymaking to direct and monitor public programs of local government in Khon Kaen City. While the KKFD is the biggest civil society organization in Khon Kaen and has long been performed as a liaison between private, civic, and public sectors to mobilize local joint efforts and organize multiple development projects in Khon Kaen City with public and private sectors, including their efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking. The establishment of the KKTT channels a more effective approach for the KKFD to incorporate with the KKTT to find new solutions and co-creation to advance urban transport services, which the KKFD has long been attempting to address for years.

5.3.2. Khon Kaen Transit System (KKTS)

The development of the KKTS reflects unity among local governments in Khon Kaen City. Thailand's first municipal corporation was established on March 24, 2017, in Khon Kaen City after the Municipality Act was enacted over 70 years ago. As such, the KKTS has inspired local governments across Thailand to mobilize local networks for the benefit of local development. The KKTS was formed by collaborative efforts among five neighboring municipalities who jointly shared the budget of 5 million baht to fund the operations of KKTS to advocate for LRT development in the city. Those five municipalities include Khon Kaen City Municipality, Sila Town Municipality, Mueangkao Subdistrict Municipality, Samran Subdistrict Municipality, and Thapra Subdistrict Municipality.


Figure 12 Five municipalities, local alliances, and founding day of the KKTS



Photo source: Khon Kaen Transit System (KKTS)

The primary duty of the KKTS is to advocate and manage the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City. The local coalition in Khon Kaen demanded the government for the authorization of LRT to be entirely local self-reliant. Therefore, the KKTS is the central organization to manage all duties related to LRT development in Khon Kaen. As a municipal enterprise, shareholders of the KKTS are all taken by those five municipalities in which the Khon Kaen City Municipality holds the major part of 80% of all equity, and each of the other four municipalities holds 5%. No central or regional authorities could intervene in the managerial and financial affairs of the KKTS except only those municipal shareholders, and all operations of the KKTS are fully directed by those five municipalities. However, as a municipal-own enterprise, the KKTS will also be monitored or guided by the provincial and ministerial authorities related to legal issues without direct interventions. The organization of the KKTS is managed by board and CEO who are experts hired by those municipalities to manage the KKTS. Further, the KKTS includes four organizational departments: the secretariat office, administrative office, accounting and budgeting office, and engineer and technical office, as detailed in the following figure.

Figure 13 Organizational structure and management of the KKTS



Adapted from Khon Kaen Transit System (KKTS)

5.3.3. Roles of Local Civil Associations

There are two key civil associations engaged in LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City. First, the Khon Kaen Future Decades Foundation (KKFD) founded in 2015 by the contributions of academic and civic efforts. The KKFD clearly stated its commitments that they would be a liaison center to promote joint efforts between public agencies, local government, private sector, nongovernmental organizations, community organizations, and civil society to advance integrated and inclusive developments in Khon Kaen City based on participatory approaches. The KKFD has organized multiple forums and referendums to drive the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen which exposed the desire of local people towards the LRT project. Another local civil organization is Khon Kaen Citizen Council (KKCC), which includes more than 150 community organizations throughout Khon Kaen City, founded in 1997. The KKCC will organize the meeting of the citizen council once quarterly in which they will publicly discuss local services, urban issues, and municipal development programs that affect the citizens. Further, most of the urban development policies of Khon Kaen City Municipality were also examined by the KKCC before its official announcement of a local development plan. Therefore, those civil organizations in Khon Kaen have actively engaged in policymaking and joint efforts that drive the development of their hometown.

Figure 14 Meeting of the Khon Kaen Citizen Council





Photo source: Khon Kaen Provincial Administrative Organization

5.4. Analysis of Local Coalition Strategies and LRT Policymaking

The LRT initiative in Khon Kaen is well-known because it is the first regional city that local governments propose to launch and is fully responsible for the development of the LRT project in their own capacities. In other words, those local governments want authorization from the central government to manage the LRT autonomously. However, railway duties have long been dominated by the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) and linked to several ministries. Therefore, local joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen have faced multiple challenges from central authority. However, Khon Kaen's local coalition has deployed multiple strategies and eventually achieved the policymaking of LRT. This section reveals how those local coalitions in Khon Kaen City have succeeded in running local joint efforts to set the LRT initiative on the national government agenda. Further, this section also examines relevant factors that strengthen the capacities of a local coalition in Khon Kaen—as a horizontal coalition to achieve LRT policymaking.

Results from data analysis and investigations of collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen City revealed ten functional factors that strengthen local coalitions to achieve LRT policymaking. Those factors are (1) approaching the center of policymaking power, (2) collaboration from the private sector, (3) dialoguing, (4) entrepreneurial urbanism, (5)

financial autonomy, (6) local self-reliance, (7) local government unity, (8) local private sector unity, (9) roles of civic sector, and (10) influences of external events, as detailed in the following table. However, based on co-occurrence analysis revealed that those factors could be categorized into four main conditions that are critical to the functionality of LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City, which are *local-self-reliance, approaching to the center of power in policymaking, integration of external events, and roles of private policy brokers*.

Table 11 Co-occurrence analysis of functional approach to local coalition in Khon Kaen City


Relevant Factors	● Centralized Issues Gr=85	○ LRT-KK Gr=314
● approach to the centre of power Gr=38	4	41
● collaboration from the private sector Gr=23	2	20
● dialoguing Gr=22	1	22
● financial autonomy Gr=20	0	22
● local government unity Gr=19	2	20
● local private brokers Gr=93	6	80
● local self-reliance Gr=15	1	13
● new government election Gr=17	1	9
● private unity Gr=35	1	26
● roles of the civic sector Gr=11	0	12

*Gr: groundedness or code frequency, which shows how many quotations are linked to a code.

The first category relies on *local self-reliance*, which could be divided into two dimensions. First, local self-reliance derives from the unity of the local private sector. Especially financial expertise and resources mobilized by the local business alliance to launch the KKTT and to fund the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City. The KKTT is the main actor who directs the financial strategy of the local coalition to seek financial resources and international loans to finance the LRT in Khon Kaen City without relying on the state budget. The second dimension is the local self-reliance that grows from the unity of local governments as resulted in the development of the KKTS—Thailand's first municipal

corporation, to run for the LRT, which is fully owned by the local government. Therefore, there are two local self-reliance approaches that strengthen the capacities of local coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, which are *financial self-reliance* and *administrative autonomy*. The financial self-reliance relies on local financing of the KKTT and international loans to fund the LRT without relying on the state's finance. Administrative self-reliance relies on the roles of municipal corporation—the KKTS, that has just been established to directly launch the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen, in which those five municipalities could freely manage the KKTS. Analysis results of relevant factors related to local self-reliance of the local coalition in Khon Kaen and relations among them are shown in the following figure.

Figure 15 Local self-reliance of the local coalition in Khon Kaen City



*G means groundedness, **D means density or number of linkages between codes

According to the analysis result, one of the most prevailing factors is the *roles of the local private sector*. It is prominently revealed that the private sector has taken leading roles to manage the local coalition in Khon Kaen and advocating for LRT on national government agendas. Therefore, unity among local business alliances to run their joint efforts and

advocate for the LRT initiative is highly tight. They have no signs of conflicts among local business partners. On the contrary, those associated business elites could work together very effectively. An interview with Mr. N, former president of the Khon Kaen Chamber of Commerce and co-founder of the KKTT, revealed that:

“We could not work alone. That is why it is important for us to do the model of a city development corporation. We could mobilize several local corporations, which include not only those twenty founding firms but also members of the Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Khon Kaen Industries.... The private alliance in Khon Kaen is highly united and active, meaning that we could talk and work together honestly. In some cities, the private sector is conflict and difficult to work together... but in Khon Kaen, we unite ours—private sector, and connect to citizens.”
(*Source code: 3:15 ¶ 6*)

Further, an interview with Mr. T from the Khon Kaen City Municipality also asserted that the local business alliance has been long active and united to run their collaborative efforts advocated for the LRT policymaking and other urban development projects, as noted that: *“The local business sector is still very much active. They are very united and always have been (Source code:5:9 ¶ 18).”* Similarly, Mr. J, a leading member of the Khon Kaen Future Decades Foundation, also reflected the unity and leadership of the local private sector that has come to engage in city development affairs and initiated the LRT project in Khon Kaen:

“The model of Khon Kaen development is an innovation. Innovation that stems from the confederacy of local corporations who would like to fight against urban problems and awareness to work for their hometown and create public benefits to the city that run by the public spirit of the local business sector.” (*Source code: 4:30 ¶ 23*)

As well as an interview with Mrs. P, a researcher in Khon Kaen, asserted that those local business elites in Khon Kaen have no conflict and they have mutually organized several events to tighten relationships among local business owners. One of the prominent activities is the monthly event of having dinner together, as Mrs. P noted:

“Good culture that I think it is a starting point towards collaborative efforts for the city development is roundtable Chinese dinner. These local business elites would assemble to have dinner together monthly, and each member would be rotated the host, who would pay for that dinner every month. Those business elites asserted that this event effectively ties them into the group and build good relationships among local business coalition to work together.” (Source code: 58:6 p6).

Moreover, what clearly reflects the roles and unified efforts of local business alliances is their financial contributions to fund the KKTT. The first capital fund to invest for LRT development in Khon Kaen City comes from the contribution of those local alliances as cofounders of the KKTT who jointly assembled the fund of 200 million baht to establish KKTT to advocate for LRT policymaking. Without their contribution, the efforts of running the LRT initiative by the local coalition might not even have happened. According to Mr. S, a cofounder of the KKTT, expressed in an interview on The Strait Times, a Singaporean press,: *“We have money. So we agreed that we would each put in 10 million baht. If that could develop Khon Kaen for the better, that’s a bet we were willing to make.”(Source code: 258:2).* Mr. S also clearly reflected with the author related his idea towards the unity and commitment of private sector in local development that:

“Today, we have young business leaders who were originally born and live in Khon Kaen assembling to establish the capital fund to use for city development in the name of Khon Kaen Think Thank (KKTT). The aim of this corporation is not to compete with other local companies, but it is to run businesses or activities that bring growth and development to Khon Kaen City, such as businesses related to infrastructure development, which today we plan to run for international hall and the light rail transit initiatives.” (Source code: 257:1).

Therefore, commitment and joint efforts of the local business coalition are crucial conditions for the self-reliance of the local coalition in Khon Kaen to advocate for the LRT policymaking, especially their financing approaches that help local government channels new strategies to leverage with the national government agencies. This local business coalition also guided local governments to strategize the LRT policymaking to establish the municipal corporation—the *Khon Kaen Transit System (KKTS)*. The KKTS reflects unity

among local governments to advance transportation. No municipalities in Thailand have mutually invested in mega transport services and jointly formed municipal corporation like those municipalities in Khon Kaen. The KKTS is also the key strategy for a municipal coalition to take over the duties of LRT development. Otherwise, the management and duties to launch the LRT would be channelled and taken over by the central agencies of the Ministry of Transportation.

Furthermore, the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen would not rely on the state's finance or local government budget. But, it relies on local self-financing incorporated between KKTS, the local private sector, and their networks to make financial support for the development of LRT. Therefore, the local private sector has taken a critical role in both mobilizing collaborative efforts among local partners and strategizing financial approaches to invest in the LRT development freely from dependency of the central government. As noted by Mr. TS, a Mayor of Khon Kaen City Municipality:

“Five municipalities and the KKTS are ready... We have the potential to carry out the development of the LRT project, and we should be the developer of the pilot LRT route of red line (north-south)... This LRT initiative would not use the budgets from the national government or the municipality, but we leave the financial duties to the private sector to mobilize the funds. This construction fund would not be transferred to the municipality, but it would be transferred to the KKTS.” (Source code: 62:4)


Therefore, the roles of the KKTT and the KKTS have highlighted the local self-reliance on financing and self-administrative capacities of local coalitions to launch the LRT initiative in Kho Kaen City. These two new local bodies have represented the unity of among partners in Khon Kaen that stems from joint efforts among multiple sectors –private, civic, and municipal sectors, to advocate for the exact needs of local people. Therefore, the unity of local alliance is the primary condition that strengthens the capacities of the local coalition to achieve LRT policymaking. In an interview with Mr. N, cofounder of KKTT, noted that:

“...I believe no single sector could successfully drive urban development initiatives. The public sector and local government could not work effectively without collaboration from the private sector. Similarly, the private sector alone could not also develop and change the city without

support from the civic sector... We have come to make regulations better so that the city development could be freely advanced. And I believe that the private sector in Thailand has high capacities. If they have the right to manage city development tasks without relying on state support, they know how to finance the project and mobilize the funds. And if the local government and civic sector support them. We could create a lot of changes and innovations. If the state allows us to do so...” (Source code: 3:5)

However, getting approval to launch the LRT from national government is the most challenging task. It has never been in history of Thailand for the municipality to manage the LRT. As such, Khon Kaen local coalition had faced multiple hindrances related to centralized authorities before they got authorization from the national government in 2016. One of their key strategies is **approaching to the centres of policymaking power**. Their key strategy to approach the centres of power relies on unity of local coalition—the KKTT and KKTS, to dialogue with decision-makers from several ministries.

Figure 16 How local coalition in Khon Kaen approaches the centres of policymaking power.



*G means groundedness, **D means density

How local coalition approaches the center of policymaking power relies on two strategies. Firstly, through the roles of private brokers—the KKTT, that represents the local coalition of Khon Kaen. Those local business elites are highly active to advocate for LRT policymaking. They have not only invested efforts and resources but also their networks that could help them get closer to the center of policymaking powers. An interview with Mr. S, a leading member of the KKTT, clarified that:

“What makes the project progress is that we integrate our networks to work with us. Whose connections are beneficial to our works are all integrated. The dean has networks; mayors have networks; the provincial government has networks; business owners also have their networks, who know whom, whose connections are useful to our works. That is the point.”

(Source code:246:10)

The strategy to dialogue with decision-makers from ministries is spearheaded by those local private policy brokers—the KKTT. Those local private elites will join and lead every dialogue meeting as represented and leading members of the local coalition to discuss and advocate for the LRT initiative with those executives from ministerial agencies. According to the Naewna News also reported that *“KKTT, which is the network of local businessmen, has the key mission to dialogue with national government to broker for the approval of LRT project”* (source code: 38:1). Furthermore, according to the interview and data records, proposal of LRT plan proposed to central government has been revised several times and those local coalitions in Khon Kan always approach to the central government by launching the dialogue meetings with ministers and ministerial executives from associated central agencies more than 19 times. The following table summarizes the timeline of how the local coalition approaches the center of power in LRT policymaking.

Table 12 Dialouging organized by the local coalition in Khon Kaen to approach the center of policymaking power.

No.	Dialoguing Meetings	Date
1	Dialoguing with the Air Chief Marshal, Prajin Juntong, Minister of Transportation, and executive MOT, OTP, to present the LRT proposal and consult about the development of public transportation in Khon Kaen.	June 10, 2016

No.	Dialoguing Meetings	Date
2	Dialoguing with Somkid Jatusripitak, the Vice Prime Minister, to consult about LRT in Khon Kaen.	May 9, 2017
3	Dialoguing with Air Chief Marshal, Prajin Juntong, the Vice Prime Minister, and the Head of the Economic Team to present and consult about LRT	May 11, 2017
4	Dialoguing with the Director General of the Department of Local Government Promotion and legal officers of the Ministry of Interior to discuss and consult about establishment of the municipal corporation	August 30, 2017
5	Dialoguing with Air Chief Marshal, Prajin Juntong, the Vice Prime Minister, to consult the LRT project.	December 4, 2017
6	Dialoguing with General Anupong Paochinda, the Minister of Interior, and Suthee Boonmark, the Deputy Minister of Interior, to discuss the development of LRT.	December 26, 2017
7	Dialoguing with executives of the Minister of Interior about the development of the municipal corporation.	January 11, 2017
8	Dialoguing with Arkhom Termittayapaisith, the Minister of Transportation, to present and discuss the development of LRT in Khon Kaen City.	December 22, 2017
9	Dialoguing with Krisada Boonyarat, the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives to discuss and present the MOU asking for the use of their public land for the development of the LRT project.	February 12, 2018
10	Dialoguing with General Anupong Paochinda, the Minister of Interior, to consult and discuss LRT.	January 22, 2018
11	Dialoguing with Air Chief Marshal, Prajin Juntong, the Vice Prime Minister, to present, discuss, and consult about the development of the LRT initiative.	March 7, 2018
12	Dialoguing with Pailin Chuchottaworn, the Deputy Minister of Transportation, to consult about the LRT.	May 3, 2018

No.	Dialoguing Meetings	Date
13	Dialoguing with the director of the State Enterprise Policy Office and the Minister of Finance, to present and consult about LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City.	May 7, 2018
14	Dialoguing with Somkid Jatusripitak, the Vice Prime Minister to consult about the challenges of centralized authorities from ministries in driving the LRT initiative.	May 9, 2018
15	The local coalition invited Air Chief Marshal, Prajin Juntong, the Vice Prime Minister, and Minister of Justice to visit Khon Kaen City to see how LRT initiative has been driven by local joint efforts and dialoguing and consulting with him about the ways to push LRT initiative forwards.	May 27, 2018
16	Dialoging with the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperation to present the MOU for taking the public lands for the development of LRT.	August 10, 2018
17	Dialogue with Somkid Jartusripitak, the Vice Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Transportation, and ministerial executives	October 17, 2018
18	The local coalition invited Air Chief Marshal, Prajin Juntong, Former Vice Prime Minister, to visit Khon Kaen and see the advancement of the LRT initiative.	December 7, 2019
19	Local private coalition invited Saksayam Chidchob, the Minister of Transportation, to visit Khon Kaen City and discuss the development and issues related to public transportation infrastructure in Khon Kaen.	February 19, 2023

As detailed in the table, there are two types of dialoguing that the local coalition deployed to approach the center of policymaking powers—*inbound and outbound dialoguing*. Inbound dialoguing is organized by invitation of key decision-makers to visit, experience, and deepen their understanding of local efforts to run the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City. Outbound dialoguing is the main approach that the local coalition directly involves and regularly visits central agencies to discuss and consult with those decision-makers related to challenges and opportunities to drive the LRT project forward. As a city with no united political party and commitments from national politicians to advocate for

LRT policymaking, approaching the center of policymaking powers is very challenging for a local coalition to handle centralized issues related to the development of LRT in Khon Kaen City. According to the interview with Mr. N, a cofounder of KKTT, noted that:

“Although politics has impacts on our works... although the Prime Minister approved the project. But it still does not guarantee that the works would be easily driven because the government needs to keep political balance ... we do not want to use politics.” (Source code: 3:10 ¶ 20)

This is also the reason why Khon Kaen City has no political brokers to represent and advocate for LRT policymaking at the center of powers. As such, the local coalition in Khon Kaen relies on the unity of local private policy brokers instead. Therefore, at the local level, those coalitions are highly united and effective. On the other hand, at the national level, they have no political leverage except their coalition’s strategy to take advantage of financial strategy and political opportunities from the external events floating around their coalition.

Figure 17 External events and LRT policymaking driven by local coalition in Khon Kaen



*G means groundedness, **D means density

Events external to the local coalition within the LRT policy subsystem are influential towards the success of collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen. How to take advantage of relevant external events relies much on the capacities of local coalitions to alter those events into their coalition strategies. In the case of Khon Kaen, local civil society organizations have come to play a critical role in taking advantage from external events and driving the LRT altogether with the KKTT and KKTS. The key external event that is relevant to the LRT policy subsystem is political instability and its new climate during 2014-2019. Thailand has been dominated by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)—the central command unit under military government control after the coup d'état on May 22, 2014. The NCPO dominated the country with an authoritarian regime during 2014-2019.

In 2014, the political climate in Thailand was unstable, a few months after the coup, political protests were organized to ask for democracy and demanded the NCPO to organize a new government election. However, the NCPO had attempted to stabilize their power and keep political movements in order. The NCPO promised the Thai people to organize the new election, but they had postponed the election several times. The NCPO first promised to organize the new election in late 2015. However, this election was postponed, leading to the wider protests nationwide requested for a new national election. Later, the NCPO announced that a new election would be run in the middle of 2016. Still, the 2016 election was also halted and the NCPO promised to organize it in 2017. Again, the 2017 election was also delayed, resulting in a wider and more serious protest against the military government throughout the country. In late 2017, the NCPO declared to organize a new election in 2018. One more, the 2018 election was postponed and in the middle of 2018, the NCPO announced to organize a new election on February 24, 2019. Still, in January 2019, the military government stated that they were unable to organize on the announced date of February 24, 2019, but the new election would be arranged on March 24, 2019, instead. Eventually, the new election was officially organized on March 24, 2019.

Thailand had no election for six years after the military took over the government on May 22, 2014. Therefore, the 2019 election was a very important event to restore democracy. However, the military government—the NCPO, wants to keep its power. During their regime, the NCPO had rewritten the constitution and built the new election rules—Mixed Member Apportionment (MMA), that benefit them to win the election. As a result of the election in 2019, General Prayut Chan-o-cha transferred from the commander of the NCPO to the Prime Minister of the national government and continues to rule the country till today.

Further, in 2022, the government also announced a new election on May 14, 2023. The political climate during late 2022 and 2023 is also more democratically alive than in the last election. Multiple political campaigns from political parties have run throughout the country, including the former heads of NCPO and democratic parties. As far as the author writes this report, General Prayut Chan-o-cha has remained in power as an acting Prime Minister.

Investigation from the case of Khon Kaen reflected that railway transport services have long been centralized and overlapped with several ministries. Therefore, this study argued that *politics matters*. As revealed through the case of Khon Kaen where local coalition is highly united and effective, but the local coalition has faced multiple challenges from central agencies due to the lack of engagement from political sector in Khon Kaen. In an interview with Mr J, a leading member of local civil society—KKFD, referred to the weak political capacity of local coalition in Khon Kaen to advocate for the LRT at the national level and Mr. J clarified and asserted that political power is the key factor that could enable local coalition achieve their policymaking, as Mr. J mentioned that:

“The key factor that could materialize the LRT in Khon Kaen is the state power. Laws related to the decision to use local resources are centralized to the center. It is the central government who decides which resources to be used. It must be decentralized to locals... The political system is also another key factor. We have no politician and political party that works for the benefit of the city. That is why the LRT project, which stems from the commitment of local people, could not be pushed forward in the national arena.” (Source Code: 4:33 ¶ 26-27)

The local coalition in Khon Kaen City has no political representation in the national political arena due to the lack of involvement from the political sector. Therefore, the city has no political agent that could deal, broker, or advocate for LRT policy at the national center of policymaking. This study revealed that Khon Kaen coalition has no political brokers, but local coalition is able to take advantages from existing political events to compensate for the lack of their political power and advocate for the LRT policymaking. During 2014-2019, along with those political protests, the local coalition in Khon Kaen City ran civil-political campaigns to obtain the interests of the NCPO during the shifting political climate towards the new government election. The Khon Kaen Future Decade (KKFD) had run local public hearings and referendums multiple times in parallel to the KKTT and KKTS,

which run dialogues with ministerial executives. During the upcoming national election climate in 2019, those events were highly influential in capturing the attention of the NCPO, who wants to remain in power. One of the most attractive events was organized before the election, which local coalition had organized the city-wide referendum on May 18, 2018, included more than 2,000 people from the KKFD, more than 175 community organizations from the Khon Kaen Citizen Council (KKCC), networks of private and industrial sectors, and local universities to show how local people want the LRT. This probably was the biggest local referendum event of Khon Kaen City that had ever mobilized local citizens to engage in policymaking. The following table shows the timeline of internal events that are organized within the LRT policy subsystem and the external events that the local coalition takes advantage into their strategies.

Table 13 Internal and external events associated with LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City during 2014-2023

Year	Explanatory Variables	
	<i>Internal Events</i>	<i>External Events</i>
2014	Local private sector assembled networks to run KKTT and urban talks related to public finance constraints, urban transport issues, and how they could develop the city.	<i>May 22,</i> Military overthrew the government, and the country was ruled by military government or the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) from May 22, 2014-July 16, 2019.
	<i>Jan 9,</i> Establishment of KKTT	NCPO confirmed to organize a new election in late 2015
2015	<i>April 23</i> Five municipalities have begun to campaign for LRT and the KKTS	<i>May 27,</i> NCPO confirmed that the election will be organized in next year (first postponement)
	Proposal on the establishment of KKTS to the MOI	
	LRT proposed the government. The establishment of a local civil society called Khon Kaen Future Decade Foundation.	

Year	Explanatory Variables	
	<i>Internal Events</i>	<i>External Events</i>
2016	The feasibility study conducted by the OTP, MOT	Country-wide protests requested for new national election
	<i>June 10,</i> Dialogue with MOT minister on LRT	
	<i>December 24,</i> Dialogue with Vice Prime Minister	
	<i>March 18,</i> NCPO officially approved the LRT proposal principle and ordered OTP to run additional feasibility which the results of this study will be reported to get official approval from the government again	Country-wide protests requested for new national election
	<i>May 10</i> Dialogue with the Vice Prime Minister (Somkid Jartusripitak), the city-level public dialoguing organized by Khon Kaen Future Decade Foundation	<i>Jan 26,</i> NCPO confirmed to organize a new national election in the middle of 2016
	<i>May 11,</i> Dialogue with the Vice Prime Minister and Head of Economic Affairs (Prajin Jantong)	<i>Jan 29,</i> Second postponement of the national election
	<i>June 6,</i> KKFDF organized the city-wide civil public referendum related to the development of LRT.	
	<i>August 30,</i> Dialogue with the Director General of the Department of Local Administration, MOI, on legal issue of establishment of municipal corporation	<i>Sep 21,</i> NCPO confirmed to organize a new national election by the end of next year (2017)

Year	Explanatory Variables	
	<i>Internal Events</i>	<i>External Events</i>
2017	23 November, Khon Kaen Governor established five direct committees to run city development initiatives and LRT.	Country-wide protests requested for new national election
	December 4, Dialogue with the Vice Prime Minister (Prajin Jantong) related to the LRT	
	December 20, The Minister and Deputy Minister of MOI visit Khon Kaen to discuss LRT.	
	Jan 11, Dialogue with legal officers related to the formation of municipal corporation	Jan 5, NCPO confirmed to organize a new national election in the beginning of next year (2018)
	Feb 20, MOI officially approved the proposal of 5 municipalities to establish KKTS	
	March 24, Establishment of KKTS	Oct 8, NCPO confirmed to organize a new national election in November of next year (2018)
	Dec 22, Dialogue with Minister of MOT (Arkhom Termvittayapaisit)	
	New studies conducted by the OTP, MOT related to public transportation in Khon Kaen and environmental impacts	The local coalition in Chiang Mai hopes to use Section 44 of the CPO to order LRT project in the city.
	Feb 12, Dialogue with the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives	Jan 25, <i>postponement of the national election</i>
2018	Feb 22, Dialogue with the Minister of Interior related to progression	January Country-wide protest requested for new national election
	March 7,	February 27,

Year	Explanatory Variables	
	<i>Internal Events</i>	<i>External Events</i>
	Dialogue with the Vice Prime Minister (Prajin Jantong) related to progression	NCPO promised to organize new election in February next year (2019)
	May 3,	June 25,
	Dialogue with the Deputy Minister of Transportation	NCPO confirmed the organization of the new national election during Feb 24, to May 5, next year (2019)
	May 7,	Oct 11,
	Dialogue with the Director of PPP, Ministry of Finance	The Election Commission of Thailand officially announced the election date on Feb 24, 2019
	May 9,	
	Dialogue with the Vice Prime Minister (Somkid Jartusripitak), giving representative joined instead.	
	May 18,	
	City-wide referendum related to LRT	
	May 27,	
	Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Justice (Prajin Jantong) visit Khon Kaen for KKTS's one-year anniversary	
	August 10,	
	Dialogue with the Deputy Minister and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	
	October 17,	
	Dialogue with the Vice Prime Minister (Somkid Jartusripitak), Minister of Interior, Minister of Transportation, and ministerial executives	
	December 4,	
	OTP requested a new feasibility study of the project	The government planned to run LRT in regional cities, including Korat, Pitsanulok, CM and Phuket cities.

Year	Explanatory Variables	
	<i>Internal Events</i>	<i>External Events</i>
2019	Establishment of another civil society called the Srichan Club	<i>January 15,</i> Thailand Election Commission postponed and declared they could not organize the new election in time.
	<i>November 14,</i> KKTT and KKTS mobilized and organized city-wide public hearings on the LRT project	<i>January 23,</i> The Election Commission of Thailand confirmed the election date on March 24, 2019
	<i>December 7,</i> Former Vice Prime Minister (Prajin Jantong) visit Khon Kaen for LRT progression	<i>March 24,</i> the first national election after the Coup with new election system. The new vice-prime minister selected
2020	<i>January 6,</i> Announcement of the selected company that won the technical and financial bidding for construction of LRT—CKKM joint venture.	
2021	<i>November 16,</i> The signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the KKTS and CKKM-CRRC Consortium for the construction of LRT at the Pullman Hotel Khon Kaen	
2022	The KKTS could not deliver the use of public land owned by the MOAC to the CKKM-CRRC to run the LRT initiative as stated on the MOA. The MOA expired on November 25, 2022.	<i>Middle 2022,</i> new national election climate
2023	Local private coalition invited the Minister of MOT to visit Khon Kaen during the political election campaigns.	<i>Beginning 2023,</i> New national election climate <i>May 14, 2023</i>

Year	Explanatory Variables	
	<i>Internal Events</i>	<i>External Events</i>
		New national election

Politics is also a critical factor that could weaken or strengthen the capacities of local coalitions to advocate for LRT policymaking. As noted by the Vice Prime Minister, Somkid Jartusripitak at the time of his visit to Khon Kaen City, invited by the KKTT and KKTS to discuss challenges and opportunities to advocate for the LRT proposal in Khon Kaen that:


“I personally think that this is a good project, and it is possible to carry out. However, you (the local coalition) have to work thoroughly. If it begins from local government, it must be clear and related ministries must be acknowledged.... You (local coalition) have to minimize all problems as much as you can. Then you (local coalition) have to report this project to the Prime Minister, General Prayut Chan-o-cha. Tell him what are the problems to run this project. What are the possibilities and impossibilities of the project? Which issues do you need the Prime Minister to help you and make this project progress? You have to do it fast. Because if you do not do it under this government, you may not be able to run the project... I speak it frankly because I see it is a very good project that comes from real commitment of local people. It is exactly the need of the Khon Kaen people. But to make it possible, you need to integrate political power and approach to the government. It will strengthen the project.”
(Source code: 108:3-4)

Similarly, the interview with Mr. T from the Khon Kaen City Municipality, who is the main officer responsible for the LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City, also noted that the political factor is the key factor to materialize the project:

“For the LRT to happen. It would rely much on national policy. Every necessary step at local points has already been done, including a feasibility study, participation from related government agencies, and participation from local people who reflect that they want LRT to operate in the city. Right now, it is only the last step that the related central agencies would allow us to run it.” (Source code: 5:21 ¶ 31-32)

Another functional factor that largely strengthens the capacities of a local coalition in Khon Kaen to advocate for LRT policymaking is policy brokers. Although, Khon Kaen City has no political policy brokers, but their local private policy brokers have been actively working to run the LRT initiative. Although those local businessmen associated with the KKTT always argued that they have come to engage in LRT policymaking because they wanted to advance the city, mainly for the public interests, not for profits. This study argued that the KKTT are local private policy brokers who willingly invest their time, effort, and resources to advocate for the LRT in the hope of future returns.

Figure 18 Local private policy brokers in LRT policymaking of Khon Kaen City



*G means groundedness, **D means density

The above figure reveals that the absence of national political engagement in the local coalition is one of the reasons that the city has no political broker to handle with political events at the national center of policymaking power. According to an interview with Mr. T, from Khon Kaen City Municipality, the “*national political representative in Khon Kaen has not been involved in the advocating for the LRT project. Mainly local government, local businessmen, and provincial authorities are key actors involved in the project (Source code: 5:12 ¶ 20).*” The absence of political representation to broker for LRT initiative at the center of policymaking power is also asserted by an interview of Mr. J, a leading member of local civil society—KKFD, asserted that: “*We have no politician and political party that*

work for the benefit of the city. That is why the LRT project, which stems from the commitment of local people, could not be pushed forward in the national arena (Source Code: 4:33 ¶ 26-27)."

Similarly, an interview with Mr. N, Former President of the Khon Kaen Chamber of Commerce and co-founder of the KKTT, also revealed that the local private coalition in Khon Kaen has no engagement with political network because it could make no changes: *"Although politics has impacts on our works... although the Prime Minister approved the project. But it still does not guarantee that the works would be easily driven because the government needs to keep a political balance ... we do not want to use politics... it is unsustainable, and we do not want to use special power or privilege to make the project happen (Source code: 3:10 ¶ 20)."* Therefore, why local coalition in Khon Kaen has relied much on the roles of private policy brokers is because the city has no commitment from national political representatives, and the private alliance themselves are frustrated have politics involved. As a result, the more absence of political actors, the more power of private alliances to direct coalition and take benefits as a policy broker.

What most signifies the KKTT as local private policy brokers is their commitment to invest their efforts, reputations, and resources to advocate for LRT initiative. It is true that those resources are used for the public benefit, but more importantly, it is also used with an agenda to expect future gains for those private policy brokers to benefit from the LRT. In an interview with Mr. J, a leading member of local civil society—the KKFD, also agreed that the profitmaking of this local alliance is part of the reasons for them to advocate for LRT policymaking, but it is also clear that their roles are necessary to for the LRT policymaking and advantageous to the public benefits:

"The development approach of Khon Kaen City stems from an alliance of local businessmen who recognized and have a sense of belonging to their hometown. It is about public interests and public spirit. However, seeing this approach as the profit-making of those local businessmen is also another way that I personally think it is not the wrong viewpoint. But LRT development is also an advantages of the city, not only benefits of some local businessmen (Source code: 4: 30 ¶ 23)." Mr. J further revealed that *"the first LRT driver in the city is Mr.X who run the real estate company. The model of city development in Khon Kaen, run by Mr. X is about public*

interests. But it is the public interest that we cannot deny the profitmaking of local business people. It is a win-win situation, that's the goal. In Khon Kaen, the basic idea of development is based on the benefits of the city which is managed by a business approach. (source code: 4: 40 ¶40)."

Therefore, the KKTT is a local private policy broker who is actively involved in setting LRT on national government agendas with the hope of the future returns that the KKTT would take over and become the operator and construction company to launch the LRT in Khon Kaen City. After the NCPO eventually approved the LRT initiative, duties to carry out the development of LRT were authorized to the KKTS in 2016. The KKTT clearly declared that they are ready to join the bidding of KKTS for being a construction firm of LRT in Khon Kaen City. As interview of Mr. S, a leading member of the KKTT, said:

"We, as a private sector that has long been in the public infrastructure industry. We are ready to join the bidding to invest in LRT development in Khon Kaen City. Recently, our company has already prepared to manufacture the electric train composites in Khon Kaen City. As well as contacting the factories, experts, and suppliers from abroad. Our company will join the bidding process of the LRT project in Khon Kaen, which we divide into two parts. First, our company will jointly invest with construction firms from China. Second, we would also incorporate the KKTT. However, at this moment, we have to wait for the government to reschedule and confirm the date for the LRT bidding." (Source code: 36:1)

Therefore, local private brokers associated with the KKTT plan to take over responsibilities for being the construction company of the LRT project in Khon Kaen. As a result of being coalition's policy broker, the KKTT co-founder won the KKTS's bidding process in 2020 under the corporation's name of "*CKKM joint venture*." The CKKM is a joint venture between Cho Thavee PLC, Khon Kaen Cho Thavee (1993) Co., Ltd., KTech Building Contractors Co., Ltd., Mobility as a Service Co., Ltd., CRRC Nanjing Puzhen Co., Ltd., and Singapore CRRC Puzhen Railway Vehicles Service Pte. Ltd. The CKKM joint venture is directed by X company—as the main cofounding company of the KKTT, and partnered with the CRRC Nanjing Puzhen Co., Ltd. as a coordinating company of international financing for the LRT in Khon Kaen. The CKKM joint venture—later called CKKM-CRRC CONSORTIUM, and the KKTS have already signed the memorandum of

agreement (MOA) on November 16, 2021, for the construction of LRT at the Pullman Hotel Khon Kaen. The MOA demonstrated that the KKTS must provide the public lands to the CKKM-CRRC CONSORTIUM for the construction of the LRT in Khon Kaen City within one year after the signing date of the MOA. However, the KKTS was unable to deliver the public land—which is owned by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MAC), as stipulated in MOA. Therefore, the 2021 MOA has already expired since November 25, 2022. However, those policy brokers still look forward to taking the LRT project and attempting to dialogue with the MAC to obtain the right to use public lands to construct the LRT depot.

In conclusion, Local private policy brokers in Khon Kaen revealed two main roles in driving and strengthening the capacities of a local coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking. The first role is the financing approach. These policy brokers have financed the project since the beginning of running their local joint efforts for the LRT, and they are also the broker who deals with international banks to finance the LRT initiative. The second role is the dialoguing approach, which is the key brokerage strategy to convince and handle with over-centralized state issues and approach to the center of power in LRT policymaking. What they get in return is not only being outsourced by the KKTS to launch the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen. Most of the KKTT cofounders are also the owners of real estate, housing, commercial, public transportation, and infrastructure industries whose businesses would be highly thriving after the LRT is constructed.

5.5. Single-Case Conclusion


5.5.1. Capacities of local coalition to advocate for LRT in Khon Kaen City

LRT policymaking advocated by local coalition in Khon Kaen City has long been well-recognized among local governments nationwide because of their success in advocating for the LRT proposal in 2016 which the government approved the KKTS— an autonomous municipal corporation run by joint effort among five municipalities, to launch operations related to LRT development in Khon Kaen City. Although local coalition eventually gets approval from the government that allows municipality to manage and launch LRT initiative, but the centralized state remains the key challenge that impede the implementation of the LRT project in Khon Kaen City. Especially, the public land use, which owns by the Treasury Department of the MOF and the Rice Department of the MOAC. Even though the local coalition has approached to these central agencies for years. But it seems that those central coalitions still have no intentions of allowing the KKTS to take the public

lands for the construction of the LRT depot station. As noted by Mr. T, from the Khon Kaen City Municipality: “*every necessary process has already been done for the LRT project... It waits only for authorization to use the public land and finding the funds to run the project (Source code: 5:20 ¶ 31-32).*” Therefore, the LRT policymaking advocated by the local coalition in Khon Kaen achieved in 2016, but the local coalition has been seeking the strategies to operationalize the LRT initiative in their city.


Khon Kaen is only the successful case where local coalition is able to influence policy makers compared to those advocacy coalitions in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. Investigation from this study revealed that there are ten factors that are relevant to the functionality of local coalition in Khon Kan to advocate for LRT policymaking, including *approaching the center of power in policymaking, collaboration from the private sector, dialoguing, entrepreneurial urbanism, financial autonomy, local self-reliance, local government unity, private unity, roles of civic sector, and external events*. Those factors could be categorized into four main groups of critical conditions which are largely critical to the success of the local coalition to advocate for the LRT in Khon Kaen, including *local self-reliance, approaching to the center of power in policymaking, integration of external events, and roles of private policy brokers*.

Figure 19 Co-occurrence analysis and force-directed diagram related to functional factors of local coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City



The above figure of the co-occurrence analysis shows that roles of private sector, approaching to the centre of policymaking power, roles of local private policy brokers, and financial factors are the major conditions closely connected to the functional factors. It denotes that collaborative efforts and roles of the local private sector and brokers are highly influential in strengthening the coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking. In other words, Khon Kaen is regarded as a *strong private-led coalition* where local private brokers are key factors in strengthening the financial and negotiating capacities of a local coalition to advocate for their LRT initiative. Furthermore, the density of lines connected among codes of these two factors—private policy brokers and approaching to the center of policymaking power, are vastly connected to codes of the LRT-KK and centralized state issues. It has proven that local private brokers take critical roles in dialoguing and approaching to the center of policymaking power to unravel the challenges related to centralized hindrances that impede the progress and weaken the capacities of the local coalition to advocate and implement the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City.

Figure 20 Sankey diagram of functional factors associated with LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City




The strong private-led coalition reflects through the roles of the local private alliances, who are critical actors in mobilizing local networks and resources to fund the KKTT and the KKTS to broker the LRT policy with the central government. The idea of LRT development was also originally inspired by the local business alliance of the KKTT, which eventually linked their business networks tightened with local partners such as

municipalities, regional government authorities, civil societies, and local universities to campaign for the LRT initiative. These local partners have formed a horizontal collaborative action in which local partners have mutually mobilized and agreed to advocate for LRT policymaking. The capacities of a local coalition in Khon Kaen are mainly strengthened by the financial strategies and expertise of the local business alliance—the KKTT, who have long been involved in the public transport and infrastructure industries. Therefore, the local alliance—the KKTT, has handled all financial challenges related to the investment of the LRT by the strategy of local self-financing model, which resulted in the LRT in Khon Kaen City not relying on state finance. As noted by Mr. S, a leading member of the KKTT said: *“we told the government, at that time the NCPO (National Council for Peace and Order), that this project is different. We just need your approval; we will find the money and run everything by ourselves. So this was key”* (Source code 258:3).

One of the main problems is that although those local business alliances have financial and technical capacities, but they have *no* official authorities to run for the development of LRT. Therefore, mobilizing local networks from municipalities, civil societies, and multiple stakeholders would legitimate them to advocate for the LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen. The establishment of KKTS—a municipal corporation, is the key strategy to legitimate the roles of those local private policy brokers associated with the KKTT to run as coalition representative brokers and advocate for the LRT policymaking. The KKTS has relied on the financial model guided by those local policy brokers. More importantly, municipal law has already authorized the municipalities to do such a joint local affair. Therefore, interrelations between KKTT and KKTS have strengthened the roles of private policy brokers to become urban elite policymakers and enlarge their roles into local public services, which they easily broker to the projects that benefit their business in return.

Figure 21 Summary diagram of ACF and policy broker frameworks in Khon Kaen City



Although the financial and administrative capacities of the local coalition in Khon Kaen have already been strengthened by the KKTT and the KKTS, they are also legitimated by civil societies. The coalition still faced multiple challenges entangled with centralized authorities. To unravel those challenges, the Khon Kaen local coalition relies extremely on the roles of their private policy brokers—the KKTT. Two brokering approaches have been deployed by the KKTT. One is the *local self-financing strategy*, which strengthens the capacities of the local coalition to leverage with the central government and ministerial agencies; at the same time the local coalition would extend their deeper dependency on the KKTT. Second is the *dialoguing strategy* which is led by the roles of those local private policy brokers to deal with challenges related to the development of local-own LRT initiatives at the centre of policymaking power. As the local coalition has no national political engagement, the dialoguing strategy relies on local private policy brokers who represent the coalition to advocate and deal with those decisionmakers at the centre of policymaking power that contains sophisticated political and bureaucratic strategies.

Single-case findings from the application of the ACF and policy brokers analysis framework to investigate the case of Khon Kaen City asserted that the roles and resources of private policy brokers are highly critical to the success of horizontal transport policymaking. Majorities of financial and political strategies to achieve their LRT policymaking are mainly directed by local private policy brokers, particularly the self-reliant financing approach. Moreover, results from the investigation of the local joint actions in

Khon Kaen also revealed that external events and internal unity associated with local joint efforts in Khon Kaen also largely influence the stability and strength of the local coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City. Those external and internal factors are also mainly handled by the private policy brokers who take benefit of the external events to strengthen their coalitions' internal capacities to achieve the LRT policymaking. Therefore, the integration of ACF and policy brokers analysis framework investigated the case of Khon Kaen City, discovered the critical influences of policy brokers in the process of policymaking, and better clarified how the local advocacy coalition in Khon Kaen achieved their transport policymaking.

5.5.2. *Dynamics of local coalition to advocate for LRT policy in Khon Kaen*


As mentioned earlier that, Khon Kaen is the only successful case where a minority coalition is able to influence decision-makers and achieve their LRT policymaking compared to those minority coalitions in Phuket and Chiang Mai. The application of ACF enables this study to clarify how the minority coalition in Khon Kaen could achieve their transport policymaking—LRT, which has long been entirely dominated by central agencies.

ACF analysis in the case of Khon Kaen revealed that two coalitions have long been competing for over a decade within an LRT policy subsystem. Those coalitions are the *minority coalition* including KKTT, KKTS, local governments, local civil societies, local universities, and other local advocates in Khon Kaen City. These local advocates are a novel coalition to the LRT policy subsystem who share similar policy core beliefs of seeking to advance and modernize their urban transport services through the development of the LRT system, which is targeted to be fully managed by the municipality, not the central authority. Another coalition is the *dominant coalition* including Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of Transportation (MOT), Ministry of Finance (MOF), and Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC). These associates have long dominated the supreme position in the LRT policy subsystem, whose policy core beliefs seek to centralize transport authorities and stabilize their leading position in the subsystem. Therefore, the dominant coalition seeks to escort their dominant position and transport authority from those minority coalitions.

This study revealed that these two coalitions deployed different secondary beliefs or instrumental strategies to translate and defend their policy core belief in the LRT policy subsystem. As the minority coalition wanted the LRT to be autonomously managed by the municipality, they deployed the financial strategy proposed to the government that

the LRT investment in Khon Kaen City would fully rely on local *self-financing*, not state finance. As an alliance that seeks to defend their LRT authorities, the dominant coalition deployed multiple *legal and administrative challenges* to compete with the minority coalition and escort their dominant position in the LRT policy subsystem. As an over-centralized state, the LRT initiative of the local coalition in Khon Kaen had been proposed to the government several times, and it was hindered by multiple legal challenges from related ministries that allied with the dominant coalition. As a result, the LRT proposal was rejected and asked to be revised several times before it eventually got approved in 2016.

Figure 22 Overview of the dynamics of minority coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City



Note: the LRT policy subsystems (A) and (B) are one similar subsystems, but the author divided it into (A) and (B) for a clearer clarification of how the dynamics of the minority coalition in Khon Kaen is able to influence decision-makers and compete with the dominant coalition in the policy subsystem.

The key initial challenge of running LRT by the minority coalition in Khon Kaen is the authorized duty to manage the rail way transport, which there has never been a municipality in the history of Thailand to manage the rail transport service before. Therefore, various legal and administrative issues related to the authority of a municipality to handle the LRT duty are the key approaches that the dominant coalition deploys to impede the LRT proposal of the minority coalition in Khon Kaen City. However, to unravel those legal and administrative challenges related to the duties of local government to manage the LRT system, the minority coalition established the first municipal corporation in Thailand called


the Khon Kaen Transit System (KKTS), which was jointly founded between five municipalities who seek to advance the LRT in their cities. In municipal law, the municipality cannot autonomously form the municipal corporation by itself, but it needs approval from the MOI.

Therefore, an attempt of a minority coalition to establish the municipal corporation—KKTS, has faced multiple challenges from central authority. The proposal to establish the KKTS was first proposed to the MOI in 2015. Since there was no establishment of a municipal corporation in Thailand before after the Municipal Law has been enacted over 70 years, this proposal was rejected by the MOI and revised several times. However, as a result of policy brokers—KKTT, who has continuously approached and dialogued with the military government—the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) at that time, the proposal to establish the KKTS was eventually approved in 2017. Since then, the KKTS has been working as a central organization to manage the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City.

The success of the minority coalition in Khon Kaen City relies much on their adaptive abilities to learn from past experiences and adjust their strategies to influence decision-makers. As shown in Figure 22, the LRT policy subsystem (A) depicts the *unsuccessful* policymaking of the minority coalition in Khon Kaen City due to the strong centralized power of the dominant coalition deployed legal and administrative challenges to the municipal-own LRT initiative proposed by the minority coalition. Further, the LRT duty also overlaps with multiple ministries that allied as a dominant coalition—MOI, MOT, MOAC, and MOF. Particularly, the most challenging issue is the public land use centralized by the MOAC and MOF. As a result, the government rejected this LRT proposal several times due to the effort of the dominant coalition to keep their principal position in the policy subsystem.

Figure 23 Unsuccessful attempt of minority coalition in LRT policy subsystem (A)

LRT Policy Subsystem (A)




The minority coalition in Khon Kaen struggled with the dominant coalition for years to influence the decision-makers and they were mostly unable to capture the government's interest for the authorization of the LRT initiative. However, a local coalition in Khon Kaen City has learned from previous experience that their earlier approach of advocating for the LRT proposal to the government was ineffective in capturing the interests of the political sector. Therefore, the minority coalition in Khon Kaen City seeks new ways to influence those decision-makers in the LRT policy subsystem. One of the most critical strategies is that the local coalition in Khon Kaen integrates political strategies to exploit the external events of the changing political climate and upcoming national election to strengthen the coalition's power and position in the policy subsystem. As a result, those external events are the new resources that the minority coalition in Khon Kaen exploits to influence the political and military decision-makers during their political campaign for an upcoming election and seek to stabilize their power in the government.

The military took over the democratic government in 2014. Since then, the country was ruled by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)—the military government, from May 22, 2014, to July 16, 2019. This changing political climate has become a new resource and opportunity for the minority coalition to deploy a new strategy of political dialogue—directed by its private policy brokers or KKTT, to approach closer to the centre

of policymaking power. The minority coalition in Khon Kaen has organized formal and informal dialogues with ministerial executives from all ministries associated with the LRT duties, the vice prime minister, and the prime minister. The dialogue was organized more than 19 times, and it could be divided into two types—one is an *inbound dialogue* by inviting the Ministers, Vice Prime Ministers, and Prime Minister to visit the LRT laboratory site, KKTT, and KKTS, in Khon Kaen City and another type is an *outbound dialogue* which minority coalition allied their network to visit and ask for the meeting with decision makers from all associated ministries at the center of power. Therefore, the minority coalition in Khon Kaen is able to drive their coalition's position, getting closer to the center of policymaking power—the military government.

Figure 24 Successful attempt of minority coalition in the LRT policy subsystem (B)



During the country ruled by the NCPO, the military government has sharp authority to command and order all ministries, regional, and local governments in Thailand. The country had no election for six years, and all ministries were commanded by the military government. This external event provided a new opportunity for the minority coalition in Khon Kaen to exploit since they learned from past experiences of their unsuccessful advocacy that if deployed the old ways, they would get only similar results because they

were too weak to compete with the dominant coalition under the over-centralized state. Therefore, the minority coalition seeks to get closer and gain access to the center of power—the military government—through a dialoguing approach and convince those military decision-makers to deploy their sharp power to approve the municipal-own LRT proposal.

Eventually, the minority coalition was able to influence those decision-makers in the subsystem and the LRT proposal was finally approved by the military government in 2016. This was mainly because of not only the political dialogue run by the minority coalition but also the city-wide referendum strategized by the minority coalition to capture the interest of the military government which sought to stabilize their power in government. After the military overthrew the democratic government in 2014, the power of NCPO was unstable due to Thai democratic parties mobilizing political movements to protest the military government and asking for a new election urgently. The NCPO confirmed to organize the new election in late 2015, but the election was postponed several times until it was eventually able to organize the new election in 2019 when the military government was still able to keep its power to run the government. However, from 2014 to 2019, there were country-wide protests against the military government and asked for a new election.

The minority coalition in Khon Kaen capitalized on this upcoming external event of a national election and recognized that the current military government wants to keep their power to run the government. Therefore, the minority coalition—led by its policy brokers and local civil societies, runs the largest city-wide referendums altogether with a dialoguing strategy to show their large capacity of constituency to capture the interest of the military government during the campaign for an upcoming election. Although the minority coalition in Khon Kean lacks a political sector engaging in their collaborative system but city-wide referendum and dialoguing approach become critical political strategies that Khon Kaen's minority coalition deployed to exploit the existing external events to strengthen their political capacity and influence decision-makers in the policy subsystem.

Further, the key secondary belief of the minority coalition—fully local-self-financing for the LRT initiative, is also critical leverage that strengthens its coalition's capacity to struggle with budget regulations opposed by the dominant coalition and the challenges from the external event of state financial constraint due to the COVID-19 and the huge government loan for the pandemic emergency and economic regression. The government has always used the state's financial constraint for its argument of suspending investment in

multiple mega projects. As in the case of LRT proposals in Chiang Mai and Phuket. However, due to the strategic secondary belief of the minority coalition that the LRT in Khon Kaen will fully rely on the local-self financing. Therefore, the minority coalition is durable to budgetary obstacles impeded by the dominant coalition and challenges from the external events of state financial constraints due to the government loan caused by COVID-19.

Even though the minority coalition in Khon Kaen successfully advocated for LRT policymaking which, the government authorized the municipal corporation—KKTS, to manage and launch the LRT initiative autonomously in Khon Kaen City. However, the minority coalition is now unable to *implement* the LRT development in Khon Kaen City because the MOAC and MOF do not render the KKTS to use their public land for the construction of the LRT. Therefore, public land use is the most critical challenge for the minority coalition in launching the LRT initiative. Even though the bidding process has already been done, and the bidding winner company is ready to invest in the LRT system in Khon Kaen and signed the contract in November 2021. However, the main condition stated in the contract is that the KKTS has to acquire and render the public land to the bidding-winner company to run the construction *within one year* after the signing date on the contract, but the minority coalition in Khon Kaen was unable to acquire the public land and give to the winning company. As a result, this contract expired in November 2022, and the minority coalition must re-launch the new bidding process and seek a new possible strategy to get authorization for public land use from the MOAC and MOF. This condition shows that even though a minority coalition is able to get approval from the government and successfully advocate for their policy proposal but, under the centralized state, the dominant coalition can still keep defending its dominant position at the policy implementation stage in the policy subsystem.

CHAPTER 6

THE CASE OF PHUKET CITY

6.1. Introduction

Phuket City is a world-renowned traveling destination located in the South Region of Thailand. Although the city is a small island, but it attracts domestic and international tourists more than 13 million visitors annually, of those are international tourist more than 9.6 million visitors (Phuket Provincial Administrative Organization, 2018: 32). Phuket has been ranked as the top city that most generated income for the state (Royal Thai Government, 2022). The income generated from the travel industry in Phuket City has hugely contributed to the national government income, more than 423,012 million baht annually. Therefore, Phuket is one of the most charming and affluent cities for investors and tourists worldwide.

Although Phuket is the city that most generated income to the country and the economic prosperity and cost of living are also more advanced than other cities in Thailand. However, the city has no inclusive and advanced mass transit system to serve tourists and suffers from traffic conditions that are caused by limited capacities of public transport infrastructures. Therefore, all visitors to Phuket City have mostly relied on rental or private car services to travel around Phuket, which is a necessary and extra cost for the tourists to be able to travel across the city. Therefore, local people and business alliances have demanded the government for the improvement of public transport infrastructures for decades but still have no progress and response from the government.

As inspired by the local joint efforts advocated for LRT in Khon Kaen City, local business alliances in Phuket have mobilized their networks and resources to fund the establishment of “*Phuket City Development Corporation (PKCD)*” in 2016, following the establishment of the Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKT) and approval of LRT project in Khon Kaen City. The PKCD has run campaigns to advance public transportation such as city buses, smart mobility, and the LRT project in Phuket City with the co-funding of 156 million baht that is jointly mobilized among local firms. As a result, the PKCD has run a new urban

transport service—the city bus called “*Phuket Smart Bus*” since 2018 (PKCD, 2018). This city bus is the only most recent and improved transport service functioning in Phuket City, which is also inspired by the experiences of the city bus service run by the KKTT in Khon Kaen.

Experiences of local movements that have successfully campaigned for the LRT in Khon Kaen City also prompted the central government to reconsider the transport imbalance and the development of LRT in other regional core cities across the country. As a result, the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) authorized the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) to run feasibility studies of LRT development in Phuket City in 2013. Later, the government authorized the Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) to run a railway business in regional core cities countrywide in 2019. Since then, the government has officially declared the plan to implement the LRT projects in four other pilot cities, include Chiang Mai, Phuket, Pitsanulook, and Nakhonratchasima. These are the primary targeted cities that the government assured to launch the LRT system, which is fully owned and operated by the MRTA—state enterprise under the MOT.

In the case of Phuket City, the experience of urban transit development run by a local coalition in Khon Kan has caused local business elites in Phuket—the PKCD, to reconsider their potential and local strategies towards the development of urban transportation. Further, as the government also assured to launch the LRT in response to the needs of local businesses and people who have asked for the improvement of urban transport infrastructure for decades. An alliance of local businesses and local governments also run their joint efforts to advocate for the development of LRT and other transport services to be set ready in Phuket before the Specialised Expo will be held in 2028—which the local coalition has actively campaigned to be the host city for this world-renowned event.

Still, the LRT initiative has not been materialized in Phuket City. Although the local coalition has run campaigns to ask the government for urgent development of LRT, but it seems their capacity to capture the interest of the government is weak. Although the city is equipped with a similar local governing body like the city development corporation in Khon Kaen City to guide and strategize local joint efforts for the LRT initiative. But, the capacity of local private alliances in Phuket is weak to mobilize and integrate political resources and external events to exert their power. Therefore, their ability to reach the center of policymaking power is weak, resulting in instability of their LRT policy position, which has

not been finalized. Therefore, this chapter will first clarify the main details of LRT policymaking in Phuket and then will examine why local joint efforts in Phuket are unable to set the LRT initiative on the government agenda.

6.2. LRT Initiative in Phuket City

The efforts of the central government seeking to advance the LRT and other transport services in regional cities go along with the local movements of the LRT in Khon Kaen City. The rivalry between the dominant coalition—central agency, and the new rival coalition—local joint efforts in Khon Kaen to take over the LRT initiative has revealed multiple challenges that weaken the inspiration of local alliances in other cities to run campaigns for the LRT in their city. Especially the challenges related to legal issues and centralized duties of railway transport services. However, after the local coalition in Khon Kaen City succeeded in the policymaking of the LRT in 2016, the central government was informed and realized that there is an increasing risk of inequalities and political stabilities to leave the regional core cities without modernizing public transport services in those regional core cities. As such, the government has planned to advance transportation infrastructures countrywide since 2012 (MRTA, 2020).

On October 20, 2012, the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) was authorized by the government to run a transport infrastructure development plan in response to the growth of the economy and industry in the southern region. Later, the MOT authorized the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) to run feasibility studies in 2013 related to the development of the inter-city LRT system traveling between Surat Thani-Phangnga-Phuket cities as well as the LRT system traveling within the city of Phuket. Afterward, in 2016, the MOT authorized the Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) for being the main organization responsible for the development of the LRT initiative in Phuket City based on the PPP model. The MRTA conducted the feasibility studies related to LRT Development Plan Phase-1, which routes from the Phuket International Airport to Ha Yaek Chalong Intersection, which was proposed to the government in 2018.

The LRT Development Plan Phase-1 covers one transit route and 21 stations, and the total distance is 42 kilometres. The operation of the LRT project in Phuket is a mixed alignment between underground, at-grade intersections, and elevated stations. Nineteen stations are at-grade station, one underground station, and the elevated station will be found only at the Phuket International Airport Station. The operation of the LRT will be based on

a double track system, and it will share the traffic lanes with other vehicles in some parts of the city. While total estimated cost to launch the LRT project is around 35,201 million baht, which will be funded under the PPP approach.

Table 14 Project alignment and stations of LRT in Phuket City

<i>Stations</i>	<i>Route Map</i>
1. Old Town Station	
2. Clock Tower Station	
3. Bang Niaw Station	
4. Phuket Public Library Station	
5. Phuket International Airport Station	
6. Muang Mai Station	
7. Muang Thalang Station	
8. Thalang Station	
9. Two Heroines Station	
10. Koh Khaew Station	
11. Bus Terminal Station	
12. Phuket Rajabhat University Station	
13. Thung Kha Station	
14. Saphan Hin Station	
15. Sakdidetch Station	
16. Dao Rung Station	
17. Wichit Station	
18. Chao Fa (East) Station	
19. Palai Station	
20. Khok Tanot Station	
21. Chalong Station	

Adapted from the MRTA (2018)

The LRT initiative in Phuket City consists of two phases. Phase-1 is routed from Phuket International Airport to Ha Yaek Chalong Intersection, purple line as detailed above Table. Phase-2 is a yellow line routed from Mueng Mai Station to Thanon Station, which includes four stations, and the total distance is 16.5 kilometers. Development of the LRT

Phase-1, which is the main transit route of the city, is targeted to be constructed in 2020 and planned to get ready for service in July 2026.

Figure 25 LRT project planned to launch in Phuket City




Photo source: <https://thelist.group/realist/blog/รถไฟฟ้า-ภูเก็ต/>

However, on February 1, 2021, the MRTA reported three possible transit systems to operate in Phuket City, including the LRT (steel wheel), the LRT (tire wheel), and the Autonomous Rapid Transit (ART). A comparative study revealed that among these three systems, the ART or autonomous bus is the most cost-effective system. The ART cost half the price of the original LRT plan. The LRT system cost more than 35,201 million baht, while the ART is estimated to cost around 17,723 million baht. Later, on March 15, 2021, the MOT authorized the OTP, MRTA, and the Expressway Authority of Thailand (EAT) to

thoroughly review the proper technical transit system to launch in Phuket City and reported to the government again.

Figure 26 LRT development concept in Phuket City



Photo source: <https://www.thaipost.net/economy-news/326016/>

Eventually, in May 2021, the MRTA reported their recommended transit system to the MOT by suggesting the ART system would be most suitable for Phuket City and it would cost less than the LRT. However, the MOT has not yet finalized the project. Leaving the concerns of local people and businesses related to the progress and which system would be operated in the city. Especially, local displeasure towards the government since they have envisaged the development of LRT service to the city. As a result, on November 15, 2021, sixteen local organizations, private alliances, regional authorities, local governments, and the press were gathered—led by the PKCD, to declare their demand for the LRT system, not the ART as suggested by the MRTA. Although, in 2022, the MRTA ran another feasibility study to find the most suitable transit system in Phuket City. Still, after more than a decade of policymaking, the LRT in Phuket City has not been finalized.

6.3. Local Collaborative Approach

6.3.1. Phuket City Development Corporation (PKCD)

As inspired by the development of the KKTT, a local business alliance from Phuket had come to learn from the experience of the KKTT before they established the

PKCD in 2016. Like the KKTT, the PKCD is established from joint efforts among 47 local business owners who mutually mobilized the fund of 156 million baht to support the operations of PKCD to advocate for LRT policymaking and other transport services. It clearly declared that the purpose of the PKCD is to form collaborative actions between public and private sectors for the benefit of Phuket's development and to drive the city as a world-leading traveling destination.

Figure 27 Press release of the development plan of the PKCD




Photo source: PKCD (2016a)

The PKCD clearly states that *“the PKCD is formed by contribution and mutual commitment among local private alliance to develop Phuket City without solely relying on the state budget as learned from the development of the Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKT). As such local businesses in Phuket led by 25 local business owners, have jointly contributed the fund of 100 million baht as initial registered capital to fund the operation of PKCD (source code: 260:1 p3, for more detail see also PKCD,2016a).”* Mr. K, one of the PKCD members, further mentioned that *“initial projects that the PKCD targeted to run is about the basic projects that promote the growth of travel industry such as investment in LRT development, city bus system, marina, yacht ports, smart city, and public infrastructure that drive Phuket to be the world-premium quality city to welcome all visitors worldwide (source code: 259:1).”* Therefore, the duty of PKCD is mainly related to the development of infrastructure that promotes economic growth, especially the transit-oriented development approach (TOD) by using transportation as a mechanism to drive the growth of the city.

The PKCD also aims to promote public participation from multiple local sectors to engage in their businesses and take the income from those businesses to advance the city. Those key businesses of the PKCD include four units which are (1) Phuket Smart Bus (PKSB), (2) Economic Center Development (ECD), (3) City Development Solutions (CDS), and (4) City Data Analytics (CDA). These four business units are run by an investment of the PKCD and joint actions between local and regional authorities and the PKCD. Especially the development of the city database run by the CDA program, which is largely useful for local governments to promote smart cities.

Figure 28 Four business units of the PKCD



Adapted from the PKCD

Although the PKCD primarily aims to advance the LRT system, as in Khon Kaen City, but their local factors are varied from the case of Khon Kaen, and the MRTA willingly targeted to be a responsible agency for the development of LRT in Phuket, as they challenged against local-own LRT initiative in Khon Kaen. As seeing multiple challenges forward, the PKCD upholds the MRTA to take responsibility for the LRT project with alliances of local and regional governments. One of the well-known urban transport initiatives run by the PKCD is the Phuket Smart Bus (PKSB). The PKSB is the most recent and advanced city bus that has served locals and international visitors in Phuket since 2018. This city bus system is routed from the Phuket International Airport to Rawai Beach. However, although the locals and international visitors are most relied on this city bus system, but the PKCD is unable to run the city bus across the Phuket island, only this one transit route, due to sophisticated bureaucratic issues and working disparity between private and public sectors.

Figure 29 Phuket Smart Bus run by the PKCD



Photo source: phuketSMARTBUS.com

6.3.2. Andaman City Development Corporation (ACDC)

The most recent city development corporation was also launched in 2021, called the Andaman City Development Corporation (ACDC), located in Phuket City. The ACDC also targets to advance integrated transit services and public infrastructure that promote wellness and economic growth of Phuket City. More interestingly, the ACDC was founded by Mr.K, who was a former leading founder of the PKCD, but he is now disengaged himself to run the ACDC with some former cofounders of PKCD. Therefore, there are two city development corporations—PKCD and ACDC, that have simultaneously run their joint efforts to advance urban transport services and other economic initiatives in Phuket City.

The primary goal of ACDC is also to promote the local traveling industry and urban transport services in Phuket. The ACDC has also taken leading roles in running a local joint movement to advocate for the LRT in Phuket, as they are welcome to push forward and be a liaison to contact private companies to continue and invest in the LRT development plan that the MRTA had studied in the past (Thansettakij, 2022). Therefore, the ACDC is another key urban policy actor that is critical to the policymaking of LRT and strengthening capacities of mutual joint efforts between the local private sector and local government in Phuket. Especially their efforts to run the Andaman Wellness Economic Corridor.

One of the key projects run by the ACDC is “*Andaman Wellness Economic Corridor*,” which they aim to invest in a city-wide cable car transit system and to promote wellness traveling industries in Phuket City. This cable car system routes from Karon Beach to the Big Buddha Station located on the mountain, with a total length of around 2.16 kilometers. On December 2, 2022, the ACDC mobilized their international business alliance and signed the MOU with two Chinese enterprises, including Huawei and CRSC which are the biggest public infrastructure company in China, to promote and invest in this cable car transit project. The development of cable car transit was planned to extend the length from 2.16 kilometers to 79.99 kilometers covering all traveling destinations across the city and total cost is estimated around 65,000 million baht which primarily invested by those Chinese companies. The recent plan is under the feasibility study related to a possible system of those cable car routes, which should be done within nine months after the MOU signing ceremony.

Figure 30 MOU Signing ceremony between ACDC, Huawei, and CRSC companies.






Photo source: <https://www.thansettakij.com/business/tourism/551679>

According to Mr. K, as a founder of the ACDC, mentioned that the “*transit network or routes of this project is not the same route which the MRTA had studied. The MRTA has only one line routed from the airport to the Chalong subdistrict, reaching only an urban area. However, other than that, the transit routes planned by the MRTA is unable to reach out, especially around the coastal areas of Phuket City. Therefore, this project would be the feeder to transit visitors and promote city panorama touring as a new traveling attraction in Phuket. (Source code: 261:1 p10).*” Therefore, the ACDC is carrying out another public transit development in Phuket, which incorporates with local governments and international financing companies to run the project guided by the ACDC.

However, according to the investigation, the ACDC has no formalized organization and is less institutionalized compared to the PKCD. The partners of ACDC are also associated with a smaller group of local firms compared to the PKCD, which is more institutionalized and financially tightened among coalition participants. Therefore, the internal capacity and multiplicity of the PKCD are more institutionalized and largely

attached to the urban governance structure of local and regional authorities in Phuket City. Nevertheless, the emergence of the ACDC reflects another effort of the local private alliance that would like to advance the urban transport system in another approach.

6.3.3. Roles of Local Governments

In Phuket, there is no municipal corporation or inter-municipal collaboration like the KKTS in Khon Kaen City, where five municipalities jointly mobilized the fund to run for LRT initiatives. Although the municipal alliance in Phuket is financially looser than Khon Kaen but their commitments have slightly revealed towards their alliance with the private sector to run for the LRT development in Phuket. One of the most prominent roles of local government is their joint movement to run press conferences to declare the local demand of LRT to the national government.

The local coalition has been dreaming of the LRT development since the project was promoted in Phuket in 2012. However, in May 2021, the MRTA proposed the government three alternative systems towards the development of urban transit in Phuket City, including the autonomous rapid transit (ART) or the autonomous bus system which is most likely to be an option. Leading to the movement of local coalition to mobilize networks and ask the government for the development of the LRT's steel wheel, not the LRT's tire wheel nor the ART, in response to the demand of local people and preparation for being the host city of the Specialised World Expo 2028.

Although local governments in Phuket have no joint governing body nor plans to run the municipal enterprise to solve limitations of urban affairs. But their common plan among local governments is to promote Phuket as a *special* local government like Bangkok or Pattaya cities. Becoming a special local government would promote Phuket City to be more financially and managerially autonomous to run public services, urban transport, and other development initiatives in Phuket. According to interviews with the Mayor of Phuket City Municipality (PKC) and the Chief Executive of the Phuket Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) revealed that they have already planned to propose to the national government about plan to promote Phuket City to a special local government because local public affairs are extensively prohibited by multiple legal constraints, limited resources, and unresponsiveness to the needs of local people due to the over-centralized state. Therefore, the promotion of Phuket as a special local government would strengthen

the financial and administrative capacities of local governments to handle those multiple challenges and deliver services that are responsive to the needs of local people.

6.4. Analysis of Local Coalition Strategies and LRT Policymaking

Although Phuket is a world-renowned travel destination, tourists worldwide have come to visit more than 13 million visitors annually. The city is also one of the most affluent cities in Thailand. However, Phuket has no advanced urban transit system to serve local and international visitors. Further, the city has long suffered with traffic conditions and limited capacities of transport infrastructures for decades. This problem has triggered the local movements led by private alliances to campaign for the development of LRT and other urban transit systems, such as the city bus and cable car to be launched in Phuket City.

The LRT initiative has been officially targeted to launch in Phuket since 2012. Yet, the project has not become visible. As such, local firms have organized a coalition and jointly mobilized the fund to advocate for LRT policymaking and other urban transit projects in Phuket City. Those local private companies, beginning with 25 leading members, have mutually contributed 100 million baht to establish the city development company called “*Phuket City Development Corporation: PKCD*” in 2016. Later, the PKCD mobilized additional contributions from local private alliances to fund the PKCD, increasing from 25 members to 47 members, and the fund was raised from 100 million bath to 156 million baht.

As inspired by the model of KKTT in Khon Kaen City, primary work of the PKCD is to run campaigns advocate for the development of LRT, as an interview of Mr. K, leading member of the PKCD, revealed that “*initial projects that the PKCD targeted to run is about... investment in LRT development, city bus system, marina, yacht ports, smart city, and public infrastructure that drive Phuket to be the world-premium quality city to welcome all visitors worldwide*” (source code: 259:1). Since the MRTA has already taken duties of LRT development, the PKCD, therefore, run a new city bus system in following year called the “*Phuket Smart Bus (PSB)*.” Without spending budget from the public sector, the PKCD has run the PSB effectively which is now most active transit system in Phuket.

However, the national government has officially assured and declared the development of LRT in response to the needs of local people and the businesses sector in Phuket. The local coalition has also hoped that what the national government had envisioned about the development of LRT would be materialized before the organization of Specialised World Expo 2028. However, it is most likely that this LRT project would be turned down

and changed into another transit system called autonomous rapid transit or the ART system, due to the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) having reconsidered the cost-effectiveness of the LRT investment. Therefore, in 2021, the local coalition in Phuket mobilized their networks—led by the PKCD and local governments, to declare their local demand of the LRT initiative, not the ART or other transit types. Because the LRT will contribute to greater benefits of economic growth and the wellbeing of local people in Phuket City.

Still, the LRT policymaking in Phuket City has not been finalized. The local coalition has dreamed and demanded for the commitment of the national government to advance the LRT and other urban transit systems in Phuket, particularly before the event of Specialised World Expo—which a local private alliance has been proposing Phuket to be the host city in 2028. After a decade of LRT policymaking advocated by local coalition in Phuket City, this study revealed 14 relevant factors that mostly impede—and with some factors strengthen, capacities of local joint efforts to advocate for LRT in Phuket including (1) absence of political brokers (2) collaboration from the private sector (3) covid-19 (4) financing (5) government loan (6) local private policy brokers (7) new government election (8) promotion to special city (9) roles of the PKCD (10) political factor (11) state dependence (12) working disparity between public and private sectors (13) working disparity between political and private sectors and (14) World Expo event, as detailed in following Table.

Table 15 Co-occurrence analysis of relevant factors related to LRT policymaking in Phuket


Relevant Factors	● Centralized State Gr=86	○ LRT-PK Gr=176
● absence of political brokers Gr=43	12	18
● collaboration from the private sector Gr=28	2	7
● covid-19-external events Gr=10	2	5
● financing Gr=32	5	9
● gov loan-external events Gr=2	0	2
● local private policy brokers Gr=100	6	13
● new gov/election-external events Gr=17	1	10
○ PK wants special city Gr=6	1	8

● PKCD Gr=22	0	23
● political factor Gr=80	23	20
○ state dependence Gr=38	10	34
○ working disparity between government and private sectors Gr=16	1	12
○ working disparity between political and private sectors Gr=12	0	6
● world expo 2028-external events Gr=24	0	26

*Gr refers to the groundedness of each code

However, the author classifies those factors into five categories that impede the capacities of the local coalition in Phuket, including *financial factors, political factors, collaboration from the private sector, roles of policy brokers, and external events*. These factors reveal the weak capacities of the local coalition to integrate relevant conditions advocated for LRT policymaking in Phuket. First is a financial factor; the LRT in Phuket is a state-driven initiative. Therefore, the LRT development is financially reliant on the state. Although, the local private coalition mobilized resources to fund the PKCD for LRT development in 2016. But, the government already authorized the MRTA to be responsible for the development of the LRT in the same year before they established the PKCD. As such, the local coalition has no financial leverage to freely materialize the LRT but the PPP model.

Figure 31 Financing model of LRT development in Phuket City



The development of the LRT in Phuket, therefore, differs from Khon Kaen since the LRT in Phuket would be managed by the MOT's state enterprise—the MRTA, and using the PPP as a financing model to fund the project. One of the prominent evidence is that the local private coalition is interested in investing in the PPP for the development of the LRT system in Phuket, as noted by Mr. V, director of the OTP under the MOT, mentioned:

“Recently, the MRTA has been running financial feasibility studies related to the PPP of the LRT in Phuket... at this moment, there are local companies in Phuket interested to invest in the project, which we expected to use the PPP Net Cost approach to reduce the burden of the government's investment. (Source code: 137:1 p3).”

The PKCD is a leading local private alliance who advocates for the development of LRT in Phuket, as they aim to invest and advance the urban transport infrastructure of the city. However, since the final decision is not dependent on the locals who want to advance urban transportation, the LRT policymaking in Phuket is highly associated with political factors at the center of policymaking. Dependence on the state somehow becomes key challenge to the development of the LRT in Phuket City due to limited state resources and limited capacities of the local coalition since they have no political brokers to deal with policymaking at the center of power. As reflected through the political decision of the Minister of Transportation who reconsidered altering the LRT investment in Phuket to change into the ART and argued for more cost-effectiveness. As noted by the Minister of Transportation that:

“Authorizing MRTA to run public hearing again related to the proper system... However, the ART is the most suitable and cost-effective. If we reached the conclusion from the public hearing, the MRTA would launch the project following the plan to advance urban transit systems in regional city (Source code: 165:2 p1).”


Therefore, critical concern towards the state dependency is not about what locals exactly need but it is all about how to minimize the central resources. As further clarified by the Minister of Transportation: *“We have to admit that the country has a limited budget, if the study revealed that the project would be cost-effective, no burden to the local people, and could solve traffic issues, so we could do it. On the contrary, if the project is not cost-effective for the investment and no one uses the system... if it is the LRT it is estimated that*

there should be 40,000 people to take service per day. Otherwise, the service price might be raised, which is not responsive to the people (source code: 194:1 p3).” Moreover, the Governor of the MRTA also clarified about limitation of state resources and the direction of policy toward the development of LRT in Phuket:

“We are still working on the project, but the system was altered into autonomous rapid transit (ART) following the policy of the Minister of Transportation to reduce the cost of investment. According to the study, ART would reduce the cost of construction around 40%. We plan to run the pilot project routing from the Phuket International Airport to Ha Yeak Chalong Intersection... If LRT, it costs 35 thousand million baht while the ART will reduce the cost to around 15 thousand million baht. (Source code: 125:1)”

Although the PKCD has mobilized local networks and demanded the central government for the development of LRT, but the coalition’s capacity is weak since they most relied on state finance, and they have no local political brokers to commit for the development of LRT initiatives at local and national arena. Therefore, the second condition that weakens the capacity of a local coalition to set LRT policy is the *political factor*. The nature of a successful state-driven project has relied much on political power since politics is a key resource to handle with the center of policymaking power. However, the local coalition in Phuket has no political policy brokers to represent and deal with policymakers located at the center of policymaking. Further, they have also no organized events approaching to the center of power in LRT policymaking, which contradicts to local joint efforts in Khon Kaen City, which approach the center of power by ministerial dialoguing. Therefore, the local coalition revealed their weak political and brokering capacities to deal with the MRTA and the policy direction of the government towards the development of LRT in Phuket City.

Figure 32 Political factor and LRT policymaking in Phuket City



Findings from this study revealed that the working disparity between local politics and the private coalition is another key challenge to the LRT development in Phuket City. According to an interview with Mr. C, a leading member of the PKCD, mentioned that *“politicians have no critical roles in supporting or done anything to drive the LRT and other infrastructure development projects, particularly national political representative (source code: 10:11 ¶ 29–30).”* Similarly, Mr. J1, a leading member of the Phuket Chamber of Commerce, also revealed disparity and disengagement of the political sector in their joint effort to advocate for LRT policymaking in Phuket, as said:

“Roles of local politicians in driving the LRT project is rarely found. They run for other issues. Politics here divides into two or three groupings but we, as a private sector, we try to be neutral too. I think we should further cooperate with those politicians, every party in Phuket... However, when we asked support from those politicians, they will say I did not know this project before how could I drive the project? But it is very easy for them to ask official report or project details from us or regional authorities, ask what the city really wants or what locals want their helps. Why should we

have to invite them or beg them since it is their duties, it their jobs as politicians.” (Source code: 11:21 ¶ 42 – 44)

An absence of local political policy brokers weakens capacities of local coalition in Phuket to reach the centre of policymaking power. Although local coalition has tried to approach to the centre of policymaking power once by organization press conference to declare local demand for the LRT system against the ART alternative plan guided by the MOT, but their political influences to leverage and broker for the desired policy is weak and unconvincing. As said by Mr. J2, leading member of the Phuket Chamber of Commerce:

“The MOT wants to change the LRT to ART. What we have campaigned for is organization of public hearing 2-3 times. Initially, we confirmed them we demanded for the LRT system because studies have been conducted multiple times, only the PPP process is left to be launched... we confirmed them also in joint committee of the public and private sectors that we and local people want the same system—the LRT. In case the MOT wants to change they need to consider about the timing and lateness of the development. Still, they do not respond to what locals need... I personally think that it is all about politics.” (Source code: 11:24 ¶ 45 – 46)

Therefore, local joint efforts run by the PKCD is grow weaker due to absence of local political brokers to represent and campaign for the development of LRT in Phuket City. However, what local coalition tries to advance and strengthen their capacities is about promotion of Phuket to be a special city likes Bangkok and Pattaya cities. Becoming a special city would largely facilitate the city be governed more effectively to achieve the LRT policymaking and the local government will be more autonomously and financially self-reliance. As noted by Mr. A, Chief Executive of Phuket Administrative Organization, said:

“Governor election—becoming a special city, is more responsive. Like Bangkok Metropolitan, they want to launch the LRT system such as BTS and MRT, they could run it easily. We have to change the governing system of our city into a special local government. Governor should come from election as in Bangkok... Today we are not financially and managerially autonomous. Phuket City generates major income to the country while other cities take benefits from income that our city produced (Source code: 9:8 ¶ 14).” Mr. A, further noted that *“we want to promote Phuket to be a*

special city likes Pattaya and Bangkok, if they—the government, would not allow. They have to find another way to strengthen capacities of our city...to promote wellness of local people and good urban transportation.”
(source code: 9:10 ¶ 21)

Therefore, promoting Phuket as a special city would be more responsive to what local people really need like the development of LRT and other transport infrastructures in Phuket City. Similarly, an interview with Mr. Y, Mayor of Phuket City Municipality, also revealed that they are running the study and developing plan to propose the national government to promote Phuket as a special city that:

“It is difficult for municipality to work effectively due to many centralized issues. Therefore, we are planning to propose the government about our plan to transform Phuket into special city. If this plan is done, we will propose to the government to ask for their approval. If we do not launch this plan, the city will lose many opportunities. We have long been constrained by centralized issues. Phuket City could not run many local desired initiatives because of many centralized issues on legal and managerial problems... we want special administration, central government would not specialize in this city than local people. (source code: 8:7 ¶ 9–10)”


Even though the local coalition has run the alternative solution to promote Phuket as a special city. But to change the local government system and to achieve such a big deal, they exactly need political brokers to represent and handle with associated challenges and opportunities floating around the centre of policymaking powers too. However, political capacities of local coalition in Phuket are weak and policymaking of the LRT is largely influenced by political agenda. Therefore, inabilities to reach the centre of policymaking and handle with political influences are key challenging issues towards policy advocacy of the LRT in Phuket City, as an interview with Mr. A, Chief Executive of Phuket Administrative Organization, said that:

“the OTP already finished the LRT studies, they also planed to change from LRT to ART since some transit details need to be adjusted. I think they should be sincere to solve urban transit here. Phuket is a living room of the country to welcome international visitors and most generated

income for the government. They have to stop playing political game in the centre and focusing on what local people really need (source code: 9:7 ¶ 12)

Mr. A reflected a clear situation that an absence of political brokers has weakened capacity of local coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking. As such, substituting roles of local private sector becomes a critical agent to local coalition in Phuket to advocate for the LRT policymaking. However, roles of local private alliance in Phuket are also fragmented. As revealed by emergence of two separated city development corporations launched in the same city: the Phuket City Development Corporation (PKCD) and the Andaman City Development Corporation (ACDC). These two new local governing bodies are both aim to advance urban transit services in Phuket and also involve in multiple urban development initiatives such as city bus service, cable car development, city database centre, and LRT campaigns. But their interrelations are fragmented.

Figure 33 Roles of local private sector and LRT policymaking in Phuket City



The PKCD established in 2016, after official announcement of the government to launch the LRT in Phuket. The PKCD is main local coalition to run joint efforts and advocate for LRT policymaking, as well as other urban transit services such as the city bus. In the beginning, the PKCD clearly states that its objective is to invest in LRT system and other urban transportations as noted by Mr. K, cofounder of the PKCD that: *“the PKCD targeted to run basic projects that promote growth of travel industry such as investment in LRT development, city bus system...and public infrastructure that drive Phuket to be the world-premium quality city... (source code: 259:1).”* The PKCD has mobilized resources from their business networks not only for LRT policymaking but also to advance urban transit system in Phuket. Most well-regarded project is the Phuket Smart Bus (PSB) which highlights the important and convincing roles of PKCD in urban development affairs. Although the PKCD had actively strategized local joint efforts to demand for the LRT, but their unity and commitment to run for the LRT has been now diminishing because they have no critical leverages to strengthen capacities of local coalition to influence and deal with central authorities.

The local private alliance in Phuket has become clearly fragmented in 2021 after the formation of the ACDC. The ACDC is less institutionalized compared to the PKCD, since it has no headquarters, official website, business model, nor active social media. But its leaders are highly influential since they are well-known among local governments and local business alliances in Phuket City. More interestingly, founder of the ACDC was also a one of former leading cofounders of the PKCD who initially launched the city development corporation to run urban transportation development in Phuket City. Therefore, two city development corporations—PKCD and ACDC, have run simultaneously local joint efforts to advance urban transportation in Phuket.

Key role of local private sector in LRT policymaking is their financial contribution towards joint funding gathered among local companies particularly through the roles of PKCD. The PKCD has actively advocate for LRT policymaking in Phuket since 2016 after lessons learned from the experiences of local private alliance of the KKTT who succeeded in the policymaking of LRT in Khon Kaen City. However, after organizations of local joint efforts trying to set LRT initiative on the national government agendas, the PKCD was inaccessible to approach the center of policymaking power since their local coalition has limited political influences. As such, the PKCD has rendered their roles and leave the LRT duties to the MRTA instead. Recently, there had no final decision related whether the LRT

would likely to turn down into the ART or not. Multiple delays of LRT plan have been seen as a dream-selling project advertised by the government. Local people who wanted the LRT are recently even question the possibility of project that would probably be materialized in Phuket or not, as an interview with Mr. J3, members of the Phuket Chamber of Commerce, said that: *“local people want the project to be happened. Majority of local people here want it... Right now, we recently think that is it will be real? Will the project be implemented or not? (source code: 11:35 ¶ 68–69).”*

Furthermore, this study also revealed disparity between local private coalition and regional authorities related to urban transit development in Phuket. The PKCD planned to expand the PSB’s transit route which they recently operate only one route. However, the Phuket Provincial Administrative Organization (PPAO) also wants to take the same targeted route to run the transport service, with limited capacity and traditional bus service. Further, the Provincial Land Transport Office of Phuket (PLTOP) also hesitated to authorize the PKCD to run another route of the PSB system. The PKCD has always assured the PLTOP that they are extremely ready to launch new transit operations and asked the PLTOP for the authorization. Further, the PKCD already bought new smart buses to test drive in targeted route to show their capacities to operate in new transit route. Still, the PLTOP has not authorized the PKCD to run city bus service in another new transit route. As said by Mr. C, cofounder of the PKCD, that:

The PKCD is ready to be operator of the transit route, but the PLTOP has not opened for us.... We already ordered new EV buses, but the PLTOP has never authorized... So, we have already talked with the PPAO...But the PLTOP always refers to the limitations of the law and take the time longer...The PKCD ask for additional operating routes of the PSB. They said we—the PKCD have to take reasons and propose the plan which is very detailed... I think which part that regional and local authorities are unable to do related to improvement of urban transportation, the PKCD is very welcome to help. (source code: 11:5 ¶ 18–19)


Therefore, this study found there is a working disparity between local private coalition and regional authorities that has caused an issue related to internal unity of local coalition to run for the LRT development in Phuket. As a result, the local tie between the PKCD and the PLTOP is loose to form collaborative actions to advocate for the LRT and

other urban transport developments. Furthermore, the roles of PKCD in seriously driving for the LRT and the PSB are also a reflection of private policy brokerage. What reflects the PKCD as a local private policy broker the most is their final goal to take parts in the alliance to run for the LRT development in Phuket. According to Mr. P, cofounder of the PKCD, mentioned that:

“The PKCD follows their master plan which will work under four pillars: urban planning, infrastructure development, travelling platform development, and knowledge and city database...Recently, the PKCD plans to raise the additional fund into 200 million baht and mobilize the fund from the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) as infrastructure capital fund of the city to advance the development of LRT in Phuket... The PKCD also plan to be developer of land and real estate located around the stations to be the depot workshop and commercial areas to promote economic growth of the city and inclusive development of urban transportation in Phuket...” (Source code: 264:1 p1)

Therefore, the PKCD invested their time and resources to run for the LRT with hope to take parts of the LRT developer in return. Similarly, the ACDC is also regarded as private policy broker in city cable car policymaking. The founder of the ACDC is also an owner of Beach Group Company where the first phase development of the city cable car transit would be initiated directly to the Beach Group Plaza. If the city cable care is done, it would attract many visitors to their plaza and other commercial areas. Therefore, local joint efforts mobilized by the ACDC and the PKCD towards urban transit developments in Phuket has been expected to benefit those brokers’ businesses in returns for what they have done for the city. Becoming local coalition’s policy brokers is not only facilitate them to became urban elite policymakers of the city but their contributions associated with LRT, PSB, or the city cable car are also directly beneficial to those business owners who work under the brand of city development corporation.

Figure 34 Local private policy brokers and LRT policymaking in Phuket City



Although the PKCD has intended to contribute their funding and commitment towards the development of LRT, but their political leverage is limited. The PKCD and the ACDC have limited political approaches to strengthen capacities of their local coalition in achieving the LRT policymaking. They have no dialoguing and political strategies reaching to the centre of policymaking power. More importantly, the working disparity between private coalition and local politics leave their local joint efforts no policy brokers to represent the coalition. As noted by Mr. C, leading member of the PKCD, mentioned that: “*politicians have no critical roles in supporting or done anything to drive the LRT and other infrastructure development projects, particularly national political representative (source code: 10:11 ¶ 29–30).*” Therefore, lacking political resources have weakened capacities of local coalition to run local joint efforts to advocate for the LRT policymaking in Phuket City.

Another relevant factors that affect LRT policymaking in Phuket is *external events*. These events are considered both hindering and beneficial to LRT development in Phuket including *the COVID-19, the government loan, new government election, and World Expo 2028*. First, the COVID-19 and the government’s loan are interrelated. Global COVID-19 pandemic has affected the LRT development in two ways. First the COVID-19 has delayed the operations of feasibility studies and local public hearings that the MRTA aimed to launch

in Phuket. As such, those processes were postponed and resulted in the delay of decision making towards the LRT initiative in Phuket City. More importantly, the COVID-19 becomes one of the reasons for government argued for the postponement of LRT initiative due to the shrinking budget of the state. Further, the government authorized the public loan with enormous amount to handle the COVID-19 effects in 2021, around 1 trillion baht, and in 2022 around 700,000 million baht. Although the government's loan is necessary process to handle with the COVID-19, but it is also a key external event that hindered possibilities and progress of the LRT policymaking process in Phuket since the government has cut off the state budget of several ministries to minimize the cost of public services and use those budgets to manage with the pandemic. Therefore, the COVID-19 largely influenced in the delay of the LRT development in Phuket City because handling with the pandemic was set as the most urgent and first priority of the government, as noted by Mr. X, governor of the MRTA, that:

“Fighting the COVID-19 by the government’s loan of 1 trillion bath might affect the projects of MRTA in the future. Especially the new projects will spend a lot of state money for the land expropriation. If the loan of government is huge... it will affect the projects that are not begin to operate and those projects might be devalued or depreciated in terms of budget allocation from the government (source code: 169:1)

Enormous amount of the government's loan is also involved with financial bonds that the government must commit for the long financial burden. As a result, mega infrastructure projects are devalued and minimized the cost of development as the shrinking scale of state budget. Therefore, the government has planned to change the operation of LRT system into the ART system in Phuket due to the government argued that ART is most cost-effective and the state has limited money, as said by the Minister of Transportation that: *“we have to admit that the country has limited budget, if the study revealed that the project will be cost-effective...so we could do it. On the contrary, if the project is not cost-effective for the investment and... the LRT service price might be raised... it is not responsive (source code: 194:1).”*

Figure 35 External events associated with LRT policymaking in Phuket City

“The World Expo is our hope. If we are selected to be the host city, it will extremely transform Phuket City. But we have to wait for the official result announcement whether which country will be the host. If we are lucky, the city will be highly advanced and that state will have to fund Phuket to develop relevant infrastructure. If we get selected, this will be the great event in our city’s history, the road, transportation, and ways of live here will be changed (Source code: 8:18 ¶ 37–38).”

Similarly, the local private coalition also views that the World Expo as the key opportunity to materialize the LRT policymaking in Phuket City. As noted by Mr. C, leading member of the PKCD, that: *“Whether the LRT or roads constructions, the government is key person to find the investors because it will spend huge money... In case of Phuket, we—the private sector, have always ready to support and materialize the projects. We support those projects to be implemented, just one concern is about ability of government to find for the investor...However, the World Expo will expedite the development of multiple projects in Phuket (source code: 10:14 ¶ 33).”* Correspondingly, Mr. J4, leading member of the Phuket Chamber of Commerce, also asserted that the key trigger to materialize the LRT is the World Expo event, as said that:

“We have discussed about LRT development for 20 years and local joint efforts to drive the project officially is estimated around 16 years. Eventually, our hope to implement the LRT is dependent on the World Expo 2028. If we are selected as the city host to run this event, we will get the LRT to be launched in our city. Everybody agreed and we all want the public infrastructures, we will get new roads. We really hope the World Expo will advance infrastructures in our city. This is very important (source code: 11:17 ¶ 34).” Similarly to Mr. J1, member of Phuket Chamber of Commerce, also said that : *“Without the World Expo event, we would never know when the LRT will eventually be materialized (source code: 11:23 ¶ 46).”*

Another relevant external event is the political campaign for the new election in 2023. The LRT development initiatives have been delayed for years after its official plan since 2012. However, there was one political party who used the LRT project to campaign and take benefits for their upcoming election, which he promises to promote and implement

the LRT in Phuket City after election. As reported by the Bangkokbiz News that, popular political candidate in Phuket promised to solve the traffic issues and LRT development, as the candidate said that:

“Phuket suffers with traffic jam problems; no government agencies take this problem seriously... Our political party will commit and take this problem seriously and promised that transportation in Phuket City should be advanced and the LRT project should be eventually implemented”
(source code: 140:2 p 3)

However, this candidate gets lost in the last election. Leaving no chances about his political influence to drive the LRT at the centre of policymaking power. This political campaign is less forceful to advocate for the LRT policymaking in Phuket if the candidate lost in the election. However, most critical influence from the external event of national election to LRT policymaking in Phuket City is that the new election will delay of the progress of LRT policymaking in Phuket because the project must wait for the new government to take decisions. As an interview with Mr. J1, from Phuket Chamber of Commerce, said that: *“we, as a private sector, have share common understanding and agreement that we want the LRT, but there are no progresses from the government. It might be because they have no money or because of somethings we do not know why it is too late. We have waited for ten years. Now we have to wait again after the finish of upcoming election... Every process gets stuck by the state (source code: 11:54 ¶ 72 – 73).”* Therefore, the new election become an event external that delay the progress of the LRT policymaking which associated with political issues and state regulations.

Analysis of events that are external to LRT policymaking in Phuket revealed two types of those events—*driving and hindering events*. The key event that hindered LRT policymaking in Phuket include the COVID-19, government’s loan, and new election that delayed the progress and possibility of LRT policymaking. Moreover, the event of new election, as the key strategic opportunity taken advantages to strengthen political capacity by local coalition in Khon Kaen, has no critical impact to local coalition in Phuket because they were unable to take advantages from this external event to strengthen political influence of their local coalition and advocated for LRT policymaking in Phuket. However, what drives LRT the most is the World Expo event expected to be organized in 2028. Being the host city of the World Expo events is key opportunity to materialize the LRT and other public

infrastructure development in Phuket. Therefore, although there were political external events existed in the LRT policy subsystem, but local coalition in Phuket was unable to integrate political approach to take advantages or alter those external events into their coalition strategy to advocate for the LRT policymaking in Phuket.

Table 16 Internal and external events associated with LRT policymaking in Phuket City during 2012-2023

Year	Explanatory Variables	
	<i>Internal Events</i>	<i>External Events</i>
2012	Oct 20, Government authorized MOT to run feasibility study related LRT in Phuket	
	Sep 10, OTP run feasibility study related to LRT	
2013	Dec 20, first public hearing	
2014	June 3, Second public hearing	May 22, Military Coup and the country was ruled by military government called National Council for Peace and Order (CPO) from May 22, 2014-July 16, 2019.
2015	Jan 6, Third public hearing	Prime minister confirmed to organization new national election in late 2015
		May 27, Prime minister confirmed election will be in next year (first postponement)
		Country-wide protests requested for new national election
2016	Feb 7, Fourth public hearing	Country-wide protests requested for new national election
	Feb 10, MOT authorized MRTA to conduct feasibility and PPP study related to LRT in PK	Jan 26, Prime minister confirmed to organize new national election the middle of 2016
		Jan 29, Second postponement of national election

		Sep 21, Prime minister confirmed to organize new national election by the end of next year (2017)
	Sep 15, Establishment of Phuket City Development Corporation	Country-wide protest requested for new national election
2017	MRTA run feasibility study and the OTP claimed the LRT will be expected to launch in late 2022.	Jan 5, Prime minister confirmed to organize new national election in the beginning of next year (2018)
		Oct 8, Prime minister confirmed to organize new national election in November of next year (2018)
		CM coalition hopes to use Section 44 of the CPO to order LRT project in CM
2018	July 13, MRTA run PPP study related to LRT	Jan 25, postponement of national election
		Government planned to run LRT in regional cities including Korat, Pitsanulok, CM and Phuket
		Jan, Country-wide protest requested for new national election
		Feb 27, Prime minister promised to organize new national election in February next year (2019)
		June 25, Vice prime minister confirmed organization of new national election will be during Feb 24, to May 5, in next year (2019)
		Oct 11, The Election Commission of Thailand officially announced election date on Feb 24, 2019

2019	April 4, MOT officially announced the Royal Decree to allow the MRTA to take railway duties in Phuket and Panggha	Jan 15, The Election Commission of Thailand postponed and declared they could not organize the new election in time Jan 23, The Election Commission of Thailand confirmed election date on March 24, 2019 March 24, the first national election after the Coup with new election system. new vice prime minister appointed
2020	Aug 24, local public hearing in Phuket City	Feb 1, MRT presented proper mass transit system in PK including LRT and ART March 14, MOT asked MRT about the most suitable system between LRT and ART May, MOT reconsidered to alter from LRT to ART
2021	Nov 15, 16 Local association movement and give official letter to the government requested for the LRT not ART	Nov 12, Plan to alter from LRT to ART in CM and PK Government's loan around 1 trillion baht
2022	Sep 14, MRTA run new feasibility study to find most suitable system between LRT, tire tram, and BRT	Middle 2022, new national election climate Phuket Expo 2028 Government's loan around 700,000 million baht. Dec 2, Minister of Transportation visited Phuket City to followed up and urge for LRT and other mega transit development in Phuket, before election.
2023	February 20-21, Public hearing related to proper system of LRT	Beginning 2023, new national election climate

	April 27, Candidate of Democrat Party use LRT as a political campaign for election in Phuket
	May 14, National election 2023
	Phuket Expo 2028
Status	<i>Unfinalized</i>

Interviews with relevant actors associated with local coalition in Phuket revealed that political external events are less relevant than occasional events of the World Expo that could largely strengthen capacity of local coalition to leverage with national government and advocate for development of LRT in Phuket City. However, without taking advantages from those political external events to campaign for the LRT, the LRT policymaking in Phuket has still been uncertain. Further, absence of political approach is key issue that would also weaken capacities of local coalition to set LRT initiative on national government agendas. Therefore, the LRT policymaking in Phuket has been unfinalized yet.

6.5. Single-Case Conclusion


Phuket is one of the highest economic potential cities that would be most profitable from the development of LRT and other urban transit systems. The city is also a global renown travel destination for international tourists, but the urban transportation is poor and on-demand taxi is extremely expensive compared to other cities in Thailand. Lacking urban transport service not only affects local people and traffic issues in the city but also those visitors to Phuket City. As such, visitors are unavoidable to rely on personal or rental car services which is an unnecessary extra cost. Further, although Phuket has most generated revenue for the government income, but the city has obtained inadequate resources that allocated from the national budgeting system to advance infrastructures that are exactly responsive to the local needs.

Recently, local alliance in Phuket, led by the local private alliance, has mobilized resources and networks to campaign for the improvement of urban mass transit system. As a result, local private clan has established the Phuket City Development Corporation (PKCD) in 2016 as a leading local association to advocate for the LRT policymaking and other urban development initiatives. The PKCD had originally inspired by local movements of the KKTT who succeeded in LRT policymaking before the PKCD was established in 2016. Moreover, leading cofounder of the KKTT is also taking part of those shareholders in the

PKCD. Therefore, cofounders of the PKCD and the KKTT are highly connected as a national network of local think tank that engages in local development in Thailand.

However, the PKCD run local joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking with limited capacities to capture interest of the government to finalize the development of LRT in Phuket City. This study revealed 14 factors that are relevant to capacities of local joint efforts to set their local-desired LRT initiative into national government agendas. Those factors include (1) absence of political brokers (2) collaboration from private sector (3) covid-19 (4) financing (5) government loan (6) local private policy brokers (7) new government election (8) promotion to special city (9) roles of the PKCD (10) political factor (11) state dependence (12) working disparity btw gov-private (13) working disparity btw politics-private and (14) world expo event. However, the author classifies those factors into five main categories including *financial factor*, *political factor*, *collaboration from private sector*, *roles of policy brokers*, and *external events*, as detailed in Figure below.


Figure 36 Co-occurrence analysis and force-directed diagram related to functional factors of local coalition to run LRT imitative in Phuket City



The most influential factor closely associated with functionality of the coalition is collaboration from the private sector. Investigation of LRT policymaking in Phuket reveals that the roles of PKCD are critical to the strategies and capacities of local coalition to run their joint efforts advocated for LRT policymaking and other urban transit development

initiatives. Especially their financial contribution to funding for the PKCD and their efforts to campaign for the World Expo event—which considerably associated and important to LRT policymaking in Phuket City. Furthermore, the roles of PKCD as a local private policy broker are also critical to strengthen capacities of local coalition to run for LRT initiative since the city has no political involvement to drive the project. As such, the roles of local private sector—the PKCD, are most critical to the local joint efforts.

Figure 37 Sankey diagram of relevant factors and events associated with LRT policymaking in Phuket.




The Sankey diagram above reveals that political factors are less relevant to the functionality of local coalition to run for LRT policymaking in Phuket. On the contrary, political factors hugely coocurrence with the centralized issues associated with LRT policymaking. Therefore, it shows that local coalition in Phuket is less associated with political approaches to advocate for LRT policymaking. Investigation from interviews also revealed that there is a working disparity between local political and private sectors. What clearly show working disparity and unity issues among local private coalition and political

sector is the roles to run campaigns and promote Phuket to be the host city of the World Expo in 2028. Local private alliance is key actor who run campaigns to promoted Phuket as an organizer of the World Expo 2028, without political support as an interview with Mr. J4, member of the Phuket Chamber of Commerce, who said that:

“Private sector running for the World Expo event is less possible, no actors who could speak out loud. Recently we—private coalition, invited the ambassadors to visit Phuket to show them about city potentials and opportunities to be selected as a city host. However, some politicians condemned us. If the Phuket get selected as the city host, they swear to gods, they said we will never achieve it and Phuket will not be selected. In the past, we let the government alone run the campaigns but recently we—local private clan, have run campaigns by ourselves. (source code: 11:55 ¶ 35)

According to the investigation, the World Expo is the only critical external event to the possibility of LRT in Phuket. After local coalition has run campaigns to set LRT policymaking for years, key actors associated with local coalition in Phuket whether public or private sectors all revealed that the World Expo is the most influential factor to materialize the LRT in Phuket City, as further noted by Mr. J2, member of Phuket Chamber of Commerce, said that: *“right now we look forwards for the World Expo... If we could be a host city of World Expo, the government has to implement the LRT project”* (source code: 11:50 ¶ 88). Therefore, the World Expo is considered a driving external event that could strengthen capacities of local coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking in Phuket.

Figure 38 Summary diagram of ACF and policy broker frameworks applied to LRT policymaking in Phuket City



Unity of local private sector is fragmented as well as the connectivity between local private and political sectors are also disjointed. As resulted in two similar bodies of city development corporation in Phuket—PKCD and ACDC, and absence of local political brokers to commit for the development of LRT policymaking. As a result, the capacities of local coalition to run their joint efforts advocated for LRT policymaking is weak and unable to deal with centralized state due to absence of political policy brokers. Furthermore, there are multiple external events that are relevant to the LRT policymaking in Phuket City. However, those events mostly undermine capacities of local coalition and possibilities of LRT initiatives to be materialized in Phuket, except for the World Expo event. Even though the World Expo is a vital event to transform the city but the dis-connectivity between local private and political sectors hindered capacities of local coalition to take advantages from this critical opportunity—which could be the only chance, to advance mega infrastructures and advocate for LRT policymaking in Phuket City.

Application of the ACF and policy broker analysis framework to investigate local joint efforts in the case of Phuket City asserted critical roles of private policy brokers in the process of policymaking. The higher capacities of policy brokers, the better chances of local coalition to achieve transport policymaking. Although local private policy brokers of local

coalition in Phuket have high financial capacity but they have limited political capacities to advocate for the LRT policymaking since there were no political approaches applied or directed by those private policy brokers. Further, fragmentation of local advocacy coalition is also key challenge that hinder capacities of local joint effort to advocate for the LRT policymaking in Phuket City. Therefore, local private policy broker has been weakened by the lack of coalition unity and political approaches to strengthen roles and resources of the policy brokers to advocate for the LRT policy which is also extremely influenced by multiple challenges from the external events. As a result, the LRT policymaking advocated by local coalition in Phuket has been unstable and planned to be altered into another transport system.

Policy brokers analysis framework applied to investigate the LRT policymaking in Phuket also discovered the disparity between local private and political sectors—as same as in the case of Khon Kaen City. The single-case investigation in Phuket also found that there was no co-existence of private and political policy brokers in a similar advocacy coalition. As resulted in the lack of political commitment to advocate for the LRT policymaking in Phuket and an absence of political policy broker to represent local coalition at the centre of policymaking power. Therefore, application of policy broker analysis framework into the case of Phuket City revealed similar findings to the local coalition in Khon Kaen City that there is the less possibility for private and political policy brokers to co-exist altogether within a similar single policy advocacy coalition.

CHAPTER 7

THE CASE OF CHIANG MAI CITY

7.1. Introduction

Chiang Mai is one of the most popular international travelling cities located in the North Region of Thailand. Like Phuket, Chiang Mai is the regional core city where economy, health and educational services, and urbanized scales are most advanced compared to other cities in the same region. Furthermore, Chiang Mai is a boundary city where its northern part of city border is closed to the Shan State, Union of Myanmar. Therefore, Chiang Mai has multiple capacities not only its renown travelling destination but also being as a strategic location where the local economy and national logistics could be conveniently connected to the regional markets in Asian country.

Economic structure in Chiang Mai is most relied on travel sectors. Therefore, local people have benefited largely from service industries associated with urban travelling. Furthermore, Chiang Mai has also been ranked in the World's Best Awards Top-10 Cities which reveals the capacities of Chiang Mai as top-ten most popular city for international tourists due to traditional charming, proper cost of living, foreigner-friendly, and natural beauty (Travel and Leisure, 2022). As a result, the city has attracted domestic and international tourists more than 10 million visitors annually (Chiang Mai Provincial Statistical Office, 2019). Moreover, Chiang Mai is one of the top-four cities that most generated revenue to the national government income. Like Phuket, most of those revenue generated from Chiang Mai comes from travelling sector, more than 4,246 million baht annually (Royal Thai Government, 2022).

Although the Chiang Mai has benefited from millions of tourists, but the city has long been constrained by traffic conditions and the lack of urban mass transport services. Like Phuket, majority of tourists are mostly relied on rental car services and local on-demand transportation called “*the red truck.*” Although there have been local movements to advance public transport services in Chiang Mai, but multiple challenges remained because of the

conflicts between former local transport operators who might get affected by the new urban transit system. Therefore, there are no critical urban mass transit system operates in Chiang Mai City.

As inspired by urban transport development in Khon Kaen, local private alliance in Chaing Mai, led by 15 leading members, has mobilized their resources and networks to advance urban transit services. As a result, the city development corporation was established called “*Chiang Mai Social Enterprise (CSE)*” in December 2016 following the establishment of the KKTT in Khon Kaen City and the PKCD in Phuket City. The CSE has largely run local joint efforts to work with local and regional authorities to address urban issues related to living and environmental problems. However, in the following year after establishment of the CSE, the new city development corporation was also established by another group of local alliance in Chiang Mai who mobilized local networks to launch the “*Chaing Mai City Development (CMCD)*” in April 2017. The CMCD has directly run local joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking and other transit systems in Chiang Mai after the government declared to launch the LRT initiative in regional cities, as like the case in Phuket City.

Retrospectively, the development of LRT in Chiang Mai had first planned over three decades ago since 1993 before the government recently declared to promote LRT in Chaing Mai again in 2018 (The Standard, 2017). The OTP conducted feasibility study related to LRT development in Chiang Mai in 2015 and proposed to the government in 2018. The government then authorized the MRTA to run feasibility and PPP studies of the LRT project in 2018 which the government announced that the LRT is expected to be constructed in the middle of 2022. Still, the LRT development in Chiang Mai has not been finalized and the government has planned to alter from the LRT to ART system, like in Phuket. Although, the CMCD had been established to directly run for the LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai, but their capacities were unable to advocate and leverage with the centre of policymaking power due to fragmented coalition and absence of political resources to advocate for the LRT.


7.2. LRT Initiative in Chiang Mai City

Originally, the first plan of LRT development in Chaing Mai had been declared since 1993 by the Expressway Authority of Thailand (EAT) before the railway duty was reformed and transferred to the MRTA. The 1993 Plan targeted to advance LRT system in eight core regional cities including Chiang Mai, Phitsanulok, Khon Kaen, Nakhon Ratchasima,

Songkhla, Phuket, Chachoengsao, and Chonburi. Further, the 1993 Plan also designed the LRT development in Chiang Mai into four main routes. Unfortunately, this plan was abolished because there was the public reform of the EAT, and the railway duty was later transferred to the MRTA. As such, the MRTA had no further intention to resume the 1993 Plan. Leaving the local dream of LRT behind the new organizational reform of the MRTA.

However, the government has planned to relaunch the LRT development again and officially declared to run the project by authorization of the OTP to run feasibility studies related to the development of LRT in Chiang Mai City. In 2018, the OTP presented the LRT initiative in Chiang Mai to the government which included three transit routes of red, blue, and green lines, the total distance is 38.8 kilometres and 39 stations. The red line includes 16 stations and total distance is 15.8 kilometres, the blue line includes 13 stations and total distance is 11 kilometres, and the green line includes 10 stations and total distance is 12 kilometres.

Figure 39 LRT initiative in Chiang Mai City



Adapted from: <https://thelist.group/realist/blog/รถไฟฟ้าเชียงใหม่/>

Figure 40 LRT initiative and its feeder lines in Chiang Mai City





Photo source: Chiang Mai Public Transit Master Plan

However, as the OTP suggested, the government decided to launch only one pilot route of the red line routing from southern part—Mae-Hia Saman-Samakkee Station located next to the Chiang Mai International Airport, to northern part of the city—Nakhonping Station, including 16 stations and 15.8 kilometres. This transit route includes on-ground and underground types which underground type is mainly located in urban downtown area started from Chiang Mai International Airport Intersection Station to Khuang Singh Station where the private cars are highly congested, as the details shown in following table.

Figure 41 Stations and alignment of LRT's red line route in Chaing Mai City



Later, the government authorized the MRTA to run PPP feasibility study related to the development of the red transit route in Ching Mai in 2019 before getting approval from the government. However, in 2021 the MRTA in accordance with the MOT planned to alter the LRT initiatives in targeted regional cities including Phuket and Chiang Mai. The plan is to change operation system from LRT to the ART which the government argued that the state has limited budget, and the ART is cheaper. Therefore, the government authorize the MOT to reorganize the process of feasibility studies again to find proper technical and financial solutions which eventually delayed the development of the project.

Recently, the LRT development has been seen as a dream-selling advertisement for local people in Chiang Mai. People have questioned about the reality and possibility of LRT development since its first promotion plan announced in 1993 but the LRT has never been materialized. Although it is true that local people want to advance urban mass transit services, but the LRT has never been materialized for decades. Although, there were attempts of local coalition to campaign and urge the government to deploy authoritarian power, during the authoritarian regime, commanding for sharp decision related to the implementation of LRT in Chiang Mai (Thansettakij, 2017). But the political constrains have limited their movements over years.

Figure 42 LRT imaginary image of LRT system operates in downtown Chiang Mai



Photo source: <https://www.home.co.th/hometips/topic-9302>

7.3. Local Collaborative Approach

Local joint efforts in Chiang Mai are structurally comparable to Phuket and Khon Kaen where the city arranged with city development corporation to advocate for the development of LRT and other urban transit services. Like Phuket, there are two similar bodies of city development corporations in Chiang Mai—the CSE and CMCD. However, capacities of those local coalitions in Chiang Mai are financially and strategically limited compared to Phuket and Khon Kaen. Still, the local private coalitions in these cities are closely associated to each other.

As inspired by the KKTT in Khon Kaen City, the local business alliance in Chiang Mai City has gathered resources and network to run local joint efforts and campaigns for the development of LRT system which facilitated by the city development corporation. As such, those local businessmen have mutually fund the CSE and CMCD to launch multiple urban development projects altogether with joint actions from local authorities in Chiang Mai City. This section clarifies how the local collaborative efforts are structured to advocate for LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai and further discusses relevant evidence related to capacities of local joint efforts to advocate for LRT initiative in Chaing Mai City.

7.3.1. Chiang Mai Social Enterprise (CSE)

Local corporations in Chaing Mai, led by 15 leading cofounders, have mutually mobilized their networks and funding of 1 million baht to establish the “*Chaing Mai Social Enterprise (CSE)*” in 2016. Following the development of KKTT in Khon Kaen and the PKCD in Phuket. The CSE clearly stated that the company is a centre where local joint efforts from private, civic, and academic sectors are mobilized to solve problems of the city. Therefore, the CSE performs as both coordinating and driving centres to run local collaborative activities from multi-stakeholders. As noted by Mr. O, one of leading member from CSE, said: “*the company is not focused on profits. But we focus on the achievement of the society where local people live in peace and harmony. This is the key goal. To help and solve the problems existing in our society mutually (source code: 278:1)*”

The CSE was founded by joint efforts mainly among academic, civic, and private sectors. Their leading cofounders include 15 members from local corporations and 6 local private associations including Chiang Mai Chamber of Commerce, The Federation of Chiang Mai Industries, Association of Chiang Mai Tourism and Business, Northern Handicraft Manufacturer and Exporter Association, Chang Mai Banks Association, and SME Association. Further, as a local think tank, the CSE also partnered with regional authorities and local universities such as Chaing Mai University and Maejo University to run policy research and formulated new urban agendas related to the economic and environmental development of the city. Therefore, the CSE’s network is diversified and professional, not only in the business sector but also researchers who expertise in urban planning, as detailed in following figure.

Figure 43 Cofounders and partners of the CSE



Photo source: <https://cse.chiangmai.in/>

The CSE primarily aims to balance the growth and living environment of the city. As such, multiple environmental and quality of living projects have been implemented such as international collaboration with JICA to green the city, urban research for policy design, and PM 2.5 haze pollution issues. The CSE also involved in solving traffic conditions in urban areas since transportation is one of the main environmental problems in the city. Further, the CSE also provides critical networks to support the LRT and other urban transit development in Chiang Mai such as funding and technical expertise to help local governments run electric vehicles of local transit system in Mahia Subdistrict, prepared for the transit feeder after the LRT finished.

Roles of the CSE in LRT policymaking is secondary to the Ching Mai City Development Corporation (CMCD). However, the CSE is much more unified and active than the CMCD in running the micro-urban transit system in which the CSE has partnered with local government and university to promote micro-transit electric vehicles as a feeder prepared to connect with the LRT stations around Chiang Mai. The CSE is also well connected to local civil societies in Chiang Mai to run joint activities solving urban problems. The CSE and civil societies are highly active and always structured in urban governance affairs of regional and local governments when decisions are made related to necessary urban solutions. Therefore, although the CSE is not the central organization who take direct responsibility to advocate for LRT policymaking, but their roles largely engage

with local joint efforts to advocate for micro-transit system and ready to support the CMCD to advocate for the LRT initiative in Chiang Mai City.

7.3.2. Chiang Mai City Development Corporation (CMCD)

Another city development corporation established in 2017 called the “*Chiang Mai City Development Corporation (CMCD)*.” The CMCD was founded by local joint efforts among local private alliance who would like to advance the city through the creation of this new governing structure. As such, more than seventy local business owners have mobilized their fund of 7 million baht to fund the operations of CMCD to advocate for LRT policymaking. Like Phuket, the CMCD was inspired by the roles of KKTT that effectively drive the LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen. Further, the cofounders of those KKTT and CMCD are also well connected to each other. As noted by Mr.NA, cofounder of the CMCD, revealed the origins of the CMCD that:

“Recently, the traffic condition in Chiang Mai is unfunctional and if we do not solve this problem the traffic issue will be worse. This is why we jointly establish the CMCD by organization of small group of people. No necessary to be set as a formal committee. But we have jointly mobilized personal budget and shared common goals that we are going to make our city better... the first priority of our work is about public transportation development because transportation is a very critical issue for our city today... We have visited Khon Kaen and learned from the Khon Kaen Model that local private sector mutually share money of 100 million baht and run the urban mass transit of the city bus... which is very successful (source code: 280:1 pp 6–7).”

Therefore, the primary duty of the CMCD is to advance urban transit system in Chaing Mai especially the LRT development. Organization of the CMCD is highly associated with those cofounders from KKTT since the KKTT has grown their networks with local private clans into Chiang Mai and help these alliances to advocate for the LRT policymaking as well as other transport development. One of the prominent projects that facilitated by these local business networks of the CMCD and the KKTT is operation of the city bus called “*Chaing Mai City Bus (CMCB)*” run by the Regional Transit Corporation (RTC) since 2018. Although the CMCD is not an owner of the CMCB, but their cofounders

are highly associated with those holders of the RTC who manage the city bus in Chiang Mai City.

Figure 44 RTC Chaing Mai City Bus



Photo source: Getting Around Chiang Mai By Public Bus – The New RTC Chiang Mai City Bus
(Retrieved from: <https://www.chiangmaitraveller.com/chiang-mai-public-bus/>)

Figure 45 Group photo of opening ceremony of new RTC application which associated with members of CSE, CMCD, and KKTT.



Photo source: RTC City Bus opens new application
(Retrieved from: <https://www.eatingoutmap.com/read/RTC-City-Bus--Application>)

Although the CMCD clearly declared themselves to advocate for LRT development in Chaing Mai City, but their roles and commitment have been shrinking particularly after their attempt to re-organize local on-demand transport service—the red truck. Investigation from fieldwork interviews also revealed the disparity between leading members of local private coalition in Chaing Mai themselves to run local joint efforts for the LRT policymaking. As such, we hardly see the roles of the CMCD to publicly run campaigns for the LRT policymaking and other urban transit development in Chaing Mai. Instead, the roles of local civil society are more active to run campaigns to better micro transport services in Chaing Mai City.

7.3.3. Roles of Local Civil Associations

Civil society organizations in Chiang Mai are well known due to their active capacities and political engagements in policymaking processes of urban planning. In Chiang Mai, there are more than ten associations that actively engaged in various matters of urban development especially cultural, environmental, and transport issues. As a result, those local civil societies are acquainted with governmental and political approaches to exercise their power and run campaigns altogether with local and regional authorities in Chiang Mai.

Recently, there are ten key civil societies that run local joint efforts to develop the city such as Pharkhi Khon Hug Mueang Chiang Mai, City Development Foundation, Hoeng Hean Lanna Conservation, and the Network of Chaing Mai Urban Communities. However, the main local civil society that has run campaigns to improve urban transportation in Chaing Mai is the “*Khon Suk Satharana (KSS)*” which literally translated as “*public happiness transit association.*” The KKS has been actively engaged in running for LRT and other micro-transit development in Chiang Mai, especially during the RTC City Bus was stopped its service due to the COVID-19 and the Chiang Mai City Municipality also stopped its city bus services called “White Buse” in late 2021. The suspension of these city bus services leave Chaing Mai City has no public urban transit to serve local people, only the on-demand red truck service.

In the middle of 2022, the KKS then run the campaigns to capture public attentions by placing posters on the bus stops that had been used before the city bus was discontinued. The campaign was about communication with society and associated agencies related to the needs of local people for better mass transit service in Chiang Mai City. Some of wordings campaign on their posters highlight the local demand for public transportation and

inequalities of urban transport services between Bangkok and regional cities such as: (1) a cry for help of missing bus, (2) help us find RTC blue bus, (3) it has been 7 years, when will we get the light rail transit?!, (4) Bangkok has city bus and LRT, Chaing Mai has nothing!, and (5) we need our mass transit! as shown in the following photos.

Figure 46 Photos of LRT and city bus campaigned by local civil society



Photo source: <https://news1live.com/detail/9650000050718>

Recently, Chaing Mai City has *no* urban mass transit to serve people or tourists. Those city bus services had ended particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the LRT initiative in Chaing Mai has also not been materialized and planned to alter from the LRT to ART system. Although, local private alliance has organized local joint efforts to advocate for the LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai. But their capacities to advocate for LRT

policymaking is loose. On the other hands, although the local civil society—the KSS, actively engaged in local joints efforts to better urban transportation but they were unable to grasp political and administrative powers to handling with the policymaking centre due to internal fragmented and weak capacities among local partners.

7.4. Analysis of Local Coalition Strategies and LRT Policymaking

Although local coalition strategies to advocate for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai are similarly structured by the city development corporation as in Phuket and Khon Kaen. However, capacities of local coalition to strategize their local joint effort in Chiang Mai are weaker compared to those collaborative actions in Khon Kaen and Phuket. Further, integrations of policy actors and relevant events that benefit to the advocacy of LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai is also limited due to the lack of policy brokers to represent and leverage for the coalition desired policy. Investigation from this study revealed that although the local coalitions in Chaing Mai City have deployed the similar strategy of city development corporation as in Phuket and Khon Kaen, but their capacities to campaign for LRT policymaking are weak and constrained by multiple factors including absence of political brokers, no political approach to centre of policymaking power, roles of civic sector, heritage city protection, collaboration from private sector, COVID-19, roles of the CSE and CMCD, financial factor, government loan, limited capacities of local government, local private policy brokers, new government election, no local LRT movements, on-demand red truck system, PM 2.5 haze pollution issue, political factor, state dependence, and working disparity between local private partners as detailed in the following figure.

Figure 47 Co-occurrence analysis of relevant factors related to LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai City

Relevant Factors	● Centralized State Gr=96	○ LRT-CM Gr=204
● absence of political brokers Gr=45	10	9
● approach to centre of power Gr=39	3	0
○ civic sector Gr=18	0	7
○ CMCD Gr=17	0	15
● collaboration from private sector Gr=43	1	12


Relevant Factors	● Centralized State Gr=96	○ LRT-CM Gr=204
● covid-19-external events Gr=12	4	7
○ CSE Gr=4	0	0
● financing Gr=33	4	4
● government loan-external events Gr=2	2	2
○ heritage city Gr=10	0	10
○ local gov unwilling Gr=11	2	11
● local private policy brokers Gr=114	4	14
● new government election-external events Gr=18	1	4
○ no local LRT movements Gr=2	0	2
○ on-demand red truck system Gr=8	0	7
● pm2.5 -external events Gr=2	0	2
● political factor Gr=87	17	25
○ state dependence Gr=39	11	7
○ working disparity between private-private Gr=12	0	9

*Gr means groundedness of a code (number of quotations coded by a code)

Those relevant factors presented above in the Table could be classified into 6 categories: *collaboration from private sector, political factors, disappearance of policy brokers, state dependence, roles of civil society, and external events*. The factor that primarily drives local collaborative actions in Chiang Mai is collaboration from private sector. The collaborative actions from private sector mostly rely on the roles of the Chiang Mai Social Enterprise (CSE) and the Chiang Mai City Development Corporation (CMCD). The CSE jointly gathered the fund of 1 million baht from their leading 15 members to fund operations of the CSE like the CMCD where 70 local business partners mutually shared

their resources of 7 million baht to fund the operations of the CMCD to advocate for LRT policymaking and other transportation systems in Chaing Mai City.

Figure 48 Collaborative actions from local private sector for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai



However, the major roles of local private alliance to drive LRT policy in Chaing Mai is most relied on the CMCD, which is a specific governing body that created to manage joint efforts and advocate the LRT in Chaing Mai. While the roles of CSE are secondary to the CMCD in running campaigns for LRT. However, critical roles of the CSE are their engagement in micro local transit and feeder system preparation to support the local transit system after the development of LRT. One of the causes to establish the CMCD is poor traffic conditions in Chiang Mai as noted by Mr. NA, leading cofounder of the CMCD, that:

“Chiang Mai has long been suffering from poor traffic conditions... therefore, we have formed the CMCD to unravel this problem... running by our small community and partial contributions from our members with hopes to develop Chaing Mai City for the next generation... and the first goal of our operation is to advance the urban mass transportation because

*poor traffic conditions have ruined the liveability of our city for decades
(source code: 280:1)”*

Another cause of establishment of CMCD is also inspired by the roles and local joint efforts among local private sector in Khon Kaen City where the KKTT has effectively run campaigns to advocate for policymaking in Khon Kaen without relying on state budget. As further noted by Mr. NA, cofounders of the CMCD, that: *“recently, the CMCD is running lesson-learned processes from the model of Khon Kaen where twenty local firms jointly contributed their fund to advance urban transit. Now, our working team is studying about proper technical and transit network in Chaing Mai (source code: 281: 1).”* Moreover, Mr. O, one of cofounders from the CMCD, also further clarified that: *“local firms in Chaing Mai must be seriously tied, we have to begin now, waiting for the national government is difficult to implement the project. I think the LRT would resolve traffic issues in our city (source code: 281:2 p 2).”* Therefore, common ground among cofounders of the CMCD is relied on the commitment of joint efforts to resolve traffic problems by the development of the LRT.

While roles of the CSE associated with LRT policymaking are subordinate to the CMCD. The CSE involves much in local micro-transit development such as transformation of local red truck operation into electric vehicle transport prepared as additional transit feeder for the LRT system in Chiang Mai City. The CSE is also much involved in living environment development since the primary goal of the CSE is to resolve the haze pollution issues generated from human activities and forest burning in Chaing Mai. Although the CSE is not a central organization to mobilize resources and networks advocate for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai City, but they have always support those cofounders of the CMCD to advance urban transpiration in Chiang Mai.


Although the CMCD gains higher financial capacities mobilized from their networks. But, the CMCD has been less institutionalized among their local partners than the CSE. The CMCD has no official website, inactive social media, nor the routine activities that shown their active strategies to advocate for LRT policymaking among working team members. As such, it is seen that the CMCD was formed by a loose connection between its cofounders and associated partners embedded in the tie of their joint efforts to run for LRT in Chaing Mai City. As noted by interview with Mr. NA, cofounders of the CMCD, that:

*“Establishment of the CMCD is actually stem from guidance of Mr. P—
professor at Chiang Mai University, who closely associated with those*

business elites of the KKTT in Khon Kaen. So, we formed the CMCD as guided by Mr. P. After official registration as the city development corporation, then we think about what to do next... and how could we help to develop Chiang Mai City forwards. We do as much as we can do (source code: 16:1 ¶ 8)”

Therefore, the ideas towards operations of the CMCD is initially much influenced by Mr. P, who is one of the urban elite policymakers in Chiang Mai and also closely associated with those business elites of the KKTT in Khon Kaen City. As a result, the commitment of local private sector to run for LRT is unstable due to the tie among partners are also attached to those policy elites outside their coalition. Further, the capacities of those local private coalition in Chiang Mai—the CMCD and the CSE, are also fragile. The capacities of CMCD and the CSE are financially and politically weak. Since the loose tie among local private partners to commit for the LRT policy and more importantly they have no political sources that could strengthen their coalition capacities to advocate for LRT policymaking. As such, the operations of CMCD and CSE are unable to reach the centre of policymaking power.

Figure 49 Limited political capacities associated with local coalition in Chaing Mai City



Chiang Mai revealed no political approaches organized by local coalitions to advocate for the LRT policymaking and leverage with the national government. The CMCD and the CSE shared limited political capacities to set LRT initiative on national government agendas due to their fragile financing and interrelationship tie among local partners. As interview with Mr. B, a professor at Chiang Mai University, revealed that *“Phuket has local movements led by local government and private companies to campaign against the decision of government to change from the LRT to ART... In Chiang Mai, there has been no such a local and political movements towards the LRT project Even those national political representatives in Chiang Mai has also never campaigned for the LRT, mostly they run for travel and haze pollution issues (source code: 268:24 ¶ 129 – 133).”* Therefore, local coalition in Chiang Mai City has no political resources and approaches to deal with the policymaking centre related to the development of LRT. Compared to Phuket and Khon Kaen, their coalition capacities to advocate for the LRT is politically inactive.

Moreover, the local governments in Chiang Mai are also unwilling to run for the LRT since they assumed that the LRT is beyond their duties. As an interview with Mr. W, Mayor of Mae-Hia Town Municipality, revealed that : *“running the LRT is difficult... because the law did not allow us to do. You have to adjust the laws from the Ministry of Interior and other related ministries.... Even in Khon Kaen or Phuket they have no progress, although they have advocated for 6-7 years but still get stuck. So you have to rewrite the laws and give more authorities to local government (source code: 15:8 ¶ 16–17).”* Similarly, interview with Mr. V, Vice-Mayor of Chiang Mai City Municipality, also revealed that:


“I heard the local movements in Khon Kaen about the LRT, and later, this movement also happen in Chiang Mai. I personally think that if we let the MRTA to be responsible organization run for the LRT, it will be easier than the local government does. But, according to my observations, the municipalities in Chiang Mai are not interested in taking responsibility of the LRT development (source code: 19:11 ¶ 141 – 147).”

Those above investigations asserted that local governments in Chiang Mai have no intentions to invest their efforts and resources to advocate for the LRT policymaking since they assumed that their capacities are constrained by centralized state. Correspondingly, an interview with Mr. B, a professor from Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration at Chiang Mai University, who conducted research to assess capacities of

local governments in Chaing Mai City also noted that “*as far as I interviewed with them (executives of local governments in Chaing Mai City), they said the LRT is enormous burden for them to carry out the mass transit services (source code: 268:11 ¶ 45–46).*” Therefore, local governments in Chaing Mai revealed lacking capacities and unintended to take part as a leading actor to advocate for the LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai City.

Local joint efforts in Chaing Mai even had no local politician to represent and handle relevant opportunities floating around the LRT policy subsystem. As such, another factors that constrain capacities of local coalition is absence of policy brokers. Chiang Mai is clear on an absence of political brokers to manage, represent, and broker for LRT. As an interview with Mr. NA, cofounder of the CMCD, asserted that: “*involvement of political sector here—to run for the LRT, is seldom founded. Major contribution comes from the local private sectors, key leaders are local private alliance... no engagement from pollical sector and the private sector is also not usually get involve with those politicians (source code: 16:14 ¶ 17–18).*” Mr. NA further elaborated that: “*LRT is important infrastructure that needs to be constructed today for the greatest benefits of our child in the future before traffic conditions will get worse... If there is no strong political unity and leverage, we might not have a chance to do it (source code: 16:15 ¶ 16).*” Therefore, capacity to run local joint efforts for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai has been constrained by their limited political resources.

Figure 50 Absence of political and private policy brokers in Chaing Mai



Political policy brokers are very important to the strengths of local coalition to advocate for policies that are highly centralized to the central authorities, especially the mega transport infrastructure like LRT. Although the local coalition in Chiang Mai acknowledged their limited political capacities to advocate for their agendas, still, they have no approaches or strategies to mobilize civil and political resources to capture the interests of those politicians represented their city. Further, Chiang Mai is a political base of liberal wing party and most of politicians represented at the parliament is also the opponents of current national government. Therefore, challenges are not only about mobilizing political resources, but also how to deal with those political dynamics at the centre of policymaking. As noted by Mr NA, former Chiang Mai Chamber of Commerce and leading cofounder of the CMCD that: *“I think if we have political-led coalition it will be easier. Today, politics of the north region is working as opponent coalition to the current government and they have not much power to support policies related to the development of Chiang Mai as much as they supposed to do (source code: 16:23 ¶ 27 – 28).*

More importantly, investigation of local joint actions in Chiang Mai also revealed that the coalition has no *local private policy brokers*. There are no actors who willingly to invest their times and resources to run for the LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai. Although, the CMCD had been seen as a policy broker to represent and run local coalition for the LRT, but the CMCD has been fading their roles away to strategize and broker for the LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai. One major cause is the disparity between leading members who initially launched the CMCD at the beginning. According to investigation from this study revealed that those founding members have distrustful issues related to functions of the CMCD to re-organize local micro-transit system of the red truck service. As an interview with Mr. NA, cofounder of the CMCD, revealed that:

“the CMCD had the real leaders around 5-6 persons but our team includes around 70 members... after we have discussed about what project we would run to advance the city. Mr. P—leading and founding member, wanted us to handle and resolve the long-embedded local transit system of the red truck service. But I do not want to do so, because I know what will happen to me if I get involve or reaching up to those red truck drivers (source code: 16:2 ¶ 10) ”

Image of the red truck driver association in Chiang Mai has been considered as local gangs who always try to impede development of alternative transport services in Chiang Mai City. Further, the red truck system is found only in Chiang Mai City, and it has long embedded as an on-demand local transport service of the city. Although there were efforts trying to change the red truck services into more advanced and systematic transport system but those efforts were failed due to reluctance from the local red truck drivers. Therefore, becoming nomination for the reform of red truck system is a critical concern among those cofounders of the CMCD. Further, according to interview with Mr. G, leading cofounder of the CSE, also asserted that:

“The CMCD is another local business alliance, they are former members of the chamber of commerce... we—the CSE, are clear because we have official company, working activities... they have not run any project. The CMCD has not worked forwards. Because at that time their leading member, Mr. TH—one of the leading founders, come to work here... he is key person who guide those businessmen to work. But they have done some conflicts and they have no further works together. (source code: 269:11 1h 4m 29s)” In relation to this point, Mr. NA, cofounder of the CMCD, further clarified that: *“we have no ideas how to run the local joint efforts. At that time, we are ready to contribute our money, for what? They said we should handle with the red truck system. We already mobilized the money from our network, to do what? Handling with the red truck system? No, I do not want to do, and I think it is unnecessary... Do we have any hidden agenda? That is all. For us, we have no hidden agendas, we are clear in our goals... we are businessmen we know... what we are able to do we will do but what benefits that are the hidden agendas we do not want to get involve. (source code: 16:19 ¶ 24).”*

Mr. P and Mr. TH are closely associated to each other, and they are both urban elite policymakers in Chaing Mai. They want to reorganize the local red truck system—which in returns they will launch the operations of the RTC City Bus which own by Mr. TH, through the nominating roles of the CMCD. However, the CMCD hesitates to run this work and aware of what would affect them as said in an interview that: *“Mr. P has actively cheered us to reorganize the red truck system. But I do not want to do, because I know what will happen to me if I get involve or reaching to those red truck drivers (source code: 16:2 ¶ 10).”* As

such Mr. P and Mr. TH run the attempts to reform the local red truck themselves. Leaving the distrustful issues among local private alliance remained unravel and halt operations of the CMCD in running joint efforts for LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai.

The red truck in Chiang Mai is very influential, not only in urban transportation but also political arena. They are difficult to access and incorporate with, especially issues related to the attempts of Mr. P and Mr. TH to reform of their transport system. According to Mrs. R, leading member of local civil society in Chaing Mai, said that:


“Their understanding is the most important issue to the reform of our urban public transit in Chaing Mai. Every time we would like to coordinate with them, they rejected, because they are afraid of being manipulated by others. They had this experience once that academic and policymakers had used and manipulated them by those who tried to reform the red truck systems—Mr. P and Mr. TH. It may not be true. But the red truck driver association thought they were manipulated by Mr. P who tried to reform the local red truck system from on-demand to systematic public transport service. Later Mr. P started new smart city bus system (the RTC that managed by Mr. TH and some owner of the KKTT) targeted to be the main public transport service in Chiang Mai substituted the original red truck system. This is like the wound in their heart—Mr. P asked for collaboration to reform their red truck transportation and later they abandoned them and bring the new city bus system to replace them. That is why they always reject the attempts of public sectors or other sectors that try to reach them. So, their understanding is very important thing because several companies and organizations try to dialogue with them such as the change of their car engine from combustion engine to electric vehicle. Right now they blocked, we could not reach them (source code: 21:16).”

As the red truck service lost their benefits, they usually rejected those attempts to reform and advance urban transportation in Chaing Mai City. Leading their refusal of the LRT in Chaing Mai as referred to an interview with Mr. B, professor at Chaing Mai University, said that: *“their reaction towards the LRT, they surely rejected. Especially the city bus service (of the RTC) was largely refused by the red truck drivers (source code: 268:12 ¶ 51 – 55).”* Therefore, distrustfulness and disparity among key actors who involved

in transport policymaking in Chaing Mai City is critical issues that hinder capacities of local coalition to run their joint efforts advocated for LRT policymaking. As such, the CMCD and other business elites associated with urban policymaking have faded their roles away to reform urban transport and LRT development in Chaing Mai City. Leaving local coalition has no local private policy brokers to invest their efforts and resources to advocate and lead strategies for LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai City.

Another critical factor associated with LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai is related to the state dependency. As the local coalition has no policy brokers who seek to invest their efforts and resources for the LRT. The municipalities also have no intents to handle with the LRT development in Chiang Mai City. As a result, local coalition must rely on the state. Although at the early phase of the CMCD had willingly aimed to invest in the LRT system, but their attempts were breakdown after the working disparity among their coalition partners associated with local transport reform of red truck service. Therefore, resources from the state are key towards the development of LRT system in Chaing Mai City.

Figure 51 State dependence's LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai



Although local coalition in Chaing Mai want the LRT but their capacities to reach out to the policymaking centres are very limited. Absence of policy brokers are critical conditions for the local coalition to rely on the state. Political policy brokers who possess political powers to handle with opportunities floating around policymaking centres as well as those private policy brokers who could strategize financial or administrative leverages to deal with those policymakers at national centre, are missing from local coalition in Chaing Mai. Therefore, financial and political dependence on the state is the main option for local coalition to implement the LRT initiative. As clarified by Mr. W, Mayor of the Mae-Hai Town Municipality, that: *“the investment of the LRT should come from the national government, local and regional authorities should be only facilitator to support them (source code: 15:16 ¶ 32 – 33)”*


Dependency on the state could be both facilitating and hindering conditions towards the development of LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai City. Investigation from interviews with key local actors all agreed that depending on the state resources would be easier to implement the LRT, as noted by Mr B., professor at Chaing Mai University, that: *“it should be deployed by the state power... expanding authorities of the MRTA to run LRT in regional cities (source code: 268:21 ¶ 107).”* Similar to Mr. NA, cofounder of the CMCD, said that: *“when our political representative formed the government, everything will get done (source code: 16:5 ¶ 10).”* However, dependent on the state will be more effective *if* local coalition has political policy brokers or political approaches reaching to the centres of policymaking. But local coalition in Chiang Mai has no political and private brokers nor the political approaches to reach the centre of policymaking. As such, the LRT initiative are fragile and politically unadaptable.

State dependence also involves multiple issues that could hinder the development of LRT policymaking. One of those factors is financial condition. According to investigation, LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai has been unfinalized and planned to alter from the LRT into the ART system because of the state’s financial constraint. As noted by the Minister of Transportation about the plan to alter LRT initiative to the ART that: *“we must admit that our country has limited amount of budget. If studies confirmed that the investment in LRT will be cost-effective and resolve the traffic issues, so we could do it. But, if it is not financially worthy... the project might not be responsive (source code: 194:1).”* Clarification of the Minister of Transportation revealed key constrain that hinder progress of LRT

development in Chiang Mai which mainly associated with the shrinking financial status and lack of political commitment to launch the LRT initiative.

Therefore, the ultimate decision related to the development of LRT in Chiang Mai is much relied on the state policy. If the local coalition could reach to centre of policymaking, there might be able to set LRT initiative on national government agenda. However, absence of political and private policy brokers has weakened financial and political capacities of local joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai. Although there have been movements of local civil societies to campaign for the LRT and other urban transport services, but their political influences are limited. Although Chiang Mai City have been regarded as one of those cities that local civil are most active, but majority of those civil societies are actively engaged in environmental, living, and political issues only few associations attempted to address urban transportation.

Figure 52 Roles of local civil society and LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai City



The key local civil society in Chiang Mai that has run joint efforts to advance urban transport is the “*Khon Suk Satharana (KSS)*” which literally means “association of public happiness transport.” The KSS mobilizes local civil and academic networks to campaign for a better public transportation in Chiang Mai City. One of their movements is social activities to capture interests of political and public sectors that are responsible for the

development of urban transportation and LRT initiative in Chiang Mai under slogan “*Chiang Mai, we want urban mass transit.*” This campaign was run by the KSS, online and onsite activities, to capture policymakers and political interests. The campaign include three proposal that the KSS proposed to the responsible authorities (Change.org, 2022): first, promotion of diversified urban transport service because Chiang Mai needs multiple options for people to take urban transport services that are suitable to local people; second, improvement of the existing urban transport systems with higher standard, and third, the public sector must facilitate and support the implementation of mass transit system in Chiang Mai.

Figure 53 The KSS's campaign for the development of urban mass transit and LRT in Chiang Mai City



Remarks: The posture puts at the LRT station modelled from Japanese underground railway station. The messages of posters referred to “*missing bus, help us find the blue bus,*” “*when will Chiang Mai get the LRT,*” “*Bangkok gets city bus and the LRT, Chiang Mai get nothing?*”

Source: Khon Suk Satharana (KSS)

Figure 54 Building of LRT station modelled from Japanese's railway station located at the most popular intersection in Chiang Mai downtown.



Description: LRT building model is just the stairway step down to footpath, not the real underground railway station.

Photo source: <https://thestandard.co/think-park-chiang-mai-pedestrian-connection/>

Roles of the KSS are also highly associated with the CSE rather than the CMCD because as mentioned earlier the CMCD has been fading their roles in running for the LRT and other urban transport development in Chiang Mai. Public transportation is also one of critical factor that could resolve the PM 2.5 haze pollution that the CSE has run the campaign

altogether with other environmental issues. However, campaigns organized by the KSS are occasional and they have not engaged regularly as a leading actor to run for LRT policymaking. Further, the capacities of local civil society alone have no influential affects to the government because the KSS has limited political resources to reach the centre of policymaking powers. As such, campaigns run by the KSS are only critical to shape social awareness rather than policy adaption.


However, there is also concern from another group of local civil society related to the status of heritage city due to the antique building architectures are located around Chiang Mai City. As such, some local civil societies have concerns and argued the government to reconsider the LRT plan that the routes of LRT should not deteriorate the beauty and value of those antique buildings in the city. As interview with Mr. V, Vice Mayor of Chiang Mai City Municipality, mentioned that: *“LRT plan was decided into two system—underground and on-ground systems which on-ground system is vey high... there was the criticize from conservationist that it might not be suitable for the landscape of city since Chaing Mai is an antique city (source code: 19:6 ¶ 44–46).”* Further, the interview with Mrs. U, members of local civil society, also revealed that heritage city has been a challenging issue for development of public transportation for years since the first plan to run city bus into the heritage zone, as said that: *“in summary, I think mass transit system in Chaing Mai has a lot of problems that remained to be solved. What we have talked about for 10-20 years is taking the bus into heritage zone (source code: 21:12)...I remembered researchers and local civil societies had come to protest about enlargement of the urban roads that cross into the heritage zone. At that time we have to thank you them because we might not be able to take advantages from becoming heritage city (source code: 21:2).”* Therefore, protecting heritage city becomes one of relevant factors that affect the progress of LRT in Chaing Mai.

Another condition involves financial constraint and the delay of LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai include four external events: the COVID-19, government loan, government election, and the PM 2.5 haze pollution. The COVID-19 pandemic is associated with the government’s loan which both hinder the progress of LRT in Chiang Mai. The government had loan the budget of 1 trillion baht in 2021 and further loan in 2022 around 700 million baht to fight against the COVID-19 in Thailand. As a results, many mega infrastructure development projects have been reconsidered due to the state’s financial constrain. One of those projects is about development of LRT in regional cities including Chaing Mai and Phuket. The LRT in Chaing Mai is dependent on the state and limitation of state finance

shows uncertainty of the LRT initiative to be operationalized in Chaing Mai. As Mr. X, the Governor of the MRTA, elaborated the reasons for alternation from LRT to ART that:

“Fighting the COVID-19 by the government’s loan of 1 trillion bath might affect the projects of MRTA in the future. Especially the new projects will spend a lot of state money for the land expropriation. If the loan of government is huge... it will affect the projects that are not begin to operate and those projects might be devalued or depreciated in terms of budget allocation from the government (source code: 169:1)

Figure 55 External events and LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai



Therefore, the COVID-19 which directed to the government’s loan has limited financial capacities and budget allocation of the state to implement LRT in Chaing Mai since the government had already spend enormous loan to revitalize post-COVID-19 effects. As such, the LRT and megaprojects are breakable. Another external event that is relevant to the LRT in Chiang Mai is an upcoming national election. Although no candidates have campaigns to advocate for the LRT in Chiang Mai, but the changing political climate and the new government directly affects progress of LRT initiative in Chaing Mai because the project can further proceed only after official appointment of new government. According

to interview with Mr. NA, cofounder of the CMCD, revealed that the changes of national government always led to the delay and alternations of the LRT in Chaing Mai, as said that:

“At beginning, the government initially aimed to run BRT, at that time I was the president of the chamber of commerce, we visited France to learn the BRT from them. Later, under Yingluck Shinawatra’s administration, the government wanted the tram. After Yingluck was taken over, under the General Prayut Chan-o-cha regime, the government wanted LRT but after conducted feasibility studies. Recently, they are going to change from LRT to ART (source code: 16:9 ¶ 11–12)


Another unique external event in Chiang Mai City is the PM 2.5 haze pollution which depreciates the importance of LRT initiative. The PM 2.5 haze pollution is appearing more urgent and critical problems that needs to be solved immediately compared to urban traffic issues. Chaing Mai City has suffered from the PM 2.5 haze pollution for years especially during summer in Thailand, Chiang Mai has always been ranked as the top-1 city in the world where air quality is terribly bad due to the PM 2.5 haze pollution coming from agricultural burning of domestic and neighbouring countries since Chaing Mai is a boundary city. The government has been unable to solve this serious problem for years due to the haze issues involve tradition of local agricultural living and the incorporation with neighbouring countries. As a result, municipalities, civil societies, and local private alliance—the CSE, in Chaing Mai City realize that PM 2.5 haze pollution and environmental issues are serious issues which need to be handled urgently than the transport. Therefore, for local governments in Ching Mai, the LRT is seemed as a secondary issue to the PM 2.5 haze pollution to handle.

7.5. Single-Case Conclusion

Although Chaing Mai is one of the world renown travel destinations. But the city has poor public transportation to serve local people and international visitors. After local joint efforts in Khon Kaen—the KKTT and KKTS, successfully set their LRT policy on national government agenda. Local private alliance in Chiang Mai City has formed their coalition and established the city development corporations—CSE in 2016 and CMCD in 2017. These city development corporations are the attempts of local private sector to run joint activities to advance Chaing Mai City. The roles of CSE mainly associated with living environmental issues and micro-transit development while the CMCD is a core organization responsible for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai City.

Although the CMCD has learned strategies and experiences from the KKTT. But their capacities to run local joint efforts for LRT policymaking is weak. As a result, the LRT in Chiang Mai has not been finalized and targeted to change from the LRT to ART system. Investigation from this study revealed critical factors that are relevant to the unfunctionality of local collaborative actions in Chiang Mai to advocate for LRT include: absence of political brokers, no political approaches to centre of power, roles of civic sector, heritage city protection, collaboration from private sector, COVID-19, roles of the CSE and CMCD, financial factor, government's loan, limited capacities of local government, local private policy brokers, new election event, no local LRT movements, on-demand red truck system, PM 2.5 haze pollution issue, political factor, state dependence, and working disparity between local private partners, as detailed in following figure.


Figure 56 Co-occurrence analysis and force-directed diagram related to functional factors of local coalition to run LRT initiative in Chiang Mai



Above figure reveals that relevant factors to the policymaking of LRT in Chiang Mai are closely associated with the political factor, the roles of CMCD, issues related to absence of political and private policy brokers, limitation of local government capacities to run for

LRT, working disparity between local private partners, local red truck, and state dependence and financing. External events that are most influential to the LRT policymaking the most associated with the COVID-19, which is also the cause to government loan, and the new government election while the PM 2.5 is secondary to them. The functional factors related to LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai are associated with collaboration from private sectors, roles of the civil societies, roles of the CSE, and financing from the state. Furthermore, the author takes the code of approaching to centre of power into analysis of LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai, although this factor is critical local coalition in Phuket and Khon Kaen. But investigation from Chiang Mai reveals that there are no relevant activities associated with coalition approaching to the centre of policymaking powers. As shown in following figure of Sankey diagram that reveals linkage functional factor and centralized state but no linkage of the approach to centre of policymaking power and the LRT in Chaing Mai.

Figure 57 Sankey diagram of relevant factors and events associated with LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai City.



Chiang Mai rarely found its policy brokers to represent and advocate for LRT policymaking. Although at the beginning, there might be seen the roles of the CMCD to perform as local private policy brokers. However, the internal fragmentation between local private partners themselves has led the CMCD fade their roles and commitment away to invest their efforts and resources to advocate LRT in Chiang Mai. As such, the local coalition in Chiang Mai has no leading structure to deal with political and financial challenges or opportunities offering around the centres of policymaking power associated with LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai City.

The LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai show weak capacities of local coalition due to internal fragmentation and disappearance of policy brokers—political and private policy brokers, to invest their efforts and resources. Although, there have partial engagement from civil societies to campaign for the LRT and urban transit development but their political influence on the policymaking is so little, just social awareness not policy adoption. Further, the local civil society is also disconnected with the CMCD for the mutual collaboration to advocate for the LRT. As such, the unity among relevant local partners to run for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai is fragmented. Engagement from civil society is mainly associated with the CSE where their roles are secondary to the CMCD in LRT duties, but the CSE is more active and institutionalized than the CMCD in running development initiatives related to living environmental issues especially the PM 2.5. Therefore, primary concern those who associated with local coalition in Chiang Mai is well informed on the PM 2.5 haze pollution than urban transport issues. Leaving the LRT policymaking and other urban transit problems are less urgent than the haze pollution.

Further, application of ACF and policy broker analysis framework to investigate the case of Chiang Mai City asserted that presence and absence of local policy brokers are critical to the success or failure of transport policymaking. Chaing Mai has no local policy brokers to represent and advocate for the LRT initiative. As such, the LRT policymaking is most breakable and local coalition is weak to advocate for the LRT initiative. Moreover, the internal fragmentation between local private alliance largely weakens capacities of local coalition to advocate for the LRT policymaking. The internal fragmentation is also key cause to an absence of local private policy broker in Chiang Mai City. Therefore, internal unity of local coalition is critical factor to the success of transport policymaking.

Policy broker analysis framework applied to investigate local joint efforts in Chiang Mai City revealed the most distinct result compared to those cases of Khon Kaen and Phuket because an absence of local policy brokers to advocate for the LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai City. Although there had been the roles of CMCD to perform as private policy broker since the beginning of development of local joint efforts in Chiang Mai, but the internal conflicts among local partners led the CMCD faded their roles away from being a policy broker. However, the similar finding resulted from the application of policy broker analysis is the working disparity between local private and political sectors to advocate for the LRT policymaking since the beginning of CMCD formulation. Therefore, the single-case investigation on policy broker analysis from Chiang Mai also asserted that there is no co-existence of private and political policy brokers within a single advocacy coalition—as similar to the cases of Khon Kaen and Phuket cities.

CHAPTER 8

THE CASE OF BUENG KAN CITY

8.1. Introduction

Bueng Kan is the latest city in Thailand, founded in March 2011. The city located in the northeastern region of Thailand—as a boundary city alongside the Mekong River, next to the Bolikhamxai Province of Lao PDR, which easily connects to Vietnam and People's Republic of China. As such, Bueng Kan is well-known for its strategic location as a new regional gateway to Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). Furthermore, Bueng Kan is the Thailand's second most greenery city, where there are two existing world wetlands located, and the city is also surrounded by the Mekong River and mountains. Therefore, Bueng Kan has consistently been ranked as the most liveable city in Thailand due to the quality of natural resources, lifestyle, and geographic landscape. The city also shares the highest numbers of natural rubber production in the northeastern region. As such, Bueng Kan is generally regarded as the rubber city due to its capacity to dominate regional and national rubber markets (National News Bureau of Thailand, 2022).

Historically, Bueng Kan had long been one of the districts under Nong Khai City, not until the local movements attempted to promote Bueng Kan as a new province divided from Nong Khai. The local movement seeking to divide Bueng Kan from Nong Khai City could be classified into two waves (Pholsim, 2023). The first wave began in 1994 and was led by local politicians of Seridham Party. However, due to limited political power to deal with national politics, those local advocates failed to promote Bueng Kan as a new city. Nearly two decades later, an attempt to split Bueng Kan from Nong Khai was brought into the government agenda by Chavarat Charnvirakul, the political leader of the Bhumjaithai Party (BP) in 2010. As a powerful government coalition party, the BP succeeded in the promotion of Bueng Kan as the new province in March 2011. Since then, the BP has attempted to grow its political ground in Bueng Kan City, both national and local politics.

Within a short period, transport infrastructures in Bueng Kan have been extensively advanced due to its political and geographical potentials. Several mega transport projects have been implemented in Bueng Kan, such as the Fifth Friendship Bridge between Thailand and Lao PDR, the Bueng Kan Airport, intercity motorways from Bueng Kan City to Surin City—the gateway city to Cambodia, and expressway development connecting Udonthani City to Bueng Kan City. These transport development projects were driven by a politician who is now the Deputy Minister of Interior and key political policy broker to represent local coalition of Bueng Kan at the centre of policymaking power.

The case of Bueng Kan reveals different shapes of local joint efforts and relevant conditions that are critical to the functionality of local coalition advocate for local-desired policymaking, in contrast to the horizontal collaborative approach. Although Bueng Kan is a small city, but those megaprojects—airport, international bridge, and inter-city expressway, are rarely found in another precedent neighbouring city that even has bigger economic scale. Investigation from Bueng Kan implies that political resource is critical to vertical collaborative action and without political policy brokers, these megaprojects in Bueng Kan would never be viable. Although local coalition in Bueng Kan has arranged with less multiple actors and no city development corporation like those horizontal approach in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket, but its transport megaprojects could be productively set on agenda of national government.

8.2. Urban Transport Initiatives in Bueng Kan

There are three main urban transport infrastructures development in Bung Kan including: the Fifth Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge (FTLFB), Bueng Kan Airport, and expressways. All these megaprojects require not only enormous amount of budget, but the political capacities to make it happened. The FTLFB has been now under construction since the government authorized the project in 2019. The FTLFB is established based on the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation (GMS) and Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) where the government of two countries from shared budget to invest in the FTLFB which total cost is 3,930 million baht, the Thai government shared 2,630 million baht and the Lao PDR government shared 1,300 million baht. Total distance of the FTLFB is around 12.133 kilometres (The Greater Mekong Subregion, 2021).

Figure 58 The concept and progress of the Fifth Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge



Description: concept and progress of the Fifth Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge construction linking Bueng Kan City, Thailand to Bolikhamxai Province of Lao PDR

Photo source (up) : <https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/business/economic/1034772>

Photo source (down): <https://www.tnnthailand.com/news/local/137290/>

Figure 59 The first Thai-Loa Friendship Bridge crossing the Mekong River in Nong Khai City, Thailand opened in 1994.



Photo source: <https://greatermekong.org/g/fifth-lao-thai-friendship-bridge-provide-shortest-route-between%20lao-pdr-thailand-and-viet-nam>

Construction of the FTLFB is 60 percent progress and it is estimated to be ready for service in 2024. The FTLFB will strengthen economic capacities of Bueng Kan in regional market due to transportation through the FTLFB from Bueng Kan City is the shortest distance to travel or export products from Thailand to China. Although there are another five friendship bridges crossing the Mekhong River to Lao, but crossing through the FTLFB in Bueng Kan takes shortest time and distance compared to those bridges in other cities. Further, the domestic transit network connected with the FTLFB is also the main regional route which can link to the international road no.R8 travelling through Lao PDR, Vietnam, and crossing into southern part of China. Therefore, the development of the FTLFB will strengthen capacities of transportation and logistics in Bueng Kan City to be more effectively connected with international market especially the Chinese market.

Figure 60 The FTLFB and transport route from Bueng Kan to China



Adapted from Department of International Trade Promotion. (2022)

Recently, there are five friendship bridges connecting Thailand to Lao PDR and the FTLFB in Bueng Kan is the most recent bridge which is under construction. Although, Bueng Kan has located here for decades, but there had been no attempt and possibility to drive the construction of the FTLFB. Not until Bueng Kan gets promoted as a new city and emergence of political broker to represent and handle with associated opportunities at the centre of policymaking power. As such, several megaprojects of infrastructure development have been planned to implement in Bueng Kan. One of those well recognized projects is the government plan to develop *Bueng Kan Airport*. The plan of government to invest in airport development in Bueng Kan is remarkable news among local people in the same region since Bueng Kan has just been promoted as a new city but they are able to capture interests of the government to develop the airport faster than those former cities in the same region.

The development of Bueng Kan Airport was proposed to the government since 2018 by provincial government’s coalition in Bueng Kan. Later, the Department of Airport (DOA) conducted the feasibility studies during 2020-2021 related to the development of Bueng Kan Airport and reported to the government. As a result, the government selected Pongpeuy and Wisit Subdistricts as a targeted location for the development of Bueng Kan Airport which is planned to be constructed in 2026 and ready to service in 2029 (National News Bureau of Thailand, 2021; Bangkokbiz, 2022). The total cost of construction is around 3,152 million baht and the lands more than 4,400 rai will be expropriated to use for construction of the airport. The government has already run feasibility studies and public hearing which majority of local people support and glad to have this project implemented in Beung Kan. As noted by Mr. Q, President of Business and Travel Industry in Bueng Kan, revealed that: “*we are very happy about development of airport in Bueng Kan because our transportation will be more convenient. The important thing is how the government could implement the project as soon as possible (source code: 240:12).*”

Figure 61 Targeted locations of Bueng Kan Airport and the Fifth Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge




Photo source: <http://eia-buengkanairport.com>

Figure 62 Concept of Bueng Kan Airport construction



Photo source: <http://eia-buengkanairport.com>

Bueng Kan Airport is located close to the Fifth Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge (FTLFB) and city downtown. Distance from the airport to the FTLFB is around 12 kilometres which is very convenient for Lao people or visitors outside the city to land in Bueng Kan Airport and travel to Lao PDR through the FTLFB. Further, transit from the airport to the downtown of Bueng Kan is just also 12 kilometres, taking around 15 minutes to reach into the city downtown. Therefore, initiatives of the FTLFB and airport development would resolve the

lack of mass transportation services in Bueng Kan and strengthen capacities of logistics and economic mobilities of local industries to be largely growth at the regional markets.

Another mega transport projects which are targeted to launch in Bueng Kan is the development of expressways. There are two critical expressways initiatives which planned to implement in Bueng Kan including (1) expressway connecting Bueng Kan City and Udon Thani City and (2) inter-city motorway linking Bueng Kan City to Surin City. First, the government authorized the Department of Expressway to conduct feasibility study related to development of the Expressway Bueng Kan-Udon Thani in 2018. This project is very interesting because there is no regional city that has expressway connecting among regional city in Thailand. The total distance of expressway construction is about 155 kilometres which cost around 20,000 million baht (Dailynews, 2022). This expressway would reduce the transport distance around 75 kilometres and reduce time consuming around 2 hours, from transit route which general taking around 3 hours and half. The project is planned to be constructed in 2026 and it will be ready for service in 2029.

Figure 63 Route and concept of the development of Expressway Udon Thani-Bueng Kan




Photo source: <https://www.dailynews.co.th/news/2402403/>

Starting point of the project begins from Kumphavapee District of Udon Thani Province crossing Nong Khai and ending at the intersection of the Fifth Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge and Bueng Kan Airport. Therefore, this expressway development would greatly strengthen the capacity of transport system that largely benefits the local industries in Bueng Kan to conveniently connect with other regional cities. Another important expressway

project is the intercity motorways connecting Bueng Kan City—as the top part of northern region, to Surin City—as the lowest part of southern region and located as boundary city next to Cambodia. The Master Plan of Intercity Motorways Development (2017-2036) revealed the plan to invest in intercity motorways following the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) strategy that government aims to connect economies between the eastern and northern parts of Thailand which associate with the GMS boundary cities. The plan targeted those strategic boundary cities that could potentially drive national industries to link with international markets. Fortunately, one of the master plans is the construction of the motorway which routes from Bueng Kan City to Surin City. This intercity motorway called the “M3” route which connects Bueng Kan—a boundary city next to Lao PDR, to Surin City—a boundary city next to Cambodia, with the total distance of 465 kilometers. The M3 route will also intersect with intercity motorway no. M2 and no M4 which are also able to connect with those boundary cities from western region—located next to Myanmar, and the boundary cities of the eastern region—which located next to Lao PDR and Cambodia.

Figure 64 The Master Plan of Intercity Motorways Development (2017-2036) in Thailand



Photo source: <http://www.doh-motorway.com/master-plan/highway-network/>

These intercity motorways will strengthen capacities of transportation and logistics system which will enable those boundary cities, as well as non-boundary city, easily link with the regional markets in Asia. The interesting point is that the intercity motorway in the northeastern region has two motorways routing in parallel, from the northern part of the region—from Lao PDR, start from Nong Khai City where located next to Bueng Kan to the southern part of the region—to Cambodia. Compared to other regions, the number of motorways in the northeastern region makes no sense. But linking to the political climate that this plan was developed under the political policy brokers in Bueng Kan and his political network rule the ministerial positions in the government. That is also why the M3 route occurred in this master plan.

8.3. Local Collaborative Approach

Investigation of Bueng Kan reveals the city has no horizontal collaborative effort where local private, civic, and public sectors have mutually run the campaign to advance their public transportation infrastructures. The roles of private and civic sectors in Bueng Kan engaging in city development are also weak to form the horizontal collaboration. On the contrary, the city prominently reflects its vertical collaborative efforts where those urban transportation developments are mainly mobilized and campaigned by political sector. As a result, majority of mega transportation projects in Bueng Kan are largely attached to political sectors where local and national politics are key factors to advocate for transport policymaking.

There are two political coalitions—the two Naka coalitions, that targeted to take Bueng Kan as a political base including: "*Wang Paya-Naka Coalition (WPC)*" which is closely attached to the Pheu Thai Party (PTP)—liberal wing, and "*Nakhon Naka Coalition (NNC)*" which is tightly attached to the Bhumjaithai Party (BP)—most powerful government's coalition party (Komchadluek, 2018 & 2020). After being promoted as a new city in March 2011, Bueng Kan organized two national elections in 2011 and 2019 and two local elections of the Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) in 2011 and 2020. Although the separation of Bueng Kan from Nong Khai is a well-known political effort of Bhumjaithai Party (BP), but the BP had always lost national and PAO elections in 2011 and 2019 to their opposition—Pheu Thai Party (PTP). As such the PTP has long dominated the political base in Nong Khai City and continued to maintain their power in the national and local politics of Bueng Kan after separation. Although the BP and NNC has sought to

strengthen their political base since 2011, they had lost every election to the WPC of the PTP.

Not until 2020 the political climate in Bueng Kan was changed due to NNC eventually overthrew WPC in the 2020's PAO election, which the NNC gained enormous votes over the candidates and former PAO's executive from WPC (Bueng Kan Provincial Administrative Organization, 2020). Winning of the PAO election in December 2020 represents the successful political campaigns of the BP and the shift of political power in Bueng Kan from the WPC to the NNC after the long effort of Bhumjaithai Party to take over the political base in Bueng Kan since 2011. Although Bueng Kan is a peripheral city a long way from economic and political centres of Bangkok. But the city holds strong political power due to the battles of politicians who seek to dominate Bueng Kan as their political base and offer several convincing initiatives to advance the city's wellbeing and economic infrastructures. Especially, when the Bhumjaithai Party occupies the national government and the NNC governs the PAO, multiple mega transport projects have been established to advance urban infrastructures in Bueng Kan—international bridge, airport, or expressway networks. These projects aim to strengthen the NNC's political base in Bueng Kan during the BP's political office term.

As a result, local collaborative action in Bueng Kan is loose especially engagement from civil and private sectors. Local civil societies have no involvement in city development while the private sector also has no intents to invest their efforts and resources to take part in urban policymaking and infrastructure developments like the joint establishment of city development corporations in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, or Phuket. As an interviewed with Mrs. Z, regional district officer in Bueng Kan, revealed that *“People in Bueng Kan are not interested and less prioritize to engage in city development. They think it is the duty of public authorities to advance the city. Therefore, collaborative actions remained only to specific group. Sacrifices for public interests are very limited. People here are most rely on public sector (source code: 255:7 ¶ 274).”* Therefore, the bounds of public involvement from civil and private sector to run joint activities are limited. Instead, joint efforts between public and political sectors in Bueng Kan are well-connected. As such, many advanced megaprojects in the are driven by the strengthen of this coalition.


Key local political leader in Bueng Kan represented by *Mr. L* who is now vice-president of Bhumjaithai Party and the Deputy Minister of Interior. His wife won the PAO

election and takes current position of the Chief Executive of Bueng Kan PAO. Therefore, central and regional agencies in Bueng Kan have been unified into those political networks who currently lead the Bueng Kan City. As civil and private sectors are less capable to run local joint efforts and take parts in city development, the roles of public and political coalitions in Bueng Kan are more critical to manage local collaborative actions and run for multiple transport megaprojects—which eventually be materialized. Therefore, the civil engagement is a supporting element to the campaign of political and public coalitions to handle with relevant opportunities floating around the centres of policymaking power.

Furthermore, there is also disparity between private and political sectors in Bueng Kan since Bueng Kan is most-producing rubber city in the region and the rubber farming dominates major part of agricultural sector. However, the leading consultant of rubber farmer association in Bueng Kan is a former political leader of the PTP and opponent to Mr. L and his local political network. Therefore, there were usually the organized protests from local rubber farmer association against the low price of rubber product and issues related to dis-functionality of rubber manufacturing located in Bueng Kan (Thai PBS, 2013; Matichon, 2020). As clarified by Mr. H, officials of Bueng Kan Provincial Authority, asserted that *“local private sector here is politically divided into multiple sides. Once the others get benefits they are unwelcome to incorporate or joint activities together, but when their alliance get benefits they are very welcome to join with. Therefore, local politics is critical factor that divides private from government sector. As such, local collaborative action is very inactive. (source code: 255:18 ¶ 275)”*

As a result, local coalition in Bueng Kan is constructed and directed by roles of local political sector which closely tie together with the regional public sectors to run for development initiatives. The civic engagement is also attached to the local joint efforts that led by the political and bureaucratic coalition, but the roles of civic sector in those joint activities are considered as a passive actor because their engagement to take part in local collaborative actions are normally guided and activated by the bureaucratic sector. While the roles of local private coalition to jump into those tripartite collaborative efforts are weak. The private sector will usually take part in local joint actions follows the formal structure designed by the city government called Joint Committee between Public and Private sector. However, the self-initiated project run by joint efforts of local private collaboration in Bueng Kan is rarely found.

Figure 65 Tripartite collaborative approach in Bueng Kan City



What makes local joint efforts in Bueng Kan represent vertical model of collaboration is the resources and interrelationship among political and regional public sectors. The resources that are used to advance mega urban transport projects in Bueng Kan are hierarchically mobilized from the state which associated with budget allocated from national government and political dealings at the centre of policymaking power. Moreover, in Bueng Kan there reveals that there are no resources that are locally assembled among the local associations to invest for any city development projects or to form a new local governing body—like KKTT, PKCD, or CMCD, that is mutually funded by public and private sectors. Therefore, vertical collaborative approach is key strategy that local coalition applied to advocate for mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan.

8.4. Analysis of Local Coalition Strategies and Urban Transport Policymaking

A decade after Bueng Kan get promoted as a new city since March 24, 2011, the city has largely grown with multiple mega transport infrastructure developments. Key transport infrastructures include: Fifth Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge (FTLFB), Bueng Kan Airport, and expressways connecting Bueng Kan to Udon Thani, and Surin cities. These megaprojects are rarely found elsewhere especially the intercity expressway that link among regional cities such as Bueng Kan and Udon Thani Cities. Furthermore, these mega transportation

developments require enormous scale of public budget. Therefore, the policymaking of those projects requires political resources to handle with relevant factors existed at the centre of power in policymaking.

Bueng Kan revealed its unique form of transport infrastructure policymaking which relies on vertical collaborative model where political resources are critical factor to achieve policymaking. Investigation from this study revealed traits of collaborative approach in Bueng Kan and relevant factors associated with policymaking of those transport initiatives classified into three categories; (1) *absence of horizontal efforts* including absence of local civil and coordinator, economic conditions, less civic engagement, less private engagement, weak roles of local private sector; (2) *tripartite coalition* comprising public sector unity, strong political-led coalition, working disparity between private, political, and bureaucratic sectors; and (3) *political factors* including central resources, political representation, strong political-led coalition, and local political brokers. As the details in following table.

Table 17 Relevant factors associated with mega transportation policymaking in Bueng Kan

Relevant Factors	○ BK-MTI Gr=71	● functional factors Gr=69
○ absence of local civil society Gr=2	2	0
○ absence of local coordinator Gr=3	3	0
○ central resources Gr=4	3	2
○ economic condition Gr=7	7	0
○ less civic engagement Gr=23	22	0
○ less private engagement Gr=9	9	0
○ local political brokers Gr=19	12	11
○ official rotation issues Gr=9	5	0
● political factor Gr=104	22	14
○ political representation Gr=2	2	2
○ public sector unity Gr=3	3	0

Relevant Factors	○ BK-MTI Gr=71	● functional factors Gr=69
○ strong political-led coalition Gr=10	8	7
○ tripartite Gr=6	5	4
○ weak roles of private sector Gr=3	3	0
○ working disparity between government-private Gr=16	4	0
○ working disparity between politics-private Gr=13	2	0


MTI means mega transport initiative.

Gr means groundedness.

Policymaking of transportation development in Bueng Kan revealed weakening roles of civil and private associations to engage in local joint efforts. The city has no additional governing body that established by joint efforts among local private sector nor the institutionalized civil society to engage in urban policymaking. One of the key factors leading to the less engagement and absence of local civil society is related to economic conditions. Agriculture dominates the majority of economic sector in Bueng Kan, especially the local rubber industry which Bueng Kan shares the largest proportion of lands used for rubber agriculture in the northeastern region. However, the local people are still in poor which force them to focus on their works in order the keep balance of their income. As interviewed with Mrs. D, local officer in Bueng Kan, noted that: “*economic issues have critical influence. When local people are still hungry and have inadequate incomes to take care their families... they have to commit for their own business first (source code: 255:13 ¶ 209).*”

Similarly, Mr. DJ, from regional government officer, further classified that: “*Bueng Kan people are mostly working in agriculture which sustained well-being for them. But this is also the key challenges to the local collaboration for city development because people would take major time for their agriculture activities. (source code: 255:12 ¶ 239).*” Mrs. VI, as local official in Bueng Kan, also further asserted the: “*occupation of local people in Bueng Kan is not suitable to promote local joint effort especially rubber agriculture (source code: 255:21 ¶ 221).*” Therefore, involvement of local civic engagement and appearance of civil society associations are constrained by economic conditions associated with personal and family agricultures.

Figure 66 Absence of horizontal efforts and mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan City




Another cause of an absence of horizontal efforts in Bueng Kan associated with the roles of private sector which are inactive to commit for the city development initiatives. According to interview with Mr. RJ, regional authority officials, revealed that: “*local private sector here is much concerned about their group benefits. They are not an active leader and lacks of knowledge and experiences in macro perspectives (source code: 255:16 ¶ 227).*” Therefore, there are no recent movements of local private sector to take the leading roles in running local joint efforts for the city development in Bueng Kan. As clarified by Mrs. M, provincial government official in Bueng Kan, asserted that: “*forming the collaboration among local private sector as well as their participation and common goal for the development of Bueng Kan is unclear. They have no clear roles and paths towards how they will run development for the city within 5, 10, or 20 years (source code: 255:19 ¶ 281).*” According to the interview of Mrs. M revealed that private sector have non-leading roles to initiate special development projects for the city. The tie among local private sector is also loose due to the difficulty and no attempts among them to form local private alliance. As such the local private sector could be regarded as passive actors in the local collaborative system of Bueng Kan, as further clarified by Mr. HB, provincial government officer, explained that:

“local private and people are inactive and unintended to jump into collaborative activities. They think it is none of their responsibility.... Some groups even refuse and against the policies or development projects which they are not get beneficial... as a result, local joint efforts in Bueng Kan is unfunctional (source code: 255:4 ¶ 202).”

As a result of the inactive roles of local civil and private sectors, Bueng Kan has no central coordinator or moderator that takes direct responsibilities for mobilizing resources among local partners in the city. This led to another relevant factor associated with functionality of local coalition to advocate for transport policymaking in Bueng Kan involves *tripartite collaborative action*. The tripartite coalition is key strategic approach which enables Bueng Kan to succeed the policymaking of multiple transport megaprojects. This model involves collaboration from three sectors including political, bureaucratic, and civic sectors. The local private sector is excluded from this model due to their inactive capacities and disparities between private and political sectors. As such, the tripartite model mainly includes three sectors which closely interrelate to each other. Although these three sectors generally existed in every city, to gather these sectors to work together requires political and financial capacities to unite the joint efforts. The tripartite model in Bueng Kan reveals political sector is critical condition that manage local joint effort of the tripartite model and deal with central authorities for the development of transport infrastructures, as detailed in following figure.

Figure 67 Tripartite collaborative approach and mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan



Key strength of Bueng Kan's tripartite approach is their political resource due to the city dominated by Mr. L, who is vice-executive of Bhumjaithai Party and now the Deputy Minister of Interior, and his wife is also now the Chief Executive of Bueng Kan Provincial Administrative Organization. Therefore, the city possesses strong political representation to lead the strategic actions approaching to the center of policymaking. According to the interview with Mr. L revealed that he prioritizes on the tripartite collaborative approach since it will foster the city's growth faster than other cities, as said that:

“Political leader, strong political unity, participation from local people, and bureaucrat are the key mechanism to implement the project. This model works—politics, people, and bureaucratic sector. The tripartite model confirms the growth, and growth faster. This is the model of development. (source code: 24:1).” Mr. L further clarified that *“about city development here, we must be aware of three things. First, local people must understand influence of politics to the development. Second, the local bureaucrats or agencies are highly united. Third, the city has influential political leader to drive the city forwards. This makes the greatest development to the city and benefits to the local people (source code: 24:7 p 19).”*

In Bueng Kan, Mr. L has represented local coalition and running political campaigns for transport megaproject to gain political support for this wife in Bueng Kan's PAO election since 2011. Although his wife had lost the PAO's election in 2011 and 2019, but they eventually gained massive support and won the PAO's election in 2020. Leading roles of Mr. L to brokering for mega transport infrastructure development in Bueng Kan have much influence on political dynamics in the city because he is one of executive members in Bhumjaithai Party—most powerful government's coalition party. As a result, Mr. L has been performing as key political policy brokers and deals with political opportunities associated to the need of local people in Bueng Kan.

However, the tripartite collaborative actions reveal insignificance of private sector roles in coalition due to the inactive capacities and disparities between private and political sectors in Bueng Kan. According to the interview with Mr. H, regional official of Bueng Kan, revealed the disparity among political and private sectors as said that: *“local private sector here is politically divided into multiple sides. Once the other side get benefits another*

side will not welcome to incorporate or joint activities together. But whenever their alliance gets benefits, they are very welcome to join in local collaboration. Therefore, politics is critical factor that divides private from government sector. As such, local collaborative action between political-public and the private is very inactive. (source code: 255:18 ¶ 275)."

Moreover, interview with Mr. KH, the Governor of Bueng Kan, also reflected the weak roles and dis-connectivity of private sector in city development affairs, as said that :

"I would like to push the public and private sectors altogether. Although private sector is getting better... their roles are still weak and inactive as like the civil sector, and rubber famer associations are also weak to joint collaborative actions... I think if they are active, the city could thrive very well... But our private sector and local people are inactive (source code: 22:5 ¶ 31)."


As private and civil sectors are inactive, the importance of political sector is getting more strengthened and deeply attached to policymaking in Bueng Kan. In other words, the weaker private and civil sector, the stronger political powers to lead the local joint efforts and direct policymaking. As a result, the tripartite collaboration among political, bureaucratic, and civic sectors becomes critical approach to advocate for mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan. Although, the roles and engagements of local civic sectors are weak and considered as inactive citizen, but the political alliance could mobilize their support—as a political backup, to run strategies for mega transport policymaking. As clarified by Mr. L, said that:

"Bhumjaithai Party, we could do that (achieving policymaking) but everything has to be ready... local people need to be mobilized and organized because they are the beginner. People is the initiator; politics is the driver. We could drive but we could not start, the legal structure does not allow us to do. Citizen has to participate always. This is the heart of policymaking. Therefore, whatever we are thinking, at the end it has to begin from the local citizen. We, politician, could think but it has to follow the process and structure. (source code: 24:10)"

Therefore, mobilization of political, public, and civic sectors has indicated as key strategy of local coalition to advocate for mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan where their political policy broker is the key actor taking advantages from opportunities floating in

the centre of policymaking power. As a result, political factors in Bueng Kan only becomes key driving factor to achieve their goals of transport policymaking. Even though the coalition has less participants engaged in local joint efforts to advocate for those transport projects, but political resources have strengthened capacities of local coalition to set their desired goals on the government agendas. As such the tripartite collaboration in Bueng Kan has tighten with their political policy brokers—MR. L and his political networks who take ministerial positions in the government, to set those megaprojects into the government plan.

Figure 68 Political factors and mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan City



Critical factors associated with mega transport infrastructure projects are not only the authorization from the government but also the enormous budget allocation from the state. Therefore, political dealings to advocate for policymaking and budgeting allocation at the national centre are key factor to the success of transport megaprojects. Especially in Thailand where the state is highly centralized. In case of Bueng Kan, ability to deploy political resources is high, since the city has already existed with influential political brokers who take the lead in Ministry of Interior and his political networks who closely associated with Mr. L are also position as Vice-Prime Minister, and another occupy the Minister of Transportation. Therefore, political resources of Mr. L could largely strengthen capacities of the political dealings to set those mega transport initiatives into the interests of the national government.

As a result, national budget has been largely allocated into Bueng Kan especially from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Transportation. What Mr. L and his political


coalition—those who ruled the ministerial positions, get in returns is those megaprojects will strengthen the relevance of political representation of Mr. L and his family in which he will gain political recognition about the massive growth of mega transportations that politically campaigned by Mr. L and his political network. As such, Mr. L and his political coalition will gain political support from local citizens and achieving the political domination in Bueng Kan City.

8.5. Single-Case Conclusion

Investigation of collaborative policymaking in Bueng Kan reveals the city has no organizations of local private and civil efforts to advocate for the policymaking of transport megaprojects. Instead, the city reveals the distinct feature of vertical collaborative approach where political resources are critical to achieve transport policymaking including Fifth Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge (FTLFB), Bueng Kan Airport, and two expressways linking Bueng Kan City to Udon Thaina City and Surin City. Although, local coalition in Bueng Kan has limited actors attached in their joint efforts but those megaprojects are able to set on the national government agendas due to the roles of political policy brokers who manage local coalition and represent Bueng Kan at the national table.

This study reveals relevant factors associated to collaborative policymaking in Bueng Kan categorized into three groups which are (1) *absence of horizontal efforts* including absence of local civil and coordinator, economic conditions, less civic engagement, less private engagement, weak roles of local private sector; (2) *tripartite coalition* comprising public sector unity, strong political-led coalition, working disparity between private, political, and government sectors; and (3) *political factors* including central resources, political representation, strong political-led coalition, and local political brokers as the following figure.

Figure 69 Co-occurrence analysis of local coalition and mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan City




The co-occurrence analysis distinctly reveals the weak collaborative system of horizontal model in Bueng Kan due to the absence of local civil and private engagements in their joint efforts. On the contrary, the coalition in Bueng Kan revealed its vertical collaborative policymaking which politics is critical to the success of those transport megaprojects. Especially, the results of co-occurrence analysis discovered that political factors, local political policy brokers, and strong political-led coalition are closely related to the functional factors that strengthen capacities of local coalition to advocate for mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan. Therefore, political resources are critical factors to the functionality of vertical coalition. Although the city has no active horizontal efforts and limited actors associated with the coalition, but due to the political broker and his resources, the mega transport initiatives are able to set on the national government agenda.

One of the critical factors associated with functionality of vertical coalition is the *tripartite approach* where collaborations among three parities—political, public, and civic sectors, are the key to those mega transport initiatives in Bueng Kan. As a city ties with weak horizontal effort, the political resources have been critical driver to run for multiple megaprojects in Bueng Kan, which in returns strengthening the capacity of political party

and further push those weak horizontal alliances to rely on political policy broker. Therefore, the unity of a political-led tripartite coalition has increasingly become critical centre of policymaking in Bueng Kan.

Figure 70 Sankey diagram of relevant factors associated with mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan.



As analysis of Sankey diagram shown in the Figure above, the author added the factors associated with local private policy brokers (yellow colour)—which regarded as one of the functional factors in horizontal collaborative actions in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, and Phuket. However, although it is clear that roles of local private policy brokers are critical as a functional factor to those cities, but in Bueng Kan there were no roles of private policy brokers to advocate for mega transport policymaking. On the contrary, the roles of local political broker and its political resources are largely involved in the mega transport policymaking of Bueng Kan. Therefore, investigation of transport policymaking in Bueng Kan City asserted that roles and resources of politics are key condition to the achievement of vertical collaborative policymaking.

Application of ACF and policy broker analysis framework to investigate the case of Bueng Kan also revealed the distinct type of collaborative policymaking and asserted the critical roles of policy broker to achieve transport policymaking. Bueng Kan has prominent political broker who manage tripartite collaborative actions and political strategies to set their desired transport initiatives and handled with challenges associated with the policymaking process at the centre of policymaking power. Therefore, although the coalition has less diversified partners associated with local coalition, but resources and roles of political broker have enabled local coalition in Bueng Kan achieved their desired transport policymaking.

Policy broker analysis framework applied to investigate the case of Bueng Kan clearly revealed the disparity between local political and private sectors since there is no engagement or commitment from local private sector to jointly advocate for urban transport policymaking in Bueng Kan. Therefore, this investigation also discovered that there is no co-existence of political and private policy brokers within the same advocacy coalition. As similar to those horizontal coalitions in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities where there was no co-existence of private and political policy brokers occurred within the same advocacy coalition. Therefore, it is very interesting that whether vertical or horizontal coalitions, those private and political policy brokers will *not* usually co-exist within the same coalition—the rise of one type of policy broker dissolves another.

CHAPTER 9

CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS

9.1. Introduction

Thailand has long been suffered with inadequate and poor public transportation for decades, especially the urban transport services in regional cities. The most convenient urban transport services are centrally located at the Bangkok Metropolitan whether the LRT, airport, or the city bus. Leaving social and economic inequalities between central and regional cities in Thailand remain a critical problem. Although there have been regional movements attempted to advance their urban transport services, particularly the LRT initiatives in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, and Phuket cities, but those local alliances encountered multiple challenges to set their goals on national government agenda. Leading to the interest of this study to investigate how those local coalitions run their joint efforts to advance mega transport initiatives in their cities.

This study also investigates relationships between different settings of collaboration and its conditions that are relevant to the functionalities of mega transport policymaking. As a result, another case of Bueng Kan City is selected as a represented case of vertical collaborative policymaking. Investigation from these four case studies revealed that different forms of collaboration rely on unique strategies to advocate for the policymaking of their desired transport initiatives. Furthermore, this study also revealed that although local coalitions share similar arrangements of structures and actors associated with local collaborative actions but the capacity of those coalitions to achieve transport policymaking is varied.

This chapter attempts to clarify the main problem statement of this research that seeks to investigate *how local collaborative actions impact urban transport policymaking*. Those four cities were undertaken to investigate specific features of local collaborative actions in each city and their consequences of transport policymaking. This chapter also seeks to address two main research questions of this research that aimed to investigate *why does some*

local collaborative action functions better than others in urban transport policymaking? to examine relevant factors or conditions embedded in each city that allow them to run their preferred policy proposal better than others. The second research question associated with different forms of collaborative policymaking and critical roles of relevant policy actors in each type of advocacy coalition, which the study aims to investigate *how does a variety and role of relevant policy actors in vertical and horizontal collaborations impact capacities of those coalitions in urban transport policymaking?*

Therefore, the beginning of this chapter would clarify comparative analysis of vertical and horizontal policymaking generated from the findings of those case studies. The following section would explain how and why some collaborative action is more functional than others by comparing functional and unfunctional cases of these horizontal coalitions running for the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, and Phuket. Later, this chapter would address the comparative analysis of vertical and horizontal policymaking in Bueng Kan and Khon Kaen as represented functional coalition of each model to advocate for mega urban transport policymaking based on research framework deployed by this study.

9.2. Horizontal and Vertical Collaborative Models of Transport Policymaking

This study found two different types of collaborative policymaking—*vertical and horizontal models*. Horizontal collaboration is “a collaborative system where participants and resources are locally mobilized, and cross-sectoral efforts are organized among multiple local partners to address public issues or common goals that could not be achieved by single actor or organization.” Therefore, associated actors in horizontal collaboration generally involve local authorities, firms, academic, voluntary group, civil society, community organizations, think tanks, or local collaborative entities that are organized at the local level. Like Kessa et al. (2021:64) simplifies that horizontal collaboration emerges at the same level, and it could classify into two types—*interlocal and intersectoral*. Therefore, collaborative actions at the local level, such as intermunicipal or cross sectoral collaboration among local actors are considered horizontal collaboration.

On the contrary, vertical collaboration is “a collaborative system where resources and participants are hierarchically mobilized, and cross-sectoral efforts occurred particularly among political, bureaucratic, and civic sectors to address targeted public issues or achieve common goals of public services and policymaking.” Although horizontal collaboration signifies resources and cross-sectoral joint efforts are locally mobilized, but the local

authorities could also involve in the vertical relationship by performing as a central liaison between local and higher tiers in implementing policies or running their own development initiatives (Rubado, 2019: 27; Carr, Gerber & Lupher, 2007).

Indications of those collaborative models revealed in this study counted on three factors—*resource mobilization, actor relations, autonomy*. First, *resource mobilization* refers to how and where the resources of local coalitions are mobilized. Different models of collaboration share different tracks of their resources. The vertical collaboration reveals a hierarchical or multilevel approach to mobilize and deploy resources to achieve their common goals, while resources of horizontal collaboration generally derive from the mobilization among local partners. As such, resource mobilization of vertical collaboration is associated considerably to resource allocation and negotiation of political and public sectors located in the centre of policymaking power (Rubado, 2019) while resources of horizontal collaboration could come from multiple sectors including local firms, municipalities, contributions from civil society or charities. As Agranoff and McGuire (2003: 21-22) noted that horizontal collaboration "*...emanates from the array of public and private interest that often must be locally mobilized...includes the interlocal resources held by nongovernmental organizations, private agencies, and area local governments...*" Therefore, these two models are varied in terms of their resource mobilization approaches.

Second, *actor relations* indicate how participants in a certain collaborative system are attached to coalition and how interrelationship among them is structured. In horizontal model, collaborative actions among participants are attached to collective duties in specific locality. Policymaking and implementation are also equally managed by those local actors. On the contrary, in vertical model those collaborative actions are attached to tiers of government where relations are shaped by hierarchy or what Kessa, Sadiq, and Yeo (2021: 62) called "*multi-interconnections among different levels of government hierarchy.*" Interrelationship of vertical collaboration is also engaged between local, regional, and national centres where higher tier holds power to direct the lower tiers. Therefore, vertical collaboration reflects top-down hierarchical and intergovernmental relations between national and regional actors, or what Ashworth et al. (2009) called the "*concept of compliance.*" As such, the roles and relationship of actors associated in horizontal model are more equal than those in the vertical model (Kooiman, 2003).

Finally, *autonomy* is one of the key elements to classify horizontal and vertical models of collaboration. The autonomy indicates an ability of coalition which can enhance their capacities to function freely without hindrance from the external authorities. As such, level of coalition's independence varied in vertical and horizontal collaborations. In vertical model, collaborative actions operate under regulatory frameworks and political guidelines exerted by government agencies (Ashworth et al., 2009). Therefore, the vertical collaborative actions are constrained by hierarchical structure where actors are reliant to each other to complete the joint duties or what Rubado (2019: 23) refers to “...*variety of interactions among different levels of government within a hierarchy...*” The lower-tier, or even the top-tier agencies, could not function autonomously due to regulatory boundaries. On the contrary, horizontal collaboration is more autonomous because engaged actors share equal status and independent to each other. Further, a horizontal model is also more flexible to mobilize resources strengthen the coalition capacities to achieve collaborative advantages. Therefore, identification of sources of power that facilitate coalition's self-reliance and what strengthens coalition capacity to act autonomously from the control of central authority is key element to indicate horizontal collation.

Investigations from this study revealed that Khon Kaen, Chiang Mia, and Phuket are identified as *horizontal collaborative model* where joint efforts and resources are locally mobilized to advocate for the LRT policymaking. Therefore, what clearly identify those three cities as horizontal model of collaboration is resource mobilization and actor relations embedded in each city. Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket are leading cities that established two new governing bodies which recently attached to local governance system in Thailand which are *municipal corporation* and *city development corporation*. In Khon Kaen City, twenty local firms jointly mobilized the fund to establish the Thailand's first city development corporation in 2015 called the “Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKTT).” These local firms mutually contributed 200 million baht as a capital fund to launch the KKTT in order to run for LRT policymaking and other urban development initiatives in Khon Kaen City. As a result of resources that are locally mobilized among these local private partners, the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen has been firmly consolidated with the local private sector.

Furthermore, the Thailand's first municipal corporation was also established in Khon Kaen City called “Khon Kaen Transit System (KKTS)” officially launched in 2017. The KKTS was jointly established by intermunicipal collaboration of five municipalities including Khon Kaen City Municipality, Sila Town Municipality, Mueangkao Subdistrict

Municipality, Samran Subdistrict Municipality, and Thapra Subdistrict. These five municipalities have together mobilized budget of 5 million bath to fund operations of the KKTS. The KKTS now becomes the central organization responsible for the implementation of the LRT initiative which is fully managed by those five municipalities. Therefore, Khon Kaen is most advanced horizontal model where resources are locally mobilized from local private sector and municipalities to advocate for LRT policymaking.

Moreover, relationship between associated partners within local coalition of Khon Kaen City is also united. As a reflection from their joint effort and resources sharing to establish the KKTT and the KKTS with no attention to wait for support from the central government. Engagement from local civil societies is also active. In Khon Kaen, there are two local civic organizations that are highly influential to the city's policymaking including *the Foundation of Khon Kaen Future Decades (KKFD)* and *the Khon Kaen Citizen Council (KKCC)*. The KKFD founded in 2018 established by joint efforts among local universities, civil societies, commercial associations, and public agencies to organize city-wide referendums and to launch multiple development programs, including campaigns for LRT initiative in Khon Kaen.

The KKCC is also another active civic organization founded in 1997 and includes more than 150 community organizations working autonomously with the Khon Kaen City Municipality. The KKCC promotes local citizens to engage in decision-making and monitoring development initiatives run by public sectors in Khon Kaen City. They are also major local alliance who mobilized the civil support for the LRT development in Khon Kaen City. Therefore, interaction and relationship among associated partners in local joint efforts in Khon Kaen City are highly united and horizontally interdependent to advocate for LRT initiative since the KKFD and KKCC are key civil societies that incorporate with the KKTT and KKTS to campaign for LRT and other urban development initiatives in Khon Kaen City.

Finally, local collaborative action in Khon Kan revealed two autonomous features. First, financial autonomy which resources to run local joint efforts are locally mobilized from private and municipal sectors. Amount of financial contributions from local private sector—the KKTT, around 200 million baht is huge and even larger than annual public budget of some municipality that is allocated from central government. Furthermore, the fund to invest in LRT development in Khon Kaen City is also self-reliant which the KKTS will not rely on financial support from the state. Instead, the role of KKTT is to broker with

international financial institutions and banks from China for the investment loan of LRT development to the KKTS. Therefore, local coalition in Khon Kan is highly autonomous in financial capacity.

Second autonomous feature of local collaborative action in Khon Kaen is their local administrative autonomy. Khon Kaen is only regional city that the government authorized those five municipalities to own and manage municipal corporation—the KKTS, freely from the command of regional and central governments. Meaning that municipality has full authorization and responsibility over the LRT development in Khon Kaen City. As such, those five municipalities, as a key shareholder, have full administrative autonomy to manage the KKTS involving financial management, legal promulgation, or procurement that associated with LRT development in Khon Kaen City. Therefore, local coalition in Khon Kaen has not only financial autonomy but also the local self-governing authority to run KKTS.

Phuket is the second-leading city that established the city development corporation following experiences of Khon Kaen. Local collaborative action in Phuket also revealed critical roles of local private alliance—led by 47 leading members, who jointly contributed 156 million baht to fund operations of the “Phuket City Development (PKCD)” established in 2016. Therefore, Phuket is also another city that resources are locally mobilized to fund for the operations of PKCD and to run campaigns for the LRT development. Although the city has no municipal corporation to be central organization responsible for LRT development likes the KKTS in Khon Kaen City. Instead, the PKCD runs as the central organization to manage local joint effort and advocate for LRT development. Furthermore, there is another city development corporation called “Andaman City Development (ACD)” recently established in 2021 by another group of local firms in Phuket City. The ACD also run multiple efforts to advance the city especially new urban transport infrastructure likes the city cable car. Therefore, PKCD and ACD are two new local bodies that local firms have jointly mobilized resources and expertise to run for LRT and multiple development initiatives in parallel with local government in Phuket City.

The relationship among local actors associated with LRT policymaking in Phuket revealed that key participants are also locally organized, mainly by local private sector, to achieve their common goals of urban transport improvements. Although, capacities of local collaborative actions in Phuket are weak, but local tie among private sector is equally

tightened to run for LRT and the World Expo event. Even though the government has been hesitant to launch LRT in Phuket, but local private coalition has run campaigns to advance urban transport services by themselves. Particularly taking opportunity of the Specialised World Expo event which Phuket is targeting to be Thailand's candidate for the host city of Specialised World Expo 2028. Furthermore, after the government planned to alter the LRT project into the ART system, local government and private alliances in Phuket also organized their local networks and movements to declare their demand of the LRT against those plans. Therefore, the resources and associated actors of local coalition in Phuket are locally mobilized and interdependent to collectively advocate for LRT initiative.

Local coalition in Phuket is also financially autonomous since the resources to run campaigns for LRT policymaking in Phuket come from those local private alliance who mutually contributed 156 million baht to fund for operations of the PKCD in driving LRT and other urban transport developments in Phuket City. Furthermore, the PKCD also targeted to use their funding to invest in LRT development under the public-private partnership approach to launch LRT service in Phuket City. Moreover, the PKCD has also already invested in the city bus service in Phuket City which local people and international tourist are largely benefit from their transit business. Although the decision related to development of LRT in Phuket has not been finalized, but the financing capacity of local coalition in Phuket is highly autonomous.

Chiang Mai is also another represented case of horizontal collaborative policymaking. Resources to fund for operations to advocate for LRT policymaking are locally mobilized among local private sector in Chaing Mai City—led by 15 leading members, jointly fund one million baht to establish the first city development corporation in 2016 called “Chiang Mai Social Enterprise (CSE).” The CSE runs multiple programs to address urban issues particularly living and environmental problems, community investment, and micro-urban transportation. Further, another city development corporation is also established in 2017 to directly run for LRT policymaking called “Chiang Mai City Development Corporation: CMCD).” Local firms—led by 70 business elites jointly gathered the finance of 7 million baht to fund for operations of the CMCD as a central institution to run for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai. Although financial capacity of local private coalition in Chiang Mai is weak compared to those private alliance in Khon Kaen and Phuket, but their joint contribution from private alliance to fund for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai is key reflection of its horizontal efforts to advocate for LRT initiative.

Actors associated with LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai are also locally organized. Although they are fragmented but the diversity of local sectors engaged in LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai revealed their horizontal efforts to run campaigns to advance their urban transport services. The CMCD is a leading organization that run for LRT policymaking altogether with local private alliance. Further, there is also engagement of local civil societies that have organized campaigns to advocate for LRT and urban mass transit in Chaing Mai. The main local civil societies in Chaing Mai include the “*Khon Sook Satharana Association*,” “*Kieaw Sauy Hoam Group*,” “*the Breath of Chiang Mai Council*,” and the “*Group of Chiang Mai Needs Public Transport*.” However, the civil society that targeted on transportation issues and most engaged in LRT campaigns is the Khon Sook Satharana Association. Although, their political influence is limited, but involvement from civil societies reflects the local needs and horizontal efforts to achieve their collective goal of LRT in Chiang Mai City.

Resources that are locally mobilized among local private sectors strengthen financial capacity of local coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai. Especially roles of the CMCD whose cofounders mobilized fund of 7 million bath to support operations of the CMCD to campaign for LRT policymaking. Furthermore, the CMCD is also targeted to invest in the LRT development in Chaing Mai as its original founding goal. During the beginning phase of local collaborative action run by the CMCD they also invited international banks and investor who interested to fund and invest for the LRT development in Chaing Mai which directly strengthen financial autonomy of local coalition to advocate for LRT development. Therefore, financial resources that are mobilized by the CMCD from local and international sources are key factor that indicates their local joint efforts as horizontal collaborative model to run for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai.

In conclusion, local collaborative actions in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket are well represented of *horizontal collaborative policymaking* due to resources which are locally mobilized, actors associated with local joint efforts are also locally and equally organized which included engagement from multiple local sectors, and the coalition autonomies are strengthen by those resources and networks that local coalitions deployed to advocate for LRT policymaking in each city. All three cities are also similarly structured with city development corporations where local companies, academics, civil society have organized political and social campaigns to advance LRT strategies. Just only one special case that in Khon Kaen City, municipalities jointly mobilized their fund to establish Thailand’s first

municipal corporation—the KKTS, to advocate for LRT initiative. Moreover, working relations of those local coalitions in Khon Kan, Chiang Mai, and Phuket are also autonomous from the state. Especially, their financial autonomy since those local alliances require no financial support from the government to run their local joint efforts.

Table 18 Difference between horizontal and vertical coalitions of transport policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, Phuket, and Bueng Kan

City	Resource Mobilization	Actor Relations	Coalition Autonomy
<i>Khon Kaen</i>	Local dependence, Locally mobilized	Local tie, Private-directed	Financial and administrative autonomy
<i>Chiang Mai</i>	Local dependence, Locally mobilized	Local tie, Private-directed	Financial autonomy
<i>Phuket</i>	Local dependence, Locally mobilized	Local tie, Private-directed	Financial autonomy
<i>Bueng Kan</i>	State dependence, Hierarchically mobilized	Intergovernmental tie, Political-directed	Political autonomy

On the contrary, transport policymaking in Bueng Kan reveals different model from those three cities. Resources and actors associated local joint efforts are well represented of *vertical collaborative policymaking*. Bueng Kan is small city, but mega transport initiatives are widely advanced—the Fifth Friendship Bridge, Bueng Kan Airport, and two intercity expressways. The main resources used to drive those mega transport initiatives in Bueng Kan are mainly allocated from national government, no financial resources that are locally mobilized to fund for those projects. As such, financial resources are much relied on capacities of political resources and broker dealing with political opportunities at the centre of policymaking power. As reflected through the annual budget allocation from national government to Bueng Kan has been largely expanded from 735 million baht in 2012 increased into 4,992 million baht in 2021 budgeting year.

Another unique feature that indicates vertical model of policymaking in Bueng Kan is its “*tripartite collaboration*.” This tripartite model indicates the strong joint unity between political, bureaucratic, and local civic sectors to drive advocate for transport policymaking in Bueng Kan where the tripartite coalition has influential political leader to represent and

perform as a coalition's policy broker to deal with relevant political events at the centre of policymaking arena. As a result, actor relation is much attached to the local political broker led by Mr. L and his political networks of Bhumjaithai Party, who could access to the centre of power in policymaking. Further, majority of executive bureaucrats of local and regional agencies are also rotated from other cities to work closely with his local political coalition in Bueng Kan. Therefore, their working relations among associated actors in vertical collaborative policymaking of Bueng Kan to advocate for transport policymaking are hierarchically and politically unified.

Although resources that are mobilized from the state are constrained by regulatory and hierarchical procedures. However, the investigation of Bueng Kan revealed that political approach of local coalition is highly autonomous. Political leader of local coalition in Bueng Kan revealed its strong political power to handle with relevant challenges at the centre of policymaking powers since the political broker himself and his associates of Bhumjaithai Party take ministerial executive positions to lead the government. Therefore, political resources associated with a political broker of Bueng Kan have strengthen capacities of local coalition—which are politically autonomous, to set those mega transport project on national government agendas. Further, political policy broker of local coalition in Bueng Kan also necessitate the relevance of civil sector in their tripartite collaboration. Because the unity of political and bureaucratic sectors alone is insufficient to strengthen political approaches and brokerage strategies at the centre of policymaking power due to the constitutional framework of those transport policymaking require involvement of local civil sector to legitimate and support for the policies proposed by political brokers. Therefore, autonomy of vertical collaborative policymaking is politically autonomous.

9.3 . What Strengthening the Capacities of Local Coalition to Run for Transport Policymaking?

Capacities of local coalitions to advocate for the desired policy are a production of internal and external factors associated with local joint effort strategies. This study applies advocacy coalition framework (ACF) to investigate those relevant factors that could strengthen and weaken capacities of local coalition to advocate for transport policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, Phuket and Bueng Kan cities. This research categorizes two unique forms of collaborative policymaking in those cities to get more precise answers to address the key research questions which aim to investigate: *why some local collaborative*

action is more functional than others in transport policymaking and how variety and role of policy actors in vertical and horizontal collaborations impact capacities of those coalitions to advocate for transport policymaking. Therefore, the research design by classification of specific collaborative form and apply ACF to investigate those forms demonstrate precise factors that weaken or strengthen capacities of each vertical and horizontal efforts to advocate for transport policymaking in Thailand.

Investigations from transport policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, Phuket and Bueng Kan revealed three types of critical factors that could hinder and strengthen capacities of local coalitions to advocate for their targeted policy include: ***policy actors, internal factors, and external events***. Therefore, this section will present result analysis found from those cases which divided into three parts. The first part demonstrates cross-case analysis of horizontal collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket to clarify why some coalition is more functional than other in transport policymaking. Especially, clarification of different factors of a horizontal coalition that succeeded their policymaking—Khon Kaen City, and those whose coalitions are unfunctional to set their targeted policy including Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. The second part portrays comparative analysis of two different collaborative coalitions—vertical and horizontal, that are both functional in their targeted policymaking including Bueng Kan and Khon Kaen cities. The final part of this section demonstrates the result of cross-case analysis on critical roles of policy brokers in horizontal and vertical collaborative policymaking.

9.3.1. *Capacities of Horizontal Coalition*

Investigations of local joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, and Phuket revealed 7 critical factors that strengthen capacities of local coalition to achieve their desire transport policymaking including: (1) *coalition policy brokers*, (2) *political factors*, (3) *financial factors*, (4) *collaboration from multiple local alliances*, (5) *roles of local government*, (6) *unity of local coalition*, and (7) *abilities to integrate relevant external events*. These factors are key responses to address the first research question in this study related to why some local collaborative action is more functional than others.

Table 19 Cross-case analysis on relevant factors associated with horizontal collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, and Phuket citeis

	Relevant Factors	Functional Factors Gr=71	LRT-CM Gr=205	LRT-KK Gr=328	LRT-PK Gr=182
<i>Internal Factors</i>	absence of political policy brokers Gr=46	0	10	22	13
	approach to centre of power Gr=39	12	0	35	2
	collaboration from local civic society Gr=18	3	7	10	0
	collaboration from local universities Gr=4	0	0	3	0
	collaboration from private sector Gr=44	12	13	17	6
	political factor Gr=105	14	25	38	18
	local coalition unity Gr=30	7	4	21	3
	local financial autonomy Gr=47	8	4	28	10
	local government unity Gr=22	5	0	20	4
	local government unwillingness Gr=12	0	12	0	0
	local private policy brokers Gr=111	12	11	79	14
	local self-reliance Gr=17	3	0	15	0
	working disparity between public and private Gr=13	0	0	0	9
	working disparity between local private sector Gr=12	0	9	0	0
	working disparity between politics-private Gr=13	0	2	2	5

	Relevant Factors	Functional Factors Gr=71	LRT-CM Gr=205	LRT-KK Gr=328	LRT-PK Gr=182
<i>External Events</i>	covid-19 Gr=12	0	7	2	5
	government loan Gr=2	0	2	0	2
	new government election Gr=18	2	4	7	7
	pm 2.5 Gr=2	0	2	0	0
	specialised world expo 2028 Gr=24	2	0	0	24
	• functional factors Gr=71	0	3	42	10

Gr means groundedness

1) Coalition policy brokers

This research shown that horizontal collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket has no political policy brokers to represent the coalition and advocate for LRT policymaking at the centre of policy making power. However, in case of Khon Kaen and Phuket cities, they have an occurrence of local private policy brokers who currently represent and run campaigns to advocate for LRT policymaking—roles of the KKTT in Khon Kaen City and the PCKD in Phuket City. Although local coalition in Chaing Mai established the CMCD who initially performed likely to be a private policy broker of their coalition but the working disparity among local private themselves has let the CMCD faded their roles away from being local private policy broker to run for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai. As a result, Chaing Mai City has no both private and political policy brokers to commit and manage the local joint efforts for LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai City.

Although local coalition in Khon Kaen City has no political policy brokers but the coalition has active local private policy brokers—the KKTT, who largely contribute and manage local joint efforts to run strategies advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen. Even though the coalition has no political brokers, but the KKTT has deployed *political approaches* by integrations of ministerial dialogues and taking advantages from external event of new national elections to strengthen their political capacity. As a results, local coalition in Khon Kaen has reached the centre of policymaking power which local private policy brokers manage coalition's political approach compensated for their absence of political policy brokers. Therefore, relations between roles of private policy brokers and

coalition approaching to the centre of policymaking power is most distinct in Khon Kaen City compared to Ching Mai and Phuket as detailed in following table.

Table 20 Cross-case analysis of coalition policy brokers in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket

Relevant Factors	functional factors Gr=71	LRT-CM Gr=205	LRT-KK Gr=328	LRT-PK Gr=182
absence of political policy brokers Gr=46	0	10	22	13
local private policy brokers Gr=111	12	11	79	14
approach to centre of power Gr=39	12	0	35	2

Although the coalition in Khon Kan has no political brokers but their political approaches could strengthen political capacities of local coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City. The KKTT has deployed the brokering strategies to run for LRT policymaking over a decade and run dialogues with ministerial executives mor than 19 times. As a result, the LRT project was officially approved by the NCPO in 2016. While in case of Phuket City, although local coalition has its private policy broker—the PKCD, but those private policy brokers have no political resource to approach the centre of policymaking power. Although the PKCD managed local coalition to organize local movement and trying to approach the centre of policymaking power once, but their political influence is limited due to lack of dialogues and private policy brokers are inaccessible and unable to deploy political resources. As a result, the LRT policymaking in Phuket has been unable to capture the interests of the national government.

In conclusion, this study found that the roles of policy brokers—whether private or political policy brokers, are key factor to the strengthen of horizontal collaborative policymaking, especially in transportation policymaking area where transport duties are highly centralized. Results of cross-case analysis from these three cities revealed that the roles of private policy brokers could strengthen financial capacities and substitute the lack of political capacities of local coalition to advocate for the LRT policymaking. Existence of those private policy brokers in all three cities largely strengthen financial autonomy of coalition to run for LRT policymaking, especially in the case of Khon Kaen City where its local private policy brokers have strategized their financial approaches that fully rely on

local-self-financing without dependent on the state. It is also their policy brokers who manage campaigns to link local coalition in Khon Kaen to dialogue with key policymakers located at the centre of policymaking power. Therefore, existence of coalition policy brokers is key to the success of LRT policymaking.

2) *Political factors*

Political factors are fundamental of LRT policymaking in Chaing Mai, Phuket, and Khon Kaen cities since the LRT is a production of political decision-making. However, the LRT initiatives in Chaing Mai and Phuket are similar because LRT initiatives in those cities are dependent on the state. On the contrary, LRT in Khon Kaen is local-self-reliant which local government takes all responsibilities of LRT development. Therefore, abilities of local coalition to integrate political approaches are critical to the success of LRT policymaking.

As shown in the following table, political factors associated with LRT initiatives in all three cities. However, majority of those political factors associated with LRT policymaking mostly hindered the capacities of local joint efforts to run for LRT policymaking in their cities, but some city—Khon Kaen, is able to take advantages of political approaches to run for their desired policy. Furthermore, local joint efforts in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, and Phuket are also closely connected among local private sectors themselves. But there has been no engagement and commitment from political sector to advocate for LRT policymaking in those cities. Working disparity between political and private sectors in those cities become the cause of absence of political brokers and critically challenging towards LRT policymaking due to those cities have no political representation to deal with relevant opportunities and lack of political backup to support the local-desired LRT project.

Table 21 Political factors and LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket.

Relevant Factors	functional factors Gr=71	LRT-CM Gr=205	LRT-KK Gr=328	LRT-PK Gr=182
political factor Gr=105	14	25	38	18
working disparity between politics-private Gr=13	0	2	2	5
approach to centre of power Gr=39	12	0	35	2

However, political factor is critical conditions towards the success of LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen because their KKTT—as local private policy brokers, has deployed two political approaches to capture interests of the national government including *political dialogues* with policymakers and *city-wide public referendum* organized during the political campaigns of an upcoming national election. These strategies have strengthened political capacities of local coalition in Khon Kaen to leverage and approaching closer to the centre of policymaking power. While abilities to take advantages and deploy political approaches are hardly found in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. Although there had organized local political campaign once in Phuket, that led by the PKCD, to demand the government for urgent development of LRT. But the coalition was unable to influence and capture the interests of those policymakers due to the disparity between local political and private sectors.

This study revealed that politics are critical factor to the achievement of transport policymaking. Although those three cities have no political brokers to exercise their powers to support and advocate for the LRT policymaking. But the cross-case analysis shows that *abilities to integrate political approaches*, such as dialoguing with ministerial executives and organizations of city-wide referendums during national political campaigns for new election, could strengthen political capacities of coalition to successfully set the LRT initiative on national government agenda as in the case of Khon Kaen City. Although local coalition in Khon Kaen City has no political brokers but they are eventually able to gain approval from the national government, allowed them to fully manage the LRT project in Khon Kaen City.

3) *Financial factors*

Another critical factor that largely strengthens capacities of local coalition to advocate for transport policymaking is financial factor. Cross-case analysis of horizontal collaboration in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket revealed that the city with higher financial autonomy is more functional to set their desired policy on national government agendas. In case of Khon Kaen City, the LRT development is financially planned to rely on self-financing approach which investment of LRT is fully funded by financial capacities of local coalition. Therefore, the LRT in Khon Kean City is financially autonomous from the state budget. On the contrary, the LRT projects in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities are state-funded initiatives through the public-private partnership approach. As a result, state financing becomes critical condition to the investment of LRT development in Chiang Mai

and Phuket cities which has been delayed by the government due to the external events of COVID-19 pandemic and limited budget from the government loan spent for economic and public health revitalization after the pandemic.

Table 22 Financial factor and LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities

Relevant Factors	functional factors Gr=71	LRT-CM Gr=205	LRT-KK Gr=328	LRT-PK Gr=182
local financial autonomy Gr=47	8	4	28	10
local self-reliance Gr=17	3	0	15	0
covid-19-external events Gr=12	0	7	2	5
government loan-external events Gr=2	0	2	0	2

Although the LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen has also get affected by the COVID-19, which delayed the loan from international banks and dialoguing process with related ministries. But due to the self-financing reliance for the LRT initiative, the COVID-19 has no critical impacts on policy alternations of the LRT in Khon Kaen. On the contrary, the COVID-19 has largely affected the LRT initiatives in Phuket and Chiang Mai since the government planned to alter those projects into the ART system due to constrained budget of the government which affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The government decided to authorize huge amount of public loans of 1 trillion baht in 2021 and further loan in 2022 of 700 million baht to fight against the COVID-19 in Thailand which resulted in re-examinations of mega transport development plans, which also delayed the progress of LRT in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities.

Therefore, this study shown that self-financing approach of LRT development in Khon Kaen is a critical factor which local coalition deployed to convince and leverage with the national government to authorize their LRT proposal. Since all cost of LRT operations will not be relied on the state budget, the LRT in Khon Kaen is also not fragile to those external events related to financial constraint of the state budget due to the COVID-19 and government loan like those coalitions in Chaing Mai and Phuket cities. Therefore, local financial autonomy to fund the LRT project is an essential factor that strengthen capacities of horizontal coalition in Khon Kaen to successfully set their LRT on government agenda.

4) Collaboration from multiple local alliances

Collaborative actions to run for LRT in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities represented horizontal collaborative policymaking which multiple actors engaged in coalition are locally organised. Cross-case analysis from those cities revealed that engagement from multiple sectors is another critical factor to strengthen capacities of local coalition on run for LRT policymaking. Especially the case of Khon Kaen City where engagement from local government, private sector, civil society, and local universities has been structured in the local coalition to mutually run campaigns for LRT development in their city. Khon Kaen revealed its most viable collaborative actions compared to local collaboration in Chaing Mai and Phuket cities.

According to comparative analysis shown in the following table, local collaborative actions in Phuket is solely relied on the roles of private sector, especially the PKCD, to advocate for LRT policymaking. While there has been an absence of local civil society to engage in their coalition. Similarly, collaborative action in Chiang Mai is also relied on the roles of local private alliances—the CSE and the CMCD, to run for LRT policymaking. Although local civil societies in Chaing Mai are largely active—in environmental and living issues, but the local civil association—the KSS, that run campaigns to advance urban transportation divided themselves from those private coalitions, and their political impact is also limited and unable to influence policy changes due to their occasional activities and loose structure of their organization. Therefore, collaborative actions among local civil society and private sectors in Chiang Mai are fragmented and resulted in weak political influence on their local campaigns for LRT policymaking.

Table 23 Collaboration from multiple sectors for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities.

Relevant Factors	functional factors Gr=71	LRT-CM Gr=205	LRT-KK Gr=328	LRT-PK Gr=182
collaboration from local civic society Gr=18	3	7	10	0
collaboration from local universities Gr=4	0	0	3	0
collaboration from private sector Gr=44	12	13	17	6

local government unity Gr=22	5	0	20	0
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Investigation from the case of Khon Kaen shown its diversity of local partners that are tightly engaged in local joint efforts to run for LRT policymaking. However, the main leading actors that strengthen capacities of local coalition in Khon Kaen City are private alliance—the KKTT, and five municipalities—the KKTS, that mutually committed themselves to run campaigns for the development of LRT in Khon Kaen City. Therefore, city development corporation and municipal corporation are key local institutions that reflects sincere commitment among multiple local partners to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen. Although there are also city development corporations in Chiang Mai and Phuket, but their commitment and potential to advocate for LRT initiatives are limited due to working disparity among local partners. Particularly the case of Chiang Mai where disparity among local private partners is clearly discovered.

Furthermore, two local universities in Khon Kaen—Khon Kaen University and Rajamangala University of Technology Isan Khonkaen Campus, are also actively engaged in collaborative actions to run for LRT policymaking. One of their critical roles is to create complete ecosystem of local railway industry in Khon Kaen City where local universities developed railway engineering curriculums targeted to produce workforces to supply for the LRT services that will be operated in Khon Kaen City. While there has no commitment from local universities in Chiang Mai and Phuket to co-create such a railway industry ecosystem like those universities in Khon Kaen City. Therefore, the co-creation between multiple local sectors have strengthened possibilities and capacities of local joint efforts in Khon Kaen to successfully convince the interests of national government on their LRT policy campaigns.

5) Roles of local government

Another critical factor strengthening capacities of local coalition to advocate for LRT is roles of local government. Khon Kaen is the most advanced intermunicipal collaboration where five municipalities mutually committed to establish the first municipal corporation in Thailand called the Khon Kaen Transit System in 2017 which those five municipalities shared their budget to fund the operations of KKTS. While there are no establishment of this new joint organizations among local governments in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. Further, those five municipalities also organized local movements and public referendum to exercise as their political strategies to capture interests of the national government during the political campaigns for the new election. Therefore, collaboration among local governments in Khon

Kaen to reach the common goals of LRT development is most unified compared to those local governments in Chiang Mai and Phuket, as the detailed in following table.

Table 24 Cross-case analysis of the roles of local government in LRT policymaking

Relevant Factors	functional factors Gr=71	LRT-CM Gr=205	LRT-KK Gr=328	LRT-PK Gr=182
local government unity Gr=22	5	0	20	4
local government unwillingness Gr=12	0	12	0	0

There have been minimum roles of local governments in Phuket City to engage in LRT policymaking, but their roles considered as a participant not a leader of local coalition like those municipalities in Khon Kaen City. The Phuket Provincial Administrative Organization (PPAO) has engaged in the local movement which led by the PKCD, to declare local demand of LRT to the government. The PPAO shown its participatory roles in local joint efforts to run for LRT policymaking, but there is no further commitment to drive the coalition forwards. As well as the Phuket City Municipality, which supports those local campaigns, but no intentions to lead and manage local coalition. However, those local governments in Phuket also incorporate with private alliance who leads the campaigns for proposing Phuket to be the host city of Specialised World Expo in 2028. This event is the key trigger to capture interests of the national government to invest in LRT and other urban transport services in Phuket. Therefore, local governments in Phuket are unwilling to lead the coalition, but they are welcome to support and incorporate those local private alliance as a secondary organization to advocate for the LRT policymaking.

This investigation found no significant roles of local governments in Chiang Mai to lead and manage local joint efforts for LRT policymaking. Furthermore, this study revealed that those local governments are unwilling to take critical parts and responsibilities for LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai because they considered that the LRT is enormous burden for them. Therefore, the commitment from local governments to lead and strategize local joint efforts advocated for LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai is barely found. Compared to Khon Kaen and Phuket cites, the roles of local government in Chaing Mai to involve in LRT policymaking is smallest. While Khon Kaen is only the city that distinctly revealed advanced capacities and leading responsibilities of local governments to run for LRT policymaking.

6) *Unity of local coalition*

Unity among local partners is critical part of functional horizontal collaborative actions. Investigation from this study revealed that local coalition in Khon Kaen City is most united compared to those coalitions in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. Especially the unity among local governments and private sector—KKTT and KKTS, who fundamentally manage coalition strategies to set LRT on government agenda with its city-wide backup from local civil societies in Khon Kaen. While local coalitions in Ching Mai and Phuket is less unified due to the disparity between their associates as the detailed in following table.

Table 25 Cross-case analysis of local coalition unity in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities

Relevant Factors	functional factors Gr=71	LRT-CM Gr=205	LRT-KK Gr=328	LRT-PK Gr=182
local coalition unity Gr=30	7	4	21	3
working disparity between government-private Gr=13	0	0	0	9
working disparity between local private sector Gr=12	0	9	0	0
working disparity between politics-private Gr=13	0	2	2	5

The result of cross-case analysis of horizontal policymaking in Chaing Mai and Phuket revealed working disparity between its local partners. In Ching Mai, the working disparity between local private sector is distinct because the CMCD has faded their leading roles to campaign for LRT development in Chiang Mai because of the conflict between local private and urban elite policymakers related to re-organization of local red truck transport system. While in Phuket, there has been an issue of working disparity between local private sector—PKCD, and provincial transport office related to authorization of new city bus transit routes. Negotiations for years, the authorization of those new city bus routes still has not been finalized. Leaving the working disparity among those two local sectors weaken capacities to form local joint efforts advocated for LRT and improve other transport projects.

Investigation of local joint efforts in Khon Kaen revealed its local coalition is most united and no working disparity between local private and public sectors. However, cross-

case analysis revealed that *working disparity between political and private sectors* has been discovered in all horizontal collaborative policymaking of Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities. Due to the lack of political involvement, the local coalitions in these three cities have no political brokers attached to their local joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking. Resulted in the lack of political leverage to handle centralized challenges. However, although in case of Khon Kaen has no political brokers but their private policy brokers are able to deploy political approaches of ministerial dialogues and city-wide civic referendum to strengthen their coalition political leverage. While there is no integration of such political strategies in Chiang Mai and Phuket. Therefore, abilities to integrate opportunities to compensate or strengthen political capacities of local coalition in Khon Kean is critical to the functionality of their local joint efforts to advocate for LRT.

7) Abilities to integrate relevant external events

This study revealed five external events that are relevant to horizontal policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket including: COVID-19, government loan, new government election, PM 2.5 haze pollution, and Specialised World Expo. The COVID-19 is the direct cause of government loan which largely affected the government finance to fund for LRT initiatives in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. Therefore, government loan and budget limitation are key argument of the state to argue for policy alternation of LRT to ART system in Chiang Mai and Phuket. Although COVID-19 pandemic affected all those three cities, but only the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City is durable from financial constraints of the government since the LRT in Khon Kean is local-self-financing. Therefore, the local-self-reliance of local coalition in Khon Kaen is not fragile to those challenging external events.

Table 26 Cross-case analysis of external events relevant to LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities.

Relevant Factors	functional factors Gr=71	LRT-CM Gr=205	LRT-KK Gr=328	LRT-PK Gr=182
covid-19 Gr=12	0	7	2	5
government loan Gr=2	0	2	0	2
new government election Gr=18	2	4	7	7
pm 2.5 Gr=2	0	2	0	0
world expo 2028 Gr=24	2	0	0	24

The new government election is another external event which delay the progress of LRT policymaking in those three cities. National election could both strengthen and weaken capacities of coalition to run for LRT, depend on abilities of local coalition to take advantages from this event. In Khon Kaen, local coalition takes benefits of changing political climate and upcoming national election to drive the LRT and capture interests of the national government. They organized several city-wide referendums which thousands of citizens are mobilized to declare the local demand of LRT in Khon Kaen City. On the contrary, the national election has affected to the delay of LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities due to there were no local joint efforts to take advantages from this political event. Therefore, one similar external event could be advantage or disadvantage to local coalition which is mainly dependent on their abilities to integrate those events into coalition strategies.

Specific external event which is only relevant to LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai City is the PM 2.5 haze pollution. This haze pollution has long been a serious issue for local people in Chiang Mai for decades. Although the PM 2.5 haze pollution is a country-wide problem which will happened during summer season in Thailand. But Chiang Mai has remarkably ranked as the top city in the world that is most polluted with PM 2.5 haze pollution. Therefore, multiple local sectors pay more attention to the haze pollution rather than urban transport problems. As resulted in the lack of involvements from local governments to prioritise on the LRT and the active civil societies are also mostly focused on living and environmental issues. Therefore, the LRT and transport problems in Chiang Mai are considered less urgent than the PM 2.5 haze pollution.

In Phuket, the Specialised World Expo is critical external event that is very relevant to LRT policymaking. Local coalition has run campaigns to promote Phuket as a candidate for being a host city of the Specialised World Expo which will be organized in 2028. Investigation from local joint efforts in Phuket revealed that the local private alliance has taken advantages from this external event to advocate for the development of LRT in Phuket City. Members of PKCD, Phuket Chamber of Commerce, and local officials also asserted that the Specialized World Expo will be the key opportunity to implement the LRT and other urban transport development in Phuket so that the city could handle with massive amounts of visitors joining the World Expo event. Therefore, local private alliance has managed the campaigns to gain support from the government for being selected as the host city of the


Specialised World Expo in 2028 not only for the economic growth of the city but also as their strategy to advance LRT and other urban transport services.

In summary, cross-case analysis of the external events related to LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket revealed that external events could strengthen and hinder the capacities of horizontal policymaking which is much dependent on abilities of local coalition to ignore or take advantages from those events external to the coalition. Cross-case analysis revealed that COVID-19, government loan, and the PM 2.5 are external events that hinder capacities of local joint effort to run for LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. While the external event of new government election becomes advantages to local coalition in Khon Kaen City and disadvantages to the progress of LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. Finally, the Specialised World Expo becomes advantageous external event of local coalition to run for LRT policymaking in Phuket City.

Therefore, an assessment of cross-case analysis of horizontal collaborative policymaking to run for LRT in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket demonstrates that Khon Kaen is only successful case to set their LRT initiative on national government agenda. The local collaborative action in Khon Kaen to run for LRT policymaking is more functional than those coalition in Phuket and Chiang Mai cities due to its active roles of local private policy brokers, local-self-financing approach, internal unity of local coalition which actively tighten between municipality, private sector, local universities, civil societies. Furthermore, abilities to take advantage of external events and integrate political approaches reaching to the centre of policymaking power are also critical factor to strengthen capacities of local joint efforts in Khon Kaen City to achieve their LRT policymaking.

The following Sankey diagram revealed that those functional factors discussed above are most associated with the LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City while they are partially connected to collaborative policymaking in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. This study asserted that absence of political and private policy brokers, financial dependence, limited political resources, and fragmented collaborative system are the key factors that weaken capacities of horizontal collaborative policymaking in Chiang Mai and Phuket to run for LRT initiatives. Therefore, the first research question of *why some local collaborative action functions better than others in urban transport policymaking* has been addressed by “*city with higher financial autonomy, political strategies, and internal unity among coalition partners, is more functional than a city with limited and lack of those capacities.*”

Figure 71 Cross-case analysis on horizontal collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities.



9.3.2. Capacities of Vertical Coalition

This part aims to address the second research question: *how does a variety and role of relevant policy actors in vertical and horizontal collaborations impact capacities of those coalitions in urban transport policymaking?* To examine this question, Khon Kaen city is selected as a functional case of horizontal collaborative policymaking to examine with the case of transport policymaking in Bueng Kan which represented as a functional vertical collaborative policymaking. Investigation on roles and influences of associated policy actors in Bueng Kan revealed 2 factors that are relevant to functionalities of vertical collaborative policymaking include: *political brokers and the tripartite approach*. While in case of Khon Kaen reveals 4 factors that are relevant to functionalities of horizontal local collaborative policymaking include: *collaboration from multiple local sectors, roles of private policy broker, political approaches, and unity of local coalition*, as detailed in the following table.

Table 27 Cross-case analysis of horizontal and vertical collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen and Bueng Kan cities

Relevant Factors		Functional Factors Gr=71	LRT-KK Gr=328	MTI-BK Gr=72
Coalitions' Internal Events	absence of local civil society Gr=2	0	0	2
	absence of political policy brokers Gr=46	0	22	0
	approach to centre of power Gr=39	12	35	0
	central resources allocation Gr=4	2	0	3
	collaboration from local civic society Gr=18	3	10	0
	collaboration from local universities Gr=4	0	3	0
	collaboration from private sector Gr=44	12	17	0
	less civic engagement Gr=23	0	0	22
	less private engagement Gr=9	0	0	9
	local coalition unity Gr=30	7	21	0
	local financial autonomy Gr=47	8	28	0

	Relevant Factors	Functional Factors Gr=71	LRT-KK Gr=328	MTI-BK Gr=72
	local government unity Gr=26	5	20	0
	local political brokers Gr=14	11	0	12
	local private policy brokers Gr=111	12	79	0
	local self-reliance Gr=17	3	15	0
	passive civil sector Gr=8	0	0	8
	political factor Gr=105	14	38	23
	public sector unity Gr=3	0	0	3
	strong political-led coalition Gr=11	7	0	9
	tripartite approach Gr=7	4	0	6
	weak roles of private sector-BK Gr=3	0	0	3
	working disparity between bureaucratic and private sectors Gr=13	0	0	4
	working disparity between politics- private Gr=13	0	2	2
External Events	covid-19-external events Gr=12	0	2	0
	government loan-external events Gr=2	0	0	0
	new government election-external events Gr=18	2	7	0
	• functional factors Gr=71	0	42	14

MTI means mega transport initiative.

Gr means groundedness.

Above Table revealed that variety of multiple local partners is less important, or even unnecessary, than its tripartite collaboration and resources of political policy broker in vertical policymaking of Bueng Kan where the city has limited number of local partners associated with its coalition. It is the horizontal policymaking in Khon Kaen that requires collaboration from multiple sectors to advocate for LRT policymaking where the roles of

local private policy brokers have largely strengthened capacities of local joint efforts to manage with those challenging political factors .

9.3.2.1) Variety of engaged partners in horizontal collaboration

Cross-case analysis from the collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen and Bueng Kan revealed different arrangements and scales of actors engaged in each type of coalition to run for mega transport policymaking. As a horizontal model of policymaking, local coalition in Khon Kaen City structured with multiple sectors and large scale of actors associated in their joint efforts. The local coalition in Khon Kaen City includes local government union—KKTS, local private alliance—KKTT, local universities—Khon Kaen University and Rajamangala University of Technology Isan Khonkaen Campus, and local civil societies—the Khon Kaen Future Decades Foundation (KKFDF) and Khon Kaen Citizen Council (KKCC) which includes more than 150 community organizations. Those diversified local partners differently functioned to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City.

The role of KKTS, which is mutually formed by five municipalities, is clear that those local governments are central organization directly responsible for LRT development in Khon Kaen City. All regulation and management of LRT initiative are under authorities of the KKTS. The KKTS regarded as strategic organizational approach of local coalition to achieve their common goal of proposing the LRT as a municipal-own initiative, not central-own project likes those LRTs in Bangkok. Therefore, local coalition in Khon Kaen takes benefits of the regulation gap and run their plan to establish municipal corporation to take over the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City. Therefore, the KKTS is key strategic approach of local coalition to broker with national government for the local-self management of the LRT project.

The KKTT is another key alliance of local coalition in Khon Kaen City because they are policy brokers who manage political and financial strategies to advocate for LRT policymaking. The KKTT has mobilized their resources and networks from local, national, and international alliances to strengthen their strategies of LRT policymaking. They have mobilized the funds from local private sector to fund operations of the KKTT and run multiple campaigns for LRT policymaking. The KKTT also organized political strategies to approach the centre of policymaking power and integrated political events to facilitate LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City such as ministerial dialogue and biggest city-wide

referendums during political campaigns for election. Furthermore, the KKTT is the main actor who strategize financing approach of LRT development to be locally self-reliance without dependence on state finance and convince their international business networks to fund for the LRT development instead of using state budget. Therefore, self-financing is a convincing approach that the KKTT deployed to induce the national government for the authorization of LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City.

Local university is also another key driving sector of LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen City. This study reveals that only local university in Khon Kaen has fully engaged in horizontal collaborative policymaking while it rarely founds the roles of local universities in Chiang Mai and Phuket. Khon Kaen University (KKU) and Rajamangala University of Technology Isan Khonkaen Campus (RUTI) are leading universities that scholars and executives support for the LRT development. Those KKTT cofounders are also closely associated with KKU and RUTI because they have several joint projects between KKTT and those universities to develop Khon Kaen as the *city of railway industries*. Although, railway industry is new, and Thailand has limited knowledge or experience about railway industry. The RUTI led by Faculty of Engineering has launched the railway engineering curriculum to support workforce and supply chains prepared to build the complete ecosystem of local railway industry and development of LRT in Khon Kaen city.

Furthermore, the KKTT also connected with their Japanese network which resulted in contribution of the used Japanese tram from Hiroshima Electric Railway Company to use for research and development at the Railway System Laboratory and Full-Size Prototype Project which co-founded between KKTT, KKTS, and the RUTI. The used tram contribution from Japan has capture interests of people nation-wide, due to the real tram system has not existed in anywhere outside the Bangkok Metropolitan. But Khon Kaen is the first city to make the tram system existed for research and development. It is also a sign to the government that local coalition is ready and seriously committed to advocate for the development of LRT. Therefore, collaboration from local universities is another key driving sector to convince the government for authorization of LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City.

Another key partner of local coalition in Khon Kane is local civil societies. Although, local government, private alliance, and academic sector have abilities to advance the LRT system, but without engagement from local citizen the LRT project will not be viable. The critical roles of local civil societies—the KKDFD and KKCC, is to legitimate the roles and

responsibilities of KKTT and KKTS to run for the local desire of LRT development. As such, those civil societies have incorporated with the KKTT and KKTS and mobilized their networks to run local referendums and declare their support and the local demand of LRT initiative. Their roles and events are largely critical during the political campaigns for national election since the city-wide referendum could capture interests of the government during the election campaign.

LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen has faced multiple challenges from the central authorities but the unity among multiple partners associated in the local coalition has strengthen the capacities of their joint efforts to achieve the policymaking of LRT. Therefore, multiplicity of local sectors is not only one of the key attributes that represent horizontal collaborative policymaking but the unity among them is also the *key driving factor* to the success of transport policymaking. Because the policymaking of mega transport initiative in Thailand is highly centralized and associated with enormous benefits. Therefore, local coalition advocates for transport policymaking are needed to be unified and diversified. Compared to those unfunctional horizontal collaboration in Phuket and Chain Mai, this study argued that *multiplicity and unity of local partners are necessary to functionality and success of horizontal collaborative policymaking to advocate for transport policies.*

9.3.2.2) Roles and resources of policy brokers in vertical collaboration

Classification of two collaborative policymaking models in this study revealed that multiplicity of engaged actor functions variously in each different model. Cross-case analysis between horizontal and vertical models of transport policymaking in Khon Kaen and Bueng Kan elaborates that *multiplicity of partner is less critical in vertical collaborative policymaking.* Local partners associated with coalition in Bueng Kan is limited to the “*tripartite approach*” which political, bureaucratic, and civil sectors are tied together to advocate for mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan. While local private sector is weak and has no attempt to formulate their alliance to advance the growth of the city.

Although local coalition in Bueng Kan has limited partners but their joint effort among tripartite partners is highly functional to set mega transport policies on the government agenda due to the roles and resources of its political policy broker. Bueng Kan has no city development corporation, municipal company, active university, and civil societies which are deemed as critical factors to functionality of local coalition to advocate for transport policymaking in Khon Kaen City. However, key driving factor which critically

facilitates joint efforts in Bueng Kan is political policy broker—Mr. L and his resources, who is now the Deputy Minister of Interior and the Vice Executive of Bhumjaithai Party (BP). The BP is considered as the most powerful government coalition party due to their political candidates are critical proportion to those political parties who would like to form the government. Therefore, Mr. L and his political resources are critical factor to transport policymaking in Bueng Kan.

Furthermore, after trying to take Bueng Kan as political base for years, his wife eventually won the PAO election in 2020 and now positioned as the Chief Executive of Bueng Kan Provincial Administrative Organization (BKPAO). Therefore, Mr. L and his political networks are influential to both national and regional levels. Furthermore, executives of regional public authorities who closely associated with Mr. L are also rotated to Bueng Kan, to get higher positions and run collaborative efforts to implement mega transport development. Therefore, the unity among political and bureaucratic sectors—whether regional or local governments, is highly united and attached to political coalition of Bhumjaithai Party (BP) which led by Mr. L and his local political alliance in Bueng Kan.

Local private and civil sectors are less active to collaborative policymaking in Bueng Kan. Further, conflicts between local private and political sectors also resulted in an absence of private alliance to engage in the tripartite collaboration in Bueng Kan. Therefore, vertical collaborative policymaking in Bueng Kan is most relied on tripartite collaboration between political, bureaucratic, and civil sectors. Although, the participation of civil sector is attached to the tripartite approach, but their roles are considered as a passive citizen. Investigation in the case of Bueng Kan asserted that local citizen wants those mega transport infrastructures, but their roles are inactive, and their participation is constrained by economic conditions due to majority of citizen located in agriculture industry. Normally, civil engagement will be organized by political and public sectors to gain the legitimacy from citizens related to the development and policymaking of those mega transport initiatives. Therefore, participation from civil sector—although limited and inactive, is still the key condition for political approach of vertical collaboration to achieve their policymaking.

Mr. L, as a key political policy broker, has represented local coalition of Bueng Kan to handle with associated political events and opportunities at the centre of policymaking power. His political associates from the BP are also positioned as Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Transportation. Therefore, Mr. L has exercised his political resources to broker

for mega transport initiatives in Bung Kan, without any critical challenging issues. Legitimacy from citizen is only one condition to drive those policies, which local people in Bueng Kan already declared their support and legitimated those roles of political policy broker to advocate for transport policymaking.

Cross-case investigations related to multiplicity of partners associated with local coalition to advocate for transport policymaking in Bueng Kaen and Khon Kaen cities founded that *capacities of vertical collaborative policymaking are not related to multiplicity of partners, but it highly associated with political brokers and resources of those brokers to access the centre of policymaking power*. As reflected in the case of Bueng Kan where its political policy broker is closely associated to the centre of policymaking. While local coalition in Khon Kaen has gathered joint efforts from local multiple sectors to deploy several political approaches to capture interests of national government and reaching to the centre of policymaking power. As such, capacities of vertical coalition in Bueng Kan are not dependent on multiplicity of associated partners, but roles and resources of policy brokers. Therefore, cross-case analysis of Bueng Kan and Khon Kaen has verified the second assumption of this study that: *“a variety of local partners is highly critical for a horizontal collaborative policymaking. While in vertical collaboration, a multiplicity of partners is less critical than resources that policy brokers processed or accessed to set transport policy on agenda.”*

9.3.3. Policy Brokers

Results of cross-case analysis revealed that policy brokers are one of those critical factors to the success of vertical and horizontal collaborative policymaking. Vertical collaborative policymaking in Bueng Kan clearly revealed that **“political policy broker”** is key actor to the success of mega transport policymaking. Although the city has no collaborative efforts from private sector and limited engagement from local sectors, but political policy broker in Bueng Kan has managed the coalition strategies to successfully set those transport initiatives on national government agenda. While those horizontal efforts to run for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket revealed that functionalities of local coalition rely much on the **“private policy broker”** who invest their efforts and resources to run strategies to achieve policymaking. In cases of Khon Kaen and Phuket, they both are clear that the coalitions are equipped with private policy brokers—KKT and PKCD. However, abilities and resources of private policy brokers in Phuket to integrate political approaches are weaker than Khon Kaen City. Although they are both

absence with political policy brokers and no engagement from political sector, but private policy brokers of local coalition in Khon Kaen are able to deploy political strategies reaching into the centre of policymaking power. Therefore, the LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen is more successful than the case of Phuket City. While in Chiang Mai, local coalition has no both political and private policy brokers to manage strategies for LRT policymaking. Resulted in its most weak collaborative system compared to those horizontal joint efforts in Khon Kaen and Phuket cities.

Application of the policy brokers analysis designed by this study can clarify how policy brokers are critical to functionality of advocacy coalition and why those policy brokers come to engage in vertical and horizontal collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, Phuket, and Bueng Kan cities. Therefore, the beginning of this section will present the findings from those selected case studies to clarify how policy brokers can strengthen capacities of vertical and horizontal coalitions to advocate for transport policymaking. The final part of this section also explains why policy brokers invested their efforts and resources to advocate for policymaking of those transport initiatives.

9.3.3.1) How policy brokers are important to policy advocacy coalition

Results from this study shown two types of policy brokers which are *political and private policy brokers*. Political policy brokers associated with vertical collaborative policymaking in Bueng Kan City while private policy brokers allied with horizontal collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket. Investigations from those functional collaborative coalitions in Khon Kaen and Bueng Kan shown that policy brokers—whether private or political brokers, usually take leading roles and manage local coalition to broker for their desired policies. Therefore, capacities of policy brokers are much rely on *sources of their power* that used to leverage at the centre of policymaking power. This part aims to clarify how functions of policy brokers are critical to the success and failure of a particular policy advocacy coalition investigated from those four case studies.

(1) Roles of Policy Brokers in Successful Coalitions

The roles of policy brokers are very critical to the success of LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen. Although the ACF assumes that policy changes or the success of coalition to advocate for certain policy is a result from the adjustment of policy belief. However, the limitation of ACF is its incapability to identify how those beliefs are adjusted and by who. The research framework of policy brokers analysis applied to investigate empirical case in

Khon Kaen argued that policy brokers are critical actors who manage and alter “*secondary belief*” of local coalition in Khon Kaen which eventually achieved their LRT policymaking in 2016 over a decade of their joint efforts to advocate for LRT.

The LRT proposal has been officially proposed to the government since 2005 but the government rejected the proposal several times. As a novel coalition to the transport policy subsystem, local coalition in Khon Ken has encountered multiple challenges from the dominant coalition—Ministry of Transportation (MOT) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Because the LRT proposed by local coalition in Khon Kaen is planned to be fully managed by municipality and it has never existed in the history of Thailand that the municipality is authorized to manage the LRT duty. But, five municipalities in Khon Kaen have jointly mobilized efforts and resources to establish Thailand’s first municipal corporation in 2017—the KKTS, to responsible for the LRT duties. However, the proposal to establish the KKTT was also hindered by the dominant coalition—the MOI, because once Khon Kaen City is able to establish the KKTS, another city will follow the experiences of Khon Kaen to establish another type of municipal corporation too, which means the MOI and other central agencies will lost their duties. As such legal and administrative issues have been challenged by those dominant coalitions.

Policy brokers—KKTT, in Khon Kaen have largely influenced the success of the establishment of the KKTS. It is the policy brokers who strategies and guide those five municipalities in Khon Kaen to establish a municipal corporation—KKTS, as an institutional tools to take the benefits from the gap of the Municipal Law that allows municipality to form the municipal corporation—based on inter-municipality collaboration, to address local problems that a single municipality is unable to achieve. The only condition is that those inter-municipal collaborations to establish the municipal corporation need approval from the MOI. Therefore, the municipal corporation and the LRT duties which have long been centralized by the dominant coalition—MOT and MOI, have been challenged by the novel coalition from Khon Kaen City.

As a novel coalition and the first city to propose a municipal-owned LRT initiative, the initial stage of policy advocacy for this proposal by the local coalition in Khon Kaen was very exhausted. The original plan to launch the LRT project in Khon Kaen begun in 1993. However, this plan was halted due to the reform of railway authorities which transform the railway duty from the EAT to MRTA in 1993. An attempt to relaunch the LRT has been

triggered again led by the local private alliance in 2005. It is those private owners who joint established the KKTT in 2015 to run campaigns advocated for the LRT in Khon Kaen City. However, the LRT proposal has been revised several times and encountered multiple legal challenges from the dominant coalition, especially the LRT legal issues associated with the MOT and the public land use associated with the Ministry of Finance (MOF).

The main revision of this LRT proposal in Khon Kaen could be divided into three versions: LRT proposals in 2005, 2015, and 2016. This study found the roles and resources of policy brokers are key factors in unraveling challenges from the dominant coalition and eventually achieving the LRT policymaking. Policy brokers—KKTS, in Khon Kean are critical to the success of LRT policymaking in two ways: roles in managing the secondary belief and integrating external events. ACF portrays a three-tiers belief system including deep-core, policy core, and secondary beliefs. However, the deep core is difficult to change while policy core belief could be change but take a decade, and secondary belief is most susceptible to change which ACF clarifies that policy usually influenced by the coalition's alternation of secondary belief. The following points show how those beliefs are applied to the case of LRT policymaking Khon Kaen:

(1) *deep-core belief* reflected in this situation is a common philosophy or collective ground of associated partners in the local coalition who want to advance transport services and improve their hometown city because they have suffered from poor transport services for decades.

(2) *policy core belief* reflects policy positions which the local coalition in Khon Kaen is the first regional city in Thailand to propose a municipal-own LRT as their policy core belief to the government. This reflects their policy position that municipality and local advocacy coalition really wanted the LRT which should be fully managed by the municipal corporation, not the MOT. Although they have been challenged and convinced by those dominant coalitions that it would be more convenient if the LRT be managed by the dominant coalition. Still, local coalition in Khon Kaen keeps the policy core belief or their policy position stable and seeks the ways to advance their policy position to be eventually authorized by the government, particularly through the instrumental secondary belief.

(3) *secondary belief* reflects instruments or strategies that the coalition deployed to advocate for LRT in Khon Kaen. The most critical role of policy broker

in Khon Kaen is located at their influence on coalition's secondary belief. It is the KKTS who manage coalition's secondary belief and deployed a financial strategy to reach acceptable solution with the government for the development of LRT in Khon Kaen. LRT in Khon Kaen is planned to be fully self-financed by the capacities of the local coalition, which means the LRT project in Khon Kaen will not rely on funding from the state finance. LRT development is categorized as a mega project and the government needs to invest a huge budget to construct and manage the LRT system. Therefore, local-self finance strategy is the key approach, directed by those policy brokers, to leverage and convene with the central government to approve the LRT plan proposed by local coalition in Khon Ken. Although the state's financial constraint has been an excuse for refusal of dominant coalition to let the LRT be fully managed by municipality, but the local-self-financing strategy has strengthened capacities of local coalition in Khon Kaen to successfully advocate for the LRT and get approval from the government in 2016 to materialize the project in the further steps.

The second role of policy brokers in Khon Kaen is their ability to integrate external events to strengthen capacities and facilitate the coalition's point of power to get closer to the center of policymaking. As found in cross-case analysis, all horizontal coalitions have no engagement from the political sector resulting in an absence of political policy brokers to handle the challenges from the political arena. Further, transport policy is also mainly centralized to the state, which requires a large degree of political power. Therefore, the local coalition advocated for LRT policy with no political power would produce little real change or eventually unable to produce policy outcome. However, although the local coalition in Khon Kaen has disengaged from political sector and no political policy brokers, but the private policy brokers are able to integrate external events to deploy political strategies approaching to the center of power.

Those political strategies include two approaches: *ministerial dialoguing and city-wide referendum*. As the LRT plan has been rejected and revised several times challenged by the dominant coalition, policy brokers in Khon Kaen have learned that if they rely only on the same approach it would produce only similar result which means the LRT proposal will be delayed further reject. As such, policy brokers have altered their coalition strategies by taking advantages from the existing external events of an upcoming national election through the organization of the city-wide referendums to captures the interest of central

government and massive support from local citizen. Another political approach which highly influence the decision on LRT policy in Khon Kaen is the ministerial dialogue which policy brokers organized the dialogues to advocate for municipal-own LRT with the military government including the vice prime minister, associated ministers of MOI and MOT, and executives from central agencies of dominant coalition. The dialogue has been organized more than 19 times directed by the policy brokers who invest much efforts to take advantage from this event to advocate for LRT in Khon Kaen. The ministerial dialogue has strengthened capacities of local coalition from Khon Kaen to interact and get closer to the center of policymaking power while this study found no evidence or abilities of private policy brokers in Phuket and Chaing Mai to deploy such political strategies. As a result, local coalitions in Phuket and Chiang Mai are able to get into the center of policymaking power and unbalance to set LRT on agenda. Therefore, the ability of policy brokers to integrate external events is key factor to the success of transport policymaking.

In Bueng Kan, local coalition is most relied on the roles and resources of political policy brokers whose political network and power are highly critical to the success of transport policymaking in the city. Cross-case analysis between Khon Kaen and Bueng Kan has revealed that collaborative efforts in Bueng Kan is less associated with private alliance due to their working disparity between local political and private sectors. As a result, coalition in Bueng Kan has no private policy brokers and disengagement from local private sector. This study found that the rise of certain types of policy brokers dissolved interests of another type of policy brokers to engaged in the coalition. As indicated in all four cases studies where working disparity between political and private sectors is clearly revealed. This means the more absence of political actor the more power of local private alliance to manage coalitions—as in Khon Kaen, Phuket, and Chiang Mai. The same way token, the more absence of private alliance the more power of political actors to manage coalition—as in the case of Bueng Kan.

As the city has no horizontal efforts, political policy brokers have enjoyed exercising their network and resources to manage coalition's secondary belief advocate for transport policymaking at national and local levels. The secondary belief of local coalition in Bueng Kan is their political-led tripartite collaboration among political, bureaucratic, and civic sectors. As such, critical role of political policy broker is to assure that their roles and those targeted transport initiatives are legitimized by the majority of local citizens. Although, the tripartite coalition has no engagement from private sector, but only legitimacy and mutual

consensus from local citizens are focal condition for political policy brokers to deploy as key leverage to advocate for their desired policy. Therefore, roles of political policy broker in Bueng Kan are not only critical to the translation of coalition's policy core beliefs, but also the roles in managing coalition's secondary belief to influence decision makers and handle with multiple challenges at the center of policymaking power.

Furthermore, the triumph of political party associated with political policy brokers from national and local elections in Bueng Kan has clearly revealed that election is key critical external events that political policy brokers take advantages from those national and local elections to stabilize their political capacity and advance coalition's point of power within the policy subsystem to reach the center of policymaking power. Therefore, events associated with national and local politics are key external events that relevant to capacity and stability of local coalition in Bueng Kan which its political policy brokers are able to handle effectively with political challenges due to their political party—Bhumjaithai Party, nation-wide regarded as most powerful government coalition party in recent political situation in Thailand.

Therefore, application of the ACF and policy brokers analysis framework to investigate cross-case analysis from this study reveals policy brokers are critical condition for the successful coalition to advocate in transport policymaking. Especially, the focal roles of policy brokers in managing coalition's secondary belief and modifying external events strengthening capacities of local coalition to reach the center of policymaking power. This study found that the coalition's point of power getting closer to the policymaking center, the better chances to achieve policymaking. Abilities of coalitions to get closer to the policymaking centre rely largely on roles and resources of policy brokers. Therefore, capacity of policy brokers to manage coalition strategies and integrate relevant external events is key to the success of advocacy coalition in transport policy subsystem.

(2) Roles of Policy Brokers in Unsuccessful Coalitions

Local coalitions in Phuket and Chiang Mai are classified as unsuccessful coalitions because those coalitions are unable to influence the government to authorize the LRT proposal to be launched in their cities. Application of ACF and policy brokers analysis framework in this study reveals that limited capacities of private policy brokers in those cities are critical factor to unsuccess of those advocacy coalitions in Phuket and Chiang Mai

cities. Particularly limited capacities of private policy brokers to manage coalition's secondary belief and inability to integrate relevant external events.

In Phuket, although private policy brokers—PKCD, have high financial capacity as reflected through huge amount of budget that mutually shared among local partners but those private policy brokers are unable to apply suitable secondary beliefs to leverage with the government. However, the problem comes from their *coalition's policy core belief* which the LRT position in Phuket is planned to rely on the state finance through the public-private partnership investment. As a result, the way to translate this policy core belief into action is to rely on state finance. The point is those private policy brokers are unable to apply suitable secondary belief—or coalition strategies, to advocate for the LRT proposal. If they are able to modify their coalition's financial strategy from state-reliant to local-self-reliant financing, like local coalition in Khon Kaen, it would strengthen capacities of those private policy brokers and local coalition to leverage and advocate for LRT initiative at the center of policymaking power.

As reported in the single and cross case analysis of Phuket, the major excuse of the government related to the delay and plan to alter the LRT project in Phuket is mainly dependent on the state's financial constraint, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, private policy brokers in Phuket have no alternative strategies to handle this challenge. They deployed no political strategies such as dialogues with the dominant coalition—the MOT, and no evidence of their attempts to change coalition's secondary belief—financial strategy. These events are contradictory to the case of Khon Kaen where private policy brokers deployed multiple ministerial dialogues and managed financial strategies to seek acceptable solutions and eventually achieved the LRT policymaking. Therefore, this study reveals that limited capacities of private policy brokers to manage and modify secondary beliefs—coalition's financial strategy, is the main cause towards the unsuccess of local coalition to advocate for LRT in Phuket.

Another cause of unsuccessful policy advocacy in Phuket is the inability of private policy brokers to integrate external events influencing the government to highlight the local demand for the LRT. One critical external event is the national election. This study found that one similar external event could both strengthen or hinder the capacity of coalition to advocate for their policy, which depends largely on abilities of coalition whether they are able to take advantages from this external event or not. The external event of national

election was taken advantage by local coalition in Khon Kaen directed by those private policy brokers who organized the largest city-wide referendum to capture the interest of the government on local demand during the political campaigns for the upcoming election. On the contrary, there was no such a political strategy to take advantages from this external event in Phuket. Therefore, the external event of national election is meaningless to advocacy coalition in Phuket, but it is meaningful to those local coalitions in Khon Kaen.

Although there is evidence of the attempt from local private policy brokers in Phuket to take advantage from the external events of the Specialized World Expo 2028 which those local coalitions attempt to promote Phuket as candidate for being the host city to organize the Specialized World Expo in 2028. Local coalitions in Phuket assured that this world-renowned event is the most possible chance to implement the LRT system because if Phuket City was selected as the city host for this event, public infrastructures and urban transport services will be inclusively advanced, including the LRT system. However, the influence of local coalition to take advantage from this event is limited due to the lack of political support. As a result, Phuket was not chosen to be the city host of the Specialized World Expo, Serbia was chosen. Therefore, there are now no existing external events that could be taken advantages to further advocate for the LRT in Phuket City.

Similarly, the local coalition in Chiang Mai is unsuccessful in advocating for LRT because of an absence of policy brokers. The roles of private policy brokers—the CMCD, were largely active once before the coalitions had working disparity issues between those policy brokers and urban policymaker elites—private and high-profile university lecture, who seek to use the CMCD as an agent to reform the local micro-transportation or on-demand red truck transport service. But the distrust issues have been discovered due to the CMCD being aware that the reform of red truck micro-transport services might lead to serious legal and political problems. Those local private elites also seek to replace the local red truck services with their business of the smart city bus system. As such, the CMCD has recognized that they were being manipulated by those urban elite policymakers. As a result, the CMCD has been fading their roles away from being policy brokers of local coalition.

The CMCD was originally targeted to be the central organization to advocate for LRT in Chiang Mai City and their local private partners have jointly shared budget of seven million baht to fund for operations of the CMCD to advocate for LRT in Chiang Mai. However, the working disparity between local private sector and distrust issues have led the

CMCD faded their brokering roles away from the coalition. Recently, the local coalition in Chiang Mai has no policy brokers to translate and manage coalition's policy-core and secondary beliefs. As a result, capacities of local coalition in Chiang Mai are most weak compared to other horizontal coalitions in Khon Kaen and Phuket. Eventually, the LRT in Chiang Mai has not been finalized and most fragile to challenges from the external events.

Findings from cross-case analysis in this study have shown that the ACF is a useful framework to clarify how internal modification of coalition's belief and external events influence the success and failure of policy advocacy coalition. The policy brokers analysis framework deployed by this study also clarifies how roles of policy brokers are critical to the functions of belief modification and integration of existing events to strengthen capacities of coalition to advocate for transport policy. This study argues that one similar external event might be meaningless or meaningful to certain coalitions depending on abilities of policy brokers to grasp those events to strengthen their coalition capacities.

9.3.3.2) Brokering for what?

Advocacy coalition framework assumes that people engaged in politics to translate their beliefs into actions, or policies (Cairney, 2015: 485-486). Policy brokers invested their efforts and resources to run for policymaking with hopes to gain something in returns for what they have invested. That is the reason why policy brokers involve, invest, and offer their resources to run for a particular policy. This study founded that private and political policy brokers in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, Phuket, and Bueng Kan have invested their times, efforts, and resources to run for mega transport policymaking with hopes to get somethings for returns in the future.

(1) Private Policy Brokers and Their Future Returns

This study revealed that city development corporations in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket are *private policy brokers* who have been increasingly enlarged their roles to direct urban policymaking associated to their expertise and interests. The emergence of city development corporation begins in Khon Kaen City where the first city development corporation in Thailand has been established so called the "*Khon Kaen Think Tank: KKTT*," which local business elites mutually invested their money and mobilized networks to run joint efforts advocated for LRT policymaking. Altogether with a private-inspired municipal corporation—*Khon Kaen Transit System (KKTS)*, which is institutional approach strategized by the KKTT to facilitate the self-financing strategy of the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen.

The KKTT, as a policy broker, has run multiple efforts to achieve LRT policymaking including financial strategy, political approach, dialoguing, and international collaboration with their business networks. This study founded that the KKTT has devoted themselves to run for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen with hopes for the future gains. Those returns include four agendas: *(1) urban growth and business gain, (2) taking over the investment of mega transport infrastructure development, (3) dominating regional urban transport industries, and (4) directing national agendas associated with enlargement of the roles of city development corporations in urban policymaking and local governance.*

First, the KKTT has always claimed that joint efforts run by local business elites are meant to address urban transport issues and promote economic growth and opportunities to the city. It is true that development of LRT would generate urban growth and economic prosperity to the city. But whose interests are beneficial the most is those cofounders of the KKTT. Majority of cofounders in KKTT is local business elites who run real estate companies, housing businesses, and transportation industry. Therefore, the development of LRT system in Khon Kaen City will largely benefit their businesses. Although, the KKTT claimed that their engagement in local joint effort is not for profits, but hidden agenda associated with LRT development is clearly shown what their business get in returns from urban growth and investment of the LRT.

Second, evidence clearly shows that efforts of the KKTT to run for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen because they planned to take over the investment of LRT development in Khon Kaen City. The KKTT strategized the LRT investment in Khon Kaen to be fully local-self-financing in which all funding will rely on abilities of local coalition to mobilize the fund for the construction of LRT. The local-self-financing model is key strategic approach that the KKTT channelled for themselves to promote their roles into urban planning and become investor of LRT. Major source of finance for LRT construction comes from international loan which managed by leader of the KKTT and their Chinese business alliance—CKKM and CRRC, who won the bidding process of the KKTS for being an investor of LRT in Khon Kaen. The consortium between CKKM and CRRC led by Cho Thawee Company and its business alliance—which own by one of KKTT cofounders, incorporated with the CRRC Nanjing Puzhen Co.,Ltd and Singapore CRRC Puzhen Railway Vehicles Service Pte. Ltd. Therefore, the KKTT invested their efforts and resources to advocate for LRT policymaking is because of their hopes for future gain of becoming the investor and constructor of LRT development in Khon Kaen City.

Figure 72 Singing Ceremony of Memorandum of Agreement between KKTS and LRT investors



Photo source: Korat Daily (2021)

Third, this study found that the roles of KKTT is closely associated with those private policy brokers in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. The leader of KKTT has firmly developed joint efforts with local business alliance and planned to dominate urban transport services in other regional core cities across Thailand. In case of Phuket, the KKTT takes part as a key company shareholder of the PKCD, listed no. 21 of shareholder board. PKCD is the main

policy broker to run for LRT policymaking and the Phuket Smart Bus—which inspired by the KKTT’s city bus in Khon Kaen. Therefore, as a private policy broker and shareholder of the PKCD, the KKTT has attempted to enlarge their roles to dominate and take benefits of urban transport policymaking in other regional core cities.

Figure 73 KKTT listed as a company shareholder of the PKCD.

Lists of Shareholders

1.คุณสมบัด อติเศรษฐี	2.คุณบรรณิศ ดันติพิริยะกิจ	3.คุณประมุขพิสิฐ อัจฉริยะฉาย	4.คุณกาน ประชุมพรรณ
5.คุณไทรธรม สันตธรรณพ	6.คุณวิจิตร ณ ระนอง	7.คุณรุ่งรงค์ งานทวี	8.คุณนิพนธ์ เอกวานิช
9.คุณมนตรีศักดิ์ คงษ์หยก	10.คุณวัชร จารุชยานนท์	11.นายบุญ ยงสกุล	12.คุณบุษภัทร พึ่งเดช
13. คุณพัชรนันท์ พัทธวีณา	14.คุณสุรชัย ชัยวัฒน์	15.คุณเบราพงษ์ จุฬิตฤกษ์	16.คุณชรินทร์กัศ ปิ่นนฤต
17.คุณสุริส บัณฑอง	18.คุณสุขเกษมสิงห์ เศรษฐี	19.คุณวิหิตร์ แซ่เต็ง	20.คุณกฤษฏา ดันสกุล
21. Mr. S-KK คุณ Khon Kaen Think Tank (KKTT) จำกัด	22.คุณเดชาธร กุ้อัครวุฒ	23.คุณสุระ ตาบุญ	24. คุณเจษฎ์จันทร์ ลิ้มรัตนเมธา
25.คุณกุลลาภา ทาวรุ่งวงศ์	26.คุณวิกรม ภูโธเลิศ	27. คุณภูไท กองสม	28.คุณเมธา โภทาสกรุภา
29.คุณพรหมมน อุทัยวิรุฬห์	30.คุณจักริน กติญชสิฎา	31.คุณศิริลักษณ์ วัลยะพีช	32.คุณสมพงศ์ สมเนน
33.คุณนิพนธ์ เท็ดวงศ์นิพนธ์	34.คุณวิภากร จุฬิตฤกษ์	35.คุณจางา อติเศรษฐี	36.คุณกฤต เพ็ชรวุฒ
37.คุณกัญญารัตน์ ลิ้มพานนท์	38.คุณศศิษา ลิ้มสกุล	39.คุณอริวัฒน์ บุญรักษา	40.คุณณกรธัญญา พันพักอง
41.คุณวิวัฒน์ ปิติกุลสดีด	42.คุณภยกร ไชยบุตร	43.คุณอภิสรดา กติญชสิฎา	44.คุณกาญจน์ กองใหญ่ บริษัท รักษาความปลอดภัย เฉลิม สิริเมฆ เมฆเมฆ จำกัด
45.คุณสมกฤต ตารรัตน์โรจน์ บริษัท ซี.เอ.เอส.แอสเตท ภูเก็ต จำกัด	46.คุณโยธิน ดำเนินมาบุญมีชัย บริษัท นายกรัฐมนตรีไฮสปีด จำกัด	47.น.ก. เ.ด.ดับบลิว.ที.ดี. เซ็นเตอร์	

Photo source: Phuket City Development Co., Ltd.

The roles of KKTT to dominate regional transport services is clear in Chiang Mai City. This study found that cofounder of the KKTT has allied with Regional Transit Corporation (RTC) who won the bidding to run “*Chiang Mai City Bus (CMCB)*” in 2018, like the city bus service in Khon Kaen and Phuket. The RTC company itself has just been established in 2018 to run city bus service in Chiang Mai City. The owner of the RTC and cofounders of KKTT and PKCD is closely connected to each other since they are in the same association to run city development corporation network in Thailand. Although the RTC won the bidding and get authorization to run the city bus service in Chiang Mai, but the real operator of city bus system is taken by a company of KKTT cofounder—whose company also won bidding for LRT investment in Khon Kaen. Not only in Chiang Mai, but the RTC also operates the city bus in other two regional cities—Nonthaburi and Samut Sakon, in alliance with cofounder of the KKTT. Therefore, involvement of private policy broker—the KKTT, into local coalitions in Phuket and Chiang Mai also indicated critical agenda of those local private policy brokers to dominate urban transport services and policymaking in other regional core cities across Thailand.

Figure 74 Cofounders of KKTT and the CSE joining the opening ceremony of the RTC City Bus in Chiang Mai



Photo source: <https://www.eatingoutmap.com/read/RTC-City-Bus--Application>

Finally, KKTT is the prototype and the first city development corporation in Thailand, followed by the PKCD in Phuket and the CSE and CMCD in Chiang Mai. These private policy brokers—led by the KKTT, have formed their city development alliance to propose the national law that facilitates and enlarges roles of city development corporations to the government. Although there has no progress related to the law proposed by those private policy brokers, but this attempt indicates their agendas to enlarge roles of business elites to influence on urban governance and transport policymaking nationwide.

Private policy brokers in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities are similar related to what they expected in returns for what they have invested to run for LTR policymaking. The PKCD in Phuket and the CMCD in Chiang Mai clearly declared that they both planned to become an investor of LRT development in each city. Therefore, if the LRT be implemented, those private policy brokers will not only benefit from being an investor, but their business will getting more prosper due to advanced mass transit service. However, the roles of those policy brokers in Phuket and Chiang Mai have been weakened by multiple internal and external challenges to run their local joint efforts advocated for LRT policymaking, as discussed in earlier section. Although the roles of those policy brokers in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities revealed their limited and unfunctional capacities to advocate for LRT policymaking, but the framework of policy brokers analysis help us to understand why policy actor invested their times, resources, and efforts to achieve particular policymaking.

Therefore, city development corporations run by those local private policy brokers have gradually enlarged their roles into urban policymaking and directing local public services nationwide. Recently, there are 20 units of city development corporation across the country, but their roles and capabilities to run local joint efforts for city development in each city are diversified. Results from this study asserted that roles and resources of those private policy brokers are critical and helpful for the local government to strengthening their financial and political capacities to advance transport infrastructures in each city. Therefore, emergence of the city development corporation—as an institutional tool of private policy broker, to engage in local governing affairs should be captured and prioritized by the interests of local governments and regional authorities throughout Thailand as a new strategic alternative to advance the city.

(2) *Political Policy Brokers*

This study revealed that political policy broker is critical to the success of mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan which is well-known as a city under the interest of Mr. L, vice executive of the Bhumjaithai Party—an influential coalition government party, who is now the Deputy Minister of Interior. Mr. L and his political resources would be accredited to several mega transport projects being implemented in Bueng Kan City because he has invested his efforts and resources to advocate for those megaprojects at the centre of policymaking power, but for what returns?

Political policy brokers always invest their efforts for future returns. Mr. L has no right to apply to be a candidate in the political election in Bueng Kan because his right is originally located in Buriram City—his hometown. However, the main reason for him to advance those mega transport initiatives is because his wife and family settle in Bueng Kan City. Therefore, his efforts to run for transport infrastructure development in Bueng Kan is to locate a new political base for his wife—who engages in local politics, and his son-in-law—who also engages in national politics as a member of the Bhumjaithai Party in Bueng Kan. Therefore, Mr. L's political agenda to dominate local and national politics in Bueng Kan is a primary justification for his efforts to deploy political resources and network brokering for multiple mega projects implemented in the city.

Bueng Kan is the newest city, which was successfully divided into a new city in March 2011 by the political power of the Bhumjaithai Party. After being promoted to a new city, Bueng Kan organized two national elections in 2011 and 2019 and two local elections of the Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) in 2011 and 2020. However, the Bhumjaithai Party (BP) sought to dominate local and national politics in Bueng Kan City but the BP always lost those national and PAO elections to their opposition—Pheu Thai Party (PTP). Not until 2020, the BP eventually overthrow its opposition party—PTP, in the 2020 PAO election. Since then, Mr. L and his local networks have settled their political base and dominated national and local politics in Bueng Kan City till now. What verified those returns for political efforts of Mr. L, as a political policy broker, is a reflection of his interview, which clearly said that:

“politics is key to drive citizen needs... people have to understand the political influence on development (source code: 291:1 ¶ 31)... I think Bueng Kan today, people are being understood about the relationship

between politics and development, how politics facilitates the development of the city and drives growth to their home town in Bueng Kan. As reflected by the political triumph of PAO's election (of his wife) in 2020 which overthrew the former candidate and gain massive votes from local people... Since then, many megaprojects have been implemented... and people recognized that election is about vote for a candidate who could make the real change to the city (source code: 24:5)”

The initiation of Bueng Kan Airport development proposed in 2018 and the authorization of the government to launch the Fifth Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge (FTLFB) in 2019 are critical triggers to awareness of local people related to the real change and growth of Bueng Kan City. These megaprojects require not only an enormous amount of state budget but also the political capacities to make it occur. The projects were publicly campaigned by a local political network associated with Mr L and his wife to capture the interests of local people and their political support for the Bhumjaithai Party in local and national elections in Bueng Kan. As a result, Mr. L's wife won the PAO's election in 2020 which largely changed the political climate in Bueng Kan into the new political domination of Mr. L, his local political coalition of Bhumjaithai Parity.

Therefore, this study revealed that policy brokers always come with the hope to gain something in return for what they have invested to the coalition. The application of policy brokers into the framework of policy advocacy coalition helps scholars to clarify the rationale of individual policy actors in a particular policy subsystem. Furthermore, the policy broker framework applied to investigate collaborative policymaking in those four cities also broadened knowledge boundaries of the ACF theory related to how and why a particular coalition successfully advocates their desired policymaking. Classification of two different coalitions—vertical and horizontal, is also obviously clarify what types of resources and policy brokers are likely to function better for each collaborative policymaking. This study suggests that policy advocacy coalition—whether the horizontal or vertical approach, should be arranged with a policy broker because those policy brokers and their resources are highly critical to strengthening the capacities and strategies of local coalitions to advocate for their desired policymaking, particularly in transport policymaking which needs multiple strategies to unravel with the challenges from centralized state.

9.3.3.3) Existence of policy brokers in vertical and horizontal collaborations

Cross-case investigations from Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, Phuket, and Bueng Kan cities discovered that the rise of a certain type of policy brokers dissolved another. Evidence from those four cities reflected that the working disparity between local private and political sectors is clearly displayed in their local joint efforts to advocate for transport policymaking. The roles of local private policy brokers are highly critical to manage local coalition in Khon Kaen and Phuket cities. Those horizontal coalitions lack engagement and commitment from political sector to jointly advocate for local-desired transport policymaking. As a result, those coalitions have no political policy brokers to commit and advocate for the LRT policymaking. Similarly, the case of Bueng Kan revealed that the roles of political policy brokers are key to the success of mega transport policymaking where there were no engagement and commitment from local private sector to jointly advocate for the transport policymaking in Bueng Kan. As such, Bueng Kan has no private policy brokers.

This study found that once a certain type of policy broker existed, another type will be dissolved or disappeared. Cross-case analysis from those four cities asserted that local private and political policy brokers would *not co-exist* within similar single advocacy coalition. As resulted in the case of Khon Kaen or Phuket, where local private policy brokers distinctly occurred as leading actors to manage local coalition strategies but no evidence of local political brokers to engage in those joint efforts to advocate for the LRT policymaking. Therefore, the existence of private policy brokers somehow will dissolve the rise of political policy brokers. Correspondingly, Bueng Kan has revealed its distinct roles of political policy broker to advocate for mega transport policymaking with an absence of local private policy broker. Therefore, cross-case finding from this study argued that those private and political policy brokers are not coexisted within a single advocacy coalition.

Application of policy broker analysis framework to those selected case studies assumed that private and political policy brokers are not usually coexisted because of the different directions of their future gains. Private and political policy brokers are both powerful in terms of financing and networking, although they deployed different types of resources to reach the policymaking. Private policy brokers used financial strategies and business networks to reach the policymaking while those political policy brokers used political powers and networks to achieve their pet policies. They both have resources and potential strategies to advocate for policymaking. However, their future gains are varied, business profits and investment gains are primary hopes of those private policy brokers in

exchange for what they have invested for the coalition. While stability of political domination over the city is the primary concern of those political policy brokers.

Different directions of the future gains between political and private policy brokers might be the key cause to an absence of coexistence among those policy brokers within a single advocacy coalition. Private policy brokers might work more conveniently to manage their future gains of business profits, without hesitations or concerns about constituent vote and political popularity. On the contrary, the political policy brokers alone are also more convenient to manage their future gains of political domination, with unnecessary to please local business network, but to target local constituents.

9.5. Cross-Case Conclusion

Cross-case analysis from this study revealed two different types of collaborative policymaking which are *vertical and horizontal collaborative policymaking*. The classification of those two collaborative systems is grounded on three dimensions including resource mobilization, actor relations, and coalition autonomy. This categorization applies to investigate collaborative policymaking of local coalitions in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, Phuket, and Bueng Kan. This study found that local joint efforts to run for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, and Phuket cities represented as “*horizontal collaborative policymaking*” where multiplicity of resource and actors are locally mobilized and autonomous. While local coalition in Bueng Kan identified as “*vertical collaborative policymaking*” where resources are hierarchically mobilized from the state, actor relations are tied by tripartite approach, intergovernmental relations, and constitutional constraints.

This chapter has revealed 7 critical factors that are addressed to the first research question of: *why some local collaborative action is more functional than others in transport policymaking*. Those factors include: (1) coalition policy brokers, (2) political factors, (3) financial factors, (4) collaboration from multiple local alliances, (5) roles of local government, (6) unity of local coalition, and (7) abilities to integrate relevant external events, as shown in the following table. However, cross-case analysis revealed that policy brokers, political factors, political approaches, and financial factors are the most critical factors to affect capacities of local coalitions to run their joint efforts advocated for LRT policymaking. Therefore, this study argued that city with higher financial autonomy, political approaches,

and internal unity of coalition, is more functional than a city with limited resources and disconnected among themselves and political arena.

Table 28 Summary of relevant factors associated with horizontal collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, and Phuket cities.

Relevant Factors	Functional Factors Gr=71	LRT-CM Gr=205	LRT-KK Gr=328	LRT-PK Gr=182
absence of political policy brokers Gr=46	0	10	22	13
approach to centre of power Gr=39	12	0	35	2
collaboration from local civic society Gr=18	3	7	10	0
collaboration from local universities Gr=4	0	0	3	0
collaboration from private sector Gr=44	12	13	17	6
political factor Gr=105	14	25	38	18
local coalition unity Gr=30	7	4	21	3
local financial autonomy Gr=47	8	4	28	10
local government unity Gr=22	5	0	20	4
local government unwillingness Gr=12	0	12	0	0
local private policy brokers Gr=111	12	11	79	14
local self-reliance Gr=17	3	0	15	0
working disparity between government-private Gr=13	0	0	0	9
working disparity between local private sectors Gr=12	0	9	0	0

Coalition's Internal Factors

	Relevant Factors	Functional Factors Gr=71	LRT-CM Gr=205	LRT-KK Gr=328	LRT-PK Gr=182
	working disparity between politics-private Gr=13	0	2	2	5
External Events	covid-19 Gr=12	0	7	2	5
	government loan Gr=2	0	2	0	2
	new government/election Gr=18	2	4	7	7
	pm2.5 Gr=2	0	2	0	0
	world expo 2028 Gr=24	2	0	0	24
	● functional factors Gr=71	0	3	42	10

Gr means groundedness

Local collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen revealed its high financial capacity since the LRT is fully local-self-financed. Although the coalition lacks engagement from political sector and absence of political policy brokers but the local coalition in Khon Kaen arranged with private policy brokers who deployed political strategies to reach the centre of policymaking power and take advantages of external events to strengthen political capacities of local coalition to run their joint efforts advocated for LRT policymaking. Furthermore, the local coalition in Khon Kaen is also organized by collaboration from multiple sectors that are highly unified to run their joint efforts advocated for LRT policymaking. The unity among local governments is also obvious due to intermunicipal collaboration among five municipalities to establish the first municipal corporation in Thailand—the KKTS. Therefore, local coalition in Khon Kan is most functional to run their joint efforts and succeeded in the policymaking of LRT.

While in Phuket City, capacities of local coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking are moderate compared to Khon Kaen and Chaing Mai. Although the local coalition has high financial capacity and emergence of local private policy brokers. But local coalition in Phuket is disengaged with political sector and their private policy brokers have no abilities to deployed political approach to strengthen capacities of local joint efforts to reach the centre of policymaking power. Therefore, political capacity of local coalition in Phuket is limited. Although, the local private policy brokers run campaigns to take advantages from

external event of Specialised World Expo 2028, but multiple external events associated with COVID-19, government loan, and the new government election have hindered the progress and stability of LRT policymaking in Phuket City. As resulted in the delay of the LRT and the plan to change from LRT to ART system which the government has not been finalized.

In Chiang Mai City, capacity of local coalition is most fragile and unfunctional compared to those joint efforts in Khon Kaen and Phuket cities. Financial and political capacities of local coalition are limited. Although the early movement of the CMCD is likely to perform as coalition's policy broker but the working disparity among local private partners themselves has led the CMCD faded their roles away from local joint efforts to run for LRT policymaking. The local coalition has also no political policy brokers and absence of political approaches to reach into the centre of policymaking power. Local governments in Chiang Mai City have also no interests to commit for the LRT policymaking. Therefore, capacities to set LRT initiative on national government agendas of local coalition in Chaing Mai are constrained by fragmented internal challenges. Moreover, local coalition and LRT initiative in Chaing Mai is also fragile to those challenging external events of COVID-19, government loan, new election, and PM 2.5 haze pollution. Therefore, local joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai is most fragile and unfunctional.

Table 29 Comparative analysis on capacities of horizontal coalitions to run for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities.

City	Local Collaborative Entities	Coalition Capacities								Advocacy Coalition Types
		Financial Capacity	Political Capacity	Coalition Unity	Coalition Policy Brokers	Local Government Joint Efforts	Accessibility to Center of Policymaking	Ability to Integrate External Events	Fragility to Challenged External Events	
<i>Khon Kaen</i>	Khon Kaen Think Tank	High	High	United	High (Private Policy Broker)	High	Accessible	High	Durable	Matured Coalition
	Khon Kaen Transit System	High								
<i>Phuket</i>	Phuket City Development	High	Limited	Fragmented	Moderate (Private Policy Broker)	Limited	Inaccessible	High	Fragile	Nascent Coalition
	Andaman City Development Corporation	High								
<i>Chiang Mai</i>	Chiang Mai Social Enterprise	Limited	Limited	Fragmented	Faded Away	None	Inaccessible	None	Fragile	Nascent Coalition
	Chiang Mai City Development	High								

The table summarizes the results from cross-case analysis of horizontal collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities. This study classifies two different types of advocacy coalition which are *matured and nascent coalitions*. Results from this study claimed that there are 3 indicators to classify difference among matured and nascent coalitions including: unity of coalitions, learning-oriented coalition, and coalition stability to external events.

- ***Unity of coalition*** refers to the harmony and connectivity among multiple sectors associated with a particular collaborative system to achieve their joint efforts of policymaking. The matured coalition like the case of Khon Kaen reveals that their local partners are highly unified especially unity and mutual trust of local private and local governments who jointly invested their resources and efforts to run for LRT policymaking. Furthermore, local coalition in Khon Kaen is also arranged with multiple local sectors who jointly advocate for LRT policymaking under their sectoral functions such as roles of private alliance, intermunicipal collaboration, civil society, and local universities. While the feature of local coalitions in Chiang Mai and Phuket revealed their fragmented collaborative system due to working disparity between local partners and the lack of commitment from local governments to jump into the local joint efforts. As such, local coalitions in Chiang Mai and Phuket shown their limited capacities to unify coalition and strategize financial and political approaches to advocate for LRT policymaking. Therefore, participants of matured coalition are more unified than nascent coalition as evidenced by cross-case analysis of local coalition in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket.
- ***Learning-oriented coalition***, refers to abilities to learn from previous experiences and adapt coalition strategies to achieve the desired policymaking. The coalition in Khon Kaen has proposed and revised LRT proposal into multiple revisions. The coalition has also faced with the legal and administrative challenges from the rejection of central authorities that ignored the local demand for the authorization of LRT. Therefore, local coalition in Khon Kaen had altered their strategies by mobilizing massive civil support, online campaigns, and political approaching to those ministerial decisionmakers at the centres of policymaking. A decade of running local joint efforts for LRT policymaking, the proposal was eventually approved by the

NCPO—military government at that time. While the nascent coalitions in Chiang Mai and Phuket have no indications of coalition learning process to alter their strategies and seeking for relevant opportunities to materialize the LRT policymaking. Therefore, matured coalition is more learning-oriented than nascent coalition. In other words, successful policymaking is a production of coalition learning process.

- ***Coalition's stability to external events***, indicates internal capacities of advocacy coalition to remain steadily in running joint efforts for policymaking without getting affected by the challenging external events. Instead, they are able to take advantages from those relevant external events to strengthen their coalition capacities. Investigation from this study reveals that fragility of coalition to external events is key indicator to classify matured and nascent coalitions. Local coalition in Khon Kaen is internally tighten among their partners and the LRT initiative is also fully local-self-financing. Therefore, local coalition in Khon Kaen get no affected by those challenging external events of shrinking state budget due to the COVID-19 and government loan. On the contrary, local coalition in Khon Kaen also takes advantages from the external event of national government election to strengthen political capacities of local coalition leveraged and brokered for LRT policy. While LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai and Phuket gets largely affected by those external events of COVID-19, government loan, and the new government election. Resulted in the delayed and unfinalized LRT policymaking. Therefore, this study reveals that nascent coalition is more fragile to the challenges of external events while matured coalition remained steadily without getting affected by the challenges from external events.

This chapter also clarify relations between multiplicity of partners and roles of policy brokers engaged in horizontal and vertical collaborative policymaking. The investigation of cross-case analysis from mega transport policymaking in Khon Kaen and Bueng Kan asserted that *multiplicity of partners is necessary to horizontal collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen, while it is less critical to vertical collaborative policymaking in Bueng Kan*. The results in this chapter revealed that success of mega transport policymaking in Bueng Kan relies on roles and resources of political policy brokers and their tripartite approach. While functional factors to the success of policymaking in Khon Kane relies on

collaboration from multiple local sectors, roles of private policy broker, political approaches, and unity of local coalition. Therefore, horizontal coalition invested many efforts to achieve their transport policymaking than the vertical coalition which is relied on political policy brokers and tripartite collaborative approach.

Table 30 Comparative analysis on capacities of horizontal and vertical collaborative policymaking in Bueng Kan and Khon Kaen cities.

Local Collaborative Entities	Khon Kaen City		Bueng Kan City
	<i>Khon Kaen</i>	<i>Khon Kaen</i>	<i>Tripartite</i>
	<i>Think Tank</i>	<i>Transit System</i>	<i>Coalition</i>
<i>Financial Capacity</i>		High	High
<i>Political Capacity</i>		High	High
<i>Coalition Unity</i>		United	United
<i>Coalition Policy Brokers</i>		High (Private Policy Broker)	High (Political Policy Broker)
Coalition Capacities	<i>Local Government</i>		
	<i>Joint Efforts</i>	High	None
	<i>Accessibility to Center of Policymaking</i>	Accessible	Accessible
	<i>Ability to Integrate External Events</i>	High	None
	<i>Fragility to Challenged External Events</i>	Durable	Durable
	<i>Advocacy Coalition Types</i>	Mature	Mature

Although Bueng Kan has a smaller number of local partners to engage in its joint efforts for mega transport policymaking because of the weak and inactive roles of civic and private sectors. But the policymaking of those mega transport initiatives is successful because of the roles and resources of political policy broker. Altogether with the tripartite approach which collaborative actions among political, bureaucratic, and civic sectors is the key approach to strengthen capacities of political policy broker to handle with political events and opportunities at the centre of policymaking power. Therefore, absence of civil

society and private alliance in local joint efforts has no effects on stability and the progress of those mega transport policymaking since the political policy broker and his networks are capable of handling with decisionmakers at the national policymaking centre.

On the other hand, horizontal collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen revealed the relevance of multiplicity of partners to strategize local joint efforts and strengthen capacities of local coalition to set LRT policy on national government agenda. Absence of political policy brokers necessitate local coalition to deploy alternative strategies to strengthen and compensate their inadequate political capacity. As such, local private policy broker has organized enormous local alliance which included actors from multiple sectors such as municipality, local universities, private associations, and local civil societies to strengthen political capacities and capture the interests of national government on their LRT proposal. Especially during the political campaigns for the new government election. Therefore, multiplicity of coalition partner and roles of policy brokers are necessary condition to the functionality of horizontal collaborative policymaking to advocate for mega transport initiative.

Finally, policy brokers invested their resources, efforts, and offer themselves to run for the targeted policymaking with hopes to get somethings in return. All private policy brokers in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket are primarily expected to be investor for the development of LRT initiative. However, private policy broker in Khon Kaen is most advanced because they have enlarged their roles to dominate urban transport industries not only in Khon Kaen but also in other regional core cities in Thailand. While political policy brokers in Bueng Kan invested their efforts with the hope of gaining political support and to dominate national and local politics in Bueng Kan, in returns for what they had invested for the city. However, without the efforts from those policy brokers, mega-transport policies might not even be materialized. This study asserts that policy brokers are critical actor to collaborative policymaking and analysis framework of policy brokers is useful for the ACF to clarify how policy changes, by whose influence, and for what rationale.

CHAPTER 10


CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

10.1. Introduction

The nature of transport policymaking is highly centralized to the state. As such, development of transport infrastructure is key factor that indicates social inequality and imbalance of state policymaking since the ultimate decision towards the development of transport infrastructures is a production of political events and state authorities to handle with agendas of multiple policy advocates. (Calderón & Servén, 2004; Calderón, Moral-Benito, & Servén, 2015: 177-198; Berg, Deichmann, Liu, & Selod, 2017: 468-473). Regional cities in Thailand have suffered from traffic conditions and poor public transportation services. Inclusive and advanced public transport services are mainly located in Bangkok metropolitan area, and the LRT system never exists elsewhere in regional cities *except only in Bangkok*. Therefore, imbalance and poor urban transport services have long been a critical issue in Thailand.

This study investigated recent movements of local coalitions that run their joint efforts for mega transport policymaking in regional cities. Four case studies were undertaken and classified into two different models of collaborative policymaking: one is horizontal collaborative policymaking including Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities, another is vertical collaborative policymaking which represented by Bueng Kan City. Categorization of these two policymaking approaches offers precise clarification related to which exact factors most strengthen and weaken capacities of each policymaking approach. Further, this study also examined relationships between multiplicity of coalition partners and their influence on policymaking in each model. The research framework of this study is grounded on the ACF theory which the author drawn new policy broker analysis framework applied to broaden and address limitations of recent ACF literature as detailed in following figure.

Figure 75 Research framework applied to this study



This study assumes that policymaking of horizontal and vertical collaborations is influenced by relevant policy actors, internal factors, and external events. Further, the roles and resources of policy brokers are also critical to capacities of those advocacy coalitions to achieve policymaking. Although previous studies suggested relevance of partner multiplicity in collaborative policymaking (Huaxman, 2003; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Clarke, 2017: 585-591; Agranoff, 2012:3; Warm, 2011: 61; Sandfort & Milward, 2010: 157-159; Vangen, 2003, 150-153 & 2020, 129), but this study assumes that in a particular policymaking model, those policy brokers are even more critical than multiplicity of partners associated with the advocacy coalition. Therefore, this study argues that classification of advocacy coalition into specific type and application of policy brokers analysis will offer more precise clarification on the relevance of partner variety and influences of policy brokers in each coalition model.

Case study research was applied to investigate and address those research interests which interviews, documentary research, and participatory observations are the main approach of data collection from those four case studies. The author deployed CAQDAS technique—computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (Friese, 2022; Bringer & Johnston & Brackenridge, 2006: 245-266; Yin 2012:166-167; Huxham, 2003) for the data


analysis using the ATLAS.ti last updated version 23 as the main software for qualitative data analysis and maintain the chain of evidence. The author also integrated Notion as software to generate the case study database before processing those collected data into the ATLAS.ti for data analysis. Findings from this research reveals theoretical and methodological contributions to broaden boundaries of recent collaborative policymaking and ACF literatures, as findings summarized in the following section.

10.2. Conclusion

10.2.1. Research Question 1 : Why is some local coalition more functional than others in transport policymaking?

Cross-case analysis revealed horizontal collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen is most advanced than those coalitions in Phuket and Chiang Mai cities. This study found functioning factors that strengthen capacities of local joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen include seven factors: *roles of policy brokers, political factors, financial factors, collaboration from multiple local alliances, roles of local government, unity of local coalition, and abilities to integrate relevant external events*. These factors facilitate local coalition in Khon Kaen to run their joint efforts against challenges from central authorities and successfully set LRT on national government agenda. One of the most critical factors is the roles of private policy brokers—KKTT, who strategically strengthen financial and political capacities of local coalition to broker with the government for the authorization of LRT initiative. As well as its coalition unity which multiple actors are firmly unified to advocate for the LRT. Especially the unity of municipalities—KKTS, which established municipal corporation committed for the LRT. Therefore, local coalition in Khon Kaen is not fragile to those challenges from external events. Instead, they take advantages from relevant external events to strengthen their political capacity to catch interests of the government on the local LRT.

Figure 76 Factors strengthening and weakening capacities of local coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities.



However, above figure shown those seven functional factors are less associated with the LRT policymaking in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. Particularly in the local coalition in Chiang Mai where cross-case analysis shown its least capacities or even unfunctional to run for LRT policymaking compared to Khon Kaen and Phuket. While local coalition in Phuket is also unfunctional to set LRT policymaking but their coalition capacity is more capable than joint efforts in Chiang Mai. Like Khon Kaen, private policy brokers—PKCD, in Phuket play critical roles to drive LRT policymaking. However, the roles of those private policy brokers are constrained by lack of political capacities to reach the centre of policymaking power and absence of commitment from local governments to join the coalition. Although policy brokers can take advantage of the Specialised World Expo’s external event, but the LRT policymaking of local coalition in Phuket is largely fragile to other challenging external events of COVID-19 and government loan. As a result, LRT policymaking in Phuket has been unfinalized and planned to alter into the ART.

Chiang Mai’s local coalition is most unfunctional because absence of policy brokers. Although the city similarly equipped with city development corporation—the CSE and CMCD, but the CSE is less engaged in LRT policymaking while the CMCD faded their roles away from being policy broker for LRT policymaking due to working disparity among local private partners. Therefore, local coalition in Chiang Mai, although diversified, but they are

fragmented because working disparities among local partners and disengagements from local governments and political sector to held responsible for LRT policymaking. This is one of the causes to of “*collaborative inertia*” identified by the research of Huxham (2003) since trust building and risk taking among partners are key to internal unity and the strength of collaborative efforts. As a result of fragmented coalition, the LRT policymaking of local coalition in Chaing Mai is largely fragile to those challenging external events of COVID-19, government loan, new election, and the PM 2.5 haze pollution which delayed and devalued the relevance of LRT initiative in Chiang Mai City. Similar arguments were also found in Kooiman (2003) asserted that exogenous shocking events are highly influential to collaborative efforts to achieve their common goals. As noted by Kooiman (2003) “*strong collaborative regimes my fall apart when powerful challenges or exogenous shocks change the beliefs and/or allegiance of member.*” Therefore, internal unity of horizontal coalition are key determinants to justify capacity of coalition to handle with challenged external evets.

In summary, results from cross-case analysis of horizontal policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket shown that local coalition in Khon Kaen is most functional to advocate for LRT policymaking. While local coalitions in Phuket and Chiang Mai are unfunctional to run their joint efforts for LRT policymaking. As resulted in the delay and instability of LRT policymaking in Phuket and Chiang Mai cities. Therefore, the results from this study have verified the initial assumption proposed to address the first research question that: *a city with higher financial autonomy, political strategies, and internal unity among coalition partners, is more functional than a city with limited resources and disconnected.*


10.2.2. Research Question 2: How does a variety and role of relevant policy actors in vertical and horizontal collaborations impact capacities of those coalitions in transport policymaking?

To address this research question, two functional coalitions of vertical and horizontal collaborative policymaking—Khon Kaen and Bueng Kan, have been selected to investigate relevance of partner multiplicity, roles of policy brokers, and their influences on transport policymaking. Khon Kaen represented most functional case of horizontal coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking where local partners are most diversified. Therefore, Khon Kaen reflects its largest local coalition to run for LRT policymaking compared to those horizontal coalition in Chiang Mai and Phuket. Although the coalition has arranged with multiple partners whose expertise and networks are diversified, but local coalition in Khon

Kaen had faced multiple challenges to advocate for LRT initiative before getting approval from the government. LRT proposal to the government get rejected by central authorities and it has been revised several times which take almost a decade—since its original plan was proposed in 2008, for the LRT proposal get approved by the government in 2016.

This study found multiplicity of partners is critical to horizontal coalition in Khon Kaen as a strategic approach for their coalition to leverage with legal and political challenges from central authorities and to broker for the authorization of LRT initiative from the government. Partners multiplicity is remarkably critical, especially during the external event of new government election existed and local coalition organized city-wide referendum to capture the government interest during political campaigns. Therefore, multiplicity of partners is key factor to strengthen internal unity and political capacities of horizontal coalition to approach the centre of policymaking and handle with political events that could strengthen capacities of their joint efforts to advocate for LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen.

Figure 77 Comparative analysis on functional factors associated with transport policymaking of horizontal and vertical coalitions in Khon Kaen and Bueng Kan.



Above figure revealed that functionality of horizontal coalition is required to invest multiple types of leverages to advocate for their desired policies such as political approaches, policy brokers, local self-financing, intermunicipal collaboration, unity of local coalition, civil organizations, or integration of national political climate. While functionality of vertical

coalition in Bueng Kan requires less conditions to achieve transport policymaking. The coalition needs only resources of political policy brokers and tripartite collaborative approach to advocate for their targeted policymaking. As previous studies also found that political power is the key to advance the rapid growth of public infrastructures (Weir, Rongerude, and Ansell, 2009; Hysing, 2009; Fossheim & Andersen, 2022; Hamilton, 2002). Similarly, the case of Beng Kan also shown that politics—political brokers and resources, is their primary strategy to advocate for local desired policies of transport infrastructures. Although Bueng Kan arranged with limited numbers of partners associated in their tripartite approach, but multiple transport initiatives in Bueng Kan has been successfully set on national agenda due to its political policy brokers.

This study argued that multiplicity of local partners is necessary for horizontal coalition to advocate for transport policymaking while in vertical coalition the roles and resources of policy brokers are more critical and influential than multiplicity of partners. Therefore, the initial assumption to address the second research question has been verified that: *“a variety of local partners is highly critical for a horizontal collaborative policymaking. While in vertical collaboration, a variety of engaged partners is less critical than resources that policy brokers processed or accessed to set transport policy on agenda.”*

10.3. Discussion

This section discusses on three points of practical and theoretical issues related to local collaborative policymaking of urban transport development in Thailand and how findings from this study help to address those practical issues and broaden theoretical boundaries of recent policy studies literature. The first section discusses on relevance of local collaborative action and their attempts to advocate for transport policymaking in an over-centralized state of Thailand. The second part discusses on how findings from this study could strengthen the capacities of local collaborative policymaking. The final part discusses on the relevance of private policy brokers in local collaborative actions.

10.3.1. A Dream Without Destination: Can Collaboration Cope with Centralized Transport Policymaking (?)

Transport policymaking is naturally centralized to the state. Running joint efforts of local coalitions to advocate for transport policymaking means challenging against those centralized authorities who have long dominated and benefited from the duties of transport policymaking. As reflected through local collations in Khon Kaen, Phuket, and Chiang Mai

that have exhausted from their efforts to advocate for urban transport policymaking challenged by those centralized authorities. Although, local citizens have declared their demand towards the development of LRT initiatives, but their voices have less influence on the government.

Establishments of the Thailand's first city development corporation and municipal corporation in Khon Kaen are the production of how local alliances translated their dream into actions—the dream of LRT to serve people and advance urban growth. The achievement of local joint efforts in Khon Kaen to set LRT policymaking has also inspired to those local dreams of LRT initiatives in Phuket and Chiang Mai cities where the city development corporations are established, followed guidance of private alliance in Khon Kaen City. However, LRT system has never been existed elsewhere in Thailand, except only in Bangkok Metropolitan. The MRTA has also never rendered their LRT duties to other regional cities. Therefore, LRT policymaking advocated by those local coalitions in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket has likely been seen as a dream-selling campaigns to citizens.

Findings from this study and previous research revealed that political power and network brokers have remained as a critical element to the success of transport policymaking (Weir, Rongerude, and Ansell, 2009; Fossheim & Andersen, 2022; Pholsim & Inaba, 2022). Even though horizontal advocacy coalition is well-connected and embraces multiple actors but if they have little political power or limited abilities to convert coalition goals into political power, the attributes of multi-party and well-connected coalition are insignificant (Weir et al., 2009: 474; Hysing, 2009: 243-261; Fossheim & Andersen, 2022: 1327; Hamilton, 2002: 403-423). As revealed through the findings from horizontal coalitions in Chaing Mai and Phuket cities, their coalitions were unable to take advantages and convert political events to strengthen political capacities of local coalitions to advocate for their demanded policy and leverage with national authorities, as such, they were unable to set their policy agendas. As argued by Weir (2009) *“The region cannot become an important venue for transport policy making unless regional actors can exercise power in these competing arenas. As a result, the regime network’s ability to exercise vertical power—in political arenas above and below the region—is a critical component in carving out the space for regional governance (Weir,2009: 480)...For regional efforts to be effective, they must be backed by political power sufficient either to prevail in competing decision-making venues or to block challenges from them. Without multilevel political capacities...regional collaborations can be easily undermined from below or from above. No matter how inclusive*

and collaborative the networks or innovative the plans for regional transportation, they will produce little real change if not backed by vertical power (Weir,2009: 485)”

Therefore, ability to exercise and integrate political powers is key requirement for horizontal coalition to achieve policymaking—especially in transport policy area. Moreover, accruing to Weir et al., (2009) also clarified that internal unity of advocacy coalition is also critical factor to the success of transport policymaking which similar argument to the findings from this research where investigations from Phuket and Chiang Mai are fragile to the challenges from external events and unable to achieve LRT policymaking because of their fragmented coalition between local private sector themselves—in Chiang Mai, and between local private and public sectors—in Phuket. Furthermore, these two cities are also disconnected with political sectors which scholars assumed as most influential factor for transport policymaking (Pholsim & Inaba, 2022; Weir et al., 2009; Hysing, 2009; Fossheim & Andersen, 2022; Hamilton, 2002). Therefore, fragmented coalition and disengagement of political sector are key hindering factors towards the local joint efforts to advocate for transport policymaking in Chiang Mai and Phuket. Although, local coalition in Khon Kaen has also no engagement from political sector, but the coalition is able to convert external political event of new government elections and organized city-wide referendums to compensate their lack of political capacity. As such, transport policymaking in Khon Kaen is more connected to the political arena and decision-making venue.

Although the LRT initiative has been successfully approved by the government in 2016 but almost two decades of policy advocacy, the LRT initiative in Khon Kaen City has not been implemented, yet. Therefore, local coalitions have achieved policymaking to set the local-own LRT initiative on national government agenda, but the legal and administrative issues from the centralized state are still key challenges that hinder the process of *policy implementation* of the LRT development in Khon Kaen City. As like those LRT initiatives in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities where the LRT has been planned to turn down and alter into the ART system. However, the government has not been finalized on the authorization towards the development of LRT nor the ART in Chiang Mai and Phuket cities. Although local coalitions have publicly declared their demands of the LRT, but their dream have no destinations and not been materialized, yet.

Organizations of horizontal coalitions in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, and Phuket cities are new to Thailand. Because those horizontal coalition included new local governing bodies

which constructed new interactive relations among local actors. Particularly the municipal corporation and city development corporations which local business elites have largely increased their roles to urban policymaking venue nationwide. However, Thailand has little experiences and knowledge related to the management of suitable interrelationship between those new local governing bodies and centralized agencies. As such, the appearance and efforts of those horizontal coalitions to advocate for LRT policymaking have been undermined by centralized state. However, this study asserted that multiplicity of actors engaged in local coalition is key condition to achieve transport policymaking which has long been dominated by the state. But the central challenge is how capacities of those horizontal coalitions could be strengthened to steadily run their joint efforts for policymaking. This study reveals seven critical factors that could strengthen capacity of horizontal coalition to advocate for transport and other areas of policymaking as detailed in the following section.

10.3.2. *How to Strengthen Capacities of Local Collaborative Policymaking*

Findings from this study revealed seven critical factors that strengthen capacities of horizontal coalition to advocate for policymaking including: *policy brokers, political factors, financial factors, collaboration from multiple local alliances, roles of local government, unity of local coalition, and abilities to integrate relevant external events*. However, all these factors are connected to the capacity of policy brokers, commitments of local government, and political approaches. As it is clearly revealed through the case of local coalition in Khon Kaen to achieve their LRT policymaking because efforts of private policy brokers who manage financial and political strategies of local coalition to advocate for LRT policymaking. Further, commitment to advocate for LRT from local governments and political approaches are found only in Khon Kaen City. Therefore, internal capacities of local coalition in Khon Kaen are most advanced and unbreakable by the challenging external events.

Roles and resources of policy brokers are key factors to strengthen capacities of local collaborative policymaking, especially the effort to advocate for transport policymaking. The success of LRT policymaking in Khon Kaen largely relied on the roles and resources of private policy brokers who manage local joint effort strategies to unravel legal, financial, and political hindrances from the centralized state. Therefore, this study argued that policy brokers are key strengthening factors to local collaborative policymaking. Similarly, Clarke (2017) deployed exploratory research to compare two collaborative initiatives in the US, a traditional state-centric model and civil society-based model of local collaboration which

argued that roles of brokers are the backbone to functionalities of both collaborative systems in state-centric and society-centered models. Clarke (2017: 587-588) argued that brokerage roles within-and-outside collaborative system is key to handle challenges and strengthen capacities of joint efforts to influence policymaking. Similar to the findings of this study which found that roles and resources of policy brokers in both horizontal and vertical collaborative systems are key factors to the achievement of transport policymaking.

Another key strengthening factor is commitments from local government which appeared only in the Khon Kaen where five municipalities jointly fund and established municipal corporation as their strategic institutional approach to advocate for local self-governing LRT initiative. Therefore, new institutional strategy is also a key approach to strengthen capacities of collaborative efforts. As such, the presence of policy brokers as a central liaison to link between different levels—local and central coalitions, joint commitment, and new institutional approach of intermunicipal collaboration in Khon Kaen verified the relevance of new institutional strategy as a critical condition that enable local coalition to link with central agencies and function effectively in collaborative policymaking.

Finally, political approach is key factor that enable joint efforts to achieve transport policymaking since political resources have remained a critical element to the success of transportation policymaking (Weir, Rongerude, and Ansell, 2009). Although horizontal coalition is well-connected and embraces multiple actors but if they have little political power or limited capacities to convert coalition goals into political approaches, those factors are insignificant (Hamilton, 2002: 403-423). Findings from this research revealed that functional horizontal coalition—which is well-connected among multiple parties in Khon Kaen, and vertical coalition—which is less-connected to multiple parties in Bueng Kan, are both in need of political power to advocate for transport policymaking. Although studies have revealed multiplicity of partners is key strengthening factors to achieve collaborative efforts (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Clarke, 2017: 585-591; Agranoff, 2012:3; Warm, 2011: 61; Sandfort & Milward, 2010: 157-159; Vangen, 2003: 150-153 & 2020: 129), but in *transport* policymaking, this study argued they need political resources or ability of joint effort to convert events and opportunities to exercise their political power. Classification of two different models of collaborative policymaking in this study clearly revealed that multiplicity of partners and political resources are key functioning factors to horizontal coalition. But political power is the only key strengthening factor to vertical collaborative

policymaking even though their coalition has less associated partners, but the political power could enable coalition to achieve transport policymaking.

10.3.3. *Vertical and Horizontal Models of Collaborative Policymaking*

The author would like to discuss the relevance of comparative research on collaborative policymaking between two models of vertical and horizontal collaborations. The cause of this discussion comes from arguments of previous studies that revealed importance of multiple actors to engage in collaborative policymaking. Most previous studies argued that multiplicity of actors is critical to achieve their collective goals (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003 & 2002; Agranoff, 2012; McGuire, 2006; Piña & Avellaneda, 2018; Kooiman, 2003; Rubado, 2019; Kessa, Sadiq and Yeo, 2021). However, the key problem of those studies is its flawed analytical framework to conclude this argument since they did not classify specific types of collaborative action. Therefore, their conclusions and arguments about the significance of actor multiplicity are broad and halfway true.

Each logical model leads to specific assessment to certain collaborative action. Therefore, with no classification of specific model to investigate collaborative actions the conclusions and arguments made from those studies are broad and unclear. Recently, there are multiple logical models applied to investigate collaborative actions. One is *collaborative governance regime (CGR)* (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012: 1-29) examined *system context*—social, political, environmental, administrative, policy factors that influence shapes of *collaborative governance regime* which driven by interaction of those relevant factors embedded in an *internal collaborative dynamic* such as shared motivation, principles, and joint capacities. Another drawn an *integrative logic model* (Stout, Bartels, & Love, 2019: 91-115) focused on behavioral and organizational relations that can hinder or foster the collaborative action through analysis of relevant events, resources, interrelations, and institutional arrangements that shape collaborative actions. Some studies drawn a logical model that specify casual relations of relevant conditions that courage or discourage certain collaborative actions (Ansell & Gash, 2007) such as casual conditions, facilitative leadership, institutional design, and collaborative process.

Results from this study asserted that classification of specific types of collaborative policymaking offer more precise clarification and framework to clarify the importance of actor multiplicity and other relevant factors to achievement of policymaking. This study revealed that multiplicity of actors is most critical only to horizontal collaborative

policymaking which needs multiple resources to strengthen their joint efforts to achieve policymaking. While actor multiplicity is less relevant to vertical collaboration to achieve policymaking. Instead, what is most critical to vertical collaborative policymaking is not multiplicity of actors but resources and roles of policy brokers. Therefore, classification and comparative analysis on different models of collaborative policymaking revealed more precise clarification on roles and influence of policy actors associated in each collaborative model. Multiple actors might be largely necessary for one collaborative system, but they might also be unnecessary for another collaborative system as well.

However, the conclusion on the relevance of actor multiplicity in each collaborative system argued in this study is mainly relied on the investigation of *transport policy area*. Therefore, applications of those different collaborative models to investigate in other policy areas might also found new arguments to verify or falsify the findings from this study. The author also encourages further studies to apply comparative research to investigate how actor multiplicity is relevant or influential to collaborative system in other policy areas. This type of comparative research would broaden theoretical and methodological boundaries of current policymaking literature.

10.3.4. *Relevance of Private Policy Brokers*

Public sector has long dominated the policymaking and public affairs management. However, Weberian bureaucracy has revealed its inefficiencies to handle with rapid changes and more complex challenges from economic and industrial capitalism. As a result, private sector has enlarged their roles into public affairs initially through the approach of public-private partnership to handle with unproductivity of public services management which once was dominated by public sector before the government shared those duties to private sectors as known of the New Public Management approach (Hood, 1991 & 1995). Since then, the private sector has increasingly become a critical partner well considered as an “*expert*” who specializes in the duties and policy strategies which the public sector alone is unable to achieve. Therefore, the emergence of the NPM since 1970 has enabled the private sector to influence policymaking and services management of the public sector (Beland, 2010: 94-102; Glennerster, 2016: 131-136). As a result, the public sector is now attached closely to the resources, expertise, and networks of private sector to achieve policymaking and public services (Laegreid, 2015: 542-543; O’Flynn, 2007: 353-366).

Moreover, the government has been shrinking their roles and resources for the management of public services and convince private sector to share resources and handle with the public affairs. Traditionally, business alliance did not occupy central role in policymaking and public service management. But emergence of public-private partnership and the recent trend towards the shrinking roles of government and creation of third-party organizations, like think tank, city development corporations, or joint venture alliances, the private sector has broadly enlarged their roles and enjoy privileged parts to exercise their powers in urban governance and policymaking (Weir, 2009: 482). Similarly, the creation of business-linked organizations such as KKTT in Khon Kaen, PKCD in Phuket, and CMCD in Chaing Mai, has granted those local business elites to exercise their power and broker for mega transport policymaking, in exchange for their future gains. Additionally, financial and administrative constrains of local government also reinforce the relevance of resources and roles from those private policy brokers to manage local joint efforts to advocate for transport policymaking which long centralized by the state.

Therefore, presence of private policy brokers could advance financial and political capacities of local coalition unity and facilitated higher possibilities for those collaboratives to achieve their common goals of policymaking. As a result, a city where its urban governance is structured with the joint effort from those business-linked organizations—private policy brokers, the local government will gain more possibilities to strengthen their financial and administrative capacities for urban policymaking. Even if there has been an absence of municipal commitments to advocate for the targeted policies but emergence of those private policy brokers could be an alternate to those local governments to voice and advocate for the needs of local people as long as they get legitimated by those citizens (Frederickson, 2007 & 2016). In other words, getting public duties done through other means rather than government's authority.

Local governments in Thailand have been long challenged by financial and administrative constraints due to the issues of over-centralized state. Emergence of those business-linked organizations—*city development corporations*, has strengthen financial and administrative capacities of local government to run co-creation initiatives which are both beneficial to private and public interests. Recently, there are 20 units of city development corporations which have been established by local private alliances in 18 cities across Thailand. The entry of those local business-linked organizations into urban policymaking indicated the changing patterns of local governance which private alliance becomes more

critical and attached to the structure of local governance to handle with the challenges that local government alone is unable to manage, such as mega transport infrastructure, large-scale economic development, or international collaboration. Therefore, those private policy brokers associated with city development corporations have been considered as a *new co-producer* of public services and policymaking in Thailand. They are also a new strategic alternative added to unravel traditional structure of public services to further advance productivity of local governments and facilitate more responsive services to local citizens in Thailand.

Table 31 City development corporations in Thailand

Established Year	City Development Corporations in Thailand
2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Khon Kaen Think Tank
2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Phuket City Development Corporation • Chaing Mai Social Enterprise
2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chiang Mai City Development Corporation • Bangkok City Development Company • Phitsanulok City Development Company • Samut Sakon City Development (Social Enterprise) Corporation • Rayong City Development (Social Enterprise) Corporation • Saraburi City Development Corporation • Chon Buri City Development Corporation • Sukhothai City Development Corporation • Songkhla City Development Corporation
2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ubon Ratchathani City Development Corporation • Udon Thani City Development Corporation • Khanom-Sichon City Development Corporation
2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mae Hong Son City Development Corporation • Nakhon Ratchasima City Development Corporation
2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lampang City Development Corporation • Leoi City Development Corporation
2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Andaman City Development Corporation

However, assessment of the Area-based Research Funding Agency (ARFA) (2022:4-10) found that majority of those city development corporations are embryonic, and their capacities are needed further strengthen. Only three selected cases studies are categorized as most advanced city development corporations—KKTT, PKCD, and CMCD. However, findings from this study argued that, in collaborative *transport policymaking*, the capacities of PCKD in Phuket and CMCD in Chaing Mai are weak and their coalition is also fragile to the challenges from external events. Therefore, seven functional factors that found in this study are critical factors to strengthen coalition capacity of those embryonic city development corporations in Thailand. Particularly, critical roles of policy brokers, political factors, financial factors, collaboration from multiple local alliances, roles of local government, unity of local coalition, and abilities to integrate relevant external events. These factors are useful and practical solutions to advance co-production of public services and collaborative policymaking between city development corporations and local governments throughout Thailand.

10.4. Theoretical Propositions and Contributions to Policymaking Literature

10.4.1. The Three Theories (TTT)

The results from empirical investigations of local joint efforts to advocate for transport policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, Phuket, and Bueng Kan have addressed the main research problems stated in this study and offered three theories to open up new discussion and broaden knowledge boundaries of ACF and collaborative policymaking literatures:

Theory One: In transport policymaking, multiplicity of local partners is more necessary to horizontal advocacy coalition than vertical advocacy coalition.

Studies have shown that multiplicity of actors and sectoral diversity engaged in collaborative efforts and policymaking is key success to reach the common goals (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Clarke, 2017; Agranoff, 2012; Warm, 2011; Sandfort & Milward, 2010; Vangen, 2020, Greenwood, 2021). However, those studies are not classified specific types of each collaborative effort before investigation. As such, they were unable to clarify how influence of partner diversity is critical or most relevant to each type of collaborative efforts. This study classifies two different types of vertical and horizontal collaborative actions to advocate for transport policymaking. The results of cross-case analysis to investigate relationship between policymaking achievement and multiplicity of partners in each type of

collaborative systems argued that multiplicity of local partners is critically necessary for horizontal collaborative action to advocate for transport policymaking—which has largely centralized to the state. On the contrary, multiplicity of partners is less critical, or even unnecessary, for vertical coalition to advocate for transport policymaking as long as those vertical coalition has political policy brokers that could access to the centre of policymaking power (Christopoulos and Ingold, 2011: 39) like the case of political broker in Bueng Kan.

Theory Two: Roles and resources of policy brokers are key to the success of vertical and horizontal collaborative policymaking to run for transport policies.

Policy scholars necessitate the importance of policy broker research because methodological analysis and theories of policy brokers have remained understudied almost 30 years since its first explanation in ACF theory (Ingold, 2011; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009; Howlett, Mukherjee, & Koppenjan, 2017; Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015). This study investigated the influence of policy brokers to manage local coalition and advocate for transport policymaking. With the classification of two different models of collaborative policymaking, this study argued that the roles and resources of policy brokers are critical to the achievement of transport policymaking in both vertical and horizontal coalitions. Further, this study revealed two different types of policy brokers located in each collaborative models. Private policy brokers located in horizontal coalition and political policy brokers in vertical coalition. Although these policy brokers are different but their roles, efforts, and resources are highly critical to the strengthens of coalition capacity in each vertical and horizontal coalition to manage their joint efforts and achieve policymaking.

As founded in the *Theory One*, partner multiplicity is necessary to horizontal coalition to achieve transport policymaking, but it is less critical to vertical collaborative policymaking. The *Theory Two* further asserted that relevance of partner multiplicity is less critical and compensated by the efforts and resources of political policy brokers in vertical coalition. Therefore, absence and presence of political policy brokers is most relevance to vertical coalition. While absence of partner diversity slightly or even has non influence on the stability and capacity of vertical collaboration *if the political policy brokers already existed*. Therefore, policy brokers are key conditions that could strengthen capacity of vertical and horizontal coalitions to achieve transport policymaking.

Theory Three: Different degree of financial autonomy, political approaches, and unity of coalition yields to different levels of functionality of horizontal coalition to advocate for transport policymaking.

Results from cross-case analysis of horizontal coalition to run joint efforts for LRT policymaking in Khan Kaen, Chaing Mai, and Phuket revealed that what make one horizontal coalition—Khon Kaen, more functional than others—Chiang Mai, and Phuket, to advocate for transport policymaking include financial autonomy of local-self-financing strategy, political approaches deployed by joint efforts to reach the centre of policymaking power, and unity among associated partners. Therefore, the *Theory Three* associated with the *Theory One*—which necessitates relevance of partner multiplicity, argued that diversity or multiplicity of partners are needed to be *unified*. Otherwise, if their trusts are broken and the coalition is *fragmented*, those multiple partners would hinder capacity of horizontal coalition and lead to the “*collaborative inertia*” (Huxhum, 2003), as reflected in the case of Chiang Mai where even coalition is arranged with multiple partners but working disparity between multiple local private alliances has weaken local joint effort capacities among their partners and resulted in the shrinking roles of CMCD to run for LRT policymaking.


Finally, Sabatier (2019: 5) noted that scientific research should “*be clear enough to be proven wrong*” meaning that scholars should clearly define findings and theoretical contributions that could be replicated, empirically falsified, and criticized by the public. According to those scientific criteria for theoretical generalization (Sabatier, 2019; Cairney, 2015:492-493), all the three theories (TTT) proposed from this study reveals its scientific potential to *empirical and theoretical falsifiability*, *theoretical generosity*, and *methodological replication*. Those three theories are clearly defined and general which is applicable for further studies to apply and falsify. The methodological analysis of policy brokers analysis framework and data analysis could also be replicated by other scholars. Moreover, for the future research they could also be further applied to falsify that, *Theory One*, diversified partners associated with vertical coalition might be found necessary condition to achieve common goals of transport policymaking or other policy areas; *Theory Two*, the roles and resources of policy brokers might not be found necessary to both horizontal and vertical coalition in other areas of policymaking; and *Theory Three*, all or partial of these factors—financial autonomy, political approaches, and unity of coalitions might be founded hindered to horizontal collaborative policymaking. Falsifications of these

three theories by those further studies might verify or give rise to new debate and theory of policymaking.

10.4.2. Policy Brokers Analysis Framework

Policy scholars have highlighted the critical roles of policy brokers in policymaking and encouraged future research to broaden knowledge boundaries of policy brokers (Kingiri, & Hall, 2012; Kingiri, 2014; Lu, 2015; Ingold & Varon, 2011; Rodrigues, Sobrinho, & Vasconcellos, 2020; Howlett, Mukherjee, & Koppenjan, 2017; Lombard, & Miller-Stevens, 2012). However, methodological analysis and theories of policy brokers have remained understudied since its first development of ACF theory (Ingold, 2011; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009; Howlett, Mukherjee, & Koppenjan, 2017; Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015). Therefore, this study has drawn a new policy brokers analysis framework to investigate relevance of policy brokers in different collaborative settings of transport policymaking advocated by vertical and horizontal coalitions in Thailand.

Figure 78 Policy brokers analysis framework



This framework focuses on influence of policy brokers, internal strategy, and external events, under different types of collaborative policymaking. Therefore, primary requirement to apply this framework is to identify each type of collaborative models which determined by three factors—resource mobilization, actor relation, and coalition autonomy,

as discussed in earlier section. Application of this framework also enable studies to identify what *sources of power* those policy brokers applied to advocate for policymaking. As such, this framework is able to clarify functional and undermining factors associated with resources of policy brokers and factors that strengthen capacities of advocacy coalition. While identification of each coalition type reflects their *point of power* where resources of coalition are mobilized, enacted to influence, and carry out operations. This study identifies two different points of power which is equivalent to types of collaborative policymaking including vertical and local points of power. Therefore, interrelation analysis between *sources of power* and *points of power* could clarify which factors or what types of sources of power could weaken or facilitate those advocacy coalition to reach or influence the *centre of policymaking power*.

This framework assumed that the closer point of power reached to the centre of policymaking power, the better possibilities to achieve their policymaking (see also Clarke, 2017). As reflected in the case of horizontal coalition in Khon Kaen where policy brokers deployed local self-financing strategy and political approaches of city referendum and ministerial dialogues as their key sources of power to strengthen and facilitate their coalition's point of power to reach the centre of policymaking power. Therefore, sources of power and roles of policy brokers influence points of power that could getting closer to centre of policymaking. However, the ACF also showed that *external events* are critical forces that could strengthen and hinder points of power—advocacy coalition, to reach the centre of policymaking power. Therefore, abilities to take advantages and convert those external events to strengthen capacities of coalition are critical factor to achieve policymaking such as horizontal coalitions in Khon Kaen and Phuket that take advantages from new government election and Specialised World Expo to facilitate their coalition's point of power getting closer to the centre of policymaking.

Types of Policy Brokers

Application of this policy brokers analysis framework to investigate roles of policy brokers in horizontal and vertical collaborative policymaking in Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, Phuket, and Bueng Kan cities discovered two different types of policy brokers: private and political policy brokers. *Political policy brokers* are found in vertical coalition which sources of power derived from their political power occupied from being positioned as ministerial executive. Resources and efforts of political policy brokers largely influenced and strengthened point of coalition power to easily get closer to the centre of policymaking.

Further, tripartite collaboration between political, bureaucratic, and civic sector is also another critical sources of power to strengthen roles of political policy brokers to advocate and broker for the desired policies. Because of the state law demands involvement of civic support to legitimate the roles and strategies of political policy brokers to advocate for transport policymaking. Therefore, interrelationships between political policy brokers and tripartite approaches are highly interdependent.

Private policy brokers are found in horizontal coalition where sources of power are derived from local self-financing strategies and unity among multiple actors. Private policy brokers are extremely critical to horizontal coalition especially for those advocacy coalitions of transport policymaking. Furthermore, this study revealed that abilities of private policy brokers to take advantages from political external events and political approaches are another key source of power that could strengthen capacities and facilitate point of coalition power to get closer and achieve their desired policymaking. This study found no co-occurrence of political policy brokers and private policy brokers embedded within each single coalition, instead this study reveals disengagement of private and political sectors in all type of advocacy coalition. A coalition equipped with private policy brokers has no engagement from political sector. Findings from this study shown that those two types of advocacy coalition are all fragmented between private and political sectors. While a coalition arranged with political policy brokers would also has no active engagement form private sector. This study assumes that because of policy brokers invested their resources and efforts for the *future returns*, but expected returns of private and political brokers are contradictory. Therefore, emergence of a particular policy brokers might deviate interests of the other policy broker types to engage in coalition. That is why private and political policy brokers are not co-existed within similar single coalition.

10.4.3. *Nascent and Matured Advocacy Coalitions*

According to Jenkins-Smith, Nohrestedt, Weibel, and Ingold (2018) suggested that application of ACF research is highly encouraged to examine on *nascent* and *matured* policy subsystems because the study on these subsystems could yield insights about conditions and characteristics of policy subsystem, the process of coalition formation, roles of advocacy coalitions in policymaking. Investigation of local joint efforts advocated for transport policymaking in those four cities revealed two different traits of nascent and mature coalitions. Khon Kaen and Bueng Kan are considered as a matured coalition while Chiang Mai and Phuket are found as nascent coalition. This study found unique characters to identify

nascent and matured coalitions particularly based on three dimensions: sustainability, unity, and stability of advocacy coalition which nascent and matured coalitions shared different traits of these indications.

Nascent advocacy coalition is usually a newly formed collaborative system where joint efforts and interrelations among associated partners are fragmented. Their common beliefs are fluctuated and fragile to internal modifications, conflicts among partners, and challenges from external events (see also Weible et al., 2020: 1068-1069). As a result, capacities of nascent coalition are weakened by internal fragmentation among their associates and coalition is fragile to challenges and unable to convert relevant external events into their advantages. This study identifies three pathways and attributes towards the nascent coalition including collision, live as fragmentation, and survive as unstable and divergent trajectories:

(1) *Collision* means associated partners of nascent advocacy coalition are usually breakable and fading their roles away from collaborative system. Local nascent coalitions have no abilities to deploy leverage or strategies to fight against the hindrances from competing coalitions and external events. As such, the existence of nascent coalition is unsustainable and be easily disappeared from the policy subsystem.

(2) *Live as fragmentation* reveals unique trait of nascent coalition that is generally a fragmented coalition where linkages among individual partners are less-connected due to the lack of active interaction, inadequate communication, or conflicts from internal modifications between associated partners.

(3) *Survive as unstable and divergent trajectories* that led to another life or “*the second struggle*”—where second effort is organized to run the similar functions or deviate from earlier commitment with weaker or lesser coalition such as emergence of two similar bodies of city development corporations in Chaing Mai and Phuket.

Matured advocacy coalition is a collaborative system where associated partners are highly unified and unbreakable by external challenges. The internal capacity of matured coalition has been nurtured through coalition learning process and gradual internal modifications of financial or political strategies. Therefore, matured coalition is highly united and invulnerable to the challenges from external events. This study identified three traits of matured advocacy coalition including collective efforts against the collision of coalition, live as a united coalition, and stably existed:

(1) *collective efforts against the collision of coalition* refers to strategies of advocacy coalition which all associated partners collectively invested their resources and efforts to facilitate the existence of coalition in a stable position where competing coalitions could not hinder their existence to advocate for policymaking. Therefore, matured coalition has mutually located themselves in a stable and strategic position to fight against challenges from opposing coalitions and external events.

(2) *live as a united coalition* means interrelation and interaction among associated partners of a matured coalition is active and highly united. Matured coalitions have learned from their failures and previous experiences of policy advocacies and seek internal modifications to strengthen their coalition capacity. Mutuality among partners is also firmly structured by their associates, without serious conflicts among participants. Therefore, internal connectivity between participants of matured coalition is well-connected.

(3) *stably existed* indicates that a matured coalition is more self-reliant and durable to external challenges than a nascent coalition. A matured coalition has reliable funding and adaptive abilities to take advantages from relevant opportunities and convert those opportunities to strengthen their internal capacities and political advantages. As a result, a matured coalition is not fragile to the challenges from external events, especially the political external events. Therefore, matured collaborative system is more stable than nascent collaborative system (see also Cairney, 2015: 490-491).

10.5. Research Evaluation and Further Research Agendas

10.5.1. Research Evaluation

This research aims to address why some advocacy coalition is more functional than others in transport policymaking by applying Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the framework of policy brokers analysis developed from the ACF theory. The methodological analysis of policy broker research in recent literature is limited. Therefore, the framework of policy brokers applied in this study paved the perspectives towards the development of new theory related to policy broker knowledge and methodology to examine roles of policy brokers in specific model of collaborative policymaking.

However, this research was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the greatest challenges are associated with data collection approaches. Although, majority of interviewees were in-person and face-to-face interviews, but some informants were

interviewed online through Zoom meeting and phone call. Those are only 2 persons from the cases of Khon Kaen City where the author has long been working with the local coalition for years. However, wearing face mask during fieldwork interviews hindered interpersonal engagement which challenged the researcher to collect in-depth data from key informants. Therefore, COVID-19 is the key challenges that hindered this research project, especially during the field interview.

The methodology of data analysis in this study is reliable and scientific through the application of global-renown scientific software for qualitative data analysis—ATLAS.ti. Furthermore, according to Yin (2012: 126-137) suggested scholars to use multiple sources of evidence, developing case study database, and maintaining chain of evidence. Therefore, this research built the case study databases where all interview data, encoded data, quotation references are stored into Cloud database of Notion and ATLAS.ti to maintain chain of evidence that links findings from this report be retrievable backwards to those evidence through Cloud-link address embedded into source code number in this report. Therefore, all findings and arguments in this study are accessible and retrievable to those backing evidence.

Findings analysed from evidence of horizontal coalition in Khon Kaen, Chaing Mai, and Phuket are scientifically satisfied and well-represented of functional and unfunctional horizontal coalitions to advocate for transport policymaking. However, Bueng Kan is the only one case represented vertical coalition to advocate for transport policymaking. Although, findings analysed from Bueng Kan is scientifically satisfied and well represented of functional vertical coalition. But inadequate case representation of vertical coalition in Thailand leaves the findings from Bueng Kan are unable to compare and verify with another vertical collaborative systems. Therefore, this study is able to identify functional factors associated to vertical coalition to advocate for transport policymaking but it is unable to identify undermining factors that hindered capacities of vertical coalition to run for transport policymaking. Therefore, cross-case analysis in this research is able to clarify only (1) functional and undermining factors of horizontal coalitions in transport policymaking and (2) functional factors associated with horizontal and vertical coalitions in transport policymaking, but the study is unable to compare and clarify undermining factors of unfunctional vertical coalitions. One reason is because the study designs to compare between functional factors of horizontal and vertical collaborative policymaking, another reason is the lack of unfunctional vertical collation in Thailand that is comparable with Bueng Kan and specifically handling with transport policymaking area.

10.5.2. Future Research Agendas

This research suggests scholars to focus on six agendas for future research that could broaden knowledge boundaries of ACF theory and collaborative policymaking literature:

- ***What are functional and undermining factors of vertical coalition to advocate for transport policymaking?*** As above mentioned, this study unable to identify undermining factors that hindered capacities of vertical coalition to advocate for transport policymaking due to the lack of well-represented case of vertical coalition that run for transport policymaking in Thailand. Therefore, focusing on these issues and limitations would further clarify what kind of events or factors facilitate and undermine capacities of vertical coalition to run for transport policymaking, or in other policy areas.
- ***Could horizontal and vertical coalition function well without a political approach to advocate for transport policymaking?*** This research agenda is aimed to falsify one of critical traits found in functional collaborative systems of both vertical and horizontal coalitions—the political strategies. Although roles of the state in policymaking is becoming more flattened, many scholars asserted that hierarchy is still very much alive (Kooiman, 2003; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2013; Frederickson, 2016; Laegreid, 2015). Partial findings from this study have already asserted that political approach is necessary for the functionality of horizontal and vertical coalition, but is there any alternative solutions that those successful horizontal and vertical coalitions could be well functioned without political approach? The findings from this research question would verify or give rise to the new knowledge related to relevant roles and resources of political factors to transport policymaking.
- ***How to sustain local collaborative efforts?*** The key remaining issue which is encouraged to address is how to sustain local collaborative efforts. Finding from the local joint efforts of CMCD in Chiang Mai revealed their shrinking roles which likely to be disappeared from a policy subsystem. Leading to this research agenda on how could a certain collaborative system sustain their joint efforts? Findings from this research agenda would enable scholars to identify casual relations to the existence and disappearance of local collaborative efforts. Kooiman (2003) also noted that little knowledge of structural conditions that affect durability and flourishing of collaborative action has been shown in recent literature. Therefore, Kooiman (2003)

also suggested future studies to investigate how different structural conditions lead to the success and failure of certain collaborative system.

- ***Could policy brokers analysis framework of this study be applicable in other areas of policymaking?*** This study advanced the policy brokers analysis framework from the ACF to investigate how roles and what sources of policy brokers influence transport policymaking. However, the author encourages future research to apply this framework or even better refine it into investigations of collaborative policymaking in other policy areas such as educational, environmental, health, or social welfare policies. The author believes that application of this policy brokers analysis framework into other policy areas will give rise to the new knowledge of policymaking literature. Because the nature of transport policymaking is highly centralized to the state while other policy areas such as local public services, environmental issues, or healthcare provision are less centralized.
- ***Are city development corporations in Thailand well functioned in local collaborative policymaking?*** City development corporations are an emerging local governing body attached to local governance structure in Thailand. Recently, there are twenty city development company located in eighteen cities across the country. This study suggests future research to deploy comparative study to investigate capacities of those city development corporations in Thailand, identify their interrelationships with local government, and their influences on urban policymaking. Comparative research focuses on nation-wide city development corporations in Thailand would be very convincing to verify whether those city development corporations are well functioned to support the co-producing of public services and policymaking or being hindered by internal factors and external events.
- ***Can coalition work without policy brokers?*** This study asserted that coalition would not work without policy brokers. This conclusion is drawn from the case of coalition that advocate for *transport policymaking*. However, in *other* policy areas such as educational, environmental, technological, or social welfare policymaking presence and absence of policy brokers might yield different or similar conclusions from this study. Therefore, the author encourages scholars to further applied the framework of policy brokers analysis to investigate how absence and emergence of policy brokers influence capacities of coalition to advocate for other policy areas rather than transport policymaking. The types, roles, and influences of policy brokers might be different from those private and political brokers found in transport policymaking in

this study. However, the most critical challenges of policy brokers research is how to identify whose roles are considered a policy broker and how their roles are critical to the coalition. These problems of policy brokers have remained unnoticed since its first development of the ACF theory (Ingold, 2011; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009; Howlett, Mukherjee, & Koppenjan, 2017; Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015). However, this study has clarified how to identify and classify those policy brokers. Therefore, the authors encourage future studies to integrate this framework of policy brokers analysis to broaden the knowledge of recent policymaking literature.

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APENDIX

A. Photos of Field Research and Interviews with Informants (Partial)









B. Transcribed Files from Interviews

Transcribed files are accessible through the following link. Please note that these transcribed files are non-encoding files. They are original transcribed files from interviews:

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/143xyX5nO4l27Vmw3kopb_qjf4MJqIAQi?usp=sharing

C. Code and Quotation Reports

Report of codes and quotations include 264 pages and contains 903 quotations. The author provides the link for readers to access online. Please click the following link to download the report:

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1YoPudAq0LEJkgdIrHVUZxV6_iYX0TF_?usp=sharing