

The G8 Summit in the Global Order for Environment and Development

Katsuhiko Mori *

I. The G8: Cause of or Solution to Global Crises?

Today's global community is faced with complex interrelated financial, poverty, climate change, food, and energy crises. Is the Group of Eight (G8) the cause of, or the solution to, these crises? I argue that the changing nature of the G8 can be the source of both conflict and cooperation. What can be done to use this forum as a source of global solutions?

In July 2008, Japan chaired the G8 Hokkaido Toyako summit. As a complement to this process, the Japanese government also hosted the fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development. The four main agenda items for the Toyako summit were world economy, environment and climate change, development and Africa, and political issues. Japan invited African leaders and leaders of other major economies to discuss these issues. Can the G8 contribute to or undermine global order for environment and development?

This paper attempts to answer the following three questions. First, what is the nature of G8 governance? From a political science perspective, I will examine the legitimacy and limitations of leadership in G8 governance. Second, why and how has the G8 summit structure evolved in the dynamically changing context of today's international political economy? I will critically examine the role of the G8 in international regimes on environment and development. Third, how have Germany, Japan, and Italy attempted to take political leadership in the fields of environment and development? These three nations had been defeated in war and excluded from the formation of the post-WWII international order.

* Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, International Christian University

Despite this, the financial contributions from these countries to the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank have increased, with Japan's quest for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, for example, not yet having been realized. Can the G8 be an alternative stage for the multilateral organizations of these countries? I will compare two series of the G8 summits hosted by these three countries before and after '9.11' by focusing on domestic sources of political leadership in these countries.

II. Political Theory of G8 Governance

Among the key concepts in political science are democracy and justice. According to Abraham Lincoln, democracy that is "... government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth" (Lincoln, 1863). G8 governance could be examined using this definition. Of what is the G8 summit talking? By whom? For whom?

1. Of What?

The main agenda for the G8 summits has been the newly emerging topics that could not be effectively solved within the preexisting frameworks. The first G6 summit convened in 1975 can be regarded as a response to the crises caused by the demise of the Bretton Woods system that was created and led by the leadership of the United States of America (USA) (Keohane, 1984). By the end of the 1960s, the structural changes in the international political economy budded, as exemplified by the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1955, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, and the Group of 77 at the UN in 1964. In particular, OPEC's oil strategy hit the economic foundation of the industrialized economies. Thus, the agenda of the international regime of G6/G7⁽¹⁾ in the 1970s consisted mainly of economic and energy items, including monetary cooperation, the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations, and economic growth without inflation.

(1) Canada joined the group in 1976.

The 1980s saw the so-called “new Cold War,” triggered by the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan. Instead of the less functional UN Security Council, then US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher brought to the G7 summit a politico-military agenda that included the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Inflation control and economic growth continued to dominate the economic agenda due to prolonged inflation and world recession throughout the 1980s. The USA also attempted to solve its problem of the twin deficits by high interest rate policy and monetary cooperation in the 1985 Plaza Accord agreed at the G5 meeting of financial ministers and central bank presidents. To rebuild a multilateral trading order, the G7 also agreed to launch the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations starting in 1986. While the oil crises in the 1970s brought recession and unemployment to developed market economies, they also created the South–South problem by seriously affecting resource-poor developing countries. The world recession also narrowed the export market for the then newly industrializing economies such as Mexico and Argentina that relied on external loans. Thereby, the debt crisis emerged as an important agenda for the G7 summit.

The international politics agenda of the summit meetings in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War included assistance to Russia (which joined the group in 1997), and nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan. The international economics agenda in the 1990s included the push for financial globalization and the response to global financial and social crises in parallel to the 1995 World Summit for Social Development. Facing the accumulated debt crisis, the G7 discussed debt rescheduling and debt cancellation. With the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the G7 also began to discuss environment issues.

Entering the 21st century, the G7/G8 discussed a variety of global issues, such as terrorism and corruption, the Doha Development Agenda negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and intellectual property rights. The social development agenda included the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), especially for public health and education. In the field of global

environment, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development reviewed a variety of environmental issues, while climate change has dominated the recent main environmental agenda at the G8. The widening gap between neoliberal globalization and multilateralism for social and sustainable development reached a peak at the 2001 Genoa summit. After Genoa, the G8 attempted to provide a visible package of aid to Africa with a sort of reformist image exemplified by the 2005 Gleneagles summit with civil society and some key artists, such as Bob Geldof and U2's Bono, as G8 partners.

Thus, a global governance agenda has dominated the recent G8 summit meetings. This indicates that peace and security, finance and trade, and social and environmental issues are interconnected. For instance, greenhouse gas reduction is closely related to industrial competitiveness, and industrial competitiveness is also related to governance and security. These complex issues have not been adequately dealt with through existing bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and thereby tabled at the G8 summit.

2. By Whom, For Whom?

Aristotle defined politics along two axes of “by whom” and “for whom.” Monarchy, or Plato’s philosopher king, which is politics by one person for the public interest, can be degraded into autarchy when the monarch pursues his or her own private interest. For Aristotle, the second best option was aristocracy, which is politics by a few people for the public interest. It was polity, or the contemporary equivalent of democracy by many that attempted to overcome the shortcomings of politics by one or by a few. The original meaning of “democracy” in the ancient Greek context had a negative connotation of mob rule, or mobocracy.

Table 1 shows this framework applied to international politics. In addition to politics by one nation-state, a few nation-states, and many nation-states, the table also includes governance by state and nonstate actors. Nonstate actors, such as transnational corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and epistemic communities, are increasingly and widely recognized in what Bull

called the “new medievalism” (Bull, 1977) of today. Heterarchy by multiple stakeholders in governance for the public interest however, can be transformed into anarchy, such as anarcho-capitalism, for their own interests.

Table 1: G8 in Political Classification

By	For	Public interest	Private interest
Unilateralism		Monarchy	Autarchy
Plurilateralism		Aristocracy	Oligarchy
Multilateralism		Democracy	Mobocracy
Governance		Heterachy	Anarchy

The summit has been expanded from the G5 Finance Ministers into G6, G7, and currently G8. In recent years, G13 (with the five outreach countries — Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa) and the G20 Gleneagles Dialogue have also been arranged. At the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako, Japan invited eight African countries (Egypt did not attend) to discuss Africa and development, and the Major Economies Meeting (MEM)⁽²⁾ with another group of eight developed and developing economies (the five outreach countries plus Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea) to consult on climate change. Such arrangements are a reflection of the difficulties in balancing the interests of G8 with the other major groups of eight countries, respectively. However, compared with the multilateralism of the UN and the WTO, G8+ is still a form of plurilateralism, or politics by a few countries. While the G8 can be regarded as a potential leadership that can allocate its wealth for the global public good, the G8 have also been strongly criticized as an oligarchy with democratic deficits serving their own interests only, exploiting the global south and emitting about more than 40% (currently) and 60% (historically) of the carbon dioxide in the world (IEA, 2007).⁽³⁾

(2) The Major Economies Meeting was originally proposed by the USA, which strongly preferred to included developing country emitters in a post-Kyoto framework. It was renamed later to the Major Economies Forum (MEF) on Energy and Climate.

(3) The G8 emitted 41.7% of all carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion in 2005.

An alternative view is that the G8 summit voluntarily collaborated with the benign US leadership, with the eroded US hegemony needing cooperation from other G8 countries. Yet another view is that the G8 is used as a tool serving the interests of the US hegemony maintaining and strengthening a USA-led “empire.” There is also a view that the G8 is helping the multilateral leadership of the UN and the WTO in global governance, or compensating for the weakened multilateralism. Another view criticizes the undermining of the efficacy of democratic multilateralism by the G8. As for the relationship with heterarchy, some hold the view that the G8 is an important partner of nonstate actors. Others strongly assert the G8 summit is an informal and illegitimate club for exploiting problem nations and strengthening the private interests of a small number of financial capitals.

Thus, a variety of views of the G8 summit have emerged in today’s international relations (Kirton et al., 2005, pp. 231-255; Hajnal, 2007, pp. 4-5).⁽⁴⁾ Perspectives on the role of the G8 are varied across time, issue-areas, and presidencies. The following sections examine the role of the current G8 in the fields of environment and development, and the presidencies of Germany, Japan, and Italy.

III. International Politics of the G8

1. The G8 as an International Regime

Stephen Krasner defined international regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” (Krasner, 1983, p. 2). In actuality, there exist many, sometimes contradicting, sets of norms and rules in today’s international relations. Table 2 shows some substantive norms and procedural rules that are concurrently converged in the four main prototype regimes: national, international, world, and global.

(4) John J. Kirton et al., classified nine different perspectives on G8, and Peter I. Hajnal added other models.

Table 2: Norms and Rules in Four Prototype Regimes

	National	International	World	Global
Substantive	Corrective	Reciprocal	Distributive	Constructive
Procedural	Unilateral	Plurilateral	Multilateral	Heterarchical

The first category is an informal regime structured by formal state actors. The examples include concerted unilateralism at the G8 summit and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The Concert of Europe is a historical instance of this category. An order can exist in the international society. According to this view, G8 members can be viewed as relatively equal state agents.

Autonomy and orderly stability are the ontology of the nation-state. When these goals are threatened, correction are claimed as justice. Since Hobbes, classic realism has personified the state, and the G8 summit was originally proposed as an informal meeting of the individual leaders of personified states. Due to the enlargement of the number of member states and the expansion of the agenda, however, institutionalization and bureaucratization of the G8 summit have developed. The so-called “sherpas” or personal representatives of the G8 leaders can be regarded as a counterreformation restoring autonomy against depersonalized bureaucratization.

The second model assumes that the G8 will also follow institutionalization of the formal member states, as with other intergovernmental organizations. Despite the G8 maintaining an informal forum without any legally binding treaties or formal organizations, joint efforts in ministerial meetings have been expanded and institutionalized during the past three decades. The ministerial meetings of finance, top-level executives, foreign affairs, and trade started in the 1970s. By the 1990s other ministerial meetings of labor, environment, energy, and development had mushroomed. Institutionalization as such may be explained by the leadership of the USA, which needed support from other G8 members in decision-making and implementation of a wider-ranging policy agenda. Realists such as Henry Kissinger and liberals such as Jimmy Carter both called for such institutionalization (Penttilä, 2003, p. 13). Both neorealist and

neoliberal versions of institutionalism assume that the US hegemonic leadership is needed for the formation of an international regime.

One of the norms of interstate joint actions is reciprocity or balancing. Economic liberalism assumes that increased efficiency through reciprocal exchange in the market is good. To secure mutual benefits within a reciprocal relationship, political liberal institutionalists go beyond the prisoner's dilemma and improve predictability in interstate relations. Thus, deliberative exchange and discourses can take place in a more predictable way through political institutionalization.

The third model emphasizes the role of informal agents, such as financial capital in the world economy, and the G8 summit of capitalist states simply represents such an informal structure. For instance, there is a view that the financial governance by the G8 is increasingly ineffective because of the relative decline of political leadership in the distribution of wealth in a globalized market economy (For instance, see Bergsten and Henning, 1996). From the perspective of Marxism, however, the base structure of the capitalist market economy also determines a superstructure of politics, and the G8 summit constitutes neoliberal hegemony serving capitalist interests. Informal policy networks, such as the Trilateral Commission, incorporate G8 and reproduce the neoliberal hegemonic structure in the world. For such a perspective, a counterhegemony based on distributive justice is called for.

Distributive justice and equality are called for as norms and principles for rules in the ontology of the world community. Keynesians and social democrats argue that welfare should be improved by collective actions for the redistribution of wealth. To politically guarantee this purpose, the membership of the G8 might be expanded in the future. The recent G8 summits invite African countries, emerging economies, and the G20 for a larger representation. The attempt for political outreach may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for distributive justice in the world community unless socioeconomic and environmental equality are not improved.

The fourth model emphasizes the ontological existence of both informal

agents and informal structures in the global community. The G8 system is regarded as a “meta-institution” or a “network of networks.” G8 leaders as traffic control officers prioritize a global agenda and supervise how other state institutions and nonstate actors cope with the problems. While arguments against the G8 continue, new norms and rules may be constructed and reformed by deliberative democracy and heterarchical governance, involving nonstate actors. For the environment, for instance, intergenerational justice and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility were formed through such processes.

Multiple stakeholders’ dialogues and public–private partnerships have been proposed to facilitate such a process. In the G8 summit processes, dialogues were held with business organizations such as the International Chambers of Commerce. In most recent years, G8 dialogues with civil society have also been conducted. In 2008, those side or parallel events included Civil G8 (multistakeholders), People’s Summit (NGOs), Junior 8 (youth), Indigenous Peoples Summit (indigenous peoples), World Religions (faith), and G8 Universities (epistemic community). From the perspective of anarchism, however, the World Economic Forum (WEF), rather than G8, could be a more outstanding, informal metanetwork of financial capitals created originally in 1971, when the Bretton Woods system came to an end. The WEF can be a symbol of the neoliberal project in the hands of a small number of capitalists, of which the G8 is regarded as a collaborator or subordinate. Therefore, the countermovement of this informal forum is another informal forum of the World Social Forum (WSF), which was launched in Porto Alegre in 2001. However, civil society is very diverse. Some suggest that neoliberal globalization is to be reformed by multistakeholder dialogue and by the construction of a global civil society, and other antiglobalization activists call for the disbandment of the G8 and other capitalist apparatuses.

2. The G8 and Global Development Governance

Since the 1960s, attempts at multilateral governance led by the UN have been made to form an international order for development by devising a decade

series of development strategies. The most recent MDG strategy became an integrated framework for development in the 21st century. Yet the midpoint review of the MDG progress indicated that almost of none the goals or targets was expected to be met by 2015, and in sub-Saharan Africa, no progress or even deterioration has been seen (MDG, 2007). The North–South problems have been discussed also at the G7/G8 summit meetings, and yet it cannot be said that the G6/G7 meeting was a leading forum for international development. For developed countries, the GATT and the WTO were for dealing with international trade negotiations, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD for international development cooperation, and the Paris Club for international debt issues. An attempt at global negotiation by an informal summit meeting between developed and developing countries was not successful, as shown in the failure of the 1981 Cancun summit. However, the accumulated debt issue became an important agenda for the G7 in the 1980s, because this problem increasingly affected the stability of the financial market in developed countries.

The financial order has been increasingly volatile since the demise of the gold-exchange standards in the early 1970s. The G5/G6/G7/G8 did attempt joint collaboration to stabilize the financial market. The G7 finance ministers and central bank governors tried to overcome the financial crises by concerted lending and issuing sovereign bonds. The Financial Stabilization Forum created by the G7 finance officers and bankers has strengthened international standardization and surveillance, rather than directly regulating short-term capital markets. These efforts at financial stabilization are virtually retained in today's “nonsystem” with the financial liberalization that makes financial collaboration increasingly difficult.

In the fields of trade and investment, the international order was shifted from managed trade by the government to liberal trade, expanding market access based on reciprocity. The G7/G8 summit meetings promoted the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations in the 1970s and the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations in the 1980s. In 1976, the first G7 Trade Ministers meeting was held, and the Quadrilateral Trade Ministers meeting was created in 1981 as an informal forum

consisting of the USA, Canada, Europe, and Japan. These arrangements greatly promoted liberalization of nonagricultural market access, and yet agricultural trade negotiations were faced with great difficulties. The G7 did provide some special and preferential arrangements for developing countries in order for them to be integrated into the international trading regime, and yet the implementation of developing countries' participation into the WTO regime continues to experience great difficulties. Now that the majority of the members of the WTO are developing countries, the Green Room meetings with a limited number of G8 negotiators are widely criticized. The reciprocity concept in the WTO context of tariff reduction is not the same as the "fair trade" concept of civil society. The current WTO negotiations are deadlocked by a variety of economic, social, and environmental development conceptions.

In development and poverty alleviation, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) targets for donors and poverty alleviation targets for developing countries are corrective and restorative indicators used by countries. The G8 summit also frequently makes statements about increasing aid. Although France, the UK, and the EU have committed themselves to reach the 0.7% ODA/GNI target by 2012, 2013, and 2015, respectively, no G8 member has yet attained the internationally recognized 0.7% target. Rather, the relative importance of private flows has been stressed by the G8, as the ratios of ODA in total financial flows to developing countries decreased. ODA commitments have often been made so that developing countries can be effectively empowered and integrated into the globalized market economy. In doing so, the G8 is determined to provide aid selectively. The G8 Africa Action Plan adopted at Kananaskis provided aid to those countries committed to the New Africa's Partnership for African Development. Some critics argue that this kind of selectivity is closer to the conditionality set by the Washington consensus, rather than distributive justice. In market society, Corporate Social Responsibility and Bottom of the Pyramid businesses have been increasingly visible. The linkage between market society and civil society are assumed in these efforts. By contrast, some civil society aspects have also suggested the G8 use the state–civil society linkage to

introduce new currency transaction tax and airfare solidarity tax to achieve the MDGs. Thus, developing countries and civil society actors called for innovative financial arrangements to solve the complex crises of finance, food, fuel, and the environment.

3. The G8 and Global Environmental Governance

Multilateral environmental orders have evolved from the four main events of the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment, the 1982 session of a special charter of the UN Environment Programme Governing Council, the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. The G6/G7 summit meetings in the early years intensively discussed the issue of energy, rather than environment, in response to the oil crises. Only in the 1989 Arch summit did the G7 start in full swing to discuss global environmental issues. France again nominated the environment as a main agenda item for the 2003 Evian summit. Climate change became the main environmental agenda in Gleneagles 2005, Heiligendamm 2007, and Hokkaido Toyako 2008, although the G8 summit recognizes a variety of environmental issues, including atmosphere, geosphere, and hydrosphere.

Setting absolute emission reduction objectives for climate change is based on concepts of restorative or corrective justice. On the other hand, emissions trading aims to achieve national and international reduction objectives by arguably efficient market mechanisms. The Kyoto Protocol exempts developing countries from emission reduction obligations, based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, although its Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) enables developed countries to finance projects that reduce emissions in developing countries and count them up for their reduction objectives. Current ODA could not be initially used for CDM, and yet additional ODA funding can be used for CDM projects under some conditions. Joint implementation, another Kyoto mechanism, is to be conducted between developed countries with binding reduction targets, whereas the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, a public-private partnership involving the non-Kyoto ratifier (the

USA), China, India, and the private business sector, may possibly construct new conceptual frameworks and practices.⁽⁵⁾

The 2010 target of significantly reducing the loss of biodiversity, adopted in 2002, was endorsed by the G8 environment ministers and the five major newly emerging countries in Potsdam, Germany, in 2007. However, the midterm targets for biodiversity were set less clearly than those for climate change. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety seeks to take a precautionary approach to protecting biodiversity by regulating the importation of living modified organisms. The Convention on Biological Diversity also aims at “the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.” This provision potentially conflicts with the intellectual property rights protection of American biological science business interests, and therefore the USA has not yet ratified this convention. The biodiversity convention was originally proposed by the International Union for Conservation of Nature, which is a multistakeholder-type NGO. The concept of biological diversity was socially constructed through this multistakeholders’ process. The epistemic community also advanced the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Compared with the Inter- Governmental Panel on Climate Change, however, the scientific assessment process for biodiversity is still new and much needs to be done to achieve effective governance.

As for fresh water, there have long been domestic rules in many countries, especially regulated by local and national governments. In Germany, which hosted the international conference on fresh water in 2000, and Japan, which hosted the third World Water Forum in 2003, governments remain the main regulators of water. On the contrary, France, which hosted the Evian summit with internationally competitive privatized water agencies, and Canada both promote deregulation and liberalization of the water service sector. *Water: A G8 Action Plan*,⁽⁶⁾ adopted at the Evian summit, reflected a combination of

(5) <http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/>

(6) http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/water_-_a_g8_action_plan.html

market efficiency and distribution of wealth. While it gives high priority in ODA allocation to sound water and sanitation proposals in developing countries, it also promotes cost recovery with output-based aid approaches. What comprises a just order for the water sector is also being formulated in public–private partnership practices.

IV. Comparative Politics of the G8

1. Three Democracies and Sustainable Development

The three pillars of sustainable development—economic, social, and environmental—can be recognized as corresponding to three democracies—liberal, social, and environmental. In other words, as shown in Figure 1, liberal democracy, social democracy, and environmental democracy are defined as democracies that search for and give priority to sustained economic growth, sustainable social development, and ecologically sustainable development.




Figure 1: Three Democracies

The sources of today’s global crises—financial, social, and environmental—are also found in the imbalance among these three pillars and goals. To solve these crises, the political balance of the three democracies must be considered. Using this framework, the following section examines the domestic politics of Germany, Japan, and Italy, as possible sources for political leadership in the G8 summit presidency. A comparison will be made of policies before and after September 11, 2001.

2. Cologne and Heiligendamm

Political power in German domestic politics has been traditionally carried by center-right political parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria, and a center-left party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD). With the end of the Cold War, however, the Green Party emerged as a third pillar. The Green Party won seats at the federal level in West Germany in the 1980s, and merged with democratic forces called Alliance 90 in East Germany in the 1990s to form Alliance 90/The Greens. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder from the SPD, who presided at the 1999 Cologne summit, led the SPD–Green coalition government, and attempted to phase out nuclear power, fund renewable energies, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The center-left ideology in the late 1990s was also dominant in other G8 countries, under leaders such as US President Bill Clinton and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. However, the rift within the red–green coalition could already be seen before the Cologne summit. Many antiwar Green Party members left the party in protest over participation of German troops in the NATO actions in Kosovo. Oskar Lafontaine also resigned from his position as Finance Minister and chair of the ruling party (and later left the SPD and formed the Left Party) in protest over the neoliberal economic policies of the Schröder government.

The Communiqué at Cologne supported, in principle, globalization by emphasizing the need “to sustain and increase the benefits of globalization and ensure its positive effect.” It also reflected a center-left position, stating that “governments and international institutions, business and labor, civil society and the individual work together to [...] realize the full potential of globalization for raising prosperity and promoting social progress while preserving the environment.”

In the area of development and poverty, a notable agreement at Cologne was the launch of the Cologne Debt Initiative, “which is designed to provide deeper, broader and faster debt relief through major changes to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) framework.” With advancing structural adjustment policy with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) process,

additional financial resources were expected to be released for investment in health, education, and other social needs. The Cologne Charter on lifelong learning was also adopted, and the importance of the socioeconomic aspect of globalization was stressed. In this context, a gradual increase in the volume of ODA was mentioned, although “special emphasis on countries best positioned to use it effectively” was made. It should be mentioned that the Jubilee 2000 campaign calling for the cancellation of Third World debt by 2000 was a driving force for the Cologne Debt Initiative. In particular, Germany and Japan, major ODA loan lenders, became the targets of the Jubilee campaign and other G7 members with little ODA loans lending. The key individuals, such as Pope John Paul II and Bono, international NGOs, and other civil society actors have greatly influenced the G7 decision on international debt issues, although the proposals demanded by the Jubilee 2000 movement were not fully adopted. This also coincided with the power shift from Helmut Kohl’s conservative government reluctant for debt cancellation to Schröder’s center-left government, which was relatively closer to a civil society position.

On the environment, the Communiqué mentioned the G8 “will work within the OECD towards common environmental guidelines for export finance agencies.” It also mentioned “environmental considerations should be taken fully into account in the upcoming round of WTO negotiations.” Those “environmental considerations” in finance and trade did not satisfy antiglobalization and anti-WTO social movements, leading to the failure to launch the new round negotiations at the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in December 1999. As for climate change, the Kyoto mechanism was not fully designed at the 1997 Kyoto conference. The CDM was later designed as part of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, and the G8 leaders noted the important role the CDM had to play. There was no progress on the genetically modified organisms issue between the USA and Europe.

After the 9.11 tragedy, the G8 governance was designed mainly by conservative leaders, such as US President George Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The 2007 Heiligendamm summit was chaired by CDU Chair

Angela Merkel, the first female Chancellor of Germany elected from former East Germany. As Kohl's environment minister, she also took a lead in formulating the Berlin Mandate that led to the Kyoto Protocol. After the 2005 election, the possible coalition of the CDU/CSU, the Free Democratic Party, and/or the Greens, as well as a possible SPD–Green coalition were reported. However, in reality, the Grand Coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD was formed.

Chancellor Merkel chaired the Heiligendamm summit meeting with “Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy” as the main theme. The agenda on the world economy included financial stabilization, investment and responsibility, and the WTO Doha Development Agenda negotiations.

The G8 Africa Personal Representatives issued the joint progress report on the G8 Africa Partnership, and mentioned the African benefits from the debt cancellation of the HIPC Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, the latter of which was committed at Gleneagles with the doubling of aid to Africa.

The key attempt on climate change was the Heiligendamm Process, consisting of high-level dialogues between G8 member countries and the major emerging economies of Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. The G8 tried to share the respective responsibilities of these countries and sought common solutions to development and environment. In Heiligendamm, the G8 agreed that “...we will seriously consider the decisions made by the EU, Canada and Japan which include at least a halving of global emissions by 2050,” but the rifts between the USA and the EU and between the G8 and the emerging economies remained broad.

3. Kyushu Okinawa and Hokkaido Toyako

In the latter half of the 1990s the triangular structure of liberal, social, and environmental democracies became visible in Japanese domestic politics. In the period of 1994–1998, the new coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Japan Socialist Party, which was renamed as the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1996, and the New Party Sakigake, an environmental democratic party was formed. This coalition was soon replaced by the LDP government, and then

the LDP–Liberal coalition. It was an LDP–Komeito–Conservative coalition government when the 2000 Kyushu Okinawa summit meeting was held. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi (LDP) died shortly before the Okinawa summit, and was replaced by another LDP prime minister, Yoshiro Mori.

Prime Minister Obuchi placed development high on the agenda for Okinawa, and invited leaders from developing countries to the summit. China did not attend, and yet representatives from Africa and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had meetings with some G7 leaders. After the Seattle clash of 1999, the G8 leaders also paid some attention to dialogues with NGOs in the summit process. It can be said that a wide range of dialogues among multiple stakeholders, including outreach countries, international organizations, and NGOs and civil society, have been gradually structured since the Okinawa summit.

In the area of development, the Okinawa summit focused on the issues of debt, health, and education, all of which became the key components of the UN Millennium Declaration and the subsequent MDGs. On the progress of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, G7 reaffirmed their “commitment to provide 100% debt reduction of ODA claims, and newly commit to 100% debt reduction of eligible commercial claims” (G7 Statement, 2000). However, actual progress was not always made as smoothly as expected, due to the PRSP Process set by the multilateral financial institutions. Furthermore, the Japanese method for the Enhanced HIPC Initiative was to provide more grant aid for debt relief (which was abolished later), rather than aid cancellation. This was an inherent limitation for the Japanese government, which was suffering from a severe fiscal deficit, and Japan’s ODA grant could not be easily increased. Japan’s position as the world’s largest ODA donor was taken by the USA in 2001. Japan’s ODA capacity was further weakened in the subsequent years of the Koizumi government by the privatization of postal saving services, which was one of the country’s fiscal and financial foundations. At the Okinawa summit, however, Japan’s ODA commitments, especially in the field of public health, were made with the strong support from LDP’s “welfare tribe” politicians, such as former

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. Japan, as G8 Chair, committed to the Okinawa Infectious Disease Initiative with \$3 million over a five-year period. This initiative built momentum for the creation of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, via the UN General Assembly Special Session on AIDS and the G8 Genoa summit in 2001.

As for the environment, G8 reaffirmed their commitment to develop common environmental guidelines for export credit policies. They also welcomed the conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, although the rift between the USA and Europe remained unresolved. On climate change, the USA, Japan, Canada, and Russia had not ratified the Kyoto Protocol at the time of the Okinawa summit. The *Report on The Implementation of The G8 Action Programme on Forests* ⁽⁷⁾ was made, and it was recognized further efforts were needed. In Okinawa, the G8 task force on renewable energy was established. International regimes on maritime pollution were also mentioned in the communiqué.

Japanese Prime Minister Shintaro Abe had prepared for the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako summit by proposing Cool Earth 50, which aims to halve green house emissions by 2050, at Heiligendamm. The LDP–Komeito coalition led by Prime Minister Abe, however, was defeated overwhelmingly in the 2007 upper house election immediately after the Heiligendamm summit. Abe eventually stepped down as prime minister to be succeeded by another LDP leader, Yasuo Fukuda.

While party politics is unstable, the relative importance of bureaucratic politics in Japan should be stressed. The development policy is led mainly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), as shown in MOFA's participation in the G8 Development Ministers Meeting. The midterm ODA support promised to Africa at Gleneagles was reconfirmed as before, and the possibility of increasing aid to Africa after 2010 was mentioned. The G8 also mentioned the removal of export restrictions, but did not provide a structural solution to financial speculation factors behind the recent surge in oil and food prices that are

(7) <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/documents/forest/index.html>

seriously affecting Africa.

For environment policy, the Environmental Agency was upgraded into the Ministry of the Environment in 2001. The environment minister is expected to take leadership on environment issues, with strong influence from other ministries, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery (MAFF), and Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).

On climate change, the G8 leaders agreed to “seek to share” the long-term “goal of achieving at least 50% reduction of global emissions by 2050,” although the base year of 1990 was reviewed as not “equitable” and setting their midterm national emission reduction objectives was postponed. Even worse, the G8 statement on the long-term goal was not fully supported by the MEM. Japan will host Conference of the Parties (COP 10) of the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2010, and in this context stressed the 2010 target of biodiversity. The 3R agenda proposed by Japan at the Sea Island summit was also reviewed at Toyako. Japanese civil society also formed the 2008 Japan G8 Summit NGO Forum, with three main units of environment, poverty and development, and human rights and peace. With this overarching structure, alternative global governance was proposed at the 2008 People’s Forum in Hokkaido.

4. Genoa and L’Aquila

As with Japan, power rotation in Italy takes place within short terms. Immediately before the Genoa summit was held in the summer of 2001, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi from Forza Italia formed the center-right coalition called the House of Freedoms, by defeating the center- left coalition government led by Giuliano Amato. The center-left coalition consisted of the Olive Tree, which covered the Democratic Party of the Left and the Federation of the Greens. Berlusconi had the experience of chairing the 1994 G7 Naples summit, and his neoliberal stance coincided with the first participation of US President George Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who first appeared at the Genoa summit. The general trend of the center left represented by Romano Prodi and Bill Clinton during the late 1990s was replaced by the

shift to the center right in the early 2000s.

On development and poverty eradication, the Genoa summit was accompanied by the outreach meeting with African leaders and announced the Genoa Plan for Africa. This was a G8 response to the New African Initiative adopted by the African Union in July 2001, and the G8 agreed to support solving African problems. These efforts of partnership support later led to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the G8 Africa Action Plan (adopted at the 2002 Kananaskis summit). The G8 decided to appoint Africa Personal Representatives to strengthen partnerships with African leaders. The Genoa summit communiqué welcomed the qualification of 23 HIPC's for an overall amount of debt relief of more than \$53 billion, compared with only nine HIPC's having qualified at the time of Okinawa. However, this was still far from the ideal level proposed by Jubilee 2000. It was a notable achievement to have a broad consensus among G7 members, especially one involving both the USA and Europe, for the renewal of multilateral trade talks at the WTO. However, the real issue—of how to guarantee the substantive involvement of developing countries, which now constitute the majority of the WTO membership—remains unresolved. Strengthening and enhancing ODA were also stressed, and a notable achievement was the G8 commitment of \$1.3 billion to a new Global Fund to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. This commitment was announced jointly by Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. It is said that the G8 commitments were lower than the level that was originally expected by Annan to achieve the MDGs. With the UN General Assembly Special Session on AIDS, Annan assumed that the fund focus was AIDS, but it also targeted malaria and tuberculosis. Moreover, it was not only an official fund, but also a public-private partnership, calling on the involvement of the private business and NGO sectors.

While some civil society groups agree with public-private partnerships, others criticize them as hypocritical. Some two or three hundred thousand protesters gathered in Genoa. Most of them were nonviolent demonstrators on a variety of antiglobalization issues such as debt, AIDS, and the environment.

One activist was killed and many wounded in violent clashes between protesters and the police. While the gravity of domestic politics in Europe was somewhere between center left and center right, leftist reaction to rapid neoliberal globalization has increasingly become widespread in European civil society. Since the Genoa riots, the G8 summit venue has been in relatively small resort areas, rather than in big cities, for security reasons. Taken together, antiglobalization movements, the limitations of multilateral governance, and the linkage between developing countries and civil society have altered the G8 system.

In the area of climate change, the early bringing into force of the Kyoto Protocol was expected for the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, but in reality US President Bush announced opposition to the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, and the rift between the EU and the USA became wider. The Bush administration, however, signed (not yet ratified) the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) adopted in 2001. Food safety was also an important agenda for Italy, where organic farming is popular and the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are located. The G8 Communiqué welcomed the establishment of the joint FAO/WHO Global Forum of Food Safety Regulators. But the Berlusconi government did not prefer strong regulation and intended to promote a biotechnology industry.

Later, in the Italian 2006 general election, Romano Prodi won a slim victory over the House of Freedoms, and led the L'Unione (Union) coalition government. However, due to his loss of a no-confidence vote, he resigned as prime minister in 2008 and Berlusconi resumed power.

As for the Kyoto Protocol commitments, both Italy and Japan increased their greenhouse emissions, in contrast to Germany, which almost achieved its reduction target. The German performance cannot be explained by the benefits of renewal and closing the old, inefficient facilities in former East Germany. There are political and policy differences between Germany, and Japan and Italy. For Italy and Japan to take the lead on climate change, it is necessary for them to develop political will and policy innovation at home.

V. Conclusion

This paper examines the role of the G8 in forming the global order for the environment and development from perspectives of political science, international politics, and comparative politics. How can the political scientist respond to the current global crises of the environment, poverty, and finance?

In the early 1970s, when the G6 summit was first proposed, *A Theory of Justice* by John Rawls was published (Rawls, 1971). Political science should answer to the global crises of the environment and development using Rawls's key concepts of justice and democracy. Justice and democracy are political philosophy concepts as well as political institutions that achieve those political and philosophical goals.

In the fields of international politics and comparative politics, *The Anarchical Society* by Hedley Bull was published in the later 1970s, and *After Hegemony* by Robert Keohane and *Hanging Together* (Putnam and Bayne, 1984) by Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne were published in the mid-1980s. In the 21st century, John Kirton and others published a series of books on the G8, which was regarded as a center for global governance. For the G8 summit to play a genuine global governance role, it is necessary to fully recognize the possibilities and limitations of plurilateralism with democratic deficits, and update with a new form of norms and rules based on a series of justice concepts in domestic, international, world, and global communities.

Germany, Japan, and Italy—nations formerly defeated in war and having no veto power—have exerted limited but notable influences in debt forgiveness, financial arrangements for infectious diseases, and climate change framework. The initiatives by these countries in the G8 framework will also serve as a litmus test for new leadership beyond the multilateralism and sustainable peace and development of the victorious nations.

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The G8 Summit in the Global Order for Environment and Development

<Summary>

Katsuhiko Mori

Is the G8 a cause of, or a solution to, the global crises of the environment and development? The changing nature of the G8 summit in the international political economy can be a source of both conflict and cooperation. The possibilities and limitations of this forum will be examined in terms of political theory, international relations, and comparative politics. The aristocratic nature of the G8 summit can check unilateralism and be a stepping stone to multilateralism, but it may also become a corrupt oligarchy. While a new form of heterarchical governance can be constructed through the transformation of the G8 into a global governance forum with African and other outreach countries, and with civil society dialogue, the G8 may play the hypocrite without fulfilling their commitments. The former defeated nations—Germany, Japan, and Italy—did have some notable but limited influence in forming a new global order based on debt forgiveness, infectious disease control, and climate change. Their leadership performance in G8 governance was also greatly influenced by domestic politics of counterbalancing liberal, social, and environmental democracies.

