

# Constituting Democracy — Psychological Warfare, Democratization, and the Remaking of the Japanese Constitution —

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## I. Introduction

One of the most important reforms of the American Occupation was the construction and promulgation of a new democratic constitution for the “land of the rising sun.” The new Japanese constitution was supposed to ensure the security of the nation by renouncing war for all time, abolishing the oppressive totalitarianism that enslaved the country, and investing sovereignty into the hands of a disenfranchised people. The constitution, created by the Japanese people and safeguarded through their own bureaucratic mechanisms, would reflect American liberties and democratic values while preserving some Japanese cultural customs, significantly embodied in the imperial institution. Although the emperor continued his imperial reign, executive power would transfer to a cadre of elected officials who in turn represented the expressed will of the people. This new Japanese version of democracy varied little from its American counterpart beyond this point and reflected the influence of its American military overlords in Tokyo, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. However, despite the American Occupation’s attempt to instill democracy and recreate Japan in its own image following the conclusion of World War II, the United States implemented democratic reforms through an undemocratic process utilizing psychological warfare tactics and manipulation to induce a defeated nation to

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embrace a constitutional democracy.

The Occupation authorities under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur originally intended for the Japanese to produce a democratic constitution that was purely Japanese in form and substance. While writing his memoir nearly two decades later, the Supreme Commander maintained his innocence by claiming he did not “try to force an American version of a Japanese constitution, and order them to adopt it.” Instead, he expressed his view that a new democratic constitution “had to be made by the Japanese themselves and it had to be done without coercion” while also “emphasiz[ing] the point that we felt a democratic regime was essential to the new Japan.”<sup>(1)</sup> Although MacArthur maintained in his memoir that there was no mandate to create a new constitution, he strongly suggested that the Japanese people instead generate one of their own. Such a “persuasive” proposal descending from the Dai-Ichi Building in Tokyo, issued by an American military general, was in itself contradictory to the spirit of the mandate to generate a workable democracy by the people.

## **II. Japanese Constitutional Reforms**

Konoe Fumimaro initially began constitutional reforms in an “unofficial” capacity. After several attempts at creating a workable draft, GHQ eventually grew weary of Konoe’s political machinations and failed constitutional endeavors. MacArthur’s dissatisfaction with Konoe combined with the firm reality that he would most likely be tried for war crimes, led to GHQ’s desire to turn away from “unofficial” constitutional efforts. SCAP’s official disassociation with Konoe Fumimaro and his constitutional revision committee on November 1, 1945 signaled a shift in GHQ’s reliance upon the Japanese to produce their own constitutional revisions. Prior to Konoe’s indictment as a Class A war criminal, the Supreme Commander relied heavily upon two Japanese constitutional reform committees. SCAP’s disentanglement from Konoe forced MacArthur and his Government Section to rely upon Shidehara’s cabinet, which the American general also instructed to form a committee to investigate constitutional reforms. The Shidehara cabinet formed the Constitutional Problem Investigation

Committee, headed by Matsumoto Joji, on October 25, 1945 to oversee the possibility of instituting liberal democratic reforms to the Meiji Constitution. The Shidehara cabinet's constitutional investigation ran concurrently to Konoe's independent inquiry. However, for all intents and purposes, the government's constitutional endeavor proved to be an impotent venture because it "moved like a tortoise and remained tone deaf to the Potsdam language even when the Americans reiterated it to them."<sup>(2)</sup> For this reason, the Allied Occupation initially relied upon Konoe and his mentor Dr. Sasaki's efforts to produce a workable draft. However, after Konoe's fall from grace on November 1, GHQ was left with no other alternative but to consort with the Shidehara cabinet and hope for positive democratic reforms. Only disappointment was in store for the Supreme Commander however because, unbeknownst to him at the time of the Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee's genesis, the influential personalities of Baron Shidehara, Yoshida Shigeru, and Matsumoto Joji aligned themselves against radical reforms. Matsumoto even admitted publicly that "the Committee [did] not necessarily aim at the revision of the constitution." Instead, the legal scholar asserted, "the purpose of its investigation [was] to determine whether any amendment may be necessary, and if so, what [were] the points to be amended."<sup>(3)</sup> Therefore, from its initial inception, the Constitutional Investigation Problem Committee established an agenda independent from SCAP's vision and ambled along a dead-end road to reform.

The failure of the Constitutional Investigation Problem Committee to produce a new satisfactory document had little to do with the failure of those commissioned to understand Allied directives. Instead, it was the Japanese committee's inability to comprehend the gravity of MacArthur and the Allied Occupation's directives regarding democratic constitutional reform. The collective obstinacy of Matsumoto, Shidehara, and Yoshida Shigeru concerning revision stagnated progress and frustrated American expectations for the Japanese to produce a constitution of their own creation prior to the general elections on April 10, 1946 that might demonstrate the Occupation's success in promoting democracy.<sup>(4)</sup> GHQ also hoped the elections would secure liberty

for the common people, rather than allowing for continued governmental dominance by the privileged elites, such as those members comprising the constitutional committee.

Despite three months of effort toward constitutional revision, Matsumoto and his assistants fell far short of SCAP's expectations following Matsumoto's presentation of two documents to SCAP entitled, "Gist of the Revision of the Constitution" and "General Explanation of the Constitutional Revision drafted by the Government" as well as a *Mainichi Shinbun* editorial. The committee presented the documents to General Courtney Whitney of the Government Section in late January 1946, and Whitney then distributed them to members of his section thereafter.<sup>(5)</sup> On February 1, 1946, the prominent *Mainichi* newspaper published a working draft of Matsumoto's constitution that appeared to mirror the former Meiji Constitution of 1889.<sup>(6)</sup> The committee made few changes other than the individual wording of particular phrases. For instance, rather than "sacred and inviolable," as the former Meiji Constitution designated the emperor, the new Matsumoto draft refashioned the emperor as a "supreme and inviolable" figure.<sup>(7)</sup> As quoted in John Dower's Pulitzer Prize winning book, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, Matsumoto admitted several years later "we thought we could handle the matter as we pleased. We even thought it might be all right to leave [the existing constitution] as it was."<sup>(8)</sup> Consequentially, MacArthur also recognized the strong similarities between the former constitution and the draft presented by Matsumoto and the battle of wills commenced.

The failure of the new draft to adhere to the Supreme Commander's standards caused MacArthur to admit that he was "now confronted with a time problem."<sup>(9)</sup> The general election schedule was merely two months away and the Japanese failed to uphold constitutional revision as expected by the Americans. After reviewing Matsumoto's draft constitution in the *Mainichi*, MacArthur contended in his memoir that "the way things stood after Dr. Matsumoto finished his work, the people would be voting on whether they wanted to keep the old constitution or one just like it."<sup>(10)</sup> General Whitney,

while writing the biography of his mentor and commanding officer, General MacArthur, also noted the lack of substantive changes in Matsumoto's draft constitution. He wrote, "Almost all of the other proposals for revision of the Matsumoto committee were so weak as to be of no importance, and in general would leave the constitution as flexible and open to repressive interpretation by the ruling classes as the Meiji Constitution had been. We could see at a glance that the proposed revisions amounted to no revision at all."<sup>(11)</sup> The Allied disappointment stemmed primarily from translation difficulties, but also partially from the unwillingness of Matsumoto and his scholars to radically alter the former Meiji Constitution. As a result, it became clear to the Supreme Commander, as well as the Government Section of GHQ, that the Japanese constitutional committee failed to comprehend the gravity of American expectations, which compelled them to initiate their own constitutional reform project despite MacArthur's pronouncement years after the occupation that "democracy cannot be imposed upon a nation."<sup>(12)</sup>

### III. The American Initiative

MacArthur wielded the power invested in him by the president of the United States as outlined in "Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" to institute constitutional reform once it became apparent that Matsumoto's draft failed to adhere to the Occupation's desires for revision. In the directive signed by Harry Truman on August 14, 1945, the president determined that the "authority of the Emperor and Japanese Government to rule the state will be subject to you [MacArthur]."<sup>(13)</sup> As the general proved many times during his illustrious career in the U. S. Army, MacArthur utilized his mandate to the fullest effect, delegating General Whitney, Chief of the Government Section of GHQ, to form a constitutional draft committee whose sole purpose would be to create an "acceptable draft" of a new Japanese constitution.<sup>(14)</sup> On the following Monday morning, in the conference room outside General Whitney's office in the Dai-Ichi building, the head of the Government Section of GHQ assembled his personnel for the monumental duty laid before them.

Conscious of the importance of their mission, Whitney announced, “MacArthur has entrusted the Government Section with the historically significant task of drafting a new Constitution for the Japanese people.”<sup>(15)</sup> Following the convocation of the twelve Government Section staff, Whitney turned the assembly over to his second-in-command Colonel Charles L. Kades, along with Alfred R. Hussey, and Colonel Milo E. Rowell, all lawyers prior to the advent of World War II. These three men comprised the Steering Committee, presided over by Colonel Kades.

Once the official pleasantries and introductions concluded, Whitney and Kades emphasized the importance of secrecy for their current mission. Their task would conclude once they completed a sufficient draft which upheld the tenets of the Potsdam Declarations and adhered to the guidelines of State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee document 228, known commonly as SWNCC-228. This document was drafted by a think-tank comprised of policy minded individuals from the State, War, and Navy Departments of the U.S. Government whose purpose was to determine foreign policy following the war. Officially entitled “Reform of the Japanese Governmental System,” the paper outlined various reform policies needed in Japan in order to create a more democratic nation. Most of the guidelines ensured civil liberties of the people and established a more democratic government apparatus, but SWNCC also addressed the controversial issue of the emperor and even suggested constitutional reform. However, SWNCC-228 also stressed to MacArthur the need for the Japanese to institute a plethora of reforms. “Only as a last resort,” the document emphasized, “should the Supreme Commander order the Japanese to effect the above listed reforms, as the knowledge that they had been imposed by the Allies would materially reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Japanese people for the future.”<sup>(16)</sup> As a result of the delicate need for secrecy expressed by Colonel Kades and generally highlighted in SWNCC-228, the twelve members of the constitutional assembly labored intensively throughout the following week, striving to produce a liberal constitution that would uphold the highest democratic ideals.

SCAP immediately embraced the opportunity to use the emperor as a weapon of psychological warfare in relation to the constitution. When the Americans finalized their revised draft of the constitution, they immediately had the document brought before Emperor Hirohito for his acceptance. Although the Americans initially intended to diminish the influence of the Imperial House, they used the opportunity of the new constitution's creation to exploit the emperor's authority over his people. By accepting the American draft, the Japanese people would become culturally and socially "bound," or psychologically persuaded to accept the new constitution that reflected American democratic values. In MacArthur's own press release regarding the acceptance of a new constitution, he carefully stated that it was "with a sense of deep satisfaction" that he "announce[d] a decision of the Emperor and Government of Japan to submit to the Japanese people a new and enlightened constitution which has my full approval."<sup>(17)</sup> The psychological ramification of citing the emperor as the foremost figure in support of the new constitution was profound as it insinuated to the people that if the document was acceptable to the emperor, then it should also be acceptable to the common people. In this way, General MacArthur successfully utilized Bonner Fellers' theory of using the emperor as a psychological and democratization tool for GHQ to implement their constitutional reform.

#### **IV. Article IX**

Aside from SCAP's intentional use of the emperor to force acceptance of its Constitutional reform agenda, the creation of Article IX became another aspect of the constitution that SCAP used as a tool to pacify the Japanese and recreate a democratic nation from the ashes of a fallen enemy. The origin of the most controversial, and perhaps even the most liberal, and arguably revolutionary, principles transformed into a constitutional article was the renunciation of war clause, Article IX, which renounced Japan's sovereign right to resort to international warfare to resolve diplomatic disputes. Still widely controversial today, Article IX of the Japanese Constitution specifically states that based upon

the interests of peace, “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. ... The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”<sup>(18)</sup> Such a radical deviation from the Meiji Constitution of 1889 most certainly reminded the Japanese that they were a defeated nation, conquered in war, occupied by a foreign military force, and forced to accept the humiliating and degrading reforms that indicated to the world, as well as their citizenry, that the fate of the nation’s survival relied upon the mercy of the victors. After several hundred years of rule by a military shogunate — a shogunate with a legacy that perhaps continued throughout the era of the Meiji Emperor and his successors until 1945 — the twelve individuals of the Government Section of GHQ effectively emasculated Japan within a week. Therefore, despite the need to create an appearance that the Constitution was originally a Japanese document, the American members of the constitutional convention operated outside the guidelines of the Potsdam Declaration and SWNCC-228 by drafting an article that contradicted the preliminary instruction for constitutional revision. Consequently, the question that naturally follows such an aberration of historical continuity, a familiar theme in Japanese history, is whose idea was Article IX and why was it implemented in Japan’s post-war Constitution? Historians have debated that question for decades, some attributing the article to General MacArthur, while others credit Charles Kades as the progenitor.

Historian Takemae Eiji, in his seminal work, *The American Occupation of Japan*, delves into the origins of Article IX. While conducting his own research on the debate, he perused several sources to identify the creator of the “no war” clause. According to Takemae, Shidehara indicated that the “war-renouncing clause was the brainchild of MacArthur.”<sup>(19)</sup> MacArthur’s memoir sought to dispel the rumor that SCAP forced the “no war” clause upon Japan and instead claimed that Shidehara “proposed that when the new constitution became final that it include the so-called no-war clause.” Following his account of the meeting between Shidehara and himself, the general assented to Shidehara’s proposal, replying, “For years I have believed that war should be abolished as an outmoded

means of resolving disputes between nations.” With further literary drama, MacArthur wrote that Shidehara’s “amazement was so great that he seemed overwhelmed ... [t]ears ran down his face, and he turned back to me and said, ‘The world will laugh and mock us as impracticable visionaries, but a hundred years from now we will be called prophets.’”<sup>(20)</sup>

When later questioned regarding his role in the genesis of Article IX, Colonel Charles Kades replied that he “received notes from MacArthur” and that the “MacArthur notes,” as they were often referred to, were the only instructions he received on the subject of the “no-war clause.”<sup>(21)</sup> Kades admitted that he was unsure whether SCAP wrote the notes or dictated them to General Whitney who eventually handed them down to Kades. He also claimed that Shidehara never “disavowed” his role in creating Article IX, but that he furthermore “never said anything about who the author was” either.<sup>(22)</sup> Justin Williams, a military officer in the Government Section during the Occupation, also referred to MacArthur’s “four ... provisions” and testified to the fact that they “were dictated not by the paper from Washington [SWNCC-228], but by General MacArthur in person.”<sup>(23)</sup> Approximately twelve years later, the Commission for Constitutional Investigation formed by the Japanese Diet sought to discover the origins of Article IX. In their published document entitled “Essentials of Investigation in the United States on the Process of Formulating of the Japanese Constitution,” the Diet members determined that after the Constitution’s promulgation, “Shidehara himself made the similar statement” that he sired the “no-war” clause idea, thus supporting MacArthur’s claim that Shidehara originally broached the subject with the Supreme Commander.<sup>(24)</sup> Therefore, the authorship of Article IX still remains mysterious, although scholars continue to debate whether it was of Japanese origin or a product of a victorious military government.

Although Japanese politicians and members of the Diet would not feel the psychological ramifications of Article IX until a few months later, Shidehara’s cabinet, especially those members employed on the constitutional drafting committee headed by Matsumoto Joji, fell prey to American peacetime psychological warfare operations. Article IX became an effective psychological

tool for GHQ because it maintained the generally accepted theory of the times that democratic nations do not choose to go to war. Instead, undemocratic states force democracies into wars to defend themselves as well as their freedoms and liberties. This essentially denied Japanese claims that under the former Meiji Constitution, Japan was a constitutional monarchy with a functioning deliberative assembly. Under MacArthur's new constitution however, the wording of the document and its controversial Article IX demonstrated Japan's emergence as a new democratic nation in the world, a concept that became increasingly more important as the Cold War in Asia escalated.

Although the insertion of Article IX into the new Japanese constitution demonstrated the effectiveness of "peacetime psychological warfare operations" against the Japanese, it also highlighted the efficiency of the American democratization mission in Japan. Merely a week passed when the Government Section members, sanctioned by General Whitney and headed by Colonel Kades, produced their final draft of a new constitution. The feat was an impressive display of intellectual collaboration, strict military discipline, and a phenomenal sense of urgency. MacArthur reviewed the entire document overnight, striking only one article from the Constitution.<sup>(25)</sup> The remainder of the GHQ constitution survived intact. Therefore, the result of the marathon drafting session was a purely American conceptualized constitutional document comprised of elements from constitutions around the globe.

## **V. Constitutional Deliverance**

The social anxiety surrounding the continued existence of the Imperial Throne and how the Americans would revise Japan's most sacred political institution, as well as the constant reminder of the looming War Crimes Tribunal, evident in the daily arrests of hundreds of Japanese civilians and military personnel, were effective methods of democratizing the Japanese through psychological control mechanisms. However, another of the most notable peacetime psychological warfare operations revolved around the presentation of the American constitutional draft. Following MacArthur's official acceptance of

the Government Section's constitutional document on February 11, 1946, SCAP scheduled an appointment with Yoshida Shigeru and Matsumoto Joji for the purpose of presenting what MacArthur deemed an acceptable constitution. Only two others were present at the meeting, Yoshida's secretary Shirasu Jiro and the interpreter Hasegawa Motokichi. <sup>(26)</sup>

Journalist Mark Gayn later popularized the whole affair; his book *Japan Diary* was a self-proclaimed "eyewitness account of what has happened in Japan ... under our Occupation." <sup>(27)</sup> In *Japan Diary*, Gayn curtly recounted how General Whitney and Colonel Kades presented the GHQ draft to Yoshida, Shirasu, Matsumoto, and Hasegawa. Upon entering the conference room where the gentlemen were apparently examining the Matsumoto draft on February 19, Whitney piped arrogantly, "Gentlemen, the Supreme Commander has studied the draft prepared by you. He finds it totally unacceptable. I've brought with me a document which has the approval of the Supreme Commander. I'll leave it with you for fifteen minutes, so that you can read it before we discuss it." <sup>(28)</sup> Once the Americans withdrew from the room, "a U.S. bomber buzzed the house." <sup>(29)</sup> According to Gayn, after fifteen minutes elapsed, Shirasu fetched the Americans and upon re-entering the room, General Whitney exclaimed, "We've just been basking in the warmth of the atomic sunshine." <sup>(30)</sup> Whitney then stated to the Japanese that no other constitution would be acceptable if it did not resemble the spirit of the GHQ draft. As a result, if they chose not to accept the provisions outlined by the American draft, he threatened that "General MacArthur will go over your heads to the Japanese people. But if you will support a constitution of this kind, General MacArthur will support you." <sup>(31)</sup> According to Gayn's account, the shock of the meeting paralyzed the four men.

The events as presented in Gayn's rendition of the meeting between the Americans and Japanese are psychologically astonishing and leave no doubt as to why the Japanese were dumbfounded. Fifteen minutes was hardly enough time for four men to study a constitutional document written in a foreign language when it took nearly a week for a significantly educated group of twelve Americans to produce it. As if the time pressure was not weighty enough to stress the

gentlemen, surely a B-29 bomber, the same instrument of aerial warfare that terrorized Tokyo with the devastating effects of fire-bombings and dropped both of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would have been sufficient enough to alarm even the most stalwart Japanese politician. Further contributing to the psychological barrage by the Americans was the “atomic sunshine” comment by Whitney which haunted the collective consciousness and terrorized Japanese memories of the war. The final *coup de grace* directed at the Japanese men in the room was the comment regarding MacArthur’s willingness to take his constitution to the people or support the Japanese in adopting one similar to the acceptable American draft. In the postwar Japanese political environment, these men were the new political elite on the cutting edge of policy formulation, occupying some of the highest rungs in the social hierarchy. The final statement by Whitney threatened their political existence within the Japanese governmental system. The four men could easily deduce that since the Japanese government was beholden to the American Occupation authorities, of whom the men in their presence belonged, it would not be difficult to follow through with General Whitney’s final threat.

Mark Gayn’s account of the meeting between members of the Government Section of GHQ, Yoshida, and Matsumoto sensationalized the event and brought a great amount of criticism upon GHQ for its heavy-handed treatment of constitutional revision. Many historians use this same account as a source for their criticism against American methods during the Occupation. However, Colonel Kades, in a later interview with Takemae Eiji, sought to dispel the significance of the meeting by justifying Whitney’s boisterous statements. Kades maintained that he did not “think that General Whitney was being serious when he said that we’re bathing in atomic sunshine. I think he was just joking.”<sup>(32)</sup> However, he apologetically admitted, “I don’t think it was a very good thing to say, as you look back. But he was not well that day. He had a high fever, General Whitney.”<sup>(33)</sup> Other sources support the fact that Whitney was ill that day but the General of the Government Section tells another story, one contrary to Kades account that he “said things he ordinarily wouldn’t say” due to a feverish illness.<sup>(34)</sup>

In Whitney's biography of General Douglas MacArthur, written in 1955, he purposefully details the meeting between himself and the Japanese on February 19, 1946. Interestingly enough, his story corroborates the essential details outlined in Gayn's *Japan Diary*. However, Whitney adopts a boastful attitude when recounting the meeting, implying that his words and actions during that day were intentional, and perhaps meant to intimidate the Japanese through peaceful psychological warfare. Regarding his comment about MacArthur superseding the authority of the Japanese government by taking his constitution directly to the people, Whitney claimed that he "took a chance" when commenting "with no prior authorization from MacArthur."<sup>(35)</sup> He then commented on their reactions to such a comment: "Mr. Shirasu straightened up as if he had sat on something. Dr. Matsumoto sucked in his breath. Mr. Yoshida's face was a black cloud."<sup>(36)</sup> After leaving the Japanese to examine the American draft constitution, and then later returning to find them sufficiently distraught, Whitney proudly boasted about the "opportune moment to employ one more psychological shaft."

When Shirasu politely apologized for keeping the Americans waiting after reviewing their draft proposal, Whitney replied, "Not at all, Mr. Shirasu. We have been enjoying your atomic sunshine."<sup>(37)</sup> He then recalled that "at that moment, with what could not have been better timing, a big B-29 came roaring over us. The reaction upon Mr. Shirasu was indescribable, but profound."<sup>(38)</sup> There is never a reference to his being ill or feverish prior to or during the meeting with Matsumoto, Shirasu, and Yoshida. Instead, his account of that crisp February day is loaded with evidence of an intentional psychological assault upon his counterparts in such a military manner as to warrant the astonished responses he received. Kades' attempt to deflect some of the criticism twenty years after Whitney's rendition of the event falls on deaf ears due to the overt attempts to intimidate the Japanese and incite fear within their midst. Following the account of his psychological assault, Whitney concluded confidently that "by the time we had left Mr. Yoshida's residence shortly thereafter, we were fairly convinced that our proposed draft would be accepted as the basis for the revised constitution"

and that he “had every reason to believe that [his] gamble would pay off.”<sup>(39)</sup>

When the Japanese finally collected themselves and negotiated the terms of their new constitution during several meetings with the Americans, while simultaneously debating the issue within their own Diet, a satisfactory constitution was produced. However, the new Japanese Constitution greatly resembled the American draft of February 19, in both form and function. The articles regarding the emperor and the “no war” clause remained with slight changes and for the most part, the Japanese draft was passed through the Diet on March 6, 1946. On that day, General MacArthur announced in a statement to the press that he was proud to present the constitution and that the new document adhered to the standards of the American Occupation officials.<sup>(40)</sup> In this statement MacArthur admitted that the product was a result of “painstaking investigation and frequent conferences between members of the Japanese Government and this headquarters following my initial direction to the cabinet five months ago.”<sup>(41)</sup>

## **VI. Conclusion**

Despite SCAP’s constant insistence that Japan needed to rebuild quickly and formulate a new Japanese government and constitution along liberal democratic lines, the reality of the American Occupation rarely paid homage to such high minded mores or liberal ideologies. SCAP’s initial failed efforts at constitutional revision through the “unofficial” employment of Konoe Fumimaro, by threatening the continuity of the Imperial Household and using the War Crimes Tribunals to intimidate, caused MacArthur to step back and allow the Japanese to take initiative for themselves. However, that tactic also failed in various forms, the most noteworthy being the Matsumoto constitutional draft that essentially retained the Meiji Constitution of 1889. Realizing that the Japanese government would not accurately or acceptably follow SCAP’s directions, MacArthur commissioned members of his Government Section to take the initiative. As military men, after suffering the trials of warfare and enduring the frustrations of facing enemies on the battlefield as well as on the streets of Tokyo

during peacetime, those chosen to represent the wishes and desires of MacArthur resorted to tactics proven on the battlefield. Such tactics were later categorized and referred to by Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, the head of the Psychological Warfare Branch and personal secretary to General MacArthur, as “peacetime psychological warfare instrument[s].”<sup>(42)</sup> Although this document does not specifically refer to Whitney’s comments February 19, 1946 as “psychological warfare,” it testifies to the potential collective consciousness of U.S. military personnel as they fulfilled their duties as occupiers and overlords of a foreign nation whose government was subject to their demands and decrees. As military men tasked to essentially govern a civilian population, they utilized the only tactics they were familiar with. Unfortunately, such tactics are undemocratic and contrary to the ideals of a liberal democracy based upon peaceful exchanges between nations.

## Notes

- (1) See MacArthur, p. 299.
- (2) See Dower, p. 348.
- (3) Ibid., p. 351.
- (4) See MacArthur, p. 300.
- (5) See Whitney, p. 248.
- (6) “Japan Commission on Constitution.” Bonner Fellers Papers. RG44a, Box 3, Folder 7. MacArthur Memorial Library and Research Archives. Norfolk, VA.
- (7) See Schonberger, p. 56.
- (8) See Dower, p. 351.
- (9) See MacArthur, p. 300.
- (10) Ibid.
- (11) See Whitney, p. 248.
- (12) See Willoughby and Chamberlain, p. 338. Major General Charles A. Willoughby served under MacArthur during the American Occupation of Japan as his chief of the Civil Intelligence Section of General Headquarters, operating from the Dai-Ichi building in Tokyo.

- (13) "Directive to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers." Records of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers; 1945-1951. RG5, Box 2, Folder 2; "Official Correspondence July-December 1945." MacArthur Memorial Library and Research Archives, Norfolk, VA.
- (14) See MacArthur, p. 300.
- (15) General Courtney Whitney as quoted in Hellegers, p. 519.
- (16) National Diet Library Website. Tokyo, Japan. <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/059shoshi.html>
- (17) Papers of Major General Courtney Whitney, USA. "General MacArthur's Announcement of a new Constitution for Japan", RG16a, Box 4, Folder 13. MacArthur Memorial Library and Research Archives. Norfolk, VA.
- (18) U.S. State Department, Far Eastern Series: 1947. "The Constitution of Japan: effective May 3, 1947." USDOCS S1.38:22. Holland Library, Washington State University. Pullman, WA.
- (19) See Takemae, p. 286.
- (20) See MacArthur, p. 303.
- (21) Papers of Charles L. Kades, 1948-1951. "Kades Memoir", RG33, Box 1, Folder 4. MacArthur Memorial Library and Research Archives. Norfolk, VA.
- (22) Ibid.
- (23) Justin Williams interview by Cineworld for their film production "American Caesar," October 21, 1982. RG32, Box 7, Folder 49. MacArthur Memorial Library and Research Archives. Norfolk, VA.
- (24) The Commission for Constitutional Investigation. "Essentials of Investigation in the United States on the Process of Formulation of the Japanese Constitution." Papers of Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, USA. RG44a, Box 3, Folder 7. MacArthur Memorial Library and Research Archives. Norfolk, VA.
- (25) See Dower, p. 373.
- (26) See Hellegers, p. 527.
- (27) See Gayn, p. xi.
- (28) Ibid., p. 128.
- (29) Ibid., p. 129.
- (30) Ibid.
- (31) Ibid.
- (32) Papers of Charles L. Kades, 1948-1951. "Kades Memoir", RG33, Box 1, Folder 4.

MacArthur Memorial Library and Research Archives. Norfolk, VA.

- (33) Ibid.
- (34) Ibid.
- (35) See Whitney, p. 250.
- (36) Ibid.
- (37) Ibid., p. 251.
- (38) Ibid.
- (39) Ibid.
- (40) For the partial quotation of this statement see note 29 of this paper.
- (41) Ibid.
- (42) Papers of Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers. Bonner Fellers to Colonel J. Woodall Greene, January 21, 1949. RG44a, Box 4, Folder 20. MacArthur Memorial Library and Research Archives. Norfolk, VA.

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**Constituting Democracy**  
— **Psychological Warfare, Democratization, and the Remaking of the**  
**Japanese Constitution** —

〈Summary〉

Caleb Sparks

This paper attempts to integrate the study of wartime psychological warfare operations and doctrines into post-war Japan demonstrating that many of the same tactics and methods used during the war were later employed by the American military bureaucracy to help create a more democratic atmosphere while simultaneously seeking to control a defeated nation. Psychological warfare pervaded many aspects of the occupation period simply because those members charged with its conduct during the war were later charged with the daunting task to democratize a vanquished nation and transform their political, social, and to some extent cultural practices, to ensure that Japan would peacefully reenter the international community as a democratic nation. As a result, the paper, as well as the larger project, questions the plausibility of creating democratic institutions through autocratic military methods. After all, many American politicians, theorists, specialists, and military staff all blamed Japan's lack of a democratic government, which led that nation to war against the United States, on militarism and those militarist politicians and bureaucrats who governed the country; ironically, following the cessation of hostilities between the United States and Japan, military men continued to govern the nation. The only difference was that these new military men were not Japanese in origin or citizenship.