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Mapping the Sorrows of War

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But as I got into the storytelling for the two movies, I realized that the 19-year olds from both sides had the same fears. They all wrote poignant letters home saying, 'I don't want to die.' They were all going through the same thing, despite the cultural differences.

— Clint Eastwood, director, "Flags of Our Fathers" (2006) and "Letters from Iwo Jima" (2007) (1)

Our right is but one:
To be rancorless sons
Of our luckless and sad Russian land.
Let our grievances burn, rot, decay deep inside
To the outside we'll spring living shoots: only then,
Looking up, will our Russia's fatigued countryside
See the Sun it awaited so long.

— Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, "Prisoner's Right"
(translated from the Russian by Ignat Solzhenitsyn) (2)

Introduction

This beginning attempt to map the sorrows of the Asia Pacific War has a threefold purpose. One is to introduce the work of Japanese artists whose voices

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are rather hidden and serve as counter narratives to the on-going acrimony over the unhealed wounds of war between Japan and its former enemies. A second purpose is to place the "sorrows approach" used in this essay in the context of the human deaths for the whole of World War II. And a third is to articulate the obvious yet often glossed-over ambiguities of the word peace as it is used in the narratives of peace and military museums in Japan. [3]

Sorrows and Japanese Counter Narratives

Imagine the effects on reconciliation that the paintings of four Japanese artists could have if they were moved out of their relative obscurity more toward the center of Japanese narratives and public discourse on the war. All artists are alive today and all experienced the war first hand either as soldiers stationed in China or as children growing up in Manchuria under the Japanese occupation. Their art challenges the resurgent nationalism in Japanese media and politics and the growing popularity of Japanese war memorials. They also challenge the



Hamada Chimei, "Landscape," 1997

familiar narratives of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that rightly command our attention to the horrors nuclear warfare but fuel at the same time a pattern of victimization that diverts attention away from the other many and arguably larger sorrows of the war.

The sculpture, "Landscape," (1997) by Hamada Chimei (1917-), was based on sketches that he had made while serving in the Japanese Imperial Army between 1940 and 1945. This complex sculpture is a variation on the suffering and horrors of the war that distinguish Hamada's art over the years, including the well-known acquatint, "Elegy for a New Conscript: Landscape," which is the shocking image of a woman's body, naked, ravished, and dead in a scene he witnessed a few days after the battle of Chūgen (Zhongyuan) in 1941. Shocking as a scene, yes, but also startling that it is the work of a Japanese soldier. Hamada's sculpture is a bold reworking of an engraving he completed in 1982 to show the unimaginable plight of the little girl that represents the suffering of the "thousands of dead people and children separated from mothers." The piece is

Sato Kiyoshi, "Shiroi zetsubō no michi," (Road of White Desperation), 1985

"troublesome" to make in Hamada's words, because while working within the limits of sculpture, which gives the image its vividness, he also captures the larger landscape of the vast destruction of the buildings and landscape behind the girl. [4] It suggests the deaths of the millions of Chinese civilians in the war.

Insisting that his work is not art, *bijutsu*, but only a record, *kiroku*, Sato Kiyoshi (1925-), a practicing architect in Kōenji (Tokyo), paints yet a different story of sorrow. It is the suffering of Japanese soldiers captured by the Soviet army as prisoners of war in August 1945. Sato was an officer in the fabled Kwantung (Guandong) Army in Manchuria and spent two years in Soviet prison camps set up along the main Baikal-Amur railroad line before he was released and repatriated to Japan. As with the "Road of White Desperation" shown here, Sato's oil paintings are the visual narratives of the suffering of — and Soviet brutality toward — some 650,000 Japanese POWs. An estimated 100,000 died in the Siberian labor camps — possibly as many as all American military deaths in the Pacific theater of the war — while among those who survived were some who were forced to wait ten years and more before their repatriation back to Japan. His earlier sketches detail the desperation and futility of the Kwantung Army in the last years of the war, the capture and march toward Siberia of the POWs, and their struggles to survive in the camps. The "deeper sorrows" of the POWs, which "took a certain time for the experiences to be internalized," are expressed in his oils which he began to paint only thirty years after repatriation. As a military cadet, Sato believed Japan would win the war with "mental aggressiveness," despite the "ridiculously prehistoric" state of military preparedness. Among his many drawings are scenes of Japanese soldiers shooting at model airplanes held up on a stick and throwing mini-bombs on wild dogs, pretending them to be Soviet tanks. Haunting Sato's memory is the "brainwashing" experience of the prisoners and the opportunism of the "activists" who collaborated with their Soviet captors. [5]

Another powerful narrative of the war is the paintings, prints, collages and films produced by Tomiyama Taeko (1921-), who spent her teen-age years in the mid 1930s in Harbin, China, living within and protected by the occupying



Tomiyama Taeko, "At the Bottom of the Pacific," in *Silenced by History*, Gendai Kikakushitsu, Tokyo, 1995, p. 44.

Japanese army. Tomiyama recalls standing with her classmates in 1937 sending Japanese soldiers off to Nanjing. After the war she visited Korea and later to Kyūshu where many Koreans had been conscripted to work in the coal mines. Already in the early 1980s she began to paint on the theme of sexual slavery, some years before Korean "comfort women" themselves came forth with their stories that were then picked up in the press. The painting shown here, "At the

Bottom of the Pacific," was completed on the fortieth anniversary of the war and displays the "graveyard" of both Japanese soldiers and their victims. Among the dead in the painting is a "living ghost" who, in Tomiyama's words, tells of the comfort women who were "crammed into the bilges of a tanker from Pusan" and upon landing in Singapore "sang *'Arirang'* for the soldiers in their party" before being called 'Korean scum' and made to be the soldiers' private whore." (6) One common motif found in Tomiyama's paintings is the fox who, long featured in Chinese and Japanese folklore for its cleverness and deception, represents the effect of military propaganda on Japanese people throughout the war. By inserting many foxes in and among her paintings of cherry blossoms and chrysanthemums — hallowed images in Japanese memories — Tomiyama has, in her words, become a "dangerous person" and is discouraged that her artwork will ever be widely appreciated among the young and old alike. (7)

The painting, "Aiming at the Setting Sun," by Morita Kenji (1939-), offers yet another unusual perspective found within Japanese counter narratives. Half a century after the war he and other well-known *manga* writers who had grown up as children in Manchuria formed their own society to exhibit drawings on their memories of the war. Their colorful work appeals to a wide audience and captures the innocence and the humor of Japanese children growing up within the short-lived security of the Japanese occupation. At the same time it shows the fear and anxiety from the uprooting and recrimination suffered by Japanese soldiers and their families in the months and years after the surrender. These *manga* artists actively promote friendship and reconciliation with China and are grateful to the Chinese people who aided them in the difficult process of repatriation, including Chinese fathers and mothers who adopted Japanese children orphaned at the end of the war. One well known story of Chinese kindness shown to Japanese who found themselves stranded in postwar Manchuria is that of Marshall Nie Rongzhen, who is credited with founding the People's Liberation Army and who adopted a Japanese orphan girl into his family. Morita writes that the children sensed on the day of the Japanese surrender that "something bad had happened...definitely the start of hell, with rumours that



Morita Kenji, "Aiming at the Setting Sun," in Recollections of Childhood, p. 112

MacArthur would land in Manchuria by parachute, followed by an uprising against the Japanese people." Morita's drawing here, showing himself as a little boy held up by his father to relieve himself over the side of a boxcar jammed with Japanese refugees fleeing Manchuria to return to Japan, is humorous, beautiful and hopeful even as he and other Japanese families felt great fear and sorrow. (8) *Manga* art historian, Ishiko Jun, who co-edits the drawings of Morita and other *manga* artists, writes about the later stages of the journey home of some 1.2

million Japanese repatriates to the seaport: the "bitterness of walking ... the joy in seeing for the first time the sea and the repatriation ships at berth ... staying in the hold of the ship's bottom for four days ... and the deaths of many children who died along the way." Completing the drawings provoked the question "why we, children, had been in Manchuria (China)." *Manga* art, Ishiko suggests, "moderates the bitterness and induces laughter, mixed in with the crying and the humor." [9] His hope is that the drawings are seen as a "bunch of flowers" hovering over the "prayers for the three million or so Japanese who lost their lives in the war," while "becoming the foundation that will in time create eternal peace." [10]

With its varied meanings and associations, the concept of sorrows serves as a heuristic device to aid in healing the wounds of war. Its appeal is broad and universal. Sorrows is the pain and grief that all human beings feel over the loss of their sons, husbands, children and other loved ones, millions of them, on all sides of the war, military and civilian, even those removed by generations from war itself. Sorrows is the many knots that get tied up in the hearts of soldiers and put a different face on the courage, bravery, and sacrifice for which they are universally admired. Sorrows is the story of all who are affected by war as it unfolds in its many horrors, in its unexpected consequences, in the fighting stories that refuse to resolve, and in the wounds that are never healed. The feelings of sorrow are also the more subtle emotions of anxiety, regrets, misplaced hopes, and wrestling down the unanswerable questions of war. The range of sorrows in the works of these four Japanese artists — seen more as spaces within a circle than points on a spectrum — also include humor, beauty, and even hope. As a lens to understanding the human dimensions of war sorrows inspires a particular kind of imagination that transcends the self-pity (victimization) or the self-glory (triumphalism) that are the hallmarks of Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and American narratives of the war. As an approach to the study of war sorrows is a line thrown to the other side, pushing propaganda and national myths aside and planting seeds of empathy for the humanity of the enemy with fears, regrets, and hopes the same as our own. It

offers an alternative to the political wrangling and diplomatic abstractions that dominate narratives on all sides of the war. As an approach sorrows is not open to the range of all feelings and realities of war. The empathy that it triggers does not extend to the gratuitous violence and wanton brutality on either side of war, except as a reminder that the extraordinary violence that we abhore is not the exclusive behavior of a few but the work of ordinary people, not unlike ourselves, who are otherwise decent and humane. In warfare there are rules of engagement, though they are often ignored in the heat of battle. There are also deeply held notions of justice and the proportionate and disproportionate uses of force. But the use of sorrows does not lend itself to some sort of ethical calculus or balancing act in which the brutality of one side can be neatly measured and used to justify the brutality of the other.

Within the national narratives of war we find a competition among dominant and counter voices that ebb and flow over time and that change with the changes in the politics of memory. American narratives of the war for example are a collage in which one finds Japan, the demonized enemy, quickly becoming both the new ally in the Cold War and the sympathetic victim of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But the master American narrative is labeled the "good war" and moves in a straight line from the attack on Pearl Harbor, to heroic sacrifice on the battle and home fronts, to victory and unconditional surrender. Chinese narratives of the war carry the label "Anti Japan War" or simply "Anti Japan," *kangrih*. But the war's integration into national narratives since 1945 has faded in and out and with the ending of the Cold War has gained prominence in Chinese textbooks, films, and popular culture in ways that fuel the cross-cultural acrimony of recent years. Korean narratives of the war begin with Japan's colonization more than a century ago and since the 1990s have fastened on the stories of the comfort women. Like China, Korean anger at Japan over the experience of war, now focuses on territorial disputes over small but energy-rich islands in the Pacific and poses a challenge to the otherwise mutually beneficial role that Japan continues to play in their respective economic miracles.

Messy and arbitrary as the stories of war can be, Japanese narratives are

perhaps the most kaleidoscopic, starting with the observation, as Haruko Taya and Theodore F. Cook point out, that "almost half a century after the conclusion of the conflict, the war doesn't even have a single nationally recognized name." Not comfortable with the names Pacific War, Greater East Asia War, Japan-China War, Fifteen Year War, etc., many of the informants in the Cooks' masterful oral history of the war referred to it simply as "the war." [11] Faced with similar frustration, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* more recently proposes assigning the name "Showa War." [12] Nor can the conflicting perspectives on the war, from the victimizing narratives of Hiroshima and Nagsaski to the triumphalist narratives of the Yūshūkan Museum at the Yasukuni Shrine, and the many other narratives above, below, or in between, be simply labeled as left or right. The largest newspaper in Japan, the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, is generally seen as conservative, following for decades the political views of its owner Watanabe Tsuneo. Yet in February 2006, drawing upon his experience as a Japanese soldier at the end of the war and his identification with the left as a student at Tokyo University after the war, Watanabe shocked the political world in Japan in saying that "this person [Prime Minister] Koizumi," whose repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have been the excuse for Chinese and Korean leaders refusing to meet with him, "doesn't know history or philosophy ... and doesn't study" and "that's why he says stupid things!" [13] Under Watanabe's guidance the newspaper, disregarding its conservative label, has taken the lead in publishing its own study on war responsibility in language that could pass for the political left: "The [Japanese] reports inflamed the Japanese people, who subsequently became increasingly hawkish;" "They steadily reported the Imperial Headquarters' announcements with sensational headlines to whip up war sentiment, although they knew most of the stories were not true ... and betrayed their mission as free speech and press organizations." [14]

Sorrows as War Deaths

How important are war deaths in understanding the sorrows of war? Are deaths the greatest sorrow? Can they be measured and meaningfully compared?

Is the death of two people in war twice the sorrow of one? Is the death of an innocent mother or child more sorrowful than the death of a soldier prepared to die? Is the death of a soldier on "our side" more sorrowful than one on the "other side?" The sorrow of one soldier or woman or child that we see in a picture, a poem, or a painting may be the clearest memory of a war. Yet how does the memory shape the understanding of that moment, that battle, or the war itself? There is no simple calculus to measure the sorrows of war. Yet surely the deaths of a whole family or village are more sorrow than the death of one woman or child. Surely the deaths of a whole platoon of soldiers are more sorrow than that of one soldier killed by a sniper. The deaths of whole communities or thousands or millions of people, gassed to death because of race, religion and culture, is genocide.

It is impossible to measure with precision the sorrows of war through war deaths because the numbers are imprecise and vary wildly. Numbers are also disputed in the conflicting national narratives of war, not just between friend and foe but as well among allies on the same side. As a propaganda tool the selective use of statistics justifies decisions leading up to war. It becomes a tool to demonize the enemy and nurture false hopes for victory. At war's end propaganda reinforces the national myths of war on all sides. Statistical abstractions are quickly forgotten and do little to peak interest in the stories on the other side, unless they are reinforced by powerful voices of literature, film and museums such as those of the Holocaust. The stories that are told again and again tend to be highly personal. War may have "profound consequences for states, empires, economies, and societies," Haruko Taya Cook writes, "but it may be as an individual experience that war takes on its universal meaning." (15)

The attempt in Chart 1 to place the sorrows of war in the context of numbers of war deaths and comparisons across national boundaries is carried out with some reservation. How good are any numbers when they are controversial, even among specialists who aspire work with an even hand? When the battle lines and battle fronts are blurred as they were in World War II, how does one distinguish with precision between military and civilian deaths? And how broad

is the definition of collateral damage? Does it include the many thousands, millions, of Soviet, Polish, Chinese, Indonesian, and Vietnamese civilians who died in war time from disease and starvation from natural causes and only indirectly from the confusion and brutalities of war? The risk in offering any number may be the reason why the few attempts to do so vary widely. For the Battle of Nanjing, known variously as the massacre or rape of Nanjing, war deaths from some Japanese sources and also from an American living in Nanjing at the time, are as low as 40,000, while some Chinese sources put the figure as high as 300,000. There is furthermore wide disagreement on the number of Japanese cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that were bombed at the end of the war, from the frequently cited sixty-six in American sources to ninety-three in Japanese sources, while the figures on the deaths, mostly civilian, vary from two hundred to four hundred thousand in Japanese sources. [16] Figures on Chinese deaths also vary widely, with civilian death given as a little over one million, as cited in Ho Ping-ti's 1967 study of the population in China, to thirty-five million, both military and civilian, cited by President Jiang Zemin in 1995. Two highly respected textbooks on modern Chinese history, by Jonathan D. Spence and Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, use many statistics in their analyses of modern Chinese history, yet neither gives a figure for Chinese deaths in the war. My use of the figure of fourteen million in the chart is used by two leading American historians of modern Japanese history, John W. Dower and John L. McClain. [17] Useful as war deaths are in offering some measure to which opposing sides might agree, other sorrows which cannot be measured or which may statistically be much smaller than deaths, such as the comfort women issue, can still have a powerful shaping war narratives.

In creating the chart on war deaths for the whole of World War II, I was astonished to be reminded that the number of military and civilian deaths suffered on the Allied side of the war is more than four times the number of similar deaths on the Axis side. [18] The map reminds us too of the relatively small number of military and civilian deaths for West Europe compared to those for East Europe and the Soviet Union. Turning toward the Pacific theater, for



World War II Deaths

Country	Population 1939	Military Deaths	Civilian Deaths	Jewish Holocaust Deaths
China	530,000,000	4,000,000	10,000,000	
France	41,700,000	212,000	267,000	
Germany	69,300,000	5,500,000	1,840,000	
Indonesia	70,000,000		4,000,000	
Japan	72,000,000	1,900,000	700,000	
Korea	23,400,000		100,000	
Philippines	16,400,000	30,000	90,000	
Poland	34,800,000	400,000	2,200,000	3,000,000
Soviet Union	168,500,000	10,600,000	11,500,000	1,000,000
United Kingdom	47,800,000	308,400	61,700	
U.S.A.	132,000,000	407,300	11,200	

Chart 1, War Deaths [19]

which Pearl Harbor is central to American narratives, one of the first questions for American students is why the United States, given its prominence in bringing the war to an end, is visually so obscure. It is shown on the map with only three and a half flags and no skulls. And further, why are all of the flags placed in the Pacific and European theaters and not shown attached to the United States as a separate country. Battles were fought in Pearl Harbor, Attu and Kiska, but the number of military deaths on American soil is but a small fraction of the 100,000 deaths that are represented by one symbol. Might these relatively small numbers correlate with the conspicuous absence of sorrows as a prominent theme in American narratives of the war?

The chart's graphic depiction of Japanese war deaths is also instructive. Compared to the American war deaths the number is very large and supports the prominence in Japanese narratives of the sacrifice by Japanese soldiers and the victimization from the American bombing of Japanese cities. But the number of Japanese civilians killed is small compared to the deaths caused by collateral damage, starvation and disease, particularly in China, but also in Indonesia and Vietnam, whose war narratives are rarely recongnized outside of their own countries. This relatively small number of Japanese civilian deaths, furthermore, is a reminder that apart from the battle of Okinawa — which has become a narrative of its own — and the bombing of Japanese cities, whose horror can hardly be overstated, the destruction of the Japanese landscape was comparatively light. Large as the number of Japanese military deaths is compared to American deaths, it too is dwarfed in number by the deaths of Chinese soldiers — Nationalist, Communist, and Chinese soldiers from Manchuria — as represented respectively by the different flag designs in the graphic.

What leaps out from the map more strikingly is the many skulls representing Chinese civilian deaths, whose comparative numbers continue to fuel the angry narratives in China. Chinese narratives are further complicated by the particular sorrows of the Taiwanese people who, as soldiers and civilians were ruled as colonials by Japan, were caught between collaboration and

resistance. The symbols for Korean war deaths furthermore are a caution against identifying deaths as necessarily the most difficult wound of war to heal. We do know that tens of thousands of Korean civilians worked as wartime laborers in Japan, that thousands of Korean men were conscripted in the Japanese army, and that as many as a hundred thousand women, or more, the largest number among them Korean, served as sex slaves or comfort women wherever Japanese soldiers were stationed in the vast empire that briefly came under their control. But because Korea, like Taiwan, was a colony of Japan until 1945, the numbers for Korean deaths are sometimes subsumed under figures for Japanese military and civilian deaths, complicating further any effort to get more precise numbers. Showing the symbol of one skull for Korea on the map, suggesting approximately 100,000 civilian deaths, seems not unreasonable.

Imperfect as the numbers are, what does emerge is a picture in which the number of Korean people who died in the war is but a fraction of Japanese deaths and an even smaller fraction of Chinese deaths. The higher levels of sorrow and of anger in Korea today, compared to narratives in Taiwan which was occupied fifteen years longer than Korea, can be understood in part as differences in the nature of the respective Japanese colonial administrations, in the differing impacts of the Asian Cold War on Korean passions for independence and unification, including the Korean War that followed, and in the continuing discrimination today against the large Korean minority population residing in Japan. Another explanation of course is the particular sorrows of the comfort women, with stories whose salience derives less from the number of Korean women who suffered and died and more from the nature of the brutality. The prominence of the comfort women stories draws upon the women's movements that have gained prominence and worldwide support only in recent decades. Sexual slavery in war memory may be more sorrowful and more abhorrent than death itself, particularly for those Korean women who after the Japanese surrender were abandoned and struggled, with many failing to find their way back home to a social environment that denied their very existence. [20]

Peace Museums and the Sorrows of War

Among the many paths, indicators, or coordinates that one might use in mapping the sorrows of war, peace museums offers another lens through which to view the problems of Japan's reconciliation with former enemies. The word peace may be as broad as the word sorrows in its meanings and certainly more common in official and popular discourse. But more than sorrows it holds contradictory meanings and uses. Its most basic understanding as the absence and opposite of war is rooted in the religious traditions of the world. Yet throughout history it has been manipulated to justify war, in its preparation and execution, and to justify national preoccupations with security in preventing future wars. War has its attractions, but few people, if any, say they believe that war is good in and of itself. At best it is a necessary evil. The contradictions and ironies can hardly be overstated. There are those who preach peace but who are themselves consumed with self-righteousness and hatred of others, while there are others who defend the necessity of war yet are modest and forgiving in the way they live.

It is commonplace in and outside of Japan to link peace museums with the cause for world peace. The museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki exercise a powerful hold on the minds of the many visitors for whom the atomic bombing was the greatest horror of war and the possibility of their use as the greatest threat to peace. [21] It is common furthermore to link the peace museums to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution that "forever renounce[s] war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." With the widespread support for Article 9 and the appellation of pacifism to the nation as a whole, Japan is often seen as a model of peace and reconciliation. Yet the wounds of war are far from healed, as seen in the unending textbook controversies, in the general Japanese indifference to the war's brutalities, and in the recent "revivalist nationalism" in Japanese politics. There is much talk of peace in Japan — peace studies courses and programs are popular in Japanese universities. [22] But reconciliation with China and Korea are muted in popular discourse and in foreign policy, which in the eyes of its

neighbors has become partner to American military hegemony in the Pacific and hostage to the deceptions that justify the expanding militarization of Japan. [23]

For decades Japan has had strong peace voices among writers, journalists, scholars, teachers, students, and conspicuously veterans from the war itself. One common thread running in the peace narratives is the horrors of the atomic bombing that feature in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki museums, established more than a half century ago. Powerful as this peace voice is, it represents a particular sorrow — the suffering from the American bombing of Japanese cities. But its voice too often fails to grasp the sorrows of others. This voice of peace appears to have little effect on the "bizarre diplomatic tussle" that has for decades bedeviled Japan's relations with China, Korea and other Asian neighbors. Wakamiya Yoshibumi, an editor at the *Asahi Shimbun*, describes this tussle as the "double face of postwar Japanese politics," performed as "acrobatic stunts" in Japanese diplomacy. On one end of the stunt is a critique of Japan's pre-war and wartime policies towards China and Korea, accompanied by statements of apology as symbols of reconciliation. On the other end is the implicit acceptance of pre-war policies as symbolized by the visits of Japanese prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine, beginning with Nakasone in 1985 — seen approvingly by the Japanese right and negatively by Japan's Asian neighbors as "revivalist nationalism." [24]

In the worldwide discourse on peace, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are sometimes compared to the horrors of Oświęcym (Auschwitz) and other death camps. For American students studying in Japan, visiting the museums has for decades been obligatory, with the number of visitors since the 1980s averaging above a million per year in Hiroshima and somewhat below that in Nagasaki. For American students visits to these museums broaden their understanding of the war in profound ways by countering the triumphalist narratives they learn from their textbooks. Yet the message of victimization obscures the lessons of war responsibility and is exploited in Japanese politics, as reflected since the turn of the century in the annual August visits to Hiroshima of Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi. His visits are perfunctory and his sympathy for the "only country ever to have experienced nuclear devastation" fails to embrace the city's efforts at



"Adapted from Murakami Toshifumi, "A Comparative Sociological Study of Peace Museums and Military Museums," Hiroshima Peace Science 25, 2003, 123-143

Peace and Military Museums in Japan [25]

reconciliation with China and Korea as voiced repeatedly by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. [26] Prominent as the peace gestures of Japanese Prime Ministers have otherwise been in Japanese eyes, they lack the sincerity and credibility of the many parallel visits of German Chancellors to the countries of their former enemies. Imagine what the catalytic effect might be on reconciliation with China and Korea if a Japanese Prime Minister, like Willy Brandt in 1970 before the Memorial to the Warsaw Uprising, were, in place of the annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine or the peace memorials in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to visit the Memorial Hall of the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre in China and drop down on his knees — in silence.

The prominent museums in Okinawa were established only after the transfer of American control of the islands to the Japanese government in 1972. For reasons of geography and remoteness alone, their visitation rates are relatively small. Yet the Okinawan narratives of war are powerful voices for the large number of deaths suffered from the American bombing of the islands but also for the treatment of Okinawan civilians by the Japanese military and the continuing domination of their lives by American military bases for more than half a century. The narrative of the more recently established Cornerstone Museum of Peace in 1995, inspired by the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Museum in Washington D. C., inscribes on large vertical slabs the names of those who died in the battle of Okinawa. It takes Maya Lin's inspiring concept one further step toward reconciliation by inscribing the names of all those who died, including American, Korean and Chinese soldiers and the people of Okinawa who perished as collateral damage.

There are many other museums in Japan whose messages express the ambiguities of peace and victimization in Japanese narratives of the war. What stands out, however, is the growing popularity of museums in Japan that are clearly "revivalist" in their intent to hide Japanese brutalities in the Asian sorrows of war. There are eleven kamikaze museums in Japan today, three of them with the word peace included in their titles. The Chiran Peace Museum, located in Chiran which was a sortie base for Japanese army attacks on allied ships fighting

in the battle of Okinawa, is near the city of Kagoshima in southern Kyūshū. The museum was founded in 1975, well after other smaller museums had been founded in the 1960s, but after rebuilding in 1981 is today the most popular kamikaze museum. The number of annual visitors to the Chiran Museum in recent years now surpasses those to the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. Its appeal parallels the popularity of the Japanese film, "Hotaru" (Firefly), released in 2001.

The growing sympathy in Japan for the memories of kamikaze pilots today stands in sharp contrast to their muted images in Japan under the occupation and even more so to the contemptible yet enduring American fascination for them. American children who may have no idea where Japan is on the map may have strong and clear associations with the word kamikaze. In his masterful website on "Kamikaze Images," Bill Gordon documents eighteen "best documentary" films that have been made in English between 1945 and 2005. [27] Although there are no American museums that tell the story of the kamikaze pilots, the demonic image endures in American narratives of the battles in the Philippines and then in Okinawa.

Another museum that echoes the conservative turn in Japanese nationalism in recent years is the Yamato Museum in Kure, located near the city of Hiroshima. The museum features a model one tenth the size of the world's largest battleship, the Yamato, which was commissioned a week after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and was sunk by an American carrier aircraft on April 7, 1945 in the battle of Okinawa. In that battle, 2,475 Japanese soldiers went down with the ship. Opened in April 2005, exhibits in the museum are focused alone on the story of the Yamato. Its popularity no doubt correlates with the success of the film by the same name. The number of visitors in the first year, despite its relative remoteness, is over one and half million, or equal to the highest number ever of annual visitors to the Hiroshima Peace Museum in 1991. [28]

With an estimated one thousand visitors per day, the controversial Yūshūkan Museum in Tokyo also reinforces the revivalist narratives in Japanese nationalism and politics. The Yasukuni Shrine, in which the museum is located,

itself enjoys an estimated eight million visitors per year. For non-Japanese people who mourn the loss of their loved ones whose lives were sacrificed in the war, begrudging the sorrows that Japanese people feel for the similar loss of their loved ones smacks of hypocrisy. Indeed, as a caution against politically labeling those who visit the shrine, many of the visitors to Yasukuni are themselves active in the peace movement and critical of Japan's revivalist nationalism. The symbolism and meanings are more complex than the cliches and sound bites on all sides lead us to believe. Among the 2,400,000 souls enshrined, there are patriotic soldiers who have died in wars since the Meiji Restoration that were seen in the west as legitimate, if not just. Among the souls enshrined are also 50,000 Chinese, Taiwanese and Korean soldiers and 57,000 women, most of them nurses, who died in their military service to Japan. [29] It is ironic how the translation of their names into English — Yasukuni in Japanese means "peaceful country" while Yūshūkan is literally the "place to commune with a noble soul"— belies the militaristic and warlike effect in the eyes not only of most non-Japanese people, but many Japanese people themselves.

It is easier, by contrast, to empathsize with the sorrows of the Japanese prisoners of war as represented in the art of Sato Kiyoshi and the exhibits of the Maizuru Repatriation Museum in the town of Maizuru located north of Kyoto on the East Sea. The soldiers were members of the Kwantung (Guandong) Army whose role in the Japanese occupation of Manchuria reaches back to the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. With the army staffed at the very end of the war by old and younger soldiers with minimal training and depleted of much its equipment and ammunition that had been transferred to the Pacific Campaign, the Japanese surrender in Manchuria was quick and dispiriting. Some of the prisoners who were detained by their Soviet captors returned to Japan within two years. But most were transferred to camps scattered throughout Siberia, some as far west as the Ural Mountains. [30] These too are Japanese sorrows, which have been overshadowed in Japanese narratives for the shame of surrender. The museum has enjoyed a small yet steady stream of annual visitors, mostly family members of the prisoners themselves. Due to its remoteness and the fading of

memories over generations, the museum's curators worry that the numbers will decline.

The Maizuru museum with more visitors than other museums founded in the 1980s and 1990s reminds us of the complexities and ironies of war memories. As the point of embarkation not only for prisoner repatriates but also for some two million Japanese refugees repatriated largely from Manchuria and many through the port of Nahotka, the sorrows of Maizuru were those of death, broken families, disillusionment with the Japanese government, and hostility towards the Soviet Union. Today the story and images associated with Maizuru are changing. Just up over and around the hill from the museum one sees in a finger of the bay the huge spread of logs floating in the water, imported through Nahotka and ready for processing in the Hayashi Plywood Industrial plant which figures large in Maizuru's economic health. At the other end of the bay, several miles from the museum, is the Marine Self Defense Force base, where 3,300 troops are stationed and which has brought with it the government-funded infrastructure that has stemmed Maizuru's economic decline. The original naval station in Maizuru was established in 1901 with Togo Heihachiro, hero from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, as the first Commander in Chief. Featured on the base is the Japan Imperial Navy Memorial Hall founded on the base in 1964. With the purpose of passing "onto the next generations the proud history and tradition of the Imperial Navy," the Memorial Hall serves, in the words of the officer in charge of the Memorial Hall, as a kind of counter narrative to the purpose and sorrows of the Repatriation Memorial. One wonders if the young Japanese men and women soldiers have any interest in the museum across the bay and the sorrows of the repatriated Japanese soldiers and civilians. For them peace is military security, in which North Korea and now China are the threat, possibly with little thought for the brutality and militarism of the past. [31]

Contradictory as Japanese memories of the war may be, the language of Chinese museums —"anti-Japanese" and "preserving peace"— further complicate use of the word peace. Echoing official rhetoric and popular sentiment, the exhibits of Chinese museums on the war are at once narratives in

victimization, vigilance and triumphalism. Of the thousand plus Chinese museums identified nationwide in the 1990s, 300 are labeled as war museums, with some carrying as well the label of peace. The Second Historical Archives of China, located in Nanjing, was created to commemorate the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, but the exhibits themselves concentrate on the war with Japan, reminding visitors that "evading the historical facts and refusing self-examination can only lead the world astray from the road to peace." [32] However clearly political and propagandistic these explanations may sound to non-Chinese ears, they make sense to many Chinese, including the young who identify with the patriotic themes of their textbooks, films and television programs. Indeed among the salient "historical facts" of China's modern experience are the narratives of struggles for the kind of political unification and stability that American and Japanese people have come to take for granted. Parallel to the "double face" in Japanese politics, Chinese leaders today can be both harsh and soft in their diplomacy with Japan.

Tempting as it is by Japanese and other outside observers to explain Chinese bitterness and resentment towards Japan as the result of government propaganda, no one can deny the genuineness of the national outrage which for mainland China scholars was not only a political but also an "ideological triumph" that validates the "heroic doctrines and enshrined reputations of Chinese communist leaders." Few Japanese and Westerners "appreciate the length and savagery" of the Sino-Japanese War that ensued years before Pearl Harbor. [33] It may be some years before Chinese nationalism will temper sufficiently for the larger narratives to appear on the Chinese collaboration with the Japanese occupation, even in the understandable language of survival. Still, expecting Chinese people to show empathy for the Japanese sorrows of war seems the much larger task, by several fold, compared to the challenge Americans for example face in showing empathy for the suffering from the bombing of Japanese cities or to that faced by Japanese in showing empathy for its far greater brutality in China. Comparisons are helpful, yet grasping the sorrows of war is not a simple balancing act.

One Japanese museum that gives voice to the sorrows of the comfort women is the Women's Active Museum on War and Peace, located on the second floor of a building, also home to various Japanese Christian organizations, near the campus of Waseda University in Tokyo. Featured in the museum's exhibits are the shattering experiences of an estimated one hundred thousand comfort women, many of them Korean, with others from Japan, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies. Opened in August 2005, the museum was founded by Matsui Yayori, daughter of Japanese Christian leaders who opposed the war, and is directed by Nishino Rumiko, former school teacher and journalist who has written on the comfort women since the early 1990s. The number of visitors is small like the museum itself, yet it is benefited by the support of women's organizations worldwide. Because of its large number of websites and the internet's impact on war narratives, the story of comfort women for many students, Japanese and non-Japanese, has become an opening narrative of the war. [34] Still, this counter narrative voice is limited by the reluctance of the comfort women themselves but also by the Japanese soldiers who used the stations to speak out — for reasons of shame. The issue is complicated too by the overlapping confusion between genuine empathy and the voyeurism that attends the narratives of sexual slavery. [35]

The Kyoto Museum for World Peace (1992) in Kyoto is the only university supported museum in Japan. It is also the most comprehensive peace museum for which Japan's war responsibility in China, Korea, and throughout Southeast Asia is featured as strongly as Japan's victimization. The museum also includes exhibits on the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraq Wars, and the cold war. The remarkable story of the museum is the radical transformation of the mission and identity of its host, Ritsumeikan University, from its embrace of Japanese militarism throughout the war, with the Institute of Defense Studies counted as one of its academic faculties. Between 1943, when Japanese university students were drafted into military service, and the end of the war, Ritsumeikan was proud to sent 3,000 of its students to the war front, with a similar number volunteering to work in military factories. Because of its strong identification with the

Japanese military, General MacArthur after the war singled out Ritsumeikan as one of three Japanese universities to be abolished, though the plan was not carried out. Its identity was dramatically transformed under the longtime presidency, 1949-1969, of Suekawa Hiroshi who instilled in the university vision the ideals of peace and democracy. In 1953 the university declared, in a ceremony dedicating the famous Wadatsumi statue, the university would never again send its students to war. In 1990 the university raised its peace commitment to a new level by organizing the Kyoto Museum for World Peace, whose ample and modern facility was dedicated in 1992. The purpose of the museum, in the words of the its long time director, nuclear physicist Anzai Ikuro, was to "face the past faithfully and admit what actually happened in history." The result is that state-of-the-art exhibits display not only the sorrows of war as experienced by the Japanese people but also the "aggressive acts conducted by the Japanese military forces in the Asia Pacific region." One of the exhibits is the story of Japanese people who opposed the war. [36] The relatively small number of visitors, compared for example to the museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is offset by its sophisticated educational programs and its leadership in persuading other museums, notably the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, in expanding their exhibits beyond the familiar theme of victimization.

It has been noted that half of the peace museums in the world today, labeled as such, are located in Japan, while new museums are established in Japanese communities every year. Yet so long as peaceful and military purposes in Japanese museums, Japanese politics, and Japanese memories remain blurred and confused, the passing of time alone may do little to soften Japanese victimization.

Conclusion

Sensitivity to the possible charges of Euro-centrism forces anyone to be reluctant to offer comparisons with the German experience in healing the wounds of war with its former enemies. But refusing to make comparisons also risks drawing charges of cultural relativism. One can start with a few

observations on how Japan, like every other country, is unique and exceptional in its own way. Geography alone may give Japan a distinctively insular view of the world, compared to the continental outlook in Germany which shares land boundaries with eight different countries. The brutality of the Japanese military, however horrific, was sufficiently different from that of the brutality of the German military as to avoid the label holocaust in describing the suffering of its victims. Both countries suffered from the Allied bombing of their cities, yet Japan's experience with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a unique kind of victimization that has altered forever our understanding of warfare and may explain, though not justify, Japan's diluted sense of war responsibility. Finally compared to post war Germany which did not form a government until after four years of occupation, the Japanese government began ruling immediately after the war, retaining the emperorship, and thus did not experience a clean break with the imperialist and wartime past. [37]

The relative success in Germany's reconciliation with former enemies has been explained in terms of the joint initiatives of its political leadership and the many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), some of which existed before the war. The number of NGOs, variously referred to as civil society associations (CSAs) and transnational actors (TNAs), has risen worldwide from approximately 500 at the end of World War II to more than 30,000 fifty years later. Guided by their bi-national and multi-national missions they have organized thousands of dialogues and exchange programs and produced textbooks with narratives of war that truly incorporate the sorrows and perspectives of all sides. [38] Among these NGOs serving as catalysts and conduits for reconciliation, as seen in the research of Lily Gardner-Feldman and Andrew Horvat, are churches, labor unions, local government programs, sports clubs, universities, student groups, artists and journalists, private foundations and "sister city" exchange programs. In the words of Gardner-Feldman the abundance and activity of civil society associations in Germany are the "oldest and most comprehensive example of international reconciliation" and are key to understanding the open, repentant, and sustained reconciliation efforts with France, Poland, Israel and the Czech

Republic. One indicator of the vast differences in the scope and effort of civil society actors between Germany and Japan is the number of sister city exchange programs — 2,200 between Germany and France compared to 228 between Japan and China and 88 between Japan and South Korea. In contrast to Germany, Horvat writes, the small number of Japanese NGOs (as TNAs) have "consistently acted as competitors to the state on historical issues," to the point where the "expression of 'historical reconciliation' (*rekishi wakai*) is virtually unknown in the Japanese advocacy community, whose members generally prefer to use the term *rekishi mondai*, 'the history question.'" [(39)] Germany's success furthermore is marked by the sincere and ongoing acknowledgement by both political leaders and CSAs, including the personal visits accompanied by gestures and words of confession and repentence by German leaders to the cities that suffered German brutality in the war. Reflecting on her lecture tour in Japan in March 2006, Gardner Feldman observes that the Japanese CSAs that do exist enjoy only limited solidarity with other CSAs and that Japanese leaders' gestures of reconciliation tend to be discrete and self-contained acts with "no sense of developing a habit of behavior." Japanese leaders furthermore commonly refer to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty as the fulfillment of their obligations from the war, ignoring the fact that the treaty, hastily put together in the height of the Korean war, was not signed by China, North or South Korea, or the Soviet Union. For reconciliation to be effective, Gardner Feldman suggests, it must begin with the acknowledgement of the victim's grievances through some public act, creating a mutual perception that the "overtures and symbolic gestures are meaningful, durable and enduring. [(40)] The scattered and unsustained work of Japanese NGOs is partially the result of the narrowness of Japan's legal "definition of permitted activities for private nonprofit groups." In Horvat's words, Japan is faced with a "Faustian bargain" from the years of the American occupation that produced an "efficient, prosperous Japan with an anticommunist government" but failed to address "Japan's negative historical legacy." The continuing effect, embedded in the policies of the U.S. Japan Security treaty, is to "forever politicize reconciliation, providing both domestic and foreign critics of

Japan with ammunition...to embarrass the government and its leaders." [41]

The visual narratives of the Japanese artists briefly introduced here are the voices of civil society agents that have been overshadowed by the voices of Japanese politics and foreign policy. It is not that their works are unknown, but that their voices are distant and hidden. Hamada's oils, acquatints, and sculptures have been featured variously in the Japanese media and exhibitions over three hundred times since 1952 and also in a number of exhibitions in the West. His famous "Elegy of a Conscript" is on the cover of the book on the "spiritual life" of a soldier by the widely quoted historian Kano Masanao. [42] With the enthusiastic support of women's groups around the world, Tomiyama's paintings have been exhibited and slide presentations and films shown many times in Korea, in five American cities, and in Berlin, Paris, Thailand, and Indonesia. The paintings of Sato Kiyoshi are prominently exhibited in the Maizuru Repatriation Memorial Museum and variously in Japan since the 1990s. Obsessed by his memories of Siberia, he continues to paint at the age of eight-one, even as he holds out little hope that the "pampered" young people in Japan today — he recommends a draft for two years of national service — will appreciate his art. With other repatriate painters from Siberia Sato is exploring contacts with communities in the Russian Far East where the POW camps were located. The Society of Repatriated Manga Writers from China is all three, NGO, CSA, and TNA, with the explicit purpose of healing the wounds of war. At the end of the volume that includes eighty of their colorful drawings and the profiles of twelve members of the society, identified by their recognizable cartoon figures, are the words on the final page, *"Chūgoku tairiku e kansha o komete"* (dedicated to the kindness of the China mainland). In late June 2006 two of the artists, Morita Kenji and Chiba Tetsuya, and Ishiko Jun, *manga* historian and co-editor of the volume, visited China, first to Shenyang, where Chinese writers in 1997 created their own statue in appreciation for the efforts of their Japanese colleagues, and then to Beijing, as guests of publishers of Chinese *manga*. They were quite "anxious," according to Ishiko, over the prospects of facing anti-Japanese protest. Their purpose was to resume contact with their Chinese

counterparts with whom dialogue had been aborted five years before over the controversies surrounding the Prime Minister's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. (43)

One would like to believe that the passing of time and the forces of globalization at work in Japan, China and Korea would soften the denials, the bitterness, and the rancor that have come to frustrate relations among them in recent years. Yet such does not appear to be the case. Tourism and student exchange programs among the three countries should also have the effect of softening hostile images and memories from the war, but in fact these grass roots visits and exchanges have declined in recent years, again over controversies tied to the Yasukuni Shrine issue. (44) One looks for signs furthermore that put a more optimistic spin on the astute observations of Gardner Feldman and Horvat.

By their nature the fighting stories of war become embedded in cherished national myths and have a long shelf life. They resist the touch of an even hand and may never reach the level of Solzhenitsyn's "rancorless sons." At the same time cross-national perceptions and politics change, sometimes quickly. The recent about-face of the powerful media voice of the conservative Watanabe Tsuneo offers some hope. Might too the goodwill leading up to the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing generate new opportunities for reconciliation? If so, the artwork and efforts of the Japanese artists who paint the sorrows of war could receive new and wider attention in Japan and be reciprocated in Chinese and Korean voices. No less is the hope that some day master American narratives of the war, with the help of powerful voices, like that of Clint Eastwood, in American popular culture, will transcend the familiar self-glorification and begin to recognize the humanity in the many Asian sorrows of war.

Notes

(1) "We All Have The Same Fears," *Parade*, October 15, 2006.

(2) *New Yorker*, August 21, 2006, 41.

(3) My interest in Japanese visual narratives of the war was sharpened at the Japan America Dialogue on the Asia Pacific War, June 18-23, 2000, sponsored by the Maureen and

Mansfield Center at the University of Montana. Among the Japanese participants from that dialogue who have given me invaluable support in my research are Teshigawara Heihachiro, Ishiko Jun, Anzai Ikuro, Nishino Rumiko, and Ishiko Yukie. While teaching at the International Christian University as a Fulbright scholar, spring 2006, Komatsuzaki Toshiaki served as research assistant and translator. Chiba Shin, William Steele, and Onishi Naoki, faculty colleagues, provided encouragement. Among the students who gave help in translating are: Morita Miyuki, Ota Yusei, Teneal Jones, Hirose Sae, Andrew Wood, Thomas Maciaszek, Kamada Sanae, Andrew Steele, and Nhung Hong Nguyen.

(4) Hamada, pp. 199, 26.

(5) Sato, p. 126. I first saw Sato Kiyoshi's paintings at the Repatriation Memorial Museum in Maizuru March 6, 2006. Along with forty-four other Japanese POW artists, Sato's paintings on "Siberia" are introduced in *Shiberia yokuryūgaten zuroku* (Exhibition of Siberian Detainees), published by the museum in 1995. On May 11, 2006 Sato granted me an interview and gave me copies of his published paintings. For an excellent discussion of the evolving and changing contexts for Japanese narratives of the POW repatriates from Siberia see Sergey Kuznetsov and Yulia Michailova, "Memory and Identity – the Japanese POWs in the Soviet Union," in Michailova and Steele, eds., *Japan and Russia: Three Centuries of Mutual Images*, (forthcoming).

(6) Jennison, pp. 88-90. Jennison writes, the "feminist perspective" that Tomiyama uses to "explore the question of oppression and control through sexual domination, has also led [her] to a self-critical position concerning Japan's colonial and imperialist history in Asia" , p. 85.

(7) Interview with Tomiyama Taeko, March 30, 2006. See Tomiyama's catalogue, *Silenced by History*. I discovered Tomiyama's large painting, "Illusions Under Cherry Blossoms" at the Women's Active Museum in Tokyo, whose staff arranged the interview with her.

(8) Interrview with Morita Kenji and Ishiko Jun, March 14, 2006. The drawing is from Ishiko and Morita, p. 112. In May 2006, *Japan Focus* (www.japanfocus.org) published three particularly helpful interpretations of Japanese memories from Manchuria and Korea: Mori Takemaro, "Colonies and Countryside in Wartime Japan: Emigration to Manchuria;" Kang Sang Jung, "The Imaginary Geography of a Nation and its De-nationalized Narrative: Japan and the Korea Experience;" and Prasenjit Duara, "The New Imperialism and the Post-Colonial Developmental State: Manchukuo in Comparative Perspective."

(9) Ishiko and Morita, pp. 177-188.

(10) Special thanks to Ishiko Jun who introduced me to Morita and gave me the published

volumes of *manga* artists. In three different interviews, Ishiko explained the contexts and details of their painting. Ishiko himself did not return to Japan until 1953.

(11) Cook and Cook, p. 11.

(12) *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 15, 2006.

(13) *Asahi Simbun*, February 8, 2006; *New York Times*, February 10, 2006.

(14) The twenty-one installments published by *Yomiuri* in August 13-21, 2006 under the heading, "War Responsibility," is scheduled to appear in book form both in Japanese and English in fall 2006.

(15) "Memories of Japan's Last War," in West.

(16) John Dower, a leading American historian of the war, gives the figure of sixty-six in his *Embracing Defeat* (p. 45), while James L. McClain, in his acclaimed *Japan a Modern History* (p. 506), also gives the figure of sixty-six, along with vivid descriptions that are highly sympathetic to Japanese suffering. The Japanese figures are on display in one of the exhibits of the Kyoto Museum for World Peace at Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto and are based on three Japanese sources: *Nihon no kūshū* (The Airraids of Japan), Sanseido, 1991, *Sensō fukkōshi* (A History of War Reconstruction), Ministry of Communication, 1970, and *Shūkan asahi hyakka, Nihon no rekishi* (The Weekly Asahi Encyclopedia of Japanese History), Asahi Shimbun, 1990. Chinese civilian deaths from the Japanese bombing of Chinese cities, though rarely mentioned in general studies of the war, compared for example to the German deaths from Allied bombing and Japanese deaths from American bombing, were still very large. In his *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953*, Ho Ping-ti gives the figure of 335,934 Chinese "killed in air raids" (p. 252).

(17) Hsü's *The Rise of Modern China* devotes thirty-five pages in his 1020 page textbook to the Sino-Japanese war, saying only that "civilian and property losses were incalculable" (pp. 611-612), while Johathan D. Spence's 728 page *The Search for Modern China* in forty-eight pages on the war, gives the figure of 250,000 Chinese troops "killed or wounded" while the Japanese "took 40,000 or more casualties" (p. 423), in summing up the fighting in 1937. For the effects of Chiang Kai-shek's blowing up the dikes of the Yellow River in 1938, Spence writes, "the ensuing flood stalled the Japanese for three months, destroyed more than 4,000 north China villages, and killed unknown numbers of local peasants." For the Battle of Nanjing he writes "it is difficult to establish exact figures" (p. 424), and for the war as a whole gives no general figures.

(18) I was astonished to see these comparative figures for deaths from in the war, despite my living for two years in Poland teaching English at The University of Warsaw and three visits

to the concentration camp at Oświęcim (Auschwitz) and working four months at the Gossner Mission in Germany.

(19) My thanks to Sasaki Yoko and Tsukisawa Atsuko at the Integrated Learning Center at ICU for creating the graphic on war deaths. The map itself is modeled after the imaginative graphics on World War II deaths created by Matthew White and viewed August 1, 2006 at http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/ww2-loss.htm. The figures used in the site build on the base, with some changes explained below, created by the Wikipedia website on war deaths, viewed August 1, 2006, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties. Their figures, Wikipedia claims, draw upon twenty-four different sources, both official and unofficial, published in Western language sources, primarily English (20) but also including Russian (3), and German (1) sources. Twenty of the sources have been published since 1990 and include the extensive work of R. J. Rummel's *Statistics of Democide*, which is also available on the internet. In *China's Bloody Century* (Table 5A), Rummel cites sources on the spread among Chinese military and civilian war deaths that range from 10.6 million to 37 million and offers his own estimate of the total as 19,000,000. To its credit Wikipedia states "Please be advised that nothing found here has necessarily been reviewed by professionals with the expertise required to provide you with complete, accurate or reliable information." Bearing this disclaimer in mind, I have used most of their figures in making the chart, but have given higher numbers to China and Indonesdia based upon the work of other scholars whose works carry academic weight. For Chinese figures see my discussion in footnote 16 above. For Indonesian war deaths I feel less confident but have chosen to use the figures that McClain, pp. 497-498, cites from a United Nations report that estimates three million people on Java and an additional one million Indonesians on the offshore islands were "killed by the Japanese or died from hunger, disease, and lack of medical care," while "probably one-half of the estimated 300,000 to one million Indonesians conscripted by the Japanese as forced laborers perished."

(20) With figures from callers using hotlines in Japanese cities in 1992, George Hicks offers the estimate of a total of 139,000 women, the majority of them Korean, used as comfort women during the war, and among them 23,000 who died in the course of the war, pp. xviii-xix. The Women's Active Museum in Tokyo with exhibits, materials and archives on the comfort women does not give any figure either for the number of comfort women who served the Japanese Imperial Army or for those who died. But it does feature the photos and stories of the hundreds of women who have come forth with their stories yet remain but a tiny fraction of the number assumed still to be alive today. McClain (p. 497) writes, "in addition

to the comfort women, as many as 70,000 Korean males died as manual laborers in Japan or as 'volunteers' in the Imperial Army." The Cornerstone of Peace in Okinawa lists the names of 263 Koreans who were killed in the Battle of Okinawa. The Center for Documenting the Tokyo Raid and War Damages gives the figure of 5,000 Koreans who were killed in the American bombing of Japanese cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In "The end of silence: Korea's A-bomb victims seek redress," *Japan Times*, August 2, 2005 Andrew Hippen writes "Ten percent of the hundreds of thousands of victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were Korean. Most of them were forced laborers making guns and ammunition in the factories of the Japanese military. Others were landless farmers, mostly from Hapcheon, looking for employment in Japanese cities."

(21) Ikuro Anzai, "Museums for Peace in Japan and Other Asian Countries," Masaru Koizumi, "The Role of the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum," and Akiko Tokai, "The Power of Active Learning: The Joint Peace Tour in Hiroshima and Nagasaki," in van den Dungen and Duffy, eds., respectively, pp. 37-44, pp.150-152, and pp.178-183.

(22) According to a report on "The History and Organization of Peace Research in Japan," the Peace Studies Association in Japan has "gradually grown to be the largest national peace-research association in the world." See www.soc.nii.ac.jp/psaj.

(23) In *The Sorrows of Empire* (pp. 2-3), Chalmers Johnson writes, "During the almost fifty years of superpower standoff, the United States denied that its activities constituted a form of imperialism... The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks produced a dangerous change in the thinking of some of our leaders, who began to see our republic as a genuine empire, a new Rome, the greatest colossus in history, no longer bound by international law, the concerns of allies, or any constraints on its use of military force."

(24) "Law of Next Year in Japanese Politics," *Asahi Shimbun*, April 12, 2006. Prime Ministers Sato in the 1960s, Fukuda in the 1970s, and Nakasone in the 1980s either visited China and Korea or received their heads of states. But within a period of two years they managed to communicate to their Asian neighbors conflicting official diplomatic intentions based on conflicting views of the war. In 1998 Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Jiang Zemin were invited to Japan by Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo who during their visits expressed apologies over the war in signed joint declarations. But a year later in 1999 the Japanese Diet passed laws reestablishing the flag of wartime Japan, the Hinomaru, as the national flag and the wartime national anthem, Kimigayo, as the national anthem. Wakamiya of the liberal *Asahi Shimbun*, and no less Watanabe Tsuneo of the conservative *Yomiuri Shimbun*, worry about Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro's annual visits since 2001 to the Yasukuni Shrine, his

insistence that they are strictly personal in nature, and his repeated dismissal of Chinese and Korean protests against the association of his visits with pre-war Japanese militarism, denial of war responsibility and support for expanding the size of the Japanese military establishment.

(25) Murakami's chart showing the number of visitors to Japanese peace museums up through 1997 is found in "Museums for Peace in Japan and Other Asian Countries," in van den Dungen and Duffy, p. 49. Professor Murakami kindly provided me with more recent figures on visitors to selected museums, via e-mail attachment, April 10, 2006. For a more in-depth analysis comparing Japanese museums with those in other countries see Murakami, pp. 123-143. Complete figures for the Maizuru museum were obtained during my visit to Maizuru, March 6, 2006.

(26) *Chūgoku Shimbun*, August 7, 2003, Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister, August 6, 2006.

(27) Bill Gordon's comprehensive and imaginative website, "Kamikaze Images," can be found on www.wesleyan.edu/kamikaze. The website was completed in partial fulfillment of his M.A. thesis in Liberal Studies at Wesleyan University in 2005. In addition his many pages on museums, Gordon offers extensive and updated discussions on films and books on the kamikaze stories. Clearly fascinated himself in discussing the museums, he points out the Army bias at the Chiran museum, ignoring the sixty percent of kamikaze pilots who were in the navy, and informs us that the kamikaze pilots were only one of the suicide attack operations, the others being manned torpedos, suicide frogmen, midget submarines, and explosive motorboats.

(28) E-mail letter to author from Anzai Ikuro, April 7, 2006.

(29) Excellent analyses of the historical and cultural underpinnings for the Yasukuni controversy are articles by Breen and McGreevy, respectively in the June 3 and August 10, 2005 issues of *Japan Focus*.

(30) Igarashi, pp. 105-132. An excellent fictional account of the Japanese POW experience in Siberia, based on interviews with returnees, is Yamasaki.

(31) Visit to Maizuru Repatriation Memorial Museum and Imperial Navy Memorial Hall in Maizuru, March 6, 2006.

(32) Wang, p. 139. In the same volume are other articles on Chinese museums by Zheng Chengjun and Guo Biqiang.

(33) "Report on the Conference on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, January 7-10, 2004," organized under the overall direction of Ezra Vogel of Harvard

University, www.fas.harvard.edu/asiactr/sin-japanese/2004summary.

(34) Before her death in 2002 Matsui was credited with organizing the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery, held in Tokyo, December 8-12, 2000. I am grateful to Nishino Rumiko, director of the museum, for hosting my visit to the museum, February 1, 2006 and for introducing me to Tomiyama Taeko's original painting, "Illusion under Cherry Blossoms," 162 x 130 cm, donated to the museum and prominently displayed as one of the exhibits. See the Women's Active Museum catalogue.

(35) See Twomey, pp. 175-184.

(36) I am grateful to Anzai Ikuro for his insight and guidance in my work, beginning with my first visit to the museum in March 2000 when I was organizing the Mansfield Center's Dialogue on the Asia Pacific War held in June 2000. Anzai has consulted with other Japanese peace museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on exhibits to place more emphasis on war responsibility and with the Repatriation Memorial Museum in Maizuru in its plans for expansion. In the spring of 2005 the Kyoto Museum for World Peace featured a traveling exhibit of the drawings of the *manga* artists who are introduced in this essay.

(37) Gebhard Hielscher, April 7, 2006, conference on "The Contribution of Civil Society to Historical Reconciliation in Europe, Opportunities for a Fresh Look at East Asia's Politics of History," Tokyo, April 7, 2006, sponsored by the Goethe Institut, Tokyo, and organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Tokyo Office, and the International Center for the Study of Historical Reconciliation, Tokyo Keizai University.

(38) Iriye, pp. 47-62. See also Toulmin.

(39) Gardner Feldman. Horvat (forthcoming).

(40) Gardner Feldman.

(41) Horvat.

(42) A lengthy discussion on the life and work of Hamada is included in Kano.

(43) According to Ishiko Jun in an interview June 6, 2006, there was considerable anxiety among the writers on how they would be received in China, given the high level of anti-Japanese sentiment protesting Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.

(44) The correlation between these declining numbers on Japan's relations with China and Korea was pointed out to me in an interview, June 19, 2006, with Yamaguchi Takashi who as an employee with the Japan Travel Bureau has led many Japanese tours and study groups abroad including China. The materials he provided me beg further research to correlate tourism and study tour levels with the changes in Japanese foreign policy and attitudes towards China and Korea.

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Mapping the Sorrows of War

〈Summary〉

Philip West

The two keywords in this essay, mapping and sorrows, are used as heuristic devices to explore the sticky problems of reconciliation among former enemies from the Asia Pacific War, 1931-1945, primarily Japan and China, but also Korea and the United States. Sorrows, as a word and concept, offers an innovative approach to healing the wounds of war by countering the powerful influence of war memories in the familiar narratives of self-pity and self-glorification. In the language of politics and diplomacy, as found generally in textbook writing and military history, victimization and triumphalism are often presented as opposing narratives. But looking at war and its unhealed wounds through the lens of sorrows, we see that they have much in common. Both fail to address the human dimensions of war as experienced by the other side. By its nature the sorrows approach, relying more on literature and art than on official documents, holds universal appeal and avoids some of the common pitfalls of national histories. Among the many ways one might map or frame the wounds of the Asia Pacific War, three are introduced here-mindful of the limitations of a short essay. One is looking very briefly at the sorrows of war as represented in the work of four Japanese artists, whose voices of reconciliation have been overwhelmed by the master narratives that are shaped by Japanese politics. A second is offering a comparison of the number of military and civilian deaths among the war's participants, including those from the European theater. This part of the mapping exercise is particularly useful in creating perspective for Japanese, Chinese, and American deaths, though less so for Korean deaths. A third way of mapping, appropriate for publishing the essay in Japan, is to explore how

reconciliation is addressed in peace and military museums in Japan today. This mapping exercise by nature is imprecise and does not claim to be scientific. Still, the intent is to offer an innovative way to understand the unhealed wounds of war with possible implications for rescuing war narratives from their diplomatic and cross-cultural impasse. The essay closes with reference to Germany's experience of reconciliation and some reflections on the roles of civil society.