

Comprehensiveness of the Austrian Security Policy

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I. Introduction

In December 2001 the National Assembly, one of the two chambers of the Austrian Parliament, adopted a new Security and Defence Doctrine.⁽¹⁾ One of its basic principles is comprehensive security.⁽²⁾ According to the Austrian Federal Chancellery, the comprehensive security means appropriate attribution of importance to both military and non-military aspects of security. What does the comprehensive security mean in the Austrian specific context? Many literatures have already discussed problematics of comprehensive security in general and constructed its analytical framework.⁽³⁾ In addition to such theoretical approach, it should be analysed also from the perspective of each state. First, it conceptualises a security policy more or less of its own depending on its own risk and threat perception as well as security interests. Second, nation states are still monopolising the sovereignty in security policy. Any bi- and multilateral agreements are only common denominators of their national security interests. Also in Europe, though there is the highly developed security system based on the regional multilateral arrangements such as the NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the sovereignty in security policy is still in the hands of each state.

This article analyses the comprehensiveness of the Austrian security policy based on the present Doctrine.⁽⁴⁾ Additionally, also security concept of the opposition parties, the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Greens, should be analysed. True, since the adaptation of the Doctrine the Middle-

Right Government has determined the orientation of the security policy and the bureaucracy have huge influence on the policy-making. However, the opposition can affect the governmental security policy in negotiation processes in the Parliament. Moreover, the Doctrine was approved only by the coalition parties because of the disagreement in the matter of the Austrian permanent neutrality and a future accession to the NATO. The SPÖ and the Greens respectively spoke of an expiry of the Doctrine in case of their participation in a Government.⁽⁵⁾

In the next chapter, prior to the empirical analysis of backgrounds of the comprehensive concept of security, risk and threat perception and means for addressing them in the Chapter 3, the definition the terms of security and security policy by the Austrian Government are described. Then, the security concepts of the SPÖ and the Green Party are compared with those of the Government. In conclusion the comprehensiveness of the Austrian security policy is summarized and agenda for it are mentioned in short.

The Doctrine and its Analytic Part⁽⁶⁾ of the Austrian Government consisting of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) are the basic materials for the empirical analysis. The latter worked out by the high rank officials and officers appointed by the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister and the Interior Minister, is the basis for the Doctrine. Additionally, the official papers and reports issued by the Government and the political parties, articles written by persons who take part in the development process of security policy, and interviews held by the author are used.

II. What is *Security*? What is *Security Policy*?

The Analytic Part of the Doctrine defines the term security as “a state of relative invulnerability.”⁽⁷⁾ The security is divided in external and internal dimensions. The external security is to understand as “situation which is relatively not affected by dangers and risks in the international context.”⁽⁸⁾ The internal security is “the results of a policy of the provision against or the avoidance of dangers and threats which can affect a society and its institutions

‘from inside’ and thereby impede the capability of behaviour and function, the development of its own lives within state or the democratic freedoms, and the individual security of the human.”⁽⁹⁾

According to the definition by Erich Reiter, the Director General of the Federal Ministry for National Defence and a main author of the Analytic Part, security policy relates to “measures and means for the internal security i.e. protecting the valid national and regal order and life and freedom of citizens inside state and measures for international external security aiming at avoiding, containing, and ending cross-border violent conflicts and stabilising of the international situation.”⁽¹⁰⁾

This understanding of the both concepts shows the comprehensiveness in the dimension of objects. The objects of the Austrian security policy namely include not only collective entities such as state, society and institution but also lives and human rights of its individual citizens. With this regard, the Austrian vital security interests include the protection and the promotion of the basic values (respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms, plural democracy, and rule of law) as well as the comprehensive protection of the citizens.⁽¹¹⁾

III. The Austrian Comprehensive Security Policy

1. Backgrounds

The comprehensive security policy of Austria is a reaction to the paradigm change in Europe after the end of the Cold War. The Analytic Part lists the following factors building the framework conditions for security policy in Europe:⁽¹²⁾

- Invisibility of world politics after the collapse of the bipolar system;
- Increase of non-state as well as state actors pursuing their own interests outside the traditional political order;
- Closer connection between domestic and external security issues;
- Cross-borderness of security issues;

- Dependence of national security on the regional security which is influenced by the global security and relativisation of geographical distance in its consequence.

At the global level,⁽¹³⁾ additionally, the framework conditions also include the globalisation, the change of the power concept, and the worldwide information and communication network. The globalisation resulted in the rise and the networking of new non-state power holders on the one hand and the restriction of room for autonomous manoeuvre of states on the other hand. Especially in the western industrial states the power has included not only military dimension but also the technology and science dimensions, the capability of asserting own laws and values as well as the control of knowledge and information.

To sum up, the collapse of the bipolar system and the globalisation have diminished the meaning of the border, promoted the interaction of the external and internal security issues, and increased the influence of the non-state actors. All of them have led to the invisibility of the development of international politics and the dependence of the national security on the regional and global security.⁽¹⁴⁾ This situation determines the nature of security issues which the Austrian Government perceives as security risks or threats.

2. Risk and Threat Perception

What does the Austrian Government perceive as risks, dangers or threats? According to the Doctrine, the internal security of Austria is now not seriously endangered by domestically motivated political terrorism in consequence of the stable economic, social and political conditions. Additionally, the accession of Austria to the EU and the positive relationship with its neighbouring states have contributed to the positive development in its external security. In terms of traditional military threat, the Government does not need to think about currently, while there is a possibility of re-emergence of such a threat in the non-foreseeable future.⁽¹⁵⁾

In spite of the generally positive security environment, the Government

regards the following issues as security risks and threats:⁽¹⁶⁾

- Negative percussion of conflicts;
- Information warfare;
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- Development and availability of long-range air assets such as ballistic and cruise missiles;
- Organized crime;
- International terrorism;
- Illegal migration;
- Natural, technological or ecological disasters including accidents in nuclear power plants and epidemics.

The security issues for Austria are almost identical with those at the global and European level. The Doctrine regards “the proliferation of WMD, terrorism by governments or certain interest groups and operating internationally, organized crime, destabilising developments in armaments, ethnic conflicts, phenomena of political fragmentation, totalitarian ideologies and fundamentalist religions, demographic trends and migration, problems of energy and resources, and problems of food supply, and environmental hazards” as the global security issues.⁽¹⁷⁾ The Analytic Part mentions the military (the invasion and re-nationalisation of security policy), proliferation (proliferation of WMD and transportation means), destabilisation (the deficit of democracy and economic, ethnic or religious tensions), globalisation (the trans-national organised crime and the terrorism of all forms), and civilisation risks (natural, technological and ecological disaster, global risks to health, and epidemics) in Europe, but excludes the actuality of the risk of invasion.⁽¹⁸⁾ Of these issues the Doctrine gives the priority to the international terrorism.⁽¹⁹⁾

The negative percussion of conflicts on Austria means the negative impacts arising from regional conflicts, such as “international terrorism, trafficking in arms, drugs and human beings, migration with a variety of motives,

environmental disasters and economic and financial crises.”⁽²⁰⁾ The conflicts result from the mixture of causes such as demographic development, increasing deficit of energy, trans-regional ecological disaster, and political instability.⁽²¹⁾ With regard to the information warfare, the technological development and the reduction of cost made the access to strategically important information easy for everyone.⁽²²⁾ As a result, the vulnerability in the area of information is pressing in both the military and the civil sector and in business and industry in the form of economic and technological espionage.⁽²³⁾ With regard to the proliferation, the Government is anxious about the availability of WMD by terrorists, organised criminal groups, sects or individuals as well as state actors.⁽²⁴⁾ They can attack strategically important infrastructure or blackmail with WMD as well as information technologies. The risks imposed by the uncontrolled migration are multi-faceted. First, according to the Sub-Strategy for Defence Policy worked out by the Defence Ministry in 2002, it can have not only negative influence on the cultural and economic stability in Europe in the medium- and long-term, but also the possibility of the immigration of political or religious extremists in Europe.⁽²⁵⁾ Second, the Government has been anxious about the import of crimes.⁽²⁶⁾ Third, the report on the integration of migrants in the Austrian society submitted on the ÖVP Federal Congress in Alpbach in October 2004 points out the anxiety of the citizens about immigrants and the potential conflict caused not only by the renewed re-distribution of public goods but also by the difference in national and cultural identities.⁽²⁷⁾

The security issues perceived by the Government expanded incrementally. The Government Programme of the second ÖVP-FPÖ-Government of February 2003 classified the traffic safety, that is, the reduction of traffic accidents in the internal security issues.⁽²⁸⁾ In the report of the ÖVP on the security issues submitted on the Federal Congress in Alpbach in November 2004 further added crimes without relevance for organised crime.⁽²⁹⁾ With regard to the security issues mentioned in the Doctrine, the People’s Party stressed terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants by listing this issue parallel to the other ones like terrorism or proliferation of WMD.⁽³⁰⁾

The risk and threat perception of the Government clearly shows the perceptual dimension of the comprehensiveness. It perceives security issues not only with military and but also with non-military nature as security risks or threats. In other words, it is not until Austria and its citizens were relatively invulnerable to all these risks and threats that they would be comprehensively secure. The clear international or transnational nature of them and the involvement of a variety of actors are determined by the above mentioned framework conditions.

3. Policy Instruments and Phases of the Deployment

How does the Austrian Government address the above mentioned security risks and threats? This question includes two further questions: what security measures should be deployed in which phases? With regard to the latter, the Doctrine listed four grand strategies in terms of conflicts.⁽³¹⁾ The first strategy, promotion of peace and stability, aims at the creation of framework conditions decreasing the probability of conflicts such as promotion of human rights, rule of law and democracy, prosperity, social balancing, and prevention of environmental dangers through the political, economic, cultural and military cooperation. In essence, its aim is the prevention of the emergence of conflicts. The second strategy, safeguarding of peace and stability, includes conflict prevention, crisis management, and direct measures for stabilization and aims at preventing violent conflicts. The third strategy, restoration of peace and stability, aims at restoring peace or stopping serious injury of international law with compulsory measures. And the fourth strategy is individual and collective self-defence not only against invasion to its territory but of its own integrity in cases of violent conflicts in its neighbourhood. Together with the second strategy, it is in essence the reactive measures for managing ongoing problems. To sum up, the security policy instrument should be deployed before, during, and after the conflicts. The Government gives the priority to the conflict prevention because of the above mentioned present framework conditions for the global and European security.⁽³²⁾ The preventive security is one of the other basic principles of the

Doctrine.⁽³³⁾ And the comprehensiveness of each phase of crises and the priority of the prevention hold true for the management of other security issues.

The recommendations in the Doctrine include the following general measures and measures in the areas of foreign policy, defence policy and internal security:⁽³⁴⁾

General Recommendations

- Comprehensive and continuous provision of information on security situation to the citizens;
- Provision of advice by a National Security Council on matters of foreign, security, and defence policy to the Federal Government and each Federal Minister;
- Intensification of the existing cooperation in the field of intelligence sharing among European states;
- Development of the Comprehensive National Defence programme into a system of a Comprehensive Security Provision;
- Further development of Austrian role in disaster relief and creation of an integrated and co-ordinated training programme on the existing civilian and military training facilities for the purpose of improvement of interoperability;
- Close cooperation and networking among relevant organizations and institutes in Austria and abroad for the expansion of the range of research on security policy;
- Introduction of a strategic leadership training for decision-makers in comprehensive security policy;
- Use of regional security policy cooperation;
- Ensuring of vital resources such as food and energy and strategic infrastructures such as communication and transport.

Foreign Policy Aspects of Security Policy

- Advocacy of worldwide respect for human rights and international law;
- Active participation in arms control and disarmament, especially non-proliferation;
- Contribution to ensuring peace, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict management;
- Engagement in multilateral institution;
- Support for Third World countries with a view to economic, social, democratic and ecological development;
- Improvement in international environmental protection;
- Effective safeguarding of the national interests within the framework of the EU as well as at the bi- and multilateral level;
- Support of EU reforms especially with a view to development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and safeguarding of its security interests;
- Coordination with other EU member states especially those which are linked by common regional interests for the purpose of promotion of the national interests;
- Enhancement of bilateral relations especially for the purpose of promotion of the economic interests;
- Active participation in the ESDP through the qualitative and quantitative contribution to the headline goal and capability goal;
- Priority support for realisation of a common European defence envisaged in the Title V of the EU Treaty;
- Further development of the relations with NATO and optimisation of the possibilities for dialog and cooperation within the framework of Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme;
- Continuous assessment of the value of NATO membership for the security and defence policy.

Defence Policy

- Safeguarding the military defence capability as required by the concrete strategic situation;
- Development and maintenance of capability to participate in a common defence effort;
- Enabling the Austrian Armed Forces to take part in the entire spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks;
- Protection for health and lives of soldiers on the highest level;
- Achievement of interoperability for peace support operations abroad and the national defence;
- Maintenance of universal conscription with bigger share of professional soldiers and volunteers with a view to coverage of the entire spectrum of military tasks in personnel terms;
- Ensuring capacities for assistance operations in case of disasters as well as in cases of terrorist threats, border control, and guarding sensitive infrastructure on the request of Interior Ministry;
- Continuous review of the objectives of the Federal Armed Forces and their achievement;
- Promotion of armament cooperation especially within the framework of Western European Armament Group;
- Provision of the necessary budgetary, personnel and infrastructure resources;
- Publication of a White Paper detailing the tasks, state and requirements of Armed Forces on the ground of the prevailing situation every two years with a ten-year perspective;
- Seeking opportunities for regional cooperation project for achieving synergies in various areas;
- Full exploitation of opportunities for cooperation within the framework of PFP and its expansion to all aspects of research, especially in the field of security policy.

Internal Security

- Reform of tasks in conformity with the principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and rule of law;
- Maintenance and increase of internal security for the security of individual and continued function of public services;
- Intensification of cooperation at the national, bilateral, and multilateral level and within the EU for fight against international terrorism including enhancement of collection of intelligence at national level and exchange of information with partner countries;
- Combat against organized crime within Austria and through international cooperation, especially with Central and Eastern European countries and Russia;
- Enhanced international cooperation with special emphasis on prevention of people smuggling, traffic in human beings, and illegal migration;
- Supply of human resources and technical equipment for the purpose of combat against crime and terrorism and border control;
- Effective protection of the EU's external border and consolidation of cooperation with neighbouring countries;
- Enhancement of exchange of information on migration within the EU and in particular also with the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand;
- Contribution to strengthening of the EU's non-military capabilities and participation in international non-military conflict prevention and crisis management;
- Assignment of international civilian crisis management including training and setting of framework conditions for their deployment and the provision of training for local police forces in conformity with financial feasibility to police and gendarmerie;
- Preparation, training and deployment of administration officials, judges, public prosecutors etc. for helping establishment of the rule of law and democratic conditions;

- Ensuring cooperation between federal and provincial civil defence authorities and with local operational units;
- Intensification and optimisation of training and exchange of information at the national and international level for combat against terrorism, crime, and illegal migration and comprehensive disaster protection;
- Improvement of public information on self-protection measures and optimisation of warning systems;
- Support for effort in the EU to implement a common migration policy by safeguarding the special national interests of the member states and upholding the principle of burden sharing.

To sum up, the Austrian Government decided to address the security risks and threats by taking the above mentioned measures in each phase (the peace time, the crisis situation, the ongoing situation, and the situation after the resolution of problems). On the other hand, the Doctrine requests the Government to work out sub-strategies for economic, agricultural, transport, infrastructural, financial, educational, and information policy in addition to foreign, defence and internal security policy.⁽³⁵⁾

It should be pointed out that the recommendations for conflict prevention and crisis management, fight against terrorism, organised crime, and illegal migration are relatively specified, especially in case of clear relevance for military means, while measures for the non-proliferation and the environmental or epidemic risks and threats are recommended vaguely. It is clear that the military aspect of the security policy should be given the priority, though the Government regards the deployment of military forces as the last resort.⁽³⁶⁾ First, in the field of defence policy the budgetary, personnel and infrastructure resources should be provided as far as necessary, while the Doctrine explicitly stipulated that the expenditure for the police and gendarmerie undertaking international civil crisis management should be limited to the extent of the fiscal feasibility.⁽³⁷⁾ Second, according to Herbert Scheibner, the former Federal Minister for National Defence, the most important recommendations to foreign policy are the

support for the realization of a common European defence and the option of an accession to the NATO.⁽³⁸⁾ Both of them have exclusively military implication. Third, the Doctrine recommends the deployment of the Federal Armed Force to address “sub-conventional” risks (transnational terrorism, proliferation of WMD, organised crimes, uncontrolled migration, cyber warfare and sabotage).⁽³⁹⁾ With regard to such assistance function, the Sub-Strategy for Defence Policy admits primary of their civil dimensions on the one hand, points out on the other hand, that the civilian state security organisations could necessitate the military assistance if the sub-conventional risks were too huge and complicated for them to address for themselves. The Defence Ministry explained the deployment of military means for the fight against terrorism by its potential availability of WMD, modern information technology and long-range air assets, for organised crimes by the involvement of the Federal Armed Force deployed abroad into the counter measures, and for cyber warfare by the influence on not only civilian but also military areas respectively.⁽⁴⁰⁾ With regard to the military assistance, it is pointed out that Austria cannot counter security challenges imposed by a mixture of terrorism, extortion with chemical and biological weapons, crime and subversion without armed forces. The military assistance would be more effective and cheaper than the establishment of new military-style resources, for instance, inside the police.⁽⁴¹⁾ The reason for this strong military tendency may be explained by the fact that the Defence Ministry and the Austrian Society for National Defence and Security Policy took initiative for the drafting of a new security and defence doctrine.⁽⁴²⁾ Moreover, the Austrian Government thinks that the chance to realise the national interests in all policy areas within the framework of the EU depends on the military contribution to it.⁽⁴³⁾

With regard to the involvement of policy areas in the security policy, the drafting of sub-strategies for justice or environmental policy is not requested and, moreover, no judicial measure is recommended in the Doctrine. But the Government regards the justice as an instrument for the security policy. Indeed, together with the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Interior, the Minister for Justice is a member of the

National Security Council, which was established as a consulting body for the Government and each minister about basic affairs of foreign, security and defence policy in November 2001, prior to the adoption of the Doctrine.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Since the adoption of the Doctrine the Austrian comprehensive security policy has experienced further development. The Sub-Strategy for Defence Policy precisely defines goals and assignments of the Austrian defence policy and Federal Armed Force and the necessary capabilities for the implementation on the basis of the Doctrine. Also the Programme of the second ÖVP-FPÖ-Government concretises the measures in the Doctrine and widens the comprehensiveness of the security policy as a response to the newly perceived security issue e.g. the traffic safety, though there is no chapter named comprehensive security. The new Austrian Government involved the justice in the fight against the international terrorism by mentioning adaptation of the competence and the jurisdiction for this purpose.⁽⁴⁵⁾ With regard to the above mentioned crime without implication of organised crime, the report of the ÖVP considers the partnership between the executive branch and the citizens as the effective measure.⁽⁴⁶⁾

IV. Concepts of the Opposition Parties

The opposition parties, the SPÖ and the Greens, basically share the comprehensive concept of security with the Government. First, they regard individual citizens as well as the state as a whole as the objects of the security policy. Second, they perceive both military and non-military risks and threats. Third, they intend to address the security issues in the context of military and non-military instruments in each phase and give the clear priority to the non-military means in the instrumental dimension and the prevention in the phasic dimension. On the other hand, there are differences between their concepts and that of the Government.

First, the most important and essential differences lay in the evaluation of potential military threat and the deployment of the military instruments. In terms of the military threat the SPÖ refers only to limited conflicts near the Austrian

border and not to the possibility of the re-emergence of the military threat in style of the era of the Cold War.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Also the Greens totally exclude it. Moreover, they assert abandonment of military structure for the territorial defence as an insurance against military invasion.⁽⁴⁸⁾ In the instrumental dimension the SPÖ gives the clear priority to the civilian means. According to Caspar Einem, Member of Parliament and Spokesperson for European Affairs, the international civil and police security policy are therefore recommended prior to the military security policy in the paper of the SPÖ for a new doctrine.⁽⁴⁹⁾ With regard to the missions of the military, the SPÖ does not recommend the deployment for fight against terrorism and protect of infrastructure.⁽⁵⁰⁾ The SPÖ represented more concrete concept for the comprehensive security with the non-military preventive means in comparison to that of the Government. According to its proposal, Austria should engage in democracy and human rights, the rule of law, social and economic balancing between the rich and the poor, and the widely invested education as a basis for the fight against dictatorship, hunger, and violence in order to realise the peaceful coexistence not only of people within a state but also in the relation among states.⁽⁵¹⁾

The Greens put clearer accent on security with civilian means and explicitly fears lest the security policy should be militarised by the military's taking over assignments for which originally the police should and could be responsible. In their opinion, the new threats such as totalitarian ideologies, environmental hazards, problems of energy and resources, demographic trends and problems of food supply can be prevented not by military but by civilian means e.g. energy policy and international diplomacy.⁽⁵²⁾ With this regard the Greens assign the police to fight against the terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and organised crimes, and border control on the one hand and a department of the Federal Ministry of Interior to protect the citizens from disasters on the other hand.⁽⁵³⁾ The priority of non-military means is made clear also by the fact that the Greens regard the development policy as the central part of the foreign policy aspect of the security policy.⁽⁵⁴⁾

Second, the range of the security issues of the SPÖ is wider than that of the

Government. In April 2005 the SPÖ set up the Competence Team Security. It was instructed to develop a comprehensive concept of security which should cover not only the issues which are identical with those of the Government such as organisation of police, fight against crimes, traffic security, social security, prevention of violence and integration, Federal Armed Force, civilian service and asylum but also original ones such as rural area (*Ländlicher Raum*) and secure city planning.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Third, there are differences between the governmental and opposite parties or sometimes among parties in each policy relevant for the security in content, though all parties admit the necessity of the policy or its revision. The dispute on a revision of the Asylum Law, which was finally adopted in June 2005 in the National Assembly, was one of the typical cases.

V. Conclusion: Agenda for the Future Austrian Security Policy

The Austrian security policy is comprehensive in the dimension of the objects, the risk and threat perception, the instruments, and the phases of the deployment. Additionally, except the first one, the Government sets the clear priority in each dimension. In the perceptual dimension the so-called new threats, especially the terrorism, are the central security concern. On the contrary, the traditional military threat has lost its reality. In the instrumental dimension the deployment of the civil means are prior to the military ones. And in the dimension of the phases of crises the prevention is given the priority. This comprehensive concept of the security is basically shared with the opposition parties. However, there are the differences in the range of the perception of the security issues, in the position to the content of each policy relevant for the security and, last not but least, in the evaluation of the military threat and the deployment of the military means.

In addition to such differences, the Austrian security policy is confronting the following challenges. First, the present comprehensive security policy as a reaction to the globalisation necessarily requires cooperation and coordination in bi- and multilateral frameworks at the regional and global level, which carried

out in the framework of the EU are the most important for Austria.⁽⁵⁶⁾ The Government links the Austrian security with that of the EU. And the Austrian security concept is basically identical with that of the EU represented in the European Security Strategy in terms of the comprehensiveness.⁽⁵⁷⁾ However, Austria does not always share risk and threat perception or ideas of institutional development and deployment of means with other member states. In such case it should think about how to safeguard its security interests in negotiation processes maximally. Second, how the comprehensive security policy is effectively and efficiently implemented depends first and foremost on the cooperation and the coordination within the Austrian political system. Liaison officials in the Secretariat of the National Security Council appointed by each minister are expected to play a key role for guaranteeing the effectiveness and the efficiency.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Third, the comprehensiveness of the security policy can expand in response to changes of security environment at the national, European, and global level. As a result, the Austrian security policy can be overloaded.⁽⁵⁹⁾

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Notes

- (1) Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin. The English translation of the Doctrine by the Austrian Federal Chancellery is also referred to.
- (2) Ebenda, S.1.
- (3) z.B. Höll und Gärtner.
- (4) Before the adoption of the present Doctrine the National Defence Doctrine (1975) had been effective. It sets goals for the comprehensive national defence. Additionally, it is connected with the Federal Constitutional Law (Art. 9a) and effective yet, together with the National Defence Plan (1985), which sums the goals for the comprehensive national defence and also the measures for their implementation. see. Docsek, S.140-158; Enzelberger, S.8-26; Höll und Gärtner, S.42-45; Reiter, S.693-694, 697.
- (5) Caspar Einem, Member of the National Assembly from the SPÖ and Spokesperson for European Affairs, affirmed a revision of the Doctrine after a participation of the SPÖ in a Government as a result of the next election of the National Assembly in the interview with the author. Also Peter Pilz, Member of the National Assembly from the Greens and Spokesperson for Peace and Security, clearly mentioned its expiry. Caspar Einem (Abgeordneter zum Nationalrat und Europasprescher der SPÖ), in interview with the author, 16. August 2004; Die Grünen, sicherheitsdoktrin: verhandlungen entgültig gescheitert, 5. Dezember 2001. <http://www.gruene.at/themen.php?tid=7371&wo=1&kat=sicherheit&kid=25>
- (6) Expertenkommission.
- (7) Ebenda, S.7.
- (8) Ebenda, Anm.2.
- (9) Ebenda, Anm.3.
- (10) Reiter, S.691.
- (11) Expertenkommission, S.58, 68.
- (12) Ebenda, S.4-7, 18-22.
- (13) Ebenda, S.18-22.
- (14) Ebenda, S.29.
- (15) Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin, S.6
- (16) Ebenda, S.6-7.
- (17) Ebenda, S.5.
- (18) Expertenkommission, S.27-29.
- (19) Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin, S.5.
- (20) Ebenda, S.6.
- (21) Expertenkommission, S.21-22, 30; Ebenda, S.5.
- (22) Expertenkommission, S.20-21.
- (23) Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin, S.6.
- (24) Ebenda.
- (25) Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, S.6.

- (26) Rainer Nowak und Michael Flieschhacker, „Strasser: Beteiligung an Flüchtlingslagern in Afrika“, *Die Presse*, 20.10.2004, http://diepresse.com/textversion_article.aspx?id=448129 (abgerufen 21. Oktober 2004); „Gegen „Asyl-EI-Dorado“: Gorbach lobt Strasser Asyl-Verschärfung“, *Die Presse*, 19.11.2004, http://diepresse.com/textversion_article.aspx?id=452772 (abgerufen 21. November 2004); see also Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, S.18.
- (27) Arbeitskreis C1, S.9-10. “Integration” means the acquirement of the basic knowledge of German language and of the fundamental values of Europe by immigrants.
- (28) Regierungsprogramm, S.8.
- (29) Arbeitskreis D2, S.12.
- (30) Ebenda, S.7.
- (31) Expertenkommission, S. 9-10; Bundeskanzleramt, S.5-6.
- (32) Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin, S.6.
- (33) Ebenda, S.1.
- (34) Ebenda, S.10-15.
- (35) Ebenda, S.16.
- (36) Ebenda, S.5-6. On the other hand, Walter Feichtinger, a Security and Defence Policy Consultant in the Federal Chancellery and an author of the Analytic Part of the Doctrine, argues the “relativisation” of the military aspect of the security policy by pointing out the composition of and the range of the consulting agenda of the newly founded National Security Council. Feichtinger, S.446.
- (37) Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin, S.14, 15.
- (38) Scheibner, S.147.
- (39) Bundeskanzleramt, S.13-14. see also Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, S.6.
- (40) Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, S.6-7.
- (41) Reiter, S.695.
- (42) Enzelberger, S.22-32.
- (43) Scheibner, S.154. see also Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, S.1.
- (44) Feichtinger, S.445-446.
- (45) Regierungsprogramm, S.7.
- (46) Arbeitskreis D2, S.12-14.
- (47) Ebenda, S.4.
- (48) Die Grünen, vorschläge zur zukunft der landesverteidigung, 7. November 2001. <http://www.gruene.at/themen.php?tid=6733&wo=0&kat=&kid=>
- (49) Einem, S.191.
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- (58) The Secretariat of the National Security Council is responsible for evaluation of and consultation about affairs of foreign, security, and defence policy as well as preparation for meetings of the Council. Feichtinger, S.445.
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オーストリア安全保障政策の包括性

< 要 約 >

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本稿は、2001年に採択された現行の安全保障・防衛ドクトリンに基づくオーストリアの安全保障政策の包括性を分析している。ドクトリンの基本原則の1つである包括的安全保障は、冷戦構造の崩壊とグローバル化の結果引き起こされたグローバル及び欧州レベルの安全保障情勢の変化に対する応答である。

オーストリアの安全保障政策は、政策の対象、脅威及び危機認識、手段、そして手段を行使する段階の側面において包括的である。第一に、安全保障政策の対象には、国家のような集合体のみならず、個々の国民の生命及び人権も含まれている。第二に、オーストリア政府が危険或は脅威と認識している安全保障上の問題は、軍事的及び非軍事的な性質を帯びている。第三に、オーストリア政府は、これらの問題に軍事的及び非軍事的な措置で対処しようとしている。第四に、安全保障政策の手段は、平時、危機、問題の勃発及び問題の解決後の各段階において行使される。オーストリア政府は、政策の対象の側面を除く、他の各々の側面において明確な優先順位を定めている。危険・脅威認識の側面においては、新たな脅威、とりわけテロリズムが主たる懸案となっている。手段の側面において、ドクトリンは非軍事的な手段を、軍事的な手段に優先している。手段の行使の段階の側面においては、予防が最重要視されている。

野党は、政府のこのような包括的な安全保障理解を基本的に共有しているが、安全保障政策の軍事的側面に対する評価、危険或は脅威として認識される安全保障上の問題及び安全保障のための各々の政策の内容について政府との間に相違が存在する。

オーストリアの安全保障政策は、その包括性故に以下のような挑戦に直面している。第一に、グローバル化への対応としての現在の包括的安全保障政策においては、欧州及びグローバルなレベルにおける二国間、多国間の協力と調整が必然的に要求される。第二に、包括的安全保障政策が効果的、効率的に実施されるか否かは、オースト

リアの政治システム内部における協力と調整の在り方にかかっている。第三に、安全保障情勢の変化に伴う包括性の拡大は、オーストリアの安全保障政策に過大な負担を強いる可能性がある。