

Weighing Influences –East Asian Regionalism and State Development–

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I. Introduction

Especially since the late 1980s, analysts have channeled a great amount of effort into research on regional security cooperation in East Asia. Some emphasize material factors such as state interests in economic development, whereas others underline ideational forces such as norms, culture, and identity. Still, while some stress external factors like balance of power, others highlight internal factors such as domestic political legitimacy. In short, scholars have identified so many factors that are influential in East Asian regionalism. James Nolt, for example, raises six obstacles to regional multilateral security cooperation: historical animosities, asymmetries in political and economic systems, limited economic interdependence, the U.S. tendency toward bilateralism, lingering tendencies to isolate China, and national differences in human rights conception and practice (Nolt, 1999, pp.96-100).

However, there is no consensus as to which factor(s) assume(s) most powerful influence on security regionalism in East Asia. What are the principal forces that are determining the dynamism of regional security cooperation in this part of the world? Is it the stable distribution of power? Is it leadership of great powers? Is it historical animosities that are rooted in colonial experience during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? Is it lingering, unresolved territorial disputes? Is it the diversity of regional countries in terms of political and economic systems, ethnicity, culture, language, and religion? Or are East Asian states inherently incompatible with the idea of regionalism and multilateralism?

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If the answer is the last one, then there is little we can do to promote regional security cooperation. Its effectiveness will be intrinsically limited. But if the answer is historical animosities or the diversity of the region, for example, policy priorities to facilitate regional cooperation become much clearer.

There is a dearth of research shedding light to this question in the work of regionalism in general and East Asian regionalism in particular. As Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue, “recent research leaves various important theoretical and empirical issues unresolved, including which political factors bear most heavily on regionalism and the nature of their effects” (Mansfield and Milner, 1999, p.590). This article thus advocates that a lot more scholarly focus must be given to research on the relative potency of the identified and still-to-be identified factors. The reason is simple. Mere identification of influential forces—i.e. stating that ‘they all matter to regionalism’—does not serve to render a useful policy guide. Since there are always priorities in foreign and security policies and state resources (time, money, personnel, etc.) are limited, it is important to weigh their relative influence in order to help provide the best guide for policy in fostering regional security cooperation.

The objective of this article is two-fold. First is to present five factors among various influences, which are considered as paramount importance in shaping overall East Asian international relations in general and forming regionalism in particular. Second, the author suggests another influence and elaborates on this sixth factor.

II. Five Factors

Because of limited paper space, the author addresses five factors that are of particular importance. They are balance of power, historical animosities, economic development, norms of sovereignty and domestic non-intervention, and domestic political legitimacy.

1. Balance of Power

Avery Goldstein observes that power balancing represents the most

fundamental pattern defining East Asian security order (Goldstein, 2003, p.171). Several prominent scholars point out the importance of balance of power in regional cooperation in this region. The Late Michael Leifer, for example, argued that “the prior existence of a stable balance of power” is the “prerequisite” for the success of regional security institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) (Leifer, 1996, p.57). Without it, Leifer continued, regional security institutions would be “bricks made without straw” (Leifer, 1996, p.59). G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama also argue that the balance of power is “one of the critical forces” for fostering regionalism and multilateralism in the region (Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama, 2002, p.82).

The importance of the balance of power is illustrated in the process of establishing the ARF. Perhaps the most important regional security concern in post-Cold War East Asia was the possibility of a power vacuum. The end of the superpower rivalry and the collapse of the Soviet Union made the U.S. forward presence in the region no longer indispensable. The U.S. presence was generally welcomed throughout the region as a counterweight against the emergence of two regional powers, China and Japan. When the U.S. withdrew its forces from Subic Bay and Clark Air Base in the Philippines in 1991-1992, apprehensions that the U.S. withdrawal would tilt the regional balance of power by triggering competition between China and Japan to fill the vacuum heightened.

One of the priorities for ASEAN was the maintenance of a regional balance of power via engagement of the U.S. and China. This became a primary incentive in the establishment of the ARF (Emmers, 2001, pp.275-91; Leifer, 1996, pp.5-20; Morimoto, 1994, pp.26-9; Nishihara, 1994, pp.60-74). A stable distribution of power was necessary for ASEAN to retain its diplomatic leverage to reassert itself and have its voices heard in its dealings with major powers. Power-balancing considerations thus played a significant role in the minds of the ASEAN leaders. Singaporean Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar stated in 1996 that the issue for ASEAN was “how to maintain a stable balance of the major powers at a time of immense fluidity” (Jayasankaran, 1996, p.18).

2. Historical Animosities

Many East Asian countries are still fettered by bitter memories of the history of Western and Japanese imperialism and colonialism. Virtually every work on East Asian security raises this factor as one of the significant barriers to regionalism in East Asia (Buzan and Segal, 1994, pp.3-21; Christensen, 1999, pp.49-80; Duffield, 2003, pp.254-62; Foot, 1995, pp.231-4; Friedberg, 1993/94, pp.5-33). Lee Jong Won argues that historically generated mistrust and antagonism is a fundamental stumbling block against East Asian regionalism (Lee, 2004, p.3). The resentment is especially strong against Japan. Japan's brutal behavior before and during the Second World War "erected unusually high obstacles" to regional cooperation (Duffield, 2003, p.254). To begin with, in the post-war era the U.S. intended to establish a multilateral Pacific Collective Security Organization through a Pacific Pact, which Japan was expected to join along with Korea, China, and other East Asian states (Hosoya, 1984, pp.181-205). The pact did not come to fruition because many prospective members of the pact "have memories of Japanese aggression which are so vivid that they are reluctant to create a Mutual Security Pact which will include Japan" (Dulles, 1952, p.182).

The resentment against Japan is muted in most Southeast Asian countries, but it remains strong in China and Korea. Historical animosities have frequently been raised as a primary impediment to cooperation between Japan and China and Japan and South Korea (Cha, 1999, pp.19-23). From the perspective of China, "the residue of animosity and distrust toward Japan, and to a lesser degree, toward the West means that Chinese have little faith in [regionalism] ...Not surprisingly, the more a nation nurses a grievance about historical humiliations, the less accepting it will be of multilateral cooperation involving the powers responsible for that humiliation" (Rozman, 1998, p.114).

Although deep distrust rooted in historical animosities has lessened over the years, chronic mistrust simmers in relations in Southeast Asia such as those between China and Vietnam, Thailand and Vietnam, Vietnam and Cambodia, and Cambodia and Thailand (Alagappa, 1998, pp.70, 111). Mutual suspicions

between Singapore and its two Malay neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, are also considered undermining security cooperation within ASEAN (Acharya, 1992, p.159).

3. Economic Development

Many analysts contend that the most important determinants of East Asian regionalism are economic factors. Peter Katzenstein argues that East Asian regionalism is “defined primarily in economic market terms” (Katzenstein, 1996, p.148). U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz also stated that “the name of the game in the [region] is economics” (Ball, 1996, p.36). Such remarks are hardly surprising since economic prosperity ranks high in the hierarchy of national goals in virtually all the East Asian countries. President Jiang Zemin addressed at the Fourteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that success in economic development is a key element domestically and internationally (Jiang, 1992, p.16). Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien also stated in 1990 that the world is now seeing “a primary interest in economic development” and “the strength of a country is measured mainly by its economic strength” (Ninh, 1998, p.456). In Indonesia, too, economic development is seen not only as an end in itself to increase prosperity and social welfare but also as a prerequisite for political stability (Anwar, 1998, p.487).

State interests in economic development militate both for and against regionalism. The idea that economic cooperation facilitates security cooperation is known as a ‘spill-over’ effect. The spill-over is a process in which cooperation in one area (e.g. economic realm) creates conditions favorable to cooperation in other areas (e.g. political realm). In East Asia, regional economic cooperation (e.g. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) had a spill-over effect in the security realm, establishing the ARF in 1994 (Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama, 2002, p.75; Kikuchi, 1995, p.281).

The preoccupation with economic development can also work to constrain progress of regional security cooperation. This was best illustrated in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Because of the crisis, defense

budgets were severely cut in many Southeast Asian countries, leading to cancellation of defense cooperation. For instance, the Thai Air Force cut its joint exercises with Malaysia and Singapore by more than half in 1998; Malaysia suspended its participation in exercises conducted under the Five Power Defense Arrangements (Ball, 1999, pp.7-8). The impact of the crisis was also considerable in Indonesia. Because of political, economic and social turmoil within the country, Indonesia lost its diplomatic leadership within ASEAN, culminating in the declining importance of ASEAN as a whole (Shiraishi, 2002, pp.3-40; Shuto, 2001, pp.21-52). The diminished leadership of ASEAN led to stagnation of the ARF. Regional countries had turned inward to deal with their national economic problems.

4. Norms of Sovereignty and Domestic Non-Interference

Norms of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic non-interference are by-products of the Westphalian state system. Sovereignty and non-intervention, coupled with the legal equality of states, have traditionally been considered as the three absolute norms specifying the “accepted and expected forms of behavior in relations between states” (Holsti, 1995, p.81). The norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations as key principles, constituting the basis of modern international law. Therefore, while there is nothing particularly ‘East Asian’ about these norms, they have growingly come to be viewed as “the long-cherished Asian principle[s]” (Liang, 1999). In fact, state sovereignty and domestic non-intervention have served as cardinal principles in cooperation within ASEAN (Yamakage, 2001, p.16).

The colonial experience of many East Asian countries drives them to strongly adhere to these norms. As already noted, throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were under constant subjugation by Western and Japanese imperial powers. Many countries, especially those in Southeast Asia, became what they are now only after the end of the Second World War. Even after independence, France continued to harass continental

Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) through the First Indochina War until the mid-1950s; and the U.S. until the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Because the state came into being as the champion of nationalist forces against the colonial oppression of the former Western great powers or Japanese imperialism, it is hardly surprising, as Hedley Bull stated, that they “cling to the rhetoric of sovereignty as one of the means available to defending it” (Bull, 1984, pp.3-4).

Adherence to the norms of sovereignty and domestic non-intervention often serve to constrain progress of regional security cooperation. As Desmond Ball points out, the security measures instituted thus far “do not impinge on core national interests—i.e., territorial claims and other sovereignty issues, defense capabilities and operations, or internal political processes”, all of which trespass on sovereignty and domestic non-intervention (Ball, 1997, p.16). Amitav Acharya goes a step further to argue that the primary objective of regionalism in East Asia has been the preservation of these norms:

Asian institutions have not taken the supranational path of the European Union. Instead, they have been sovereignty conforming....Asian norms and institutions were shaped by decolonization at a time when the main concern of regional actors was to preserve the modern nation-state as a permanent feature of the Asian political order....Asian multilateral conferences and institutions helped to embed the Westphalian norms of independence, reciprocity, equality, and non-interference within regional diplomatic and security practices. As a result, Asian regionalism, unlike its European variant, has not been transformative. Instead it has been conservative and norm preserving (Acharya, 2003/04, pp.158-9).

5. Domestic Political Legitimacy

Domestic political legitimacy is closely associated with economic development and the norm of sovereignty because they are sources of the former. It relates to the right to rule the country with popular support. More

specifically, it is the degree of approval and support of the ruled for the ruler's moral authority to issue commands and the people's corresponding obligation to obey such commands. (Alagappa, 1995, p.29).

The importance of domestic political legitimacy as a driving force of regional cooperation is discernible in East Asia, as it figures prominently in policy-making of many developing countries in the region. In Southeast Asia, internal stability and domestic political legitimacy was a major factor in shaping the nature and agenda of regional cooperation within ASEAN. The common threat of the ASEAN members in the 1960s stemmed from internal communist insurgencies. One of the salient incentives for the formation and development of ASEAN was that with the doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs of another, the members could concentrate on the management of threats posed by internal communist insurgencies so as to consolidate political legitimacy within their countries. In short, Southeast Asia countries viewed regionalism as a means to deal with internal security problems. Leifer characterized ASEAN as "collective internal security": Regional partnership "will enable more effective individual attention to be paid to internal revolutionary challenge in an environment in which internal security is believed to be indivisible among the five states of the Association" (Leifer, 1989, p.1; 1980, p.6; Yamakage, 1997, p.327).

Observing such development in Southeast Asia, Mohammed Ayoob argues, "successful regional cooperation is based primarily on the convergence of regime interests relating to internal security, especially the shared perceptions of internally generated threats to the security of states and the stability of regimes" (Ayoob, 1995, p.62). Similarly, Acharya contends that regime security is the main driving force of regionalism in the Third World (Acharya, 1992, pp.143-64). More recently, Shaun Narine has argued that "the most single important factor" in East Asian regionalism "is the concern of most East Asian states with domestic political legitimacy" (Narine, 2004, p.423).

III. The Level of State Development: A Sixth Factor?

The author would like to advance another factor, namely the level of state development. Three among the five factors (economic development, the norms of sovereignty and domestic non-interference, and domestic political legitimacy) discussed above are closely related to this variable. In this respect, the level of state development can be considered as their underlying factor. Why the level of state development? The proposition of this variable can be explained from a debate in theories of International Relations between neo-realism and neo-liberalism, the two leading schools of thought on international cooperation.

The debate has suggested that the feasibility and dynamics of cooperation differs depending on a realm on which states cooperate. The debate posits that cooperation is extremely difficult in a military security field because it displays a zero-sum game where states cannot afford to let others gain relatively more than themselves since the relative gains of others may be fatal to their survival. Conversely, cooperation in a non-traditional security field is easier and sustainable because it displays a positive-sum game where all the participating states can gain and are less concerned about relative gains. This is why international cooperation is more likely in economic issue areas than in those concerning military security (Lipson, 1984, pp.1-23).

Regional cooperation in East Asia shows, however, that this is not necessarily the case. For example, in the area of sovereignty and territorial disputes in which the resolution of them will be zero-sum, while not much progress has been made between Japan and Russia over the Northern Territories or between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands, China and Russia reached an agreement in October 2004, resolving their decades-old Eastern border disputes. The dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan Islands between Malaysia and Indonesia was also solved through the ICJ in December 2002. Furthermore, although there have been little military confidence building measures or preventive diplomacy efforts between China and Taiwan or between China and the South China Sea disputing Southeast Asian countries, such measures have been in place between Japan and South Korea and between Japan and Russia. In

a non-traditional security area where positive-sum situations are likely created, on the other hand, whereas extensive efforts have been taken among Southeast Asian countries to secure energy (e.g., the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Project), little progress has been made to exploit crude oil and natural gas in the East and South China Seas.

These examples illustrate that the type of security problems—whether it is traditional or non-traditional—does not explain well the dynamics of East Asian regional security cooperation. Instead, they demonstrate that the willingness for cooperation varies from state to state. Some states are cooperative in both traditional and non-traditional security issues while others which are not cooperative in the military security area exhibit a similar negative attitude toward cooperation in the non-military security field. Showing a negative attitude toward regional cooperation, however, does not necessarily mean that the state is totally uncooperative; it can mean that its cooperation is limited.

A possible explanatory variable that can account for the noted attitudinal differences is the level of state development. The argument is as follows: the stage of state development a state is in conditions the willingness of the state to cooperate. The more a state is developed, the more it is inclined for regional cooperation. The reason is two-fold. First, the process of state development is accompanied by the development of outward-looking policies. Second, high levels of economic and security interdependence and advanced transportation and communication systems obscure distinction between internal and external affairs, leading to the growing concurrence of national and regional/international interests. One important assumption here is that state preferences differ in accordance with the level of state development.

The level of state development as a factor in regional cooperation is not unsaid in a dense body of literature on regionalism. For example, Susumu Yamakage argues that two of the main obstacles to the deepening of cooperation within ASEAN, an association comprising countries whose level of state development is a lot more compatible with one another in comparison with that of states in such a larger region as East Asia, derive from the disparity in

economic development and the immaturity of political institutions (Yamakage, 1997, p.180). Paul Evans also writes, “Latecomers to the process of state formation, few if any governments are willing to delegate sovereignty to larger political units. This sets limits on the scope and effectiveness of any kind of regional organization” (Evans, 2000, p.456). Tsutomu Kikuchi contends that because the process of state-building is still on-going in many parts of East Asia, international negotiation is strongly influenced by domestic policies (Kikuchi, 1997, p.177). Nonetheless, the correlation between the level of state development and regionalism is rather made only in passing, and arguably the level of state development is often regarded as of secondary or tertiary importance. Most importantly, there are few studies that systematically examine the influence of this variable upon regionalism.

The term ‘state development’ used in this article carries a broader notion than state-building. State-building is a term that tends to be used with developing countries since the assumption is that the state is already built in developed countries. Francis Fukuyama defines state-building as “the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones” (Fukuyama, 2004, p.ix). State development, on the other hand, embraces state-building, but goes further to include a different notion. In recent years, there is an emerging (and growing) view that the role of the state is being reduced in certain areas in developed countries. As opposed to state-building, according to this view, the process of “state-reducing” is taking place in the latter states (Fukuyama, 2004, p.5). State development, in short, encompasses both state-building and state-reducing. The term state development is preferable to state-building because East Asia is a region comprising both developing and developed countries, where the process of state-reducing may be more at work.

It should also be noted that the notion of state development is less concerned with the *type* of political and economic systems. Although the differences in political and economic systems among countries have been raised as an impediment to regionalism in East Asia, a distinction should be made between the *type* and *strength* of political systems (Fukuyama, 2004,

pp.6-15). In this regard, political development is not necessarily equated with democratization.

As noted, developing countries, some of them are described as a weak state or a Third World country, are concerned primarily with the process of state-building. The principal distinguishing feature of these countries is their “high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government” (Buzan, 1991, p.99). For the first two decades of independence, for example, the Indonesian government was preoccupied with internal sources of insecurity such as Islamic insurgencies and communist coups d’état (Anwar, 1998, p.489). Consequently, regional security issues are not the chief concern of developing countries. But, leaders of these states will become concerned about regional security issues if they are related to issues of state-building. Regional cooperation, hence, comes about when states perceive that their internal security and domestic political legitimacy are best preserved through inter-state cooperation. “In much of the Third World in particular,” Louise Fawcett argues, “the tasks of nation-building, promoting political stability or economic development are of more immediate importance and indeed are prerequisites” to greater regional cooperation and integration (Fawcett, 1995, p.34).

As states develop politically and economically, attention of national leaders goes beyond their national boundaries. In terms of security, internal stability allows security interests and concerns of the developing state to turn outward because its main threat to the state now comes from external. Put differently, the legitimate use of force that the developing state now monopolizes allows it to free individuals from what Hobbes labeled the ‘war of every man against every man’ domestically but serve as the basis for national defense at an international level (Fukuyama, 2004, p.1). Because border change by force is possible, a mutual recognition of state sovereignty and domestic non-intervention are important elements for national security of developing countries.

The reorientation of ASEAN defense strategies and doctrines from counter-insurgency warfare to conventional warfare capability in the late 1970s indicates not only the growing interests but also the affordability or capability (as a result

of improved domestic stability) of the ASEAN members to deal with issues that are not strictly confined within national boundaries. Moreover, the concepts of national resilience and regional resilience, which became the rallying cries for ASEAN, are in line with the outward development of state concerns. National resilience is an inward-looking concept, based on the proposition that national security lies not in military alliances with great powers, but in self-reliance deriving from domestic factors such as economic development, political stability, and a sense of nationalism. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas once said that “national resilience, if possessed by each country, could grow into regional resilience” (Alatas, 1996). The development from national to regional resilience signifies that the achievement of national resilience will allow governments to pay more attention to the outside world and provide them with latitude to cooperate with one another to create a better regional environment in order to sustain and enhance their security and economic growth (Acharya, 2001, p.73).

Economically, too, states become increasingly outward-looking because the route to prosperity lies in international trade. Many countries, even socialist economies, now recognize that trade liberalization promotes economic prosperity. Long Yongtu, China’s vice minister of foreign trade, stated that “China’s economy must become a market economy in order to become part of the global economic system” (Lardy, 2002, p.21). In search of prosperity, states choose to interact with one another. As Robert Scalapino argues, “As an economy mature[s], it [is] essential to adopt new techniques to cope with increased labor costs, to devise methods of securing access to higher levels of technology, and to find means of discarding or drastically restructuring backward sectors with minimal social costs. Virtually all of these requirements demand greater internationalization, however strong the protectionist forces within the society” (Scalapino, 1994, p.47).

Developed countries are in essence more cooperative for two reasons. First, marked increases in international economic interactions deepen the level of interdependence, especially among developed states. Because

economic and security problems easily transmit to other countries as a result of interdependence, states find it more efficient and effective to prevent and solve them through cooperation than handle them individually. From a Deutschean perspective, increases in social communications and economic transactions also generate a sense of community among states, thereby promoting cooperation between them (Deutsch, 1957). Because it is much more profitable to expand economically than to conquer territory, developed states no longer harbor intentions of invading the territories of others (Cooper, 2003, p.39; Sørensen, 2004, pp.122, 191; Tanaka, 2002, pp.160-161). Prosperity is best achieved through cooperation. Some regions, such as Europe and North America, have evolved into security communities, where the use of force as a way to settling disputes is rendered inconceivable (Adler and Barnett, 1998). Sørensen explicitly argues that a security community has replaced international anarchy in relations among the developed states (Sørensen, 2004, p.122).

Second, an increasing number of international interactions and the consequent international interdependence lead to the “increased sensitivity of domestic conditions to international events” (Morse, 1970, p.383). Because various political, economic and social interactions take place across societies in developed states, it becomes hard to draw a clear distinction between domestic and foreign affairs (Cooper, 2003, p.29; Morse, 1970, pp.374-7; Tanaka, 2002, pp.158-60). Globalization is a worldwide phenomenon and not distinctive of developed countries, but the dynamics of globalization are nowhere more profound. States and non-state actors conduct their activities domestically and internationally without much cost differences. Activities undertaken at the domestic level by states or non-state actors increasingly have consequences at the international level and vice versa. With increased influence of non-governmental actors, governments in the developed state no longer have full control over many of the activities occurring within its borders. In policy-making, be it domestic or foreign, a plethora of actors—businesses, interest groups, the public, the media, etc.—come into play; a dense web of policy networks hence emerges. Consequently, foreign and domestic policy in developed countries constitutes “a

seamless web” (Friedrich, 1966, p.97). Due to the breakdown of the distinction between internal and international issues, state interests of the developed state no longer remain ‘national;’ national interests increasingly come to coincide with regional and international interests. Given these two features, the motivation for regional cooperation is considered very high in developed countries.

If this argument is valid, the key actor in facilitating East Asian regional security cooperation would be developing countries, rather than developed, great powers as often suggested (Tow and Gray, 1995, pp.436-51). Because developing countries are in the midst of state-building processes, they attach great importance to economic development, the norms of sovereignty and domestic non-interference, and domestic political legitimacy. Developing countries would thus resort to regional cooperation under the following conditions: (1) it is fruitful to their economic growth; (2) it contributes to strengthen domestic political legitimacy; and (3) it does not impinge on their state sovereignty or interfere in their domestic affairs. Conversely, they will be averse to regionalism if it is viewed as detrimental to these values.

IV. Conclusion

Regionalism in East Asia—Southeast Asia, in particular—can be understood as an exercise in state-building. This is because Southeast Asian countries constructed and have exploited a sub-regional framework named ASEAN as a hedge against external intervention to focus on their state-building processes (Yamakage, 1997, p.327). This still continues today. The establishment of the ARF is therefore a continued attempt by developing ASEAN countries to preserve a favorable environment to remain focused on state-building by maintaining peaceful engagement of great powers such as the U.S., China, and Japan to the region (Takano, 2003, p.83). In short, the ASEAN countries are seeking wider East Asian security in order to ensure Southeast Asian security, and not vice versa (Yamakage, 1997, p.308).

In many works on regionalism, it is frequently the case that a compatible level of state development is either assumed or taken for granted. This is because

the study on regionalism has been built on the European experience, a region where major countries have roughly similar levels of development. As a result, one of the main assumptions is that regionalism, one scholar writes, occurs “only in countries of similar economic size and levels of industrialization, either between industrialized countries, or between developing countries, but not between industrialized and developing countries” (Weiss, 1999). In fact, there are few studies that systematically examine the influence of this factor on regionalism. The linkage between regionalism and the level of state development thus remains unfounded. It is possible that the level of state development is one of the most influential factors in East Asian regionalism. To serve as a useful policy guide to better promote regional security cooperation, it is imperative that scholars weigh the relative importance of various factors, including the level of state development.

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東アジア地域主義と国家発展レベル —諸要因の比較検討の必要性—

< 要 約 >

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東アジアにおける地域安全保障協力的ないし地域主義の進展に影響を及ぼす要因は、先行研究によって多数紹介された。しかし、どの要因がいなかる状況で最も強い影響を与えうるのか、また、いかなる要因が最も当該地域の地域主義に重要な影響を及ぼしているのかといった問題については、必ずしも十分な研究が行われてこなかったのではないかと。本論文は、それら諸要因の比較検討を行う必要性を訴えるものである。

比較検討の意義は2点ある。1つは、国家の外交・安全保障政策には常に優先事項があり、また政府の人的・物的資源も限られているため、多数の要因を列挙するだけでは、政府が政策決定を行う際あまり有用な役割を果たさず、諸要因の影響力を比較することによって、初めて実用的なものになるということである。もう1つは、特に影響力が強いと考えられる要因が明らかになれば、なぜそれ(ら)が重要なのかといった、当該地域における地域主義の力学の理解を促すことに繋がるということである。

本論文は、様々な要因のうち、指摘される頻度が高く、特に重要と考えられている5つを選択し紹介する。それらは、勢力均衡、歴史問題、経済発展、主権ならびに内政不干渉原則、国内的政治正統性である。

また、本論文は第6の要因として、後者3つの要因(経済発展、規範、国内的政治正統性)に関連する「国家発展(state development)レベルの差異」を挙げ、なぜこの要因が重要であるかを考察する。国家の発展レベルが高ければ高いほど、地域協力的に積極的な姿勢を示すという仮定の下に、本論文は、先進国が発展途上国より地域主義に好意的である理由を2点挙げる。第1は、国家構築(state-building)プロセスが進めば進むほど、国家の関心は国外へ向かうということに起因するものであり、第2は、経済的・安全保障的相互依存が深まると、国内問題と国際問題の境界線が不明瞭になるということに基づくものである。

発展途上国は、国家構築が最優先事項であるため、経済発展、主権・内政不干涉規範、政府の正統性といった、国家構築プロセスの根幹を構成する要素に非常に大きな重きを置く。よって、発展途上国が地域協力を好意的になるか否かは、これらの要因にいかに関連するかによって左右される。

東アジアには日本のような先進国とインドネシアやマレーシアのような発展途上国が共存する地域である。当該地域の安全保障協力は、発展途上国の国家発展プロセスの成否に左右されるのではないだろうか。