戦後民主主義教育の意図せざる結果について
What "Democratic" Teachers Did to Their Pupils During Postwar Years

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ABSTRACT

戦後日本の自殺率は，1958年前後および2000年前後と，2度にわたるピークを画している．前者の主因は当時15歳から24歳であった若者の自殺の激増に求められ，最近のピークは55歳から64歳までの中・高年齢層の自殺の増加により説明できる．2つのピークは共に，1936年から1945年の間に生まれた同じ世代の自殺から生じている．それぞれ彼らの社会への参入時と，社会からの引退時に対応している．本論では，2つのピークに共通する原因として，戦後教育改革期（1945－1955）における民主的な教育内容と，保守的な日本社会との対立に注目する．教え子を再び戦場に送らないとの決意のもと，改革期の教師の多くは「個人の尊厳」を強調する民主教育を展開した．しかし彼らの意図とは裏腹に，そうした教育は今度は教え子を，大量にしかも生涯にわたって，アノミックな自殺へと追いやる結果となったと推論されるのである．

1. Suicide Rate as Indicators of the Effects of Teaching

From the perspective of devoted school teachers, few things may be more significant than the long-term effects of their teaching upon pupils. However, nothing may be more difficult than ascertaining such effects accurately. Among major historical efforts in this direction, an eight-year study by the American Progressive Education Association as well as a Bennington Study by Theodore Newcomb immediately come to mind. Although they were statistical and positive in their methods, they analyzed data on a limited number of pupils through relatively short periods of time (Kandel, 1957; Cremin, 1961; Newcomb, 1957). For a study of long-term effects of teaching in postwar Japan, the present author has taken up statistical data on suicide. Surely such data represent only a limited aspect of the various social features. Among such features, however, the suicide rate recommends itself as an instrument, particularly to inquire into the long-term effects of teaching. First, with contrast to academic surveys and researches, such data provide massive and rather accurate information for entire nations such as Japan. Second, the data enable a longitudinal study which may extend even over a few decades. Finally, as Emile Durkheim eloquently argued a hundred years ago, the suicide as a human act points strongly to the degree of human estrangement and unhappiness in this world (Durkheim, 1961). That act stands diametrically opposite to any ideal goal of education and is to be avoided at any cost by anyone engaged in teaching. Thus, although in purely negative terms, suicide may cast light upon the inquiry into the effects of education. The point clearly applies to the case in postwar Japan where efforts of teachers, in their genuine enthusiasm for a democratic education, created the effect of bringing about quite unintended consequences upon their pupils.

2. Salient Features of the Suicide Rate in Japan over Past Several Decades

Chart I shows the fluctuating suicide rate in Japan over the past seventy years from early Showa to the present. The suicide rate, shown on the left-side right after each year, refers to the number of those committed suicide, annually, per 100,000 population. As indicated by the graph, during this seventy-year period, the rate has changed rather drastically between the record low of around or even lower than 10 (estimated) in 1944 or 1945 and the other extreme of 26.0 in 1998 (Kosei Rodo-sho or Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 1948-2004). Such a change marks a contrast, for instance, to the stability of the corresponding rate for the United States, especially from the 1940s through 2001, which is shown in Chart II (U. S. National Center for Health Statistics, 2003).

Now, what are some of the major characteristics of the changing rate of suicide in Japan over the past several decades? First, in prewar years, the rate has risen slowly but steadily until around the start of a battle with China in 1937 when the rate began to decline conspicuously. The downward change apparently derived from the degree of national solidarity achieved by the imminent threat of a major war. Second, during the last years of the Pacific War, when Japan's defeat was becoming apparent, the figure probably hit the lowest rate, ever in Showa Japan, of around 10. Third, the postwar years to date experienced notable ups and downs culminating into two sharp peaks around the late 1950s and the turn of the new century, respectively. Indeed, between these two peaks, suicide rate remained rather low and through this period most of the Japanese were aware of only one major peak in the late 1950s. Today, they must confront two, instead of one, beside a minor high peak around the mid-1980s.

How was the late 1950s peak brought about?



Figure I: SUICIDE-RATE IN JAPAN FROM EARLY SHOWA TO THE PRESENT (1931 - 2003) (NUMBER PER 100,000 POPULATION)



Figure II: SUICIDE-RATE IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1931 TO 2001 (NUMBER PER 100,000 POPULATION)

Instead of gazing at the graph helplessly, the application of the Cartesian method of analysis is recommended. The data should be divided into minute sections and attention must be focused onto each . Table 1 shows the numbers and percentages of six age-groups from 15-74 for the selected years between 1947 and 1967. It is easy to see that the different age-groups contribute very differently to the vicissitudes of total numbers of suicide between 1947 through 1967. The numbers and percentages of those between 15 and 24 years rose up notably from 2,180 (17.9%) in 1947 to 8,312 (35.2%) in 1958. The same figures dropped equally as conspicuously to 2,544 (18.0%) by 1967. Although not very salient, the figures for those between 25 and 34 years showed a similar pattern, marking the highest in 1958 and dropping down to the lowest at both ends. As far as percentages go, the remaining four age-groups of 35-44 years, 45-54 years, 55-64 years, and 65-74 years demonstrate an exactly opposite pattern; namely, figures proved the lowest in 1957 and 1958, the highest at both ends. All this leads to the conclusion that a dramatic rise of suicide rate

Table 1 Number and percentage of suicide of respective age-groups for the selected years between 1947 and 1967

	All age	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-74
1947	12, 166	2, 180 17. 9%	1, 828 15. 0%	1, 335 11. 0%	1, 709 14. 0%	1, 980 16. 3%	2, 085 17. 1%
1950	16, 311	4, 114 25. 2%	2, 683 16. 4%	1, 781 10. 9%	2, 054 12. 6%	2, 253 13. 8%	2, 211 13. 6%
1951	15, 415	4, 288 27. 8%	2, 656 17. 2%	1, 673 10. 9%	1, 808 11. 7%	1, 959 12. 7%	1, 911 12. 4%
1952	15, 776	4, 656 29. 5%	2, 825 17. 9%	1, 629 10. 3%	1, 782 11. 3%	1, 878 11. 9%	1, 865 11. 8%
1953	17, 731	5, 769 32. 5%	3, 373 19. 0%	1, 764 9. 9%	1, 778 10. 0%	1, 964 11. 1%	1, 852 10. 4%
1954	20, 635	7, 257 35. 2%	4, 187 20. 3%	1, 920 9. 3%	1, 983 9. 6%	2, 146 10. 4%	1, 923 9. 3%
1955	22, 477	8, 231 36. 6%	4, 587 20. 4%	1, 951 8. 7%	2, 137 9. 5%	2, 198 9. 8%	2, 020 9. 0%
1956	22, 107	7, 756 35. 1%	4, 432 20. 0%	1, 890 8. 5%	2, 060 9. 3%	2, 388 10. 8%	2, 130 9. 6%
1957	22, 136	7, 713 34. 8%	4, 552 20. 6%	1, 889 8. 5%	2, 176 9. 8%	2, 341 10. 6%	2, 084 9. 4%
1958	23, 641	8, 312 35. 2%	5, 047 21. 3%	1, 930 8. 2%	2, 152 9. 1%	2, 478 10. 5%	2, 254 9. 5%
1959	21, 090	6, 737 31. 9%	4, 538 21. 5%	1, 837 8. 7%	2, 035 9. 6%	2, 411 11. 4%	2, 224 10. 5%
1960	20, 143	6, 486 32. 2%	4, 340 21. 5%	1, 715 8. 5%	2, 011 10. 0%	2, 238 11. 1%	2, 052 10. 2%
1962	16, 723	4, 381 26. 2%	3, 715 22. 2%	1, 621 9. 7%	1, 646 9. 8%	1, 985 11. 9%	1, 959 11. 7%
1967	14, 120	2, 544 18. 0%	2, 877 20. 4%	1, 750 12. 4%	1, 512 10. 7%	1, 972 14. 0%	2, 010 14. 2%

among the young from 15 to 24 years old was largely responsible for the overall increase in the number of suicide around 1958.

Our question to the cause of the late 1950s suicide rate surge boils down to the question of what drove those within the age-group of 15 and 24 years to the act of killing themselves. The answer to this may have to simultaneously explain why the downward trend followed the late 1950s and what made the same rate consistently low for Japan through the 1980s. Following the notable increase among the youths, there appeared a few interpretations. As early as 1961, a sociologist attributed the phenomenon to the lack of "autonomy and independence" peculiar to Japanese youths(Ida, 1961). Ida may be correct in pointing to the factor of collective personality in suicide, but his interpretation comes across as inadequate since it indicates that the levels of "autonomy and independence" among the Japanese youths radically fluctuated between 1957, when their suicide rate reached a peak (44.5) , and only ten years later in 1967, when the same rate dropped to 12.8. It is absurd to assume, the author believes, that their personality underwent a fundamental change within such a short period of time.

Some interpretations point to the increased unemployment of the period as a major cause of suicide(Kohsaka and Usui, 1966, 184; Gendai no Esupuri, 1975, 21). However, the unemployment rate offers mixed evidence at the very most. A year-long period from the middle of 1956, for example, is known as an unprecedented economic boom named the "Jinmu Keiki," or literally the first of such since the beginning of Japan. Moreover, had economic troubles been a major cause of high suicide rate, the rate must have been much higher in 1949 when three times as many workers were curtailed than the number of those in 1957 (Orihara, 1963, 79). The fact is that the suicide rate among the age-group of 15 and 24 years for 1957 proved three times as high as that for 1949, disqualifying the unemployment thesis.

Maurice Pinguet, a French historian, has related the increased suicide to the wartime experience of those youths who were born between 1930 and 1935. As premature youngsters, Pinguet claims, they personally witnessed and have kept vivid memories of idealized image of their fathers and (elder) brothers who devoted their lives to the country without any compensation. As they themselves matured around the late 1950s, they followed the steps of their idealized figures, this time, by taking their own lives (Pinguet, 1986, 24ff). Pinguet's scheme is superior in that it can explain the marked increase of suicide among a certain age-group during this specific period of time. It is deficient, however, because during the period the suicide rate rose similarly among girls as well as boys.

Opposite the side of those speculative explanations dealt with so far, the sociologist Hiroshi Orihara's analysis appears much more realistic as well as positive. Orihara has taken up and analyzed most of some fifty-five specific suicide cases which occurred in a Shizuoka Prefecture town during 1955 through 1958. Originating largely in agricultural or semiagricultural areas, these cases seemed to have stemmed from generational conflicts between aspiring sons and daughters, and conservative parents, especially fathers. With the breakdown of the "household-constraint" after the defeat of the war, the youths suddenly began to look toward a free choice of vocation and lucrative and relaxed city-life. Their parents, on the contrary, consistently pressed their children to stay on farm and help them. In many of these cases, the youths became desperate and took their own lives.

Under limited circumstances, when children's income from side jobs much exceeded that of parents', it was the latter who were put to the corner. Due to new education and rampant mass-

communications, the youths's levels of expectations were escalated and aspiring youths could not but confront the conservative establishment and risked of their own lives(Orihara, 1963, 100-118,142-43). Better than any other previous theory, Orihara's scheme explains how the high rate of suicide occurred around the end of 1950s.

However, when examined against subsequent occurrences, the shortcomings of Orihara's scheme were revealed. When he published his essay in 1963, there was only one known peak of suicide rate during the postwar period. As already pointed out, by now we know there are two major peaks. How was the second one around the end of the turn of the new century brought about? Table 2 shows the changing numbers and percentages of suicide in accordance with different age groups for a few years around 1998. Unlike some forty years ago, young people between 15 and 24 years old made no substantial contribution to the increase this time. On the contrary, their percentages showed a relative decline. Among the age groups, the 55-64 years old marked the highest relative increase of 3.1 percent from 1993 to 2000. The 25-34 years group registered the second highest of 1.4 percent difference followed by the same of 1.1 percent by the oldest group of 65-74 . But, they lagged behind the 55-64 years group by wide margins. Indeed, this 55-64 years group contributed most to the increase in all three terms; namely, in absolute number, in percentage, as well as the rate of increase between 1993 and 2000. Thus, it is fair to

Table 2 Number and percentage of suicide of respective age-groups for the years 1993 through 2002

	All age	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-74
1993	20,516	1,378 6.7%	2,071 10.1%	3,008 14.7%	4,419 21.5%	4,010 19.5%	2,593 12.6%
1994	20,923	1,610 7.7%	2,301 11.0%	2,793 13.3%	4,492 21.5%	4,035 19.3%	2,535 12.1%
1995	21,420	1,538 7.2%	2,359 11.0%	2,722 12.7%	4,766 22.3%	4,165 19.4%	2,687 12.5%
1996	22,138	1,510 6.8%	2,387 10.8%	2,708 12.2%	4,960 22.4%	4,465 20.2%	2,915 13.2%
1997	23,494	1,478 6.3%	2,610 11.1%	2,842 12.1%	5,182 22.1%	4,877 20.1%	3,127 13.3%
1998	31,755	2,065 6.5%	3,512 11.1%	3,627 11.4%	7,141 22.5%	6,969 21.9%	4,303 13.6%
1999	31,413	1,966 6.3%	3,631 11.6%	3,708 11.8%	6,940 22.1%	6,928 22.1%	4,186 13.3%
2000	30,252	1,804 6.0%	3,480 11.5%	3,547 11.7%	6,647 22.0%	6,832 22.6%	4,136 13.7%
2001	29,357	1,667 5.7%	3,400 11.6%	3,609 12.3%	6,450 22.0%	6,383 21.7%	4,173 14.2%
2002	29,949	1,592 5.3%	3,448 11.5%	3,774 12.6%	6,612 22.1%	6,773 22.6%	4,102 13.7%

say that this 55-64 years group was primarily responsible for the increase of suicide around the end of the twentieth century. And it is none other than the very same age group which produced by far the largest number of suicide previously, around the end of the 1950s.

Nor is this the end of the whole story. Table 3 represents longitudinal data on suicide and suicide rate for each ten year period between 1957 and 1997. Among other things the table tells that the very group whose young comrades took their own lives in a large number in the late 1950s has actually undergone a unique forty-year career. At the beginning in 1957, this group lost 7,713 members, marking a high rate of suicide at 44.5. Ten years later, the same group grew into the 25-34 years group whose suicide rate was lowered down considerably to 16.9. Still, this figure was higher than not only that of the group immediately above them (35-44), but also that of the following 45- 54 years old group. Given the general trend that the suicide rate singularly increases with the advance of age, such a reversed order is unusual. Then, twenty years later, in 1977, the rate for the same group, now 35-44 years old, was 20.1 , somewhat higher than the next group's 15.4. The same point applies to the cases of 1987 as well as 1997 when their figures at the ages 45-54 and 55-64, respectively, were still higher than their elders'. In other words, compared with other groups, the original 1957 15-24 age group has consistently been marked as having a high rate of suicide throughout their life time.

3. How Did They Become More Prone to Suicide?

Who are these people who have consistently taken their own lives more than other age groups? They were born between the mid-1930s and mid-1940s, the oldest of whom include individuals such as the novelists Kenzaburo Oe and Sho Shibata as well as the one-time Boston Philharmonic conductor Seiji Ozawa. The youngest are

Table 3 Longitudinal Data on the Number of Suicide and Suicide Rate of the Respective Age Cohorts for the Years 1957, 1967, 1977, 1987 and 1997.

	All age	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-74
1957	22,136 24.3	7,713 44.5	2,658 18.1	1,889 17.9	2,176 25.3	2,341 38.1	2,084 58.8
1967	14,120 14.1	2,544 12.8	2,877 16.9	1,750 12.1	1,512 14.9	1,972 25.4	2,010 42.6
1977	20,269 17.8	2,368 14.3	3,908 19.6	3,436 20.1	2,189 15.4	2,315 24.3	2,675 41.1
1987	23.831 19.5	1,634 9.1	2,686 16.7	3,994 20.0	5,190 31.0	4,048 30.3	2,878 35.6
1997	23,497 18.8	1,478 8.4	2,610 14.7	2,842 17.7	5,182 26.4	4,877 30.4	3,127 26.1

Table 4 Differences in the numbers of deaths and suicide between those born during 1916-1925 and 1936-45.

	Those who were born between 1916 and 1925	Those who were born between 1936 and 1945
	In the year 1980	In the year 2000
Number of those who died between the age 55 and 64	96,420	106,672
Number of those who committed suicide between the age 55 and 64	3598	6,882
Percentage of those who committed suicide	3.73%	6.45%

comprised of those who were born around the end of the Pacific War. Are these people really more prone to commit suicide than other age groups? Table 4 compares the percentage of suicide as well as the total deaths at the ages from 55 through 64 years between two generations. One group are those who were born between 1916 and 1925, the other(the group of our concern here), those who were born between 1936 and 1945. Twenty years separates the two groups. In 1980, among the first group, a total of 96,420 deaths, 3,598 of which took their own lives. The percentage of suicide among all deaths was 3.73. Then in 2000, twenty years later, among the second group a total of 106,672 people died. Of these 6,882, or 6.45 percent, was attributed to suicide. These figures lend support to the thesis that the said group are actually more prone to suicide than other age groups (Tachikawa, 1996; Kameda and Saito, 1998; Ishihara, 2003).

Now, the author would like to assume that the said group were not different genetically than the other groups, those before and after them. In other words, the author takes it for granted that they were not born prone to commit suicide. On the other hand, he does not ascribe the suicidal pattern of the said group to purely external causes. As a major reason for suicide, some social scientists give importance to economic conditions. It is absurd to assume, however, that the same economic difficulty, such as unemployment, should consistently press hard only against the said group throughout their entire life, and at the relative neglect of other groups. Setting aside the fact that unemployment itself proved much less than almighty cause of suicide, the above position will have the effect of conferring upon unemployment an influence of a magical kind which consistently works selectively upon one specific group. Equally or even more illogical is the interpretation which assigns distinctly different causes to different periods which worked invariably to promote the suicide of the said group at different periods of time. This hypothesis will contend that when the said group were 15-24 years old, there was Cause A which prompted their suicide, that when they were 25-34 years old, there was Cause B which prommoted...then Cause C and so on. At first sight these two positions appear reasonable, but in fact they tend to make recourse to the supernatural and both may well end up with stigmatizing the said group simply as "a cursed or ill-fated generation." In short, the three approaches stated above defy logical inquiries.

If we avoid two extremes of a purely genetic as well as a purely environmental explanation, there remains the golden mean. A most reasonable scheme may be the following: during their infancy and early adolescence, the said group received and imbibed a kind of education which gave, and are still giving, them a consistent type of orientation.

Partially because of this internalized orientation, whenever they had confronted, or are confronted, difficulties of one kind or another in the course of their lives, such experiences drove, and are still driving, the group to suicide relatively more easily than other groups.

Were the said group then taught to give up their lives easily? By no means. On the contrary, it was precisely their elders who were constantly inculcated that, by the side of the Emperor and his State, their lives weighed even lighter than the feather, a metaphor deriving from the *Imperial Rescript for Soldiers* of 1882. The generation which Kenzaburo Oe, Sho Shibata and Seiji Ozawa exemplified were taught something exactly the opposite.

Those who came into this world between 1936 and 1945 received their elementary and secondary education under the postwar system of schooling. They shared universally not only a primary level but also, very importantly, a compulsory secondary level education in the newly established schools. These schools, in turn, were to stand on quite democratic ideas which emphasized "the dignity and worth of individual human beings." If the older pattern of education had been organized essentially upon authoritarianism, so argued the U. S. Education Mission, in the new pattern "the starting point must be the individual"(U.S. Education Mission to Japan, 1946, 4-6). The fresh textbooks fully incorporated such ideas. Indeed, Kenzaburo Oe himself, who, as an 13 year-old-adolescent, read a social studies textbook thus prepared in 1948, has written that it implanted in him "an unforgettable, heart-warming passion" (Fujioka, 1991, 24).

Isn't it paradoxical that those who were taught and learned passionately that they must put much value on the lives of others as well as of themselves have taken their own in such a great number? This is particularly so in contrast to their elder generation who had been trained quite otherwise but did not actually give up their own lives so easily during the postwar years. What did the age group to which Oe, Shibata and Ozawa belong absorb from the postwar democratic education in Japan? What had the effect of driving them massively to apparently unintended consequences?

As already indicated by Orihara's study, the causes of suicide during the later 1950s had been characteristically pessimistic and world-weary (Kohsaka and Usui, 1966, 41). How did they come to feel alienated from the world? Although it is difficult to trace the process accurately, the author takes up a few personal cases in some depth to obtain some clues. There remains, for instance, memoirs of a girl, eighteen years old in 1958, who came to dislike the world and who thus attempted suicide several times in that time. After finishing her secondary education, she became a factory worker which proved as a complete disappointment to her. On the first day of her work, she entered the gate of the factory with some positive expectations. Virtually all of what she saw discouraged her bitterly. Workers' conditions were less than what she believed were minimally guaranteed by the Labor Standards Act. When lunch time arrived, they did not even have chairs on which to eat. Above all other things, the realities of the workers' union bothered her most. Senior members would dominate and they would not permit novices like herself to speak up and express opinions till the very end of general meetings. Thus confesses the girl:

> I have never thought that our society was such a place. To be sure I had not conceived of my workplace in terms of paradise. Nonetheless, the so-called realities which have been filled with contradictions just left me speechless (Kohsaka and Usui. 1966, 416-17).

She had envisaged her work at the factory as challenging at least, if not an ideal, one. However, the gaps between her expectations and realities turned out to be enormous, which discouraged her and made her speechless. Deep in her heart she had alienated herself from the "real" world.

Another example is from the autobiographical novel written by Sho Shibata, who, along with Kenzaburo Oe and Seiji Ozawa, belongs to the generation of our special concern in this paper. The best-selling work of the 1980s, the novel entitled "And Yet Our Days-" depicted the days of politically committed students during the late 1950s and their subsequent frustrations. One of the major figures is named Sano, a student who was single-heartedly devoted to the dreams of a communist revolution. With the complete failure of their plans, he became an elitist worker of a big company, but found to be increasingly tired of his life and of himself and committed suicide. His will comprises the following passage:

> On the surface of life, nothing is different, but deep in my heart I feel weary of everything ... day to day work, even inviting Ayako (his fiance) to a concert. I am very tired of listening to records at my apartment. No, even getting up in the morning, eating, going to bed at night! Then, gradually, in my daily life, was formed an idea of death ... (Shibata. 1961, 87).

Sano certainly had his personal, prior history which rendered such state of mind natural to him. That history began when he was admitted, in the second year of his high school days, as a formal member of the communist party. In the same will, he shot a question to the addressee:

> I even now vividly remember the spiritual uplift which I had when I first became a formal member of the party in the summer of my second year in high school. Have you yourself experienced an enhanced feeling like that? To leave the party signifies to negate everything of my past including such an uplift (Shibata, 1961, 65).

Sano once had immersed himself in the excitement of his participation in an anticipated revolution. A few fatal events discouraged his dreams, and the gaps thus created between his dreams and his subsequent career had the effect of alienating him from the world.

4. How were the Teachers Responsible for the Fate of the Generation?

The two examples taken above indicate that prior to their frustrations and discouragement, these two individuals had high expectations and ideals with an accompanying spiritual uplifting and bright prospects. Now, it is known that excessive expectations and ideals often lead their holders to suicide. To isolate such cases of suicide, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim defined an "anomic" type of suicide which, along with another major type called "egoistic" suicide, is peculiar to modern times. According to him, under ordinary or rather conservative conditions of a society, societal norms of various kinds imprint upon its members a certain framework of expectations. The members are in turn protected from holding excessive expectations whose breakdowns may lead them to fatal disappointments. During a time of radical social change such as the immediate postwar years, such a framework will disintegrate easily. When given stimulation in certain directions, expectations of youngsters will escalate indefinitively. Their hopes and expectations thus escalate and, in turn, will collide squarely with social "realities", very often at the defeat and disappointment of the young. As a consequence, youngsters will have found themselves weary of the

world and have taken their own lives to resolve uneasy situations. Hence, a large number of anomic suicide in Japan around the later 1950s.

Where and how did the 18 year old girl and her generation learn and imbibe such hopes and expectations that had the effect of ultimately destroying themselves? Most probably from those democratic teachers in postwar Japan, and in part, through those textbooks which apotheosized democracy as the basic and supreme principle. Certainly, textbooks did not simply depict factories as the ideal place for work, nor did they advocate any armed revolution. Nonetheless, many of those postwar teachers who had once sent their school boys onto the battle field who did not return, were determined to change their goals completely. In their reflection and remorse on what they did during the war, these teachers extended their unconditional respect for children as individuals and promoted education for democracy and peace. Pupils in turn responded enthusiastically to those efforts on the part of democratic teachers (Kanazawa, 1967; Uchida, 2004, 52-3).

The author once personally learned from Mr. Motofumi Makieda, former President of the Japan Teachers Union, who stated that the ten years to the mid-1950s proved the best period for both teachers and pupils in Japan. (Mr. Makieda visited ICU in the early 1980s and gave a convocation speech on the theme.) Tragically enough, however, one of the consequences of these best years turned out quite contrary to their good intentions. For the second time, after a short period of interval, the same teachers drove their dear students to death, in not small numbers, this time in the form of anomic suicide. Apparently, it is simply too much just to blame these teachers. The United States Education Mission to Japan originally proclaimed high ideals and expectations in education immediately after the war's end in March 1946. On the basis of their recommendations, the Ministry of Education prepared very "democratic" and idealized school textbooks. Also seriously responsible were miserably outmoded styles of capitalism and even of labor unions in postwar Japan. Without any of these, youngsters' fate would have undergone a somewhat different course.

Nevertheless, those "democratic" teachers will not be totally excused from what they did to the said generation. They inspired many of their pupils to the verge of anomic state of mind in the midst of a rather conservative and old-fashioned society. The teachers' educational goals were diametrically opposite, perhaps, between war-time and postwar years. They thought they promoted distinctly different directions in education. However, their relative roles in the death of their pupils has remained the same. Moreover, unlike those who had sent their pupils to the battlefield, postwar "democratic" teachers have been under no criticism of their fellow teachers or of historians. They themselves may have largely remained unconscious of what they did. To that very extent, historians must make effort to evaluate their actual roles critically.

Readers may duly ask: what and how, then, should the teachers have taught? The author's answer is trite and uninspiring. As anything else, teachers must carry out their task just to a proper degree. Now this "proper degree" is not easy to locate. But the author seriously believes that that is precisely one of the important lessons we must learn from the consequences of the education reform in postwar Japan. As a consequence of an excessive democratic education, a generation of individuals suffered a large loss of their comrades throughout their life time, especially at the time of their entrance into, and at the time of their retreat from, their "real" society.

From the point of view of teaching and learning, one more point should be added. These teachers, and even pupils, were indeed successful in teaching

and imbibing certain doctrines and attitudes, to a degree which is difficult to attain these days. From the point of view of the transmission of certain doctrines and attitudes from one generation to the next, these teachers lived through the best of times. From the point of view of its consequence (or happiness of their pupils), their work proved otherwise, although we must learn further, from history as well as from our experience, to define the substance of pupils' happiness itself.

Note: This paper is an expanded and updated version of the author's short essay which was originally published in *Ippankyouiku Gakkai Kaishi* (*Journal of the Liberal and General Education Society of Japan*) XVIII-1 (1996), pp.27-33 under the title "Nihon Kyouikushi no Kyouzai toshiteno Jisatsu-tokei." ("Statistical Data on Suicide as a Teaching Material for the History of Japanese Education.") This expanded and updated paper was read at the ICU-U. of Vermont Summer Workshop on July 8, 2004. The author would like to thank Professor Mark Langager, who organized the workshop, as well as the audience from Vermont for their incisive and sympathetic comments. A.T.

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