

# 道徳教育を通じて育まれる市民性

## From Moral Education to Citizenship

英国の政策と諸問題

Principles and Problems in UK Policy

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道徳性, 市民性, パブリック, プライベート, 社会的包摂

Morality, Citizenship, Public, Private, Social Inclusion

### ABSTRACT

本稿ではまず初めに、市民教育における最近の動向の文化的背景を素描する。続いて、正邪の問題をめぐる教師の自信喪失という道徳教育の問題に取り組む、イギリスとウエールズにおける試みを紹介し、これを批判的に吟味する。次に、1990年代後期における道徳教育から市民教育への関心の推移という傾向に関連して、1998年に英国で発行されたクリックレポート、『市民性のための教育と学校における民主主義の教授』について簡潔に論ずる。このレポートが首尾一貫し良識あるものであることを認めた上で、本稿は、特に社会への包括 (social inclusion) に関し、市民教育の考え方についてより幅広い問いを投げかける。結論として、本稿で考察してきたすべての動向において、倫理、そして市民性についての矮小化されすぎた考え方が浸透しているということを指摘する。人々の生活を特色づけこれに意味を与えている、身近で、局所的で、互いに絡み合い、そしておそらくは葛藤をもはらむ諸々の忠誠の形を重んずるような形で、公的世界と私的世界の関係をとらえ直すことが、特にグローバリゼーションの時代においては必要である。このことは、教育実践全体に関わるものである。

What is the relation between moral education and education for citizenship? In the UK in recent years these issues have been prominent matters of concern in educational policy and practice.

This paper begins with a sketch of the cultural context of contemporary developments in citizenship education. It goes on to describe and critically to examine the attempt in England and Wales to address the problem of teachers' lack of confidence in moral education. In parallel to the shift of attention from moral education to citizenship education in the late 1990s, the discussion then moves to a brief account of the Crick Report, *Education for Citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools*. While the coherence and good sense of this report is recognised, the paper raises broader questions about the idea of citizenship education, especially with regard to social inclusion. It concludes with the suggestion that all the developments that have been considered suffer from too narrow a conception of ethics, and hence of citizenship, and with the recommendation that both need to be understood in terms of something more like the education of character, a conception with implications for educational practice as a whole.

### **The different regions of the UK-the cultural context of citizenship**

The general thrust of concern in citizenship education has been with civic responsibilities understood in terms of rights and duties. Allied to this there is a presumption that citizens should in some degree be committed to the common good; in some cases this is

construed in terms of a kind of cultural allegiance. While these are common (and unremarkable) features of the idea of education for citizenship throughout the United Kingdom, the question of the need for a common sense of belonging or a common identity receives different attention and responses in the different parts of the United Kingdom. To appreciate the significance of this it is necessary to bear in mind, first, the differing degrees of independence of the education systems of Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales *vis-à-vis* central government, and, second, their respective histories and demographic profiles. It is Scotland that enjoys the greatest degree of independence in this respect, education being one of the main institutional factors, alongside the legal system and the church, in such political autonomy as it has, and contributing significantly to the sustaining of a robust sense of identity. In comparison with these factors the recent (re) establishment of the Scottish parliament has been of relatively minor significance. In public pronouncements on citizenship education in Scotland, then, one finds the above commitments to civic responsibilities supplemented with the endorsement to a celebration of Scottish identity in the curriculum. In Northern Ireland, for obvious reasons to do with its divided people, there has been no comparable emphasis on the celebration of a national identity; there is still the central preoccupation with civic responsibilities but this is imbued with a strong commitment to toleration. In Wales, partly because of reasons of scale and geographical proximity, the real differences that might emerge tend to be subsumed under policy for England. In addition to the trends sketched

here, the emergence of calls for the development of European citizenship should also be acknowledged, though these remain little more than calls at present; they are undoubtedly less influential in the UK than in some other European countries.

I make no apology for the focus, in what follows, on the case of England because policy change there has been more decisive. In 1998 a major report, *Education for citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools* — otherwise known as the Crick Report after its chairman, the political philosopher Bernard Crick — was published. Many of its recommendations, in fact more than Crick himself anticipated, have since become law, and in general these changes have been well received, by politicians, teachers, academics, and the community at large. To understand the significance of this report, however, it may be helpful first to consider certain features of the historical background, especially the “citizenship deficit” that has been widely noted to be a aspect of British cultural life.

One feature of this deficit is commonly understood to be a product of the fact that the British are *subjects* rather than citizens. It would be a mistake to let too much hinge on these terms, of course, given the limited role of the royal family, not to mention the existence of monarchies in several other countries where such questions do not seem to arise. On the other hand there are related factors that may feed into the deficit in question. Political stability and lack of disturbance have helped to make it possible to live with a lack of a written constitution. The fact that this is much cherished by many may not be a matter of nostalgia or of a concern to maintain the status quo, but it does have its sinister side. It

is not so much the antiquated structures of Parliament as the influence of what is commonly referred to as the Establishment and the wielding of disproportionate power by a relatively small network of people that are the problem. The divisions of social class, though altered so much by the changes described here, persist nevertheless in new and surreptitious ways.

It is no doubt a truism to say that England, in particular, is a very different place not only from the country that existed at the beginning of that century but from the twilight of the empire in the decades following the Second World War. The weakening of national allegiance that accompanied this was probably felt more acutely in England than in the other parts of the UK. Apart from its coincidence with the rise of a different culture during the economic prosperity of the 1960s, there was a related post-colonial change with the influx of ethnically different groups, conditions that together laid the way for rapid social change and the move to what was in many respects a more egalitarian society. Burgeoning wage demands and the oil crisis during the 1970s, however, laid the way for a political reaction: for the division or fragmentation the political left and centre left, and for the meteoric rise of Margaret Thatcher as leader of the Conservative Party. When she came to power in 1979, it was with a radical (and, that is, with what was in many ways an anti-conservative) agenda. Free market economics, as advocated by Milton Friedman, was introduced, whereby a reduction in inflation was achieved at the cost of dramatic increases in unemployment and ensuing social unrest—witness the riots that occurred during the early 1980s in London, Liverpool,

Bristol, and Birmingham.

One new note that Margaret Thatcher struck at this time was her reappraisal of greed not as a vice but as the engine of enterprise. It was only if avaricious ambition was unleashed that prosperity for the nation could be achieved. But although the logic of her position pointed to the creation of a minimal state-the lack of government interference in industry or in markets-she wielded power in such a way as to centralise decision-making and control. At the same time, the conditions for the kind of prosperity that followed were achieved at the expense of the privatisation of nationalised industries and services-a selling off of the nation's assets that seemed to extend, in Harold Macmillan's famous phrase at the time, to the family silver. In the UK, as in the USA, there emerged at this time a new underclass. This was, and still to some extent is, the 40 : 30 : 30 society, where 40% are doing very well indeed, 30% (including, for example, ordinary teachers and nurses) are living in a reasonable though modest way, and 30% constitute a new poor, whose condition is exacerbated by new forms of social exclusion and scarcely ameliorated by the demeaning routines of unemployment benefits and futile training programmes.

While Margaret Thatcher showed her famous antipathy towards Europe, she had no such inhibitions with regard to the United States, and so the Americanisation that has extended across the world proceeded apace in the UK. It is then something of an apparent irony that the 1980s were also a time of growth for the heritage industry, when the British television's considerable prowess and expertise in the production of drama was turned to some extent away from "plays for

today" (the title of a ground-breaking series in the 1960s) and towards adaptations of Victorian and later classics, *Brideshead Revisited* being a significant example of the genre. At the beginning of the 1990s the new prime minister, John Major, in spite of the fact that his background was extraordinarily different from his predecessors' in terms of social class and education, expressed a vision of England that oozed embarrassingly with nostalgia: the sight of spinsters bicycling home from evensong on summer's evenings, the sound of cricket on village greens, the taste of warm beer.

The landslide victory of so-called New Labour in 1997 brought a degree of euphoria, inaugurating as it did an agenda of social inclusion, a sense that the social divisions that had riven the country might be healed. With this there came a sense of excitement that had a commercial edge to it, with talk of Cool Britannia and the rebranding of Britain (an idea that was allowed to blend shamelessly with the booming success of Richard Branson's Virgin empire). Although embarrassingly unconvincing in many ways, this attention to style went along with a general political sense that the "feelgood factor" was of paramount importance. While there is now some disillusionment with the ability of the present government to put into effect the social inclusion that it advocates, one aspect of policy that has been a success is the economy. (Inflation has for some time been less than 2%.) There are, on the face of it, reasons to complain that the Government's agenda of social inclusion is compromised by its determination to appeal to business interests and to secure the continuing allegiance of former Conservative voters in prosperous parts of the

country. At times this Government has seemed to want to outdo the Conservatives in commitment to these causes. Furthermore, while the ranks of the unemployed have diminished dramatically since the 1980s, the poorest segment of the 40 : 30 : 30 society now ekes out an existence with low-paid, part-time, short-term work or on state benefit. Thus there is a fear that the substance of policy, and the real fight against injustice, is covered over by a language of welcome and inclusion that smacks more of the chat-show host than of the extension of real benefits to those who are worst off.

One reason for Margaret Thatcher's success, as for Ronald Reagan's, was her recognition of the role of presentation. If a policy was unpopular with the voters, the problem was not with the policy but with the presentation. In many ways her alertness to this picked up on a more general tendency in the (post) modern world where commitment to substantive values is progressively weakened in favour of a newly self-conscious style. It is not difficult to see the nihilistic tendencies that this tendency harbours. In some ways the problems with this obsession with presentation are reflected in the Millennium Dome. When the Labour government came to power in 1997 they faced a difficult decision over this particular hugely expensive cultural project. At that time it would no doubt have been difficult not to proceed, though some ministers argued exactly for this. The building that now stands in Greenwich on the south bank of the River Thames is the largest covered space on earth. It cost approximately \$1.2 billion. The exhibition it housed throughout 2000 was an exploration and celebration of aspects of human life and achieve-

ment, covering such themes as work, learning, money, mind, body, faith, play, transport, communications, and the environment. It had a theme park emphasis on novel experience and fun. The Dome's publicity leaflet advertised itself as "One amazing day. One year only":

You can't let 2000 go by without spending a day at the Dome. Where else can you have a tug-of-war with a ballerina, kiss a complete stranger, journey to the centre of the earth and watch a love story where the heroine is swept off her feet (100 feet high) ?

It's the world's largest visitor attraction under one roof and the world's "must see" event of the millennium. For one year only, for young and old, it's a full value, full day out.

The Millennium Dome, a celebration of our cultural lives and common humanity, turns out to be something between a fair-ground and a theme park. This is *culture-lite*. Standing empty and useless throughout 2001, the Dome has become a national embarrassment. Setting aside the questions of the inordinate costs and the architectural and technical achievement of its construction, the heart of the problem is what is at its heart, and that is to say really nothing very much. The themed zones each combine superficiality with gimmickry and a lack of real substance. The Dome is like a gigantic symbol of the gap in values, the fundamental nihilism, at the heart of our lives.

## Moral education

Something of this nihilism is evident also in education policy.<sup>1)</sup> During the 1990s there was a general concern about the erosion of moral standards in the country and the blame for this was attributed partly to teachers. The appalling murders of the two year old Jamie Bulger by two ten year old boys and of head-teacher Philip Lawrence by one of his teenage pupils stood out in the public mind as symbols of what was thought to be a deep malaise. It was partly in response to this that the Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) produced reports designed to address questions of moral and spiritual education. It is no small irony that a degree of uncertainty about the nature of morality is to be found in this work itself, where an understandable sensitivity to the increasingly pluralistic nature of British society led to the confused assumption that the absolute nature of moral imperatives could be established by an empirical survey! The intention of the report to help teachers to have confidence about values they are teaching is undermined where the authors demonstrate such confusion themselves.

The starting point for the SCAA's position is that a pervasive climate of relativism has "struck at the heart of schools' confidence in the teaching of values" (Talbot and Tate, 1997: 1). The National Forum for Values in Education and the Community was set up by the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority with two over-arching aims: first, to discover whether there are any values upon which there is common agreement within society; and second, decide how schools might be supported in the important task of

contributing to pupils' spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. The Forum identified a number of values on which members believed society would agree, and on the strength of extensive consultation, so it was claimed, demonstrated that there was overwhelming agreement over these values. With regard to the second part of the remit, the recommendation was made that SCAA produce guidance for schools on the promotion of pupils' spiritual, moral, social, and cultural development. This guidance, it was recommended, should be structured around the contexts of value, build upon current good practice, encourage rigour and a whole school approach to work in this area, and be supported by booklets of case studies, a directory of resources, a glossary of commonly used terms, and guidelines for community service. It was also recommended that the guidance include suggestions on how the school might involve the local community in this respect. The Forum produced a "Statement of Values" with recommendations regarding *the self, relationships, society, and the environment*.

The starting point for values concerning *the self* was the claim that we value ourselves as unique human beings capable of spiritual, moral, intellectual, and physical growth and development. Hence, on this basis, we should: develop an understanding of our own characters, strengths, and weaknesses; develop self-respect and self-discipline; clarify the meaning and purpose in our lives and decide, on the basis of this, how we believe that our lives should be lived; make responsible use of our talents, rights, and opportunities; strive, throughout life, for knowledge, wisdom, and understanding; and take responsibility, within

our capabilities, for our own lives.

Regarding *relationships*, it was asserted that we value others for themselves, not only for what they have or what they can do for us. Relationships then are to be seen as fundamental to the development and fulfilment of ourselves and others, and to the good of the community. We should, therefore: respect others, including children; care for others and exercise goodwill in our dealings with them; show others they are valued; earn loyalty, trust, and confidence; work co-operatively with others; respect the privacy and property of others; and resolve disputes peacefully.

Regarding our part in *society*, we value such things as truth, freedom, justice, human rights, the rule of law, and collective effort for the common good. In particular, we see families as sources of love and support for all their members, and as the basis of a society in which people care for others. On the strength of this we should: understand and carry out our responsibilities as citizens; refuse to support values or actions that may be harmful to individuals or communities; support families in raising children and caring for dependants; support the institution of marriage; recognise that the love and commitment required for a secure and happy childhood can also be found in families of different kinds; help people to know about the law and legal processes; respect the rule of law and encourage others to do so; respect religious and cultural diversity; promote opportunities for all; support those who cannot, by themselves, sustain a dignified life-style; promote participation in the democratic process by all sectors of the community; contribute to, as well as benefit fairly from, economic and cultural resources; and make truth, integrity,

honesty, and goodwill priorities in public and private life.

We recognise *the environment*, whether natural or shaped by human beings, as both the basis of life and a source of wonder and inspiration. Hence we should: accept our responsibility to maintain a sustainable environment for future generations; understand the place of human beings within nature; understand our responsibilities for other species; ensure that development can be justified; preserve balance and diversity in nature wherever possible; preserve areas of beauty and interest for future generations; and repair, wherever possible, habitats damaged by human development and other means.

In spite of these considerable measurements of agreement that the Forum found, teachers were not, they claimed, operating with the kind of confidence that such shared understanding should support. The Forum recognised, and they are surely right in this, that teachers' confidence has been sapped in recent years. Some of this can be attributed to the way education and schooling have come to be treated in the public domain. Teachers have been on the receiving end of blame for the much-publicised "decline in moral standards". Working in a disparaged public sector, and in demoralising conditions, they have become easy targets for criticism and virtual whipping boys for some politicians and journalists. This acknowledgement is less evident in the work of SCAA.

Another reason for lack of confidence, and in particular the confidence to tackle the issue of moral education, may be that the question "whose values are we to instil?" has itself sometimes been put in a rhetorical way that has discouraged clear and imaginative think-

ing. This again is something that escapes their considerations. It is possible too that talk of “values”, and the title “Forum for Values”, is unfortunate: it plays into the hands of instinctive subjectivists (so often called “relativists”) since “values” have the air of something personal to the individual. Talk of “morality” and of “ethics” is preferable since it suggests a broader and more sophisticated view of things. It also suggests that problems here go deeper than can be solved simply by in-service training in the “delivery” of “values education”.

The National Forum was indirectly a response to concern that while much time and energy was spent on the promotion of pupils’ academic development, their “spiritual, moral, social and cultural development was being neglected”. But if their academic development was neglecting all this, it might be asked, what was it achieving? What kind of academic development is it that does not touch all these areas? There is something odd about the idea of education without values. The neglect of the types of development mentioned threatens not simply to reduce the worth of education but to deny it the title of education, properly so called, at all. How could the academic not be a part of the cultural? How could the study of an academic subject not reflect on and be a part of our shared social world? How could it be pursued without some conception, however tacit, of the good?

Nor is it simply that “values” have been *neglected*. The problem is rather that the *wrong* values have been promoted. The truth about the neglect of the spiritual, moral, social, and cultural is that the dominance of a climate of instrumentalism has meant that a

thin and impoverished conception of human lives has governed education. This does have effects in terms of the allocation of curriculum time but to see it in these terms is really to miss the point. Rather our very ideas of education, of knowledge, and of work have been debilitated, reduced to the “essentials” — taken “back to the basics”, in John Major’s cliché d’expression — of supposed core and transferable skills. Once this reduction and fragmentation has taken place it is a mistake to imagine that the damage can be undone by adding social education here, moral education there, and, not to forget, spiritual education over there. Moral education is the last thing that could be “bolted on”. Whether as good moral education or as bad, this is something that pervades our lives.

The remit of the Forum was first to see if it could be “demonstrated once and for all” that there are values upon which there is agreement across society. Very quickly, it was claimed, the sub-groups charged with this task came up with a number of values that “no-one of goodwill” could sincerely deny, irrespective of their race, ethnic group, religion, age, gender, or class. These included friendship, justice, freedom, truth, self-respect and respect for the environment—the values, that is, enumerated above. If it is complained that such values are like motherhood and apple pie — an initial objection that is considered—this is precisely, Talbot and Tate argue, because they are part of our common humanity (Talbot and Tate 1997: 3). But the very obviousness of these values, they say, especially where we have been preoccupied with respecting differences, may have made them invisible. Conclusive empirical evidence for the claim that these are values on



which everyone of goodwill concurs is provided by the poll conducted by the respected Mori organisation which found that 95% of those consulted agreed.

Leaving aside the suggestion of circularity in “everyone of goodwill”, there seem here to be elements that may muddle future debate. There is a shift from empirical claims about whether or not people as a matter of fact hold certain values to the implication that these are somehow universal, and elsewhere that they are “absolute”. If they are universal, why did not *all* the people consulted agree? The idea that these values are absolute, furthermore, is a metaphysical claim which could not be proved by any empirical research, let alone a Mori poll. To say that a value is absolute would embody an ethical claim — that this is what people *ought to* value and live by.

Here, paradoxically, the Forum sells morality and moral education short by appearing to rely on empirical evidence for claims that can only rest on ethical and philosophical argument. And this is odd because what above all the Forum ought to be doing, and in places clearly is doing, is making out the case for saying that morality is unavoidable: that it is an institution, or a practice, without which we could not live a recognisably human life. What would it be like, after all, to live without weighing up the people around us and responding to them on the basis that they are, for example, trustworthy or liable to let us down, charitable or uncaring, truthful or deceitful? These are moral evaluations, and we make them constantly. It is hard to see how it could be otherwise. We are a moral, an ethical species. Unlike most of the animal world we have a degree of choice: we could decide to do other than we do. But this is

different from claiming that — except as a matter of contingent fact — we share substantive values, or that such values are universal.

It is in part then the search for agreement and consensus that seems to be causing confusion. For instance, *Education for Adult Life: the spiritual and moral development of young people* tells us:

There were doubts as to whether there could be national agreement on core values. Employers, however, generally felt that there is little difficulty in establishing national core values. They pointed out that many organisations have developed statements of core values to which all employees can subscribe. Those engaged on school-based projects (for example, on citizenship education or readiness for employment) appeared to have no difficulty in producing lists of qualities desirable in young people. (SCAA 1996: 10)

The confusion leads to another unfortunate shift: from national agreement on core values (presumably the kinds of values that no-one of goodwill would deny), to national core values (which presumably might not operate amongst other nations, whether inhabited by people of goodwill or not), to something like the organisational mission-statement, to lists drawn up by committees and working-parties. What are properly *moral* questions are not to be solved by people of goodwill making a list. The confusion is another inducement to lose sight of specifically moral values and moral argument.

Of course it is reasonable to try to find out what values people in fact hold and then to

see how this evidence can be used as a basis for guiding moral education in schools. It may be stimulating to share the views of those who are especially concerned with these matters, that is, the sort of people who make up the Forum. These might be seen as pragmatic measures to find a negotiated basis for policy. There is a gap, though, between this and the language of universals and absolutes. Agreement does not show that the values espoused are the right ones, even if it may provide a way for people to live together. The danger is in moving from a pragmatic approach to the assertion of metaphysical claims. And, we might note, the more such claims are absolutist in nature the more dissent and disagreement there is likely to be.

Tate and Talbot are right to argue that productive disagreement depends on a level of agreement. Indeed the point could be put more strongly in that if there were no agreement about anything at all, we could not even communicate. But the problem with their notion of agreement here is that it is tied too much to the assumption that there must be clear-cut propositions on which we agree. Certainly people share reactions and responses at a quite basic, more or less physiological level — hunger, thirst, and so on. What is less clear is that there must, therefore, be a set of values at a higher level they will all agree about. When Talbot and Tate say that there must be agreement on premises for there to be any argument, this is true in strictly logical terms. But what often lies behind an argument is precisely failure to agree on the premises, or failure to agree entirely what the terms used imply. Typically these are not differences that can be resolved by recourse to a dictionary; a whole perspective is taken for

granted by one person, something different by another. “We disagree so violently,” they argue in connection with the abortion debate, “because each side believes that the other’s acceptance of the premise—that human life, or human choice, ought to be respected—should entail the other’s acceptance of the conclusion.” But is what perplexes us genuinely the failure of the other side to reason logically from these established premises? It may rather be that where other people do share these premises they do not interpret them in the same way. Their values — the substance they give to terms such as “respect for human life” — are different from ours. Where there are points of conflict, returning to the common ground does not always resolve the issue—in fact, the common terms can mislead us as to what the common ground is.

The Forum’s concern, however, is not so much with these difficult cases of moral conflict themselves as with the behaviour of those who take the view that it is morally acceptable to beat up someone with whom one disagrees. Now it is doubtful whether someone who takes this view (or behaves as if they do) is really going to be open to *argument*. To put the emphasis on reasoned argument in such contexts is to lose sight of the kinds of lives that many people live and of the small part that is played by reasoned argument in relation to the density and variety of moral experience. This is not a comment only about thugs and muggers: the point is that the moral life extends for all of us into areas of our being where the views we explicitly articulate play but a tiny part. It is also to pass silently over the many ways in which dimly understood forces violently erupt into people’s lives. Is *argument* necessary to

convince us of what is right and wrong? More likely we pick up these notions at our mother's knee. As we grow up it is experience and experiences that make their mark on us, sometimes providing a sudden revelation, sometimes a slow dawning, of the wrongness of something that we had not before appreciated. Fiction can help us in this growing awareness. Argument also has its place—seriously discussing things with parents or friends or teachers. But even here it will be as much a matter of gradually coming to see what the terms of our premises amount to as of spotting a flaw in the reasoning.

In the absence of a belief in common values, according to the Forum, we face a situation where “anything goes”. It is not clear why this should follow. Suppose that everyone in a country belongs (and is loyal) to one or another of two tribes and that these tribes have opposing values but within each there are rigid codes of behaviour. Given that someone must be in one or other tribe and that the tribes do not have common values, how can it be the case for him or her that anything goes? One response might be to say that whatever values these tribes apparently hold and whatever conflicts there appear to be, underneath there are values that they share and these are universal human values. But given the existence of situations not so different from the one described (in Kosovo, for example), it is not clear how plausible this is, or how far it gets us.

Still more to the point is the question of how one encounters the opinion that “anything goes”. Typically this sentiment takes the form: “Everyone's entitled to their own opinion. You shouldn't be judgmental”. It is worth remembering that sentiments such

as “anything goes” are seldom uttered by muggers and their like: probably they occur more in “debates” about morality (of the kind that can indeed occur in, and in connection with, schooling — often where people, young or not, lack practice in using different sorts of moral language) than in the real circumstances of people's daily moral experience. Most people who utter these words normally behave with no lack of conviction about what they and others should do concerning a vast range of moral matters. What often seems to be at issue here is less the much-discussed matter of *relativism* than what might be called “moral feebleness” — the reaction of the person who sees the mugging or the bullying and for whom “Well, what can you do? You never know the background” (or similar) is a form of evasion, a refusal to be involved.

If argument is of relatively minor importance in moral education, how do we learn that mugging or rape are wrong? What kind of moral education has the mugger or the rapist received, or failed to receive? Could we *tell them* what they need to know? No-one normally *teaches* their children that murder is wrong. To do so would be highly unnatural. It is interesting to consider how any of us learned that murder was wrong (as opposed, say, to learning that killing “Red Indians” counted as murder). Probably we cannot remember because this is rather something we absorb as we grow up. The person who has not learned this does not need to be *told* about it: if they really cannot see it then it is unlikely that any explanation will cut much ice. What they need is a complete change of perspective. Their whole picture of things needs to shift and then perhaps the horror of rape or the mean brutality of mugging will

dawn on them.

There is a general problem regarding contemporary conceptions of morality which the Forum does not entirely escape and this has to do with choice. The prominence given to circumstances where people are faced with dilemmas, and especially to discrete and debatable dilemmas (abortion, blood sports, euthanasia), is apt to give the impression that morality is reserved for special occasions. Compartmentalising morality in this way has the effect of neutralising it or making it into a kind of side-show in our lives — suitable material for a parlour game or perhaps a radio phone-in. This is a travesty of the ways in which our lives are never without moral significance. It is also symptomatic of the running together of our excessive preoccupation with individualism and the identity imposed on us as consumers. We think of ourselves as people who express ourselves through choices. To oppose someone's choice then looks like an unwarranted suppression of their individuality and authenticity, of what is closest and most real to them. No wonder we then hear that we should not be judgmental, that everyone's entitled to their opinion! No wonder then that anything goes. SCAA hopes that pupils will be able to choose their own value system. Moral choice takes on a kind of aesthetic slant, just as you choose a colour scheme for your home. But values, and especially moral values, are not like that. We do not *choose* to think this is right and that is wrong. Normally *we cannot see things otherwise*: their rightness or wrongness forces itself on us. To change our values requires a more subtle and fundamental change of view.

Talbot and Tate argue that schools need the help of society and that the Forum's state-

ment of values is a tool that schools can use to elicit the help of society. We must ask what exactly is meant by society, especially in view of pronouncements, such as Margaret Thatcher's, that there is no such thing as society, that there are only individuals and families. This opens a gap between the inward-looking unit of the family and the home, and the impersonal forces of the state. Between the individual and "our common humanity" the idea of *community* is more or less eclipsed. There is a weakness here which is written into many contemporary complaints about relativism. It is assumed that relativism must take the form of "anything goes" and that, if the notion of universal human values is rejected, relativism is the only alternative. But in the making of this assumption — and however sensitive the subsequent working out of a statement of values — the truth of our embeddedness in community is passed over.

Lastly, against the benefits of moral agreement and consensus the worth of a competing claim needs constantly to be evaluated: that it is a better prospect for humankind to live in a world where there are irreconcilable conceptions of the good and where values are seen and acknowledged to be disparate. Some would say that the challenge we are then presented with has the potential to lead us beyond the dangers of complacency and of hubris that have so commonly, not least in the twentieth century, been the failing of the human race. Perhaps in the moral life we have continually to acknowledge and respect real difference while seeking such moral agreement and consensus as we can find. A large part of moral education consists in learning how to achieve that fine balance.

In some ways it is not sufficient simply to

entertain the *idea* that there are irreconcilable conceptions of the good: this is something one must *experience* for oneself. This is probably most fully realised where there is immersion in an unfamiliar culture. In a recent paper at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Akira Tachikawa eloquently explores the liberalising effects of such experience in the lives of ICU and other students studying abroad (Tachikawa 2001). He presents a number of different cases, each involving cross-cultural encounters: a Chinese student at the University of Beijing receives massive endorsement from a visiting Fulbright scholar for her own fledgling commitment to women's rights; a Korean woman discovers, in the alien and surreptitiously conformist lives of students at Dartmouth College, that the intellectual life is compatible with ugly, selfish individualism; a young male student spending a year in Lithuania meets racism for the first time in his life. Such experiences are typically not always comfortable and they may be unpleasant. Tachikawa emphasises the asymmetry of what one encounters: it is not that the different culture comfortingly mirrors one's own. It is the mismatch that is at the heart of the experience. There is a disturbance of the ways of thinking that the learner otherwise assumes. In the rift between different ways of life, between different values and practices, there is a deepening of the sense of the engagement between one's own life and one's culture. This both enables one to gain some distance and enhances awareness of this engagement.

Tachikawa sees implications in this experience for aspects of curriculum practice, applying his argument to two candidates for inclusion in liberal and general education: on

the one hand, courses based on social issues, such as environmental problems, the population explosion, or genetic engineering; on the other, studies in the classics. He recognises the increasing prominence that courses of the former type have in liberal education today, and acknowledges their potential relevance to future problems. He is concerned nevertheless that such forms of study will lack coherence if they are not informed by discipline-based approaches and the theoretical principles they supply. Moreover such courses are likely to be ineffective if they are not presented in relation to the personal responsibilities of students. Yet even under these circumstances a further problem stands in the way. This is that the mass media of television and newspapers often present and analyse such matters more dramatically and effectively than classes in schools or universities can do. In the end such experience will harbour a kind of symmetry, doing little more than reinforcing students' old beliefs. With classics, in contrast Tachikawa is more optimistic, for here there is the possibility of focusing on what is asymmetrical to students' accustomed worlds. The argument is not that these are texts of enduring value, true though this may be, but that they are strategically important in students' lives in enabling them to see beyond their present frames of reference.

My own contention would be that the broadening of experience and the growth of maturity that is at issue here also has implications for study within disciplines, and hence that it can figure in the substance of the curriculum in other ways: where, for example, disparate readings of an event in history are considered; where incompatible responses

to a literary text are exposed; where the conditions and values of diverse ways of life, perhaps historically distant civilisations, come into view; and perhaps where incommensurable points of view in science are entertained. Such conflicts cannot come into view at the start of disciplined study, but it does not follow that this must wait until higher education. Any disciplinary study worth the name must include its own self-criticism and its internal conflicts. There is a broadening of outlook engendered here that is not irrelevant to ethical education, and to the growing maturity of outlook that is Tachikawa's concern.

The relative lack of impact of the initiatives on moral education is to be contrasted with the fate of policy developments in citizenship education. Although both answer to similar concerns, there is a sense in which citizenship can be thought to be containable or comprehensible in a way that morality cannot; that while the former might seem to many to come down to matters that are ultimately subjective, the latter involves ways in which we can and should co-operate; and correlative benefits we can reasonably expect. Moral education, it might be crudely supposed, involves being told what you should not do; citizenship education helps you to live in society and shows you what you can get out of it. Hence citizenship education is likely to be more popular than moral education. In the light of this let us consider the particular form that developments have taken in England.<sup>ii)</sup>

## **Education for citizenship: the Crick Report and its effects**

In 1988 a major reform led to the establishment of a National Curriculum affecting all countries in the UK except Scotland. For the first time, legal requirements were established for the greater part of the curriculum for all pupils in state schools from the ages of five to sixteen. Before this time the curriculum had been subject to the discretion of local education authorities, head-teachers, and indeed individual teachers themselves. While the move to a national curriculum was not unwelcome to teachers in general, the structure and implementation of that curriculum have proved unwieldy and they have been modified in various ways. A requirement of education for citizenship was built into that 1988 legislation, but as the National Curriculum came into operation this was quietly squeezed out and forgotten under pressure from other teaching demands. In consequence it was very much the purpose of the Crick Committee to devise ways in which a policy of citizenship education might have real effect.

The recommendations of the Committee can be summarised in terms of nine main points:

1. Citizenship education should be a statutory requirement on schools, constituting no more than 5% of curriculum time, flexibly distributed.
2. All those involved with citizenship education should be provided with a clear statement of what CE involves and their

role within it.

3. Citizenship education involves three interrelated elements: social and moral responsibility, community involvement, and political literacy
4. In interaction with each other these constitute active citizenship.
5. Citizenship education involves more than knowledge: it should lead pupils to behave and act as citizens. Hence it requires the development of skills, values, attitudes, and dispositions.
6. Citizenship education overlaps with a number of other aspects of schooling—including personal, social, and health education and various methods of promoting moral social education. But it must be separately specified in the curriculum as there are aspects of it that might otherwise be overlooked (for example, knowledge of political structures and institutions).
7. Citizenship education necessarily involves addressing controversial issues. Teachers should be given guidance about how to guard against bias and to achieve balance, fairness, and objectivity.
8. Learning outcomes should be specified rather than prescriptions for the detailed programmes of study, to give schools flexibility and to allay fears that a single way of teaching politics is being promoted. These assist in assessment and progression.
9. The framework for citizenship education should be governed by the principles of breadth, coherence, continuity and progression, relevance, quality, and access and inclusion.
10. There should be a Standing Commission on citizenship education with quasi-autonomous relationship to the Department for Education and Employment and the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, to include cross-party membership, in order to monitor progress and recommend amendments.

Running through these recommendations is the recognition that citizenship is the subject of controversy, and that there is an understandable fear about the possibility that such an education might entail a kind of moulding of people. The Report sets out to avoid this, and is of course alert also to the dangers of indoctrination. It can perhaps be seen to address the requirements of citizenship in terms of four factors, the order of which represents increasing levels of potential controversy. First, there is the propositional knowledge that students must be given (for example, knowledge *that* government and the judiciary function in this way rather than that); second, there are skills and abilities to be developed (for example, the ability to express one's point of view or, beyond that, to formulate arguments one does not agree with; more generally, awareness of how to gain the information one needs in order to exercise one's rights); third, there are certain dispositions that need to be fostered (as, for example, toleration and the willingness to listen

sympathetically to the points of view of others); and fourth, there are certain commitments that might be encouraged (for example, to active participation, to certain democratic forms, and perhaps to particular institutions such as the European Union or one's country).

A excellent detailed discussion of these points and a critical survey of criticisms that have been advanced is provided by T. H. McLaughlin in "Citizenship Education in England: The Crick Report and Beyond" (McLaughlin 2000), while an account of the philosophical background to the recommendations of the Report is provided by Crick himself in "The Presuppositions of Citizenship Education" (Crick 1999). I shall avoid further elaboration of the substance of the report beyond the following remark: that while the recommendations here seem reasonable enough, and while they have proved politically viable, they leave aside the broader issues of morality, and hence of moral education, with which any rich conception of citizenship must be implicated. The proposals are reasonable as far as they go, but they do not go as far as a rich conception of citizenship requires, and the reasons for this may themselves be political.

Rather than further exploration of this report then, in the remainder of this paper I want to turn to a particular and topical theme that in many ways serves to illustrate the costs of ignoring these broader issues. This is a theme that is explicit in the revised National Curriculum (published in late 1999), that recurs in the Crick Report, and that has become *de rigueur* in policy pronouncements on a range of issues relating to education, in the UK, Europe, and generally in the Western

world. This is the question of social inclusion. In many respects this principle is one that it is impossible to oppose, impossible, that is, if one has any egalitarian commitments at all. Yet the fact that it has become something of a mantra for contemporary politics should give us pause to question its rhetoric and the assumptions that trail behind it. It is a matter of critical importance for the kind of citizenship that our institutions promote. What then can be said to put it in question?

### **Some problems with social inclusion**

There is a contemporary British quiz show that has recently gained some popularity. The contestants are families who are required to answer such questions as "What items would a woman be most likely to carry in her hand-bag?", "What items would you be most likely to find in a bathroom?", "What on a Christmas tree?", and so on. The "correct" answers to these questions are determined on the basis of a public opinion survey carried out prior to the quiz asking those same questions. Contestants thus have to guess the five items that most people would have guessed. The game nicely illustrates a kind of dumbing down, the logic of the highest common factor, and what Michel Foucault called normalisation: it inclines everyone towards being the same. One might take the view that this after all is just a game, but there are various ways in which similar effects are achieved by apparently more sophisticated commercial and political processes. Thus the extensive use of customer feedback and focus groups is inclined to reduce policy to what most people



want, where what most people want is then reinforced through marketing strategies that artificially stimulate or reinforce desire.

The consequence of dumbing down may be not only the loss of high culture but a progressive uniformity. The endless variety in the contemporary marketplace of goods and lifestyles gives the superficial impression that difference is celebrated; the uniformity consists in the fact that all possibilities are subsumed under the terms of the market, as raw material for its uniform operation. A political corollary of this situation is found in the hegemony of the discourse of rights, a discourse that is apparently a peculiarly attractive dimension of the notion of citizenship. A right is something that you have and that you can choose to exercise. That there is a parallel between this and the exercise of choice in the market place, however, should cause us to wonder what kind of reduction of the political is being effected here. Jean-François Lyotard's sardonic words capture something of what is at stake here:

Express yourselves freely, have the courage of your ideas, of your opinions, communicate them, enrich the community, enrich yourselves, set yourselves to it, converse, there is nothing but good in making use of your rights since it takes place in respecting the rights of others, circulate, everything is possible within the limits fixed by laws or rules. And besides, these rules can themselves be revised. . . . For the exercise of one's rights and the vigilance over their being respected to be required as forms of duty, therein lies a kind of self-evidence, as infallible as a totalitarian disposition can be. Infallible as for the ruin of self-contain-

ment. Why didn't you do this, say that, you had the right !"

(Lyotard 1997: 118-119)

The socially included, on this view, are those who assert their points of view and exercise their rights. Without this they cease to be politically substantial; in effect, they disappear. If we conceive of the political realm in this way, we become reduced to being nothing more than the bearers of rights (and correlative duties), just as the market reduces us to consumers: we are reconceived and diminished as people. And at the heart of that reconception is an absence of value — in other words, a kind of nihilism. In contrast, it is, Lyotard says, the silent and secret part of ourselves that is essential for the rights that we have to have worth, for them to have the meaning they do (*ibid.*: 121-122).

One can imagine political structures and a kind of citizenship education that would enable people to live effectively in such a world — understanding their rights and asserting them, and accepting correlative responsibilities — and hence to be socially included. But if the criticism mounted here is sound, this might amount to a kind of disablement through social inclusion. There may well be amongst the ranks of the excluded those who have some intimation of this; and there may be many more who maintain a reserve with regard to this civic orientation but whose resistance is less socially obtrusive. Is there perhaps something totalitarian about bringing such people into line with the obligations of civic participation and the assertion of rights ? And, let it be added, with what seems sometimes to be an enforced sociability ? No doubt much will depend on questions of

balance here. But the suggestion is not simply that civic participation is right for some, not right for others. It is that an excessive orientation distorts human life and *a fortiori* diminishes the citizenry that is formed. A part of the problem here is illustrated through reference back to the normalising effects of certain aspects of contemporary life: there can be then a neutralisation of different points of view by inclusion. With this comes the suppression of difference and the loss of real political debate.

It is no exaggeration to say that this amounts to the erosion of a public culture. One does not have to make nostalgic and idealistic reference to the *agora* of Athens in order to be aware of ways in which the public forms of our civic life are being degraded, compromised, or otherwise impoverished. There is apathy and cynicism amongst many, young people especially, though it would be wrong to blame this solely on the direct failures of our forms of governance or other overtly political structures. Globalisation is undoubtedly critical in the kinds of shift in political sensibility that we are now seeing, and this has commercial, communicative, and cultural dimensions.

In *Postmodern Fables* Lyotard presents the reader with a dystopian picture of a world become endlessly suburban, a megalopolis stretching from Los Angeles to Rome to Kuala Lumpur, with its anodyne shopping malls and character-less estates. We can imagine this to be not the creation of some evil tyranny but the outcome of a liberal secularism. It is the product of a rational consensus that effaces real debate over values and neutralises pluralism. (Religion has for the most part gone part-time and so is easily tolerated). There

are shades here of De Tocqueville's "soft despotism" and of the tyranny of the majority.

Its impoverishment has two striking facets, involving a new accommodation of the relation of the public to the private. In a way symptomatic of the metaphysics of presence, the public becomes the realm of public display — of self-presentation, the assertion of rights, and a degenerate confessional television. The panopticon now extends to what was the private sphere where the theatrical display or recounting of most intimate things is submitted to the public gaze, and where psychotherapy presumes the desirability of the retrieval of the past and the forgotten into present consciousness. Conversely, the new realm of the private is one of possession and ownership, of privatisation not only of public companies but of the person (and hence of the citizen) in a regime of competitive atomistic interests-of social isolation, security locks, and burglar alarms. This is a perverse return to a state of (un)nature.

As an engine of globalisation, new technology has contradictory effects. It would be far too quick merely to condemn the ways in which it enables and encourages us to retreat to the wired world of our homes and offices, for this technology also realises new modes of social interaction and the possibility of a new politics. But it would be more rash to suppose that these benefits do not come without their costs. So much remains to be determined in terms of how that new politics might unfold. Any citizenship education fit for these changing circumstances must be cognisant of this.

While the relation between the public and the private cannot remain static, and while

these categories must themselves change in the process, it remains a duty of any citizenship education to reclaim a public culture. In part this is inseparable from more general political support of public institutions, but these must be seen in the light of that larger purpose. A failure to do this, a crude recourse to the things that the opinion polls and the focus groups show that the people most want, would lead to that banality and parody of public culture to which the Millennium Dome stands as testimony.

It follows that education for citizenship cannot stop with the propositional knowledge or the skills and abilities that were the uncontroversial first and second concerns of the Crick Report; it must extend to the kinds of engagement implicit in those more controversial elements of dispositions and commitments. Yet these do not develop in a vacuum and they cannot be simply imposed through schools. To some extent they depend on the kinds of allegiance that different cultural groups manifest in varying degrees. In a pluralistic society, especially one where many are brought up within a vague and largely unacknowledged liberal secularism, such allegiances are various and often hard to discern — if, that is, they have not been quite displaced by the brand loyalties and MTV values that come with globalisation. But they are to be found, in more modest ways, in those local and partial attachments that more specific social institutions can generate: significant and valuable loyalties can be directed towards sports clubs, arts activities, political parties, and other interest groups, and civic amenities in a local area such as libraries, parks, sports centres, and indeed schools and colleges themselves, can be

important focal points of local concern and gathering. What can be done in these circumstances is to create civic and educational structures that allow some space for diverse interests to flourish.

So there is a case for diversity in schooling or, at least, in some aspects of schooling, and hence for religious schools. But, as the preceding remarks suggest, although claims for a religious schooling may be the most audible elements in such debates, the significance of these matters for citizenship education is altogether more pervasive. Moreover, if we are to regard the pluralistic society as inevitable and to welcome what John Dewey discerned as its rich potential for democracy and education, it may be desirable for people in general if the allegiances they form are not all of a piece: our identities no doubt are more elaborately constructed and sustained than was the case in simpler societies (though perhaps they were never as uniform or contained as we now sometimes fondly imagine). Such a diversity of interweaving allegiances may turn out to be a force of social cohesion. But the central point is surely this: such satisfactions and responsibilities of engagement, and the disturbances and asymmetries through which these mature, are essential for the maintenance of a civic life whose robustness runs deeper than the sometimes obtrusive clamour of talk of rights and duties. They suggest the kind of moral education that citizenship requires.<sup>iii)</sup>

## Notes

- i) For a discussion of nihilism in relation to education policy and practice, see Blake et al., 2000.

- ii) Some of the ideas presented here are adapted from Smith and Standish, 1997. Richard Smith is thanked for his original work with me on this topic.
- iii) This paper was developed on the basis of a talk given at ICU on 25 September 2001. I should like to thank ICU for the invitation and those present on the occasion for their contribution to the discussion. I also thank Dr Naoko Saito for her readiness to interpret on the occasion.

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