

National Identity as a Salient Component of Self-conception in Cross-national Contact

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Introduction

What patterns of self-conception emerge from what types of interactional contexts? This problem has been in our field a long time now. We have not yet, however, sufficiently exploited it through systematic empirical research, even since Cottrell argued, in his presidential address before the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society in 1950, that this problem of self-conception had not yet received adequate systematic attention and that direct and indirect results of intensive attack upon this problem would greatly strengthen our theory and method.¹

Another related problem on which we need more explicit theory and empirical study is identity, because it is a crucial component of self-conception. The child is faced with comprehensible definitions of himself through his social context. Certain definitions are accepted by him and become his self-conception. Moreover, as he develops, certain trustworthy representatives of his social context are accepted by him as identification models. Thus, it is assumed that central to his self-conception is his identity. Rogers stated this importance of identity as follows:

Interaction with others in a situational field provides the individual with a sense of identity. The "others" in a situational field are significant to the individual and influence his behavior. These "significant others," or reference groups, aid an individual in developing his self-identity. The manner in which an individual identifies himself influences his behavior ;...²

Festinger also provided a framework for understanding the relationship between the individual and others.³ His basic assumption is that the individual has the drive to evaluate himself and often evaluates himself by comparison with others.

During the past decade or so, a steady growth of theory and empirical research on problems of international behavior has been accompanied by an increase in cross-national communication, travel and contact. A key area for international behavior research is the study of the relationship of the individual to the nation, which in turn defines his national identity. The development of his self-conception as a national is also a significant aspect of the socialization process. One type of experience in cross-national situations which is most likely to have a profound effect on self-conception is direct contact with nationals of other countries. Contact with them may be a way to discover his national identity because they could be the "significant others" to him in the situational field. However, there has been little systematic effort so far to explore in detail the notion of national identity in cross-national contacts, and, in particular, to relate it to the self-conception. This is certainly an area requiring more research. Thus, the relationships of national identity to self-conception and to certain relevant factors in a cross-national situational field will be explored in this paper. It is hoped that the insights to be gained from this exploration will proceed toward a general theory of international behavior.

Some Notions of Self-Conception⁴

In the broadest sense, self-conception can be defined as an individual's view of himself in a socially determined frame of reference. Cottrell defined self-conception as "the individual's characteristic pattern of expected response from others and his assumption as to what response others expect from him in given types of situations."⁵

The term *self-concept* is often used among psychologists instead of self-conception. Self-concept "...seems to be more often found in a context of terminology implicitly or explicitly individualistic rather than social..."⁶ Manis defined the self-concept as "the organized collection of attitudes, opinions, and beliefs an individual holds about himself" and assumed that "the self-concept is not essentially different from any other set of attitudes, opinions, or beliefs collected by an individual about any given object or topic."⁷ Kinch also defined it as "organization of qualities that the individual attributes to himself."⁸ By "qualities," he meant "both attributes that the individual might express in terms of adjectives (ambitious, intelligent) and also the roles he sees himself in (father, doctor, etc.)."⁹ In this paper, the two terms, self-concept and self-conception, will be used synonymously since the meaning of self-concept is apparently nearly identical with self-conception.

Kuhn suggested, in terms of the components of self-conception, that self-conception consists of (1) a view of identity, (2) notions of interests and aversions, (3) a conception of goals and successes in achieving them, (4) a picture of the ideological frame of reference, and (5) some kind of self-evaluation.¹⁰

The crucial importance of self-conception in the study of human behavior has been attested to by those who are mostly under the influence of the symbolic interactionist notions about self-conception,¹¹ based on the writings of Mead and Cooley.¹² The Mead-Cooley interactionist framework can be said to provide a basis for the study of self-conception.

Miyamoto and Dornbusch summarized the Mead-Cooley framework by stating that: (1) the individual is influenced in shaping self-definitions by the responses of others; (2) there may be a distinction between the actual response of the other and the subject's perception of the response of the other; (3) the self takes the role of the individual's conception of the organized social process of which he is a part, that is, the role

of the "generalized other."¹³

Kinch also stated the basic notion of the Mead-Cooley framework in one sentence: "The individual's conception of himself emerges from social interaction and, in turn, guides or influences the behavior of that individual."¹⁴ Then, he presented a formalized theory of self-concept. The basic postulates of his theory are: (1) "the individual's self-concept is based on his perception of the way others are responding to him"; (2) "the individual's self-concept functions to direct his behavior"; (3) "the individual's perception of the responses of others toward him reflects the actual responses of others toward him"; and (4) "the behavior that the individual manifests influences the actual responses of others toward that individual."¹⁵ The Kinch's theory can be summarized as follows: the actual responses of others toward the individual will, to an extent, determine that individual's perception of the responses of others toward him; this perception will influence his self-concept, which will direct his behavior; this behavior will lead to the new actual responses of others toward him.

It should be noted, however, that in reality these postulates hold only in various degrees under certain conditions. For example, as Kinch pointed out, the third postulate is more likely to hold in such cases that: (1) the individual is more familiar with the situation and the others in the situation; (2) the situation has more visibility; (3) the individual has had more experience in interpersonal situations; and (4) there is less interference from irrelevant conditions.¹⁶

Furthermore, Deutsch and Krauss stated that "the self concept is a cognitive structure and as such consists of a set of elements which are organized into a systematic relationship."¹⁷ These elements of the self-concept are organized into a consistent structure, which has the properties of a "good Gestalt." Rogers also stated:

It would appear that when all of the ways in which the individual perceives himself—all perceptions of the qualities, abilities, impulses, and attitudes of the person, and all perceptions of himself in relation to other—are accepted into the organized conscious concept of the self, then this achievement is accompanied by feelings of comfort and freedom from tension which are experienced as psychological adjustment.¹⁸

In this regard, Brownfain considered the stability of self-concept as an index of adjustment.¹⁹ As Calvin and Holtzman pointed out, "discrepancy between the self concept and objective reality is a common feature of maladjustment."²⁰ The individual reorganizes his self-conception to have more adequate correspondence with the self as viewed by others. He must throughout his life assimilate new experiences in this fashion. He always tries to adjust himself to his environment in a manner that will be harmonious with his self-conception.

Review of the Evidence on the Self-Conception

Miyamoto and Dornbusch examined, in their empirical study of certain assumptions in the interactionist view of the self-conception, the relations of self-conception to the behavior of others, to the perception of others, and to the perception of the generalized other.²¹ Their findings indicate that the response of others is related to self-conception, but the individual's perception of others' response is more closely related to self-conception; the individual's self-conception is more closely related to his perception of the generalized other than to his perception of others' response. These findings empirically support the symbolic interactionist notions of self-conception and suggest possibilities of self-conception study within the symbolic interactionist framework. In using this framework, Reeder, Donohue, and Biblarz also found, in their study conducted at a small military base, the high degree of relationship between self-conception and the

perception of the generalized other, but the low degree of relationship between self-conception and the response of others, except for persons who rated themselves low.²² Respondents whose self-conception disagreed with the response of others were more likely to have a greater number of reference groups.

On the basis of empirically grounded inferences, Kuhn and McPartland concluded that: "Persons vary over a rather wide range in the relative volume of consensual and subconsensual components in their self-conceptions"; "the consensual (more directly socially anchored) component of the self-conception is the more salient component."²³ The consensual components are statements which refer to consensually defined statuses and classes, e. g., student, girl, husband, Baptist, from Chicago, daughter, studying engineering. The subconsensual components are statements without positional reference, e. g., happy, bored, too heavy, interesting. From the ordering of twenty responses to the question, "who am I?", they found that "respondents tended to exhaust all of the consensual references they would make before they made (if at all) any subconsensual ones."²⁴ If this ordering of responses is a valid reflection of the individual's self-conception, it might appear that the individual's self-conception is heavily influenced by his positional relations to others in his social system.

Further details of this problem are given in the study by McPartland and Cumming.²⁵ They classified the twenty-responses into four modes of self-conception: (1) the concrete mode which includes statements of physical attributes and other concrete information, e. g., "I am a blonde," "I am five feet, seven inches tall," or "I live at 1709 Elm Street"; (2) the positional mode which contains references to positions which are socially defined and validated, e. g., "I am a father," "I am a college graduate," or "I am a home owner"; (3) the stylistic or situation-free mode which includes statements that are abstract enough to transcend

particular social situations but specific enough to provide guides to others, e. g., "I am a happy person," or "I dislike hypocrites"; (4) the extravagant mode which included statement that do not lead to any meaningful differentiation of the person and deny the question, e. g., "I am not a Communist" or "People are not trustworthy." Then, they assumed that "middle-class groups would report self-identifications which involved institutional positions, while lower-class groups would identify themselves more frequently in terms of personal characteristics, without reference to positions in groups."²⁶ Their main findings were that "the proportion of self-conceptions based on positions in established social systems is significantly greater in the middle-class" and "the proportion of self-conceptions based on 'situation-free' identifications is significantly greater in the 'lower-class' group."²⁷ Finally, they concluded that the distribution of self-conceptions is significantly different among groups of middle-class and lower-class origins, and that the observed differences in self-conception are consonant with subcultural differences in social participation.

The relationship between self-concept and adjustment was investigated by Brownfain.²⁸ He developed an operational measure of the stability of the self-concept as the discrepancy between "positive" self-concept and "negative" self-concept (the larger this discrepancy, the more unstable the self-concept).²⁹ The main findings of this study were as follows: (1) Ss with stable self-concepts (stable Ss) are better adjusted than those with unstable self-concepts (unstable Ss); (2) Stable Ss are freer of inferiority feelings and nervousness than unstable Ss; (3) Stable Ss are better liked and considered more popular by others than unstable Ss; (4) Stable Ss see themselves more as they believe others see them than unstable Ss do; (5) Stable Ss have more active social participation than unstable Ss; and (6) Stable Ss show less evidence of compensatory behavior of a defensive kind

than unstable Ss. Calvin and Holtzman investigated the discrepancy between the individual's self-concept and others' responses toward that individual as a measure of "insight,"³⁰ and found that individuals who manifest poor insight are more likely to be maladjusted than are those who manifest good insight.

Furthermore, self-concepts and perceptions of others toward the individual were factor analyzed by Burke and Bennis.³¹ They found three factors, accounting for 86 per cent of the total variance: Friendliness-evaluation, dominance-potency, and participation-activity (the first factor accounted for 53 per cent of the total variance, the second for 25 per cent, and the third for 8 per cent). They also demonstrated that as members of the group meet together over time they tend, significantly, to agree more with one another within the participation-activity dimension and not in the other two dimensions. This finding might be helpful in conducting further research.

Some Notions of National Identity

Kuhn defined an individual's identity as "his generalized position in society deriving from his statuses in the groups of which he is a member, the roles which stem from these statuses, and the social categories which his group memberships lead him to assign himself."³² Thus, an individual's national identity may be thought of as deriving from his national anchorages. Katz noted that national identity is "an anchoring frame for the individual's conception of himself."³³

The growing child is confronted with a comprehensible hierarchy of social roles as provided by his parents, his siblings, and whoever else belongs to the wider family. Then, he tends to identify with these roles: he not only internalizes the roles but adopts them as his own, striving to attain the necessary skills and to conform with the role norms.³⁴ Identity formation, according to Erikson, "arises from the selective repudiation and

mutual assimilation of childhood identifications and their absorption in a new configuration."³⁵ Identity, thus, is not the mere sum of earlier identifications, but alters them in order to make a unique and coherent whole of them. The child, in the multiplicity of successive and tentative identifications, begins to build up his identity not only as a unique personality but also as an individual belonging to an in-group in contrast to out-groups. He internalizes the role system of the in-group and considers himself a member of it. This group identification develops around immediate local groupings and then extends to those who are embraced by the national structure. According to Young, "the national state is for the modern man the largest in-group that calls for his reverence, deference, and sense of belonging."³⁶ Since the individual has to do with the simplification of cognitive structure in terms of in-groups and out-groups,³⁷ he may readily internalize a sense of national identification.

Ziman regarded identification as a part of the acculturation process by which the adult seeks satisfaction for his dependency need.³⁸ If this dependency need is not satisfied in childhood, there is a tendency to search for it in the succeeding stages of life. The goal is emotional maturity. This process is also typical of the group, in which it becomes socially acceptable to transfer the early need from the mother to other people or to the group. Then the nation would provide a substitute.

There is another type of national identification, which is based on the individual's attempts to solve his own internal conflicts and insecurities. This is a defense mechanism of identification with the nation from which he can derive a vicarious sense of power. "Not being able to find full satisfaction of their desire for power within the national boundaries," Morgenthau stated, "the people project those unsatisfied aspirations onto the international scene. There they find vicarious satisfaction in identification with the power drives of the nation."³⁹ Katz traced the motivating

force behind the national identification to three sources: "a greater satisfaction of men's material needs," "an enhanced psychic income," and "the projection of hatred and hostility upon the out-group."⁴⁰ This kind of identification is a response to the widespread need for security in a dangerous and hostile world. Just as the individual holds to his family relationships to achieve security in the small group, so does he identify himself with the nation against the dangers from others.

This type of national identification is also basically the authoritarian syndrome.⁴¹ National identity may grow partly out of the basic authoritarian system of the family and the father's use of the family group relationships as a means of keeping his authority. In early life the individual attributes unlimited power to the father; in later life he identifies the nation with the father.⁴² The symbolic relationship to the parent-figures of infancy is transferred to the nation.

The identification with the nation, however, is not so easy to maintain as identification with the family to which one is devoted.⁴³ For this reason, presumably, the call to make national identification is not always answered with the same degree of enthusiasm and promptness. Here the suggestion is timidly advanced that national identity may be produced or facilitated by the kind of nationalism characteristic of modern world.⁴⁴ With respect to nationalism, Christiansen showed, in his study of the relation between aggression and nationalism, that destructive tendencies in foreign affairs do not represent any isolated aspect of the individual personality, but are linked with other dynamic and cognitive aspects.⁴⁵

As is remarked above, we may generally find a high incidence of people whose feelings of national identity are central to their self-conceptions. However, the individual's national identity as part of his self-conception seems latent in most usual situations. With respect to its latency, Katz pointed out that it becomes

manifest under conditions of the confrontation at two levels:

At the level of personal experience it is aroused by direct contact with other nationals.... Its arousal is further facilitated and the feeling maintained if the confrontation with other nationals entails some degree of conflict, competition, or even comparison....

.....
At the secondary level of the world created by the mass media and communications from leaders, the sense of national identity is aroused by perceived matters of *national interest* and *national security* in relation to other nations.⁴⁶

Thus, it may be worthy to explore the notion of national identity under the condition of direct contact with other nationals.

Review of the Evidence Relevant to the National Identity in Cross-National Contacts

In the studies of American travelers abroad or of foreign students in the United States done by Smith, Pool, Isaacs, and Useem and Useem,⁴⁷ it was uniformly found that the most profound effect of their stay in a foreign country was a greater appreciation and understanding of their home countries and an intensified reidentification with their home countries.

With respect to this reidentification, Kelman and Bailyn discussed two patterns of the responses which involved increased identification with the home country.⁴⁸ In one pattern, the identification took a defensive form about the home country, indicating an undifferentiated satisfaction with that country, while in the other it took the form of differentiated appreciation of the country which might reflect a willingness to engage in self-criticism and to become personally involved in the experience abroad. Thus, it would appear that the existence of these patterns of national identification makes for wide differences in the self-conception.

Bauer, Pool, and Dexter also showed, in their study of American businessmen who traveled abroad, that foreign travel made the businessman see the trade issue in national terms, rather than in the parochial terms of his particular industry, and that his reference group also changed from a parochial to a national one.⁴⁹ The person whose identity is shaken is usually distinguished by his transfer of reference groups. For a student whose professional status is less established in his own country, this new reference group often consists of his colleagues in the host country.⁵⁰ However, renewed attachment to the home country seems to be normally often realized.

Anything personally significant in cross-national contact seems to provide a variety of people an opportunity to react so that they can produce different desired self-conceptions. In examining students who were members of The Experiment in International Living, Pool summarized the findings in terms of the travel experience which enabled the traveler to see himself in a new image as follows:

In each instance the circumstances of travel unshackled the traveler from the routines of normal life and enabled him to experiment with who he is. His images of himself and the world were expressed in these experiments....

.....

At the same time the traveler acquired a deeper conviction of his image of himself as a person and as an American. In his contacts with foreigners he could establish a sense of his identity more clearly than he might have seen it before.⁵¹

Emerging Assumptions

From the evidence reviewed in the preceding sections, it seems reasonable to derive the following assumptions with respect to an individual's national identity as a component of his self-conception established in his cross-national contacts and to its relations to

some variables.

1. An individual's national identity would be a salient component of his self-conception.

Salience means the individual's readiness to respond—the more salient a component of the self-conception, the more readily will it be expressed with a minimum of stimulation. An individual may be made aware of his alienness in his cross-national contacts and may be stimulated to compare his nation with other nations. This may arouse a variety of national identity.

2. Individuals would vary over a rather wide range in the salience of national identity in their self-conceptions.
3. The individual whose national identity is salient would have the positive self-conception.

An individual's identification with his nation may lead to his conviction of security derived from a vicarious sense of power and, in turn, to his positive view of himself.

4. The individual whose national identity is salient would have favorable attitudes toward his nation.
5. The individual whose national identity is salient would have interest in his nation and would seek his national information.

The salience of national identity may be aroused by national interest and then it may lead to national information seeking.

6. The individual whose national identity is salient would perceive himself as different from others' views of himself.
7. The individual whose national identity is salient would have a relatively small number of reference groups.
8. The individual whose national identity is salient would not have much social participation.
9. The individual whose national identity is salient would not have much contact with other nationals.
10. The individual whose national identity is salient would have much exposure to the mass media.

Exposure to the mass media which seems to provide the back-

ground information of national interest and security may encourage the sense of national identity.

Notes

1. L. S. Cottrell, Jr., "Some Neglected Problems in Social Psychology," *American Sociological Review*, 15 (1950), 705—712.
2. E. M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 302.
3. L. Festinger, "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes," *Human Relations*, 7 (1954), 117—140.
4. We should have begun with the theoretical clarification of the self. However, it might be fortunately unnecessary to discuss it in any detail here because C. S. Hall and G. Lindzey reviewed representative views of the self: Freud's ego; Jung's self; Adler's creative self; Sullivan's self-system; Allport's self-functions; Angyal's symbolic self; Cattell's self; Symonds' self; Snygg and Combs' phenomenal self; Lundholm's subjective self; Sherif and Cantril's ego; Sarbin's self; Bertocci's self; Hilgard's inferred self; Stephenson's self; Chein's self; Mead's self; Koffka's self; Rogers' self; Murphy's self (*Theories of Personality* [New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957]).
5. Cottrell, "Some Neglected Problems in Social Psychology," 709.
6. M. Kuhn, "Self-Conception," in *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, ed. by J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 630.
7. M. Manis, "Social Interaction and the Self Concept," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 51 (1955), 362.
8. J. W. Kinch, "A Formalized Theory of the Self-Concept," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (1963), 481.
9. *Ibid.*
10. M. Kuhn, "Self-Attitudes by Age, Sex and Professional Training," *The Sociological Quarterly*, 1 (1960), 39—55.
11. "The term 'symbolic-interactionists' has been applied to the main representatives of sociologically oriented social psychology, because of the stress which this group places upon social interaction and communication as the matrix from which human selves arise" (N. N. Foote, "Social

- Psychology" in *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*. p. 664).
12. G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902).
 13. S. F. Miyamoto and S. M. Dornbusch, "A Test of Interactionist Hypotheses of Self-Conception," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (1956), 399—403.
 14. Kinch, "A Formalized Theory of the Self-Concept," 481.
 15. *Ibid.*, 482—483.
 16. *Ibid.* 483—484. Kinch used R. A. Merton's definition of visibility: "the extent to which the structure of a social organization provides occasion to those variously located in that structure to perceive the norms obtaining in the organization and the character of role-performance by those manning the organization" (*Social Theory and Social Structure* [rev. ed., New York: The Free Press, 1957], p. 350).
 17. M. Deutsch and R. M. Krauss, *Theories in Social Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1965), p. 181.
 18. C. R. Rogers, "Some Observations on the Organization of Personality," *American Psychologist*, 2 (1947), 364.
 19. J. J. Brownfain, "Stability of the Self-Concept [as a Dimension of Personality]," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 47 (1952), 597—606.
 20. A. D. Calvin and W. H. Holtzman, "Adjustment and the Discrepancy Between Self Concept and Inferred Self," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 17 (1953), 39.
 21. Miyamoto and Dornbusch, "A Test of Interactionist Hypotheses of Self-Conception."
 22. L. G. Reeder, G. A. Donohue, and A. Biblarz, "Conceptions of Self and Others," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 66 (1960), 153—159.
 23. M. H. Kuhn and T. S. McPartland, "An Empirical Investigation of Self-Attitudes," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (1954), 75.
 24. *Ibid.*, 70.
 25. T. S. McPartland and J. H. Cumming, "Self-Conception, Social Class, and Mental Health," *Human Organization*, 17 (1958), 24—29.
 26. *Ibid.*, 25—26.

27. *Ibid.*, 26.
28. Brownfain, "Stability of the Self-Concept as a Dimension of Personality."
29. The positive self-concept: "A rating of himself slanted positively. Here the subject gave himself the benefit of every reasonable doubt while still conceiving of this as a believable self-picture" and the negative self-concept: "A rating of himself slanted negatively. Here the subject denied himself the benefit of every reasonable doubt while still conceiving of this as a believable picture of himself" (*Ibid.*, 598).
30. Calvin and Holtzman termed the self perceived by others as the inferred self, that is, the individual as other persons see him. "Insight" was defined as "the degree of agreement between the inferred self and the self concept" ("Adjustment and the Discrepancy Between Self Concept and Inferred Self," 40).
31. R. L. Burke and W. G. Bennis, "Changes in Perception of Self and Others During Human Relations Training, *Human Relations*, 14 (1961), 165—182.
32. M. Kuhn, "Self-Conception," pp. 630—31.
33. D. Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies of International Conflict Resolution," in *International Behavior*, ed. by H. C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 366.
34. H. M. Johnson, *Sociology: A Systematic Introduction* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960), p. 128.
35. E. H. Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1968), p. 159.
36. K. Young, *Social Psychology* (2nd ed.: New York: F. S. Crofts, 1945), p. 379.
37. See, for example, S. Feldman, ed., *Cognitive Consistency* (New York: Academic Press, 1966).
38. E. Ziman, *Jealousy in Children* (New York: A. A. Wyn, 1949), pp. 29—30.
39. H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (2nd ed.: New York: Knopf, 1954), p. 95.
40. D. Katz, "The Psychology of Nationalism," in *Fields of Psychology*, ed. by J. P. Guilford (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1940), p. 165.

41. See T. W. Adorno, *et. al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).
42. K. E. Appel, "Nationalism and Sovereignty: A Psychiatric View," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 40 (1945), p. 359.
43. L. W. Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 130.
44. See L. W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
45. B. Christiansen, *Attitudes towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality* (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1959).
46. D. Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies of International Conflict Resolution," p. 366.
47. H. P. Smith, "Changes in Attitudes Resulting from Experiences in Foreign Countries" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1954); I. de S. Pool, "What American Travellers Learn," *Antioch Review*, 18 (1958), 431—446; H. R. Isaacs, *Emergent Americans: A Report on "Crossroads Africa"* (New York: John Day, 1961); J. Useem and R. Useem, *The Western Educated Man in India* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955).
48. H. C. Kelman and L. Bailyn, "Effects of Cross-Cultural Experience on National Images: A Study of Scandinavian Students in America," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6 (1962), 319—334.
49. R. A. Bauer, I. de S. Pool, and L. A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963).
50. See R. D. Lambert and N. Bressler, *Indian Students on an American Campus* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956); J. W. Bennett, H. Passin, and R. K. McKnight, *In Search of Identity: The Japanese Overseas Scholar in America and Japan* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958); G. V. Coelho, *Changing Images of America: A Study of Indian Students' Perceptions* (New York: The Free Press, 1958).
51. I. de S. Pool, "Effects of Cross-National Contact on National and International Images," in *International Behavior*, pp. 127—128.