Role of Nationalism in India’s Relations with Japan:
A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation

インドと日本との関係におけるナショナリズムの役割
――新古典的現実主義解釈――

A Dissertation Presented to
the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
International Christian University
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

April 16, 2020

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DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the International Christian University, Japan, is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others.

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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to explore the role of nationalism in India’s foreign policy during post-Cold war era, especially under the leadership of Bharatiya Janata Party. This thesis will focus on how India’s relations have evolved and changed with Japan during these years. In order to answer this question this study adopts conceptual framework based on the neoclassical realist approach. This study will also analyze the sources of and nature of nationalism in contemporary India and how the element of Hindutva influences India’s foreign policy.

By incorporating an NCR model, this study has sought to explain why and how the rising nationalism has influenced the foreign policy decisions in India. The rise of nationalism has significantly altered India’s view as a state and this is clearly visible in its changing relations with Japan. The main IR theories like neo-realism and neo-liberalism marginalize the role of unit level factors like nationalism in defining a state’s foreign policy, while the constructivist analysis emphasizes too much on it without considering the external factors. NCR on the other hand, takes a middle ground, giving equal importance to external and domestic factors, which provides a comprehensive understanding of the underlying logic behind the deflect in India’s foreign policy from Nehruvian socialism to a realist one. It is clear that during the years of Congress rule, right up to 1991, India adhered to Nehru’s socialism but the 1992 brought BJP in the mainstream politics and with it merged the politics of masculine Hindutva that promoted a strong and wealthy state. Unlike neo-realism and neo-liberalism, nationalism finds a place as a salient feature in the NCR model that explains India foreign policy, while also acknowledging other plausible external variables.

On the other hand, Japan has also seen rise of nationalism at the domestic front. The growth of the revisionist movement demanding revision of the constitution and the education system, high-profile visits of the Yasukuni shrine and the growing anti-China sentiment has forced Japan to reevaluate its foreign policy. Due to the rise of Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea and Senkaku islands, Japan, amidst unpredictable US policies, is seeking more partners in Asia to safeguard its interests in the region, clearly indicating that external dynamics mitigate effects on nationalism’s efficacy.

The study uses Messari’s identity model to understand the reason behind the deepening of relations between India and Japan. In both the cases the external dynamics played an important role in the rise of nationalism in both the states influencing their foreign policy.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The general topic of this research is rise of nationalism in India and its impact on its relations with Japan and China. The reappearance of nationalism in national debate since past few years has had impact on state’s domestic policies and international politics as well. This has drawn attention from the society, however being a recent phenomenon, there has not been much written or researched on this topic. Experts working on India’s behavior as a state focus mainly on structural factors that shape its foreign policy. However, developments that took place after the end of Cold War reveal that the state’s policy took a major U-turn. With the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) gaining relevance in the Indian political scene, repeated attempts to revive Hindu nationalism were made. The revival of Hindutva evident through the Babri Masjid demolition of 1992, the election of BJP to power in 1996 and 1998 and the nuclear tests of 1998 demonstrate that Hindu nationalism was reemerging as a potent force in national politics.

The structural changes in the region when interacted with the resurgence of nationalism had a major impact on redefining national identity, interests and external perceptions affecting India’s stand on bilateral relations. Experts like Pant (2009), Bandhopadhyaya (2009), Ganguly (2010), Raghavan (2016), Ghosh (2009), Debiel and Wulf (2017), Ogden (2014) believe that external structural-material factors like the demise of Soviet Union, rise of China and US losing its preeminence in Asia Pacific
heavily influenced India’s foreign policy. Scholar like Ogden (2014 & 2017), Anand (2016), Ghosh (2009) see this change as a reflection of the changing domestic socio-political changes, where the unit factor nationalism has become a major idea influencing the political debate. The growing hindu nationalism is seen by some as a culprit, while scholars like Ogden and Anand see it playing a major role in determining India’s foreign policy.

The study of Indian nationalism mostly deals with anticolonial and postcolonial studies. A huge section has been dedicated to the subaltern studies and describing the grand narrative of the rise of nationalism in the Indian subcontinent. Roy (2007) in her book discusses the link between the nation and state in terms of Indian nationalism, with emphasis on nation building. She discusses in detail the policies of Nehruvian India during the first two decades after independence. The Nehruvian vision was to create a strong subnational diversity rather than homogeneity in postcolonial India. However, this vision created a differentiated model and failed to create a unified model of national belonging. Under this vision the state tried to create a nation without deploying any identifiable resource, like culture, so as to protect the wider frame of national identity. Symbols of diversity, democracy, development and institutional discourses on science and technology were used in the task of nation-building. Pant (2016) even goes on to claim that India did not have any foreign policy. He attributes this not to the lack of interest in world politics, but lack of ‘grand vision’ in forming its policy towards the world. He accuses Nehru of being over impatient towards western imperialism yet romanticizing Chinese revanchist attitude. His idealist policy cracked during the Sino-
India war of 1962 and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also failed because United States had to come to India’s aid in its moment of humiliation.

After Nehru, his daughter Indira Gandhi followed the policy of hardened realism towards Pakistan, while intensifying the rhetoric of non-alignment yet deepening India’s relationship with Soviet Union (Pant, 2016). This policy continued till the arrival of Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) in 1990s on the forefront of Indian politics that revived nationalism in India (Vatter, 2011). By popularizing these ideational and normative factors, the BJP led government (1998-2004) inculcated several substantive changes in India’s foreign policy, producing an irrevocable gearshift in India’s security policy (Ogden, 2014). Geertz (1973), Nairn (1981), Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983) argues that nationalism is not a rational doctrine because it is an imagined concept and people act without regard to the consequences of their actions. However, contrary to this argument, Hardin (1995) and Nederveen (1996) argue that nations act in a way that maximizes their self-interest and enhances their chances of survival. Simply put, a person’s nationalistic actions do not validate the legitimacy of his emotions, however, it is a well-thought rational action which he deems necessary for the best interest of his community. Mayall (1990) goes on to argue that nationalism was one of the main factors that shaped the emergence of an international society. Smith (2013) sees nationalism as an ideology that shapes the modern nation state, making liberal ideas of citizenship and civil society possible.

Scholars like Kapila (2015), Sidhu & Yuan (2003) and Menges (2005) view the sudden military and economic rise of China as a threat to power balance in Asia. The rise of nationalism and changes in the security identity of India can lead to rise in
tension in the region. The testing of nuclear bomb in 1998 is seen as a result of growing nationalism initiated by BJP in the early 1990s. The efforts to expand military and economic might of India cannot just be attributed to the structural and systemic changes that have taken place in Asia after the end of Cold War. After elections in 2014, India elected Narendra Modi as its first Hindu nationalist prime minister. This not only had important implications on domestic politics of India, but the changes in foreign policy of India too showed nationalist markings. There has been a constant struggle over the past two decades to homogenize India’s billion plus population under the values of Hindutva and common culture. The claims of common ancestry, imposition of Hindu values and culture on Muslims and Christians to create a common identity can be seen as efforts to create a Hindu nation (Kinnvall, 2007). On foreign policy matters Modi took conciliatory approach towards Pakistan and China after getting elected to office, but has now adopted a hard-line policy towards them after repeated attempts by them to provoke India on various fronts. Different from popular approach, the example of contemporary Indian foreign policy shows that domestic variables impact the foreign policy of a state, and the systemic units are not the only variables that govern state behavior in international arena. In this context, this study will explore the role of structural factors in the rise of nationalism in the post-Cold War India, and how in turn the rising nationalism impacts a state’s behavior using Japan and China as a case study.
1.1 Research Objective

Politically both Japan and India are established democracies and are viewed as natural partners (Rajamohan 2006, Brewster 2012, Shambaugh & Yahuda 2014). Pant (2008) argues that India and Japan demonstrate how economic growth can be pursued in consonance with democratic values. Indo-Japanese diplomatic relations were established in 1952, and the initial fifty years of this relationship witnessed various phases during which the interaction between the two states has been intermittent. Post World War II, India and Japan started their diplomatic relations on a high note by signing a peace treaty with Japan and waiving ‘the right to reparation.’ India throughout maintained friendly attitude towards Japan, and took various objections to the Anglo-American draft in the San Francisco Peace Conference. In India’s policy towards the peace settlement, there was an underlying desire that there should be no vindictive action and the settlement should be capable of wiping out hatred from the minds of the people concerned (Vishwanathan, 2010). India also provided key resources and raw materials to start off industries in the war torn Japan.

Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi visited India in 1957, and Japan started providing yen loans to India from the following year. However, during the Cold War, due to India’s non-aligned stance and Japan’s alliance with USA served as a setback for Indo-Japanese relations and India remained as a ‘non-entity’ from the viewpoint of Japanese interests (Hirose, 1994). However, Indo-Japanese relations strengthened after the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991, and since then the relationship has transformed into a strategic partnership with various frameworks of security and defense
dialogues, not undermining the strong economic relation and swelling volume of trade.\(^1\) The visits of prime-minister Mori (2000), Koizumi (2005), Abe (2006, 2014) and the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in October 2008 have led to further deepening of Indo-Japanese ties.

Present Indo-Japanese relations are driven by various factors like economic partnership, security cooperation, infrastructure development and a strategic objective of minimizing economic dependence on China. The build-up of this relationship can be classified into three phases namely the Cold War phase (1945-1990), post-liberalization phase (1991-2000) and post 9/11 phase (2001~). The Indo-Japanese relations warmed up considerably in the post-liberalization and post 9/11 phase primarily due to three factors. The first factor has been the change in structural environment of the international system after the end of Cold War. The second factor has been economic. Until 1990, India was not a major trade partner of Japan, however, the post-Cold war era saw the deepening of economic ties between New Delhi and Tokyo. The third factor, as this study argues is the rise of nationalism in both the countries. Both external and domestic-level factors have been responsible in the formulation and implementation of India’s policy towards Japan. Apart from external drivers like structural and economic factors, domestic factors like rise of nationalism also play a significant role in formulating India’s foreign policy towards Japan. The key questions this study analyses are:

© What is the role of nationalism in the change in India’s foreign policy during post-Cold war era?

\(^1\) See [https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html)
1) What are the sources and nature of nationalism in contemporary India?

2) How the Hindutva element influences India’s foreign policy?

3) How did the revival of Hindutva, a unit level factor, influence India’s foreign policy towards Japan?

The first and primary question concerns how nationalism can be defined in India’s foreign policy. In order to analyze the over-arching question, some sub-questions also need to be answered. The first question would analyze the sources and nature of nationalism in modern India. The second sub-question explores how the Indian nationalism is mainly Hindu in nature, and how does this Hindutva identity influence India’s foreign policy, while taking into account the major structural changes that have fueled this nationalism. The third sub-question analyzes the role of Hindu nationalism in India in formulating foreign policy towards Japan.

By exploring the above questions this study attempts to uncover the complex relationship between rising nationalism and foreign policy in Indian politics. Previous studies have focused on the structural and economic factors to analyze India and Japan relations, and have completely ignored the domestic-level factor i.e., the influence of nationalism on foreign policy. This research is an endeavor to fill this gap and uncover the relationship nationalism shares with foreign policy formulation. The timeframe will concentrate on the contemporary period, i.e. between 1990 and 2018, with some reference to earlier decades for context.
1.2 Hypothesis

1) The rise of BJP in the 1980s and the revival of Hindutva ideology led to the rise of Hindu nationalism which drew its ideological support from Kautilya and Savarkar, which legitimized a strong and masculine state.

2) This Hindu nationalism, apart from other structural factors, is a major driver behind the contemporary Indian foreign policy.

3) Although both the states were aligned in opposite groups during the Cold War, India has built a strong partnership with Japan following the Kautilyan strategy of hedging and bandwagoning.

1.3 Significance of this Research

This research is an effort to uncover the complex and till now ignored relationship of nationalism and foreign policy. Despite the optimism generated by Fukuyama’s ‘The End of History,’ great power politics continues to dominate the international system in the post-Cold War world (Fukuyama 2006). After the breakup of Soviet Union and decline in the power of the US, China has emerged as a challenger to secure a greater role in world politics. This has caused concerns to several Asian states, especially India and Japan that are seen as challengers to the growing Chinese influence in the region. While India is a mature democracy, home to 1.2 billion people, third largest economy (in terms of PPP) and a nuclear-armed state, Japan on the other hand is also a democracy, world’s third largest economy (GDP) and a leading industrial power; and
how the two interact is of vital importance for students and practitioners of international relations. The thesis analyses how the rise of nationalism in India under the BJP, influences state’s foreign policy. BJP leadership subscribes to the revisionist school that does not agree with the Nehruvian idea of India and believes in an ideology shift to strengthen the state and restore the past glory. In light of this, New Delhi has been following the Chanakya Neeti of entering into strategic partnerships and thus broadening the scope of its diplomacy and preparing itself to counter any attempt to hurt its interests.

It is a common consensus among the IR scholars in the world that India’s foreign policy has always been centered on the policy of non-alignment, peace and friendship with all countries (Srivastava 1984, Gupta & Shukla 2009, Okoth 2010). However, during the Cold War India could not follow complete non-alignment and depended heavily on USSR for security, trade and technology (Jayapalan 2001, Gupta & Shukla 2009). The end of Cold War The collapse of the Soviet Union and the change in the global order forced Indian policymakers to drastically change the Indian foreign policy at multiple levels. At the world level, the term ‘non-alignment’ had lost much of its meaning. As a former Indian foreign minister and then prime-minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, remarked, “It is a mantra that we have to keep repeating, but who are you going to be nonaligned against?” (Ganguly, 1994) With the end of Cold War and the non-alignment for all practical purposes, India’s foreign policy was suddenly orphaned of a grand strategic vision.

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2 Srivastava (1984) adds that India follows a course of its own on the international scene which is based on the principles of (1) equality, (2) non-interference in internal affairs, (3) respect for territorial integrity, and (4) sovereignty and non-belligerence.
The Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the liberalization of Indian economy in 1991 led to a complete overhauling of the Indian foreign policy, both militarily and economically. The rise of Hindu nationalism since 1990s has also had an effect on the foreign policy of India towards its neighbors (Schaffer, 2002). While adopting an approach of rapprochement towards Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, India has adopted a strict policy towards China and Pakistan. The mainstream theories of IR like neorealism, neoliberalism fail to engage with nationalism while analyzing India’s foreign policy and constructivism also does not provide a satisfactory explanation for relationship between change in foreign policy and rise of nationalism in India. There exists an ocean of literature on the rise of nationalism in India; however nobody except Ogden (2014) analyzes its impact on contemporary foreign policy. Scholars of India’s foreign policy focus on external variables and have ignored the impact of nationalism on the foreign policy of India. Thus, it can be argued that the subject of nationalism and it impact on India’s foreign policy has not been systematically studied.

1.4 Contribution of the Research

With the fast-changing structural realities of the world, Asian security structure is also changing. The aggressive rise of China has alarmed both big and small states in the region, including both India and Japan. Post Kargil war (1999), India and US relationship has undergone a major overhaul and both states see each other as strategic partners and friends. This in itself is a great example to prove identities are not
permanent. The US-India alliance is seen as a ‘pillar’ of regional security. Another emerging partner in this strategic relationship is Japan that has worked meticulously to strengthen its relations with India over the past decade and half. Stockwin (1999) remarked that the India-Japan relationship will gain importance in coming years and will be vital to world security. Several studies have been done on the economic and strategic importance of India and Japan relations; however all have ignored the factor that is driving this change, i.e. nationalism.

By critiquing the role of nationalism in India’s foreign policy, this research will provide a valuable addition to the on-going debate of rising nationalism in India and state policy. Of all the previous studies, none, except Ogden (2014) have analyzed the role of nationalism (in depth) in formulating the foreign policy of India. Most studies analyze the economic or strategic relations and overlook the causal factor behind these relations.

Naidu, Chen and Narayan (2014) offer a comprehensive analysis of a variety of issues dealing with economic development models, military strategies, and the boundary dispute between India and China. Brewster (2012) analyzes India's international relations in the Asia Pacific and examines strategic thinking about the Asia Pacific, its relationships with China and the United States, and argues that India will become a major power in the Asia-Pacific in the future. While linking the influence of Western values and institutions in India, Japan and China, Charlton and Ellen (2009) establish links between politics and each state’s unique cultural and historical contexts. They shed light not only on the politics of India, Japan and China but also how historical dispositions and social issues may affect modern day politics. Jeshurun (1993), Hall
(2014), Mitchell (2008), Chellaney (1999) analyze the pivotal role of the Asia-Pacific region in world politics and mainly deal with the major economic and strategic developments taking place in the region. Murthy (1986), Sisodia and Naidu (2006), Mathur (2012) analyze the importance of a strategic bilateral relationship, Mukherjee and Yazaki (2016) discuss the four key areas of bilateral cooperation like economics, energy and climate change, security, and global governance. Only Ogden (2014) delves deeper while trying to establish a relationship between India’s foreign policy and Hindutva. He argues that hindutva is more than a religion and has been the basis of BJP’s politics since its birth. BJP draws its assertive nature of politics from the masculine nature of hindutva it subscribes to, and this forms the core of its security policy as well. Ogden describes how hindutva has also taken the center-stage in domestic politics and how this impacts India’s policy towards other states.

As mentioned above colossal amount of research has been done on the economic and strategic aspect of India’s relations with Japan and China, however not much has been done to understand the drivers behind this. Therefore, this study will be a novel undertaking in examining the role of nationalism that drives India’s current foreign policy.

This study apart from bringing in the dimension of nationalism, will contribute to the nascent literature in five distinct ways:

1) Uncovering how the rise of nationalism within a state influences its foreign policy.

2) Collection of contemporary data in form of interviews, statistics and official statement
3) Synthesizing and revising arguments in the secondary literature with current trends
4) Supplement the growing body of NCR work and
5) Integrate study of India’s foreign policy and the Indo-Japanese relationship thereby bringing a new and under-developed perspective to the study of India’s foreign policy matters.

This study should be of interest to students and practitioners of international relations, analysts of Indian foreign policy and Asian power politics.

1.6 Argument

India has been a late entry into the arena of power politics in Asian arena. India’s foreign policy right from the time of Nehru has been a puzzle for analysts and commentators. The structural realities of Cold War world hindered the active participation of India and kept it aloof from the big power game. However, due to the decline in US influence in the Indo-Pacific region and the rise of assertive China, Indian foreign policy, having left the Nehruvian past behind, was reformulated to meet the need of the hour. India’s foreign policy has often been compared to an elephant\(^3\) due to its disengagement in world politics for a very long time. Bahl (2010) quotes Fareed Zakaria, who captures the real essence of Nehru’s morality play: “Nehru rooted India’s

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foreign policy in abstract ideas rather than a strategic conception of national interest. He was disdainful towards alliances, pacts and treaties, seeing them as a part of the old rules of realpolitik, and was uninterested in military matters.”

However, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indian diplomacy was left directionless and was forced to redefine itself. The new foreign policy was formulated to take India out of the financial crisis, build new partnerships in the region and define the roadmap of future diplomacy. Since then the post-Cold War structural changes have greatly influenced the strategic, economic and defense policies of India. India’s ‘Look East Policy’ and the post-1998 rapprochement with US and Japan brought India back into the arena of international politics as a major game changer to counter China’s ever-growing presence in the region. Also the memories of 1962 war with China made India realize the importance of militarization and growing dependence on Chinese goods created a need of diversification from the Chinese market.

These structural parameters coupled with nationalism inspired by Savarkar, made Japan an important strategic ally of India. Savarkar who disagreed with Gandhian pacifism and believed in use of force, argued that although war is undesirable it is necessary.

1.7 Research Methodology

The primary research scope draws on the role of revival of nationalism in shaping India’s policy towards Japan and China during the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and United Progressive Alliance (UPA) during the Vajapayee, Singh
and Modi administration. The central focus of this research is the state-to-state relations. State agencies that influence these relations would also be examined. This study treats the state-elites as the principal foreign-policy designing agents. State-elites may include the top-level members of the ruling party, comprising the Prime Minister (PM), Foreign Minister (FM), Defense Minister, Finance Minister, State Security Head, Army Chiefs, nationalist political parties and organizations like the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). Role of nationalist political parties and organizations is important because they are a part of the ruling alliance and have a major influence within the power realms of NDA. The present Modi government draws ideological and political inspiration from the RSS and VHP. On the other hand, the role of the business community that forms a part of the non-state agency would also be analyzed.

The true form of nationalism manifests only when the above-mentioned state and non-state actors interact with each other in the political arena, hence an important aspect of this of this research is to observe this interaction and analyze how the external structural factors influences this domestic interaction in defining India’s foreign policy. The politico-ideological outlooks of the state elites would also be studied to analyze its effect on foreign policy making. Externally, the impact of the end of a bipolar world, the growing power imbalance within the Asia-Pacific region and regional security concerns shall be examined to understand India’s position.

This study uses India’s relations with Japan as case-studies to test the NCR model and analyze how the nationalism, a domestic-level factor, influences the foreign policy towards it. Firstly, Japan is seen as an ally state by India. The role Japan played
in helping India during its struggle for independence is still remembered by the state elites. Security analysts within India and Japan view China as a common security threat in the region, and both the states being a democracy become natural allies. The amount of investment and technical support provided by Japan for India’s modernization has not gone unnoticed by the Indian masses and Japan has positioned itself as an all-weather ally in the Indian foreign policy. Both states have various domestic issues; however, their democratic values along with convergence of strategic interests on various issues help them make natural allies. Both face hostile neighbors and are not in favor of a unipolar Asia. Secondly, India’s relations with China have been “cold” right after both the states gained independence. After the Sino-Indian war of 1962, India saw China as a major adversary and threat to its geopolitical interests in the region. The “stapled visa” issue, the border disputes over the Aksai Chin region and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, and the continuous skirmishes between the Chinese and Indian army along the eastern border, have made it extremely difficult for Nehru’s dream of “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai” (literally “India and China are brothers”) to become a reality. China’s constant support for Pakistan and its efforts to block India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and a UN Security Council permanent seat have also roiled relations between the two neighbors (Kumar 2016; Pant & Joshi 2015). India also sees China’s “string of pearls” policy as a critical threat to its security and economic interest, reflecting a wider encirclement strategy on the part of the Chinese (Samaranayake 2011).

In case of Japan, nationalism has stirred the debate of re-militarizing Japan in the wake of an assertive China; while in case of India the rising nationalism has stirred the
popular anti-Chinese sentiment resulting in rapid modernization of Indian army and various China-centered policies aimed at containing China in the Indo-Pacific region.

This study utilizes qualitative research methodology, which was divided between primary document analysis, interviews and supportive secondary texts. The basis of primary sources will be derived from: i) publicly available official documents (i.e. official publications, annual reports, and white papers from related ministries/agencies and think-tanks); and ii) relevant information in various published forms (i.e. official declarations and press statements, and media reports/commentaries/debates via newspapers, magazines, and news monitoring services). The approach adopted in this study is NCR, as it engages with systemic level and explores how power relation is affected by the domestic unit-level factors, and how this is translated into the behavior of state actors. NCR seeks to broaden the existent research base of realism. NCR build upon the complex relationship between the state and the society found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of neorealism (proposed by Waltz) about the constraints of international system. According to Rose (1998), NCR explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist

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thought. She writes ‘the scope and ambition of a countries foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its position in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on the foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.’

1.7.1 Primary Sources

Primary data sources included official government statements, speeches, reports by foreign policy analysts, press releases, proceedings of conferences and seminars involving think tanks and academicians from India, Japan, China and US. The official statements of Government of India (GoI) were sourced from Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI), Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Ministry of Road, Transport and Highways (MRTH), Ministry of Railways (MoR). This study is based on contemporary politics, and thus emphasis was placed on the articles, editorials and opinion pieces from leading dailies of India, Japan, US and China to demonstrate the view of opinion formers. The Indian perspective was sourced from Press Trust India (PTI), Times of India (ToI), Hindustan Times (HT), The Hindu, Indian Express (IE) and The Telegraph. This was supplemented by political and international debates on NDTV, Times Now, CNN-IBN, Zee News. The Japanese perspective was sourced from Yomiuri Shimbun (YS), Asahi Shimbun (AS), Japan Times (JT), Mainichi Shimbun/Daily News (MS/MDN), Sankei
Shimbun (SS), Kyodo News (KN) and The Nikkei. In addition to these, opinions, articles and reports from other quality press like Reuters, The Associated Press (AP), The Economist, Agence France-Presse (AFP), Xinhua News Agency (XNA), The Global Times (GT) among others were used as a crucial empirical source in this study. These were derived mainly from online archives of the related newspapers, and media monitoring services.

The next part of this study was the open-ended interviews that were an important source of factual data, understanding policy decisions and political rhetoric. These interviews helped the author to gain insights into the political decisions and policies. These insights were helpful in understanding the reality not made public in official statements. These interviews were conducted with serving and retired officials and diplomats, academic experts, security experts, members of local nationalist bodies and army personnel from India and Japan. The chosen bureaucrats had experience of working in government and participating in official bilateral dialogues. Unlike the bureaucrats, the academics were independent of scrutiny and gave a more subjective response. The retired ambassadors were another useful resource who were able to disclose lot of information important information. A close-end questionnaire survey was also conducted to study the sentiment of general public regarding nationalism and national security among 634 individuals (India 561 and Japan 73).

The interviews were structured around the main theme of this study, which also included the historical origins of nationalism in India, historical links between India and Japan, foreign relations and trade relations between India and Japan, security environment in Asia, defense and maritime cooperation between India, US and Japan
and future patterns of cooperation. The interviews were conducted taking into account the recent developments, for example the NSG and MTCR membership issue. The interviews ended with predictions about the impact growing nationalism may have on India’s foreign policy and the future of relationship with Japan. The interviews were conducted in both formal and informal settings. Due to the open-ended nature of the interviews, several unconsidered topics also entered the research agenda.

1.7.2 Secondary Sources

Additionally, secondary sources from the related literature will be used to furnish the background information; contending theoretical approaches and critical perspectives will be used to deepen the knowledge and understanding required to tackle the research problem. Databases from the Diet Library, National Archives of Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies, Digital Archive of the Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, National Archives of India, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, National Defense Research Institute etc., will be used for both primary and secondary research.

Also, expert interviews will be employed as a supplementary, to overcome the problem of “superficiality” of official Japanese (and Indian) records/documents, as well as gain insight in to how policies are formulated in practice. The targeted interviewees will comprise relevant government officials, academics, politicians, press members, public figures, and other informed individuals. The selection of interviewees will
principally be based on identifying those with first-hand experience/knowledge of Japan-India relations, preferably the direct/indirect protagonists of the policy/diplomatic processes concerned. Equally important are relevant members of the academic/research community and media, and opinion leaders knowledgeable on Indian and Japanese nationalism and foreign policy-making.

Finally public opinion surveys conducted by both government and the media will be used for the analysis and interpretation of popular sentiment on nationalism, Indo-Japanese relations, changes in foreign policy and perceptions, images, and attitudes towards common threats and regional challenges.

1.8 Chapter Outline

This thesis consists of 6 chapters including introduction and conclusion. The first chapter deals with the research question and hypothesis, framing the argument and defining the methodology. The primary question which this thesis seeks to answer, is to explore the role of nationalism in the change in India’s foreign policy during post-Cold war era, especially under the leadership of Bharatiya Janata Party. This thesis will focus on how India’s relations have evolved and changed with Japan during these years. In order to answer this question this study adopts conceptual framework based on the neoclassical realist approach. While answering the over-arching question this study will also analyze the sources of and nature of nationalism in contemporary India and how the element of Hindutva influences India’s foreign policy.
The second chapter will offer a brief overview of the ongoing debates in the Indian foreign policy and discuss India’s foreign policy within the framework of international relations theories. This chapter will discuss neo-realism, neo-liberalism, and constructivism to frame the argument why these theories are not sufficient to explain the change in India’s foreign policy. Later the chapter offers neoclassical realism as an alternative view that lays emphasis on structural factors whilst allowing for their mediation through domestic political processes by incorporating unit-level factors as well.

The third chapter seeks to define nationalism and analyze the various theories associated with nationalism. This chapter talks in detail about the three main theories of nationalism i.e. the primordialist, modernist and ethno-symbolist theories and seeks to understand the nature of Indian nationalism.

The fourth chapter deals with nationalism in India and Japan. The first section discusses the pre-modern nationalist ideology in India and then the nationalism under the colonial era. This chapter seeks to understand the pre-modern Hindu nationalist thought, and discuss the changes it went through during the colonial period. This chapter also discusses the rise of Bharatiya Janata Party and its ideological roots. The second part of this chapter analyzes nationalism in Japan and is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the prewar Japanese nationalism, while the second part deals with postwar nationalism. This part also discusses the discourse of the neo-revisionists who support the nationalist Abe regime.

The fifth chapter deals with the history of India and Japan’s relations, which divides it into four phases. The first phase briefly discusses the ancient links between
India and Japan during 2\textsuperscript{nd} century to 6\textsuperscript{th} century. This section discusses in detail the Japanese aid to India during the World War II and the formation of Indian National Army in Japan. The second phase discusses India-Japan relations during the Cold war period and how the two nations despite starting their diplomatic relations on a very good note, failed to build strong ties due to the different blocks the subscribed to. The third phase talks about the liberalization of Indian economy and how it opened Indian markets to the world, including Japan, leading to betterment of ties. This section also talks about the reaction of Japan after India’s tested nuclear bomb and how it led to souring of relations between both the countries. However, prime-minister Mori’s visit in the year 2000 led to normalization of the ties, which is discussed in phase four. Phase four discusses the new heights India-Japan relation reached during the leaderships of Koizumi, Abe, Vajpayee and Modi. It discusses in detail how the relationship between India and Japan is very near to turning into an alliance, has how both the countries have become an important strategic partners.

Finally the last chapter concludes what kind of role nationalism has played in India and Japan’s relations and how it has influenced their foreign policy. This chapter argues that nationalism has been the force behind the recent change in policies of India and Japan. India, following the teachings of Kautilya, Savarkar and Golwalkar has left the path of Nehruvian socialism, that could never happen during the first 50 years of its independence. Japan on the other hand is try to change its image of a pacifist country by attempting to change amend its constitution and trying to become a ‘normal country’.
CHAPTER 2

KEY DEBATES IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

It is a common consensus among the IR scholars in the world that India’s foreign policy has until 1990 been centered on the policy of non-alignment, peace and friendship with all countries (Srivastava 1984, Gupta & Shukla 2009, Okoth, 2010). However, during the Cold War India could not follow complete non-alignment and depended heavily on USSR for security, trade and technology (Jayapalan 2001, Gupta & Shukla 2009). The end of Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the change in the global order forced Indian policymakers to drastically change the Indian foreign policy at multiple levels. At the world level, the term ‘non-alignment’ had lost much of its meaning.

The Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the liberalization of Indian economy in 1991 led to a complete overhauling of the Indian foreign policy, both militarily and economically. The rise of Hindu nationalism since 1990s has also had an effect on the foreign policy of India towards its neighbors (Schaffer, 2002). The mainstream theories of IR like neorealism, neoliberalism fail to engage with nationalism while analyzing India’s foreign policy and constructivism also does not provide a satisfactory explanation for relationship between change in foreign policy and rise of nationalism in India. Extensive research has been done on the rise of nationalism in India; however very few including Ogden (2014), Ganguly, Chauthaiwale and Sinha (2018), Pande

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5 Srivastava (1984) adds that India follows a course of its own on the international scene which is based on the principles of (1) equality, (2) non-interference in internal affairs, (3) respect for territorial integrity, and (4) sovereignty and non-belligerence.
(2017) have analyzed its impact on the contemporary foreign policy. Scholars of India’s foreign policy focus on external variables and have ignored the impact of nationalism on the foreign policy of India. Thus, it can be argued that the subject of nationalism and its impact on India’s foreign policy has not been systematically studied.

2.1 India’s Foreign Policy within IR theory

2.1.1 Neo-Realism

Neorealism is one of the most influential contemporary approaches to international relations (Powell 1994). Neorealism also known as ‘structural realism,’ propounded by Kenneth Waltz (2000), is an ideological departure from Hans Morgenthaler's writing on classical realism. The term ‘structural realism’ signifies that while seeking to explain the outcomes in international politics, this theory analyzes the effects of the structure of the international system. Neorealism relies heavily on material structure at the international system level to explain state behavior (Waltz 2000, Johnston 2019). Neorealist thinkers propose that structural constraints—not ideational or historical factors—will determine state behavior in international relations, because the interests of the states are similar (Hough et al. 2015). Donnelly (2000) sees states as unitary rational actors with unchanging identities and exogenously determined and intrinsically given interests. Neorealisists see international politics as a “pool table” consisting of balls whose inherent properties (shape, the material they are made of, etc.) are essentially the same but the sizes of the balls vary greatly (Shiraev & Zubok 2015).

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[6] Neorealism accepts the principal assumptions of classical realist theory, but narrows the focus of realism and its conception of theory to advance a formal proof for the power-seeking of states through a system of states (Kolodziej 2005)
They believe that it is the nature and structure of the system which determines the behavior of states (Mearsheimer 2001). So based on this fact it is believed that a state’s foreign policy is shaped by its position in international system and distribution of power yielding capabilities (Smith 2010). They dismiss ideology, form of government, norms, identity etc. as irrelevant in explaining the outcomes in international politics. To this Kitchen (2010) argues, that if ideas were merely for rhetorical purposes, then why are statesmen urged to adhere to the ideas of realism? If the ideas contained in realism’s foreign policy can shape the world, then how can ideas be dismissed as lacking power to affect international affairs?

Despite ideational and domestic factors playing no role in neorealism, scholars like Mearsheimer (2011) believe that nationalism has an effect on state policy and argue that there exists some affinity between nationalism and realism. He argues that before French revolution the power wars were fought for limited objectives and with limited means and nationalism shaped the Clausewitzian concept of “absolute war.” This idea is very important to understand the contemporary Indian foreign policy, because it connects state behavior with nationalism (domestic and ideological factor). Muni (2009), Behuria (2010) and Hall (2019) have defended the realist foreign policy of India, which is both indigenous and Western in origin – a mixture of Kautilya and Kissinger.

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8 John J. Mearsheimer in his “Kissing Cousins: Nationalism and Realism”, paper written for the Yale Workshop on International Relations in 2011, analyzed the interaction between nationalism and the realist theory of International Relations. According to him, nationalism and realism are two particularistic theories, both deeply different from liberalism and Marxism given their universalistic approach.
2.1.2 Neo-Liberalism

Neoliberalism is another important paradigm of IR that focuses on the role of institutions and negates the role of ideational factors (Deng 2000, Kubalkova 2015). Buzan (1993) argues that Waltz theory of neorealism is not wholly wrong, but is incomplete. Neoliberalism draws the attention towards ‘complex interdependence’ and increasing prominence of ‘international regimes’ (Crawford, 2005). Keohane (1986) notes that neoliberalism demonstrates the possibilities of international cooperation under anarchic conditions. For neoliberalists, the relative economic gains that mitigate the structural anarchy of the system govern a state’s foreign policy, and can be utilized to explain institution building and economic policy among interdependent states.

For neoliberals, the thriving economic relations between India and China or China and Japan demonstrate how states can keep a check on political hostility if the relationship is highly interdependent. Thus it can be said that since neoliberalism does not engage with domestics and ideational factors and sees states as unitary actors with identities that are preordained (Axelrod 1981, Krasner 1982, Keohane 1986, Buzan 1993); it is unable to explain the role of nationalism in the foreign policy of India.

2.1.3 Constructivism

Another mainstream IR theory which can was formulated in 1980s and consolidated by Alexander Wendt (1992) is constructivism, which highlights what has previously been overlooked. Constructivists depart from centrality of structure in neorealism and

\[ In Neoliberalism, actors are motivated by possibility of absolute gains and the existence of multiple linkages they can use to influence politics. Power still remains relevant, yet its meaning is not limited to hard power, and focuses on the interdependence theory and the growing primacy of economic sphere over military dimensions (Sandal & Fox 2013, Zhao 2004) \]
neoliberalism and focus on the ideational factors. Constructivism views the course of international relations as an interactive process in which the ideas and communications among agents (individuals, groups, social structures and states) serve to create structures (treaties, laws, international organizations). These structures in turn influence the ideas and communications of the agents. Constructivists do not constitute a monolithic perspective, but they do share some key ideas, the first of which is that the environment in which states act is social and ideational as well as material (Holsti 2006). Katzenstein and Sil (2010) argue that ideational structures mediate how actors perceive, construct and reproduce the institutional and material structures they inhibit as well as their own roles and identities within them.

In 1992 Alexander Wendt published an article "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics" in *International Organization* that laid the theoretical groundwork for challenging both neo-realists and neoliberal institutionalists. In his article he argued that even "power politics" which is considered a core realist concept is not natural and is socially constructed. This social construct makes it capable of being transformed by human practice. Nicholas Onuf (2002) wrote “World of Our Making” which is considered to be his best contribution to constructivism. In his article he rejects the realist and liberal claim that most of the actors of world politics, such as states and structures, such as the anarchic international structures are a stable given. Constructivists read all such “knowledge” as much more fluid than realists and liberals. Constructivists acknowledge the existence of states; however argue that they are mental pictures of who we are and based on the willingness of the agents (citizens).
Thus for constructivists, domestic factors, ideational factors (culture and identity) and other material factors are of great significance (Terada 2010). The policy of non-violence and non-alignment that formed the grounds of India’s foreign policy was followed for almost fifty years; even after the elites who articulated these policies were long gone. History and memory also play an important role in the constructivist theory, and the historical baggage that China and Japan carry influences the contemporary relations of both the states (Lai 2013). Similarly, historical memory also influences India’s relations with China and Pakistan. These historical memories and social factors are also shared by political leaders and elites of the society who are the decision makers in most cases, and they may be misguided in their judgment of domestic environment or may manipulate symbols and feelings of identity to mobilize a political following (Orvis & Drogus 2013). Constructivism discards the rationalist and materialist assumptions of IR to conclude that the very meaning of power and the content of interests are functions of ideas (Wendt 1999). Thus constructivism’s overemphasis on the role of norms and social structures and lacking of the ‘theory of agency’ limits the approach’s utility. (Checkel 1998, Focarelli 2012, Schmidt 2014).

Due to the shortcomings discussed above, IR theories have not been able to fully analyze the impact of rising nationalism on India’s foreign policy. Many scholars argue that foreign policy of India is torn between framings of Gandhi and Kautilya, i.e. between idealist and realist framings (Bandyopadhyaya 2003, Gaur 2005, Chacko 2013, Husar 2016). However, the another group of scholars argue that over the last two decades (since the 1990s) there has been a shift in Indian foreign policy from idealist to realist (Shukla 2005, Vanaik 2008, Behuria 2010, Ollapally & Rajagopalan 2012). Both
neorealism and neoliberalism regard states as unitary rational actors with unchanging identities and exogenously determined and intrinsically given interests. Constructivism also treats state as a socially pre-given actor, and Wendt (1999) has also argued that constructivism is not a theory. Thus there arises a need of an alternative paradigm that fuses classical and neorealist approaches with domestic (unit-level) variables to analyze the role of nationalism in India’s foreign policy towards Japan.

2.1.4 Neoclassical Realism (NCR) – An Alternative Approach

NCR\textsuperscript{10} seeks to broaden the existent research base of realism. NCR build upon the complex relationship between the state and the society found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of neorealism (proposed by Waltz) about the constraints of international system. Kitchen (2010) quotes Rose (1998) to argue ‘NCR explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought.’ Rose (1998) also says that ‘the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its position in the international system and specifically by its relative material power

capabilities, making them realist. However, that the impact of such power capabilities on the foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level, making them neoclassical.

The aspect that makes neoclassical realism new is its attempt to systematize the wide and varied insights of classical realists within parsimonious theory and to identify the appropriate intervening variables that can offer greater explanatory richness to realism’s structural variant (Kitchen 2010). NCR rejects neo-realism’s ultra-parsimonious privileging of systemic-structural variables over unit-level ideational factors (Roth 2006). Rathbun (2008) proposes to call NCR as ‘post-structural realism,’ because it values theory while seeking predictive capacity, while recognizing the fact that world is complex and international politics is impacted by the interaction of various factors. NCR lays emphasis on structural factors whilst allowing for their mediation through domestic political processes by incorporating unit-level factors as well (Walt 1996). Thus NCR engages with the issues of *innenpolitik*, state power and processes, leaders’ perceptions and the impact of ideas, identity and norms while attempting to explain the state behavior in international environment (Schweller 1997). At the individual level the neoclassical realism understands that the ideas held by powerful actors within the state matter (Kitchen 2010). The individuals (here leaders) construct systems, institutions and bureaucracies. Individuals tend to hold on to ideas based on the quality of idea itself, i.e. its internal coherence and congruence (Yee 1996). Luthi (2008) notes, ‘What if, for example, Stalin had not died but continued to live into old age, been intellectually alert, and remained politically active?.......What if Khrushchev
had not come to power but the Soviet Union had been run by another leader closer to Stalin’s outlook? The Soviet and world history might have taken a different turn.

Kitchen (2010) argues that impact at the unit-level occurs when individuals sharing common ideas collectively form groups, organizations and institutions that effect policymaking process. These institutions later encase these ideas and continue to influence policy even after the interests and ideas of their creators may have changed. Keohane (1993) argues that when institutions intervene, the impact of ideas can last for decades or even generations. Thus the ideas that get embedded in the social norms, patterns of discourse and collective identities become accepted and instinctual part of the social world. It can be argued that ideational variables and ideas embedded in national culture have the potential to explain why some states act contrary to the structural imperatives of the international system (Desch 1998).

According to Kitchen (2010), NCR scholars believe that the identities and choices of decision making actors are shaped by the specific characteristics of the state’s political system. However, these choices retain a top-down conception of the state in which systemic forces are mediated by a national security of foreign policy executive. Thus the elites, based on their assessment of relative power and intentions of other states, determine the national interests and conduct foreign policy. However, this is always subject to domestic constraints. The definition of state in NCR is pluralist. This definition recognizes that apart from the external factors and considerations of power and security, domestic political considerations and prevailing ideas based on cultural aspects and ideologies influence the processes with the state. The neoclassical realist position argues that variables at the unit-level play a crucial role in the state’s foreign
policy. The introduction of intervening ideational variables allows neoclassical realism to explain the changes in state’s policy, in an environment where the external systemic factors remain unchanged, by analyzing the unit level shifts. NCR remains a structural realist theory of IR. Kitchen (2010) stresses that NCR prioritizes and stresses power, interests and coalition making as the central elements in a theory of politics. However, it also lays emphasis on the need to look within and between societies in order to negate the idea that power and interests of states are the only factors that influence state behavior.

Legro (2005) argues that great power ideas matter because they guide foreign policy and are a building block of international life and when they change they do so with earthquake like effects. According to Buzan (1993), unlike neorealism, where the system comprises of the structure and interacting units, NCR recognizes international system to be composed of units, their interactions and structure. Even though the system has structure, the extent it can define it is limited to the information it receives regarding the interactions of states. Thus, the concept of ‘interaction’ is very crucial in NCR (cf. Kitchen 2010). Thus by borrowing classical realism’s understanding of the state, NCR is better able to explain the changes in state’s foreign policy, which is not wholly derived from a shift in international structure.

2.2 Nationalism and Foreign Policy in IR

The revival of nationalism as a product of structural changes in both domestic and international fronts has become a powerful force reassessing India’s national interests and external orientations, which also have an impact on its relationship with
other states. Structural transformations brought about by the Cold War and the changing domestic political environment have been responsible for the current noticeable strategic shifts in foreign policy of India. Nationalism has become influential in shaping the public mood and the domestic political debate. This research will systematically study the significance of external/structural-material factors that are impacted by domestic-ideational determinants, namely ‘nationalism’ in influencing state behavior and preferences in bilateral ties. The study will analyze the revival of nationalism in post-Cold War India, its causality in redefining India’s external policy orientations and its impact on the atmosphere of the bilateral relationship.

Although nationalism is a very important factor in defining state’s foreign policy, the IR-oriented studies paying attention to it are extremely scarce. This is inherently due to mainstream IR theories’ preoccupation with structural-material variables and system level analysis, which causes them to ignore ideational and domestic-level theorization (Tooze 1996). The subject of nationalism and identity politics receives most attention amongst constructivists as they emphasize on domestic-level analysis and cultural and ideational factors. However, the existing works also encounter analytical limitations that include the lack of visible theoretical frameworks to engage with nationalism, and over-dependence on domestic/cultural-ideational factors to explain foreign policy and international outcomes, at the expense of external/structural-material imperatives.

NCR effectively overcomes these limitations as it emphasizes on the interaction of external and domestic factors, and bridges mainstream IR-constructivist reasoning to engage with nationalism’s role in India’s foreign policy towards Japan. NCR practitioners believe that the effects of systemic imperatives are indirect, complex and
subjective, and there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking them to foreign policy behavior (Rose 1998). Scholars of NCR argue that instead such systemic factors must be filtered through or mediated by unique domestic political process/actors, or ‘intervening’ variables of the unit-level, i.e. perceptions of the state-elites or decision makers, political competition within the state, nationalism, national institutions, all of which under specific settings and time contexts can impact the state’s behavior and preferences (Sterling-Folker 2002, Schweller 2004, Taliaferro 2006, Lobell et al. 2009).

Thus, it can be argued that external constraints do not automatically induce states towards specific policy choices. Schweller (2004) observes that a state’s response is determined by both external and internal considerations of policy elites, who must reach consensus within an often decentralized and competitive political process. The framework of NCR allows nationalism to be operationalized as a domestic, ideational and material (power) variable within its realist-oriented framework (Lai, 2013). By problematizing nationalism, the NCR model can systematically determine how nationalism interacts with domestic political process and influences state policy matters, and assess its impact on policy-making in bilateral affairs.

Once we have established a relationship between the intervening role of domestic variables in foreign policy, let us now delve further into the debate of what influence does nationalism, a unit level/domestic factor, have on foreign policy. Despite nationalism’s increasing significance as a global issue after the end of Cold War, studies analyzing the role of nationalism in foreign policy have been limited. One reason might be that the interest of realist scholars is only limited to studying the role of nationalism as a source of conflict or its impact on the capacity of states to wage war (Kratchowil &
Lipid, 1996). Smith (2010) argues that nationalism has played an important role in the genesis of both the world wars, and Evera Van (1994) explores the nexus between nationalism and war, but leaves his hypothesis untested, as he calls for further inquiry on the subject.

Recent years have seen the development of empirical studies that explore the relation between foreign policy and nationalism, for example Japan (Lai 2008, Kuroki 2013), China (Hughes 2006, Zhao 2004, Lai 2008), USA (Hass et al. 1994, McCartney 2004), Turkey (Helpin et al. 2018, Saracoglu & Demirkol 2015), and Russia (Kozhemiakin & Kanet 1998). However, despite India being a major player in Asia, and located at a strategically important point, there has been no research that engages with NCR framework to understand the role of nationalism in India’s foreign policy.

As it has been discussed above, that NCR scholars call for the incorporation of socio-cultural-ideational variables to demonstrate how they affect the perception of state elites (Rose 1998). This study engages with nationalism as one such variable, which derives its political character, meanings and power from these abovementioned elements. To understand how nationalism and national identity affect perception, we need to first define perception. Jervis (1976) argues that perception is the intersubjective understanding of an object or situation that a person derives through his/her cognitive lenses. Berger (2003) sees cognitive lenses as the social, psychological and cultural process that a person is subjected to in life, which defines one’s identity. Nationalism is one such cognitive lens, which has socio-psychological-cultural underpinnings and has the power to inspire individuals or groups with collective national identity, shape their perceptions and influence their interests (Guibernau 1996). Furthermore, these
perceptions shaped by ideational processes like shared history, culture, beliefs, education etc. give meaning to the forces of nationalism.

In the case of NCR framework, nationalism works on state perceptions through the cognitive filters of the state elites and decision-makers. It can define the perceptions of state’s policy-makers by invoking friendly or adversarial images of other states by highlighting or reducing their mutual differences (Druckman 1994). To understand how identity or perception influences a state’s foreign policy, first it is necessary to understand how it is created. Neumann (2016) states that Shapiro (1988) argues that foreign policy is all about making the ‘other’. Drawing inspiration from Shapiro’s work, Messari (1998) proposes that foreign policy is a tool that creates identities, and erects distinct boundaries between the self and the other. In this process, it also demarcates the national interests. However, it is important to note that national identity is not natural and is socially constructed, and is inextricably linked to the notion of the ‘other’ (Kuroki 2013).

From the above argument, it can be drawn that the identity of a state is never static, and is always in the process of reconstruction and reformation. Messari (1998) argues that national identity cannot be formed only though the internal commonalities, but is defined as ‘a process of differentiation from and in contrast to others’. The national boundary has a clear distinction between the inside and outside. While the inside is considered to be secure, the outside is regarded as ‘insecure’. However, Hopf (2002) notices an interesting relationship between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and argues that both are co-constitutive, i.e. without interaction with the ‘other’ or the ‘foreign’, the identity of ‘self’ or the ‘domestic’ cannot be established.
In this approach, establishing a relationship between national identity and foreign policy is important. During the transformation of the ‘difference’ into the ‘otherness’, foreign policy plays an important role by creating boundaries between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ (Messari 1998). These boundaries created by the foreign policy decide who is a part of the nation, and who is not. Thus, by drawing borders, foreign policy creates lines of differences and helps in creation of national identity.

In this process, the entity on the other side of the border is perceived to be a threat. Inside is considered to be peaceful and secure, while outside is anarchic and dangerous (Messari 1998). Torfing (1999) argues that the ‘self’ believes that the ‘other’ and ‘outside’ constantly conspire to negate the identity of inside. Laclau & Mouffe (2001) suggest that inside and outside cannot coexist, as both continue to negate each other’s identities. This lead to the friend-foe division between the self and the other, resulting in social antagonism and the construction of an ‘enemy’, which is considered to be the cause of the failure of self.

Thus, it can be argued that the national identity is not fixed, and the perception of state elites is the main reason behind the way a state responds in the external arena. Hansen (2006) argues that foreign policy relies on the representation of identity, however, through the practice of foreign policy, national identity is also forms and reformed. Therefore, it becomes a two way co-constitutive process. Upon establishing the relationship between foreign policy and national identity, and problematizing the existence of the ‘other’ with regard to ‘self’, it can now be argued that nationalism, which is the core of national identity, has direct influence on foreign policy (Hall 2017).
In order to further explore the nature of nationalism, which Hall as the core of national identity, the next chapter delves into the theories of nationalism, and will form an important basis of understanding the nationalism in India and Japan.
CHAPTER 3

NATIONALISM AND ITS APPROACHES

3.1 Introduction

Cambridge Dictionary of American English defines Nationalism as ‘the feeling of affection, loyalty and pride that people have for their country.’ Nationalism can also be seen the desire for political independence among the people of a country that is ruled by another country. Websters New International Dictionary defines nationalism as ‘an exaltation of one nation above all others, and primary emphasis on loyalty to and the promotion of the culture and interests of one nation as opposed to subordinate areas or other nations and supranational groups. The American Political Dictionary states that ‘the social and psychological forces that spring from unique culture and historical factors to provide unity and inspiration to a given people through a sense of belonging together and of shared values. Nationalism binds together people who possess common culture, linguistic, racial, historical or geographical characteristics or experiences and who give their loyalty to the same political group.’

Western colonization created artificial multi-ethnic states without ascertaining the political aspirations of constituent ethnic groups, leading to the difficult task of building political nation superseding various ethnic nations. Most scholars agree that nationalism incorporates two important characteristics: emotional and political (Ganguly & Phadnis 2001). A breakthrough in nationalism theory occurred in 1926 with
Carlton Hayes influential essay, “What is Nationalism?” He defined the meaning of nationalism in four ways: (1) an actual historical process, (2) a theory, principle or ideal, (3) a particular political party and (4) a sentiment or condition of mind (Sullivan 1995, Ganguly & Phadnis 2001). First, nationalism is seen as an actual historical process of establishing nationalities as political units and creating the modern institution of the nation state out of tribes and empires. Second, nationalism may be described as a theory, principle or ideal that intensifies the consciousness of nationality and the nation-state during the actual historical process. Third, when historical process and political theory gets combined, nationalism may denote the political activities of certain political parties like Kuomintang or Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Finally, nationalism may be described as a sentiment or condition of mind among a certain group, in which loyalty to one’s national state surpasses all loyalties, and the pride and belief of intrinsic excellence in nationality are integral parts (Snyder 1990, Ganguly & Phadnis 2010).

Modern nationalism is basically considered as the revival and fusion of old trends, rather than being a completely new phenomenon. The English were the first to come together as a nation. Although nationalism was born in England, it was the French Revolution that gave nationalism its true meaning and identity, and created a true nation-state. Various factors like culture, territories, politics and religion can be attributed to nationalism. The following section discusses in detail the origin, meaning and definitions attributed to nationalism.

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3.1.1 Meaning and Definition of Nationalism

A review of literature available on nationalism suggests that there are two sets of approaches to definition of nationalism. One set considers nationalism to be an idea, belief or principle; while the second set considers nationalism to be a process, which develops gradually over time. Ignatieff (1995) sees nationalism as a concept that includes the political idea of territorial self-determination, the moral idea of justified action to protect the rights of one nation against the other and the cultural idea of the nation as one’s primary identity. Haas (1986) on the other hand gives a very basic definition to nationalism, calling it a belief held by group of people that they ought to constitute a nation or that they already are one. Gellner (1983) in his definition of nationalism sees it as a principle which holds that units of polity and nation should be congruent. Motyl (2001) strongly defends nationalism as an idea, and calls it “ideal.” He argues that although nationalism can be seen as an idea – based on nation-state, national identity, self-determination and national superiority – but actions, which are a result of this idea, cannot form the basis for definition of nationalism. Like the idea of class is central to Socialism, yet the idea itself does not make the whole economic system socialist, while the principles that govern it do.

The second approach takes “nationalism” to be a process that is seen as a result of the unifying features of the nation, or the actions that result from the collective beliefs of the group (Barrington 1997). Nationalism literature defines nationalism as an organized struggle to control the national homeland and turn it into an independent state. Not all agree with this, and Gellner proposes the ‘Potato Principle’ and says that
territory itself is imagined (Gellner 1983). Just as there are not predetermined nations, there are no predetermined homelands. However, there is consensus over the fact that all nationalists want control over their state. Mellor (2015) drawing from the idea above defines nationalism as ‘the political expression of nation’s aspirations.’

Treitschke (1916) defines the state as ‘the people legally united as an independent power.’ He views state as an omnipotent unit that is always above the individual/individuals, and is not bound by any moral laws and exerts power by itself establishing laws depending on the particular needs of the state. Since every state has different needs, codes of morality for every nation are different. The state also exerts power through war, which Treitschke describes as political science par excellence, and views war as a medicine for national disunion and waning patriotism (Treitschke 1916). Durkheim defines state as a group of officials sui generis, within which representations and acts of violation involving the collectivity are worked out, even though they are not the product of the collectivity (Guibernau 1996). He criticizes the individualistic theory defended by Spencer & Wollman (2002), Kant (2003) and Rousseau (2006) that defines the state as an agent whose task is to watch over the maintenance of individual rights. Durkheim argues that this theory does not agree with the facts, since the functions of the state tend to multiply and gain relevance and the state has an inclination to expand its own scope. Durkheim was also critical of Hegel’s ‘Spiritualistic school’ that argued that every society has an aim that is superior to individual ones and is unrelated to them. It is the state’s task to pursue this social aim, while individuals should be an instrument for putting into effect plans they have neither arranged nor are concerned about (Guibernau 1996). In Durkheim’s view, initially the aim of the state was to become increasingly
powerful, while ignoring the needs and interests of the individual, and only taking along ‘collective beliefs’, collective aspirations’ and the traditions and symbols which expressed them.

Durkheim does not use the term nationalism in any of his works, but refers to patriotism, which he defines as ‘a sentiment that joins the individual to the political society in s far as those who get to make it up feel themselves attached to it by a bond of sentiment’ (Giddens 1972). He describes ‘patrice’ (father-land) as an indispensable milieu to human life. Treitschke (1916) argues that genuine patriotism is the consciousness of cooperating with the body-politic, and believing in ancestral achievements and transmitting them to descendants. Patriotism requires sense of belonging to a particular group and conscience of cooperating. This implies that an individual does not only belong to a particular group, but is also involved in a process. He further argues that the unity of a state is based on nationality, which is a natural bond of either real or imaginary blood-relationship. He argues that patriotism is the consciousness of being rooted in ancestral achievements and attributes ‘moral grandeur’ and ‘cultural supremacy’ to ‘large states,’ where a ‘large state’ refers to a more powerful state. The large state in Treitschke’s definition has the power to impose its own way of thinking, present itself as a ‘superior state’ and promote its art and culture. The theme of power is recurrent in Treitschke’s works.12

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12 Davis, H.W.C quotes Treitschke in The Political Thought of H. von Treitschke (Constable & Company, 1914) that “if a nation has power to preserve itself and its nationality through the merciless race-struggle oh history, then every progress in civilization will only develop more strikingly its deeper national peculiarities.”
Weber, in his works, has also mentioned about the intrinsic relation between power and the state (Guibernau, 1996). He says that only a state can ensure the survival of the many cultural values unique to nations. According to Weber (1976) the nation corresponds to the concept of ‘ethnic group.’ He describes ethnic group as those human groups that hold a subjective belief in their common descent because of physical similarities or similar customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration. In Weber’s view, ethnicity does not lead to the constitution of group, but only facilitates group formation (Weber 1976).

Kohn (1955) stresses on the emotional and sentimental nature of nationalism and defines it as a psychological and sociological group consciousness, which in the case of conflict of group loyalties owes the supreme loyalty. This supreme group is the nation-state and the loyalty towards this group is nationalism. Shafer (1955) also viewed nationalism as a sentiment or emotion that is not a fixed concept, and is a combination of beliefs and conditions. It binds a group of people with real or imagined historical experience and common aspirations to live as a separate and distinct group. This sentiment could be (1) unit of territory, (2) social and economic institutions, (3) cultural characteristics and (4) group security. Snyder (1990) also sees nationalism as a sentiment of a group of people living in a defined territory, speaking common language, possessing common religion, traditions and customs, and a literature in which common aspirations of the nation have been expressed. He argues that nationalism is a product of political, economic, social and intellectual factors at a certain stage in history. Kedourie (1993) claims that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and nationalism is a doctrine that was developed in Europe that supplies a criterion for
the determination of the group to enjoy exclusive governing and legitimate exercise of power in the state. Toynbee (1963) describes nationalism as “a state of mind in which we give our paramount political loyalty to one fraction of the human race to the particular tribe of which we happen to be tribesmen. In so far as we are captured by this ideology, we hold that the highest political good for us is our own nation's sovereign independence; that our nation has a moral right to exercise its sovereignty according to what it believes to be its own national interests, whatever consequences this may entail for the foreign majority of the human race; and that our duty, as citizens of our country, is to support our country, right or wrong” (Berkeley 1995).

Gellner and Smith have also added important definitions to existing data on nationalism. Gellner (1983) sees nationalism as a political principle, where political and national unit are congruent. He developed the theory of modernization to explain the emergence of nationalism. He argues that during transition from agrarian to industrial society standard vernacular language, high culture, mass education and strong state were necessary the ingredients required to transmit national identity to the broad mass of population. Thus, nationalism can be seen as a modern phenomenon, since it is linked to rise of industrial society and modern nation-state. Smith, like Gellner, approaches nationalism from a sociological perspective. He agrees with Gellner regarding the changes in society that gave rise to nationalism; however, he adds that the roots of nationalism lie in modern ethnicism. He sees the relation between early ethnicism and nationalism as being one of ‘continuity’, and not identity (Smith 1971). Smith defines nationalism as an ideological movement by a nation to attain and maintain self-
government, with the ultimate functionality of dispute settlement through institutionalized mechanism of state power (Smith 1971).

The Royal Institute of International Affairs, under the chairmanship of E.H. Carr, published a report on nationalism in 1939 that defined nationalism as a distinct consciousness and desire of the member of a nation to increase the strength, liberty and prosperity of his nation (Carr 1945). For a nationalist the interest of his own nation is supremely important. Thus, nationalism instills pride in the people of the group, demands loyalty and sometimes the ultimate sacrifice from the members of the nation. Nationalism calls for attainment and maintenance of self-government; and the desire to increase strength, liberty and prosperity of the nation.

The second approach views nationalism as a movement. Marx views nationalism as an expression of bourgeois interests. He argued that for the bourgeoisie the nation consisted only of capitalists. Smith referred to ‘nationalism’ and ‘Marxism’ as ‘salvation movements,’ which describe the present situation as an oppressive one, in which individuals live alienated lives (Marxism) or have lost their identity (nationalism) (Guibernau 1996). Nationalism treats the ‘invading enemy’ as the tyrant, while Marxism treats the ‘bourgeois capitalist’ as the tyrant. Both nationalism and Marxism share the myth of final era of justice and freedom, although they view the past in different ways. Nationalism seeks inspiration from the past to restore national identity and free the nation from its oppressors, whilst Marxism believes in the dialectical conception of historical development in which the past is accepted in order to transcend it and advance through the stages of history. Guibernau (1996) argues that both are mass movements and rely on the intellectuals to lead the movement. In Marxism the
intelligentsia promotes the ideology, while in nationalism the elites knowing the authentic origins of the community are charged with the defense of national identity and fight against invading enemy.

3.1.2 Nation and Nation-state

The word “nation” forms the root of nationalism. “Nation” originally stems from the Latin verb *nasci*, which means “to be born”, and was used for a group of people who were born in the same place, irrespective of the fact that the place was a few hundred or many thousand square miles. The European universities during the late Middle Ages referred to the group of students who came from same region as “nations”. During the 18th century, the radical writers of France referred to the people of a given country, without distinction of rank and in contrast to the ruling monarch as a “nation” (Sills 1968).

Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1992) and Greenfeld (1993) and Smith (1991, 1996, 2013, 2016) argue that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, however, Hastings (1997) argue that nationalism is basically the revival and fusion of older trends, which is sometimes mistaken to be a modern phenomenon. Nationalism even existed thousands of years ago as tribalism among primitive people (Snyder 1990). The anthropological studies suggest that tribalism which existed before the dawn of recorded history that existed among primitive people was a kind of nationalism. Kamenka (1973) suggests that throughout the period of the recorded history (say from 5000 BC to 1700 AD) this primitive tribal nationalism was submerged or subdued due to advancement of civilization. The tribal nationalism that had kept groups or tribes together had ceased to
command supreme loyalty and patriotism of civilized men. This was a result of new historical developments that created new human groupings and new symbols of human patriotism. These factors were

1. The increased interdependence among tribes due to advancement and diffusion of agricultural and industrial arts, spread of metals like iron, copper and bronze, development of boats and domestication of animals like horses.
2. The conquest and consolidation of great empires like the Egyptian, the Assyrian, the Chinese, the Persian, the Roman and the Arab.
3. The spread of intertribal religions like Buddhism, Christianity and Islam.
4. The employment of literary languages like Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Chinese by the intellectuals

However, the concept of nationality had still no relevance to the minds of civilized people in ancient or medieval times. The fusion of several tribes in one empire led to creation of a large community (can also be called a nationality), with similar language, customs and traditions; and whose members, even though not supremely loyal or patriotic, were aware that they were one people from within, and could demonstrate real nationalism on certain occasions. The history of Egyptians, Jews, Greeks and Persians mention of such occasions. Later during the Middle Ages, the consciousness of nationality was shown by Europeans (during the Crusades and Hundred Years War); however, it was occasional and less commanding (Seligman 1954).

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Before there were the states, the various political entities, which were constantly engaged in security competition, due to the danger of being erased from the map was always present. Machiavelli was still writing when dynastic state was emerging in Europe. Italy was often subjected to Austrian and French brutality and was in a state of ‘slavery and disgrace.’ Machiavelli identified the taproot of problem as the city-state system being used to govern Italy, and proposed to create a single state that could stand up to the surrounding states (Machiavelli 1998). In the early version of the state, people had little loyalty towards the state, as the state was the means to extract resources from the people (Mearsheimer 2011). The fact that sovereignty rested with the crown is evident from Louis XIV’s famous remark “L’état c’est moi” (I am the state). The concept of modern nationalism first manifested in England during the 17th century, making England the leading nation of European community. The modern age scientific spirit in political thought and activity and industry created immense opportunities for English people instilled immense confidence in the community. This led them to believe that the English people were the chosen ones to start a new true reformation of the world, and the old values of the Church and State were challenged in the name of liberty of man (Hans 1955). Due to various historical reasons like early growth of trade and manufacture, democratic and nationalist ideas and geographical situation, England emerged as the first European state to be welded together as a nation (Seligman 1954). The emergence of nationalism in Europe was the ideological expression of complex, political, economic and social developments.

However, the true nation-state came into existence not until the French revolution (1789). The emergence of nationalism in France created a mass of people who were
loyal to the state and were willing to fight and die for it. The political and social institutions were secularized and transformed to serve the purpose of a national state. The sovereignty no longer resided in the crown. Nationalism was a huge force multiplier and helped Napoleon overrun the most of Europe. Other European states soon realized that to survive they also need to turn themselves into nation-states, and thus the Italians, Pales, Prussians and Slavs strode towards creating a strong national state (Mearsheimer 2011). Soon nationalism spread to America and then to all other parts of world, and since the middle of twentieth century became a universal idea at the force of contemporary history (Sills 1968).

3.2 Theories of Nationalism

There have been various attempts by scholars to capture nationalism in a theory. Analytical writings based on the subject raise a number of problems which, once understood cause much of the literature based on the concept to lose its persuasiveness (Waldron 1985). Despite the availability of wide and rich intellectual currency, nationalism as a concept or theory has been difficult to theorize. Woodrow Wilson admitted this fact in his classical work Constitutional Government in the United States, that it is difficult to define the term ‘nation’, and finally noted that nation could be defined as a group animated by ‘common political consciousness’. A number of theorists like Shills, Geertz, Gellner, Kohn, Armstrong, Smith, Anderson, etc. have tried to provide a general explanatory mechanism of nationalism. Past few decades have seen many theories of nationalism; however, the focus of the debate has been around three
opposing approaches. Based on Ozkirimli’s (2000) classification, Indian nationalism can also be analyzed with the help of these approaches.

1) Primordialist Approaches

2) Modernist Approaches

3) Ethno-symbolist Approaches

The first approach considers the rise of Hindu nationalism a result of the unity and continuity of culture and national identities based on race, blood, religion, language, etc. Savarkar (1949) claimed, “the Hindus were bound and marked out as a nation by themselves.” Savarkar conceived Hindus as an ethnic community inhabiting the land of Bharat (India) and sharing the same racial and cultural characteristics originating from the Vedic Golden Age (Jaffrelot 1993). The second approach attributes the roots of Hindu nationalism to the advent of modernity. Like elsewhere, the invention of printing press, and evolution of capitalism during the colonial era along with social reforms, led to the crystallization of Hindu identity. Anil Seal sees Western education as a major factor that led to the rise of nationalism in India (Seal 1968). The third approach propounded by A. D. Smith states that Hindu identity is based on myths of shared ancestry, homeland, values, traditions, symbols and memories of past, at least amongst the elites.

3.2.1 Primordialist Approaches

Primordialism (also known as Perinnialism) treats group identity as a given factor. For primordialists “naturalness” of the nation forms the basis of the identity of
the group. The primordialists treat ethnic identity as a given factor and believe that it is deeply rooted in the historical experience of human beings (Llobera 1999). The ethnic bonds are ‘natural’ or ‘primordial’ and are fixed by basic experiences with families and other primary groups. Berghe (1995) argue that these bonds are genetic but Shils (1957) and Geertz (1973) view them as cultural. Primordialists approach problematizes the fact that why people are always ready to defend “kith and kin” and die for the nation.

In context of India, repeated claims have been made by organizations such as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) about the traceable Hindu history and the glory and advancement of the ancient Hindu society. According to this approach the glory of Hindu society was destroyed first by foreigners (Muslims and British), and later by Indian National Congress, which was a according to Hansen (1999) was a pseudo-secular political party setup by the bourgeoisie to meet their economic aspirations (Mistry 2017). This bourgeoisie class was created to rule over Indians in place of British. Lord Macaulay\(^\text{14}\) in his famous “Minute on Education” in 1835 said “We must do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indians in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals, and in intellect” (Tharoor 2018). The primordialist Hindu discourse argues that the nationalist pride and dignity lost with time needs to be revived and restored to its former heights.

For primordialists like Annie Besant, a supporter of Indian self-rule, the real idea of India is embedded in its ancient Vedic past and is like a giant forest with millennia

\(^{14}\) Thomas Babington Macaulay was a British historian and Whig politician. He played a major role in the introduction of English and western concepts to education in India, and published his argument on the subject in the "Macaulay Minute" in 1835. This led to the systematic wiping out of traditional and ancient Indian education and vocational systems and sciences.
behind it (Besant 1915). Savarkar\textsuperscript{15} and Golwalkar\textsuperscript{16} also believe that it is this ancient past that showcases India as a land of political justice, social harmony, scientific advancement and material plenty. Savarkar (1937) said that:

\begin{quote}
Hindudom is bound and marked out as a people and a nation by
themselves not by the only tie of a common Holyland in which their religion took
birth but by the ties of a common ancestry, a common culture, a common
language, a common history and essentially of a common fatherland as well.
\end{quote}

The essentiality of a common language, ancestry and fatherland is a reason why Chinese and Japanese, although Buddhists, cannot be termed as Hindus. They both believed that the decay of Hindu society is a result of foreign invasions and lack of Hindu will and unity. Golwalkar believed that the foreign invaders who came to India could not be absorbed by the land and remained a separate entity (Golwalkar 1966). Savarkar too argued that Muslims and British are alien to India alike and the common belief that Muslims if left to themselves would never have indulged in any anti-national, ulterior, anti-Hindu designs is a myth.

\begin{quote}
Thousands of Congressite Hindus are observed to have been duped in to
this silliest of political superstitions. As if Muhammad Kasim, Gazanis, Ghoris,
Allauddins, Aurangzebs were all instigated by the British, by this third party, to
invade and lay waste Hindu India with a mad fanatical fury. As if the history of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} Vinayak Damodar Savarkar was an Indian politician, lawyer and writer known for his activism for Indian independence. Savarkar coined the term Hindutva to create a collective “Hindu” identity. Savarkar wrote the work describing Hindutva, espousing what it means to be a Hindu, and Hindu pride, in which he defined as all the people descended of Hindu culture as being part of Hindutva, including Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs.

\textsuperscript{16} Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar was the second head of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. He remained at this position for 30 years. One of Golwalkar’s major innovations was an anti-communist, anti-socialist ideology, with the slogan “Not socialism but Hinduism.”
the last ten centuries of perpetual war between the Hindus and Moslems was an interpolation and a myth. As if the Alis or Mr. Jinnah or Sir Shikandar were mere school children to be spoiled with the offer of sugar pills by the British vagabonds in the class and persuaded to throw stones at the house of their neighbours. They say, 'before the British came, Hindu-Moslem riots were a thing unheard of.' Yes, but because instead of riots Hindu-Moslems wars was the order of the day. (Savarkar 1937)

However, it is argued that identities are not ascribed at birth but are adopted, rejected, negotiated, imagined and in certain circumstances imagined (Shani 2008). Shani (2008) argues that the identity cannot be fixed by a primordial attachment such as language religion or ethnicity, but is too a process of becoming. Moreover, in present time nations are mass legal-political communities with concept of citizenship and form a part of international system of states. Smith (2010) argues against this approach by calling it flawed and limited only to pre-modern nations. The pre-modern India too, was a land mass inhabited by various nations and tribes that did not see each other as “kith and kin”. Malik & Singh (1994), Seal (1968) and Mccully (1940) argue that Indian nationalism is product of modernity, while Desai (2005) and Karner (2011) interpret Indian nationalism from the ethno-symbolic approach.

3.2.2 Ethno-symbolist Approaches

Ethno-symbolism underlines that the persisting features in the formation and continuity of national identities are myths, memories, values, traditions and symbols. This is a complex set of elements that Smith tends to use interchangeably, often without
sufficient specification to allow critical analysis or easy application. Myths of ethnic
descent, particularly myths of ‘ethnic chosenness’, lie at its core. Of all these myths, the
myth of a ‘golden age’ of past splendor is perhaps the most important. Although Smith
does not systematically focus on the intellectuals, he acknowledges their pivotal role as
the creators, inventors, producers and analysts of ideas (Smith 1971).

Smith argues that intellectuals are central to ethno-symbolism because they act
as ‘chroniclers’ of the ethnic past, elaborating those memories which can link the
modern nation back to its ‘golden age’. Philologists, archeologists, poets, literati and,
most of all, historians are the key players in the ethno-national game (Conversi 1995;
Hutchinson 1987). Leoussi (2004) adds visual artists, inspired by demotic, historical and
ethno-cultural themes. If one extends the category of intellectuals to include ‘conveyors
of ideas’, rather than mere producers of ideas, one can see the key role of painters,
musicians, sculptors, photographers, novelists, play-writers, actors, film directors and
television producers in establishing a connection between the present times and a
national ‘golden age’.

It is necessary to understand how do the intellectuals influence, mobilize and
‘instrumentalize’ public opinion. Smith (1991; 1996) sees the intelligentsia as a group
of individuals exposed to some form of superior education. It is not strictly a class but
rather a social category, since in theory individuals from all classes can belong to it.
They have not merely the will and inclination, but also the power and capacity to apply
and disseminate the ideas produced by the intellectuals. Therefore this stratum plays a
very important role in the success of nationalist movements. Once the intelligentsia
begins to challenge officialdom by exploiting its strategic position, it becomes a key
protagonist of expanding mass movements. In general, the intellectuals’ role is seen by ethno-symbolists as providing a skeleton upon which to build a larger movement.

Ethno-symbolism focuses on the mobilizing power of selected symbols and myths, which focus on the pre-modern ethnies (Karner 2011). Smith (2000) argues that the ethnie and the symbols, values and myths provide a basis for the emergence and persistence of nations. He defines ethnie as ‘a named human population with a common myth of descent, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture link with historic territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites (Smith 2010).

The ethno-symbolist argument cannot be applied to India, as it has never been a nation-state. India is inhabited by different ethnies, who are very diverse. The ethnies of India speak different languages; believe in different religions, symbols and myths; do not share historical memories and have no measure of solidarity with each other. The only aspect the ethnie shares is the historic territory with few similar cultural traits. If the ethnie had been real, India would not have been a landmass of 584 princely states at the time of independence in 1947. A look at the recent thousand years of history of India clearly tells that despite the realization of a common land mass, the dwellers of this land have never lived as one nation. The people of India have always been divided over culture, myths, food, language, symbols etc, and have also sided with foreign invaders against a local ruler. Thus, we can argue that Smith’s argument that memories of ethnic descent and golden age, language, symbols, habits, food etc. gives birth to an ethnie cannot be applied to India. This theoretical impasse can be resolved by Modernist approaches.
To understand the emergence of nationalism in India, it is important to analyze the impact of modernity on Indian society. With the discovery of the printing press, the speed of spread of ideas became faster, and this helped in creating a sense of nationhood among Indians. The ideas and beliefs helped in creating a socially constructed community that was bound by common myths, ideas and beliefs. The next section furthers the argument that nations are a product of modernity, and how it is imagined.

3.2.3 Modernist Approaches

Modernist approach argues that nationalism is a product of modernity and contends that nationalism emerged as a result of the process of transition from traditional to a modern state. Modernist approach attributes the rise of nationalism to various paradigms like socio-cultural, economic, political, ideological and constructionist (Smith 2010). However, all approaches hold that the nation, nation-state and nationalism are a recent phenomenon and are a product of modern conditions namely industrialization, capitalism and globalization. McCully (1940), Seal (1968), Malik & Singh (1994), Veer (1994) and Bhatt & Mukta (2000) see Indian nationalism as a modern phenomenon. The idea of nationhood came to India after the establishment of British colonialism in the 18th century. Britain physically unified India and gave Indians common aspirations and a sense of common destiny (Rotberg 1966). Under the British rule, India got its first national government, common laws and a common language.

M.N. Roy, the founder of Indian Communist Movement denies the claims of origin of Indian nationalism in Vedic times. He argues that Indian nationalism is a
recent phenomenon and came into existence due to “Historical Materialism” (Roy 1971). According to him nationalism was born due to changes in economic and education system that created a middle class in Indian society. He further states that the development in mode of production created a bourgeoisie class that was welded into a national entity, and INC, that became the face of Indian Nationalist Movement, was a result of aspirations of the rich intellectual bourgeoisie who was facing difficulties due to social discrimination and falling income. McCully (1940) and Seal (1968) consider English education as the agency through which nationalism permeated in the minds of Indians. Western education created a class of religious thinkers like Vivekananda, Dayanand Saraswati, Aurobindo Ghosh and Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who became a source of inspiration for later nationalists (Veer 1994, Bhatt & Mukta 2000). The new education system led to the creation of class of Orientalists who constructed the idea of Indian nationalism, which was spread further due to the invention of the printing press. Thus, it was this nationalism that invented the nation, where it did not exist (Gellner 1983). Thus, it can be argued that modernity indeed did create a sense of nationhood among Indians and was largely responsible for bringing together the Indians masses during their struggle for freedom.

Chandra (1986) and Bhabha (1990) view the idea of Indian nation as “imagined”. Hastings (1997) contests Anderson’s idea of nations being imagined communities (Anderson, 1991). He argues that even if we accept the idea of (1991), that Indian people were made to imagine themselves as members of a nation, yet it could never be ‘a matter of groundless imagining, rather a growth in realization of, and preoccupation with certain important shared characteristics.’ However, Shani (2005) quotes Chandra,
'the national movement was the process through which the Indian people were formed into a nation and a people...it was the existence of a common oppression by a common enemy and the struggle against it which provided important bonds uniting the Indian people.' Partha Chatterjee argues that it is wrong to see third world nationalisms as mere copies of European ones (Chatterjee 1986). His basic argument is that the concept of nation-state is one formed in Western social scientific thought, and thus it may not even work for all states as the given it is often taken to be. He argues, that the practical problem is that post-colonial administrators adopted the paradigm of nation-state and thus blinded themselves to new possibilities of thinking outside Western categories (Chatterjee, 1998).

In case of British India, the rise of nationalism can be seen as a feature of anti-colonial struggle (Chatterjee, 1991). Due to the print-capitalism, the imagined Indian nation came to acquire a concrete shape. However, the idea of India was shattered in the partition of 1947, and by the 1980s, there was great dissatisfaction among the Indian masses due to the structural problems in the system and certain decisions by the political class that undermined ‘national interest.’ As a result, the Indian elites started a movement to reinvent the Hindu rashtra (nation) on the lines of Hindutva (essence of Hinduism). Thus, using the ideas of Vivekananda, Savarkar, Golwalkar, etc. the idea of India was reimagined by the state elites using religious symbols, language and myths of origin and golden age.

Smith (2010) recognizes the strategic use of national symbols, as ‘perhaps even more potent than nationalist principles’ and ideology. Through them, the imagined community becomes vividly popular, emotionally awakened and periodically celebrated.
Scholars, artists and poets help the modern nation to draw sustenance from a re-lived ancient past, providing the linkage with earlier ethnies or ethnic communities. Indeed, a historically deep ethnic foundation is a prerequisite to the survival of modern nations. ‘Intellectuals’ should not necessarily be understood as individuals belonging to a particular class and sharing a specific high culture. As initiators of nationalism, they first envision, define, codify and set the boundaries of the nation. Nationalist ‘intellectuals’ must be literate, but barely so: there is no need for particular finesse or sophistication. What matters is their capacity to express and combine a credible national identity. This includes an ability, not simply to speak the language of their core constituencies, but to reinterpret and re-live their ancestral myths.

For the Hindu nation, the spiritual essence and holism of Hindu religion, the martial nature of Hindu race and the later decay of Hindu glory have been the ‘symbolic border-guards’ (Barth 1995). Religion, be it Hinduism in India or Shinto in Japan, is seen as a source of myths, memories, values and symbols (Durkheim 2012, House & Jowers 2011). Ethno-symbolism as a tool has played an important role in the reimagination of the Hindu nation leading to the rise of neo-nationalism. For Smith (1996), an ethnie is defined as a ‘a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more elements of a common culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least amongst elites.’ From this perspective, the Hindu community corresponds to Smith’s definition of an ethnie.

Sinha (2018) and Fatah (2008) argue that the Hindu ethnie share common ancestry myths dating back to the common origin of ethnie from Brahma, the founding
of the land of Aryavrata (old name of India) and tales of Ramayana and Mahabharata. Modern day Hindi is derived out of ancient Sanskrit which is considered as a sacred language by Hindus (Nariman 1992). Anderson argues that all of the great classical communities conceived of themselves as cosmically central, through the medium of a sacred language linked to a superterrestrial order of power (Anderson 1991). The Hindus believe in the ataman (Supreme Being) and the process of reincarnation. They also believe in karma and abstain from eating beef. For Hindus, the land of Aryavrata (Greater India, which includes Pakistan and Bangladesh) may be equated with what A.D. Smith terms the ancestral land where, ‘in the shared memories of its inhabitants, the great events that formed the nation took place’ (Smith 1996).

Hindu intellectuals like Tulsidas, Vivekananda, Paramhansa and more recent ones like Savarkar, Hedgewar and Golwalkar have played an important role in linking the past with present and spreading the ideology of Hindutva (the spirit of Hinduism).

Organizations like the RSS and VHP have been involved since 1990 in mobilizing the religious and cultural symbols to reignite the national consciousness (Jaffrelot 1996, Hansen 1999, Rajagopal 2001). This led to the coming to power of Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1998, 2014 and 2019 general elections. The BJP subscribes to the ideology of Savarkar and Golwalkar, who belonged to the romantic school of Indian nationalism and believed that Hindus are a primordial and perennial ethnie. The Hindu nationalist symbols with nationalist connotations like the Mother India, national anthem and national song, Ram temple in Ayodhya; and the securitization of cow, placement of nationalist symbols like flags and army tanks and the most recent Statue of Unity can be seen as symbolic denominators suited to BJP’s
ideological attempt to transcend Hindu diversities of caste, sect and region (Jaffrelot 1996).

With the above discussion, it can be argued, that the nationalism in India is a by-product of modernity. The argument of imagined community (Anderson 1991) is applicable in the case of building of the Indian National Movement as an anti-colonial struggle, while in the present scenario; it is the state elites, who have imagined India on the lines of a common ethnie. However, the way India is imagined has changed over the years.
CHAPTER 4

NATIONALISM IN INDIA

4.1 Past Heritage

The ancient land of Aryavarta or commonly known as India is a land that is unified not only by geography but also tradition. It is interesting to note that most of the languages in India use the same root word for yesterday and tomorrow, which reflects that Indians believe in life as an eternal cycle. However, some critics blame this as the reason behind modern India’s failure in keeping

Skeptics see it as the reason for contemporary India's failure to keep pace. Rushdie (1980) acerbically observes that "no people whose word for" yesterday "is the same as for" tomorrow "can not be considered as having a firm grip on the hour. Others contend that India's rich heritage maintains it even if it does not measure up to the currently developed nations of the world. According to Tharoor (2004), India is not, as people keep calling it, an underdeveloped country, but rather, in the context of its history and cultural heritage, a highly developed country in an advanced state of decay.

Five thousand years of continuous civilization nourished in the vast space between the Himalayas to the north, the Indian Ocean to the south and the Hindu Kush and Arakan mountains to the west and east has engendered a feeling of Indian exceptionalism. Some people may judge India by some modern indicators like economy, human development index, which is extremely low, or the apparent political or social chaos the country seems to be in. the Indian subcontinent is like a civilization, which cannot be separated from its history. The achievements of this civilization are a matter
of extreme pride and sometimes a sense of superiority for Indians. Based on the concept of a life cycle that is eternal, the Indians believe that no matter what, if they do good deed, their future will be better than yesterday. The sentiment of the Indians reflects the glory of past dynasties and empires. India's interaction with the rest of the world has almost always been informed by this civilizational sense of the Indian self (Saran, 2017). However, many thinkers in the West, and recently some in India too, consider India as an artificial nation. Strachey (1888) argued many years ago that "the first and most important thing to learn about India is that there is not and never has been India" (Saran 2017).

Despite Strachey’s argument, India had a centralized empire under the Mauryas, covering a major part of the subcontinent, expanding from Iran to Bengal, at least a century before the Qin united only part of Han China. Advani (2008) quotes Alexander Cunningham, the British archaeologist who served in colonial India that learned men described India to Alexander of Macedon as a ‘single land.’ These men attested that the land known as India is a rhomboid or roughly quadrilateral in shape, with the Indus to the West, the Himalayas and Hindu Kush to the North and oceans skirting the East and the South.

Cunningham goes on to write:

> The close agreement of these dimensions, given by Alexander's informants, with the actual size of the country is very remarkable and shows that the Indians, even at that early date in their history, had a very accurate knowledge of the form and extent of their native land.
In the ancient epic Mahabharata, the narrator, Sanjay, describes the vision of entire cosmos for King Dhritarashtra. He referred to the cosmos as a massive circle of seven concentric oceans that separated six varshas or regions, each possessing its own mountains and river systems. In the middle of this cosmos lies Jambudvipa, which is described as a four-petalled lotus floating in the ocean, with Bharatvarsha or India, defined by the southern petal. It has the Himalayas and the mighty rivers and seas surrounding its triangular shape, like the other varshas.

![Fig. 1 The Puranic Jambudvipa shaped like a giant lotus flower](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/The-Puranic-Jambudvipa-shaped-like-a-giant-lotus-flower_fig1_255739121)

It can be argued that the image of India as described in the ancient scriptures has been imbedded in the shared Indian consciousness that shapes the view of the world around till present. This vision also prevails over the political, social and cultural particularities.
When discussing the influence of ancient Indian thought on the foreign policy and state behavior of India, Kautilya (c. 370-283 BC) is one scholar that cannot be overlooked. Kautilya, who was also known as Chanakya, was an Indian philosopher who was an adviser to Chandragupta Maurya, who found the Mauryan Empire in 322 BCE. It is believed to be the first Indian dynasty to control large parts of the subcontinent, Iran and Bactria. A lot of work has been done on the influence of Chanakya on the strategic thinking of India. His work, the Arthashastra (‘Textbook of Statecraft and Political Economy’) advocates his famous mandala theory, which professes the idea that if a king or state (vijigisu) intends to become a universal monarch (chakravartin) and extend his influence, then he must place himself at the center of a series of concentric circles (mandalas). There are over fifteen volumes of Arthashastra, which contain 150 chapters. Chanakya discusses subjects like political philosophy, public administration, diplomacy, war strategy and foreign policy.

When the vijigisu intends to expand itself, the seven constituents of state power are a must. These seven constituents have a contemporary resonance and are echoed in the modern concept of ‘comprehensive national power’ (Rangarajan 1992, Saran 2017). These are:

1. Political leadership - svamin
2. Good governance through counsellors - amatyas
3. Territory and people - janapada or rashtra
4. The economy - kosha
5. Fortifications - durga
6. Military power - *danda*

7. Allies – *mitras*

Kautilya also talks about what options a state may have when challenged by a hostile state. The options are:

1. Seeking peace through treaty - *sandhi*

2. Staying neutral - *asana*

3. Marching on an expedition - *yana*

4. Seeking protection from stronger states - *samshraya*

5. Pursuing a dual policy of war with one state and peace with another – *dvaidhibhava*

Similar to the Prince written by Machiavelli, Kautilya's discourse advises a king who wants to effectively manage his empire. In the book Kautilya describes the world as he sees it, and underlines various challenges and opportunities a king may face in his lifetime. Like classical realists - Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, Kautilya also argues that anarchy is the order of the world and a state cannot depend on anyone but itself. Kautilya argues if a king wishes to survive in this anarchical world, then he must be wise enough to differentiate between friends and enemies, as well as potential allies and potential foes.
Kautilya sees the circle of states as a wheel, where the *vijigisu* is the hub and his allies are the rim connected by spokes. The intervening territory between the hub and the rim may contain hostile, neutral or vassal states. Kautilya argues in *Arthashastra*, that ‘the immediate neighbor is a natural enemy as he desires your territory and resources and may take them if he is more powerful than you. However, the neighbor’s neighbor is your natural friend because he desires your neighbor’s territory but cannot attack you until he becomes your neighbor.’ This identification of friends and potential rivals proceeds outward in mandalas or circles. Every state in the mandala system faces the same difficulty: they all face a series of concentric circles of enemies and friends (Pande 2017).

Later the Kautilyan model of statecraft was accepted and expounded on by several scholars. The *Nitisara* or *Nitishastra* of Kamandakiya (The Elements of Polity) builds on Kautilya’s theory and also uses the *mandala* as a conceptual framework for examining interstate relations. At the most basic level is the state, which has a set of immediate neighbors and a set of neighbors’ neighbors. This is the elementary mandala. The states that are immediate neighbors have an inherent tendency to be hostile towards the protagonist state in question. The immediate neighbors' own neighbors, in turn, are likely allies to the protagonist state since they are subject to the same dynamic with respect to their own immediate neighbors. But these categories are not undisputable and can change depending on the circumstances.

Kamandakiya also describes the role of diplomats and diplomacy in the section titled *Dutapracana*. Saran (2017) refers to it as an ancient Indian version of British diplomat Ernest Satow’s “A Guide to Diplomatic Practice” first published in 1917.
Kamandakiya lists three categories of royal ambassadors: the first is empowered by the king to take decisions while on a mission, the second has limited and specific powers, and the third has the role of an envoy who is only an emissary with the task of delivering and receiving messages on behalf of his king.

The *Jambudvipa mandala* does not assign centrality and supremacy to India or the Bharatvarsha, which is only one among the lotus petals that make up our universe. Each of the concentric circles in the *mandala* that radiates outwards is superior to the preceding one. This is the reverse of the Chinese world view described by Elliott (2012), which sees the Han core as the most advanced, with the increasingly larger circles symbolizing the more barbaric and the less civilized.

### 4.2 India during Medieval Ages

India was attacked several times by the invaders from Central Asia and Turkey who eventually ended up staying and adopting Indian culture. It was not only the outsiders, but the Indians also adapted to external influences. Even when India was ruled by foreigners, the Indian empire retained the unique qualities of Indian culture. Pande (2017) argues that the Mughals might have had Turkic origins, but the soul of their empire was very much Indian and the essence of Indian culture can be found in the British rule of India as well. Pande proposes that India is too big to be taken over by others and instead, others ended up being Indianized. This simple historic fact has led Indians to firmly believe that Indian culture and civilization have a great absorptive capacity.
Under the Mughal rule, India understood the importance of securing ties with the principally Muslim west and north-west. In strategic terms, the Mughals were aware of the fact that in order to protect their empire from the foreign enemy, they needed to secure the control of the important forts in Kabul and Kandahar. Applying the mandala strategy to this, a weak or friendly neighbor would be beneficial to the Mughals, as it meant that they needed to spend fewer resources on defending their empire's border. Learning from the Mughal tradition, the British too understood the importance of building buffer zones along India's northern frontiers. A look at India’s foreign policy, and survey of friendly states confirms that modern India is following the traditional Kautilyan treatise.

There were certain emotional and personal reasons for the Mughals as well, for desiring to extend their influence into Central Asia. Babur, the founder of the empire, was a prince from Central Asian, from Fergana that lies in present day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. He had lost his throne to rival princes in the region and had come to India, in hope to rebuild his army and resources in order to recapture his original kingdom. But Babur died soon after coming to India and was never able to return to his native land to regain his Central Asian crown. Babur’s dream of regaining control of Central Asia was pursued by his son Humayun and great-grandson Shah Jahan but they were not successful. Other Mughal emperors, like Akbar, Jahangir and Aurangzeb did not harbor any intentions of recapturing their ancestral homeland and focused on the consolidation of empire in India. Under the Mughal rule, the subcontinent became more diverse, ethnically and religiously, which laid the foundation of India that was culturally pluralist.
Close cultural ties with regions that lie in west and north-west of India, a border policy based on the concept of buffer regions and the use of Persian as the official language are some aspects of the Mughal empire that had a large impact on India’s external relations during that era. The British were quick to learn from the Mughals, and they also implemented institutional legacy based on personality-driven administration, that can still be seen in Indian politics. Under the Mughal rule, various institutions, like the imperial council or council of nobles, existed; it was solely the emperor who made the decisions (Farooqi, 2004). However, the later Mughals inherited an India that lacked institutions and centralization of power. When the British took over, they replaced Persian with English, and laid foundations of modern institutions as they wanted to create an elite governing class which would help them rule the Indians. However, they were unable to free the Indians from the shackles of personality-driven administration, which they had become accustomed to during the seven hundred years of foreign rule. Under the Mughal rule, the ruler was above the rules, and this penchant for power can still be seen in Indian bureaucracy, where the rule is meant to be followed by common people only, and the officials are free to do as they like (Saran, 2017).

Many scholars argue that it was during the British colonial rule that the idea of self and one nation was embedded into the minds of Indians. The British introduced modern means of communications like the printing press to India, along with railways, power loom and the telegraph. By building schools, colleges and universities, the British introduced a system of formal education that did not exist before. Due to the above facilities, Indians in various regions were able to different parts of the country with greater speed and ease, and understand the geographic and cultural boundaries of
India. Trained in Western education, they could also share ideas and emotions with fellow countrymen and became increasingly aware of their rights.

It can be successfully argued that among all of India's occupiers, only the British were the least willing assimilate into the Indian culture (Pande 2017). They maintained a distance that the Aryans, Parthians, Greeks, Persians, Mongols, Turks and Afghans did not. That being said, the British were unable to weaken India's sense of self, and the colonial rule only helped create a framework of institutions that enabled India develop a sense of nationhood and gradually led to the end of India’s self-imposed isolation. While paving the way for an independent future, India’s struggle for independence gave Indians a chance to restore, what they believed was, their glorious past and a way to retain whatever has been lost in the thousand years of slavery.

Long before the Western colonial powers knocked at the doors of India, the empires in the subcontinent enjoyed a civilizational sphere of influence from Persia to Indonesia. Pandey (2017) argues that the idea behind this was the buffer state model, given by Kautilya in 3rd century BC. Geography also had a significant role to play in defining the importance of India’s land and sea borders. In order to ensure their kingdom’s security, the Indian kings often created buffer states by annexing neighboring territories. Present day India understands the civilizational influence it has on its neighbors, and the fact that geographic neighbors are important in safeguarding the state's borders against any foreign invasion and acts of irredentism. The foreign policy makers of India believe that, despite various states in the Indian subcontinent, it
is still one entity, or Akhand Bharat\textsuperscript{17}, and India’s neighboring states are crucial for its security. They also believed, until quite recently, that India’s immediate area of interest lies in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, however, due to globalization and election of Modi government to power, the area of interest has been extended from US in west to Japan in east.

Geography and security compulsions that shape India's world view have underpinnings of the philosophy and thought that was inherited by it over centuries of experience. Palmer (1960) noted that every aspect of India’s foreign as well as domestic policy is firmly rooted in its civilizational traits and philosophy. For example, the speeches of Prime Minister Nehru were often loaded with historical facts. Similarly, Prime Minister Vajpayee’s speeches also had history references. However, Prime Minister Modi’s actions are based in tradition more than any other leader. For example, starting the cleanliness drive based on the principles of cleanliness in Indian culture, reference of the Sanskrit phrase of \textit{vasudev kutumbakam} (the world is one family) several times and leading mass yoga sessions on International Yoga Day. However, it is interesting to note that despite the leadership, there has been a continuous trend of turning to India's heritage in order to generate national pride and to explain contemporary policies.

\textbf{4.3 The Colonial Era}

India is a vast country inhabited by several nations and groups. It is divided into

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{17} Akhand Bharat is an irredentist term meaning "Undivided India" in Sanskrit and encompassing those nations or regions of South, East, and Central Asia that were once part of pan-Indian empires or influenced by the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism.
several smaller political units for administrative purposes. Despite the socio-linguistic diversities, there is unity and oneness among the people of the Indian state leading to the feeling of unflinching devotion towards the motherland or fatherland and constituting the sense of nationalism.

Language fuels nationalism and nation-building in many societies (Wimmer, 2013). Nationalism also finds a prominent place in the Sanskrit literature which is the common heritage of all the people of India (Kanjilal, 1994). Many scriptures written in Sanskrit language continue to influence cultural trends, literary endeavors and the value-system of present-day Indians. Epics like Ramayana and Mahabharata, and political works like Arthashastra, for thousands of years, have been the founding pillars of the Indian value-system and form the basis of moral and political thought of Indians, highlighting the importance of rule of law, defending the motherland from foreign aggressors, duties of ideal monarchs and their sense of commitment to the welfare of subjects and maintaining the social fabric of the nation. Despite the fact that India is not a nation-state, a majority of Indians construe themselves as a nation due to the belief in Sanatana Dharma (Eternal Order) which has a unified world view (Melton & Baumann, 2010). Kushwah (2001) suggests that this vision of unity on the spiritual plane binds the members of Sanatana Dharma as one and indivisible entity, and associates them with the bigger units like nation.

The Indian view on nationalism emphasizes on the unity of consciousness among the people dwelling the land of their origin. The corresponding Sanskrit word for ‘nation’ is ‘rastra’, derived from the root ‘raj’ with the addition of affix ‘stran’ and conveys three meanings: (1) that which manifests all the people; (2) by which all are unveiled or made known, all with grandeur; (3) that which shines all over the world.
Arthashastra and Dharmashastra view rastra (nation) as one of the seven organs of the state, whose function is to enrich the people with all the wealth (Savarkar 1969; Tiwari 2019). Having been derived from the root ‘raj’, the rastra becomes an enlightening and spiritual geo-cultural unit because it in itself takes the form of common culture, religion, inspiration and emotion (Jafferlot, 2005). This is very close to Smith’s definition of nation where he sees it as a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members (Smith, 2010).

The process of transfer of power from British into Indian hands, led to the emergence of national movement in India. British imperialism gave rise to various political, social and economic forces, that interacted with each other resulting in Indian nationalism. Medieval Indian society was transformed into a modern national society. The change was a result of various significant factors like the establishment of new economic institutions, modern transport and means of communication, Western education system and the printing press by the British government to realize the political and administrative unification of India (Purohit, 1965).

Heimsath (1964) argues that the Indian leaders of late 19th century realized that local or provincial issues formed the core of earlier political activities and the groups involved did not identify themselves with the entire nation (Malik & Singh, 1994). However, this environment changed after India came into close contact with a Europe and England. It is often argued that Indian nationalism is a result of English education and Western morals. However, a few scholars also believe that Indian nationalism is not just a result of modern education but also the new social conditions and forces that have emerged with the Indian society due to the British colonialization. Desai (2005)
suggests that Indian nationalism was the outcome of the conflict of interests of the British and Indians. Britain wanted to politically and economically control India, while the Indian people aspired for an independent India, free from any political, economic and cultural influence of Britain.

Indian nationalism emerged as a national movement towards the end of the 19th century. By that time, there was an influx of educated class in the country and with the rise of industries, the industrial bourgeoisie came into existence. The largely economic based conflict between British and the Indian interests became the root cause of Indian national movement (Desai, 2005). Using Dutt’s (1940) argument Desai argues that modern education was not the root factor behind the movement. Dutt opines that:

"The Indian national movement arose from the condition of imperialism and its system of exploitation... the rise of Indian bourgeoisie and its growing competition against the domination of the British bourgeoisie were inevitable, whatever the system of education, and if the Indian bourgeoisie been educated only in the Sanskrit Vedas, they would have assuredly found in them the inspiring slogans and principles for their struggle"

The very existence of foreign power in India fueled the cause of nationalism in India. The realization of being oppressed brought resentment against foreign rule that led to the growth of the nationalist movement to drive out the foreigners from the country. All social classes in India, including the intelligentsia, the peasants, the artisans and the workers all played their part in the struggle (Mahajan, 1981).

The study of the origins of Indian nationalism suggest it was a bi-product of the structural and economic changes in society due to the British Raj, later leading to the formation of the Indian National Congress in the year 1885. This national awakening
found expression in various spheres of national life including social, political and cultural (Desai 2005).

### 4.4 Phases of Indian Nationalism

Rothermund (1970) suggests that the intelligentsia of Calcutta and Bombay who were educated under the British system crystalized the idea of Indian nationalism. This class was greatly influenced by the democratic and nationalist ideas of the West and aspired to develop national consciousness and aspiration among fellow Indians. The likes of Raja Ram Mohan Roy\(^\text{18}\) and Vivekananda\(^\text{19}\) propagated the idea of Indian nation and initiated socio-religious reform movements to modernize the Indian society. During the later half of the 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century, the exploitive economic policies of the British started showing their effect on the Indian society leading to national unrest which culminated in the rise of Indian National Congress (INC) in 1985.

Burke (1997) categorizes the development of Indian nationalism in three different phases. The first phase or the Moderate phase spans from 1885 to 1905, the second phase or the Extremist phase stretches from 1906 to 1916 and the third phase i.e., the Gandhian phase stretches from 1917 to 1947.

\(^{18}\) Raja Ram Mohan Roy was the founder of the Brahmo Samaj, a socio-religious reform movement in the Indian subcontinent. His influence was apparent in the fields of politics, public administration, education, and religion. He is considered by many historians as the “father of the Indian Renaissance.

\(^{19}\) Vivekananda was an Indian Hindu monk, who was a major force in the revival of Hinduism in India, and contributed to the concept of nationalism in colonial India.
I. *The First Phase (1885-1905)*

The first phase began by the establishment of INC by an Englishman A.O. Hume in 1885. It is believed that he was commissioned by the then viceroy Lord Dufferin to create an Indian political party that would play the role of a safety-valve during dangerous times. INC was supposed to serve as a visible and overseeable platform on which the Indian masses could vent out their growing frustration (Mahajan 1981). At the helm of the Congress leadership were the liberal intelligentsia, who mainly voiced the demands of the bourgeoisie and the elite class through constitutional agitation and argument also sometimes labelled as prayer, petition and protest.

The Indian masses were frustrated due to growing unemployment, economic misery and famines, and the Congress could do nothing to resolve their problems. Due to the ineffectiveness of the liberal group, a new section crystallized within the party that relied upon use of forceful methods like assassinations and mutinies for achieving political freedom (Desai 2005). This section of Congressmen came to be known as the ‘Extremists’ and included leaders like Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Aurobindo Ghosh, B.C. Pal, Lala Lajpat Rai, Subhas Chandra Bose etc.

II. *The Second Phase (1906-1916)*

During the second phase the moderate leadership of the Congress was replaced by an extremist leadership, who instead of demanding political freedom from the British believed in forcefully taking it. The leaders of this section based their ideology on the Hindu philosophy, weakening the secular nature of Congress and leading to the development of Muslim political consciousness that resulted in the formation of Muslim League in 1906.
The main development that took place during this phase was that the elitist nationalist movement gained a broad mass basis due to the awakening of Indian masses. This happened due to a number of factors like economic crisis, increased repression of the peasantry and the working class and growing sense of unity among Indians. International events like Russian revolution and the rise of Japan, an Asian country, that was strong enough to lock horns with any Western country instilled a sense of pride and deeply stirred the consciousness of Indian masses.

III. The Third Phase (1917-1947)

The industrial expansion during World War I helped the Indian capitalists to become stronger and this made them the Swadeshi movement\textsuperscript{20} started by Gandhi. Thereafter, the industrial bourgeoisie framed the policies and strategies of the political struggle under the leadership of Gandhi. The dominance of bourgeoisie of the political climate resulted in the growth of the Socialist and Communist groups, whose ideology resonated with that of the Indian working class. As an outcome, by 1928 the working class also became a part of the freedom struggle.

Even though the nationalist movement became stronger under the Congress, the mixing of religion and politics by Gandhi alienated the Muslims of India; and the strong grip of industrialists over Congress resulted in a befogged national consciousness. Due to loss of trust in Gandhi’s ideology and methods, Bose, from the extremist group, was elected as the president of Congress and another section of the party formed the Congress Socialist Party.

\textsuperscript{20} The Swadeshi (indigenous) movement, part of the Indian independence movement and the developing Indian nationalism, was an economic strategy aimed at removing the British Empire from power and improving economic conditions in India. Strategies of the Swadeshi movement involved boycotting British products and the revival of domestic products and production processes.
4.5 Philosophical Streams in IFP

Using Murty’s argument (1964), Pandey (2017) draws comparison between the Indian philosophical streams and the Western ones. She classifies Indian foreign policy into two philosophical streams, namely the realist and the idealist or moralist. Murty draws back the origin of Indian realism to ancient philosophical discourses like the Arthasastras, Dharmastrastras and Nitisasstras. She argues that a key element of Indian realism was that the theory is valid only for 'states within India' and calls it the 'positivistic Kautilyan theory'.

Pandey (2017) argues that in Indian politics the origin of the idealistic and moralistic philosophical stream stems from Buddhism and Jainism, and refers to this as the autochthonous and moralistic ‘Ashokan theory'. He says that in contrast with locally applicable Indian realism these streams have 'universal application'. Ashoka (269-232 BC) is considered to be the greatest emperor of the Mauryan dynasty. After the Battle of Kalinga, he embraced Buddhism due to the amount of loss of life, and governed based on the humanitarian tenets of his new religion.

Pandey goes on to divide the ancient Indian realists into two groups: the Arthasastrins and the Dharmastrastrins. According to him, the Arthasastrins, or the followers of Kautilya, were like Machiavelli's "foxes" who 'recommend pretense, infiltration, mutiny, propaganda and economic pressure in preference to war which they considered to be risky and expensive. On the other hand, the Dharmastrastrins, or those who follow Manu, are 'Machiavelli's "lions” who are willing to fight heroically for a just cause and do not care about winning or losing.
Using Murty’s argument, Pandey further categorizes the ancient Indian moralists into two streams as well: the Buddhists and the Jain-Hindu pacifists. The Buddhists believe that it is possible to peacefully convert the world to dharma or the cosmic order. However, the Jain-Hindu pacifist, while believing in the path of ahimsa or non-violence also never ruled out the use of force to achieve the just cause. Thus, it can be argued that isolationism and involvement, both were an important part of India's ancient diplomatic tradition. It is evident that this is similar to the modern day non-alignment which is understood to be an Indian initiative. For that reason, Nehru insisted that the roots of non-alignment date back to the time of Ashoka or earlier, and had a positive concept with an implicit philosophy behind it.

Refereing to Wright (1964)²¹, Pandey asserts that international relations can be understood better from the framework provided by the Indian philosophers than Western ones. In contrast to the Western philosophy and political thought which draws heavy influence from Plato’s insistence on universality, she says that ancient Indian rejects the universality of ideas. This argument explains that why Indian governments are usually not consistent in following the principles they may possibly believe in’.

This can be related to the assertion made by Jha (1989) that ancient Indian philosophers did not associate ‘private with public morality’ and believed that a king while taking action on behalf of the state needs to consider the interests and wishes of his people’. Prime Minister Nehru acknowledged in his many speeches that some of his actions, like the military action in Goa, were rooted in this ancient Indian belief. Nehru chose to annex Goa in 1961 which was under the rule of colonial power Portugal

²¹ Introduction by Quincy Wright in K. Satchidananda Murty, Indian Foreign Policy, Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1964
through military action, while waited patiently for France to hand over the French colonies of Pondicherry, Karikal, Yanam, Mahe and Chandernagore on Indian soil after a referendum (Pandey, 2017).

Nehru believed that unpredictability was a necessary function of statecraft (Anderson, 2012). India was dealing with two different states at that time. On one side, there was France, a liberal state, which was willing to discuss the return of its Indian possessions to India; while on the other hand, Portugal was not ready to acknowledge any Indian demands. Thus the Indian polity believed that negotiations were a better option in case of France, while force was the only option in dealing with an uncompromising Portugal. In his speech of 1948 in the Constituent Assembly, Nehru famously stated: 'It may be that sometimes we may be forced to side with this power or that power. In a certain set of circumstances I can conceive of our siding with an imperialist power that might be lesser of the two evils' (Ray, 2013). This also explains that despite not engaging with United States for a very long time, why India has now become an important partner of the liberal and democratic US in its endeavor to counter China who does not believe in liberal values.

4.6 Approaches in Indian Foreign Policy

Walter Mead highlights four different approaches that helped shape United States’ foreign policy since its independence in his book Special Providence (2001). Mead argues that the foreign relations of the United States over the period of its entire history can be analyzed in light of key ideas put forward by important individuals. Thus,
it can be understood that named after the first secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton, the Hamiltonian school of foreign policy, sees the first task of the American government as promoting the health of American enterprise at home and abroad. The Wilsonian ideal, enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson, 'believes that the United States has both a moral and a practical duty to spread its values through the world. The Jeffersonian view, put forward by President Thomas Jefferson 'has seen the preservation of American democracy in a dangerous world as the most pressing and vital interest of the American people'. The Jacksonian approach, crafted by President and Jackson, 'represents a deeply embedded, widely spread populist and popular culture of honor, independence, courage and military pride among the American people'. Makers of US foreign policy have tended to follow one or a combination of these schools of thought through most of US history though some have tried to embrace the European approach, which Mead terms 'continental realism' based on maintaining a balance of power to protect America's global interests.

A similar analysis of India's global outlook would help identify the context and underlying principles of India's foreign policy Several scholars have attempted to explain India's world view though, unlike Mead in relation to the United States, they have not offered neat categories of Indian policy approaches. Naipaul (1976) argues that India's problems are not external or caused because of periodic invasions or conquest. He sees India as plagued with the crisis of what he refers to as a 'wounded old civilization' that while 'aware of its inadequacies' is 'without the intellectual means to move ahead. Naipaul's broad-stroke analysis, when applied to Indian foreign policy,
would suggest a desire for international respect without having the resources to exercise global power and a refusal to accept that reality.

On the other hand, Khilnani (1997) argues that contemporary India has been shaped by a 'wager' of India's educated urban elite on modern ideas and modern agencies. India's 'nationalist elite itself had no single, clear definition of this idea and one of the remarkable facts about the nationalist movement that brought India to independence was its capacity to entertain diverse, often contending visions of India. Indian nationalism before independence was plural even at the top, a dhoti with endless folds. It contains people from markedly different backgrounds yet whose trajectories were often parallel (Khilnani 1997). According to this standpoint, nationalism subsumed India's diversity and its advocates hoped to build a modern India inspired by the past but connected to the present and looking towards the future.

Cohen (2001) classifies Indian strategic thought as divided between those he styles Nehruvian which includes the Gandhian view), militant Nehruvian and finally Realists and Revivalists. Similarly, Ganguly (2010) argues that personal, national and systemic factors framed Nehru’s views and were responsible every time any of Nehru's successors changed or adapted his policies.' This view casts Nehru and his ideas as the major point of reference in modern India's world view.

According to Pande (2017) major strands in India's contemporary foreign policy can be classified as: Imperial, Idealism, Realism and Isolationism. The 'Imperial' school of thought draws primarily from the period of the British Raj, where power rests with Delhi and India's Central government is best suited to make security decisions. Idealism,' that is inspired by the moral legacy of ancient Indian thought which
emphasizes that India is an example for the world and that India has the duty to proclaim that example for other nations reiterated during the national struggle under Mahatma Gandhi. Every Indian leader, whether Gandhi or Vivekananda, whether Nehru or Modi, has demanded that the rest of the world accord India stature commensurate with its civilizational contribution.

It is a function of India's idealism that Indians, whether the lay public or their leaders, have always believed in India's heritage as a great civilization and have anticipated the future great power. It is almost as if all India has to do is to wait for the world to accept its greatness. India has often claimed the moral high ground in international relations and believed that it has the right to preach to other nations about what policies to adopt. During the cold war, India used multilateral venues, like the annual United Nations gatherings and the NAM and G-77 groupings for philosophical elocutions on right and wrong that others saw as sermonizing (Pande 2017).

At the same time, Indian has also seen ‘realism’ as the basis of external relations. Pande (2017) suggests that realist and idealist philosophies have coexisted in India and the post-independence era and the Indians reflect a cultural ability to entertain seemingly contradictory thoughts parallel to each other. New Delhi recognizes the importance of hard power, the idea propagated by Kautilya.

Despite idealism the Indian state has a Hobbesian view of the world where India can depend only on itself (Hobbes 1986). This explains the strong desire for strategic autonomy, the push for economic autarky and the pursuit of military self-sufficiency. Indian leaders from Nehru onwards have recognized the importance of all elements of national power, including military power. The emphasis on economic growth in recent
years is also tied to the realization that India's great power ambitions would not be realized without having the means to pay for a strong military, among other things.

Although India aspires to play a global role, it is reluctant to be drawn into global issues or ideologies and India has isolated itself from issues of global concern. Ironically, the British were the first power/empire in India that had an outward world view. Until the advent of the Raj, with the exception of the ancient south Indian Chola dynasty, no other Indian empire had sought to extend itself beyond the Indian subcontinent. Indian philosophers too asserted that would-be emperors or sovereigns must build an empire within the subcontinent and not outside. Thus, to many Indians, external entanglements hark back to the imperial outlook of the Raj instead of representing a genuinely swadeshi (home-made) world view.

Modern India has consistently been reluctant to involve itself in international conflicts and blocs though Nehru's non-alignment ideology was a way of being involved in the world without external commitments that would bind India to specific choices. India was trying to get the best of both worlds. Even now, India wants to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council without building the power potential possessed by other permanent members. For Indians influenced by isolationism, keeping India territorially intact, building a strong economy, eradicating poverty and creating a just society have often been more important than playing an active role in global conflicts or choosing between ideologies and blocs. However, with the change in political class that sits in Delhi, Kautilyan realism, mixed with nationalism of Savarkar and Golwalkar, has come to the center stage of domestic politics. It has been predicted
by political pundits that the power of BJP will further grow in coming years and it is important to analyze how its ideology would shape India’s behavior as a state.

The next section will discuss the ideology and the factors responsible for the rise of BJP in the political arena of India.

4.7 Rise of Bharatiya Janata Party

4.7.1 The Bharatiya Jana Sangh

In its ideological, organizational, and leadership structure the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is the direct descendant of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS). The Jana Sangh ideology was based on the traditions of Hindu nationalism, with its emphasis on Bharatiya sanskriti (Indian culture) and maryada (traditions). The Jana Sangh believed in the reform-oriented traditions of Bharatiya culture reflected in the reform movements led by such Hindus as Swami Dayanand Sarswati, Swami Vivekananda, and Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak (Malik and Singh 1994). These leaders perceived that to be dynamic, the Bharatiya culture had to adapt itself to face the challenges of modernization, without losing its identity.

The Jana Sangh was founded on October 21, 1951, and Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee (1901-1953), a distinguished statesman, became its founding president. Even though he was once the president of the Hindu Mahasabha, an organization opposed to the policies of the Congress party, he was invited by prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru to join his cabinet because of his administrative experience and personal integrity. Later on,
however, because of policy and ideological differences with Nehru, Dr. Mookerjee resigned from the cabinet and sought to organize an alternative to the Congress party. He felt that the Congress party, under the leadership of Nehru, followed policies designed to appease Pakistan and the Muslim minority in India at the cost of Hindus. In his efforts to organize an alternative to the Congress party he sought the support of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (the RSS) that could provide his party a mass base.

The RSS, a Hindu nationalist organization with a large cadre, was banned by the government of India after the murder of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948. The ban was subsequently lifted when the government could not find any evidence of its linkage with the conspiracy to assassinate Gandhi. The Sangh claimed to be primarily a cultural and social organization. But the ban on its organization and activities, and the treatment of its workers by the government, convinced many of its leaders that, without any influence in politics, the Sangh would be subjected to arbitrary actions in the future by those in power. Thus, the Jana Sangh and the RSS worked in tandem in various stages of the development of the party.

Despite the efforts of many RSS volunteers, the new party was unable to mount a major challenge to the domination of the Congress party. very few political parties were willing to cooperate with the Jana Sangh, because of its strong commitment to the ideology of Hindu nationalism.

Because of the Jana Sangh's opposition to the Nehruvian model of Indian nationalism, its struggle to enter the mainstream of Indian politics was not easy. Its leadership was, however, willing to adopt a variety of strategies to achieve this goal. Recognizing the emergence of the multi-party system as the main feature of Indian
politics, the Jana Sangh leadership, at first, sought coalition partners. To facilitate the formation of stable governments in states, its working committee invited the opposition parties to join in, forming non-Congress governments on the basis of mutually agreed programs. In 1967, therefore, the Jana Sangh participated in united front governments in Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh, however, most of the coalition governments in the states were short-lived.

4.7.2 Jana Sangh in the Mainstream of Indian Politics

Cooperation and collaboration between Jayaprakash Narayan, a socialist leader and the leaders of the Jana Sangh and the RSS took shape after the 1971 national and 1972 state electoral sweeps of the Indira Gandhi-led Congress party that led to widespread corruption. The Jana Sangh leadership, supported by the RSS, favored value-based politics and was highly critical of the pragmatic politicians of the centrist political parties.

In 1973, middle-class discontent with the growth of this type of political culture led to political agitation in different parts of the country. The Jana Sangh leaders saw an opportunity to enter the mainstream of Indian politics through these movements. The Jana Sangh and the RSS joined the Jayaprakash Narayan (JP)-led movement, which provided an excellent opportunity to prove their credentials for their value-based politics.

Indira Gandhi's imposition of Emergency Rule in June 1975 and the arrest of the opposition leaders, including the leaders of the Jana Sangh and the RSS, forced the
opposition parties to contest elections jointly. This resulted in the formation of a single united party the Janata Party, through the merger of such parties as the Bharatiya Lok Dal, Socialist party, Congress (O), the Congress for Democracy (CFD), the Jana Sangh, and others.

The contrasting elements, which constituted the Janata Party, represented different and often contradictory subcultures of Indian politics. The members of the Jana Sangh, however, not only had ideological cohesion but also displayed a high degree of discipline and the ability to subordinate their personal interests and political ambitions for a particular cause or in the interest of party unity. They tended to be more loyal to institutions than to personalities.

However, the Janata Party was not aloof from internal conflicts of powerful leaders who aspired to be the prime minister of the country as well as the leader of the party. Since there was constant struggling among these leaders for the top position, the Jana Sangh group eventually separated from the Janata Party and founded a party of its own.

4.7.3 Founding of the Bharatiya Janata Party

After separating from Janata Party, Jana Sangh decided to rebrand itself since its earlier self was confined to the high caste, urban middle class of the Hindi-speaking states of north and central India and lacked mass base. Therefore, to emphasize the continuation of real Janata traditions, both in ideology and political aspirations, the new
party was named the Bharatiya Janata Party. In order to capture political power, the Hindu nationalists needed to broaden their electoral reach on both a geographic and demographic basis.

The new party sought to build a new image through its ideological rhetoric. Socialist leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan and Morarji Desai had considerable impact on the thinking of its leadership. The party stressed the need for value-based politics. In a bold attempt to depart from the chauvinistic Hindu nationalism of the Jana Sangh and to present itself in more moderate and humanistic guise, the BJP leadership adopted Gandhian socialism, that rejected Marxism and claimed economic distribution should be based upon ethical and moral principles.

To further strengthen its political base among the masses, the BJP leadership also committed itself to nationalism and national integration, a task it claims left incomplete by Nehru.

4.7.4 Ideology of Bharatiya Janata Party

Bharatiya Janata Party released various documents in its first conference in April 1980 which clearly showed that BJP, infact, wanted to shed its Bharatiya Jana Sangh image. Although principles outlined by it did contain the values of the BJS yet its major thrust was to identify itself with the Gandhian economic ideas. A.B. Vajapayee particularly emphasised the intentions of the Bharatiya Janata Party to join the mainstream by mobilizing support of all sections of the society to provide a national alternative (Noorani, 1991). Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the founding President of the BJP, addressing the first National Convention of the party held at Samta nagar in Bombay on
December 28-30, 1980, put forward five principles which it thought could be the basis on which national consensus could be created. According to Bharatiya Janata Party (1980), these five principles were called as 'Our five commitments which are:

1. Nationalism and National Integration
2. Commitment to Democracy
3. Positive Secularism
4. Gandhian Socialism
5. Value Based Politics

In this way Atal Bihari Vajpayee sought to give the party a more liberal, democratic, secular and egalitarian image. He gave a clarion call to his party men to draw inspiration from Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaja in the functioning of the party and the guidance from Mahatma Jyotiba Phule in its crusade for social justice.

I. Nationalism and National Integration

The first principle is of Nationalism and National Integration (Zaidi, 1981). The party believes that we are living in an era of nation states and the welfare of the people largely depends on national efforts. Defense of national interest should thus become the primary concern of every Indian. India is one nation and Indian's are one people, constituting and mutually accommodating plurality of religions, faiths, ideologies, languages and interests etc. BJP believes that people of different faiths and different ideologies should be able to co-exist in peace and harmony with one another. National Consensus is possible when the development of one social group leads to the
development of other social groups. Those who have external or extra-territorial loyalties or are engaged in anti-social activities cannot be expected to contribute to national consensus and therefore will have to be kept out.

The BJP committed itself to the cause of nation building in India. It pledged to build up India as a strong and prosperous nation which would be modern, progressive, and enlightened in outlook and which proudly would draw inspiration from India's ancient culture and values and thus would be able to emerge as great world power playing an effective role in the Comity of Nations for the establishment of world peace and just International order (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2004). The party declared to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India, as a part of its national spirit. In a bid to distance itself from the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the BJP recognized the composite character of Indian nation.

In order to become a mainstream political force, it participated in the movement for maintaining national integration in India. Now the BJP is convinced that Hindutava has immense potentiality to re-organize this nation and strengthen and discipline it to undertake the arduous task of nation building. This can and does trigger a higher level of patriotism that can transform the country to greater levels of efficiency and performance.

II. Commitment to Democracy

The BJP aims at establishing a democratic state which guarantees to all citizens, irrespective of caste, color, creed or sex, political, social and economic justice, equality of opportunity and liberty of faith and expression (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2004). BJP
leaders are of the view that the strength of a democracy is directly proportionate to the strength of three pillars on which it rests—the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary (Chaudhary, 1991).

BJP believes that five decades of misrule and misuse of these institutions has eroded their strength. Corruption at the highest level of Executive has corroded people's faith in Government. The Congress and United Progressive Alliance government's inability to take firm decisions and make tough choices, apart from their failure to confront disruptive forces, has weakened the authority of the Indian State. The over centralization of power at the center and unbalanced models of development have led to Centre-State disputes and controversies. Abuse of constitutional provisions like Article 356\(^{22}\) and the misuse of Raj Bhavan (Government Houses) as extension counters of the ruling party at the center have defiled the sanctity of the Indian Constitution. The democratic spirit of the party got manifested in its Election Manifesto of 1998. It gives importance for taking care of the just rights of all individuals, groups and communities by establishing relevant institutions and commissions.

III. Positive Secularism

Third, Bharatiya Janata Party believes in the policy of Positive Secularism based on moral values (Zaidi, 1981). The secularism of the Congress party has, they argue, been totally immoral and opportunistic and a fraud played on the people of this country because it increasingly communalized the Indian politics. Communal vote banks have become Important. This cancer of Indian politics has to be fought because it strikes at

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\(^{22}\) Under Article 356 of the Constitution of India, in the event that a state government is unable to function according to constitutional provisions, the Central government can take direct control of the state machinery.
the very roots of Nationalism and national integration. BJP ensures full protection of the life and the property of the minorities. Besides, Secularism has been reduced to a totally negative concept. The congress never gave any connotation to secularism as was given to it by Gandhi. Secularism does not imply that there should be intolerance among different religious groups. We can say that broadly It also means distillation of common moral values whether derived from different religions or from other historical and civilizational experience and approach, which always remains Integral to the Indian civilization.

The Bharatiya Janata Party defines Secularism as ‘Sarva-Dharma-Sambhava’.

Considering the concept of theocratic state as alien to Indian traditions and political thought, Vajpayee advocated for a more positive idea of Secularism as the same constitutes the bedrock of democracy. The Congress has been distorting secularism for many years by formulating policies for appeasing narrow communal and sectional interests, he made the BJP subscribed to Positive Secularism, which would ultimately guarantee Nationalism and National Integration.

In the words of Vajpayee "In the Indian background we can claim to have established a truly secular state only if we are able to instill in every citizen, irrespective of his religion, caste, region or language, a sense of Indianness which I believe exist in all our countrymen and which needs to be assiduously nurtured and strengthened. This Indianness is based on a value system we have derived from Indian culture and traditions. This value system has developed out of a synthesis of divergent experiences of various sections of the people over the centuries. This process of synthesis and harmonisation must continue, and all religions in the country can contribute towards
making our citizens better Indians and all Indians better human beings” (Vajpayee, 1980).

To be a secular state, the country’s political system must not reject or stand above religion but inculcate religious ideals. Secondly, it must base itself on the foundation of Indian cultural heritage, which is seen as synonymous with Hindutava (Chakravarty, 1991). The Hindutava has been explained in various terms. Broadly stated, its premise is that India's national identity is rooted in Hindu culture, as Hindus are dominant majority in the country and "nations are built on the basis of common culture and ideology (Malik & Singh, 1992). To the Bharatiya Janata Party a genuine concept of Indian nationhood should incorporate the Hindu heritage along with the traditions, practices and beliefs that flow through the ancient history of the country. The Bharatiya Janata Party constructed this concept in the negative sense by creating a fear in the minds of Hindus that in near future, Muslims, who had been invaders to the country, would destroy Hindu culture by demolishing Hindu temples. Majority community would be outnumbered in their own land. Due to this strategy the Bharatiya Janata Party easily roped a large segment of Hindu population.

Another part of Hindutava ideology adopted by the BJP leadership was to convince the people that 'secularism in India is Islamized and is merely another name for the Hindu bashing. The BJP's of the opinion that no other party seriously pointed out that Secularism should not be protected at the cost of Hindu interest and protecting Muslim minority (Uniyal, 1992).

In the opinion of L.K.Advani "A Hindu should be proud of his religion, a non-Hindu is belonging to India." Again, "we do not use the word Hindu in religious terms. By Hindu Rashtra, I mean Bharatiya Rashtra" (Swain, 2001). The BJP leader further
claimed that while there should be no minority appeasement, nor any allergy to Hinduism in the name of Secularism, Hindutava must not be misconstrued as Hindu fundamentalism. So the BJP adopted Positive secularism which means equal treatment to all religions. It means there should not be any special provisions for the minority.

The BJP differentiates the positive and the real secularism from pseudo-secularism. It claims that as against the 'pseudo secularism' practiced by all other political parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party is the only party which professes genuine secularism. The Bharatiya Janata Party leadership claims that their insistence on "Hindutava" as the basis of Indian Nationalism is not anti-secular at all, because they hold, the word 'Hindu' is merely the term for every inhabitant of Hindustan or India. Hence, they view, Christians, Muslims or Parsis living in India are Hindu Christians, Hindu Muslims or Hindu Parsis. On the whole the BJP ideologues are in favor of Interpreting the term 'Hindu' in the light of geographical nationalism and for that matter it has nothing to do with the so called Hindu religion.

Many critics have criticized this stand of BJP and they feel that it a tortuous attempt to reconcile their faith in Hindu Nationalism with Secularism (Paranjape, 1991). Further 'by equating Bharatiyata' with 'Hindutava', the BJP leadership has cut off Indian culture from its rich mosaic of diverse cultural elements, reducing it to a strictly Hindu phenomenon (Chakravarty, 1991a).

The idea of Hindutava, as a national ideal is more puzzling than convincing. In the words of Debasis Chakravarty, "Hindutava as a state religion does not even cover all Hindus, let alone India as a whole. It merely represents the views and interests of a small section of the Brahmin priesthood somehow subsisting under present conditions. Hence, the proposition that the religious ideals of Hindutava will ensure the unity and
integrity of the country is the hallucination of a few self-styled politicians and an illusion of the vast mass of ignorants" (Chakravarty, 1991a). It also means 'equality' of all religions under the domination of Hinduism as the superior and major religion and branding as a foreigner anybody who refuses to accept the BJP-Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh version of history (Chakravarty, 1991b). Thus the "positive secularism" of the Bharatiya Janata Party turns into a positive negation of the rights of non-believers.

IV. Gandhian Socialism

In contrast to the BJS's chauvinistic Hindu Nationalism, the BJP projected itself in more moderate and humanistic guise by adopting 'Gandhian Socialism' as a prominent ideology of the party. The BJP leadership accepted Gandhi's idea of fulfillment of man's material and spiritual needs. Bread, freedom and employment are the Gandhian first important principles. The BJP make these principles the central core of development strategy and try to build a national consensus around them. The Gandhian Socialism based upon the Indian spiritual ethos is one unique ideology which has become the cornerstone of Indian political heritage. The Bharatiya Janata Party leadership rejected Marxism or scientific socialism for its adoption of violent means. All the communist revolutions have adopted the course of violence and have survived, resulting in tragic consequence, by greater use of force against its own people. According to BJP leadership a Marxist revolution eats its own child.

Unlike Marxian socialism, which subjects human values to social relations, conditions of production and material conditions, Gandhian Socialism attempts to reconstruct the socio-economic system on the basis of historically evolved and tested
human values. For preventing exploitation of man by man in the society, a plan for economic decentralization should be drawn based upon ethical and moral principles. Gandhian Socialism favors decentralization of economic and political power, revitalization of the representative institutions, especially at the local level, participatory democracy and reduction in the size of bureaucracy etc. It means Gandhian Socialism considers decentralization as the basis of its political system wherein two parallel systems of political institutions and processes exist. The one will be institution of Representative democracy and other will be institution of Participatory democracy (Swain, 2001).

Gandhian Socialism aims at ultimately replacing both capitalism and stateism by the principles of a co-operative system and trusteeship in all fields of economic activity. Actually concentration of economic power either in the hands of the state or in the hands of individual has its own dangers and leads to corruption in power. Gandhian Socialism is not a mere set of objectives or ends as it also demands reliance on right or reasonable means (Fox, 1987). The gradual transformation of the society toward trusteeship and co-operative commonwealth should take place through non-violent means. Gandhi’s idea of trusteeship shows a third way to the world by inhibiting the good aspects of both capitalism and communism. For harmonizing the interests of consumers, producers, the state owners of property and labor, there is no alternative except trusteeship. The concept provides politico-economic democracy which would ultimately end exploitation.

The BJP pledged to mobilize a national campaign for adopting Gandhian Socialism as third alternative which ensure reconciliation of freedom and equality. Gandhism has
been misinterpreted to mean either total reliance on 'small is beautiful' or limited scientific and technological development. In fact, in the Gandhian framework there is always a scope for large, medium and small, and there need not be any restriction on any ideology so long as it does not debase human beings or becomes an instrument of exploitation or neo-colonialism. The Indian civilization has always progressed on the basis of a combination of moral values and positive approach to science.

V. Value Based Politics

Vajpayee pronounced, the fifth commitment of the Bharatiya Janata Party is to pursue the Value based politics. Criticizing the political manipulations of the contemporary politicians on the chess board of politics he said, "I believe that the country's crisis is essentially a moral crisis. The biggest curse of our public life is that moral values have given way to self-seeking and power lust, and politics has become a pure power game" (Vajpayee, 1980) The BJP finds this degeneration of public life in the form of unethical means adopted by the Prime Ministers during the elections of 1969, Declaration of National Emergency in 1975 to cling on to power rather than to security, serious crimes such as hijacking, blatant collusion of politicians with anti-social elements and incitement of communal, casteist, regional feelings etc. during the 1980 elections. The process of degeneration gets further manifestation in the double standards of morality. In the process, this moral decay has ultimately permeated the entire Indian society, the bureaucracy, the industry and the trade. The Nation as a whole looses its capability to face challenges in the wake of the erosion of moral strength.

The BJP aims to build up such a Value-based politics, and thus seek to cleanse the filth surrounding the public life (Vajpayee, 1980). The party committed itself to
strengthen the values of tolerance, contentment, simple living, hardwork and brotherhood on the basis of which a new Indian society would be built on the basis of programmes, policies and approaches advocated by Mahatma Gandhi, Jai Parkash Narayan and Pt. Deen Dayal Upadhayay. Vajpayee called upon his party colleagues to launch a struggle by consciously organizing the poor peasantry, workers, the harijans, the tribals and other exploited sections of the population. This would result in a new society free from exploitation, discrimination and inequality. For successfully mobilizing the masses, he kept before his party the task of establishing credibility in the minds of the people. To quote his words "The people must feel convinced that there is a party different from the crowd of self-seekers who swamp the political stage, that its aim is not somehow to sneak into office and that its policy is based on certain 80 values and principles" (Vajpayee, 1980).

It was a great Intellectual effort on the part of Vajpayee to ensure BJP's start as a part and parcel of mainstream politics in terms of issues, ideas, perceptions and even in terms of political vocabulary, idioms and language. In his persuasive Presidential Address to the National Convention, Vajpayee made little reference to the veteran ideologue of Bharatiya Jana Sangh’s D.D. Upadhayay and completely ignored the founder of Bharatiya Jana Sangh Dr. S.P. Mookerjee. Precisely, Bharatiya Janata Party under Vajpayee's leadership opted for a nearly complete rejection of the BJS in order to become a meaningful, viable and stable national political party. The party had the vision and the political will to transform India into a prosperous and powerful nation in the initial decades of the next century.
All the responses and suggestions regarding the main ideological thrust of the party were examined. There were suggestions to include Antyodaya, establishment of a society free from exploitation and based on equality, modernism and application of science and technology for eradicating poverty, upliftment of downtrodden etc. Few extreme suggestions came up to abandon all the existing commitments except one i.e. 'Nationalism' (Chaudhary, 1991).

Whether Nationalism can be defined strictly as a political ideology or not in the context of Politics in India, nationalism became an ideology par excellence. While seeking independence for the country, political leaders and Indians intellectual establishment became engaged in a broad based discussion on the nature and functions of the state, the potentials and the limits of political authority, the basis of political legitimacy and the definition of national identity. Nationalism has two important versions - Indian Nationalism and Hindu Nationalism. Hindu Nationalism developed as a reaction against the Indian Nationalism. In the words of Heimsath, "Having at its base an anti-traditional, liberal democratic, secular and politically oriented concept of the nation, "the early nationalism developed an ideology which could properly encompass all Indian cultures and religions" (Heimsath, 1964). These nationalists sought to distance themselves from the cultural heritage of Hindus.

The origin of 'Hindu Nationalism', is rooted in the revival of Hindu Culture and social reform movements of the 19th century. This movement aimed at social reforms by incorporating western values and sought their validation through re-interpretation of Hindu sacred texts. Influenced by both liberal and Marxist thought, Nehru, after World War I, developed an alternate model of Indian Nationalism (Nehru, 1946). He was of
the view that India needed a Nationalist ideology based on rational ideas and norms of behavior which could rise above religious beliefs and practices. Such an ideology should enable a person to override the narrow caste, communal and regional loyalties which are deeply embedded in the psyche of the average Indian. Nehru perceived that it were economic factors that aggravated social and religious conflicts in India (Nehru, 1946). He was convinced that if and when traditional societies like that of India base their course of development on science and technology, secularism would become the norm of politics.

Nehru and his associates did not totally reject Hindu cultural ethos, recognizing the synthetic nature of Indian culture to which many other cultures, especially Muslims, had made their contributions. However, according to Hindu nationalists, their goal was to "remake India in the western image." Nehru promoted cultural and ideological consensus among the people of India irrespective of their race, religion and place of birth. The Nehruvian school of Indian Nationalism became the dominant ideology in post independent India and it led to the introduction of liberal democratic institutions. Slowly and steadily there were such developments that stand testimony to the failure of Nehruvian ideology of Indian Nationalism. The revival and re-assertion of the Hindu Nationalism in the 1980's not only has led to the rejection of the Nehruvian concept of secularism but also directed towards actually re-defining the Indian National identity (Jain, 1991).

The concepts of Hindu Rashtra (Nation) is considered the logical product of this movement. Historically, the people living in the region east of the river Sindhu (Indus) are called Hindus, whatever their religion is. The term Hindu does not denote religion.
Hindu Nationalism according to its proponents advocates a single homogeneous national identity for the whole country, rejecting the idea that India is a multi-national state (Malik & Singh, 1994). The term Hindu has got cultural connotations. According to Seshadri and Sudarshan, the Hindu Nationalist Ideologue, "It denotes the national way of life here. All those who feel firmly committed to the unity and sanctity of our country and our people, and look upon our great forebears as their national hero's and sublime values of our cultural life as their points of veneration and emulation, are all Hindus" (Seshadri and Sudarshan, 2011).

Thus, in practice, the concept of Hindu Rashtra becomes identical to Hinduism as a religion. Critics feel that the concept of Hindu Nationalism is narrow and it seeks unity among those who believe in specific values and norms of behaviour. This becomes clear when we look at the Hindutava, the key concept of Hindu National Ideology.

Hindutava or Indianness is the "sum total of the ever-evolving qualities and attributes, moral and ethical values, and the attitude of mind which all make the inhabitants of this country a distinctive entity by themselves" (Seshadri, 2011). Hindus have the largest and unbroken history of civilizational and cultural evolution of an essentially indigenous nature (Ray, 2005).

Then after a lot of discussion the leaders of BJP decided that existing commitments of the party needs to be updated in the light of the contemporary socio-political situations. In view of the party's call to its workers to fulfill a national historical role, for re-dedicating themselves for creating a national alternative to meet the crisis of Indian society, the working group stressed equal importance to the formulation of an alternative 'ideology' around which a national movement can be launched. The ideology
must be capable to resolve the multi-dimensional crisis confronting mankind today. It was felt that there must be an Integral approach which later on, came to be known as Integral Humanism, the basic philosophy of Bharatiya Janata Party (Bharatiya Janata Party, 1980).

The working group, felt that in the contemporary scenario, the mankind is engulfed by unprecedented crisis which has assumed dimensions covering all aspects of human life and environment. All the nations of the world are troubled nations. They are suffering from various problems ranging from degradation of natural and social environment, unequal distribution of income, loss of faith in values, traditions and institutions, monetary disorders like yawning inflation, unemployment, rise in crimes, violence, alcoholism and drug abuse have become universal phenomenon. Despite of sophisticated tools and techniques, human efforts are unable to offer solutions to these problems.

A majority of modern thinkers continue to analyze all complex phenomena - social, biological or material by taking the universe as a machine. It has resulted in a reductionist or fragmented approach and ultimately leading to the exploitation of nature and weaker sections by a superior mind. Thus the roots of the exploitative socio-economic systems and institutions lie in this defective mechanistic perception of world phenomenon.

No basic change has taken place in BJP’s ideology since its inception, except the working group of party (Report) which recommended the change of Gandhian Socialism with Integral Humanism (Ray, 2005). There was certain nervousness on the use of word Gandhian. The word Gandhian, therefore, in many minds has negative
connotation (Paranjape, 2009). Gandhi’s Socialism was also found repugnant by a large section of the Bharatiya Janata Party hardliners. The right wing of the party felt that Bharatiya Janata Party possibly could not continue to have the Socialism as the declaration of its goal (Dixit, 1986).

That is why the working group rejected the socialism of whatever variety as unsuitable to the Indian conditions. Gandhian approach to the socio-economic problems has been reiterated, and Integral Humanism has been elevated to the basic philosophy of Bharatiya Janata Party. The central theme of this Integral Humanism is the development of human personality. This concept has been enunciated by Deen Dayal Upadhayay. In order to understand the true features of ideology of BJP, the concept of Integral Humanism needs to be studied and analyzed in detail (Bharatiya Janata Party, 1985).

**Integral Humanism**

The working group of the party presented its report to the National Executive at Bhopal on 20th, July, 1985. Subsequently the National Executive and the National Council of party met at Gandhi Nagar Gujarat. The report was considered and it was recommended that 'Integral Humanism' should form the basic philosophy of the party. It was also decided that Gandhian Socialism should be changed into Gandhian approach to socio-economic issues leading to the establishment of an egalitarian society free from every type of exploitation. The party also re-iterated its objectives to build up India as a strong nation which is modern, progressive and enlightened in outlook and which proudly draws inspiration from India's age old cultural ethos. These changes in the ideological thrust and orientation of the party were clearly meant to enthuse those
supporters of the party who were strongly rooted in the political moorings and ethos of the erstwhile Bharatiya Jana Sangh.

Upadhayay was one of those ideal personalities like Shukracharya, Brihaspati and Kautilya, who inspired the modern politics to stand on healthy foundation of purity and humanity. Upadhayay’s greatness was appreciated by his followers and opponents alike even after his death. Praja Socialist Party leader Nath Pai described him as a link in the tradition of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Mahatma Gandhi and Subash Chandra Bose. CPI leader Hiren Mukerji named him 'Ajaat Shatru' (enemy of none) and Acharya Kriplani similized him as 'Daivi Sampada' (divine wealth) (Upadhayay, 1992).

Infact, Upadhayay wanted to evolve such a political philosophy which must be in tune with the nature and tradition of Bharat, and can make all round progress of the nation. He named his philosophy- Integral Humanism. He was of the view that this philosophy with its roots embedded in the glorious achievement of this country, will provide universal nutrition to the curious minds. It is the only remedy to the imbalance created by the modern industrialization that has brought out the humanity at the edge of precipice. Integral Humanism re-establishes man's place in the right perspective and tries to develop him as a complete personality. It is a concept which is familiar to the vast masses of the party, and was given a detailed philosophical and political exploitation. And the constitution of the party was amended to incorporate Integral Humanism as the basic philosophy of the party (Bharatiya Janata Party, 1985).

It ensures the integrated development of human personality. A critic said, "Man is a conglomerate of body, intellect and soul along with the material development we have to consider the moral and spiritual development also" (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2004).
Similarly in the words of Upadhayay "Body, mind, intelligence and soul - these four make up an individual. But since these are integrated, we cannot think of each part separately" (Nene, 1988). He further added that "Progress of man means simultaneous progress of the body, mind, intellect and soul, and it is known as the integrated human development of human personality. As the individual makes the society, the integrated development of the entire individual means integrated development of human society. Upadhayay said, a nation is itself a big human society in a definite territory and it has got its own soul.

The philosophy of Integral Humanism, follows the essentials of Bharatiya Sanskriti (culture), seeks to discover the unity underlying diversity. It takes an integrated view of both the society and the individual and find that basically there is no conflict between them. Without the individual there is no society and without society the individual can hardly exist. Individual’s moral and material progress is possible only when he is guided by 'Dharma'. Dharma is not a religion, as the term is frequently translated in English. Dharma means "those eternal principles that sustains an entity - individual or corporate, and abiding by which, that entity can achieve material prosperity in this world and spiritual salvation in the next" (Dayal, 1979). Hence, it is this 'Dharma' that is supreme. Dharma is the repository of the Nation's soul. If Dharma is destroyed, the nation perishes. Anyone who abandons Dharma, betrays the nation" (Upadhayay, 1979)

The 'Integral Humanism' forms the basic philosophy of the BJP. It enshrines the political, socio-economic, religious and developmental ideas of the party. The Bharatiya Janata Party considers 'Integral Humanism' as a doctrine in consonance with ancient Indian ethos. The party believes that 'Integral Humanism', being a part of Indian
philosophy, builds up a new social order which is capable of resolving modern conflicts and there is no type of exploitation in the society. This integral approach establishes a symbiotic relationship between the society (whole) and the individual (parts). The philosophy of 'Integral Humanism' recognizes the urge for freedom, on the part of both individual and the nation, as natural. Democracy is a device to uphold the people’s right. It is not only confined to political participation to safeguard people’s rights. It is extended to economic and social spheres also, where each constituent participate equally for sustaining the system (whole) and the individual enjoys various fundamental rights (Upadhayay, 1979).

4.7.5 Nationalism of Bharatiya Janata Party

There are two predominant versions of nationalism in India: Indian nationalism and Hindu nationalism. Hindu nationalism developed as a reaction against the Indian nationalism. The proponents of the latter were mainly Western-educated Indian elites who were secular and utilitarian in their approach. In the words of Heimsath (1964), "Having at its base an anti-traditional, liberal democratic, secular and politically oriented concept of the nation," the early nationalism developed an ideology which "could properly encompass all Indian cultures and religions." These nationalists sought to distance themselves from the cultural heritage of Hindus (cf. Malik and Singh 1994).

The origin of Hindu nationalism, on the other hand, is rooted in the Hindu cultural revival and social reform movements of the nineteenth century. Being syncretistic in nature, the movement aimed at social reforms by incorporating Western
values and sought their validation through reinterpretation of Hindu sacred texts (Malik and Singh 1994).

To the Hindu elites in the nineteenth century, the concept of Indian national identity was indistinguishable from Hindu identity. They accepted textual Brahmanism as a potent political force, and linked the rising Indian identity to the period of Vedas and Upanishads and accepted the role of the state in carrying on the reforms of the religious aspects of Hindu society. Nandy (1980) observes:

_Brahmanism provided, for the first time, a basis for collective identity, which was more open to new ideas and less fettered by primordial allegiance and fragmentation of the myriad folk cultures of India. Predominantly integrationist and liberal, it was informed by a certain positivist universalism that made sense to a majority of the Indians in the public sphere._

They laid the "foundation of Indian self-image that would not humiliate the country's majority of Hindu inhabitants (Nandy 1980). Swami Vivekananda, who became the apostle of Hindu nationalism, recognized the spiritual heritage of Hinduism as the basis of the country's emerging national identity. He also declared, “The backbone, the foundation, the bedrock of India's national life was its spiritual genius. Let others talk of politics, of the glory of acquisition or of the power and spread of commercialism; these cannot inspire India. Religion is the one consideration in India.”

Aurobindo Ghosh, another prominent philosopher-thinker of the early period of the nationalist movement, also closely identified nationalism with the teachings of Sanatan Dharma, the orthodox version of Hinduism. Giving an absolutist definition of
the newly developing Indian national identity, he asserted that "nationalism is simply
the passionate aspiration of the realization of the Divine Unity in the nation." For Ghosh,
therefore, nationalism was a religion, one which requires pursuit of an active rather than
a meditative life. For him, the Indian nation was an incarnation of a Mother Goddess.

In contrast to Vivekananda, Bankimchandra Chattopadhyya, in his propagation of
national identity, emphasized Hindu valor and blamed Hindus' excessive
otherworldliness for the lack of national unity among Hindus in India. He also asserted
that Hindu history was falsified by alien historians, including the Muslim scholars in
order to dampen the Hindu quest for liberty and unity. Furthermore, Chattopadhyya held
that, unlike the Europeans, Hindus were not interested in the acquisition of power but,
rather sought knowledge as a way to personal salvation.

Chattopadhyya and other early Indian nationalists became ardent devotees of
Durga, the goddess of power. Early nationalists sanctified India, and nationalism
became a new religion for them. Thus, Chattopadhyya and Bipanchandra Pal, another
early protagonist of Hindu nationalism established a parallel between ancient Hindu
gods and goddesses and the new god called nation. However, despite the strong Hindu
element, the emergence of a national idea in India had noticeable European
characteristics to it.

Such an ideology of nationalism, laced with symbols and myths of Hindu
religion, was further popularized by Bal Gangadhar Tilak and his associates in the
Congress, and by the writings of a host of authors in regional languages of India,
especially in Maharashtra, Bengal, Gujarat, and Hindi writings of north India. Such an
ideology not only gave a glorious vision of the past but also visualized a future where
the religious and cultural traditions of the ancient times would serve as guideposts for the upcoming generations (Malik and Singh 1994).

4.7.6 Reassertion of Hindu Nationalism as an Alternate Ideology of State

There are many proponents arguing the cause of Hindu nationalism, one being the majority's right to set the goals of the Indian state. First of all, Hindu nationalists argue that the partition of India on the basis of religion and the creation of the Muslim-majority state of Pakistan was itself a testimony to the failure of the Nehruvian ideology of Indian nationalism. If Muslim nationalism was the reason for the creation of Pakistan, logically Hindu nationalism should have become the dominant ideology of the Indian state. Zutshi (1986) argues:

‘Rightly or wrongly, the Congress in fact robbed the Hindu majority of its legal right to succeed the British Raj. With Hinduism as its religion, India could have been a truly secular state. Intentionally or otherwise the move of Nehru reduced the Hindu majority to an impotent political nobody, a game that has been played by the successive Congress regimes to perpetuate its rule -and that too on the strength of the Hindu vote.’ (cf. Malik and Singh 1994).

Hindu nationalists reject the idea that Indian culture is a composite or synthetic culture. While it might have been influenced by other cultures, it is not simply a mixture of those cultures. All others, such as Buddhist, Jain, or Sikh cultures, are Hindu sub-cultures in reality, since all of them originated out of Hinduism, and thus are part of Indian culture. Hindu nationalists reject the European version of a secular state, as for
them their own religion and culture very are flexible and tolerant. According to L.K. Advani, the Bharatiya Janata Party leader:

*Religious tradition in India has been remarkably free of taboos or intolerance.

In ancient times, this country had Charvaka ridiculing God and religion in a forthright manner. Even such an unabashed protagonist of atheism and materialism has been acknowledged as a Rishi [sage]' (Advani 1988)

The BJP leaders insist that secularism is natural to Hinduism because it is "impossible for the Hindus to evolve an established church or proclaim a state religion and call upon the state to impose it by force" (Advani 1992). For the Hindu nationalists "secularism means guarantee of equality and justice to all citizens irrespective of their faith. No discrimination against or in favor of anyone" (Advani 1992). The Hindu nationalists assert, that Nehru and his associates were able to declare India a secular state only because of India's Hindu majority. Such a step could not have been taken in a Muslim-majority state. According to them, however, the Nehruvian version of secularism ultimately became "a euphemism for Hindu-baiting" (Advani 1992). There has been strong criticism of secular intellectuals, such as the Marxists and the socialists, who, Hindu nationalists charge, have borrowed their ideologies from the West and have deliberately distorted and misrepresented the Hindu cultural heritage.

Therefore, Hindu nationalists argue that the Indian state needs to take no special action to safeguard the distinct cultural or religious identity of such minorities as the Muslims, since Muslims enjoyed cultural and religious freedom in such Hindu kingdoms (Malik and Singh 1994).
Contemporary Hindu nationalists like Rajnath Singh, Yogi Adityanath, Subramaniam Swamy, Mohan Bhagwat, Rakesh Sinha and many other insist on the Muslims' acceptance of the pre-Islamic cultural heritage of India. They argue that the ‘Bharatiya’ (Indian) culture, that is, the ancient civilization of India and its traditions, preserved to the present is the heritage of all Indians irrespective of their religion (Basham 1991). The problem arises when the intellectual advocates of Hindu nationalism insist on Muslims' acceptance of the ancient cultural heritage of India, but refuse to recognize the contributions of Muslims to the development of Indian culture.

4.7.7 Revival and Redefinition of Indian National Identity: Hindu Rashtra

The revival and reassertion of Hindu nationalism in the 1980s not only has led to the rejection of the Nehruvian concept of secularism but also is directed toward actually redefining Indian national identity. The concept of Hindu Rashtra (nation) is considered the logical product of this movement. Historically, the people living in the region east of the river Sindhu (Indus) are called Hindus, whatever their religion. Used in this sense, the term Hindu does not denote religion. Ray (1991) quotes Vasant Sathe, a former Congress politician, “all the citizens of Hindustan are Hindus. Hindu does not mean religion; rather, it signifies nationality.”

For Hindu nationalists the secular concept of Indian national identity, based upon an alien ideology of socialism, is limited to the state and lacks those psychic elements which bind the people as a nation, and Nehru’s socialism without Hindu cultural content cannot sanctify the unity of country (Malik and Singh 1994).
The concept of Hindu rashtra, as the foundation of Hindu nationalism, does not promote the development of authoritarianism. Rather, it calls for the country to have a democratic system of government, with equal voting rights. The fear of domination of the minority by the majority is ‘just a phantom propped up by interested politicians and religious fanatics to maintain their separatist grip upon their faithful’ (Swarup 1987).

By understanding the ideology of Savarkar and Golwalkar, one can understand the political ideology of BJP and also why nationalism is at the core of its foreign policy. Both Savarkar and Golwalkar argued that although war is undesirable, yet it is inevitable because the world is full of selfish individuals. They suggest that India must cultivate a willingness and ability to engage in war as and when required, which is a major shift from the Nehruvian ideology (Savarkar 1937, Sagar 2014). For Savarkar the universal state constituted the highest ideal in politics, however, he argues that human tendency towards parochialism makes ‘survival of the fittest’ the rule of nature. He was against absolute non-violence professed by Gandhi and said violence is the law of nature. Sarvarkar (1984) refers to Hindus as a martial race whose martial instinct was subdued by Gandhi’s doctrine of non-violence. He argued that:

‘If a serpent finds its way slyly into a pack of children sleeping soundly or a mad dog rushes all of a sudden foaming with insane exasperation into a crowded fair and you do not kill it there and then even if you can, on principle of absolute non-violence, you abet the murderous violence which the serpent or the mad dog commits by biting innocent human beings to death, you are criminally doubly guilty in refusing to save the life of human beings to spare the life of a serpent or a dog and leave it free to take more human lives at leisure as occasion arises. On the
contrary if you kill the serpent and the dog there and then you are still guilty of violence from the point of your own principle of absolute non-violence killing no living being. Even this one illustration is enough to prove that the principle of absolute non-violence is not only absolutely impracticable but anti-human and therefore absolutely immoral’. (Savarkar 1937)

Golwalkar also speaks on the lines of classical realism, calling conflict a hard reality, and groups and states are inspired only by self-interest. He draws inspiration from Kautilya’s mandala theory and justifies the use of force.

‘Our nation is surrounded by various other nations and it is a matter of history that no two nations are either permanently friendly or permanently hostile to each other. The relationships on changing. Each country is guided by its own self-interest and does not hesitate to stoop to any tactics to achieve its ends. So they are all in a way 'potential enemies' to our country. It is all right that, while speaking and moving among others, we cherish sentiments of friendship, world peace and world fraternity and even strive for them. But the statesman, who guide the destinies of the country, must always keep in view this hard reality of the world which can be ignored only at our peril’. (Golwalkar 2000)

Golwalkar (2000) argues that ‘no country that is weak and unable to protect its own interests cannot show the path of greatness to others.’ Golwalkar’s idea of power has a striking resemblance with Thucydides’, who said “the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must.” According to Golwalkar, ‘the basic rule of relations between nations is the law of the jungle – the strong feeding upon the weak and getting stronger.’
In order to survive both Savarkar and Golwalkar advocate alliance formation. Savarkar (1937) suggests that ‘befriend those who are likely to serve our country’s interests in spite of any ism’ they follow for themselves and to befriend only so long as it serves our purpose,’ while Golwalkar (2000) suggests that based on self interest ‘nations change their friends and enemies.’ He also stresses that alliances are not the only way to ensure national security and it is very important for a state to have power because ‘the strong do not desire the friendship of the weak.’ Golwalkar further argues that pacifist slogans and papers serve as the camouflage for self-seeking predatory states to pursue their own ulterior motives. He argues that a weak state unable to engage in violence cannot claim to be a pacifist. He says:

‘A person sufficiently strong to do himsa (violence), but not doing so out of restraint, discretion and compassion can alone be said to be practicing ahimsa (non-violence). Suppose a strong man is going in a road and somebody knocks against him. If the strong man says with compassion, “All right, my dear fellow, I excuse you for the wrong you have done me”, then we say that the strong man has practiced non-violence. For, though he is capable of giving him a blow and smashing his skull, he has restrained himself. Suppose, a thin, lean man – just a mosquito! – is going and somebody pulls his ears and the ‘mosquito’ trembling from head to foot says, "Sir, I excuse you", who will believe him? Who will say that he is practicing non-violence?’ (Golwalkar 2000)

Thus, we see that both Savarkar and Golwalkar, who can be termed as the ideational fathers of BJP, saw the international system as anarchic and argued that having power is the only way for a state to safeguard its own interests. By
understanding Savarkar and Golwalkar, it becomes clear why BJP opposes the idea of Nehruvian pacifism and endorses the idea of a strong state.

4.7.8 Supportive Organizations

I. The RSS: The Fountainhead of Hindu Nationalism

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was launched in September 1925 by Dr. Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, a Maharashtrian Brahmin born in 1889 in the city of Nagpur. In his youth Hedgewar was attracted by the Indian National Congress, and in the 1920s he actively participated in its activities. However, he was soon disillusioned with the policies and politics of the Congress. It was the outbreak of the Hindu-Muslim riot in 1923 that spurred him to find an alternate model of nation-building in India in contrast to what was being proposed by Gandhi and Nehru.

Deeply influenced by the writings of Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, he became convinced that the cultural and religious heritage of Hindus ought to be the basis of Indian nationhood. The essence of Savarkar's Hindutva, which Hedgewar adopted as the basis of Indian nationhood, is a person's acceptance of India, with its ancient cultural heritage, not only as his/her fatherland but also as the holy land. Savarkar asserted:

To the Hindus, Hindustan being their fatherland and holy land, the love they bear to Hindustan is boundless. What is called nationalism can be defined as in fact the national communalism of the majority community.... Thus, in Hindustan it is the Hindus, professing Hindu religion and being in
overwhelming majority, that constitute the national community and create and formulate the nationalism of the nation. (Chakrabarty & Pandey, 2009)

Although Savarkar and the leaders of the RSS were not able to work together, the RSS' definition of Indian nationhood reflects his concept of Hindutva.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was founded as a cultural organization, but it had a distinct political goal. The volunteers who joined the Sangh before the independence of India pledged to work towards the liberation of the Hindu nation and to safeguard Hindu dharma and its culture. After independence the pledge was slightly changed; now they pledge to "work for all-round progress of Bharatavarsha by strengthening the holy Hindu Dharma, Hindu Sanskriti (culture) and Samaj (society)."

Despite the declaration of its political intents, the RSS for the most part stayed out of politics. Its activities were directed towards character building of its members through inculcation of discipline, the spirit of service to Hindu society and Hindu rashtra, and devotion to mother India (Bharatmata).

After Hedgewar's death in 1940 Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, popularly known in the RSS circle as Guruji, became the head of the organization. Golwalkar, another Maharashtrian Brahmin, was educated in Benaras Hindu University, where he had earned a Master of Science in biology. An ascetic by disposition and interested in Hindu philosophy of Vedanta, Golwalkar showed little interest in politics. Initially there was dissatisfaction with his style of operation, especially with his reluctance to involve the RSS in politics, and there was some defection from the organization. Nevertheless, the
RSS earned enormous goodwill among Hindus with its work during the partition of India in 1947.

Golwalkar became a spokesperson of Hindu chauvinism, and his explanation of Hindu nationalism is well known:

*The non-Hindu peoples in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture, i.e. they must not only give up their attitude of intolerance and ungratefulness towards this land and its age-old traditions but must also cultivate the positive attitude of love and devotion instead-in a word they must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privilege, far less any preferential treatment-not even citizens' rights.* (Commuri, 2010)

It has been frequently charged that the RSS is against the minorities, especially Muslims. Nanaji Deshmukh, a senior leader of the organization, called the charge preposterous since it goes against the philosophy of the organization. He also denied that the RSS incites riots, adding that the RSS wants "to see India unified into a strong nation through a process of integration in which all communities join the national mainstream" (Malik & Singh, 1994)

Until the late 1970s the RSS did not admit non-Hindus into its ranks. It did so only in 1977, under intense public and political pressure. Anti-Muslim bias is clearly visible in the RSS publications. The RSS heroes like Shivaji, Maharana Pratap, and
Guru Gobind Singh fought against the Muslim rulers. The RSS glorifies their activities, while its villains come from the ranks of Muslim invaders and rulers.

It is often asserted by the RSS intellectuals that even after independence Muslims in India have not become part of the national mainstream. Support for the creation of Pakistan came from the areas where the Muslims were in the minority such as Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat. Most of them stayed on in India even after the establishment of the Islamic state of Pakistan, while Pakistan drove its entire non-Muslim population from its Western wing.

The RSS believes that Indian Muslims still hold on to "their pre-independence psyche and emotional attachment to Pakistan and its ideology. According to RSS analysts, Indian Muslims are led by fundamentalists and fanatic clergy, who keep preaching about the unity of ummah and therefore "even today the Muslim community in India tends to look at itself in isolation, far away from the national mainstream" (Kirmani, 2016). The RSS holds that Namaz-E-Jumma (Friday prayer) is used to denounce members of other religious communities and to teach religious bigotry. In these sermons by the Muslim clergy not even the government is spared. Furthermore, RSS members say that a large number of Muslims are educated in Madarsaas, funded by Saudi money, where half-educated clerics "brainwash children with imaginary tales of Islamic millennium. These 'Madarsaas' are nurseries for communal fundamentalism. According to Balasaheb Deoras, even though Mahatma Gandhi appeased Muslims, they never accepted him as one of their own" (Malik & Singh, 1994).

Bani Deshpande, a former member of the Communist Party of India who later became an RSS supporter, wrote in RSS mouthpiece Organiser that Islam is
incompatible with the ideals of a secular state. He bases this on the assertion of a Muslim intellectual that the "character of Islam is immutable and eternal and will not bend itself to any sort of remodeling for the realization of such ephemeral goals as nationalism and secularism" (Deshpande, 1993).

The BJP and the RSS believe that by accepting the basic premises of the ideology of Hindu nationalism, the Muslims of India would be assured of their honorable place in the society. Those Indian secularists, the RSS charges, who keep harping that a triumph of Hindu nationalism would result in another partition of India are indirectly encouraging the Muslim separatism (Rao, 2019). Since the Muslims do not constitute a majority in any of the states of India except Kashmir Valley, the secularists' strategy is designed to create unnecessary fear in the minds of people, according to the RSS.

Golwalkar kept the RSS out of active politics although he allowed many RSS workers to join politics individually. This lack of participation in politics prompted V.D. Savarkar to remark that the "epitaph for the RSS volunteers will be that he was born, he joined the RSS and died without accomplishing anything" (Kulkarni, 2017)

The RSS was courted by right-wing Congress leaders after independence. When it was found that the RSS was not involved in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi and in July 1949 the government lifted its ban on the organization, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, second only to Jawaharlal Nehru in the Congress party, persuaded Golwalkar to let the RSS become part of the Congress. While the RSS volunteers would be involved in cultural and educational activities leading to character building among young Indians,
Congress leadership would stay active in politics. However, because of the opposition of Nehru, the deal fell through (Jaffrelot, 1996).

Balasaheb Madhukar Dattareya Deoras succeeded Golwalkar as the RSS chief called Sar-Sangh Chalak in 1973 after Golwalkar's death. During his tenure, Balasaheb was considered one of the ten most powerful people in India, because of his organizational abilities.

It is believed that during his leadership the Sangh widely expanded its activities and assumed a far more politically active role. The RSS' participation in the 1974-75 movement led by Jayaprakash Narayan against political corruption and for reorientation of Indian politics on a moral basis extended the reach of the RSS into the remote villages of the country. This enabled the RSS volunteers, who originated mostly from urban India, to familiarize themselves with the problems faced by rural Indians.

Moving away from the abstract Vedantic traditions upheld by his predecessors, Balasaheb employed the symbols of popular Hinduism to mobilize the Hindu population. Meanwhile, he was willing to back political parties other than the BJP if they promoted the cause of Hindus and the territorial integrity of India. Such skillful use of his organization brought the BJP back into the fold of the RSS to the extent that the BJP has virtually become the political arm of the RSS.

The RSS under Balasaheb's leadership sought to build a powerful and modern India which could rival the West. He believed that the "responsibility of building up the nation's future rests with the Hindu society and only a well organized Hindu society can discharge this responsibility" (Balasaheb, 1992). Balasaheb believed that India's future
lied with the Hindu nationalists, and he warned that all those "who are under the illusion that this nation can be strengthened by belittling the Hindus, by dubbing them narrow-minded and communal, are running after a mirage” (Agha, 2019).

Unlike many BJP politicians who were unwilling to undertake any social reform among Hindus, Balasaheb not only denounced undesirable customs in Hindu society but also believed that the RSS volunteers should actively oppose the caste system and untouchability and create harmony among the different sectors of Hindu society. He believed that the Hindu way of life should be an example for the rest of the world. However, Hindus can set up an exemplary way of life only if there is no discrimination and segregation among them. He did not place much trust in the government's ability to bring about social revolution in India. He argued that it is rather the people's power which can bring real changes in the society and polity.

Many have grave concerns about the decline of traditional values in Indian society. This normlessness has caused a moral vacuum leading to an increase in violence and anarchy all around in the country. The RSS holds that short-sighted politicians use divisive appeals and arouse passions among different segments of the society in search of political power and votes, and that they have little concern about the future of the country and the society. The entry of criminal elements into politics has aggravated the situation. The new rich classes use their wealth to buy politicians and influence, corrupting both the society and the polity. According to the RSS, it is the non-political organizations which should take the initiative to halt this decline and restore moral values in the society.
After the BJP moved away from Vajpayee's strategy and ideology, Balasaheb inducted the best and the most dedicated of his pracharaks into the BJP. In the 1991 elections many of the parliamentary candidates of the BJP came from the ranks of the RSS. According to one estimate, out of 477 candidates nominated by the party, over 300 had RSS background. Similarly, in the present Modi government, three out of four ministers are rooted in RSS (Pandey & Shankar, 2020). Furthermore, the RSS workers were deeply involved in electioneering and campaigning. It was reported that only the RSS pracharaks were entrusted with jobs such as finances, publicity, managing polling booths, and getting people to vote.

Although the BJP included some young RSS workers in its candidates for parliamentary and state legislative offices, the top party leadership at the state and the national levels is dominated by people in their mid-sixties or early seventies. Because of their training and organizational discipline, the younger generation of BJP leaders coming from the ranks of the RSS does not show any eagerness to take over the place of the party elders. While leader like Rahul Gandhi, Priyanka Gandhi, Sachin Pilot, Jyotiraditya Sindhia, Omar Abdullah, Tejaswi Yadav follow dynastic politics, and have jumped the line ahead of many deserving men, people with strong roots in RSS like Sambit Patra, Sudhanshu Chaturvedi, Ram Madhav, Siddhart Nath Singh and many others seem willing to wait in the wings.

In 1989 India celebrated Jawaharlal Nehru's birth centenary at the same time the Virat Hindu Sammelan was convened to commemorate the birth centenary of Dr. Keshav B. Hedgewar. The events represented the dramatic changes that were beginning to unfold in India since the founding of the RSS. While Nehru's vision of a secular India
based on a liberal-socialist ideology started crumbling, Hedgewar's Hindu nationalism, represented by the RSS, was on the rise.

Until the 1990s, India's educated and westernized middle class was strongly committed to the Nehruvian concept of Indian national identity. However, in the past two decades, with the spread of education and increased media exposure, India has seen an enormous expansion in the size of a class that has started seeing through the wrongs done by Nehru. At the same time, with the introduction of criminal elements into Indian politics by the centrist parties, members of the middle class have become disenchanted with this new breed of politicians. The RSS has successfully exploited the middle class alienation and built a strong base in this class. The RSS has also been able to project an image of itself as an organization committed to certain basic values, its cadre being clean, incorruptible, committed to the service of the society, and devoted to the territorial integrity of the country.

The RSS is not dependent on personalities; its strength comes from its organization and the dedication of its volunteers to its ideological cause. The RSS has established itself as a social and political force, through its sophisticated use of modern media, its various service-related activities, and its crisis management during periods of national disasters, such as its help for the Hindu refugees after the partition of the country in 1947, its cooperation with the government during the wars of 1962, 1965, and 1971, and its relief efforts during floods in various states across India.

The impressive organizational abilities of the RSS are an asset for a political party like the BJP. The RSS' primary goal of mobilization of Hindus as a united community has been the cherished objective of all types of Hindu nationalists. The
organization's multifarious activities endear it to Hindus, generate a strong sense of identity, and provide it a solid support base.

However, its leaders' lack of political experience makes the RSS ideologically inflexible. Many of the RSS workers have a narrow mindset. They believe, like the Muslim leaders, that issues related to faith and religion are beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. Whether this stance is a reaction against the Muslims' intransigence or not, this kind of posture makes it almost impossible for the politicians to negotiate to find compromise solutions to emotionally complex problems. Such compromise is an integral part of the political process in a democratic society, but the intertwining of political and religious issues gets in the way. Since the BJP has accepted the RSS Hindu nationalism position, it is difficult for the BJP leadership to make any claim to the practice of genuine secularism.

Furthermore, the RSS looks upon Indian Islam as an alien religion and tends to distrust almost the entire Muslim community of India. This attitude results more from deep-seated prejudices than from existing realities. The recent political behavior of some of the Muslim leaders-like Shahabuddin and Shahi Imam Bukhari of Delhi, who called for the Muslim boycott of the celebration of India's Republic Day-did not help the cause of the Muslim community. Most of the Indian Muslims, however, ignored these leaders' disruptive strategies.

In order to prove their loyalty to the Indian state, the RSS demands that Muslims join the mainstream of national life. In other words, they should seek assimilation rather than special protection or privileges for their community.
The RSS propaganda keeps denouncing Muslim leaders' unwillingness to accept the central place of Hinduism in the political and cultural life of the country. Such strong denunciations reinforce the anti-Muslim prejudices of Hindus and add to the tension existing between the two communities.

II. Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)

The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) is another support group of the BJP and an important member of the RSS or the Sangh Parivar (the Sangh family). Although the Rao government in December 1992 imposed a ban on its activities and froze its bank accounts, it had to soon withdraw it orders, given the range of its activities and the support which the organization enjoys at the grass-roots level.

It is this organization which had raised the slogan "Beyond caste, beyond parties, O Hindus, awake, arise and unite" (Badhwar, 1986). Along with Virat Hindu Sammelan and Hindu Samajotsava, it has organized several massive Hindu conventions and conferences to give a sense of unity to the Hindus of India. The VHP runs schools, temples, hostels, and medical centers. It carries on massive propaganda, asserting that "around ninety-five percent of those who took part in the freedom struggle were Hindus. In the war with Pakistan also, ninety percent of the casualties were Hindus. And yet Hindus are second rate citizens in their own country. Their voice does not have any weight." The VHP denounced the previous Congress led governments for spending Hindu taxpayers' money to welcome the Pope in 1964 and 1986 and for providing
subsidies to the Muslims to make pilgrimages to Mecca, while forcing Hindus to pay pilgrimage taxes in their own country.

The VHP was established in 1966 in the city of Prayagraj (Allahabad). Its goals were to consolidate and strengthen the Hindu society, to protect and promote ethical values of Hindus, and to establish contact with the Hindus living in other parts of the world. Its six objectives include elimination of the practice of untouchability; unification of all Hindus irrespective of their linguistic, regional, sectarian, and class differences; and creation of a sense of pride in the cultural heritage of Hindus. It also seeks readmission of all those Hindus who embraced Christianity or Islam in the past and are now willing to come back into the fold of Hinduism.

The VHP has prepared a charter of seventeen different programs to be undertaken by the organization. These include such things as propagation of Sanskrit language, introduction of religious instruction in the universities, protection of cows, enlisting support of Hindu priests, saints and preachers to create religious consciousness among the Hindu masses, and holding frequent meetings and festivals to promote social consciousness and responsibility among followers of Hinduism.

To maintain its autonomy, the VHP bars politicians from holding any office within its organization. But this does not mean that the VHP does not have its own political agenda. Like the RSS, it seeks to bring the Muslims into the mainstream of Indian nationalism. The VHP does not oppose Islamic or Christian worship. According to its leaders, the organization is opposed only to those Muslim extremists who adopt an anti-Hindu and pro-Pakistan attitude. In the words of the VHP leaders:
We have no opposition to the people who accept Bharat as their motherland and who believe that the culture and traditions of Bharat as their own. Indonesians are Muslims by faith but they feel proud to participate in Ramalila or Rasalila. If the Muslims of this country also behave in a similar manner, there would be no problem whatsoever.

The VHP is an ideological ally of the RSS and works in close cooperation with the Sangh. It has been able to set up its units throughout the country and has more than 6.8 million active workers spread all over India. It has also set up separate women's units in more than 236 districts of the country. The VHP has also established overseas units, including in the U.S., Canada, U.K., Australia, Southeast Asia, and other areas. At the national level the VHP has created as many as sixteen departments dealing with such issues as religious propaganda (dharm prasar), service (seva), cow protection (goraksha), publicity and liaison (prachar and sampark), foreign (videsh), youth (vuva), publication (prakashan), Sanskrit, and central office (kendirya karyalaya). It is primarily the VHP which makes claims to Hindu sacred places converted into mosques by the Muslim rulers. Ashok Singhal, the VHP general secretary from 1984 to 2011, warned Muslim leaders against provoking a confrontation with the Hindus, and added that "the VHP was not trying to settle the score with Muslims for their past sins but was demanding only three places of worship, i.e., Ayodhya, Mathura and Kashi, to be restored to Hindus" (The Economic Times, 2015). And he assured Muslims that if they conceded these demands, they would receive full-hearted love and affection from Hindus. Over the years, the VHP has gained enormous success in the organization of
Hindus at the grass-roots level by using traditional symbols of popular aspects of Hindu religion.

With the support and cooperation of the RSS it has created such organizations as Dharma Sansad (religious parliament), Kandriya Marg Darshak Mandal (central guidance council), Dharma Mandals (religious councils), and many others. Most of these organizations consist of Hindu holy men, sadhus and dharmaacharyas (traditional scholars of Hindu religion). All these organizations are designed to create a degree of homogeneity among Hindus, who are deeply divided on sectarian, doctrinarian, caste, and class bases.

The VHP has persuaded the upper caste Hindus to undertake philanthropic activities among the members of lower caste Hindus and the tribals. It has brought the reformers and the orthodox together on the same platform, impressing upon them that the unity of Hindus is imperative for national survival. The VHP plays up the political dimension of religious unity while emphasizing that only through the assertion of Hindu nationalism, will the majority population of the country be able to save its culture and traditions.

The primary goal of the VHP, not unlike the RSS, is political unification of Hindus. It does not seek to create a centralized religious authority with a single deity or a uniform code of behavior for Hindus, as some of its critics allege. In other words, it does not seek to eliminate the inherent pluralism in Hindu society. Its leaders know that any effort to organize Hindus with one sacred book and one prophet, like a monotheistic religion such as Islam or Christianity, is destined to fail (Tharoor, 2018). They realize that since Hindus are divided on a sectarian basis, eliminating doctrinal diversity is
neither desirable nor practical. Religious issues, however, could be used to unite the Hindus irrespective of their caste or sect.

Like the Muslims and the Sikhs, the VHP wants to use places of worship for political purposes. Since 1980s, it has mobilized Hindu holy men to organize the highly successful Ekatmata yagna (integration rites) in which a holy water pitcher was carried by a member of the backward community to perform the worship of Bharat mata (mother India). It was observed that "the high caste Thakur women, lined up with the so-called low caste sweeper women offering their worship to Ganga Mata and Bharat Mata" (Mitra, 2013). In another political move the VHP successfully mobilized the Hindu population for the "liberation" of the birthplace of Lord Ram. The VHP also worked ardently to create a Hindu vote bank.

Bajarang Dal, the VHP's youth wing, is its fighting arm, and consists of militant elements (India Today, 2018). The Bajarang Dal has been successful in raising large amounts of money in the name of Ramjanambhoomi not only from the traders and small-scale manufacturers but also from the countryside, primarily of north India but also from south and east India.

The VHP's support of the BJP has oscillated from time to time. Mahant Avaidyanath, a prominent VHP leader, observed that "at the moment the only party which respects our feeling is the BJP (Malik & Singh, 1994). The BJP's history shows that its ideology has vacillated in the past. The BJP is a political party, which, according to the Mahant, is guided by the percentage of the votes it receives. If the BJP finds that issues dear to the VHP have become political liabilities, it might switch its ideological stance. This can be argued from the fact that BJP has tempered its initial stance, and
instead emphasizes on “normal” issues of education, health, secure livelihood, and good governance (Kohli, 1998).

The RSS leadership, however, holds that all sister organizations are bound by the common ideology of Hindu nationalism and play autonomous roles in their respective areas. This may, however, be only partly valid; the BJP and the RSS both represent the Hindu middle class, which displays considerable polish and intellectual sophistication, while the bulk of the followers of the VHP come from the lower middle class and the Hindu working classes with vernacular education. They may not have much patience for the RSS and the BJP’s strategic considerations.

The VHP, like the RSS workers, believes that religious matters are beyond the jurisdiction of the court. And, in such matters, the VHP would be willing to defy the courts if court decisions were imposed upon it (Pradhan, 2002).

Many of the members of the VHP believe that the Constitution of India not only disregards the values of Hinduism but is blatantly anti-Hindu.

From among the two prominent members of the RSS family, namely the VHP and the BJP, the VHP is believed to have better access to the top leadership of the RSS than the leaders of the BJP have. Sud (2008) quotes Ashis Nandy that “Even the fulcrum of the financial power of the family has shifted towards the VHP, which has collected enormous amounts of money worldwide, mainly from the expatriate Indians in the West. To this money, the BJP has no access; it has to collect money the way other parties do.”
The VHP became increasingly radicalized under the leadership of Pravin Togadia (2003-2018) and hardened its stance towards minorities, especially Muslims. Togadia was arrested in April 2003 after distributing tridents to Bajrang Dal activists in Ajmer, in a ceremony termed "trishul deeksha," defying a state government ban (The Times of India, 2003). He was also criticized for saying that “those talking about independent Kashmir should go to Pakistan” (Firstpost, 2017). However, after the exit of Togadia, V. S. Kokje, a retired High Court Judge, was elected as the president of VHP in 2018, and since then the radical stance of the organization has toned down. He has advocated the eradication of the caste system to ensure unity among all Hindus and bringing ‘samrasta’ or harmony among Hindu communities (The Times of India, 2020).

III. Deendayal Shodh Sansthan (Deendayal Research Institute)

One of the sister organizations of the RSS family is the Deendayal Research Institute (DRI), which works quietly as an autonomous think tank. The organization was founded by the RSS stalwart, Nanaji Deshmukh, who in 1977 declined a cabinet position in the Janata Party government. After spending more than thirty years in active politics, in 1978 he retired from party politics and devoted himself to social and constructive work on the Gandhian line. Deshmukh found politics to be too power oriented to play a constructive role in the process of nation-building. He thought that by launching educational institutions and working at the grass-roots level one could play a more constructive role in the reform and revitalization of the society. He spent most of his time working first in Gonda, a backward district of U.P. which was also his parliamentary constituency.
Founded in 1968 in memory of Pandit Deendayal, the former Jana Sangh leader and founder of the philosophy of Integral Humanism, the DRI directs its activities in search of "a philosophy of life and socio-economic structure suited to the present age. The organization is dedicated to translating Deendayal's dream of a strong, prosperous, and dynamic India into reality.

The intellectuals associated with the DRI believe that under the imperative of politics India has drifted away from the ideals of the freedom movement. The organization believes that both the establishment intellectuals and their Marxist critics are influenced by the Western model of development. Both are captives of the ideology and the thought process introduced by the colonial masters. With the collapse of Communism and the crisis faced by capitalism, these intellectuals believe that people worldwide are seeking alternative modes of thinking and living styles, and they should lead in the search and "collectively re-learn from our own heritage.

At this stage of India's development, according to the DRI intellectuals, there are three autonomous and dynamic forces working within Indian society: the intellectual and academic community, the political process, and voluntary grass-roots movements. Each has its shortcomings. While the academic and intellectual community proposes theories and holds discussions, it is completely divorced from political realities. Politics and parties are often vehicles of cheap rhetoric and populism directed towards winning elections in the pursuit of power. The grass-roots voluntary organizations, though attracting the most dedicated workers and performing useful services, lack coordination.

According to an article written by Mohan Bhagwat in the DRI mouthpiece Navrachna, regular and constant interaction is needed to strengthen and coordinate
these three forces. "Any genuine effort at nation-building must involve all the three simultaneously. What is urgently needed now is to generate an intellectual movement which would act as a bridge between these three streams" (Bhagwat, 2018)

The DRI is engaged in presenting position papers and policy options as well as publishing scholarly journals like Manthan. The organization is engaged not only in theoretical formulations and in offering alternate models of economic and political development but also in social experimentation. It has set up various pilot programs in agricultural development, rural industries development and training, the Gō-Vikas (Cow Development) project, poultry training-cum-production center, rural and tribal mobile eye care units, and several village development projects. Its Appropriate Technology Research Center is working on extracting edible oil from non-traditional sources.

The DRI, in many ways guided by the Gandhian philosophy and methods of economic development, does not believe that government aid is needed to implement rural development programs. Generally its members have a negative view of politics and believe that politicians tend to forget the people as soon as they acquire political power.

Combining the Gandhian philosophy with the thinking of Deendayal Upadhyaya, the DRI emphasizes creating a balance between the ecological needs of the society and developmental goals. Since a majority of Indians live in rural areas and are dependent on agriculture and cottage industries for their living, the institute focuses on these subjects.
There does not seem to be any direct linkage between the DRI and the BJP. However, the leading intellectuals at the institute are ardent BJP supporters. Frequently they provide intellectual rationale for the political activities of the BJP leaders. Nanaji Deshmukh, for instance, while calling the demolition of the Babri mosque unfortunate "to the extent that it was not part of the proposed karseva agenda," at the same time felt that there was no need to be apologetic about it." The expression of profound regret by Advani and other leaders of the Sangh Parivar should be looked upon as the natural reaction of genuinely secular people. Following the BJP line of argument on the Babri mosque, Deshmukh asserted that it was the pseudo-secularist elements and the media which had projected it as an issue of Hindu-Muslim conflict.

The DRI is frequently consulted by the RSS leadership; in fact, there is constant interaction between the senior leaders of the two organizations.

IV. The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS)

The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh is a Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh-affiliated trade union and one of the largest labor organization in India. It has more than three million members. It was established to counter the communist influence among the working classes. It has been very successful among the white collar workers, although it has considerable following among the textile and transport workers. Its strong base is the Hindi-speaking states of North India. The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh was legally constituted in Delhi on August 13, 1967 and it follows BJSs Hindu nationalist agenda. Since the introduction of 'economic liberalization' by Rao government, the Bharatiya...
Mazdoor Sangh has been promoting the 'Swadeshi' movement which is the central theme of the BJP’s economic policy. It has been opposing the entry of multinationals into India. It follows the ideology of Integral Humanism.

The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh holds that the problems faced by the Indian economy can neither be solved by communism nor by capitalism. Its seeks to maintain a balance between the working classes for material and mental welfare. The BMS has been opposing the privatization of the public sector undertakings. It recommended that workers be allowed to take over the so called 'sick industries'. To start with, labor should be allowed to acquire 20 percent equity. It favours the establishment of National Commission to determine the patterns of ownership in industries. The leadership of BMS holds that productivity is based upon the will of the workers and the employers. Both factors should work in unison with the national commitment (Mehta, 1990). The BMS seeks to cultivate harmonious relations between the employers and employees. It does not believe in the concept of class struggle, which it holds, is contrary to Hindu culture. The organization has been active in promoting higher wages for the workers and employees compensation plans and in dealing with issue of retrenchment, plant closings and so on.

V. **Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP)**

The Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) is another affiliate of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh-BJP coalition. RSS leaders like K.P. Sudershan, Bal Apte, Raj Kumar Bhatia led the ABVP and the Janata Yuva Morcha (Janata Youth
Front), the Youth wing of the BJP. In July 1948 Balraj Madhok-- a teacher favored the infiltration of student organizations and formed in Delhi- the ABVP (Jafferlot, 1996).

This organization, working within the framework of RSS philosophy was to evolve certain kind of collaboration among all those involved in University education. Many of the BJP's top leaders like Narendra Modi, Arun Jaitley, Amit Shah, Rajnath Singh, Rakesh Sharma, Nirmala Seetharaman and Nitin Gadkari received their political training in the ABVP before they became active in party politics.

During the 1975 Emergency, thousands of its members were arrested. ABVP is one of the fastest growing student organizations in the country. By 1974, the ABVP had 160,000 members across 790 campuses and had gained control over several prominent universities, including University of Delhi via student elections. By 1983, the organization had 250,000 members and 1,100 branches. ABVP grew during the 1990s, receiving more support as a result of the Babri Masjid demolition and the economic liberalization pursued by the Rao government. It continued to grow after the United Progressive Alliance came to power in 2003, trebling in membership to 3.2 million members as of 2016. It claims to be India's largest student organization.

Its primary goal is to spread the message of RSS. For this purpose, it holds a large variety of extra-curricular activities such as sports classes, symposiums, tutorial groups, health centers and various others (Damle & Anderson, 1987). The ABVP has been active in campus politics by contesting elections for the student unions. It has been successfully winning student union elections in the prominent universities located in Delhi, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. It has got significant presence in the campus politics in Gujarat, Bihar, U.P., Orissa, Maharashtra
etc. The ABVP spreads the RSS message and ultimately gathers student support for the BJP.

VI. Vidya Bharati

It is an educational organization run by the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh which has set up hundreds of secondary schools in India. It is providing education to more than 1.2 million students. It has given jobs to many teachers. It is a powerful tool of indoctrination and political socialization. Vidya Bharati educational system is recognized as an alternate model of education.

VII. Seva Bharati

The Seva Bharati is also a Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh run organization. It is working for the upliftment of downtrodden and lower castes. It has undertaken work among the slum dwellers by introducing various schemes for their welfare. It has set up more than 10,000 centers. It offers vocational courses and spreads the virtues of Hinduism among the people. Its services were recognized by the Central government with a cash award and a certificate of merit. There is another organization Maitri Chhaya, which works under the auspices of the Seva Bharati, which looks after the welfare of children particularly in Delhi and Madhya Pradesh for last many years.

VIII. Vanbasi Kalyan Sangh
It is also known as Centre for Tribal’s Welfare. It was established by Ramakanta Keshav Despanda in 1952, a Brahmin lawyer from Amravati, with the support of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. It aims at protecting the tribal population, who are part of the Hinduism, from conversion into Christianity by the missionaries (Swain, 2001). It is working for the tribals in M.P. and Chhattisgarh region. It protects the tribals from conversion and also re-conversion of the Christianized tribals to Hinduism. It has opened its centers in more than 31,000 tribal villages in India.

4.8 BJP & Foreign Policy

Let us now explore how the rising nationalism in India has influenced the security policy. From the detailed analysis of the Indian political scenario after the independence, it is evident that repeated humiliation at the international front and slow economic growth had shattered the idea of India to the common man. After the stroke of the midnight hour on August 15, 1947, India awoke to a dismembered India plagued by communal violence. Soon after that, the loss of Kashmir and a war with China, which completely changed the dynamics of power in South Asia destroyed the ‘idea of India’ which Nehru had shown to the masses (Sharma 1997). The very identity of Indians was at risk, and public lost faith in the very idea of India and state. All this combined with India’s non-aligned stance, which did not help it in being sucked into the geopolitical affairs of the region, and rising threat from China and Pakistan, along with the minority appeasement politics adopted by Congress led governments, gave rise to
‘banal nationalism’ (Fuller & Benei 2001), which was given voice by organizations such as BJP and RSS.

However, the rise of neo-nationalism can be attributed to identity crisis created by the deep economic crisis India underwent in 1980s and the rise of Pakistan supported militancy in Kashmir which forced several thousand Hindus out of the region. India was partitioned on the lines of religion, and the Nehruvian policy of *sarva dharma sambhava* (equal treatment of all religions) was questioned when India’s adherence to it Hindu roots and identity was labeled as the cause of political and economic failure. Although the Indian constitution guarantees of no state discrimination on the grounds of religion, the majority of the population felt discriminated against due to the vote-bank politics practiced by the majority of state-elites.

Ogden (2014) calls the rise of neo-nationalism a way to alleviate the growing frustration among masses due to the fading idea of India and instill pride in the Hindu identity and reinstate the lost golden era. Post-independence, there was seldom any occasion for the Indian public to feel pride in the state, except 1971, when Bangladesh was created. Although India won all four wars with India, the 1962 war with China left a serious dent in the national pride. Nehru’s belief in the India-China friendship and peaceful coexistence was shattered and left a permanent mark on the security identity of India. Until then India had not secured its eastern borders, however, the defeat served as a reality-check in the increasingly anarchic South Asian arena. On the other hand, the non-aligned stance of the Indian state did not resonate with the masses, which could not see the benefits of staying away from political alliances in light of the security situation in the world.
Indian leaders of Nehruvian era insisted upon a swadeshi (home-manufactured) approach, consisting of principles of socialist self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Dating from anti-colonial movements, swadeshi emphasized on domestic production and limited international engagement. This was seen as a move to make India strong and to discourage the influence of outsiders (Ogden 2014). However, this approach was suited only until the initial few years, and due to the financial crisis in 1990s and loss of support and markets in Soviet Union, the Indian government had to open up the market through liberalization of the economy.

However, as discussed above, this was not the only sore point of the growing frustration among Indian masses. Rising militancy in Kashmir, growing Naxal movement in Central India, National Emergency of 1975 and the Ram Temple issue saw an increase in sentiment (Ogden 2014). Within this atmosphere, the emergent nationalist Hindutva philosophy of the BJP represented a backlash against Nehru and Congress who were seen to have discriminated against Hindus by being overtly inclusive (Ogden 2014). Against this backdrop, the rise of Hindutva, the BJP and Hindu communalism became one of the counter trends to the democratic process in India (Mohanty 2004).

After the win in the general elections in 1998, the BJP government quickly proved its Hindu nationalist credentials in a way India had never seen. Vajpayee, the Indian prime minister stated that ‘the government wanted to show the electorate that it meant business’ (Chawla 1998). The tests also fitted BJPs pre-1998 rhetoric that the political Hinduism dominant under Congress was historically defensive and reactive (Kapur 2006). However, this defensive attitude had led to the identity crisis among the
Hindus and BJP argued that such an attitude was unwilling to assert itself against outside forces as Pakistan, China and Western influences. Sarkar (1998) calls the nuclear tests of 1998 as ‘explosion of self-esteem’, which was assertively promoted inside India, and generated lot of support for the BJP government. The tests were a political statement to show that BJP is the only political party who was serious about national security, and has the potential to restore the lost golden age of India.

On the issue of Kashmir and Pakistan as well, Nehruvian approach had been soft and reconciliatory. After the partition in 1947, Pakistan sent tribal forces to attack Kashmir and captured a large territory, today known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). India also sent its forces after the accession of Kashmir into India, and after a limited military conflict, UN brokered ceasefire was reached, with Pakistan gaining a third of the Kashmir. The contested status of Kashmir led to a psychological state of mutual demonization between India and Pakistan. Based on the Westphalian and Weberian precepts of sovereignty and self-determination, the issue became ideological. Drawing from Messari (2001), an image of self and other was constructed, where Pakistan was seen as the ‘other’ or anarchic in comparison to the ‘self’ who was fighting for a just cause. While taking the blame for not taking PoK back, Congress government was also blamed for taking the matter to UN and giving special status to Kashmir, which has hindered the complete assimilation of the territory in India. However, BJP declared in its manifesto that it will reintegrate Kashmir in India, and abrogate Article 370 which was seen as a technical hindrance in Kashmir’s integration.

Ever since winning the election in 2014 and again on 2019, BJP leadership has shown zero-tolerance policy towards any attack on the Indian state and has retaliated
twice across the border in Pakistan after the Uri and Pulwama attacks on Indian soil. It also shown tough stance towards the insurgents in Myanmar and Naxals in Chhattisgarh state. Moreover, BJP led government abrogated Article 370 in August 2019, thus ending threats to the sovereignty of threats to India. It can be argued that this change in political stance shows a clear shift towards a revisionist ideology, propagated by the BJP elites like Savarkar and Golwalkar.

In case of China as well, both the states started off on an amicable note with the *Panchsheel* Treaty (The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence), but things took a different turn after the 1962 Sino-India war. Although, India lost badly to China, the successive Congress governments did very little to secure the fault lines with the state’s security system. Ogden (2014) notes that after 1962 India’s foreign policy became national security. Although the relations between India and China have improved since then, unresolved border issues and continued suspicion remain, and these norms continue to dominate India’s security identity. The state leaders have represented China as the radical ‘other’ whose existence is always a threat to the existence of ‘self’. Although the responsibility of losing the 1962 war and being less militarily advanced lies with India, yet the social antagonism towards China has made it a enemy state for Indians. Not even a single bullet has been fired across the Line of Actual Control, yet there have been skirmishes and scuffles along the border, the most recent being Dokhlam standoff in 2017 and Sikkim scuffle in 2020.

India’s response to Chinese aggression has also changed considerably, and it has been actively involved in hedging against China. India agreed to the participation of Japan in the Malabar Military Exercises, despite initially showing reservation towards it,
has become a member of the Quad and has rallied against China in the World Health Organization over Covid-19 investigation. Recently two Indian ministers also participated in the swearing-in ceremony of Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen in May 2020.

By contrasting ‘friendly’ Japan and ‘anti-India’ Pakistan and China, a friendly image of Japan was constructed. Japan was regarded as a state which upholds universal values and contributes to world peace by professing non-violence, an innate value of the Indian culture. In other words, producing positive facets in Japan’s identity helped create a positive image of the self in the minds of the Indian public. On the other hand, by distancing the self from China and Pakistan, the radical ‘other’, helped in creating an antagonist identity in the minds of Indians, labeling them as enemy state.

Thus, it is clear from the above examples that national security has been the top most criteria of BJP government, and it attempted to put into practice policies intended to overcome the politics of appeasement and pseudo-secularism they believed to have been practiced by Congress. The power of governance gave BJP an opportunity to shift away from the notions of inclusive, secular nation to ideational based. Elliot (1998) quoted that BJP activist Goradia once said, ‘we haven’t come out of slavery complex… we need heavy dose of nationalism to develop national and communal self-confidence so that we get over this’.
CHAPTER 5

SOURCES OF JAPANESE NATIONALISM & FOREIGN POLICY

In a dynamic and energetic Asia, Japan, which once enjoyed the status of the only Asian power, at least in terms of economic development, has undergone unprecedented economic recession and is frustrated by the gap between external pressures to play a more meaningful role in global security and its domestic constitutional limitations.

During the Cold War era, the ideological difference between the realist and pacifists defined the debate on the foreign policy of Japan. The realists favoured the US-Japan Security Treaty, while the pacifists opposed it, as they argued that any military alliance with the US can push Japan in the future wars of US. However, after the end of Cold War, there was a shift in the foreign policy debate and political parties like, Social Democratic Party of Japan, which strongly opposed any military alliance with US started supporting it, after the party president Murayama Tomiichi became the prime minister in 1994. During the leadership of prime ministers Koizumi and Abe, there has been a drastic change in the foreign policy of Japan, and the modern Japan subscribes to a very different ideology than it did to in past.

In its external relations, Japan comfortably confined its role as a junior partner in its alliance with the United States throughout the Cold War era. In the post-Cold War situation, however, to what extent Japan can and should continue to depend on the US has become a matter of concern. Japan's relationship with China reached its all-time low during Prime Minister Koizumi's administration. Moreover, a direct threat was created
by North Korea when it launched a missile into the Pacific Ocean over-flying the
Japanese Archipelago. The abduction issue is still unsolved, but the international
community prioritized the denuclearization of North Korea rather than this humanitarian
issue. Although Japan's relationship with China improved under prime-minister Abe and
Fukuda administrations, the rivalry, if not confrontation, with China continues.

The following section will explore the sources of Japan’s nationalism from
prehistoric era to modern era.

5.1 Sources of Nationalism in Japan

When Japan began its military adventures in China in 1931, it was a society in
turmoil. Less than 80 years previously, it had been forced out of two-and-a-half
centuries of self-imposed seclusion from the rest of the world, when the Tokugawa
Shogunate was overthrown, and Japan embarked on rapid modernisation under
Emperor Meiji. By the beginning of the 20th century, Japan was beginning to catch up
with the world’s great powers, and even enjoyed its own version of the Roaring
Twenties.  

Throughout history, since the Meiji Restoration, the emergence of Japanese
nationalism has often coincided with an emphasis on Asia. Before the war, however,
Japan's Asia policy was inspired to a considerable degree for the acquisition of
international recognition as a great power by the West. In that sense, Japan did not meet

23 Powers, David in Japan: No Surrender in World War Two. Feb 2017, BBC
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/japan_no_surrender_01.shtml
Asia directly. Japan found itself lagging behind the Western powers in material terms, for which the earlier leaders wanted to make up by emphasizing the spiritual side. This was the basis of Japanese nationalism, which penetrated deep into the nation through education.

Until the arrival of U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853, Japan was a country divided among different clans or Uji (氏). The peasants had little to do with members of the other clans, approximately 300 in number, and their loyalty lay with the Daimyo or the feudal lord. The society was divided not only horizontally, but also vertically. The caste system was called Shi-Nou-Kou-Shou (士農工商) and divided Japanese society into soldiers, farmers, artisans and merchants.

Upon Perry’s arrival, the Japanese people realized that all the inhabitants of the Yamato state were one nation. Miura (2019) cites Soho Tokutomi, an influential Japanese journalist, to support his argument that the idea of nation is a relative one and arises when two different nations come in contact of each other.

However, it would be wrong to say that no national consciousness existed among Japanese before Perry. In fact, the idea that the Japanese were a nation existed in the minds of Japanese people way before the arrival of Perry. The myth of creation of Japan, the claim of divine lineage of Japanese emperor24 and the idea of the ‘divine wind’ or the kamikaze that helped the Japanese defeat Kublai Khan in 1274 and 1281, made the Japanese people believe that they are a race of invincible people favored by

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24 It is believed that Jimmu Tenno, the first Japanese emperor, was the descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu, through her grandson Ninigi, as well as a descendant of the storm god Susan-wo, who was Amaterasu’s brother. He launched a military expedition from Hyuga near the Inland Sea, captured Yamato, and established this as his center of power.
the gods (Gluck 1985). This can be seen from an excerpt below taken from the writings of a farmer in Edo era.

\[ Japan is superior to all other countries... From the Emperor Jinmu of the direct line of descendant of the Sun-Goddess to the current Emperor, the three Imperial regalia of Japan are succeeded for 115 generations... This is a token that Japan is land of gods. (Miura 2019) \]

5.1.1. Prewar Nationalism

The fact that the idea of the Japanese being a race existed as early as 11th century, can be proved from the letters Jojin’s mother wrote to him before his journey to China. Jojin was an 11th century Tendai sect priest, who figures predominantly in the \textit{Nihonjinron} or ‘Theories about the Japanese,’ which is a collection of texts that focus on Japanese identity. Before Jojin set out for China, his mother warning him to not forget Japan, said that ‘the act of going to China to bring back foreign culture might be very noble, yet he must not forget the fact that he is Japanese’ (Borgen 1998). Later in his writings, Jojin too referred to Japan as the “Great Japanese Nation,” that is a reminiscent of prewar Japan’s official name “Great Japanese Imperial Nation” (Borgen 2000).

During the Tokugawa period, the concept of \textit{kokutai} or ‘national character’ permeated Japanese society. Later, during Meiji period, it developed in to \textit{Nihonjinron}, that formed the basis of \textit{Nihonshugi}, and was extensively used to consolidate the
national spirit of Japan. It includes topics like climate, culture, society, economy and uniqueness of Japanese mind.

1. ‘The Japanese race is unique to the point that it has no affinities with any other race.

2. Japanese enjoy distinct seasons that shape Japanese thinking and behavior making the Japanese an extension of nature itself.

3. The Japanese language is so unique in its structure that it creates the condition for the Japanese to think in a peculiar and vague way.

4. The Japanese society is based on a hierarchical relationship and operates on parent-child patterns of behavior.

5. The perception of how one feels toward the other based on particular dependency wishes forms Japanese human relationships.’ (Ando 2009)

Going (1989) argues that kokutai indicated a mystical force residing in the Japanese nation as a result of Amaterasu’s divine decree that ‘the imperial throne of Japan would be coeval with heaven and earth.’ During the end of Tokugawa regime, this ‘mystical force’ crystallized in form of nationalism and led to the ideology of ‘Sonno Joi’ (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarian) that resulted in the Meiji Restoration of 1868.

However, there was huge sense of inferiority to the West among the Japanese, and the ideology changed to ‘Fukoku Kyohei’ (Rich Country, Strong Army) from ‘Sonno Joi’. This led to an upsurge of nationalism and birth of militarism in Japan.

The Meiji government took various steps to build national strength and solidarity that included establishing a modern army, education system and modern communication network. Loyalty to the emperor became equivalent to patriotism and great stress was
laid on Confucian ethics like filial piety and loyalty. The end of the 20th century saw renewal of traditional standards and ultra-militarism. In 1881, Toyama Mitsuru founded the secret *Genyosha* nationalist society that supported Japanese military expansion and conquest of the Asian continent. *Genyosha* was also involved in acts of violence and assassination against foreigners and liberal politicians. *Genyosha* had a vast intelligence network spread in China and Korea and the Japanese military used it during first Sino-Japanese war and Russo-Japanese war (Harries & Harries 1991). *Genyosha* advocated pan-Asianism and envisioned the whole of Asia to be ruled by the fatherly figure of Japanese emperor.

Going (1989) says that ‘with a new awareness of traditional values and a reawakening of interest in "things Japanese" combined with the development of a popular press, a national army, a universal education system, and a strong central government, sufficient social cohesion had been created to permit a popular response to national danger.’ Victory in wars against China (1895) and Russia (1905) put Japan at par with Western imperialist powers and this created a deep sense of national unity.

Riding high on success, Japan wholeheartedly set out on the path of imperialism and made Manchuria (1895) and Korea (1910) a part of Japanese empire. During World War I Japan’s prosperity along with confidence in its ability grew, as it provided arms and ammunition to the Allies. In a 2014 article in *Japan Times*, Mizokami says that ‘Japan built destroyers for France, merchantmen for Britain, and supplied arms and ammunition to Britain and Russia… The Japanese navy provided escorts for ships carrying Australian, French colonial and New Zealand troops bound for the Western Front… Eventually the war’s demands on the mighty British Royal Navy meant Japan
was asked to assume responsibility for patrolling a large portion of the Indian Ocean...
The Japanese task force in the Mediterranean operated 17 warships, and by the end of the war they had escorted 799 transports carrying 700,000 Allied soldiers’ (Mizokami 2014).

However, the decline in demand of arms and goods after the end of war resulted in economic crisis in Japan and led to social unrest. The period that followed from 1919 to 1931 was of internal reform that focused on strengthening the nation from within, rather than depending on foreign opportunities. Under the new educational program, the Ministry of Education published ‘Principles of Kokutai,’ as a teaching guide, and was distributed nation-wide. This guide emphasized on elimination of individualism and assimilation of foreign culture (Going 1989). He says that in 1930s, ‘nationalist ideology stressed on the divine qualities of traditional institutions, principles and standards,’ and creation of a new political order in East Asia, known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (大東亜共栄圏), which is seen as an example of Japanese government’s attempt to colonize China and South East Asia.

In order to realize the dream of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japanese Army occupied China, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Myanmar, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia etc. Japanese Army was also successful in occupying certain areas of British India. However, it had to withdraw following its defeat in 1945.
5.1.2 Postwar Nationalism

After Japan’s defeat in the World War II, the symbols and markers of Japanese culture that had long been source of inspiration to the Japanese people no longer remained a source of pride. When the photograph of the meeting between Emperor Hirohito and General Douglas MacArthur was published, it came as a shock to many Japanese, because a man who had been portrayed to them as a living god stood much shorter than MacArthur. During this period, many structural changes also took place in the international order that directly influenced Japanese nationalism. These were the Korean War and US demands for rearmament of Japan (Kuroki 2013), criticism of Japan over checkbook diplomacy in Gulf war, collapse of Soviet Union and rise of an assertive China in the Indo-Pacific region. Along with the aforementioned external factors, there were certain domestic factors as well, which led to the development of nationalism in postwar Japan. The section below discusses these factors.

External Factors

In the Cold War situation, Japan was comfortably able to confine its role as a junior partner in its alliance with the US, while maintaining a low profile to avoid criticism or attacks from its neighbours due to the absence of an apology for the wartime experience. Japan was a confident nation as a result of its unrivalled economic power in Asia; and it did not assert itself politically. However, such a comfortable situation did not last long. The changes in both external and domestic environments compelled Japan to take up a more active policy.
Externally, Japan, for the first time in history, was challenged by other Asian powers that emerged since the 1980s. The so-called Newly Industrialized Economies, such as South Korea and Singapore were the first to come up, followed by some ASEAN countries, China and finally India. On the other hand, the Japanese economy was suffering decade-long recession and the Japanese monopoly of a prestigious status was seriously threatened. Under such circumstances some rightwing elements started raising questions as to why Japan should always maintain a low profile in international politics; why Japan should be denied a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, despite its large financial contribution; and why a new Japan should continuously allow itself to be attacked by some Asian countries for something that pre-war Japan had done and for which it had already paid compensations. Riding on the wave of neo-conservatisms in the West, Japan also started walking a more nationalist path (Hirose, 2005).

The second external factor affecting Japan was pressure from the West to play a more meaningful role in maintaining global peace and stability. The watershed was the Gulf War. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Japanese government condemned Iraq but did little to fight against it. The pressures of the Bush Administration for military action mounted daily, but the Japanese response of financial contributions and volunteer medical teams sent to the Gulf, was found far from satisfactory by the US. The US government did not hide its displeasure, stating that unless Japan bore the entire expenses of US military bases in Japan, the US may be compelled to reduce the size and strength of their forces stationed there. The Japanese reaction to such threats was to increase its contribution to the US operation in the Gulf.
As the situation in the Gulf region showed no signs of improvement, the Japanese government announced that Japan would adopt some legal measures to enable its SDFS to participate in the UN Peacekeeping Operation. To take such a big step forward, however, the government had to overcome two major obstacles: the anxieties of neighbouring countries like China, and domestic opinions opposed to the revival of militarism in Japan. An explanation given to China was that Japan would 'send unarmed SDFS'. A task force was set up in the Cabinet Secretariat in July 1991 and a bill was prepared by the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enable the SDF personnel to cooperate with the UN in Peacekeeping Operations. The government introduced the bill in the National Diet on September 19, 1991 but was forced to withdraw it within a month due to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's weak position in the Diet and the lack of consensus among political parties. However, after a prolonged discussion in the Diet, the Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations was adopted on June 15, 1992 (Japan Cabinet Office). Hence, Japanese response to US pressure was much too negative, much too slow and much too late from the US point of view.

Frustrated with Japan's inability to take any actions while receiving criticisms from around the world, some members of the ruling party and the government started raising their voices. They claimed that a visible contribution was now required of Japan and that it should become a 'normal state' (Hughes, 2013). Those who advocated more active roles were still in a minority in the early 1990s but they gradually gained momentum towards the 21st century.
After this bitter experience, Japan decided to take some action within the limits of its Constitution. The policy was to send the Maritime SDFS to engage in minesweeping operations, which was possible under the existing law. Article 99 of the SDF Act of 1954 prescribes minesweeping operations as a task of the Maritime SDF (Johnston, 2019). The minesweeping operations were to secure the sea lanes for Japan for the transportation of energy resources and other goods, and therefore, it was explained, was part of the defense activities.

Japan sent 511 personnel to the Gulf, and they were able to remove 34 mines at the last and 'more difficult stages' without any casualties (Hirose, 2005). This was Japan's first experience of ever sending its SDFs outside its own territory, yet Japan was heavily criticized for its inaction and lack of will to contribute to international peace and security, despite it being a path-breaking event in the fifty-year history of the SDFs. As such, external pressures did work for Japan's deeper involvement in international quasi-military' activities.

**Domestic Factors**

The first domestic factor responsible for emerging Japanese nationalism was the restoration of prewar nationalist ideas in Japan. During the early Cold war period, Japanese polity was divided into two groups, one that was a conservative, right-wing group and other, which constituted of pacifists. The right-wing group favored alliance with US while desiring to rearm Japan, while the pacifists were against any Western subordination and had support of the society (Gao 1997, Sasaki 2001). Due to the threat
of spread of communism in Japan, US ended its military occupation and many nationalist leaders who were convicted for war crimes were released (Kingston 2004). This led to the restoration of prewar nationalist ideas in Japanese society and led to the establishment of rightwing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955 (Pyle 1996).

LDP was a merger between Liberal Party led by Yoshida Shigeru and Japan Democratic Party led by Hatoyama Ichiro. It was later learnt that around mid-1990s that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spent millions of dollars in order to influence Japanese elections in favor of DPJ (Weiner 1994, Johnson 1995). The command of LDP remained in hands of Hatoyama Ichiro and Kishi Nobusuke that not only signifies US sponsorship of prewar Japanese nationalism, but also US interest in keeping Japan dependent on itself. According to Miyazawa (1997), Kishi had US support while attempting to revise Article 9 of the constitution and remilitarize Japan. Thus, prime-minister Shinzo Abe’s attempts to revise Article 9 are inspired by Kishi, who was also his grandfather.

The second domestic factor was the accelerated economic growth which instilled sense of pride in the Japanese people. Japan’s economic growth period started in 1960s and lasted till about late 1980s. This was the period of post-war recovery and saw the rapid growth of Japanese industry and business leading to an accelerated economic growth (Sasaki 2001). McCormack (2000) calls it the GNP nationalism that was a result of Japan not being effected by the international economic crisis and admission into the G-7 (Sasaki 2001). During 1970s and 80s, the rise of modern postwar Japan was compared to the rise of Japan during the Meiji era, which according to many intellectuals was a result of uniqueness of Japanese mind, tradition and culture (Yoshino
This led to the burgeoning of *Nihonjinron* or ‘theories of Japanese’ that credited Japanese exceptionalism to the success. This was an attempt by the polity to reconstruct the lost national identity of Japan. The impact of Japan’s economic success could also be seen on its political nationalism, when Nakasone administration suggested that Japan’s military role should correspond to its economic weight (Rose 2000).

However, the bursting of the Japanese bubble in early 1990s created structural problems in society that made the public to question the very tenets of Japan’s national identity (Sasaki 2001). The ‘humiliation’ of Gulf war and frequent ‘Japan bashing’ by US in the 1990s paved way for ‘neo-nationalism’ (Kingston 2004). The rise of neo-nationalism can be seen as the response of the elite ruling class to reinstate national pride and reiterate the Japanese identity. The efforts to break the shackles of American subordination, stand up to Chinese heckling and establish an independent foreign policy are visible measures to get back the lost pride of the Japanese people (Matthews 2003). According to Kato (2014) and Nakano (2015), this surge of nationalism has made Japan drift to the “right.”

The third factor was the loss of confidence among the younger generations, caused by the economic recession in Japan. For nearly a decade, a large percentage of fresh graduates could not expect to get a job. As they witnessed newly emerging Asian powers, their frustrations mounted, and this generated an aggressive ultra-nationalism.

Another domestic factor responsible for emerging Japanese nationalism was the generational change. In post-war Japan, nationalism was long regarded as an evil, overlapping with the image of pre-war militarism. Therefore, as long as wartime memories were vivid, there was no room for nationalism to capture the minds of the
majority. As time went by, the number of people who actually experienced the war reduced in number, and young parents who had no bitter experience or memories of the war increased. Accordingly their children had no hangovers from the past. Thus they were released from that taboo.

Finally, the end of the Cold War and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union affected the Japanese party system. The Socialist Party, which had enjoyed substantial strength in the National Diet and had opposed any 'military action' outside Japan, suffered a severe setback in the local elections in April 1991. Subsequently, the party system went through a drastic change and the Socialist Party was reduced to just a nominal existence. Thus, one of the major domestic obstacles for Japan to take a more assertive policy was removed. The business community welcomed the disappearance of the leftist opposition.

Both external and domestic factors pushed Japan to a more assertive, active and even a more nationalistic posture. The obstacles to sending troops abroad were gradually removed. Once the ice was broken by the decision to send minesweepers to the Gulf, the next step was much easier. In June 1992, Japan enacted the 'Law Concerning Cooperation for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations' (commonly called the International Peace Cooperation Law'). For the first time it enabled Japan to engage more actively in UN peacekeeping operations and international humanitarian relief operations, including the dispatch of SDF units. However, this is dependent on certain conditions such as a ceasefire agreement, consent of the parties concerned, and minimum necessary use of weapons. Based on the International Peace Cooperation Law, Japan participated in international peace
cooperation activities in Cambodia, Mozambique and the Golan Heights; and international humanitarian relief operations for Rwandan refugees, displaced persons in East Timor and Afghan refugees.

5.1.3. Neo-nationalism

With the surge of nationalism in Japan, various attempts have been made by the polity to instill nationalist attitudes in society. These include revision of school textbooks, highlighting of wartime symbols and revision of Article 9 of the constitution. One of the main target of the revisionist school is the education system of Japan. This school believes that that society is learning the distorted and masochistic view of Japan’s history that has led to loss of pride in their nation (Saaler 2005). LDP the ruling party has been a major force behind this revisionist ideology and has founded several committees working towards historical revisionism (Saaler 2005, 2014). Abe himself has been a key figure in the historical revisionist movement (Hayashi et al. 2013, Penny 2009). In 1993, the History Examination Committee (HEC), of which Abe was also a member, called the Asia-Pacific War a war for self-defense and refused to call it a “war of aggression” (Saaler 2016). Abe is also a member of various organization that promote nationalist agenda and revision of education system.

The government’s sponsorship of ultraconservatism encouraged a number of writers to publish books and articles that reiterate governments revisionist ideology. In 2012, Watanabe a revisionist scholar who is famous for his criticism of Korea and
claimed that “all Korean heroes are terrorists” (Saaler 2014). He suggested that ‘during 1920s and 1930s the unfair trade policies and confrontational diplomacy of America and England pushed Japan into a corner. Japan’s wars were, in this view, a legitimate and courageous attempt to free Asia from “Western” imperialist bullying’ (Penney 2009). According to Tamogami (2010), Japan must have the right to collective self-defense and should arm itself with nuclear weapons. Kanji and Nobuyuki (2016) criticized the royal family for destroying the lifestyle of the imperial household by attempting to reconcile with Japan’s neighbors and drawing too close to the public. Another revisionist Hayakuta Naoki, ex NHK governor, called the leftists “human scum” and claimed that Japanese war crimes are nothing but fabrication of America and China. Okawa Ryuho, a politician and a religious leader, has called for revision of Article 9 and an active military stance in face of any foreign threat. In 2012, his political party issued a response to the ‘Zero Nuclear Power Policy’ of the Noda administration stating:

‘The zero nuclear power policy is also completely unacceptable from the perspective of Japan’s security. As Japan faces military threats from the nuclear power China, North Korea, which is quickly moving ahead with the development of nuclear missiles, and other countries, what Japan needs is a policy of building up its national defense. Nevertheless, if Japan abandons nuclear power, this means that the country will relinquish its potential nuclear deterrent force and the country will be placed in a dangerous situation.’

25 For more information see the party website http://en.hr-party.jp/blog/381.html
In 2009, Okawa’s wife even said that “With lives of Japanese people in danger, we think that we should make a pre-emptive attack if it is clear that North Korea intents to launch a missile” (The Telegraph, 2009).

Another measure adopted by the Japanese nationalists is the emphasis on symbols of prewar Japan. The old custom of venerating Emperor Jimmu was again started in 2016 when the Emperor and Empress visited Jimmu’s tomb. Before this, similar figures from Japan’s mythological past were introduced into the public arena during 1880s-90s before the polity came in grip of imperialist nationalism. This lays emphasis on the ‘eternally unbroken imperial family line’ founded by Jimmu, the grandson of Sun goddess Amaterasu.

Another symbol of prewar Japan is the Yasukuni shrine, which apart from other 2.5 million people enshrines 1068 war crimes convicts, including class A war criminals. Koizumi, starting from year 2001 till 2006, regularly visited the shrine that drew sharp criticism from all over the world. His successor Shinzo Abe also visited the shrine in 2006. Later in 2008, 62 Diet members and in 2013, a group of 169 Japanese lawmakers paid a visit to the controversial shrine. These visits have sparked a debate over the role of religion in Japanese politics. China and Korea have repeatedly criticized these visits calling them official endorsement of Japanese atrocities during the occupation period and an effort to glorify the militaristic past. Abe again paid a visit to the shrine in 2013 and sent ritual offerings to the shrine multiple times in the same year. He later told media that ‘I prayed to pay respect for the war dead who sacrificed their precious lives and hoped that they rest in peace’ (Mainichi 2013). China reacted sharply to this visit and issued a strong rebuke in a statement posted on the ministry's website stating, ‘We
strongly protest and seriously condemn the Japanese leader's acts’ (Mainichi 2013). There have been attacks on the shrine by Korean and Chinese citizens in past. In 2011, a Chinese man tried to burn down gate column at shrine, while in 2015 a South Korean national planted a bomb that damaged some parts of the shrine.

Abe administrations’ repeated attempts to change the pacifist constitution clearly display LDP’s nationalist leanings. In 2001, Koizumi approved the expansion of the Japan Self-Defense Forces granting them greater scope to operate outside Japan. Koizumi government also introduced a bill to upgrade the Japan Defense Agency to the Japanese Ministry of Defense. Abe has also voiced his disdain for Article 9 and sees the US-drafted constitution as a humiliation imposed on Japan (Japan Times 2018). In 2015, the Abe government passed a law allowing Japanese troops to defend U.S. and other allies in case of foreign attack. This is seen as a major change in policy of a country which till now only maintained forces for self-defense. Abe is pushing for another revision in constitution that will permit the existence of the Self Defense Forces (SDF).

It is evident from the above examples that revisionist ideology is on a rise in Japan. The revisionists desire to make Japan a ‘normal’ country that is capable of defending itself and does not have to rely on US for its security. The efforts to revive nationalism by Japanese politicians along with the rise of belligerent North Korea and assertive China has instilled a feeling of vulnerability among the Japanese people as well. This is evident through the Public Opinion Survey on the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and Defense Issues which is conducted every three years by Cabinet Office to gauge the trend in public perceptions of the SDF and defense issues. Figure 2, which
shows that the percentage of people who have interest in SDF and other defense issues have gone up over the years.

![FIG.2 INTEREST IN SDF AND DEFENSE ISSUES](image)

**Source: Cabinet Office, Public Opinion Survey on the Japan Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues, 2015**

The survey reveals some other interesting data as well. On being asked the reason for having interest in SDF, 46.1 percent of the respondents replied that it is an issue that concerns the peace and independence of Japan. Other important facts that help us to understand the changing image of security among Japanese people are listed in the table below.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive impression toward SDF</td>
<td>80.9%</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
<td>92.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense capabilities of SDF should be increased</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will join SDF if Japan is attacked</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk of Japan getting involved in war</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China is a concern for Japan</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>60.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense exchanges with other countries other than US are important</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is quite evident from the above statistics that the Japanese polity has been successful in making the people believe that Japan needs a proper and stronger army to ward off any misadventure Japan’s neighbors might try. In light of this, Japan has entered into various partnerships and alliances with Asia-Pacific states to shape the regional security environment. Australia has proven to be a worthy partner and recently India has also joined the list of Japan’s strategic partners. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, is a strategic dialogue between the Japan, United States, Australia and India that was set up in response to the increased Chinese economic and military power, and has been termed as the Asian NATO by security analyst (Huang 2017). The 2016 India-Japan joint statement mentioned the bilateral cooperation to “develop smart islands” in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) for strategic purposes. The next chapter discusses in detail the historical background and present of India and Japan relations.
5.2 Japanese Foreign Policy

5.2.1 Historical Background

Post-War Reforms and the Formation of Japanese Foreign Policy

The first and the most important dimension of Japanese foreign policy post-World War II is its relationship with the United States. The foundation of Japan's foreign policy was laid by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (1946-1954) during the Occupation (Edstorm, 2011). Yoshida emphasized the importance of economic growth and insisted that Japan should concentrate its efforts on economic rehabilitation and further development. Having lost practically everything in the war, Japan had to begin the reconstruction of the nation literally from the ashes. Among other efforts, Yoshida believed that economic rehabilitation was the first task that should be assigned to the government and the people (MacDougall, 1988). Under such circumstances, Japan could not afford to rearm itself. In order to implement economic policies effectively, Yoshida advocated that Japan should depend on the US for its defense (Sugita, 2016). This pro-Western stance, which Yoshida held throughout his diplomatic career, clearly contributed to such dependence policy. Moreover, demilitarization of Japan was one of the most important objectives of US Occupation Policy.

The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America was a manifestation of Yoshida's idea (Hirose, 2005). The two governments signed the treaty in San Francisco, where the Peace Conference was held and the Peace Treaty signed by 49 nations. The Security Treaty was so controversial that Japan was sharply divided on this issue (Hirose, 2005). Owing to objections to the Security Treaty, the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia and Poland refused to sign the Peace Treaty. Moreover, three non-aligned nations, i.e. India, Burma and Yugoslavia decided to stay away from the San Francisco Conference itself. Due to so many disadvantages and shortfalls, some leftwing politicians and opinion leaders insisted that Japan wait until all the nations agreed to sign the Peace Treaty (zenmen kowa = peace with all nations), while the conservative parties and the business community argued that the first priority should be the achievement of independence, and for that purpose Japan should conclude the Peace Treaty with those in the Western Bloc who were ready to sign it (henmen kowa - partial peace). The latter prevailed and Japan regained its sovereign status as a member of the Western Bloc. Thereafter, the relationship with the United States became the single largest concern of Japanese decision-makers (Hirose, 2005).

During the Occupation, the US government initiated drastic reforms in Japan. In addition to its defense, Japan owed its post-war reforms including the drafting of the new Constitution to the US. The draft Constitution was imposed by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), and the scope of change proposed by SCAP was far beyond the imagination of Japanese decision-makers. They had no option but to accept it in order to save the Emperor. Gatu (2015) quotes Masumi, who argues that this 'revolution' in Japanese history was not possible without 'outside powers'. Moreover, the dissolution of the zaibatsu, land reforms, labour reorganization and democratization of the bureaucracy were all carried out by the Occupation Forces. Among the wide range of reforms, Japan's demilitarization was one of the most important objectives of US Occupation Policy immediately after the war, though it changed this policy in the wake of its confrontation with the Soviet Bloc. The US's initial policy to democratize and
demilitarize Japan started tilting towards creating a militarily strong Japan under the Cold War context. During the Peace Treaty negotiations between Yoshida and John F. Dulles in 1951, the latter forced the former to agree that Japan would establish the National Police Reserve consisting of 75,000 men, which was renamed the National Safety Forces in 1952 and put under the administration of the newly established Safety Agency. The National Diet passed the Self-Defense Forces Act in 1954, reorganizing the Safety Agency into the Defense Agency and the existing forces into three services: Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces (Hirose, 2005).

5.2.2 Dimensions of Foreign Policy Debates

Since Prime Minister Yoshida introduced the basic framework of Japan's foreign policy, Japan has maintained a reasonably consistent one. The state was almost polarized for about four decades during the Cold War period. Debates on foreign policy in Japan can be categorized into two parts: the attitude towards the US and interpretations of the wartime experience (Kuroki, 2013).

The first is the US factor. The entire nation was sharply divided on the issue of the Japan-US Security Treaty. Among those involved in foreign policy decision-making at various levels, the mainstream under the single predominant party system, the Liberal Democratic Party, supported by the bureaucrats, was most pro-US, while the leftist opposition parties were vociferously anti-US. The Communist Party was and still is against any alliance with the US, along with the Socialist Party (Social Democratic Party of Japan), which used to enjoy about half the strength of the LDP, aligned next to
the Communists. The centrist parties, such as the Komei Party and the Democratic Socialist Party were located between the two extremes (Hrebenar, 2019). Other foreign policy issues, such as the two Koreas, China and the Vietnam War, were largely determined on Japan's basic position with regard to the US. This sharp division was somewhat blurred after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the single predominant party system of the early 1990s (Tennichi, 1998).

The second category is the dichotomy of assertive or passive stances (Tomar & Shani, 2018). The difference is derived mainly from the interpretation of the wartime experience. A section of society, fearing that Japan might revert to the dreaded pre-war militarist course, advocate that Japan should keep a low profile in international politics and that the Constitution, especially Article 9, which renounces war, should be maintained at any cost. They consequently oppose Japan sending its Self-Defense Forces (SDFS) abroad.

The other group seeks a stronger leadership for Japan in international politics in general, and in Asia in particular (Kuroki, 2013). They maintain that Japan should revise the Constitution so that it may legally possess military forces and not under the name of the Self-Defense Forces', which imposes several restrictions on their activities. They also seek a larger role and a better position which they believe Japan deserves, such as a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Not until a long time ago, such views unnerved most Japanese left-oriented intellectuals and some sections of the general public as a revival of pre-war militarism, but these views are gradually gaining support (Kuroki, 2013).
These were the main issues that divided Japanese opinions on foreign policy at least until the beginning of the 1990s. The choice between Asia and the West, which was one of the most important issues in the making of pre-war Japanese foreign policy, did not draw attention after the end of World War II. A common understanding was that the relationship with Asia should be consolidated but not at the cost of Japan's strong ties with the US.

5.2.3 Japan's Contemporary Foreign Policy

Japanese foreign policy has entered a new era, although Japan has been rather slow in adapting itself to the post-Cold War external environment. The Japan-US Alliance has to assume a new role, while the relationship with China should be redefined within the wider context of Asia. But the new element is India. Having failed in the past to pay due attention to the giant elephant, "Japan has finally taken a positive interest in India. It is not an exaggeration to say that the relationship with India will be a milestone in the success of Japan's new Asia policy.

With its emerging nationalism, Japan certainly wants to assert itself and make its presence felt not only in Asia but also globally (Kingston, 2016). A large proportion of the younger generations now demand a more assertive foreign policy including the possession of full-fledged military powers. Constitutional revision is open to discussion, and firm policies are demanded against North Korea.

Japan has now taken its own defense and security matters seriously under a drastically changed environment. The relationship with an assertive China, the
immediate threat from North Korea and the ever-present terrorism have forced the Japanese nation to discuss defense and security issues, which were long held as a taboo in post-war Japan.

**Japan-US Alliance**

To a large extent the relationship with the US still determines the overall direction of Japan's foreign policy. Successive Japanese leaders have taken the alliance policy with the US for granted. Even after the end of the Cold War, the US assumed by far the most important position in Japan's foreign relations. However, there are some signs that suggest that the alliance policy could drift. Although official 'positions reaffirm the Japan-US security arrangements, recently, some different opinions have been expressed.

Firstly, it is increasingly difficult to maintain the US military bases in Japan. People in Okinawa have articulated their grievances and the Government of Japan has to cope with them. Moreover, Japan has been increasingly shouldering the cost of the US troops stationed in Japan. In order to counter the argument of a Japanese free ride, the Japanese government agreed in December 1977 to bear part of the expenses of the US military bases in Japan from the succeeding budgetary year. A little over six billion yen was allotted in the 1978 budget to cover the wages of the Japanese staff working in the US military bases (Yoda, 2006). In 1986, Japan added costs accruing from facilities, such as maintenance and repair, followed by the inclusion of electricity and other expenses in 1995 (Yoda, 2006). The Japanese share increased by 40 times in the next two-and-a-half decades, amounting to 275.6 billion yen in 1999. According to an annual report titled Allied Contributions to the Common Defense published by the U.S.
Department of Defense in 2004, Japan provided direct support of about 366 billion yen and indirect support worth 1.18 billion dollars, offsetting as much as 74.5 percent of the total cost (Japan Times, 2017). In the mind of Japanese people, this arrangement is certainly not a 'free ride' (Ikenberry & Mastanduno 2003, Karan 2010, Washington Post, 1981; Nikkei Asian Review, 2019). It has become a heavy burden for the nation to maintain the US military bases on its soil.

Secondly, the policymakers and think-tanks have started questioning the reliability of the US as an alliance partner. Apart from the problematic Iraq policy and war on terror, the US's nuclear deal with India and its North Korea policy have led some Japanese politicians, the mass media and people at large to question the meaning of the Alliance. For many Japanese observers, the deal reached between the US and India was in India's favor to a great extent. They regret, that faced with tough negotiations, the US gave in to such a considerable degree to a mere partner' without even consulting its traditional 'ally' (Abraham, 2007).

Some differences between the two allies were also revealed in the North Korean issue. While the main concern of the six parties except Japan was the denuclearization of North Korea, the abduction issue has become an emotional one and therefore there can be no compromise on it by Japan. Japan expected the US to understand the nation’s sensitivity and its difficult position, but during the negotiations that the US was somewhat inconsistent, and Japanese polity covered up its incompetence by using the term “shikata ga nai” (It can’t be helped) (The NewYorker, 2015).
The Nuclear Issue

It is estimated that the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki directly killed about 214,000 people. Many more died unnatural, premature deaths caused by radioactivity. Japan launched its nuclear policy as the only victim of the deadly weapons of mass destruction. The Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 confined research and development and the use of nuclear energy strictly to peaceful purposes. In 1967, three years after the Chinese nuclear explosions, based on the study report mentioned above, the then Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato, declared the three non-nuclear principles: not to possess, not to manufacture and not to introduce nuclear weapons on Japan's territory. The three principles were adopted as a resolution in the National Diet in 1971. Japan signed the NPT in 1970 and ratified it in 1976. The three non-nuclear principles have since been the guidelines for Japanese nuclear policy, which Japanese political leaders both in the ruling and opposition parties have repeatedly referred to up to the present day.

However, due to the circumstances mentioned above, some Japanese politicians started mentioning the possibility of Japan going nuclear. Shoichi Nakagawa, Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council of the LDP, openly said in 2006 that it would do no harm if Japan started discussing the possibility of going nuclear (Japan Times, 2013). Some of the politicians who served as prime minister, including Nobusuke Kishi (1957-1960), Hayato Ikeda (1960-64), Eisaku Sato (1964-72), Yasuo Fukuda (2007-08), Taro Aso (2008-09) and current prime minister Shinzo Abe have mentioned that the Japanese Constitution did not prohibit Japan from possessing nuclear weapons and have favored nuclear armament of Japan (Japan Times, 2013).
The nuclear option was officially studied as early as in the late 1960s and later in the mid-1990s. The first study was prompted by the Chinese nuclear test followed by the negotiations over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The second study was conducted in the context of the missile launch by North Korea and a perceived nuclear threat. However, the conclusions of both studies were that it would not be in Japan's interest to go nuclear because of the strategic, political and diplomatic constraints, and costs. In the 21 century, the opposition to the nuclearization of Japan has toned down to a considerable degree (Japan Times, 2017).

Given the opposition of the majority of the Japanese to nuclearization, the diplomatic risk, and the economic cost, acquiring nuclear weapons is not a realistic option for Japan. However, what should be noted here is that the Japanese sensitivity to nuclear issues affects its relationship with every nation including its most important ally, the United States. Japan's mission, many people still believe, is to initiate global nuclear disarmament, and therefore, any movement against it, especially when it affects Japan's own security concerns, could lead to a backlash. The US's reliability as Japan's most important ally, as perceived by the Japanese, is obviously a key to the future polity, though many Japanese would still resist Japan's nuclearization even if it could not depend on the nuclear umbrella that the US provides (Washington Post, 2017).

The New Asia Policy

Even after World War II, as mentioned earlier, barring the two factors, i.e. the wartime experience and the supply of energy resources, Japan did not pay adequate attention to Asian countries. It was Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda (1976-1978), father of the former Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, who established the Japanese Asia policy.
Takeo Fukuda announced in Manila in 1977 that Japan would never become a military power, establish heart-to-heart relations with South East Asian countries based on equal partnerships, and would establish a stable regional order in South East Asia. The three principles later came to be known as the 'Fukuda Doctrine', and formed the basis of Japanese diplomacy, not only for South East Asia, but for the whole of Asia including South Asia, though the three principles have not always been practiced.

The 21st century is again witnessing emergence of Japanese nationalism and a sense of the increased importance of Asia. Asia no longer provides a mere stage on which Japan plays an important role and proves to be a leader there merely to impress the West. Instead, challenges from the Asian powers in the military and economic fields are among the most important factors for current Japanese nationalism.

The next section discusses in detail the role of nationalism in Japan’s foreign policy.

5.2.4 Nationalism’s Influence on Foreign Policy

It is clear from the above discussion that Japan’s experience in World War II completely changed Japan’s national identity and its view of nationalism. Japan faced severe identity crisis, the public lost pride in the national symbols and institutions, which throughout the history had instilled pride in them. However, the nationalism did not completely disappear from the society, and took a different ‘banal’ appearance, in form of cultural, economic and other nationalisms. The US fear of growing communism in Asia led to the re-establishment of a conservative right-wing LDP in 1955, made sure
that the pacifist voice could never become mainstream in Japan, and the prewar nationalism continued in postwar Japan (Dower 1996). Befu (1984) and Yoshino (1992) opine that the rapid economic growth instilled confidence and pride among Japanese, and this led them to challenge the Western values that had become a ‘thick’ value in Japanese society.

However, the real rise of neo-nationalism in Japan can be attributed to the deep identity crisis created among Japanese people due to the bubble burst in 1990s and political sterility of the ruling class (Kingston 2004). During the ‘lost decade’, Japan not only lost its economic prowess, but also its international status. Moreover, despite continued support to US on international matters and providing substantial amount of foreign aid and investments, Japan has continuously been ‘bashed’ and ‘passed’ by senior partners, resulting in international humiliation and has never been given the recognition it deserves (Shibata 1994, Matthews 2003). Along with the above, anti-Japanese flavor Chinese nationalism (Lai 2008) and North-Korea’s hostile tactics have led to the rise of neo-nationalism in Japan. Sasaki (2001) calls neo-nationalism a reflection of state-elite’s responses to the popular mood, in order to alleviate the identity crisis spreading among masses due to the ‘weak’ perception of Japan. The motive of this is to revive national pride and reaffirm national identity among Japanese people. This also indicates dissatisfaction with the continuous subjugation of Japan by the senior partners, and the desire to establish an independent self-reliant foreign policy (Kingston 2004).

Due to the revelation of wartime atrocities carried out by the Japanese army after the demise of Emperor Hirohito has left a serious dent on Japanese pride and identity
This has also fuelled the neo-nationalist discourse in Japan. The information revealed through archived documents and auto-biographies of ex-army men has been a topic of national-shame for Japan, which it feels the need to redress. Along with the issue of national shame, the growing threat perception from China and North Korea; and repeated humiliation of Japan on the issue of war history and comfort-women has triggered a nationalist backlash within Japan, which reflects growing realism about national security (Lai 2008). The new generation of Japanese yearns for a closure to the above mentioned issues, and long to become ‘normal’ citizens who are not shamed to have a Japanese ‘identity’.

Most of the present Japanese leaders were born after World War II and did not witness the trauma that most people went through. These leaders are more confident of Japanese identity and have inspired security-policy shifts that are meant to enhance Japan’s role in the international arena (Green 2000). The leaders of modern Japan are assertive and less tolerant towards criticism and acts to provoke Japan (Sasaki 2001). This change of mood can also be seen among the Japanese society as a whole, which is increasingly defensive of any intervention in the domestic affairs of Japan. This rise of neo-nationalism can be confirmed from the re-election of Abe for the third term in 2018 (Japan Times 2018). Abe, who openly supports the revision of Article IX, defeated his challenger by a wide margin.

From the above arguments, it can be demonstrated that the Japanese politics, once overshadowed by the pacifist forces, has drifted towards the rightist revisionist history, which calls for restoration of national pride and remilitarization of Japan (Tamamoto 2005). The neo-nationalists like Abe Shinzo, Aso Taro, Ishihara Shintaro
etc. advocate the use of force as a foreign policy instrument, and demand for the remilitarization of state, independent of the US security umbrella (Taniguchi 2005). Nationalist leaders like Koizumi and Abe have provoked China and South Korea multiple times by their visits to the Yasukuni shrine and advocating constitutional reforms. Cronin (2010) argues that by pledging to create ‘a beautiful and glorious Japan’ by reigniting patriotism, Abe has created a revisionist-ideological brand of nationalism.

Cronin (2010) argues that the neo-nationalist sentiment has also gained ground in the Diet, due to the presence of groups like Nippon Kaigi, Ishin no Kai, Sunrise Party, Shinto Politics league, Committee to Produce New History Textbooks (Tsukurukai), Diet Memebers league ‘for Bright Japan’ and ‘for Passing of Correct History’ and ‘for Reflection on Japan’s Future’. The presence of such revisionist groups has helped in quick passage of security-related bills in Diet. The sanctioning of Kamigayo and Hinomaru in 1999 was a result of the growing presence of such groups in Diet.

The ‘nationalistic’ shift in public mood has also given strength to the revisionist voices in Japan. Public support for the Yasukuni shrine visits of Koizumi and Abe (Lai 2008), and nationalist publications and media houses show that revisionist ideology has slowly penetrated into the public sphere (Lai 2008). Japanese attack on two North Korean ‘suspicious ships’ in 1999, and sinking of another such ship in 2001 was widely supported by the Japanese public (Hughes 2004). Furthermore, as discussed earlier in this chapter, public interest in SDF has been continuously growing in past few years, increasingly more and more people have a positive impression of it. This marks a clear difference from the earlier impression of Japanese public towards armed forces. More
and more people have shed the burden of guilt associated with symbols of Japan’s wartime past, and now take pride in it.

It is clear from the above analysis how Japan is gradually drifting towards a revisionist ideology, fuelled by nationalism, and state-elites are the forces behind this populist drive. It is a way to alleviate the growing frustration among Japanese masses due to the lack of respect and recognition in international community, external pressures and the desire to return to ‘normal statehood’ after decades of ideational inconsistency. Moreover, in light of the growing Chinese and North Korean aggression in the waters around Japan, Tokyo seeks to redefine its national security outlook and expand its international role.

5.2.5 South Asia in Japanese Foreign Policy

Traditionally, South Asia was a distant region for Japan. Until the late 1990s South Asia was hardly visible in the Japanese perception of 'Asia' or 'Asia-Pacific'. As pointed out earlier, the US and to a lesser degree the West in general were the prime concern for Japanese policymakers throughout the post-war period.

In comparison to other Asian countries, South Asia, until the leadership of Modi and Abe, drew much less attention from Japanese policymakers. Before Abe and Modi took India-Japan relations to a new height, differences in Japanese attitudes towards East, South East, South and West Asia were noticeable. Japan was extremely cautious in dealing with China, Korea and to some extent South East Asia. It also treated the countries in the Middle East with more consideration and respect. Bitter wartime
memories and close economic ties in the former cases, and the importance of oil supply
in the latter, made Japan more careful and cautious (Pant, 2009).

However, Japan was free from such constraints with regard to South Asia. It was
indeed ironical that even in the absence of bitter wartime memories and given the
accommodating attitudes of South Asian countries, Japan did not develop a close
relationship with them (Ganguly, 2010). But psychologically, even today, South Asia is
still considered a distant, different and difficult region many Japanese. 'Beyond the
Arakan Yoma (in Myanmar) is "an outer world",' is a common expression (Mathur,
2012).

It is interesting to note that it was because of India’s nuclear test in 1998 and
later Pakistan that Japan started showing an increasing interest in the subcontinent, and
not because of India's economic liberalization policy (Hall, 2014). Japan was
exceptionally keen to dissuade both India and Pakistan going nuclear and held regular
bilateral dialogues with both, but to no avail. As a result, Japan suspended ODA – not
only grants but also new yen loans - to the two 'newly emerging nuclear powers'. Japan
had only suspended grants to China when it had conducted its nuclear tests earlier.
Almost for the first time, South Asia drew the special attention of the Japanese
politicians, bureaucrats and mass media (Ganguly, 2010).

It was not a coincidence, therefore, that Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and
Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi started focusing on the Kashmir problem, and was
inclined to mediate, though they were not knowledgeable about the situation. Not
surprisingly, Japan's move on the Kashmir conflict infuriated India and the relationship
between Japan and India reached a record low during the Kargil crisis (Hall, 2014).

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Japanese policy with regard to the India-Pakistan conflict has always been to maintain an equidistant stance between the two countries. Depending on the issues, however, such an equidistant policy worked in favor of one nation or the other. The suspension of ODA in the wake of the nuclear tests did much greater harm to the fragile Pakistani economy than the relatively large-scale, more self-sufficient Indian one. On the other hand, trying to be as 'neutral' as possible during the Kargil crisis, a Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman said, 'We are not in a position to say who is responsible for it,' which gave the impression that Japan was more sympathetic towards Pakistan and pushing India further away from Japan (Hirose, 1994).

It was not until Prime Minister Mori's visit to India in August 2000 that the relationship between India and Japan started recovering (Hirose, 2005). Witnessing the improvement of the relationship between the US and India and the close communications maintained by the two countries even after the India’s nuclear tests, Japan slowly began to recognize its importance. The development of the IT industry in India also contributed to Japanese appreciation of the Asian giant elephant.
CHAPTER 6

INDIA-JAPAN RELATIONS

While discussing the impact of nationalism on India and Japan’s foreign policy, it has come to light that the rise of neo-nationalism in both the states is a result of growing frustration among the public and political class over lack of recognition and respect in the geopolitical arena. The rise of neo-nationalism can be seen as the state-elites’ responses to the popular mood, in order to alleviate the identity crisis among masses. In this chapter, the underlying reason behind the strengthening of India and Japan relations will be explained. After discussing this, a historical account of India Japan relations and a detailed analysis of their contemporary relations will be provided.

Narendra Modi, was elected as India’s prime minister, following BJP’s landslide victory in 2014. In the same year, he announced his administration’s Act East Policy (AEP), under which India was to turn its attention towards deepening partnerships with Southeast Asian states. India’s vision was to engage with like-minded states, which share India’s vision of free, open and inclusive rules-based order. In 2018, in his keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Modi had espoused a “free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region” (De 2020). Through AEP India seeks to put the Indo-Pacific region in the heart of South, Southeast and East Asia. It can be argued that India has done this to enhance its role as a key geopolitical player. As a year later, Modi urged all the Indian diplomats worldwide to help in making India a global leading power, and not just remain as a balancing power. Unlike Modi’s
predecessors, India’s foreign policy under him has been a proactive one (Mishra 2019). Under the AEP, the India-Japan strategic partnership has been lifted to an entirely new level (De 2020), with Japan and India involved in multiple economic, strategic and military projects. At the same time, in 2015, India’s Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar in a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore, declared that India aspires to be a leading power, rather than a balancing power, which marks a decisive shift in its foreign policy (Horimoto 2020). India’s policy towards Japan was articulated on the basis of the role India seeks for itself in future.

Similarly Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, delivered a speech titled ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’, at Indian parliament in 2007, urging for close cooperation between, US, Japan, India and Australia, which share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and the respect for basic human rights as well as strategic interests (Abe 2007). He announced to launch a diplomacy centered on these common values and authored the concept of “free and open Indo-Pacific”, which was upheld by India and USA. Taking forward the Abe’s idea of value-centered diplomacy, foreign minister Aso Taro also proposed the idea of ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, on the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the Japan Forum on International Relations. Highlighting the common ideational factors, and representing the other as ‘similar’ to ‘self’, led to the positive identification and assimilation. This demonstrates how ideational variables play an important role in perception of state elites and are affect their foreign policy decisions.

In the foreign policy discourse Japan was represented as a friendly country which upholds the values of democracy, freedom and peace. Furthermore, Japan’s past
colonial actions in India are often not talked about, and its role as a true friend of India is stressed upon. Japan is represented as a peace loving country, which also shares cultural and religious values with India, making it a ideal state to engage with. Similarly Japan also views India as a country, with which it does not share any historical baggage and would not accuse Japan of its past imperialist actions.

As explained in Chapter 2, national identity has a deep impact on state’s foreign policy, and the state elites use these ideational variables by constructing ‘self’ or ‘other’ to form allies or enemies (Messari 1998). India and Japan have used the identity-making process to highlight the positive aspects of each other’s identity. Thus it can be argued that ‘foreign policy can produce and reproduce national identity not only by dealing with an enemy through opposition and exclusion, but also by dealing with an ally through assimilation and constitution of similarities’ (Kuroki 2013).

Post 1998, India rapidly improved its relations with Japan, as it saw Japan as a state which was strong, pacifist, and had no territorial or ideational disputes with India, unlike Pakistan and China. India views Pakistan and China different from ‘self’ and forms the part of the radical ‘other’. Messari (1998) argues that a state’s identity is created through contact with both allies and enemies. During this process similarities (ideational) are highlighted and differences are usually not discussed. Once this distinction is made, it is implied that values similar to ‘self’ must be defended (Messari 1998).

India’s proactive diplomacy is the key term in Discussing Modi’s foreign policy. In a speech given on September 14, 2017, Modi emphasized on value-centric diplomacy by enhancing relationships with countries which had similar universal values and
promotion of a free and open ‘Indo-Pacific’ region (Modi 2017). Similarly Abe, in his policy speech ‘Confluence of Two Seas’, spoke about enhancement of relations with like-minded countries and argued in favor of an open Asia full of innovation (Abe 2007).

With the growing ‘Chinese Arc of Influence’ has made India’s Indo-Pacific policy a necessity (Mall 2020). In a joint declaration addressing global and regional consultations reflected the perceived synergy of India’s “Act East” policy and the United States’ “rebalance to Asia”, citing such items as upgrading the trilateral dialogue among Japan, India, and the United States to the level of foreign ministers (Muni & Mishra 2019). In another joint declaration between Abe and Modi on free and open Indo-Pacific in 2017, ‘the two prime ministers affirmed strong commitment to their values-based partnership in achieving a free, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific region where sovereignty and international law are respected, and differences are resolved through dialogue, and where all countries, large or small, enjoy freedom of navigation and over flight, sustainable development, and a free, fair, and open trade and investment system (MOFA 2007a).

Thus it can be observed that to strengthen its ties with Japan, India relied on the three identities, which it shares with Japan. First identity is India and Japan abide by the universal values, both are trusted democracies and have been peaceful, responsible states in the anarchic geopolitical arena. Modi has emphasized in many of his speeches the importance of strengthening partnership with democratic countries. Furthermore, Abe has also mentioned in his policy speeches of strengthening relations with India (Japan Cabinet Office 2016).
When India-Japan relation is analyzed from Messari’s identity model, it is a case of dealing with a friend or ally. Japan supported India morally and militarily during its freedom struggle. It is also a democratic state, and remains one of the largest recipients of Japanese ODA. Similarly, Abe during his speech in 2007 claimed that Japan is going through the ‘discovery of India’ phase, and visited the home of grandson of Justice Pal, despite criticism from China and North Korea. Furthermore, most of Japan’s neighbors have historical or territorial issues with it, while there is no such problem in its relations with India. Therefore, Japan’s relationship with India also alleviates it from the ‘guilt’ of being an aggressor, allowing it to be a ‘normal’ state and not feel alienated in Asia. Thus, both Japan and India affirm each other’s values and identity of being promoters of universal values and peace, which make furthering of bilateral relations more easy.

6.0 Overview of India’s Relations with Japan

By the time the Cold War ended, India’s policy of non-alignment had become a caricature. In the absence of cultural, economic and political ties, the United States chose to ignore India during this period. With the end of Cold War started a vigorous internal debate within the elite demanding a shift in India’s foreign and security policy (Ganguly, 1994a). Some stood by the Nehruvian policy of socialism and Non-Alignment and argued that these percepts were still relevant to the world (Muni, 2009). Another segment, that was the right-of-center, headed by Bhartiya Janta Party argued for a more hawkish and assertive Indian Foreign Policy (IFP), and stressed on acquisition of nuclear force by the state (Ganguly, 2003).
Bajpai (1998) describes India’s pre-Cold War foreign and security policy as “modified structuralism.” This meant maximizing India’s national interests while following a normative world order. However, after the end of Cold War, and the disintegration of USSR, India realized that the Soviet had been dissolved permanently and what remained of the former mighty power was an anemic Russia, which was not in a position to support India’s demand for economic and security development. Erstwhile USSR had provided India with vast potential markets and highly subsidized weaponry. Analyzing India’s Cold War economic policy, Thakur (1992) argues that India had followed a “bunker mentality” with an emphasis on import-substituting industrialization and hostility towards investors, which further reinforced India’s isolation and non-alignment in the international arena. However, Rural and urban poverty, loss of Eastern Bloc markets coupled with unprecedented balance of payment crisis in 1991, compelled Indian policy makers to embrace a market-oriented strategy of economic development.

With Soviet no more around and US figuring nowhere in India’s foreign policy; and groupings like Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) taking shape, India decided to look towards its eastern partners to preserve and promote its economic and security interests. Japan, Korea and China along with ASEAN provided most economically dynamic situation in the whole world. A few other factors like growing influence of China and Pakistan in Myanmar and growing apprehension of Southeast Asian states due to India’s naval expansion in the Indian Ocean forced India to initiate confidence building measures with its eastern partners (Muni, 2002).

After taking adequate measures to strengthen the economy, policymakers also realized that a strong military state has considerable advantages in the global order.
Anarchic world system, competition for regional dominance and rise of terrorism forced
the policymakers to take some critical measures to secure India’s territorial and strategic
resources. In May 1998, India conducted a nuclear test in Pokharan to evade the global
pressure it may face to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which had been designed to come into force
from September 1998. The primary reason of India’s nuclear deterrent is seen as the
Chinese nuclear blackmail and coercion (Gupta, 1966). As a result of the tests,
Australian and Canadian high commissioners were withdrawn (Brewster, 2012). China,
USA, UK and Japan also strongly condemned the tests, and various economic sanctions
were imposed on India. In July 1998, during the Manila summit of ASEAN, Japan,
Australia, Canada, Philippines, Thailand and New Zealand favored sanctions to contain
India, while Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia advocated a more benign
attitude (Malone, 2011). However, within next two years New Delhi managed to get
most of the sanctions lifted and pursued dialogue with United States to improve the
bilateral relationship. With the September 9/11 attacks on United States the era of War
on Terror started, and this further strengthened India and US relations because now
United States became a close partner of India in fighting a war that India had been
fighting for two decades.

In the wake of strengthening of US-India relations, Japan, where revisionist ideology
was growing stronger, also showed keen interest in developing close relations with
India. This warming up of relations was followed by numerous high-level diplomatic
exchanges and joint-military exercises, and the relations have significantly strengthened
with the election of the new BJP government, which believes in having an assertive and muscular foreign policy.

On the other hand, the change of Japanese foreign policy towards India is driven more by security factor than anything else. Dramatic changes took place in Asia Pacific region as a result of end of Cold War. These changes have significantly affected Japan’s security concerns, with American commitment to Japan’s security looking doubtful (Naidu, 2004). Cambell (2000) argues that the Asia pacific region is on the verge of a major change in the strategic environment and the world’s center of gravity has shifted to this region. The concept of Security has assumed multi-dimensional character, which includes resource security, technology transfer, sea-lane security, trade and commerce security etc (Kesavan, 2002).

The most important driver in transformation of Indo-Japanese relations is the removal of the ideological hold over Japanese politics by the end of Cold War. For Japan, the decade of the 1990s was also momentous in many ways. The Gulf War of 1990 became a milestone in Tokyo’s strategic thinking as it came under censure from Washington over its inability to contribute manpower to assist its ally. This made Japan come out of its uncertainty and face the realities of the newly emerging global scenario. Despite making a significant contribution to the tune of US$13 billion, Japan was criticised for mere “chequebook diplomacy”. Other developments which shook up Japan were the North Korean missile tests in 1993, the U.S.-North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 and firing of a Pyongyang’s missile which flew over Japan’s Honshu island in 1998. All this combined with the long-standing friction with China over the interpretation of wartime history. A domestic debate was stirred within Japan and
realists like Sato Seizaburo (1996) criticized Japan’s strategic thinking for not being in tune with the international order. He clearly favored an alteration in Japan’s strategic philosophy and vociferously expounded Tokyo’s right to exercise both individual and collective self-defense as well as the need to amend the Constitution (Seizaburo, 1996).

The next section discusses India-Japan relations after the end of World War II in detail. The section has been divided into four phases. First phases covers the historical links between India and Japan, starting from pre-Buddhist era right until the end of World War II. The second phase discusses the Cold War period from 1945 to 1990. The third phase (1991-2000) covers the period of liberalization of Indian economy and India becoming a nuclear power. The fourth phase that started in the year 2001 after Japanese prime-minister Mori’s visit to India, under the leadership of Koizumi, Abe, Vajpayee, Singh and Modi, catapulted India-Japan relations to new heights.

6.1 First Phase: Pre-Buddhist Era to 1945

6.1.1 Ancient Links

India and Japan have various social and cultural similarities and similarities as Asian countries. India, China, Mongolia, Korea and Japan are geographically close, and long ago nomads and merchants created social relations and trade relations between these countries using Silk Road and the sea route. Buddhism came into Japan in the 6th century, but the exchange between Far East and India was flourishing long before that. In the 2nd century a princess from city of Ayodhya in India got reached Korea by sea route and married the king, Kim Suro, who is considered to be the forefather of Kim
clan in Korea. Furthermore, in the 7th century, a woman from Shravasti in India went to Japan on a special unsinkable boat called *catamaran*.

The influence of India is seen in Japanese culture, and the language also has the influence of Sanskrit language and Tamil language. I would like to mention how the two countries are connected even if there is a language barrier. The following points describe common points seen in religious and social customs.

Along with Buddhism, a number of Indian gods were introduced to Japan. Below is a list of Indian gods that form the part of the Buddhist pantheon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indian Gods</th>
<th>Japanese Avatar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shiva</td>
<td>Daikokuten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahma</td>
<td>Bon Ten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vishnu</td>
<td>Naraenten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indra</td>
<td>Taishakuten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kubera</td>
<td>Bishamonten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goddess Lakshmi</td>
<td>Kichijoten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goddess Saraswati</td>
<td>Benzaiten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatur Maharaja</td>
<td>Shitenneno</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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26 *Catamaran*-type vessels were first developed as early as 1500 BCE. They were in wide use as early as the 5th century by the Tamil people of Tamil Nadu, South India. The word "*catamaran*" is derived from the Tamil word, *kattumaram*, which means "logs bound together."
There are many cultural similarities in the Indian and Japanese cultures. For example, the *rath yatra* in India and the *mikoshi* in Japan, significance of certain numbers (like 7), superstitions, etc. Ancestor worship is another common feature of Indian and Japanese society. It is believed that the soul of the ancestors plays an important role in the happiness of their descendants. In order to comfort the ancestors' souls, it is necessary to make appropriate rituals for their funerals and deaths. Like the Hindu "Shradh" ceremony, there is a ceremony of "Bon Festival" in Japan. After the introduction of Buddhism in Japan, ancestral worship expanded further. According to one myth, Mudagalayana (a disciple of the Buddha) saw that his mother suffered from starvation in hell in a dream. Worried that his mother was suffering, he sent clothes and food to the mother, that turned to ashes as soon as they reached the other world. Worried, Mudagalyana consulted with the Buddha who told him to pray to in his mother's name and then offer that food to monks. Mudagalyana did that every year resulting in ritual of Bon.

The story of another legendary figure Ninigi no mikoto closely resembles the story of Indian deity Rama, who fought a war against a devil to bring back his wife. Ninigi no mikoto also fought the barbarians from south who had kidnapped his queen. Interestingly, both Rama and Ninigi were helped by monkey gods in this.

There are numerous such examples that indicate there was contact between India and Japan in ancient times, however, with the coming of outsiders in India in the 10th century, this link was broken and got revived only in 20th century after the visit of Rabindranath Tagore to Japan and establishment of Indian National Army by Subhas Chandra Bose.
6.1.2 Japan’s Vision of Asia in 20th Century

Before the Meiji Restoration of 1868 Japan was a closed island country, with little or no interaction with outside world. After Japan was forced to open to the West in the year 1868, it transformed itself into a modern state as wealthy and strong as any other European state. In the twentieth century, rapid modernization and industrial growth made Japan look beyond its territory for raw materials to feed its machines. Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05) instilled national pride in the Japanese people and many began regarding themselves as superior to other Asians. Many Japanese people believed in the official ideology that claimed that the Emperor is the direct descendant of Amaterasu, the Japanese Sun Goddess (Tierney 1991, Kirkland 1997, Ito 2002). With the sense of superiority to Asian neighbors, there grew a need to create the philosophy of ‘Asianism’ that could justify Japan’s policy of protecting (in fact invading) the neighboring countries. Tarui (1885) in his work ‘Greater East Asian Union Theory,’ proposed that Japan should annex Korea and China, and then further develop the idea of Asian unification under the leadership of Japan.

The Japanese government inspired by the Monroe Doctrine of America, urged the West to withdraw from East Asia, and sought to create one big, self-sufficient and productive economic bloc under the ‘fatherly’ leadership of the Japanese Emperor (Bix 2001). The Japanese people believed that Japan being the most advanced nation in the whole of Asia and having absorbed the true essence of Asianism by assimilating Indian and Chinese culture and philosophy into its own, deserves to be the leader of this region and should guide the other nations on the path of prosperity. The Japanese leaders felt
that it was a divine command that they had to bring all eight corners of the world under one Imperial spirit (八紘一宇) in order to promote people’s welfare and realize co-existence and co-prosperity (Beasley 1991). The Japanese people were taught that the people of Asia were their brothers and should cooperate in creating a new world order which would have to compete with a European bloc controlled by Germany and an American bloc controlled by USA in future (Schiltz 2012).

Based on this ideology in 1938, Fumimaro Konoe, the Japanese prime minister, announced the ‘New Order in East Asia,’ which was limited to North-East Asia only (Bernd 2006). This idea was expanded in 1940, and it was decided to include the British, Dutch, French and Portuguese colonies bordering East Asia in ‘New Order in East Asia.’ This came to be known as the Greater East Asia (GEA) Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan’s sphere of aggression expanded from China to Southeast Asia and southwestern Pacific region. The GEA Sphere was to act as a defensive and economic bloc led by Japan, and excluded the non-Asiatic countries (Norman 1973). This new bloc was to eliminate dependence of Asian nations on Europe and America, fostering the culture of the Orient (Hotta 2007). The sphere was deemed necessary to avoid imperialistic control structure and was believed to seek defensive, political, economic, cultural and organic structure. Duus (2008) argues that this economic unit was not designed to build an exploitive relationship, but a cooperative relationship in co-existence and co-prosperity (kyoson-kyoei), and create a new East Asian culture, based on Asian principles.
6.1.3 Political Situation in 20th Century India

Meanwhile in India, when the British East India Company arrived in the early 17th century, it did not expect it to be thickly populated, with kingdoms and government systems as complex as any European country. The British thought India would be a lawless country like Australia or America, with thinly populated plains which could be easily captured. Soon the British realized that to rule India only force and intimidation was not enough, since the Indians outnumbered the British soldiers and administrators by not thousands but by millions. So the British entered into political, administrative and military alliances with Indians, who spoke English and looked after the day to day work and allowed smooth governance. Lord Macaulay in 1833 in House of Commons said that

“We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.”

The Indians were denied opportunities to rise up in the system and were discriminated against. The farmers were forced to grow cash crops such as opium, indigo, jute, tea and coffee instead of subsistence crops which resulted in famines across the Indian subcontinent, in which millions of people died. Laws were passed which paralyzed the peasants of India both politically and economically (Chaudhary 2008). Heavy taxes were levied on farmers by the landlords, which in turn were collected by the British officials. In the Great Bengal Famine of 1769-70, more than ten million people died in Bihar and Bengal alone due to hunger (Sen 1981). In successive famines of 1791, 1837, 1869 and 1876 more than thirty million people succumbed to hunger.

and another three million died in Bengal Famine of 1943. For more than two hundred years the British were engaged in transferring wealth from India back home (Tharoor 2018). The banks of Britain used this wealth to fund the industrial development in Europe and America. There were many uprisings which took place against the British rule in India, but the British cleverly used the feuds among local rulers to their advantage by pitting one against the other and then taking side with those inclined to them.

In the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, also known as the First War of Indian Independence, the rebel sepoys were tied to the mouth of canon guns and blown off (Havholm 2008). Same year the royal family was also massacred en masse. In 1919, British authorities opened fire on a peaceful mass rally killing more than thousand people. Thus indiscrimination, exploitation, subjugation and cultural annihilation by the British led to mass unrest among the Indians and their demand for independence became stronger (Brown 2010).

6.1.4 Japan: An Inspiration for Indian Nationals

India’s political bonding to Britain, which strengthened after the events of year 185729, had been vaguely known in Japan until the 1880s. With the development of newspapers and other means of communication, the Indian problem started receiving

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29 The Indian Rebellion of 1857 began as a mutiny of sepoys of the East India Company's army on 10 May 1857, in the town of Meerut, and soon escalated into other mutinies and civilian rebellions largely in the upper Gangetic plain and central India. The rebellion posed a considerable threat to Company power in that region and is also known as India's First War of Independence.
increasing attention from the Japanese public, and many political figures supported India’s cause (Singh 1969). After the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, it became increasingly difficult for Japan to express sympathy openly for the cause of Indian independence (Scully 2012). The British were aware of the impact on Indian intellectuals made by Japan’s rapid rise to power and were naturally anxious lest Indian nationalists should seek and obtain moral and material support from Japan in their struggle for freedom. Britain’s concern about preventing assistance from Japan reaching the Indian nationalist movement grew serious after Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905.

Gradually, the impact of Japan’s rise as a major power could be seen among the Indian intellectuals. In August 1905 the Swadeshi (Native) and Swaraj (Independence) movements had been launched by the Indian leaders. The aim of Swadeshi movement was to boycott all foreign goods, particularly British manufactures, and to encourage the use of home-made goods. Japanese goods were excluded from this boycott, and this upset the British because of their commercial rivalry with Japan. Neither the Swadeshi movement nor the Swaraj slogan had received any material support from Japan. And yet the mere fact that Japan had shown the path was enough to inspire nationalist opinion to spell out its demands. Lebra (2008) quotes a British observer, Leonard Alston, who noted that after the Russo-Japanese War, India’s “higher patriotism has been deepened and strengthened by the spectacle of Japan.” Valentine Carol, another Englishman, observed that the emergence of Japan had made powerful impression on India. He also mentioned that it would not be surprising if Indian nationalists were to seek ‘guidance and assistance’ from Japan (Lebra 2008). The concern British felt was so great that the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, refused to see the Japanese Consul in India who had journeyed
up to Simla to convey the sympathies of his Government over the Bihar earthquake disaster (Majumdar 1963). The British kept up pressure at the same time on the Japanese Government, through diplomatic channels not to let Indian political activists use Japan as a base for anti-British activities.

The inspiration which Japan had provided to the Indian nationalist movement in the early years of the twentieth century began to wane during the 1930s as a result of militarism and ultra-nationalism in Japan. The dream of “Asia for Asians” had been destroyed by the spectacle of war and tension in the Far East. Indian National Congress issued a call to the people of India to boycott Japanese goods in an attempt to bring home to Japan the need to retrace its imperialist steps (Lebra 2008).

Rash Behari Bose and the Indian Independence League The British authorities in India had a complete list drawn up of Indian political activists residing in Japan. These included Gyani Bhagwan Singh, Herambalal Gupta, and Rashbehari Bose. Bhagwan Singh had been active in the Ghadar movement (revolt), in the early 1900s, in the United States along with Barkatullah. He reached Japan by way of Canada late in 1913. When the Komagata Maru was lying at anchor at Yokohama, he went on board, along with Barkatullah, met passengers, and addressed them (Nakajima 2009). As soon as Bhagwan Singh’s arrival in Japan became known, British sought his extradition on the ground that he was involved in a conspiracy to foment trouble against British rule with the help of German agents. Although he failed to elicit any material help from Japan, he did not suffer from deportation either. Finally in 1915, he left Japan for Seoul. Hermbalal Gupta also reached Japan in September 1915. The most important man on the British list of most wanted men was Rashbehari Bose, who was allegedly involved
in the bomb explosion on the occasion of the State Entry of Viceroy Lord Hardinge into Delhi in 1912. Rash Behari along with a few others emerged as the face of revolutionary movement in Bengal.

The British Government was worried due to the rapidly growing nationalist sentiment in Bengal, and in 1912, decided to shift the capital from Calcutta to Delhi (Nanda 2005, Wilson 2005). This move was made in order to break the backbone of revolutionary movement in Bengal by shifting the attention of the whole country from Calcutta to Delhi. On December 23, 1912, when the Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge, was entering Delhi, a procession was organized to welcome him. Rash Behari personally undertook the task of hurling the bomb at the Viceroy, in the very heart of the new capital. In this incident, Lord Hardinge was badly injured. Officials from Central Intelligence and Scotland Yard rushed in but could not find any clue leading to the culprit (Central Intelligence Agency 2010). Rash Behari escaped and reached Dehra Dun, where he addressed a public rally criticizing the bomb-thrower and also offered his services to the CID, so that he could remain in touch with the progress of investigation. For several months he duped the Government, and when finally he suspected that the investigators might soon find out that he was the real culprit, he went underground. Rash Behari's associates advised him that he should leave the country both for his personal safety and for leading the revolutionary movement from abroad.  

After leaving India, Rash Behari reached Shanghai under the guise of Raja P.N. Tagore. From there he wanted to supply arms and ammunition to other Indian revolutionaries, but China herself was pre-occupied in her own war of liberation and

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Rash Behari could do very little under those circumstances. Rash Behari reached Japan in June 1915, which was a popular meeting place for Indians engaged in the nationalist movement. Rash Behari sought help of prominent leaders like Ōkawa Shūmei and Tōyama Mitsuru.

Rashbehari Bose’s life in Japan constitutes an important part of the history of the nationalist movement abroad. As soon as he reached Japan, he convened there a meeting of the sponsors of the Indian Freedom Movement, in the renowned 'Sayoken Hotel’ on November 25, 1915. Besides reputed revolutionaries and the Japanese government’s sympathizers, the meeting was also attended by Lala Lajpat Rai, a famous and influential Indian revolutionary. The meeting aroused the sympathy of the Japanese people for the efforts of the revolutionaries. But Rash Behari and his associate, Herambalal Gupta were directed by the Japanese Government to leave Japan, as it was bound by the conditions of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. However, the Japanese people and the press came out openly supporting Rash Behari, due to which the elderly political leader, Tōyama Mitsuru, assured help and protection to Rash Behari (Mujhekrjee 1996). Aizo Soma, a man of fortune and owner of the most reputed Japanese Hotel, 'Nakamuraya,’ provided secret hiding for Rash Behari in the cellar of that influential hotel. Three months later, a British man-of-war attacked a Japanese ship, and this provoked the Japanese Government to hurt the British by reversing its policy in

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31 Ōkawa Shūmei (大川 周明) was a Japanese nationalist, Pan-Asian writer and Islamic scholar. In the prewar period, he was known for his publications on Indian philosophy, philosophy of religion, Japanese history, and colonialism.

32 Tōyama Mitsuru (頭山 満) was a right-wing political leader in early 20th century Japan and founder of the Genyosha nationalist secret society. In the 1930s, he was considered as a super patriot by a large section of the Japanese public, including the chauvinistic military.
regard to Rash Behari. Rash Behari came out in the open in April 1916. Rash Behari later became a naturalized citizen and adopted a Japanese name ‘Hayashi Ichiro.’

He continued to work for Indian independence and moved between China, Japan, and Korea in an attempt to mobilize Indians living in that part of the world. R.B. Bose formed the Indian Independence League in 1924 and the Pan Asian League in 1926 to further the cause of the Indian nationalist movement in East Asia.

After the outbreak of Second World War, Rashbehari Bose and other Indians living in Tokyo decided to launch a struggle against the British. The Japanese government saw it as an opportunity to expand further in Asia, and looked up to vast India as a buffer zone and deterrent for the Allied powers to cross over and jeopardize Japanese territories in South East Asia. On February 15, 1942, Japan captured Singapore and 15 thousand British, 13 thousand Australian and 32 thousand Indian soldiers were taken as prisoners of war by the Japanese army. Japan also took over Malaya and established her authority over the country of five million people, among whom 3 hundred thousand were Indians (Lebra 2008).

The Japanese government helped R.B. Bose to found the Indian Independence League in South-East Asia and also in forming the Indian National Army by organizing the Indian soldiers taken captive by the Japanese Army. From June 14 to 23, a conference of Indians was held in the East in Bangkok. Representatives of about 300,000 Indians scattered all over Java, Sumatra, Indo-China, Borneo, Manchuko, Hongkong, Burma, Malaya and Japan had gathered in large numbers. The conference presented a memorandum to Japan requesting that its demand for equal rights and status for the Azad Hind Fauz of Free India be conceded. However, Japan did not agree to all
the demands set by the Indians. The meeting also constituted the War Council of the League with Rash Behari Bose as the first President. The conference also decided to invite Subhas Chandra Bose to lead the Indian Independence League and the Azad Hind Fauj in the East, and an invitation was sent accordingly. Soon after the conference, the membership of the League swelled to 120,000, and fifty thousand Indian soldiers were enlisted into the Indian National Army. An independent broadcasting center was also set up at Bangkok (Lebra 2008).

Another conference between Indian and Japanese leaders to discuss future course of action was held in Tokyo in March 1942, where apart from other topics it was decided to extend the status of most-favored-nation on a reciprocal basis to win the confidence of Indian leaders. The Indian delegates met Japanese Premier Tōjō, who assured them that the Japanese government had no ulterior motive in offering help to the League and the Army. After Subhas Chandra Bose reached the Far East via Berlin in May-June 1943, he assumed control of both the organizations.

6.1.5 India & Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere has been viewed by many scholars as an example of Japanese government’s attempt to colonize China and South East Asia. The Japanese government denied all allegations regarding the imperialist nature of the GEA Sphere, however Lebra (2008) argues that Japan wanted to economically use GEA as both supplier and market, just like its European counterparts. The ambiguous policies of Japanese government towards South East Asia and lack of coordination between agencies resulted in highly divergent GEA structure, which differed from one country to another.
The Japanese leaders could not reach consensus regarding the geographical boundaries of the GEA Sphere. A certain section of the military looked at India as a resource rich country which would be an asset to the Sphere. In September 1941, Chief of General Staff Sugiyama asked Major Fujiwara Iwaichi to look at Indo-Japanese relations from the standpoint of establishing the GEA Sphere (Lebra 2008). “In fact, in 1942 when Fujiwara met the 8th Section, responsible for India project, he was surprised to see the Imperial General Headquarter (IGHQ) plan for India because the title of the document read ‘India Stratagem Plan’, which Fujiwara later got changed to ‘India Policy Project’” (Fujiwara 1983). Some Japanese militarists announced that India, Australia and New Zealand were to be included in the GEA Sphere (cf. Lebra 2008). Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Japan was advised that these three nations had a large number of automobiles which can be put to use for transportation of wheat and other materials within the GEA region.

The President of Nippon Yusen Kaisha in an article published in Oriental Economist, in 1942, wrote that India should be included in the GEA vision to give teeth to the bloc, and make it more powerful than any other economic blocs which were to come up (Lebra 1975). In his speech which appeared in The Japan Times in 1942, Premier Tojo claimed that the areas that were important for the defense of Greater East Asia, which could be labeled as the Japanese empire, would be directly controlled by Japan. Under the umbrella of GEA, the Japanese army also followed cultural imperialism by trying to create a mass of young people who were fluent in Japanese language and understood Japanese culture. It was proposed to make Japanese Yen the
common currency in the whole GEA region and Japanese textbooks were also implemented in schools.

Bose attended the Diet session on 16 June 1943, where Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki announced that his country had full sympathy with Indians and was determined to extend all possible support to them to fight against the British regime. It will be interesting to mention here some excerpts that Lebra (1975) cites from the speech of Prime Minister Tōjō delivered in the House of Peers in the 79th Diet session in 1942.

“The cardinal point in the War of Greater East Asia, which our Empire is now prosecuting, is to secure strategic bases in Greater East Asia and to bring the regions with important resources under Japan’s control, thereby augmenting our fighting strength and, in close cooperation with Germany and Italy, to extend increasingly vigorous operations and to fight through until the United states and the British Empire are brought to their knees.......It is truly an unprecedently grand undertaking that our Empire should, by adding these regions, establish an ever-lasting peace in Greater East Asia with a new conception which will construct a new world order...... It is the intention of the Government that in this construction the areas which are absolutely essential for the defense of Greater East Asia be controlled and dealt with by Japan itself, while regarding other regions, appropriate measures be taken as the war situation develops.”

This desire to include India in Japan’s empire, discreetly called the Co-prosperity sphere, was sown in the minds of her militarists by Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka in 1940 when he advocated alliance with Germany and Italy in order that,
after Britain’s defeat, Japan might have the right to help herself to Britain’s undefended possession in the East (Lebra 1975).

Moreover, Japan’s un-willingness to accept the five resolutions of the ‘Council of Action’ of the Indian Independence League at the Bangkok Conference clearly indicates the real intention behind the Japanese government’s support to INA (Toye 2007). The five demands are listed below:

1) **Control by the League and INA of all Indian prisoners.**

2) **The status of the INA as an army freely aligned with Japan.**

3) **Unfettered League control of the INA**

4) **The absolute independence of India after liberation.**

5) **League control of the property in East Asia of Indians who had left as refugees.**

These demands made by the Indians had angered Première Tōjō, who did not want to make any promise to the Indians which might stand in the way of her undisclosed intentions to conquer India at the ‘opportune moment,’ by which policy planners meant the time after Britain was knocked down by a German invasion of the island (Kunizuka 1959). The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was both a deceptive slogan and an expression of resolve to expand. This makes it clear that big plans of making further conquests were up the sleeves of the Japanese leaders, and that the execution of those plans was awaiting an ‘opportune time’. This ‘opportune moment,’ no doubt, was a situation when India would lie open to the invader with no big power to defend her. In such a situation, the Japanese believed, there would be no
justification for delaying action any longer for better preparation because there would be no big power to confront the Japanese army (Butow 1969). Japan in the Bangkok Conference of 1942 declared that:

“The Indians residing in the territories occupied by the Imperial Forces of Japan shall not be considered enemy nationals so long as they do not indulge in any action injurious to this movement or hostile to the interest of Japan.” (Toye 2007).

It is quite clear from this statement that the Japanese government would not have tolerated any resistance from the Indian side to push back Japan, once it is inside India. The use of ambiguous words in Japanese government’s statements deceived many people who relied for their conclusions on quotable official documents, and believed that the invasion of India does not have a place in Japan’s plans.

6.1.6 Indian National Army and Japan

In 1943, S.C. Bose assumed full control of both the Army and the League, and moved to Singapore to set up his headquarters. Fay (1997) states that to establish India’s independent identity Bose planned the formation of a Provisional Government of India. On October 21, 1943, he announced before a conference of the Indian Independence League the birth of the Azad Hind Government (Provisional Government of Free India) and the Azad Hind Fauj (National Army of Free India). Two days later Japanese Board of Information announced that it had accorded recognition to the Azad Hind Government (Fay 1997). The Indian National Army, popularly known as the Fauj was reorganized and reinforced with Japanese army’s assistance and cooperation. However,
the soldiers of this segment were lightly armed for guerilla warfare only, so that after
crossing the Indian border they should not become a problem for the Japanese army.
The Japanese military did not want to see the INA develop into a large fighting force
and saw INA as an intelligent guerilla network to defend Burma and the western border
of the Great East Asia-Co-Prosperity Sphere (Hauner 1981). The INA worked as an
autonomous unit, which assisted the Japanese army in the Burma war, and then fought
against the British Empire with Japanese ammunition support. Bose declared war
against Great Britain on October 24, 1943. Field Marshal Terauchi received instructions
from Tokyo that all possible support should be extended to the Indian army under the
command of S.C. Bose.

Immediately after the Japanese army completed the conquest of Burma in the
month of June in 1942, the Japanese officers advocated of attacking Imphal without
losing any time. The Japanese army considered that they should strike immediately and
not give time to the British army to recuperate from their disastrous withdrawal.
Moreover, if the Japanese could capture Imphal, then the British forces would not have
a base for launching a counter-offensive against the Japanese forces in Burma. But there
was another view in the Japanese army that any attack on Indian Territory by the
Japanese may lead to the build-up of anti-Japanese sentiments among the Indians, which
may hurt the Japanese plan. So, in December 1942, it was decided to abandon the plan
of attacking India.

The execution orders to attack Imphal came on January 7, 1944, two years after
the siege in Burma, and this was called “Operation U.” Even though the Allied forces
had recuperated from the retreat of 1942, the collective offensive by the Japanese and Indian troops took the British by complete surprise. This meant that the Japanese and Indian troops, finding no resistance, literally galloped through the mountains and jungles routing the enemy on the way. The Japanese Imperial Headquarters announced on April 8, 1944, that "Japanese troops, fighting side by side with the Indian National Army, captured Kohima early on 6 April" (Calvocoressi 1972). Bose soon got down with the Japanese army to discuss the administration of the liberated territories in India. Prime Minister Tojo, in his response to a call made by Bose to clarify the future of the occupied territories, announced that all areas of India occupied during the war by the Japanese army would be transferred to the Provisional Government.

While the Indian and Japanese forces continued their siege over Imphal, the Allied Air Force regained strength and started preparing for a counterattack. By the middle of April, the military balance started to shift against the Japanese and INA forces, the battle which up till now was being fought with an offensive attitude gradually turned into a defensive one. The battle strength of the forces was reduced by forty percent due to the non-regular supply of rations and ammunition. However, it was the monsoon that gave the final blow to the already dwindling Japanese-INA spirit. Due to the overflowing rivers, the Japanese army’s supplies were disrupted, due to which the INA men suffered from disease and hunger. The British realized that the battle was now turning in their favor, and they started airlifting more and more troops into Kohima. Railways were also used to send in more forces. Japan could not match the British in air power and the Japanese army could not strike back at enemy air operations. In the wake of the heavy monsoon disease became rampant and cholera, dysentery, beriberi, malaria,
and other jungle sores started to take their toll on the Indian forces. Even the food supplies could not reach the Indian forces as they were left stranded in the jungle due to overflowing rivers. This forced the INA and the Japanese men to survive on rations consisting of rice mixed with jungle grass. On July 8, after consulting with top-ranking army generals which included Mutaguchi and Kawabe, Prime Minister Tajo issued the order to stop “Operation U” and orders of retreat were issued. This campaign ended in final defeat of the Japanese army, followed by an alleged plane crash of Bose, in Formosa, in which he reportedly died.

Despite the fact that Japan had suffered defeat at the hands of Allied Powers, and the INA had withered away on the Indo-Burma front, Bose and his Indian National Army had become household names in India. The British Government had hoped that by prosecuting the members of the INA, it would be able to boost the morale of the British army. However, on the contrary, rather than boosting the morale it resulted in creating unease and tension among the soldiers. The Indian soldiers of the British Army felt ashamed of themselves for supporting the enemy of the nation and were filled with guilt. The sepoys thought that if the whole of India confirmed that Bose and his men did the right thing by waging a war against the British for India’s freedom, then the Indians in the British army must have been on the wrong side. It was a gradual realization for the Government of India that the mainstay of the British rule, the army, could no longer be relied upon led to the independence of India in 1947.

The British Prime Minster, Lord Clement Atlee, who was responsible for granting independence to India, later admitted in an interview with noted historian R.C.
Majumdar, that it was Bose’s activities that had made it impossible for the British to command loyalty from the Indian army, and that Gandhi’s struggle had minimal effect on the decision of Britain to grant India its freedom (Majumdar 1967). Kumar (2007) describes the hopeless situation of the British in India by quoting British historians P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins (2002) as follows:

*By the end of war, there was a loss of purpose at the very center of the imperial system. The gentlemanly administrators who managed the Raj no longer had the heart to devise new moves against increasing odds, not least because after 1939 the majority of the Indian Civil Service were themselves Indian. In 1945 the new Viceroy, Wavell, commented on the “weakness and weariness of the importance of the instrument still at our disposal in the shape of the British element in the Indian Civil Service. The town had been lost to opponents of the Raj; the countryside had slipped beyond control. Widespread discontent in the army was followed in 1946 by a mutiny in the navy. It was then Wavell, the unfortunate messenger, reported to London that India had become ungovernable.*

On the other hand, after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the World War II officially came to an end, resulting in the occupation of Japan by the Allied forces till 1952. During this phase Japan slipped in to the American block, and India, though officially maintaining a non-aligned approach, became close to the erstwhile USSR.
6.2 Second Phase: Cold War phase (1945-1990)

6.2.1 The Cold War and Non-Aligned Movement

United States has played an important role in forging India-Japan relations. Cold War had a very huge impact on Indo-Jap relations. For the majority of the past six decades, the U.S.-India relations were frosty, which directly translated into cold Indo-Japanese relations.

For many years after India achieved its independence in 1947, the U.S. regarded South Asia as a region that was marginal to its central strategic needs. However, many American administrators did view India to be an important partner in the Cold War contest, viewing it to be a young democracy trying to find its place under China’s communist shadow. Assuming that India’s fate could have serious implications for other states in Asia fighting for their independence U.S. provided India with large economic assistance, particularly because of the deteriorating Indo-Chinese ties. Moreover, U.S. came out in support of India during the 1962 Sino-Indian War and even supplied military equipment to India (Maxwell, 1970). Having said this, it was clear from early stage that India would not be a part of any U.S. battle against communism, despite Indo-U.S. cooperation in various fields. Instead, India created its own course of “non-alignment” considered to be independent of either superpower.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was born after the World War II, during the collapse of the colonial rule in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions of the world. The Movement in its early days was a key factor in the process of decolonization,
and played a major role in the attainment of freedom by many countries and founding of new sovereign states.

Therefore, at one level U.S. sympathized with the policy of “non-alignment” adopted by India. After all, opposing camp could have targeted India for openly taking sides in the Cold War struggle. This was one of the main reasons that the U.S. did not join any military groups throughout the 150 years of its history. Thus it was expected of India, a new and weak country, to refrain from taking sides (Gaddis, 2005). However, the main problem U.S. had with India’s policy was that ‘non-alignment’ did not genuinely translate into neutrality because India got inclined towards Soviet’s ambit, away from the U.S.

The affinity of India for Soviet Union was based on preferences that were subjective, and strategic factors that were objective. Indian elites for long time had admired the economic success of the Soviet Union and prime-minister Jawaharlal Nehru himself was inclined towards socialist values and highly distrusted the free-market capitalism endorsed by America. Moreover, looking at the colonial history of the world, Indians believed that Soviet Union would never become a colonial power, and thus not seek to colonize other states or pose a threat to India’s sovereignty (Ganguly, 2003).

At the strategic level, Soviet Union could guarantee India protection against regional rivals. In 1971, India and Soviet Union signed a treaty of “peace, friendship, and cooperation” under which both parties were to help each other during a perceived military threat. Due to this New Delhi relied heavily on Moscow to protect itself from China, with which it fought a war in 1962 and also had territorial dispute. Moreover, during the early 1970s, Beijing enjoyed improved relations with the Washington, which
posed a threat to India. Soviet Union responded by further strengthening their friendship with India by providing highly sophisticated arms and subsidized rates and favorable terms. They also supported India in the Security Council over the Kashmir issue.

As a return gesture, Indians also supported the Soviets on various controversial issues. India abstained from criticizing the Soviet Union during its invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979). India also denied that the military might of the Eastern Bloc threatened Western Europe. Thus, the Indians not only denied cooperating with U.S. in containing Soviet power, but they assisted the Soviets against U.S. in several ways. U.S. found India’s ‘non-aligned’ policy considerably irritating and thus India lost a position in the grand strategic goals of America. Beyond the strategic issues mentioned above, India was also economically unattractive for the American businessman during the Cold War.

Apart from these strategic problems, India was economically unappealing for U.S. during the Cold War. The U.S. did not view India as a serious trading partner, worthy investment target or source of skilled labor due to its long continuing underdevelopment. Due to the long continuing economic weakness India failed to develop as a military power, further reducing its relevance on the globe. Therefore, India which refused to cooperate with U.S. and offered limited economic benefits while posing direct military threat to American interests was by and large ignored (Rotter, 2000).

So unable to gain Indian cooperation, U.S. turned to India’s arch-rival, Pakistan for promoting its strategic interests, by including it in anti-communist alliances like Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
(SEATO) (Brines, 1968). Pakistan which served as an important channel for the shipment of American arms to anti-Soviet forces also allowed its territory to be used as a flight base and spying on Soviet Union. In return for their service, the Pakistanis received substantial American economic and military assistance (McMohan, 1994). Thus close U.S.-Pak ties convinced Indians that U.S. had malicious intentions towards them. Equipped with superior American equipment and training, Pakistan’s government adopted an offensive approach towards India, and became a major security threat for Indians. Due to rising threat from Pakistan and also China, New Delhi was forced to increase its defense spending, which further pushed it into the Soviet ambit.

The decision by President Nixon to dispatch the aircraft carrier ‘Enterprise’ to the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Bangladesh war further exacerbated the Indo-U.S. relations, and the relations hit an all-time low. Indians saw this as the zenith of American support for Pakistan and an open attempt to threaten the security of India. The growing closeness between U.S. and Pakistan resulted in frosty Indo-U.S. ties, as the Indians were convinced by American actions that it is working to undermine their security by supporting its arch-enemy.

Finally, the issue of nuclear proliferation during the Cold War period was a major cord of dispute between India and the U.S. after the “peaceful nuclear explosion,” of 1974 by India, the U.S. drafted the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (1978), the Symington Amendment and the Pressler Amendment to thwart India and Pakistan from entering the nuclear club (Hagerty, 1998). Indians highly criticized this policy and called it discriminatory and later in 1998 the then foreign minister Jaswant Singh called the U.S. policy as “nuclear apartheid (Singh, 1998).”
This era of uncertainty and doubt and alignment vs. non-alignment kept India away from the Western bloc, and Japan which was a part of this bloc was also affected by this. One reason why Japan had to be a part of the Western bloc was that the occupation of Japan (1945-52) was administered solely by U.S., and unlike Germany, Soviet Union was not allowed to be a part of it. Hence Japan had no choice but to be placed in the Western camp and it also heavily relied on the U.S. for its defense. Japan’s wartime policies and then the onset of Cold War largely isolated Japan from Asia, while an alliance with U.S. turned Japan’s attention towards the Pacific and beyond.

At home, the Japanese politicians were divided over the policies Japan should adopt in the changing world. The Left wanted Japan to neutral and pacifist, detached from any bilateral alliance. However, the Right which went on to rule the country for almost next fifty years could not decide whether Japan should rearm and return to the prewar political system or continue with the alliance. The compromise was worked out by Yoshida Shigeru, four-time postwar prime minister, and shaped the foundations of Japan’s foreign policy. One of the important aspect of this doctrine was continued reliance on alliance with the United States and maintaining a low profile in international politics. It is commonly believed that when any international crisis occurred, the Japanese foreign ministry would first look to Washington and then to the site of crisis. Under such conditions India and Japan drifted far apart diplomatically and much interaction did not take place between the two democracies of Asia. However, the next section will discuss the limited bilateral exchanges that took place at the economic and political level between India and Japan during the Cold War period.
6.2.2 Economic Aspect

The economic determinants of the Indo-Japanese relationship consist of aid, trade and investment, of which private investment assumes an important role. For many years, Japan’s contribution to trade and direct investment in the South Asian region, particularly India, was minimal. South Asia as an economic and political region has been missing from the Japanese definition of ‘Asia’ within the ‘Asia-Pacific’ framework (Hirose 1994). One reason attributed for this is that most South Asian economies had preferred inward-looking policies in the earlier period. They did not emphasize exports or strive to increase the competitiveness of their products in the global arena. India’s earlier embrace of a socialist pattern of development and restrictive measures such as the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) of 1969 and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1973 had a negative impact on Japanese investors for a long time (Banerjee 1991). The White Paper on World Economy by the Economic Planning Agency of Japan did not even mention any South Asian countries in its statistics until 1991, which indicates the relative lack of importance given to these countries by Japan (Abe and Igawa 1992).

Domestic issues, however, have been the major impediment in the growth of an economic relationship between India and Japan. Labour laws, poor infrastructure, lack of political will to implement the liberalization process effectively and high tariff have made India an unattractive destination for Japanese investors. Indo-Japanese economic relations traditionally focused mainly on financial assistance to various development projects such as Japan’s first overseas investment in 1951 to the iron ore development
project in Goa (Nester 1992). Japanese FDI began to flow, albeit in small terms, into India in the early 1980s. From the 1980s onwards, the participation of Japanese Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in Indian enterprises increased sharply.

During the 1980s, Japanese FDI was centered on the production of transport machinery and other related sectors. The best-known success story of an Indo-Japanese joint venture is the Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL), which commenced production in December 1982. Encouraged by this success, Japanese investors showed interest in India between 1983–87, investing mainly in two-wheeler and four-wheeler vehicles, including light commercial vehicles, with technical collaboration and technology transfer being the main component of these ventures. Apart from the automobile sector, foreign investment and technical collaboration took place in the consumer electronic industry in general and computerization of product design and related industrial activities as well.

The unfavorable condition of Indian economy forced India’s policymakers to dramatically alter India’s domestic and international economic policies. These involved abandoning the country’s historic commitment to import-substituting industrialization, unbundling, though fitfully at best, its vast public sector and dismantling a complicated set of regulations, licenses, permits and quotas which had largely stifled economic growth.

During the 1990s therefore, Indo-Japan relations improved substantially. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited Japan in June 1992 to explain India’s economic policy and seek Japanese cooperation in India’s economic development. In response to India’s liberalization, a Japanese foreign ministry sponsored delegation consisting of over 100
corporate representatives, industrialists and financiers, as well as officials from the ministries of foreign affairs, finance, international trade and industry visited New Delhi on 26 January 1992 to explore the possibilities for investments in select high potential sectors of the Indian economy (Esho, 1999). The delegation expressed Japanese appreciation for the reform process and sought assurance from the government that there would be no policy reversals in the reform process. As a result of these positive developments, India’s exports to Japan increased from Rs. 303.9 million in 1990–91 to Rs. 1.59 billion in 1999–2000 to Rs. 4.56 billion in 2005–06 and further to Rs. 6.10 billion in 2012–13. However, Japan’s share in India’s total exports declined from 4 per cent in 1999–2000 to 2.4 per cent in 2005–06 to less than 2% in 2010. Similarly, India’s imports increased from Rs. 324.5 million in 1990–91 to Rs. 2.15 billion in 1999–2000 and in 2013 reached Rs. 62.2 billion. However, Japan’s share of India’s imports decreased from 5 per cent in 1999–2000 to 0.9 per cent in 2013 (GoI 2013).

However, Japanese FDI in India continued to be the engine of growth for the bilateral relationship. The cumulative amount of Japanese FDI increased from Rs. 115.5 million in the 1980s to Rs. 956.9 million in 1991–96 to Rs. 3.4 billion in 1996–97 (RBI various years). Japanese FDI to was very high in 1998–99, totalling US$ 235 million, but since then it decreased significantly to US$ 66 million in 2002–03. It increased slightly to US$ 139 million in 2004–05 and touched its peak in 2008 totaling US$ 5551 million. FDI for the year 2014 was US$ 1.2 billion (Indian Embassy, Tokyo).

However, the Pokhran II nuclear explosion conducted by India in May 1998 dampened the Indo-Japanese economic relationship. Japan’s response was surprisingly swift and exceptionally harsh. The Government of Japan announced, in two stages, what
it described as ‘economic measures’. These included the freezing of grant aid for new projects (except for emergency, humanitarian and grassroots assistance), suspension of yen loans for new projects, withdrawal of Tokyo as a venue for the India Development Forum, a ‘cautious examination’ of loans to India by international financial institutions and imposition of strict control over technology transfers (Jaishankar 2000). On the other hand, the economic sanctions imposed on India by major economies did not inflict any deep impact on the Indian economy. India managed to continue its economic growth.

6.2.3 Political Aspect

The initial phase, which continued from the time of the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty till the early 1960s, was a period of peace and goodwill and strengthening of the relationship. The Japanese saw the initiative for better Indo-Japanese relations as a medium for gaining access to the Afro-Asian world. The Indian response to Japanese moves was mild and slow, and focused largely on economic interaction.

The next phase began in 1963, when, in the wake of the 1962 border conflict with China, India was seeking to enlarge its relationship with Japan, among other countries of Asia. Japan became a credible economic power during this time and was looking for new opportunities to keep up its economic pace and started maintaining better trade relations with China and other Asian countries. A characteristic feature of this phase was that while India’s expectations of Japan were increasing, the latter did
not feel particularly positive about India. However, the relationship warmed during the mid-1980s, largely because India was working towards opening its economy. Finally, with the end of the Cold War, both countries identified common interest in strategic terms with a view to enhancing regional and global security interests.

As two important non-communist states in Asia, Japan and India have several things in common. Both India and Japan are free societies, where a successful parliamentary form of government is in power, and both promote peace and stability in the world in order to achieve their economic objectives. Both regard international institutions like the United Nations (UN) as a key player in ensuring international stability and peace (Murthy 1986). During the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi to New Delhi in 1957, his discussion with the Indian leaders was focused on comprehensive and all-round nuclear disarmament, economic development of Asia and strengthening of the bilateral relationship (Murthy 1986). Significantly, no wartime memories act as stumbling blocks in their relations: apart from the Battle of Kohima, Japan did not invade India during World War II.

On the other hand, differences in worldview have been the major feature of the Indo–Japanese relationship in the past. Ever since India gained independence, it believed in a political outlook rooted in non-alignment, while Japan followed a policy of alliance with the US. While India viewed Japan as a willing and a silent partner of the US, Japan doubted India’s non-alignment to be sympathetic to the former Soviet Union. India has shown determined political activism on global issues at most forums, whereas trade-oriented Japan has chosen to contribute to trade and development related issues. Also, for reasons that are partly political and partly historical, both India and Japan rely
on the West more than on each other. Their differences are by no means trivial, and because of that Indo-Japanese relations have neither been hostile nor cordial and have stepped short of being comprehensive. Moreover, the Cold War and the resultant international security order played a huge role in shaping their national outlooks and foreign policy strategies, which had a major impact on their economic policies as well.

In the earlier stages, India and Japan expressed mutual compassion and magnanimity for each other. Jawaharlal Nehru was revered in Japan as a champion of peace and positive neutrality. Nehru’s Panchsheel principles (agreement between India and China in 1954) were widely acclaimed as they were rooted in Buddhist principles. In the immediate postwar years, many Japanese were attracted to India’s policy of non-alignment and its search for organizing a common voice for third world countries. By the late 1950s, the political relationship had become even friendlier. Although Japan had joined the US-led alliance system, it was cognizant of India’s moral and idealistic principles for solving the world’s problems. Both countries showed concern for the preservation of world peace and shared common views on nuclear disarmament.

Developments in the Indian subcontinent during the 1960s, however, curtailed the friendly relationship. India’s non-violent foreign policy had not been tested in a war-like situation. During this time, India was beset by a series of politico-military problems like the liberation of Goa (1961), border clashes with China (1962) and wars with Pakistan (1965 and 1971). All these events caused considerable concern in Japan and both nations drifted apart. India’s decision to use its military force to annex Goa dented Japan’s faith in India, particularly India’s commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes. This development reflected the conservative view in Japan that Panchsheel or
the five principles of peaceful co-existence were only meant for weaker nations and were ineffective against a determined colonial power like Portugal (Murthy 1986).

Likewise, Japan’s approach to the India–China border dispute was bland. Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda expressed sympathy for India over the difficulties thrust upon it by Chinese military action but did not go beyond extending moral support. Contrary to Indian expectations, Japan took a neutral stand. After India’s defeat in the 1962 war against China, Japan began to view non-alignment as an impractical and unrealistic foreign policy doctrine that had proved incapable of providing security to India. Japan therefore decided to extend the Japan-US alliance system. Thus, the China factor is an inextricable factor in Indo-Japanese relations. The current emergence of China as a pre-eminent power in Asia has therefore brought Japan and India closer.

Japan treated India on par with Pakistan with regard to the dispute between the two countries. Throughout the history of the conflict, Japan pursued a delicate balancing act with regard to South Asia. Its policy towards the problem was in consonance with US policy towards South Asia. Japan’s attitude to the 1971 Bangladesh crisis was also half-hearted vis-à-vis India. Japan joined Italy and Belgium in forwarding a UN resolution demanding immediate ceasefire and cessation of all military activities by India. Japan subsequently supported another UN resolution sponsored by the US condemning India’s military assistance to Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s revolt against Pakistani forces. India regretted Japan’s actions, particularly its suspension of aid to India, an action that was in sharp contrast to other major economies like Britain, France and West Germany, which continued their aid programs to India. Thus, Japanese
reaction to the critical problems faced by India widened the gap between the two countries. Japan was increasingly seen by India as a US surrogate in Asia. Likewise, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of 1971 led Japan to presume that India was a de facto Soviet ally in the region.

On nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, both countries began with almost identical views. However, even here the similarities began to steadily blur. India and Japan came to harbour divergent views about the elimination of nuclear weapons. India stood for a comprehensive ban of all nuclear fissile materials while Japan’s stand was ambiguous since the US nuclear umbrella protected it from a possible Soviet security threat. The situation was further aggravated when India conducted a peaceful nuclear test in 1974, to which Japan reacted severely, passing a unanimous resolution in the Diet condemning India’s action. Wasting no time, Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976 (Goto, 2012). Since then, Japan has been cooperating with the US and other nuclear countries in preventing further expansion of the nuclear club.

Japan reacted harshly to India’s nuclear tests in 1998 by suspending all grant aid and subsequent new yen loans. Japan took on the role of the chief global advocate of ‘punishing’ India for its defiance of the NPT regime in the UN, at the G-8 summit, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting and other international forums (Jain 2000). Japan also played a leading role in drafting and proposing a UN resolution that was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly on 6 June 1998. Ironically, although during the 1980s high-level visits from both sides had taken place, they had largely focused on economic matters.
The end of the Cold War changed the international system profoundly and led to the restructuring of the East Asian security environment. The relative decline of the US presence in East Asia and the emergence of China as a new regional power center compelled Japan to reorient its policy towards Asia. Japan was forced to pursue a policy of ‘cooperative approach to regional security’ (Drifte 1996).

6.3 Phase III (1991-2000)

6.3.1 Liberalization of Indian Economy

Few events, excluding the shocker of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, has had as much of an impact on India’s foreign and security policies as the collapse of the Soviet Union followed by the end of the Cold War (Ganguly 1989). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the change in the global order forced Indian policymakers to drastically change the Indian foreign policy at multiple levels. At the world level, the term ‘non-alignment’ had lost much of its meaning. With the end of Cold War and the non-alignment for all practical purposes, India’s foreign policy was suddenly orphaned of a grand strategic vision.

Also the economic rise of countries like China, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan which started their journey almost at the same time India did, forced the Indian policy makers to reform the Indian economy. India was well aware of the fact that it was militarily and economically far behind its neighbor China which was perceived as a threat after the 1962 war. During its course of reforms, Chinese government laid stress on the transformation of system and methods of economic management; expansion of
economic cooperation with other countries; adoption of the world’s advanced technologies and equipment; and strengthening of scientific and educational work. The importance of the four modernizations (modernizing agriculture, industry, national defense, science and technology) was emphasized. (Tisdell, 2008)

When Indian policy makers introduced the economic reforms, India was going through the worst balance deficit crisis in its history. The fiscal position of the state deteriorated sharply during the 1980s. The fiscal deficit increased, reaching 10.5 per cent of the GDP in 1989–90. Public sector savings declined from 4.3 per cent of the GDP in 1978–9 to less than 2 per cent in 1989–90. From the mid-1980s onwards, large current account deficits were increasingly financed by commercial borrowings. Total external debt rose from US$ 18.7 billion in 1980 to US$ 56.3 billion in 1989, or from 11 to 21.5 per cent of the GNP. The debt service ratio (as a proportion of exports of goods and services) increased from 9.1 per cent in 1980 to 26.3 per cent in 1989 (Joshi and Little 1994).

The crisis of 1990–1 was preceded by a period of unsettling domestic political disturbances. The Mandal Commission award of 7 August 1990 led to violent agitation among various upper caste groups. The arrest of opposition leader L.K. Advani near Ayodhya led to the withdrawal of BJP support for the government, its fall on 7 November 1990 and replacement by another minority government. The first Gulf War broke out at the same time and oil dependent India faced soaring international oil prices and a sharp decline in remittances from workers in the Middle East. At the same time, the collapse of the USSR led to the loss of important Indian export markets such as knitwear from Ludhiana (Tewari 1999). Between September and November 1990,
foreign exchange reserves fell by 50 per cent as NRI3 deposits were withdrawn. When left with two months import cover and facing imminent default, India turned to the IMF. According to the orthodox view, the shocks in 1990–1 were the triggers for liberalization in 1991 and the long period of fiscal profligacy provided the underlying necessity for a change in policy.

6.3.2 Political Aspect

Soon after the liberalization of Indian economy Prime Minister Narasimha Rao launched the Look East Policy in the early 1990s, which was aimed at integrating India within the Asia-Pacific region, economically as well as politically. The policy’s twin objectives were, firstly, to emulate the development model of Asian tigers and, secondly, to enhance India’s political involvement to the region (Gordon 1995). China’s proximity to the Indian Ocean region and its close cooperation with Myanmar at the political and military levels generated greater concern for India. Close interaction with non-communist countries of the Southeast Asian region could enhance India’s strategic leverage in the region.

However, economic interests continued to dominate the Indo-Japanese relationship. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu visited India in January 1991 and Prime Minister Narasimha Rao paid a visit to Tokyo in June 1992 to explain India’s economic policy in order to encourage Japan’s cooperation with India. Japan supported India’s candidature to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which discusses security-related matters. Nevertheless, because the Look East Policy was focused on the Southeast Asian region, the political relationship with Japan did not attain much significance.
In spite of the fruitful visits by political leaders as well as exchange of ideas between the two countries, diplomatic relations between Japan and India did not progress effectively. There was only one visit each at the prime ministerial level during the 1990s. The lack of regional institutional arrangements for regular consultation and exchange of views on global as well as regional issues were obstacles in facilitating better bilateral relations. The slow progress of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a regional unifying organization also did not meet Japan’s expectation. In contrast, Japan developed and maintained a close relationship with ASEAN as it provided an effective vehicle for the exchange of ideas, information and opinions with member nations.

Geostrategic imperatives such as the 1998 missile crisis in the Taiwan Straits, nuclearization in the Korean Peninsula and the Clinton administration’s policy of ‘strategic engagement’ with China caused Japan to reorient its policy towards Asia, including India, resulting in a changed policy towards India that became evident in subsequent years.

6.4 Phase IV (2000 ~)

The terrorist attack on America’s World Trade Center in the year 2001 marked a significant leap in Indo-US relations, as United States realized that Pakistan cannot prove to be a worthy partner in its fight against terrorism. The seeds of this relation were sown in 1999 during the Indo-Pak Kargil war. American president Bill Clinton’s actions during the Kargil conflict helped begin undoing the deep distrust of the U.S. that Indian leaders had acquired over the previous several decades. To explain, India discovered in
the spring of 1999 that Pakistani forces had breached the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir in a sector called Kargil. The Pakistani positions enabled them to threaten Indian lines of communication into northern Kashmir. As a large-scale Indian counter offensive began to beat back the intruders, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif traveled to Washington in July and asked Clinton to help him devise a solution to the conflict. Clinton refused to cooperate until all Pakistani forces had retreated back to their side of the LoC. He also kept New Delhi informed of the progress of his discussions with Sharif. The prime minister eventually agreed to Clinton’s terms and called for the withdrawal of all intruding forces back across the LoC.

Clinton’s actions were significant because they demonstrated to India that the U.S. was not blind to Pakistani malfeasance and that it would not necessarily support its traditional ally at India’s expense. Indeed, under the right circumstances the U.S. was prepared to side with India even to the detriment of Pakistan. This signaling to India was not simply an accident but rather a deliberate goal of Clinton’s approach to Kargil (Talbott, 2006). In fact, it proved tremendously important in demonstrating America’s good faith to the Indians, suggesting that the two countries could work together as partners in the future. As Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh told Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in the wake of the Kargil crisis:

“Something terrible has happened these past several months between us and our neighbors. But something quite new and good has happened . . . between our countries, yours and mine—something related to the matter of trust. My prime minister and I thank your president for that.”
The sweetening of Indo-US ties meant Indo-Japanese relations also saw a high period as throughout the post-war history, Japan had fashioned its policies within the broad policy parameters established by American leadership (Miyashita, 2003). Moreover, with rising friction with China and North Korea, Japan was forced expand its horizon of security beyond East Asia. While doing so, India came across as the most worthy partner as it was a nuclear power and also a democracy like Japan.

When Japanese Prime Minister Mori visited India in 2000 as part of his four-nation South Asian tour after a hiatus of 10 years since the last visit at the prime ministerial level, an agreement on ‘Global Partnership in the 21st Century’ was signed by India and Japan. This agreement put Indo–Japanese relations back on track after a stormy phase following the nuclear tests of 1998 (MOFA 2000). During his stay in India, Mori stated that he would ‘like to make India–Japan relations much better than they are’, and he devoted special attention to cooperation in the IT sector.

During Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Japan in 2001, both countries agreed to continue the Japan–India comprehensive security dialogue and Japan–India military-to-military consultation. Both Prime Ministers confirmed that it is important to continue such dialogues and to annually hold the Comprehensive Security Dialogue covering the entire range of issues of mutual concern including disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as military-to-military consultations. On 26 October 2001, the Government of Japan announced its decision to discontinue the measures taken against India following the 1998 nuclear tests. The Government of India expressed its appreciation and recalled the generosity of the people and the Government of Japan in assisting India’s economic development (MOFA 2001).

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6.4.1 Economic Aspect

A 2004 survey of Japanese investors by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation shows a nearly three-fold increase in the number of firms that see India as a leading FDI destination in the medium and long-term (Desai 2005). In another survey in 2006, India received the largest increase in the share of votes compared to China in terms of being the most promising country for Japanese FDI (JBIC 2006). Many Japanese firms see India’s achievement of sustained economic growth as an indication of India offering an attractive destination for Japanese investments.

In 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi visited India and together with Prime Minister Singh issued a joint statement on the ‘Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of the Japan-India Global Partnership’ and in order to realize full potential of this ‘Eightfold Initiative for Strengthening Japan-India Global Partnership’ was adopted.33 This comprised measures for cooperation in eight key areas of interaction, namely:

(i) enhanced and upgraded dialogue architecture, including strengthening of the momentum of high-level exchanges, launching of a High Level Strategic Dialogue and full utilization of the existing dialogue mechanisms;

(ii) comprehensive economic engagement, through expansion of trade in goods and services, investment flows and other areas of economic

cooperation, and exploration of a Japan-India economic partnership agreement

(iii) enhanced security dialogue and cooperation

(iv) Science and Technology Initiative

(v) cultural and academic initiatives and strengthening of people-to-people contacts to raise the visibility and profile of one country in the other

(vi) cooperation in ushering a new Asian era

(vii) cooperation in the United Nations and other international organizations, including cooperation for the early realization of U.N. reforms, particularly Security Council reform

(viii) cooperation in responding to global challenges and opportunities.

Next year in 2006, when Prime Minister MM Singh met Prime Minister Abe in Tokyo it was agreed to establish a ‘Strategic Global Partnership’ between India and Japan.\textsuperscript{34} (MOFA 2015)

During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in December 2006, seven memoranda of understanding (MoUs) including CECA and the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) were signed with Japan. The EPA and CECA were an outcome of the recommendations made by the India-Japan Joint Study Group (IJJSG) in June 2006. The IJJSG made a series of recommendations to strengthen the bilateral relationship by diversifying areas of cooperation beyond the economic sphere and making relations more encompassing in nature. The specific areas marked for such

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
cooperation were trade in goods and services and direct investments, especially in the Information Technology (IT) sector.

In order to widen and deepen the economic engagement, both countries decided to set up a Japan–India Special Economic Partnership Initiative for catering to the ‘enhancement of investments from Japan to India and help develop India’s infrastructure and manufacturing capacity, taking full advantage of the ample availability of skill and human resources and the public-private partnership policy-initiative of the Government of India’ (MOFA 2006b). Significantly, Japan has already been the largest provider of Official Direct Assistance (ODA) and has decided to enhance ODA for various infrastructural projects in India such as the Delhi–Mumbai industrial corridor, Special Economic Zones (SEZ), and a couple of seaports on India’s west coast.

Due to the above efforts by both Indian and Japanese government, exports between both the countries have increased considerably. The magnitude of Japan’s exports to India remained more or less at around US$1-2 billion a year until the early 2000s. It began to increase in the early 2000s, exceeding $3 billion in 2004, and then it increased sharply to reach $10 billion in 2011. Japan's imports from India also began to rise in the twenty-first century. However, compared to Japan's exports to India, the rate of increase of Japan's imports from India was not as high, at around $2 billion until the early 2000s. It then increased to over $3 billion in 2005 and continued to increase, reaching more than $7 billion in 2013. However, this trend did not last long and the figure for 2016-17 stands at $3.8 billion (See the chart below)
Despite the relatively rapid expansion of Japan's trade with India, India's share in Japan's overall trade is still very low. The foreign trade policy statement 2015-20 released by the commerce ministry alludes to non-tariff barriers faced by Indian exporters. Moreover, “the Indian business entities are facing problems in market access due to language constraints faced by Indian companies in Japan, highly demanding product and service standards, regulations that require business modalities making market access a costly venture, and a relative lack of intensive effort on the part of Indian business” (Mishra 2017). It should be noted that the bilateral trade balance between Japan and India changed from a surplus for India in the 1990s to a surplus for Japan in the twenty-first century. This shift largely reflects the differences in economic growth performance between the two countries. In the 1990-2012 period, Japan's economic growth remained quite low while India's economic growth rose sharply in the twenty-first century, resulting in a trade surplus for Japan (Urata & Ando, 2016).

![India-Japan Trade (2000-2016) in US$bn](image)


It is worth noting that the product structure of bilateral trade is very different on both sides. Japan's exports to India consist mainly of machinery products, while Japan's imports from India are mainly natural resource-based products. In general, Japan's
major export products and their shares in its total exports are general machinery (24.3%), iron and steel (15.1%), transportation machinery including auto parts (12.8%), electronic machinery (8%), and precision machinery (4.3%), whereas India's major export items and their shares are petroleum products such as naphtha (42%), agricultural and fishery products (13.1%), machine tools (5.7%), gems and jewellery (4.9 %), and alloy iron (63.3%) (JETRO 2016). These findings appear to indicate that the trade of Japan and India are complementary, reflecting differences in their respective levels of economic development and natural endowments.

The current Indian government's focus on Make in India is therefore a timely initiative that might have beneficial impacts for India-Japan trade in the future. In contrast, Japan's exports to India are likely to increase because they consist of manufactured products with high-income elasticity and because India's economic growth rate is expected to be high. These observations indicate the increasing importance of India's high economic growth for Japanese firms, as it would provide them with an increasingly attractive market.

As India moves towards a knowledge-based economy, it has sought Japanese assistance for the further advancement of this sector. In this regard, Japan has agreed to cooperate in science and technology, including in frontier areas of research and development (R&D) and has decided for joint R&D programmes in areas such as nanotechnology, life sciences and information and communication technology. MoUs have been signed between the Indian Department of Science and Technology (DST) and RIKEN of Japan (Institute of Physical and Chemical Research), Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST), and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).
Collaboration has also been agreed between the National Institute of Advanced and Industrial Science and Technology of Japan and Indian research institutions, particularly Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), DST, Department of Biotechnology and Jawaharlal Nehru Centre for Advanced Scientific Research.

This sea change, as seen in the planned bilateral projects, the large yen outlays and the transfer of technology and human resources between India and Japan, indicates that both countries have come together for cooperation in a comprehensive manner. In his address to the Japanese Parliament, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated:

‘I invite Japanese companies to expand their presence in India’, adding that ‘economic ties must be the bedrock of our relationship and a strong push is required in this area’ (Subramaniam 2006).

The Indian Prime Minister also pointed out that the time has ‘come for our two ancient civilizations to build a strong contemporary relationship involving strategic and global partnership’ and the ‘most important area in which we can build this partnership is in the field of knowledge economy’ (Subramaniam 2006).

It is important to note that in 2004, Japan’s FDI to India was a meager US$139 million, but this reached US$4.7 billion in 2016–17 (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Government of India) as a result of a convergence of long-term political, economic and strategic goals. Between the years 2000 and 2016 Japan was ranked third in terms of FDI equity inflows to India. The inflow of Japanese FDI in the past few years has been affected by roadblocks such as administrative inefficiency and lack of transparency on the Indian side. However, recent structural reforms like the
introduction of the Goods and Service Tax, a single-window system, digitalization of payment modes, removal of various duties on machines used for electronic transactions and strengthening of the grievance-handling mechanisms, among others, attracted US$43.5 billion of total FDI in India, out of which Japanese FDI amounted to US$4.7 billion, just over 10 per cent.

During the 2014 visit of Indian prime minister Modi to Japan, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe promised to double Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) and invest $33 billion in India in the public and private sources over the next five years and the relations were upgraded to 'Special Strategic Global Partnership'.35 In return, Modi pitched India as a competitive low-cost manufacturing hub and invited Japanese firms to ‘Make in India’.36 FDI was doubled under the Japan-India Investment Promotion Partnership, and this guarantee the set-up of Japanese manufacturing units in India, which would boost India’s economy and create new jobs.37 The following graph shows the flow of Japanese FDI to India between 2000 and 2016–17.

36 Ibid
The pharmaceutical sector and the automobile sector have received the largest amount of Japanese FDI over the past few decades. The chart below illustrates the total flow of Japanese FDI in India by sector between 2000 and 2015.

Source: Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP), Ministry of Commerce and Industry, GoI
The rising interest of Japanese firms in India as an FDI destination is reflected in information on Japanese firms operating in India released by the Embassy of Japan in India (Embassy of Japan, 2017). According to an investigation conducted by the Embassy of Japan and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) office in India, the number of Japanese firms operating in India in October 2017 was 1369, an increase of 148 per cent from 2008. The number of affiliates of Japanese firms in India was 4838, an increase of 477 per cent from 2008.

Source: DIPP, GoI
Various motives may be found behind Japanese firms FDI in India. First, a large and growing Indian market is very attractive for large firms. India has a population of approximately 1.36 billion in 2018, behind China’s 1.4 billion, and population growth was 15 million per year or around 1.2 per cent per annum according to the 2016 statistics (Chamie & Mirkin, 2017). This is significantly faster compared to China, where the corresponding value is 0.5 per cent. At this rate, India’s population will surpass China’s by 2023 (see the chart below).

Source: Embassy of Japan, India
One of the important characteristics of India's population is a large proportion of young people. Indeed, as much as 45 per cent of the population is 25 years old or younger, and only 6 per cent is above 65 years (CIA World Facebook, 2018). These observations indicate that India's domestic market is already huge, and it is likely to grow further if economic growth continues.

Second, the availability of low-wage labor is another attractive element of India as an FDI destination. According to a survey conducted by JETRO, the average monthly wage of a factory worker in Mumbai in October-November 2012 was US$188, which is lower compared to the average in many Asian cities including Shenzhen ($329), Guangzhou ($395), Jakarta ($239), and Bangkok ($8345) while it is higher compared to cities in Vietnam such as Hanoi ($145) and Ho Chi Minh City ($148.18). In addition to these factors, there are Japanese firms that are interested in setting up a base in India from which they would like to conduct business in the Middle East and Africa. Finally, the liberalization of trade and FDI policies as well as deregulation which have been
pursued by the Indian government since the early 1990s have contributed to the expansion of Japanese FDI by improving the FDI environment.

Talking at Japan’s Nikkei Exchange PM Modi tried to lure Japanese businessmen by playing the India’s 3D card. Modi said that for business to thrive a country needs Democracy, Demography and Demand; and India can offer all three. He also assured to do away with red-tapism and offered a red carpet to Japanese firms by promising (i) single-window non-discriminatory and speedy clearances, (ii) setting up of a special management team under the Prime Minister’s Office to assist investment proposals from Japan (Tomar & Shani 2018). This special management team would also have two nominees from Japanese side as well. In this visit, Japan also promised to assist India in developing high-speed bullet trains between Ahmedabad and Mumbai, where Japan will provide financial, technological and operational support to India. Work on this project has already begun and is expected to be completed by 2021. In addition to this, both the PMs agreed to set up electronic parks, industrial corridors and smart cities.

By upgrading the relations to 'Special Strategic Global Partnership', Japan showed willingness deepen the strategic relations with India. India and Japan signed their first defense deal in 2016 and concluded a nuclear deal in 2017, which was aimed at promoting regional stability. Japan also announced ODA of 188 billion yen for private-public partnership projects in India (JICA, 2018).
Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor

The Economic Survey of India 2012-13 states that the ‘Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor’ (DMIC) is being developed by the Government of India with a view to using the high capacity western Dedicated Freight Corridor as a backbone for creating a global manufacturing and investment destination. The master plan has a vision for 24 cities, each linked to a manufacturing zone. ‘The project goals were to double employment potential in 7 years, triple industrial output in 9 years, quadruple exports from the region in 8-9 years, and target 13-14 per cent growth per annum for the manufacturing sector on a sustained basis over the following three years’ (Economic Survey of India, 2012-13). General manufacturing, information technology (IT)-enabled services, electronics, agricultural and food processing, heavy engineering, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and services are some of the sectors being actively promoted in the proposed industrial clusters, with an estimated investment of US$90 billion. The DMIC was conceived by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japan and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) of India (METI 2006). Estimated to be a US$100 billion project, by 2014, US$4.5 billion worth of investment was already under implementation in the first stage of the DMIC through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and JBIC.

The DMIC project’s influence area of 436,486 square kilometers is about 13.8 per cent of India’s geographical area. It extends over seven states and two union territories, namely, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat,
Maharashtra, Diu and Daman, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli. The population influenced would be around 17 per cent of the country's total population.

The key to DMIC's infrastructure is the multi-modal high axle load dedicated freight corridor (DFC), a high-capacity railway system. Covering 1,483 kilometres and nine new railway stations along which other railroads would connect, the DFC is set to lay a wide network in the transportation of goods and services in the north-western part of the country. Other infrastructure plans include logistics hubs, feeder roads, power generation facilities, upgrades of existing ports and airports, development of green-field ports, environment protection mechanisms, and social infrastructure (JICA 2017).

The basic provision of trunk infrastructure is unlikely to be commercially viable, at least initially. Hence, public financing is required to build this infrastructure, which includes land improvement, road works, earthworks, sewerage, storm water drainage, flood management, and solid waste management. There are major implementation challenges including land acquisition, power, water management and environmental protection. Once such infrastructure is in the subsequent addition of cities would become commercially viable and can be implemented through public-private partners (PPPs).

**Urbanization of Cities**

The single largest urban transformation of the twenty-first century will be in India. Between 2014 and 2050, India's urban population is expected to grow by about 400 million people—just under a million a month. About one-sixth of the global increase in urban population until 2050 is expected to be in India (China, with under one-eighth
will have the second largest increase). India's demographic projections suggest that over 65 per cent of Indians are going to be between the ages of 15 and 65 by 2032. If the labor participation rate is assumed to rise from 60 per cent to 70 per cent and the population of India to be around 1.5 billion in 2032, this points towards an active and young labor force that is 730 million strong (Thomas 2014).

A large part of hugely expanding labor force is expected to move out of agriculture and into urban occupations, making India's urban infrastructure investment requirements vast. A recent report by the McKinsey Global Institute estimated that India required US$1.2 trillion of investment in urban infrastructure by 2030, to be financed by public finance, monetizing land assets, leveraging debt and PPPs, and accessing private investment (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010). In 2014, India's Ministry of Urban Development estimated that India needs to invest about US$250 billion over the next 20 years for basic urban infrastructure relating to transport, water supply, sanitation, and solid waste management alone. (Economic Times, 2014)

As a resource-scarce country -especially in land and energy-Japan has had to develop technologies, regulations, systems, and practices that are well adapted to its natural endowments. In particular, its land scarcity has led to dense urban metropolitan areas, where Japan has developed a comparative advantage in public transport systems and solid waste management, both of which are critical gaps in India's urban expansion.

India will need to fund public transport investments to provide high-capacity and quality transport infrastructure. From 2002 to 2011, the transport sector received 25 per cent of JICA's total assistance to India. Within this sector, subway (or local city train) systems account for the largest share (77 per cent), followed by railways (12 per cent), roads (10
per cent), and ports (1 per cent) (JICA). Japanese aid has been supporting the construction of subway systems in Delhi, Bengaluru, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Chennai. The model has been the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, which began construction in Delhi in 1998. Yen loans covered about 60 per cent of the costs for the first phase and roughly half the costs for the second phase, and Japanese companies received orders in a broad range of areas including construction, signal systems, and rail cars (Ray 2011).

**Indian Railways**

Connectivity is the bedrock of growth in a modern economy. While digital connectivity is growing rapidly, India continues to be severely constrained in physical connectivity, that is, the movement of goods and people. While roads and highways have received a much-needed push in policy, investments in railways have been languishing for many decades. The Indian railway system has unfortunately suffered from a lack of investment, both in terms of capacity addition and technology upgrades (Kilhof, 2014).

Other than congested passenger travel, the biggest casualties of underinvestment in railways in India have been the manufacturing and power sectors. Access to markets and the flow of raw materials, specifically coal and iron ore, are constrained. Low passenger ticket prices are often cross-subsidized with high freight rates. Rail freight rates in India are therefore expensive and have been growing steadily. This has ensured a decline in the share of railways in freight from over 60 per cent in the 1970s to about 33 per cent today, with most of the difference being compensated by roads (Kapur & Lamba, 2016).
Given the large investment needs of railways in India, there are many options from an investor's perspective. Japanese excellence in railways can be leveraged through the production of state-of-the-art locomotives, rolling stock, and signaling equipment. Collaboration with Indian Railways in producing locomotives in India will allow for the transfer of technology, which is essential for the development of domestic capacity in railways.

In terms of current and prospective Japanese investments in the Indian railways, for the western DFC project currently under implementation, Japanese ODA of ¥646 billion (US$5.4 billion) is envisaged and loan agreements for ¥226 billion (US$1.9 billion) have already been signed (Kapur & Lamba, 2016). This ODA has a condition of 30 per cent goods being sourced from Japan, which includes electric locomotives, rails, high-capacity electric transformers, and signaling equipment.

Another area where there is long-standing Japanese technological leadership is that of high-speed trains. Following feasibility studies on the Mumbai-Ahmedabad corridor, in October 2015 Japan offered to finance India's first bullet train, estimated to cost US$15 billion, at an interest rate of about 1 per cent. Work on the 508 kilometer stretch began in 2018 and is expected to be completed by 2022. JICA has agreed to fund 81% of the total project cost of US$12 billion through a 50-year loan at an interest rate of 0.1% with a moratorium on repayments up to 15 years. Japan would also supply 20% of the components used on the corridor, however, they will be manufactured in India.
Japan Plus Team

Following Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan in September 2014, the Indian government established a special cell called Japan Plus in the MoCI to attract and fast-track Japanese investments in India. 2 According to government documents, the mandate of Japan Plus runs through the entire spectrum of investment promotion-research outreach, promotion, facilitation and aftercare. The team will support the Government of India in initiating, attracting, facilitating, fast tracking and handholding Japanese investments across sectors. The team will also be responsible for providing updated information on co-opportunities across sectors, in specific projects and in industrial corridors in particular. In addition, the Japan Plus' team will identify prospective Japanese companies, including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and facilitate their investments in India. (Ministry of Commerce & Industry, India)

The cell has been organizationally placed in the DIPP in the MoCI. Currently the team is composed of six members four from the Government of India and two from Japan's METI. The decision to place two members of a foreign government directly within a unit of the Indian government is exceptional and conveys the priority that both governments attach to facilitating and implementing the agreements reached between them.

The four major objectives of Japan Plus are as follows. First, hand-holding existing Japanese companies and their investments in India. Second, investment in industrial parks, particularly in identifying locations and working with Indian states. Third, an e-
forum to find potential partners on both sides for joint ventures. Finally, facilitating technology transfers from Japanese firms.

6.4.2 Security

After Prime Minister Koizumi assumed power in Japan, he resuscitated a nationalist fervor in the guise of anti-China sentiment and sought to establish better relations with the older rivals of China such as Vietnam and India. During his visit to New Delhi in 2005, Koizumi signed an eight-point plan aimed at creating a ‘strategic cooperative partnership’, which encompassed:

i. Enhanced and upgraded dialogue architecture, including strengthening of the momentum of high-level exchanges, launching of a High Level Strategic Dialogue and full utilization of the existing dialogue mechanisms;

ii. Comprehensive economic engagement through expansion of trade in goods and services, investment flows and other areas of economic cooperation and exploration of a Japan–India economic partnership agreement;

iii. Enhanced security dialogue and cooperation;

iv. Science and technology initiative;

v. Cultural and academic initiatives and strengthening of people-to-people contacts to raise the visibility and profile of one country in the other;

vi. Cooperation in ushering a new Asian era;

vii. Cooperation in the United Nations and other international organizations, including cooperation for the early realization of UN reforms, particularly Security Council reform; and
Cooperation in responding to global challenges and opportunities (MOFA 2005).

This new initiative was significant not just in the context of the China–Japan squabble, but reflected a genuinely new phase in Indo-Japanese relations (Paul 2005). It earnestly symbolized Japan’s recognition of India’s strategic importance in Asia, particularly in matters relating to its political and military role. A series of reciprocal visits occurred within a span of less than two years, including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in December 2006. This visit signaled a new era in Indo-Japanese relations, prompting both countries to give attention to strategic imperatives and to establish a strategic and global partnership that would impart stronger political, economic and strategic dimensions to their bilateral relations, enhancing all-round cooperation for greater regional peace and stability (MOFA 2006b). Japan’s new approach to India culminated in the understanding that a better strategic engagement with India is necessary for the preservation of Asian security, even though Japan had always preferred the US for ensuring peace and stability in Asia.

Strategic affairs have been gaining increasing significance in the Indo-Japanese relationship. The visits to India by Japanese Prime Ministers Yoshiro Mori in 2000 and Junichiro Koizumi in 2005, emphasized the convergence of strategic interests. Koizumi’s eight-point ‘strategic partnership’ program was noteworthy in this context. Until this phase, Japan had always insisted that India sign the NPT and adhere to international non-proliferation mechanisms. However, by the end of the 1990s, Japan’s attitude towards India began to change in spite of India remaining noncommittal about Japan’s demands regarding its nuclear policy. Eventually Japan recognized India’s strategic importance in the region and unconditionally lifted its sanctions against India.
The term strategic generally has two connotations: first, it implies a long-term relationship with a common vision and shared interests and concerns and not tactical, short-term interests and, second that the national security of the two countries forms one of the components of the bilateral relationship. It may be the predominant or very important component, as in the case of Pakistan’s relations with the US or China, or India’s relations with the erstwhile Soviet Union (Raman 2005).

The new partnership has been largely driven by three factors. First, it must be seen as part of Japan’s emergence as a ‘normal’ power in the post-Cold War period. By the end of the Cold War, Japan’s security calculus began to change profoundly, forcing it to formulate new strategies to face a ‘multiplicity of challenges’. The Gulf crisis in 1991 raised a question mark on its foreign policy: Japan was criticized for not taking a coherent approach to the problem and opting for ‘cheque-book’ diplomacy instead. Similarly, developments in the surrounding region, the nuclear crisis in the North Korean Peninsula (1993 and 1998), China’s rapid military modernization program and relative strategic decline of the US in the Asia-Pacific region forced Japan to adopt an independent approach to security (Hughes 2004). North Korea’s launch of a Taepodong-1 missile over Japan’s airspace in August 1998 demonstrated that Japan was vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. Besides, during US President Clinton’s visit to Northeast Asia in June 1998, he visited only China, not Japan. This raised a debate on the reliability of the US security guarantee in Japan.

Over the past decade, Japan has given considerable importance to upgrading its national defense capabilities. Over the last few years, the Japanese Diet has passed a series of legislations on national emergency that for the first time in the post-War period
established a comprehensive framework to strengthen the ability of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (JSDF) to respond to a direct attack (Hughes 2004). In order to cope with future challenges, the present Shinzo Abe government is determined to amend the pacifist character of the constitution, especially Article 9, which constrains Japan from becoming a major ‘military power’. More significantly, during his last term, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his first policy speech in Japan’s Parliament, mentioned wanting to deepen relations with India and Australia in his endeavor for a ‘proactive’ diplomacy and with a view to widening the circle of free societies in Asia as well as the world (The Japan Times 2007). It was the first time that a Japanese Prime Minister mentioned India in his policy speech before the Diet.

Second, China’s pursuit for pre-eminence in Asia has accelerated the need to bridge the gap between India and Japan. Japan perceives the crisis in the Taiwan Strait and the related implications of China’s military presence in the region as a major threat over the long term (Hughes 2004). In its third National Defense Program Guidelines of 2004, China and North Korea were referred to as major ‘threats’ for Japan (Shimoyashi 2004). This apprehension was heightened by China’s economic rise, and by the qualitative build-up of its armed forces. More importantly, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 raised Japan’s suspicions about China’s military posture. Japan is also concerned about the quantum leap in China’s defense spending over the years, which for the seventeenth consecutive year continues to be in the double digits (DoD 2006). In 2006, China’s defense spending was US$ 35.1 billion, 7.4 per cent of its total national budget, 14 per cent higher than the previous year (People’s Daily 2006). Japan’s concerns are heightened not just by the expansion of China’s military capabilities per se, but also by
China’s willingness to project military power beyond its immediate borders in support of its national interest. Beijing could use its small blue-water surface, submarine and amphibious naval capacities to assert China’s territorial claims to the South China Sea, thereby disrupting Japan’s Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) (Hughes 2005).

China’s regular dispatch of ‘research ships’ and warships into the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu island ‘zones’ are seen as indicative of China’s aggressive intentions (Drifte 2003). Japan’s concerns vis-à-vis China were heightened when a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine passed through Japanese territorial waters in late 2004, for which Japan demanded a formal apology from China. Bilateral friction has continued over China’s natural gas exploration activities (started in early 2005) in an East China Sea oilfield abutting what Japan claims as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In coping with the perceived threat to China, Japan has been assiduously trying not to be entrapped in the ‘tug of war’ between the US and China over Taiwan. Rather, Japan has been pursuing a ‘hedging’ strategy towards China (Hughes 2004). This involves increasing Japan’s political and economic engagement with China, strengthening its bilateral security alliance with the US, increasing its strategic partnership with India and strengthening its own national military capabilities without alienating China (Hughes 2004). Thus, Japan does not openly identify China as an enemy in order to avoid unnecessary tension. Interestingly, India is also following Japan’s path and is engaging with China at all levels, without openly labeling China as an enemy state.

Furthermore, 80 per cent of the oil and 20 per cent of the ships bound for Japan pass through the Straits of Malacca, its protection is a matter of concern for Japan (Sovacool 2010). The Straits of Malacca are very prone to piracy, robbery and other
forms of maritime terrorism. According to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), in 2003 alone there were 375 incidents against ships of which 42 per cent were pirate attacks, making it the ‘most dangerous passage of all’ (for oil tankers). In financial terms, it has been estimated that the loss of cargo and rising insurance costs amount to US$ 16 billion per year (Pinto 2006). On an average, 600 ships transit the Straits every day. Since Japan does not have direct access to protect its interests in this region, it cooperates with friendly countries to ensure safety of the shipping route. In 1999, the Indian Navy and Coast Guard recovered a Japanese merchant ship MV Alondra Rainbow, which had been hijacked in the Malacca Straits, off the coast of Goa. Such incidents have led to closer coordination between the naval forces of Japan and India. This rescue operation was appreciated by the Japanese government, which stated that the Indian initiative in this regard underscored the importance of international cooperation to challenge piracy (Sakhuja 2000). During the visit of the then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes to Tokyo in 2000, both countries initiated a security dialogue involving joint naval exercises, search and rescue missions and anti-piracy operations on the high seas (Pinto 2006).

The geostrategic importance of India for Japanese maritime security is critical for the steady and uninterrupted supply of energy from the Middle East. As a major power with considerable naval prowess, Japan understandably expects India to assume a high-profile role in patrolling and safeguarding the busiest sea lane in the Indian Ocean. Close cooperation with India would therefore guarantee safe passage of Japan-bound oil and merchandise ships.
India and Japan have increased their maritime cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels. India has joined as the tenth member of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), the first regional government-to-government initiative to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery at sea. Likewise, both countries share their mutual concerns at the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), a non-governmental grouping discussing maritime-related and other security issues. Both India and Japan have also hosted each other’s naval chiefs. The Coast Guards of the two countries already conduct joint exercises, alternately in Indian and Japanese waters (Bhatt 2006).

Apart from the above strategic partnerships and bilateral cooperation, the Modi and Abe have kept national interest over political correctness. In 2007, when Prime Minister Abe was in New Delhi he met Prasanta Pal, son of Radhabinod Pal, who played a key role in saving Abe’s grandfather Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in the Tokyo Tribunal.³⁸ By this, he risked inviting ire of China and South Korea, and South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo criticized the meeting by saying that the meeting projected that war criminals are seen as innocent by Japan (Chosun Ilbo, 2007). Abe also addressed the Indian Parliament and in his speech, ‘Confluence of Two Seas’ he emphasized the cultural and historical ties shared by both the countries and proposed the quadrilateral linking of US and Australia with Japan and India in the concept of ‘broader Asia’ (Tripathy, 2012a, 2012b). Japan, to which until then Asia meant China

³⁸ Radhabinod Pal was the only member of the 11-judge Allied war crimes tribunal after World War Two to voice dissent at the process, criticising the panel as an example of victors’ justice. Pal is seen as a hero by many Japanese nationalists including Prime Minister Abe.
and South Korea, was particularly keen on the concept of broader Asia as it had been alienated in Asia due to the Yasukuni Shrine controversy; and Japan sought new partners like India, Australia and New Zealand to expand its bilateral ties.

Under Abe and Aso Indo-Japanese ties strengthened considerably, and both countries saw each other as natural allies. Due to the increasing assertiveness of China, Japan directed its attention towards India, which is a democracy and respects universal values. This move was also aimed at appeasing the conservatives, revisionists and the anti-Chinese forces in Japan. By extending a hand of friendship towards India, the motherland of Justice Pal, Abe sought to increase his credibility among the conservatives and anti-Chinese, to whom Pal was a national hero and in a way legitimized Japanese aggression towards other Asia countries in past (Kuroki 2013). In his speech in Indian Parliament in 2007, Abe claimed that Japan was then going through an ‘India discovery phase’, which would redefine Indo-Japanese partnership. In May 2007, at the inaugural session of “Parliamentary Group to Promote Value-Oriented Diplomacy” president Furuya Keiji said that Japan should enhance ties with countries that share common values and argued:

“China does not share common values. We must take a hard look at their true intention veiled under their smile diplomacy.”


While India continues to carry the baggage of the 1962 war with China, China has recently expanded its influence in India’s neighbourhood by acquiring infrastructural facilities in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Significantly, both India and Japan are worried about China–Pakistan and China–North Korea cooperation in the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology fields. India has initiated a strategic extension of its relations with the Southeast Asian region in order to minimize China’s influence in the region. Amitav Acharya (2003) argues that: India is seeking closer ties with Burma to counter growing Chinese influence there, and Indian officials see India’s security role in Southeast Asia as a means for balancing China. The ASEAN recognizes India’s role as a possible counterweight to any potential future threat from China, inviting India to become a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (Acharya 2003a).

Likewise, India was invited as a formal member of the first East Asian Summit (EAS) held at Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 although China had unsuccessfully campaigned against India’s inclusion. However, with strong support from Japan and some ASEAN countries, India’s participation in EAS was made possible. Both Japan and ASEAN perceived that without India’s participation and that of Australia and New Zealand as well, EAS would be a China-centric organization. Of late, this view has been recognized by Japan and it is making overtures towards India for enhancing the strategic partnership, though the language has been couched in terms such as ‘global security’ (Acharya 2003a). The Indian Ocean region is vital for Japan’s energy lifeline as 80 per cent of Japan’s oil imports pass through this area. Any disruption in its SLOCs would harshly affect Japan’s economy as well as its security (Sovacool 2010).
In October 2008, India and Japan, represented by their prime ministers signed the India-Japan Joint Security Declaration, strongly underlining the bilateral as "an essential pillar for the future architecture of the region" (MoFA, 2008). Beyond bilateral agreements, what characterizes Japan and India relations, is their steadfast adherence to democracy. It is this temperament that guides the two countries as they face challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. Democracies have a methodology in conducting diplomatic relations by initiating structural constructs in the form of multilateral institutions and relying on 'soft power' to advertise and extoll a temperament that speaks the language of cooperation.

The strategic determinant between India and Japan’s partnership emerges amidst the growing power and heft of China in the region. China's increasing centrality to power politics in the Asia Pacific region comes at the expense of established norms in the region and a belligerent posture adopted by Beijing for rallying domestic nationalism (Jo 2020). Japan has borne the brunt of this orchestrated version of stoking domestic nationalism by China, when infringements take place in the East China Sea, especially the Senkaku islands, where Japan's sovereignty is challenged by China's 'historical' claims (Lai 2008). China’s economic growth is accompanied by assertive actions in the maritime domain that encourages Japan to look for allies beyond the United States. This is precisely where India enters the picture. The United States remains Japan's security guarantor, yet, recent policy drift in Washington in matters of domestic and international, encourage doubt as to the commitment shown by Washington in staying the course in the Asia-Pacific, thereby creating a security vacuum being filled in by China, and its playing the 'victim' card of history. Importantly
furthering strategic linkages is the Indian Navy's 'Malabar' exercise here Japan's regular participation is much appreciated by India. Security linkages between the two sides has also seen the entry into force of the Defense Framework Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology' and 'Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information' (Narayanan, 2018). These agreements complement and add to the security and defense dialogue frameworks between Japan and India including the "2+2" Dialogue, Defense Policy Dialogue, Military-to-Military Talks and Coast Guard-to-Coast Guard cooperation.

6.4.3 Maritime Security

Since independence the nature of India’s maritime threat perception has undergone fundamental changes as the maritime strategists continue to assess and evaluate the threat to India’s maritime security. After the 1971 war with Pakistan, and subsequent US involvement in it, India became increasingly aware of the importance of maritime security. Later with the assertive rise of China and its attempts to dominate the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), India has increasingly become aware of the about its stakes, not only with regard to security but other interests like commerce, trade and energy supplies. The dangers of piracy, robbery and low-armed conflict have also led to this new sense of maritime security. China’s ‘String of Pearls’ policy has made India further aware of its position in the IOR. On the other hand, Japan also relies heavily on IOR for its trade and energy supplies and China’s misadventures in East and South China Sea has made Japan seek more influential and reliable partners (Naidu, Chen and Narayanan 2014).
India-Japan relations are multi-faceted. Besides, the focus on economic issues, their relations also encompasses regional security issues, maritime security issues, energy security and United Nations reforms. Thus, the relations which were previously political in nature have attained the strategic status. In the fields of security, as Kapila (2015) analyses, “the operative principle should be that spheres of initiatives and cooperation are restricted to the bilateral context of India-Japan relations.” The aim of India-Japan strategic cooperation should not be viewed as a policy of containing China but moderating and engaging proactively China’s approaches to Asian and East Asian Security to the extent possible under ‘contact’ and ‘engagement.’ Kapilla further observes that:

without getting overtly drawn into a United States-China strategic confrontation, countries such as Japan and India will be well advised to operate in close cooperation and in sync with each other and which could hopefully provide necessary counter-ballast for ensuring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. With Japan and India opting for strategic cooperation, the third big Asian power i.e. China would consequently accord much needed strategic space to these two powers thereby paving the way for a balanced Asian security. (Alam, 2015)

In present times maritime security has become a great concern for all states (Srivastava 2016). It is because the coastal states are now faced with multiple challenges like arms trafficking, narco terrorism, illegal migration etc. In spite of promises of international cooperation amongst several countries the number of attacks by pirates on the ships carrying petroleum and other vital resources have not gone down. These issues
underline the fact that since an increasing number of states are involved in commercial and trade activities through sea lines of communication (SLOCS), they need to focus on the regional cooperation. In the era of globalization, the growing volume of international trade has catapulted maritime security on to the center stage and has become a sensitive issue among policymakers. The volume of global trade passing through the straits of Hormuz, Malacca, Lombok etc. in the IOR has further increased the importance of maritime security.

Given the fear of international terrorism, due to the presence of hostile terror outfits in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Africa, the SLOCs in the IOR remain at risk. Thus, any misadventure by such groups in the strategic sector can seriously disrupt the economic progress of many countries in the region, which later can have global effects. In present times, the littoral states receive majority of their energy supplies through sea routes, and hostile terror groups can disrupt such links, which can lead to increased risk of escalation of tension in the region. A recent example is the attack on Saudi oil tankers allegedly by terror group Hamas in 2019. Moreover, disruption of scarce energy resources can lead to serious security problem in the region as such resources have become an integral part of strategic policies of many countries.

Therefore, maritime security plays a major role in the strategic policy of various coastal countries. Although India is not a littoral state, and can access Central Asia through Pakistan, but the unfriendly ties with its neighboring state force India to feed its increasingly growing industry through its SLOCs. Moreover, China after expanding in South China Sea, realized that in order to secure it strategic interests it needs to secure sea links in IOR as well, and thus, started rapid expansion. This has forced India to
press the panic button and even collaborate to invest in less strategic projects like the Hambantota airport in Sri Lanka.

China's aggressive territorial stance in Asia has created many security related issues for both Japan and India (Brewster 2012). For example, China's military desires in the East China Sea region have been a cause of nervousness in Japan. In November 2004, a Chinese nuclear submarine entered into Japan's water near Okinawa. Moreover, some other issues that add to Japanese concern are, rights over gas fields in the East China Sea; the territorial dispute over the Senkaku islands, problems over Japan’s close relations with Taiwan; China's anger over the atrocities created by Japan during World War II period etc. As far as India is concerned, it is evident that China sees it as a rival in the region and using the string of pearls policy, China wants to protect its SLOCs, and deprive India of the same. The aim of China is to become a regional and then a global hegemon.

Japan essentially being a maritime nation depends on the oceans for its resources and external trade. Almost 90 per cent of Japan's oil needs come from the Persian Gulf region (Zhu 2017). This means that any hindrance in the normal movement of oil supplies can have serious repercussions on Japan's economy. Similarly, various economic and strategic interests of India are dependent on security of Indian Ocean. Though India had a long maritime history, it was more focused landwards due to various border issues with China and Pakistan and paid less attention seawards. The geographic location of India gives it the strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean and thus can play an important role in maintaining rule-based order at sea. India is sandwiched between the two most important choke points for global oil supplies (the
Straits of Malaca to its East and Straits of Hormuz to its west). After the end of Cold War, New Delhi has pursued a comprehensive maritime strategy which entails development of ports and harbours, exploitation of marine resources and expansion of commercial shipping (Zhu 2017).

Being democracies, both India and Japan have supported freedom of navigation and over flight, civil aviation safety, unimpeded lawful commerce, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law. Where there is convergence of interests, India has always invested in strengthening relations with the like-minded countries (Brewster 2012). The shared commitment towards protecting sea lines of communication as a 'public good' for the region also goes in favour of enhanced maritime cooperation between India and Japan and the next step in this direction should be knowing each other's operational concept." Japan has highly depended on the US Navy for safeguarding some SLOCS, but now it has started taking cognizance of India's growing capabilities as far as securing SLOCS is concerned. India, in fact can play a productive role in SLOCS (Brewster 2012). Besides protecting the energy interests, the straits like Malacca Strait, are exposed to the dangers of piracy and terror incidents. India has extended cooperation during the 1999 M/V Alondra Rainbow piracy incident which subsequently led to confidence-building and a robust framework of cooperation between the coast guards and navies of both the countries (Ong-Webb 2006).

The Malabar exercises were started by Indian and US Navy in 1992. Japan also participated in many drills from 2007. This participation of Japan in Malabar exercises has irritated China, which forced India to briefly discontinue it. But the early revival of India-US-Japan trilateral exercises proves that there is a more strong maritime policy on
the Indian side. The off and on appearance of China’s nuclear submarines in Indian Ocean and the construction of Chinese first overseas military base in Djibouti (in the Horn of Africa) are the reasons which extend India-Japan maritime cooperation to the Indian Ocean.

In November 2011, India's Defence Minister A.K. Antony visited Japan and agreed to conduct bilateral naval exercises. To operationalize the agreement, the first Japan-India Maritime bilateral exercise codenamed JIMEX-12 was conducted by Indian Navy with Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force in June 2012. Recently on 14th September 2017, the two Prime Ministers commended the significant progress made in maritime security cooperation evidenced by the expansion in scale and complexity of the MALABAR Exercise in the Bay of Bengal (Mukherjee & Mohan 2015). They noted the ongoing close cooperation between the Indian Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in various specialized areas of mutual interest, including anti-submarine aspects. They also acknowledged the importance of bilateral cooperation in maritime security by strengthening and enhancing exchanges in expanding maritime domain awareness (MDA) in the Indo-Pacific region.

**Balancing the China's Rise**

Post April 2005, after the anti-Japan demonstrations, the China factor became a very important aspect in relations between India and Japan. During prime minister Koizumi’s visit to India in 2005, India and Japan took a major step by agreeing upon an Action Plan called the 'Eight Fold Initiative for Strengthening India-Japan Global Partnership' (Inoguchi 2019). This plan clearly displayed the intention of the two
countries to enhance bilateral security dialogue and cooperation. Under this Eight Fold Initiative, it was decided to:

1. Strengthen service to service exchanges between defense establishments of the two countries,

2. Working to ensure the safety and security of Maritime traffic through joint exercises against piracy and annual Japan Coast Guard-Indian Coast Guard talks, and


The rising trajectory of Chinese aggression in the IOR has been a reason for political and strategic concerns for both India and Japan. Both countries are concerned about growing assertion of China. By docking submarines in Sri Lanka and Pakistan etc. China has made clear the intentions of People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Indian Ocean Region. Also by establishing extensive maritime links with eastern Africa, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Cambodia, China wants to "strategically encircle" India. In his March 2015 visit to the littoral states of IOR, Modi laid out a strategic 'blue-print' for the IOR (Chaulia 2016). This blue print spoke of continuous maritime engagement with India’s coastal neighbors. India must now broaden it to include structured maritime engagement with key Indo-Pacific states.

Regional security situation in the Indo-Pacific has been worsening in recent years. China's rapid rise; frequent skirmishes along the Indo-China border, like the recent Doklam Plateau standoff; China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and other strategies of China for its influence in South Asia, necessitates India to look for allies.
China’s ‘string of pearls’ policy also includes establishment of military and naval facilities in the India's immediate neighborhood like in Myanmar, Pakistan and Bangladesh has raised fears in New Delhi about naval encirclement of India. China's aggressive foreign policy has left no choice for regional powers, but to increasingly collaborate and cooperate with each other (Vidal & Pelegrin 2018). The South China Sea issue and the message that China tried to send to the world by refusing the Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling shows how important it is for India and Japan to work together in order to protect their strategic national interest as well as other smaller states in the region (Vidal & Pelegrin 2018). The rising tension on the Korean Peninsula due to the security threat from the recent nuclear tests and missile launches by North Korea has forced Japan to look for allies in order to balance the changing security structure in Asia. This has given India an opportunity to utilize this opportunity by keeping its national interest ahead and form an alliance with like-minded states and play a greater role in the Indian Ocean Region.

Chinese irredentism, aggressive behavior and willful subversion of established international norms, is what encourages India to establish a deeper and more meaningful relationship with Japan. The two countries, as democracies, understand complications arising out of the emergence of a China that appears to be wanting to rearrange existing institutional and multilateral arrangements in the region with a Pax Sinica, where power is not distributed but is a centrifugal force radiating outwards. China's almost unstoppable rise as the primary vector is in economic and strategic terms with an outlook that encourages an Asia, where a plethora of political systems exist under the 'benevolent tutelage of a China at the centre again after a century of 'humiliation'
beginning with the reverses and eventual demise of the Qing dynasty since the Opium Wars of the 1840s (Narayanan, 2018).

The coming to power of BJP and reelection of Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe reiterates that external factors influence the domestic political environment. It also reinforces the domestic political trends globally, where conservative political parties are increasingly dominating the political center stage in established democracies (Sharma 2019). Regarding Japan-India relations both the countries have political parties at the helm who represent a conservative outlook in politics domestically and make their propensity to reach out to similar democratic polities an article of faith in their foreign policy behavior. Modi and Abe represent a conservative outlook in domestic politics and are increasingly putting a personal stamp on bilateral relations by advocating the need for a strategic equivalence (Sharma 2019).

A common determinant influencing decision-making in Tokyo and New Delhi is China. Beijing’s policies in the maritime realm and the mountains bordering India play an important role in the domestic politics of Japan and India to adopt an obdurate stand against China. In New Delhi’s case, the humiliating defeat in 1962, to China still reverberates in domestic politics. For Tokyo, the extremely transactional approach to the bilateral adopted by China stumps domestic opinion makers and elected representatives. Until 2003, the ODA Japan provided was weighed heavily in favor of China (MOFA 2016). Every hostile act by China-verbally and in the maritime domain-against Japan, empowers domestic political expressions that favour a tougher line to be adopted towards Beijing. Matters regarding handling an assertive China get complicated with Washington, long a security umbrella to Japan, is going through its own churning in the
domestic political sphere and a coherent foreign policy continuity lacking with the Trump administration forcing Tokyo to look for partners willing to assuage Tokyo's current conundrums regarding Beijing.

If New Delhi and Tokyo have their fair share of domestic actors directing their respective domestic audiences towards the shenanigans from Beijing, it translates into political gains for whichever party is in power by adopting a 'tough and principled' line against Beijing. An important aspect of Tokyo and New Delhi getting closer is the existential challenge posed by a China that is irredentist, aggressive, and displaying intent to use force to affect outcomes suiting its needs. The existing compact of a norm adhering tendency appears to be unraveling with Beijing deciding how to re-order the structures that it feels for long have kept its aspirations shackled.

6.4.4 Countering International Terrorism

Though Indo-Japan ties range to almost all the probable dimensions of the cordial relations between two friendly countries, their strategic dimensions appear to be a novel idea taking place in the wake of new political role that Japan took upon itself in the post-cold war times. In view of the complex geo-political circumstances prevailing in the South-East Asia, both the countries found it pertinent to forge a strategic tie between the two. Though the Indo-Japan strategic ties aim at ensuring the persistence of peaceful co-existence amongst all the countries of the region, an unconventional aspect of this tie happens to be the advent of the menace of international terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 which is spreading its tentacles to all parts of the world, without
any concession to either India or Japan (Kakihara 2003). While India's experiences with the phenomenon of international terrorism is quite comprehensive and goes back to the days of her gaining independence, Japan has also not been immune to this phenomenon. However, the threat of international terrorism to Japan becomes really serious for at least two reasons in contemporary times.

Firstly, being an ally of the US, the Japanese would always remain an enemy of those who despise the former (Mitchell 2008). Secondly, the geo-political circumstances are such in the South-East Asia that Japan would turn out to be at the receiving end of the terrorist groups, seeking a foothold in the region. The paper, thus, seeks to analyze the nature of strategic partnership between the two countries, with special reference to the threat of international terrorism to them and looks at the plausible options available to the two to pool their efforts to take on the menace.

The two countries are emphasizing counter-terrorism as one of the common security interests. Thus, in the present times, Indo-Japan relations are probably at the all time high in both range and intensity, with even greater expansion being visualized with each passing day.

**Counter Terrorism - As a Strategy**

Conceptually, the term strategic stands for those interactive decisions of people or states that allow for conflict and utilize the cooperation, and strategy means a plan of action suitable to materialize such decisions (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1993). Kumaraswamy (2017) conceptualizes ‘strategic’ in terms of certain common traits like geopolitical and/or ideological convergence, military-security cooperation, political convergence,
closer economic relations, and shared strategic interests." Hence when we talk in terms of Indo-Japan strategic ties, our focus is on almost all those aspects of the relation between the two countries which powerfully impinge on their national interest, and it would be beneficial for the two if they join hands together to meet the challenges jointly (Pinto, 2007).

Terrorism has remained a menace to India for a long period of time, but it has attained international dimensions since 11 September 2001, stretching its reach to almost all parts of the world through the networks mainly, if not exclusively, of al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS). Drawing support from the unstable geo-political situations prevailing in the region, the international terrorism manifested prominently in the continued disturbed conditions in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. Indeed, the spectre of international terrorism has been on the prowl to feed on any and all the countries supposed to be the ally of the US in its game plan in these countries. In such a scenario, both India and Japan have been placed in a precarious situation of not only protecting themselves from the probable attacks from the international terrorists but also design a more prominent role in helping to secure the world peace and security in the future by assisting in stabilisation of the conditions in the region. Cooperation between the two countries has, in fact, already been forthcoming on this point, as illustrated by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) maneuvers in the Indian Ocean during the offensive against the Taliban in Afghanistan (Tanter 2006). But as coalition led forces struggle to calm the area, it is argued by experts that there exists a further scope for India and Japan to join hands through the United Nations (UN) and help secure a more stable future for disturbed regions.
Another related issue with the phenomenon of international terrorism is the matter of checking the proliferation of the weapons of mass destructions (WMD) into the hands of the terrorist groups or other fundamentalist groups operating in the countries like Pakistan (Albright & Hinderstein 2009). Moreover, the discovery of trade links between Pakistan and North Korea over sensitive nuclear weapons technology happened to be a shocking reminder that WMD proliferation was a real and persisting threat demanding serious attention from the countries having stakes in its checking. Interestingly, while North Korea has been viewed as the immediate trouble spot for Japan, the revelations of the nexus between the North Korea and Pakistan on the matter of nuclear technology transfer sent shock waves between India and Japan. Though Japan did not take the nuclear test by India in 1998 kindly, its primary concern now seems more to be putting the control and command system of the nuclear arsenals in safe hands. In this respect also, India and Japan share a common concern to check the pilferage of WMDS into the hands of the rogue states and terrorist elements.

Also, the imperatives of energy security have propelled India and Japan to seek an enhanced level of strategic partnership between the two countries. As a matter of fact, while Japan is the world’s third largest oil importer relying heavily upon the West Asian supplies, the robust economic growth in India catapulted India also into the category of the prime oil importers in the world. In such a situation, learning lessons from the oil crisis of 1970s, the two countries are trying to diversify their sourcing of oil from other regions of the world also (Mahajan 2018). The peace and security in the West Asia remains a top priority for the both countries. The option available for the two countries in this regard, therefore, appears to be two fold. One, with the earnest attempt to bring
peace and order in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, the move should also be started for ensuring rapid reconstruction and stabilisation of the situations in these countries. At the same time, India and Japan, being close allies of the US, need to exert as much pressure on the US as possible in order to dissuade it from taking any misadventurous steps in the case of Iran while persuading Iran also to desist from indulging into unscrupulous and illegitimate activities on the nuclear front in violations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations.

Further, India and Japan have much scope for partnership in maritime and naval spheres owing to a number of common concerns between the two countries (Khurana, 2007). Given the Japanese position as a maritime nation depending overwhelmingly on the seas both for energy transportation as well as fishing resources, anxiety over the freedom of navigation has grown with particular doubts being cast over the safe passage of ships in the East China Sea and Straight of Hormuz. Moreover, in recent years the rising tide of international terrorism in South and South East Asia with the menace attaining alarming proportions in the seas around Indonesia and the Arabian Sea, as manifested in the Mumbai attacks on 26 November 2008 by the terrorists taking sea routes to reach their destination, the concern for maritime security has started getting greater attention in the Indo-Japan strategic partnership.

Consequently, Japan now looks at India as its prime strategic partner in securing the seas from the menace of both the pirates as well as the terrorists. India, being a reliable naval power in the region has been found propitious by Japan to partner with it in the wake of its growing naval involvement in the Arabian Sea for providing logistical support to peace keeping operations in Afghanistan (Mukherjee & Mohan 2015). In fact,
any prospective defense cooperation between India and Japan is supposed to be heavily tilted towards cooperation in the naval field. Japan has also taken notice of the contribution made by the Indian Coast Guard in protecting the cargo ships from the pirates in the seas at times, and thus seeks to strengthen the coast guard to coast guard cooperation also (MOFA 2020).

The Indo-Japan strategic ties gain added significance in view of the China factor weighing in the strategic calculations of both the countries. Despite both India and Japan having strong preferences for increasing bilateral trade with China, the security related issues compel both the countries to position themselves in such a way as to counter any threatening move by China effectively. While Japan is primarily concerned about the Chinese policy towards Taiwan and any probable move on the part of China to change the status quo of the Taiwan Strait, India's prime concern remains rooted in its border disputes with its giant neighbor. In such a scenario, both India and Japan find themselves as the natural ally in the face of any move on the part of China which seeks to undermine the strategic position of either of the two. However, the two countries do not want to play up the issue in such a way so as to jeopardize their positive engagements with China. Their pursuits towards China still remain focused on increasing the volume of trade and enhance the scope of other positive interactions and exchanges with China. Nevertheless, the China factor in the safety and security of both the countries remain a permanent factor and the Indo-Japan strategic ties reflect the existence of this prominent factor in their relations.

In sum, the range of strategic partnership between India and Japan now covers almost all the probable avenues. The regularity with which the top leadership of the two
countries are visiting each other, and seeking to forge both bilateral and multilateral partnerships appears to be the pointer of the shape of things to come in future. In this pursuit, the two countries are also trying to readjust their conventional doctrinal focus and foreign policy objectives to accommodate each other's concerns and interests as much as possible. That way, Indo-Japan strategic ties are likely to be one of the greatest achievements of the Indian foreign policy in contemporary times.

**International Terrorism**

India has been at the receiving end of the international terrorism much before the menace became endemic to other important countries in the world like the United States. Ironically, the stark reminder to the US in the form of the 9/11 that the phenomenon of international terrorism is for real and no country in the world could remain immune from its sinister designs and onslaughts happens to bear the testimony to the Indian argument before the US that all sorts of terrorism are some kind of hidden enemies which can hit even their erstwhile promoters and supporters (Mitchell 2008). In other words, the grim reality which India has been facing for a number of years became a matter of concern for other major countries in the world only when they themselves got the taste of the demon. Now, India has been joined by several other countries to be the prime targets of the network of international terrorism, carried forward by the radical Islamists in the main. Indeed, the situation has become so precarious for almost all the countries that none of them finds themselves in a position to tackle the menace single-handedly, necessitating the formation of a global front against the international terrorism.
Though not facing the menace of international terrorism to the degree faced by India, Japan had neither been nor is immune to the threats of some sort of terrorism. Indeed, it is startling to note that the pro-imperial nationalism that led to the Meiji restoration in Japan in 1868 was accompanied by frequent terrorist attacks on Tokugawa Shogunate (Narang, 2000). In recent times also, the Japanese experiences in bearing the brunt of terrorist activities are multiple. For instance, the 'Chukaku-Ha' (Middle Core Faction) was active up through the very early 1990s, attacking police stations or targets associated with the imperial family, and sometimes, foreign interests in Japan, especially airports (Arudou 2015). The smaller and much more deadly terrorist group, the Japanese Red Army attacked in Japan and then increasingly only outside the country, the climax of which reached in 1996 high profile hostage holding in the Lima Embassy of Japan (Harman, 2000). Another horrible instance of the act of terrorism in Japan happens to be the release of chemical agent Sarin in a Tokyo subway in May 1995 by the followers of the cult of Aum Shinri Kyo.

The menace of international terrorism has become most formidable in the wake of 9/11 for at least two reasons in contrast to the spectre of terrorism existing in the previous times (Mitchell 2008). Firstly, in the past, the terrorist groups had their prime targets as only certain particular countries like Israel or India and there existed no second level of targets groups, thereby confining their area of interest to these countries only. However, after 9/11 a perceptible change appears to have taken place in the outlook of the terrorist groups (Mitchell 2008). Now, having identified the US as their prime target, they have also chosen a number of secondary levels of targets in terms of those countries and interests which happen to be associated with the US. Thus, with the
direct targeting of the US interests, having taken the sole superpower as their enemy number one, within and outside the country, the terrorist groups have somewhat expanded their sphere of operation to almost all parts of the world, for, the US allies as well as interests are scattered all over the globe, with Japan and India standing prominently on this for such count.

Secondly, in the previous times, there existed a number of terrorist groups based in different countries and having their distinct area of operation (Mitchell 2008). Such groups functioned in somewhat disorganized and uncoordinated manner presumably given their lack of contact with each other at times and mutual antipathy at others. In such a scenario, the nature of terrorism could not attain international dimensions for obvious reasons. But now with the advent of al-Qaeda and the IS, the menace of terrorism has truly become international owing to the seemingly widespread network of these organizations, in most parts of the world. Moreover, the other smaller terrorist groups operating in various countries now look upon them as the coordinating monoliths and are perhaps willing to accept their leadership role in carrying out the terrorist operations in different parts of the world. Thus, the terrorist attack might have taken place in any part of the world or might have been carried out by even local terrorist groups, the imprint of the al-Qaeda or the IS influence in planning and execution of the terrorist attack becomes distinct (Mitchell 2008).

In the transformed milieu of the objectives and operational methodology of the international terrorism, the vulnerability of India and Japan to the international terrorism needs to be explained (Mitchell 2008). Given India’s brush with the onslaughts of terrorism for a fairly long time, this menace has only added new dimensions and
lethality to the existing phenomenon of terrorism in the country. However, the expansion of the terrorist activities in South Asia would definitely propel India to become an important force to take on the rise of international terrorism in the region (Chellaney, 2001). But for Japan, things appear to have taken a serious turn in real sense as a survey on the perceptions of Japanese students on terrorism and other security problems has found terrorism reckoned as the second most pressing concern of the people. Thus, Japan, indeed, had its share of terrorism in the past. But the menace of terrorism in Japan was not formidable enough to pose any long-term and serious threat to the socio-economic or political system of the country. However, the arrival of the international terrorism on the scene in the aftermath of the 9/11 appears to have made the things tougher for Japan for at least three reasons (Mitchell 2008). In this first place, with Japan remaining a close ally of the US and the prised US interests including the US bases in Okinawa, Misawa, Yokosuka and Saseba remaining positioned in Japan, there seems to be a strong likelihood that, sooner or later, Japan is bound to become a prime target of the terrorist groups bent on harming the interests of the US and its allies (Mitchell 2008).

Second, given the increasing involvement of the Japanese Self Defense Forces in the military operations mounted by the US led forces as in Iraq and Afghanistan, Japan is emerging as one of the strong supporters of the US in its operations in the areas from which the terrorist groups draw their sustenance. Moreover, in the aftermath of the 9/11, Japan volunteered itself to be a dependable ally of the US in its war against international terrorism. In such a scenario, there exists a probability that Japan, like Britain might
emerge as a primary target of the terrorist groups instead of presently remaining a secondary target of such groups.

Finally, as the terrorist groups may seek a foothold in the South-Eastern Asia countries, Japan being an important country in the region, is bound to be adversely affected. Indeed, the growing menace of the international terrorism in the region has induced US and in turn Japan to take a tough posture against such groups. Consequently, Japan has become one of the frontline states in the region to take on the monster of the international terrorism.

Thus, with both India and Japan facing the spectre of international terrorism in one way or another, there existed ample opportunity for the two to write a new chapter in their strategic relations (Chaudhary 2019). Given India's own long standing fight against terrorism and her urge to enter into strategic relations with other countries to evolve a joint front against international terrorism, Japan was definitely well placed to benefit from the experiences of India in this regard. With the turn-around in the security perspective of Japan in the wake of the 9/11, whereby a cardinal principle of its long-term security strategy becomes the 'cooperation with other countries in combating terrorism, the stage appeared to be set for India and Japan to enter into an agreement to meet the challenges of international terrorism jointly (Mitchell 2008).

Though India and Japan have been issuing joint statements on countering international terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11, the first step towards concretizing such oral assertions came in the form of the setting up of the Japan-India Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism in 2006 (Ghosh, 2009). The issue was specially highlighted during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Tokyo. The
two countries not only agreed for close bilateral cooperation on the issue but also called upon the members of the United Nations to work together for the adoption of a comprehensive convention on elimination of international terrorism, thereby giving a multilateral texture to the fight against the menace. The Group held its 5th meeting in Tokyo in 2017. India and Japan also held their maiden 2+2 Ministerial meeting between Foreign and Defense Ministers in 2019, where both the states called for action in rooting out terrorist safe havens and infrastructure, disrupting terrorist networks and eliminating financing channels and halting cross-border movement of terrorists. The Ministers underlined the need for all countries to ensure that all territory under their control is not used to launch terrorist attacks on other countries in any manner (Economic Times, 2019). The Indo-Japan cooperation against international terrorism has become sharper and more focused now with the growing amalgamation of their national interests.

6.4.5 China as a Common Factor

**Economic Relations of Japan and India with China**

Economic relations are the backbone for the stability of any country. In the present international scenario, the economic interdependence among nations leads to stronger relations so, each country aims to have greater economic development so that it not only has economic growth and prosperity but other countries also benefit due to trade relations followed by import and export, but these economic relations also get disrupted in case of disputes among nations.
In 2019 the economic ties between India and China play a major role in the bilateral relations in the world and it has been seen that it has surged to 92.68 billion dollars in 2019 from 52 billion dollars in 2008 and 3 billion dollars in 2000 (Varma, 2020). In the trade sector too, India and China are increasing three times the pace of the US-China trade and it is likely to continue to do so. The foreign direct investments (FDI) between India and China are also supposed to grow. India is a kind-off a leader in software development and China is the leading base in the Information Technology (IT) manufacturing and synergy could well lead to an unbeaten combination. Keeping in mind, the need for energy resources, China and India are dependent on resources of oil and gas and this makes them look for overseas oil equity and in order to get the control of the oilfield, they end up outbidding each other (Zhang & Xing 2018). Thereby, both of them should aim for a strategy based on cooperation rather than competing against each other which would help them share benefits in infrastructure costs and secure the risks.

India and China are global economies with great prospects in their bags, but a major low they recently faced was the Doklam dispute, which led to the escalation of tensions between both the sides (Zhang & Xing 2018). However, both India and China have decided to de-escalate the tensions by the withdrawing of troops as they realized that trade was getting affected and normalization of ties was essential. China's trade policies are protectionist and it continues to benefit from such policies. This protectionist policy affects India's pharmaceutical sector along with the generic drugs. The trade has been skewed heavily in China's favour and if restrictions are put on the import of Chinese goods it would badly affect the Indian industries as India imports
more than 22 million dollars' worth of electronic goods especially cheap mobile phones and information technology products. India has been criticized for its anti-dumping duties by China and the products on which anti-dumping duty is levied are chemicals and machinery items, steel and other metals, fibers and yarn, rubber, plastic, electronics and consumer goods (Varma, 2020). The basic logic behind applying this anti-dumping duty is to be able to protect the domestic industries as they don't match the cheap prices from the Chinese products. The other reason for the imposition of unreasonable restrictions on Chinese imports is because of a contravention of the World Trade Organisation's laws (WTO) and the local manufacturers in India aren't able to supply goods to the telecom sectors and developing countries and thereby, India is forced to import goods from USA and Europe at a prohibitive cost. China is the largest trading partner of India as their bilateral trade is of 92.68 billion dollars and the total imports that India took from China last year leads to 74.72 billion dollars and the total that India exports to China is about 17.95 billion dollars, the figures of import and export between China and India gives it away that China benefits from this relationship (Varma, 2020).

One needs to understand the logic behind this unfavourable trade balance between China and India is because India exports only the raw materials like copper and iron ore and the deficit can only be reduced when India starts adding the value to its exporting products but it does not happen because the Indian manufacturing industry sector needs to develop further to be able to reach Chinese value added export products. India is facing problems because of Chinese cheap goods and it is affecting the 'Make in India' initiative as well (Deepak 2018).
Japan and China's economic relationship is rather crucial for the East Asian region, so it is necessary to scrutinize it in detail in order to understand this complex relationship. Japan imported roughly 170 billion dollars' worth of goods from China making China their top import partner in the present time (Workman, 2020). On the other hand, China has imported 135 billion dollars' worth of goods from Japan. China is a more sought after trade partner as it is a consumer market which supplies products at a cheaper price. Reports suggest that a new trend has emerged in the cross-border e-commerce and according to Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), China is going to make more purchases from Japan of about 1.905 trillion Yen in 2020. The year 2020 marks the "48th anniversary of normalization of ties and the 43rd anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China" and it is believed that Japan has been making many efforts for rapprochement with China and under this, the Abe administration has decided to be a part of the Belt and Road Initiative (B&RI) and further, considered joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

It is evident that China has an upper hand in its trade with Japan and India, with the trade deficit weighing heavily in favor of China. The aggressive attitude displayed by China in recent years has been a major concern for the states of Indo-Pacific region, and has nudged India and Japan to work together to secure their interests (Jaishankar 2016). Japan understands that a strong India will work in its favor, and has thus invested over 30 billion dollars from 2000 to 2019 in the different sectors of India, becoming the third largest investor in India (Varma, 2020). This clearly gives us an insight into the efforts made by India and Japan to counter and contain China.
Strategic and Military Relations

Every state needs to have a strategy in place to be able to safeguard its territory and for this purpose; a military comes into play which strategically hits out in the name of national interest and state’s sovereignty and this is incomplete without having strategic relations in place.

India and China have a long history of wars but all that needs to be kept aside and they should aim for the betterment of their strategic and military relations keeping the ever-changing relations in the international arena. Both the countries last year had their sixth chapter of joint Military Training Exercise 'Hand in Hand' with the aim to focus on transnational terrorism and counter-terrorism operations in semi-urban scenarios. India was very supportive in getting China into the United Nations especially in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and thereby, India feels that China too would support its case. The irony is that in the present scenario China has been objecting to India's place in the UNSC and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). China needs to realize that if India gets a membership into UNSC, it would help Asia's clout in the international affairs, but China doesn't see that as it is only bothered in building itself as a 'hegemonic power in Asia', increasing its 'China clout' in the world and it feels that if India get this UNSC seat, it would be a threat to China's dominance and thereby, China feels India needs to be pushed down and countered.

Further, both China and India need to address the issue of terrorism, as South Asia is a hub of terrorism and in the BRICS-Xiamen Declaration in 2017, China spoke about security issues and discussed about terrorist groups like Taliban, ISIS/DAISH, Pakistan based Al-Qaida and its affiliates including Eastern Turkistan Islamic
Movement, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, TTP and Hizbut-Tahrir and it is rather interesting as it tests China's support to Pakistan at time, when Pakistan has been cornered not only in BRICS Summit hosted by China but also, at the recent United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in 2017 where India has declared Pakistan a "pure land of Terrorism called Pakistan as Terrorism" leaving Pakistan isolated, but despite this China is Pakistan's all-weather friend (Patranobis 2017).

The cause of concern in the relationship between India and China is China’s friendship with Pakistan and India is rather convinced that China has helped Pakistan by giving them access to nuclear warhead designs, fissile material and missile technology, fully assembled and crated M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan. They have also been given joint weapons and equipment for developmental programmes which include AI Khalid tanks, F-22 frigates and FC-1/JF-17 fighter aircraft. India, further believes that Chinese have increased their military aid to Pakistan and helped Pakistan waging a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir. Further, China has been constantly after India whether in the name of opposing India's nuclear weapons programme, to stopping India from joining the NSG, to building infrastructure under the String of Pearls policy in and around the Indian Ocean region (IOR), to increasing activity in the Bay of Bengal to attempts, to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to being suspicious of India wanting to join the quadrilateral grouping with Japan, US and Australia and feels that the US-India and Indo-Japan strategic partnerships are ways to threaten against China.

**Japan and China**
Japan's relation with China has been through many ups and downs especially till 2005 and the 'ice-breaking' of this relationship came with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit with an aim to have "a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests", increased cooperation on economic and environmental policies, find solutions to disputed areas and also deal with North Korea as it is a major cause of concern for Japan and China has good relations. Japan has concentrated its focus on the increasing influence of China's dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. China has made efforts towards Japan along with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) including a China-ASEAN free trade agreement but it only gave rise to China's hegemony making Japan vary of China's actual intentions and created underlined level of competition between them. This competition was seen when China secretly built relations with African Union (AU) states. In the recent times, Japan has urged China to be more transparent with their military expansion especially after President Xi Jinping announced China's goal of becoming a strong power. Japan further asked China to explain its ballooning military expenses, naval and maritime expansion and aviation activities near Japan. China to answer Japan's questions has said that their relationship would remain on the path of peaceful development in the terms of defense policy (Chinese Embassy, White Paper).

Though, both Japan and China have decided to work on the implementation of a maritime hotline to avoid any clashes in the East China Sea (EAS) and further agreed to start maritime and aerial communication mechanism. This year marks the 48th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between Japan and China which is an excellent example of mutual understanding despite having so many disputes.
From the above discussion it is evident that China is a major cause of concern for India and Japan as China is trying very hard to build itself as a strong power not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also in the Indo-Pacific region strategically by using its string of pearls policy and expansionist policy and that has both threatened and unnerved India and Japan, who are undergoing a phase of revival of national identity. India guided by its Mandala policy has tried to form alliances with key global players to safeguard its territorial and strategic interests.

**Territorial Relations**

India and China have a long history of territorial disputes and it happens because of China's expansionist policy. This section will discuss the Aksai Chin dispute, MacMohan Line dispute, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which passes through India's disputed territory of Gilghit-Baltistan and the recent Doklam dispute.

Aksai Chin is one of the most strategically important areas of dispute between India and China. India after independence used the Johnson Line which made Aksai Chin an area of Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir but China claims it to be a part of its territory. The dispute arose in the 1950's when China built a road connecting the Xinjiang area to Tibet with a route into Aksai Chin and India wasn't aware that this road had been made until it was declared in the newspaper and maps by China. This area holds a strategic importance as it is closer to Delhi and could be seen as an immediate threat to India's sovereignty and Aksai Chin acts like an unmanned Chinese satellite which would help China keep an eye on India easily. This has always been a major cause of concern for India as it has had to increase its defense spending as well as a strengthening of borders security. India's other cause of concern is that China is Pakistan's all-weather friend and
in case of a war, Pakistan might use Aksai Chin as its base which would make it very difficult for India. Aksai Chin is a natural barrier between India and China and if it was in control of India, it would help expose China's vulnerabilities.

The other dispute between India and China is due to the Macmohan Line, though China has never accepted this line drawn by the British India and Tibet as it believes it's a violation of their rights. China believes in the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which also sees Arunachal Pradesh as its territory and doesn't accept the Macmohan Line. India on the other hand, doesn't accept the LAC as it believes that Arunachal Pradesh is its own territory. Over the years, many times, both the countries have come to talks but haven't yet reached a solution.

The OBOR initiative by China aims to open up an economic trade route which would help connect Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Under this Belt and Road Initiative (B&RI), the flagship project is the China and Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which aims at a comprehensive and substantive bilateral cooperation between China and Pakistan and the initiative for this had been proposed by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in May 2013 during his visit to Pakistan and in July 2013, and the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif signed an MOU to start work on CPEC. The central feature of the CPEC is based on the key areas like Gwadar port, energy, transportation infrastructure and industrial cooperation. Though, India has raised an objection to this project as it runs through the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region which is situated in the north-western corner of Jammu and Kashmir. As India sees the Gilgit-Baltistan area as a part of the Indian Territory and claims that it has been illegally occupied by Pakistan, thereby, it is seen as an insensitive move on India's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
and India feels that they have never been fully explained or told about the Road and Belt Initiative (R&BI). Further, this project can't just be seen from an economic project perspective and it should also be seen from a political perspective with an aim to have control promoted by China. Further, this project should be seen as China's neo-colonial policy where smaller countries induced into the debt cycle, their ecology destroyed and result in the disruption of local communities and inhabitants, Thereby, India had refused to attend the OBOR conference organised by China and the refusal to attend this conference came after a year's bilateral discord as China opposed India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) twice in 2017. Though, the road ahead would only become tougher as India is also the co-founder of the Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB) and has recently become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) from June 2017 and both these organizations would demand India to support the B&RI project which would only make it a very difficult situation as the UN Secretary-General has given an endorsement mentioning the B&RI to be seen from the perspective of a shared vision aimed at global development.

Prior to this, the Tibetan Spiritual leader Dalai Lama had visited Arunachal Pradesh and was later hosted by the then President of India Pranab Mukherjee and all this didn't go down well with the Chinese. The Chinese reacted in an unexpected manner by stopping the Indian pilgrims to go to Kailash Mansarovar, a Hindu pilgrimage site, by the Nathu La pass in Sikkim and this was the starting of the 2017 standoff. The face-off between India-China resulted in a tri-junction between India, Bhutan and China in Doklam, Sikkim and the cause for this face-off was the opposition by the Indian troops on the construction of the road by the Chinese in the Doklam
plateau. This road became a major concern for India because this road if completed would shorten the distance between China and India's strategically vulnerable 'Chicken Neck' area also called the Siliguri Corridor and it further, extends from Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri and Terai regions of West Bengal towards the Northeast and it becomes a rail hub connecting the military formations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and road network for connecting to West Bengal and the Northeastern states. Siliguri Corridor is essential as it joins the Northeast to India and it lies in the Chumbi Valley of the Chinese held Tibetan Autonomous Region which is dangerous for both the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. Reports have suggested that Chinese have already build a road near Doka La and want to extend it towards Gamochen which is guarded by the Indian troops and that would mean intrusion into the Bhutan territory.

The year 2007 marked the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty and Bhutan banks on India to be protected and since Bhutan has no diplomatic ties with China so; it is a greater responsibility for India to keep this trust intact.

China is one country in the world which has a territorial dispute with almost every country. Chinese deep state doesn't realize that in the present scenario, the way the international relations are being balanced, it will become necessary for smaller states in Southeast Asia to bandwagon with India and Japan, which would further strain on the volatile geopolitical situation in the region.

**China in the High Seas**

The future of the changing dynamics in international relations would be based on the maritime relations as it is believed that the geopolitical arena in future will be set in the Indo-Pacific region. Thereby, the need to have control over strategic water bodies
would depict the importance of a particular country at the international stage and the 'future wars could be fought over waters'.

The Indian Ocean has strategic importance for China as it imports up to 82 per cent for its energy requirements in the form of oil and gas and 30 per cent from the sea trades and both are shipped through the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Since China is a manufacturing hub; it automatically becomes dependent on the trade routes from the Indian Ocean and African region as they help in the supply of the 3Ms - raw materials, minerals, markets and labor. The Malacca Strait becomes a major checkpoint as the bulk of China’s trade and energy passes through it and the Former President Hu Jintao spoke of the 'Malacca Dilemma' and said: "whosoever controls the Malacca Strait would end up having a control over China's energy route" (Deepak, 2018). China remains worried for its energy supplies and thereby, they have ventured in the Persian Gulf to help them get the supply of the energy resources like oil and natural gases and aimed to build a special relationship with these countries in the Persian Gulf. China has many guns pulled out for the 'Indian Ocean dependency' and are following the 'string of pearls' strategy, under which China has taken the initiative to build ports, pipelines, roadways and railways all connected to Eurasia, Africa and the Indian Ocean and the participants in these Chinese funded port building projects are Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar and countries along the East African coast. Under the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR), China has facilitated another project called the China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor (CPEC) which is an initiative for China to have access to the Arabian Sea which is east of the Persian Gulf and also building deep sea ports being developed in Gwadar, Pakistan to be connected to a road-pipeline project in the Xinjiang province of China.
On the other hand, China has facilitated the building of ports in Myanmar at Sittwe and Kyaukphu to railroad-waterway-pipeline facilities in Myanmar to link the Bay of Bengal to China's Yunnan province and a canal system build across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand to help increase the Chinese energy resources. Further, the Chinese have been successful in the building of additional ports with its naval facilities at Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Marao in Maldives and Kyaukphu, Hianggyi, Great Coco, Mergui and Zadetkyi in Myanmar.

The intention of China was very clear in their 2015 Defence White Paper which clearly spoke about the security concerns overseas with respect to the energy resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCS) and the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) gradual shift to a combination of offshore water defense with an open seas protection. China's involvement could be traced back to the time, when PLAN had participated in the multi-national anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa's to building a military base in Djibouti to docking submarines in Colombo and Karachi to finally building a long-standing partnership with Pakistan to add value to their naval power and move towards becoming a 'naval hegemonic power' in this region.

India's interest in the Indian Ocean is obvious as India sits at the crossroads of Indian Ocean (Jayshankar, 2016), and about 70 per cent of its oil and gas are imported from the sea for India and is expected to reach an all high at 95 per cent by 2025. India's primary concern of holding the Indian Ocean is because 95 per cent of the India’s trade by volume and 68 per cent by value come from it and as per 2018 India had become the fourth largest trading partner in the region of the Indian Ocean (Modi, 2018). India's wake-up call to China's 'geostrategic encirclement theory' also known as the 'string of
pearsls policy’ was dealt by using the Indian Navy's 2015 maritime security strategy which covered the primary areas of interest ranging from the Cape of Good Hope to Indonesia's Lombok Straits including the Malacca Strait. China fears that the Indian naval capacity would be a built up of 200 ships by 2027 and the Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region in 2015 with the United States of America where they aimed for “safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation, especially in the South China Sea” and that would inevitably change the politics of the Indian Ocean. India has also strengthened its relationship with Seychelles, Mauritius, Vietnam and Sri Lanka and is working towards building a blue economy supported by projects like Sagarmala and Mausam. China further fears that India could fortify the islands of Andaman and Nicobar into a 'metal chain' that could act as a blockade against Malacca and further use the Andaman's as a strategic spring broad to push India's Look East Policy, which currently is known as the 'Act East Policy' paving way for the betterment of relations in the South China Sea (SCS).

China's maritime conflict in the South China Sea (SCS) is yet another example of China's expansionist policy as this region is a significant commercial gateway for the Indo-Pacific region and it is bordered by Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam who are the key players in this region. Japan and South Korea also heavily rely on the South China Sea for its supply of fuels, raw materials and export route. Despite the signing of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China and Philippines along with Taiwan, Vietnam, and Malaysia have been conflicting on disputes over the Spratly, Paracel and Scarborough Shoal Islands. China has made the largest claim in the South
China Sea with the dash line. China has been aggressive in this area by starting drilling operations, colliding vessels leading to the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat to the construction and installation of large-scale military capable infrastructure to further building multiple runways and port facilities. This is a clear indication that China will do whatever it needs to in order to achieve its goal of occupying territory in the South China Sea.

East Asia Sea (EAS) is another example of China's maritime dispute based on the Daioyu Islands against Japan which calls it the Senkaku Islands and this dispute has been overlapping with the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China claims that the earliest record of the Daioyu Island can be traced to the book *Voyage with a Tail Wind* published in 1403 and the surrounding waters were used for fishing for generations and also claimed that these islands had been used by the Ming Dynasty as a coastal defence against the Japanese pirates. China claims that Japan stole these islands from them during the First Sino-Japanese War. On the contrary, Japan claims that these islands had been subsequently incorporated into the Japanese territory in 1895 after their victory in the First Sino-Japanese War and later, briefly had been incorporated in the American Occupation in 1945 and was returned to them in 1972 under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement and further, Japan claimed that neither China or Taiwan have claimed these islands earlier and it was only in 2012 that the Japanese Government bought these islands from a private Japanese. The question here arises that why are these islands so important? These islands have great economic and strategic advantages as they are near to the shipping lanes which transit international trade, a major fishing bed and also a big
possibility of abundance of natural resources like oil, gas and mineral deposits. Further, the location has strategic importance due to the rise in competition amongst Japan, China and the United States of America for gaining a military supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region. China yet again is slowly but steadily violating the boundaries of this island by sending in the military as well as fishing ships into the Senkaku waters despite the fierce protects by the Japanese Government. It has been seen further both the Chinese and Taiwanese military forces have entered the areas with planes which have led the Japan Air Self-Defense Forces to scramble its jets. The other cause of conflict between Japan and China is Okinotori shima, as Japan calls it an island and China calls it rocks and according to the international law, China doesn't recognize it as a surrounding 200-mile exclusive zone. For Japan, it is strategically important as it uses the cultured coral reefs and plans to eventually make an island of corals. The need to solve these disputes is essential as these maritime conflicts affect the marine life, inhabitants living in and around these places.

From the above argument it is clear that China is aggressively following an expansionist policy not only on land but also on water as it believes that to be a maritime superpower it needs to venture out and lead in the maritime sector and that's the reason why it is building itself into a massive naval hegemonic power accompanied by its encirclement theory which would help the state keep an eye on the competitors as well. China has also realized that after the Asia-Pacific region, the Indo-Pacific region will be next in line to be future economic and strategic hub and thereby, it is also very cleverly setting its base here so that it can also be a leader in the Indo-Pacific region.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

What is Indian nationalism and how its revival has influenced India’s foreign policy? This study started from this question. Generally when the topic of nationalism arises in Indian context, most people refer to it as the Indian nationalist movement during the colonial period or the subaltern studies focusing on the post-colonial era. The majority of scholarly work dealing with Indian nationalism deals with rise of nationalism during the colonial era. However, India has seen the rise of neo-nationalism in the recent years and it is important to study the impact of neo-nationalism on foreign policy. The contemporary Indian political thought sees heavy influence of the realism of Kautilya, Savarkar, Golwalkar and other nationalist leaders. Due to this, India has moved away from the path of non-alignment which Nehru showed to India. It has entered into strategic partnerships with countries it shares common values with and has been increasing its power to safeguard its national interests.

In this context, this thesis has primarily explored what role and salience of nationalism in defining India’s foreign policy during the present administration of Bharatiya Janata Party. The thesis has marked important research questions that required investigation related to the efficacy of nationalism in defining a India’s foreign policy. By engaging with the NCR model, the study has sought to explain why and how neo-nationalism has affected India’s foreign policy decisions.
It has been explained in Chapter 2, that nationalism is usually marginalized by the main IR theories like neorealism and neoliberalism, while given over-emphasis in constructivist framework. To bridge this methodological divide, this thesis engages with nationalism via NCR’s middle ground theory, to develop a comprehensive understanding of the logic behind the change in India’s foreign policy. The research also undertakes a novel task to study the effect of nationalism on Japan’s foreign policy as well, and develop an explanation behind the strengthening of ties between India and Japan. It is hypothesized that nationalism is a salient feature in explaining the contemporary foreign policy of India.

This chapter begins by summarizing the theme of research and empirical findings. This will be followed by an evaluation of feasibility and relevance of NCR model in addressing the question of nationalism. The concluding section summarizes the argument and discusses implications for future IR researches on Indian foreign policy.

7.1 Summary

By incorporating an NCR model, this study has sought to explain why and how the rising nationalism has influenced the foreign policy decisions in India. The rise of nationalism has significantly altered India’s view as a state and this is clearly visible in its changing relations with Japan. The main IR theories like neo-realism and neoliberalism marginalize the role of unit level factors like nationalism in defining a state’s foreign policy, while the constructivist analysis emphasizes too much on it without
considering the external factors. NCR on the other hand, takes a middle ground, giving equal importance to external and domestic factors, which provides a comprehensive understanding of the underlying logic behind the deflect in India’s foreign policy from Nehruvian socialism to a realist one. It is clear that during the years of Congress rule, right up to 1991, India adhered to Nehru’s socialism but the 1992 brought BJP in the mainstream politics and with it came the politics of masculine Hindutva that promoted a strong and wealthy state. Unlike neo-realism and neo-liberalism, nationalism finds a place as a salient feature in the NCR model that explains India foreign policy, while also acknowledging other plausible external variables.

The subjugation of India for several centuries, first by Arab, the Mughals and later by the British, created a desire among the masses to see India rise to the greatness that its ancient texts describe of. However, due to the socialist ideology of Nehru, India had to face defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, and also lost a major part of Kashmir to Pakistan. Over the years the blame for partition of India has also been put on Nehru (Anderson 2012 in Shani 2016). Due to the above factors, the rise of the Hindu party, the BJP, was seen as the revival of the glory of Hindutva that was lost long ago. By reintroducing myths and symbols of the Hindu belief in the mainstream politics, the BJP could create a wave of nationalist sentiment in India. The party was successful in creating a image of a masculine state that follows a realist foreign policy and is ready to take part in the ‘big power game.’

Due to the breakup of Soviet Union, and rise of assertive China and presence of troublesome Pakistan, Indian leaders taking note of the mandala theory of Kautilya, saw US and Japan as natural allies (since according to Kautilya, enemy of enemy is a friend).
Both USA and Japan that were a part of the capitalist block became important allies within a few years, and India-Japan and India-US can now boast to be one the most important strategic partnerships of the world.

On the other hand, Japan has also seen rise of nationalism domestically. The growth of the revisionist movement demanding revision of the constitution and the education system, high-profile visits of the Yasukuni shrine and the growing anti-China sentiment has forced Japan to reevaluate its foreign policy. Due to the rise of Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea and Senkaku islands, Japan, amidst unpredictable US policies, is seeking more partners in Asia to safeguard its interests in the region, clearly indicating that external dynamics mitigate effects on nationalism’s efficacy. This scenario laid foundation for a strengthened India-Japan partnership. In both the cases the external dynamics played an important role in the rise of nationalism in both the states influencing the foreign policy.

Since the liberalization of Indian economy and the ‘Look East’ initiative by Indian prime minister Narasimha Rao, India-Japan relations have come very far. After the year 2000 visit of Prime Minister Mori the relations reached new heights. In 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi visited India and together with Prime Minister Singh issued a joint statement on the ‘Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era,’ that called for strengthening of bilateral ties and cooperation in responding to global challenges and opportunities by enhancing security cooperation. In 2006, India and Japan established a ‘Strategic Global Partnership’ to strengthen the bilateral relationship by diversifying areas of cooperation beyond the economic sphere and making relations more encompassing in nature. Strategic affairs have been gaining increasing significance in
the Indo-Japanese relationship. This must be seen as part of Japan’s emergence as a ‘normal’ power in the post-Cold War period. China’s pursuit for pre-eminence in Asia has accelerated the need to bridge the gap between India and Japan. The developments in the surrounding region, the nuclear crisis in the North Korean Peninsula (1993 and 1998), China’s rapid military modernization program and relative strategic decline of the US in the Asia-Pacific region forced Japan to adopt an independent approach to security (Hughes 2004).

While India continues to carry the baggage of the 1962 war with China, China has recently expanded its influence in India’s neighbourhood by acquiring infrastructural facilities in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Significantly, both India and Japan are worried about China–Pakistan and China–North Korea cooperation in the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology fields. India has initiated a strategic extension of its relations with the Southeast Asian region in order to minimize China’s influence in the region. The recent standoff between Chinese army and Indian army at Dokhlam, Burma, came as a surprise to many and can be seen as the resolve of Indian government to stand to any Chinese attempt to disrupt the status quo.

Following the example of China, India has also realized that economic prosperity is the key to a strong state. As India moves towards a knowledge-based economy, it has sought Japanese assistance for the further advancement of this sector leading to numerous planned bilateral projects, large yen outlays and the transfer of technology and human resources between India and Japan. Japanese investment is considered to be the main reason behind China’s rise and if Japan can duplicate the same with India, it will find a much reliable partner, who shares similar values.
7.1 Empirical Findings

7.1.1 Salience of Nationalism

To kick start the discussion, the research found that nationalism was responsible for the change in India’s foreign policy during the BJP administration. For the ideational reasons nationalism was re-introduced into the domestic political arena, and used as a strategic instrument by the state elites in foreign policy making, for personal gains and nationalist agenda of historical revisionism and sovereignty.

It was found that nationalism was salient in India’s foreign policy, and it did lead to many instances where India engaged in military action in its neighborhood, like Pakistan and China. The research observed a paradigm shift in India’s foreign policy under the Modi’s leadership. There was a traditional reluctance among Modi’s predecessors to expand India’s diplomatic and strategic links with non-traditional partners like Japan, Israel and Australia (Mishra 2019). It was found nationalism’s salience depended on the perception of the state elites of the prevailing external environment, and the domestic political conditions. Especially, the perceptions of Hindu organizations like RSS and VHP was greatly reflected in the foreign policy decisions of the BJP. The previous Congress administrations who followed the Gandhian and Nehruvian ideology, were found to be less influenced by Hindu nationalist rhetoric. However, they were influenced by anti-colonial nationalism. The study revealed that
India’s foreign policy under BJP is a break with past, as he gave up on the idealist and reactive policy of Congress to pave way for the proactive and pragmatic foreign policy.

7.1.2 Are Nations Imagined?

During the development of the argument, it was re-established that the idea of India is a product of modernity (Chatterjee 2010, Shani & Kibe 2019) and the idea of India was reimagined by the state elites using religious symbols, language and myths of origin and golden age. It became necessary as Nehru’s idea of India was very different from the idea of Savarkar and Golwalkar. The founding fathers of RSS disagreed with Gandhian pacifism and asserted a more muscular version of Hinduism, argued that although war is undesirable it is necessary. It was this ideology that was deployed to reimagine India during the era of mass gloom in 1980s. Ogden (2014) calls the rise of neo-nationalism a way to alleviate the growing frustration among masses due to the fading idea of India and instill pride in the Hindu identity and reinstate the lost golden era. Against this backdrop, the rise of Hindutva, the BJP and Hindu communalism became one of the counter trends to the democratic process in India (Mohanty 2004).

Similarly, it was established that Japanese nationalism is a response to the ‘lost decade’ and lack of recognition and respect of Japan in the geopolitical arena. Along with this, the anti-Japanese Chinese nationalism and North-Korea’s hostile tactics have also contributed to the rise of neo-nationalism in Japan. The motive behind the rise of nationalism is the revival of national pride and reaffirmation of national identity among Japanese people. Furthermore, the issue of national shame due to Japan’s militarist past,
the growing threat perception from China and North Korea; and repeated humiliation of Japan on the issue of war history and comfort-women has triggered a nationalist backlash within Japan, which reflects growing realism about national security. The Japanese politics, once overshadowed by the pacifist forces, has drifted towards the rightist revisionist history, which calls for restoration of national pride and remilitarization of Japan.

7.1.3 Why are India & Japan Natural Allies?

After studying the influence of nationalism on the foreign policy of India and Japan, the research demonstrates that ideational variables like ‘democracy’ and ‘universal values’ were used to create a favorable image of each other. In the Indian foreign policy discourse Japan was represented as a friendly country which upholds the values of democracy, freedom and peace. Japan was represented as a peace loving country, which also shares cultural and religious values with India, making it a ideal state to engage with. In the same way, Japan also views India as a country, with which it does not share any historical baggage and would not accuse Japan of its past imperialist actions. The state elites use these ideational variables by constructing ‘self’ or ‘other’ to form allies or enemies (Messari 1998). India and Japan have used the identity-making process to highlight the positive aspects of each other’s identity and forging multi-faceted partnerships.

7.2 Evaluation of NCR Framework

The NCR framework worked fairly well in answering and meeting the research questions and objectives. The NCR framework is allows the analysis of the nationalism
as a domestic variable within its model, and also accessed the external variables effecting the foreign policy. The NCR framework gives adequate emphasis on nationalism analyzing its interplay with external constraints and domestic variables. NCR’s accommodating nature towards unit-level domestic factors helped bridge the divide between structure centric and ideational theories, which makes the findings of this study novel.

Through the accepting nationalism’s impact on foreign policy, NCR allowed (i) to inspect the sources of nationalist manifestations in India and Japan, and (ii) to analyze the impact of nationalism on foreign policy, while not ignoring the structural variables. Furthermore, to understand why nationalism is the main reason behind the deepening of ties in last few years, NCR gives freedom to employ constructivist methodology of examining the ideational and psychological variables. This helped in engaging with Nizar Messari’s model to determine the factors responsible for India’s affinity towards Japan.

7.3 Implication for Future Research

By engaging with NCR framework, this study has demonstrated the salience of ideational and psychological variables in India’s foreign policy. However, a more thorough investigation needs to be done by engaging with different case studies. This being a novel research, there existed limitations on the scope of material available. As mentioned in Chapter 1, most of the empirical work done on BJP’s foreign policy engages with structural parameters and ignore the ideational ones. A more systemic and elaborate model of nationalism’s influence on foreign policy could have been designed
which would serve as a formula to predict a state’s foreign policy response by altering
the structural and domestic variables. Furthermore, another opening for future research
is to study the influence of Islamic nationalism on India’s foreign policy.

Hence, it can now be argued that due to the rising frustration in domestic front in
India, the foreign policy of the state will become more and more aggressive. At present,
there is a big power imbalance between India and China, however, it would be
interesting to see how the power game plays out in future. Even if the BJP government
loses elections in 2024, it is expected that, the new government will not be able to
diverge from the path this government has set, since India is now imagined as a Hindu
polity, and, unlike in the Nehruvian period, Japan is considered a natural ally.
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