“Truth is a jealous mistress that will not reveal itself a whit to any but the most disinterested seeker.”


In 2001 the birth of a new junior high school textbook, *Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho* (New History Textbook hereafter, *ARK*), occurred. The authors, known as the *Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukuru Kai* (Committee to Write New History Textbooks) were at that time a relatively small group of a chief editor, Nishio Kanji, five editors, and nine contributing authors, including the militant *manga* (comic) artist Kobayashi Yoshinori. (The latter has discontinued his participation.) Most of the authors ranged in age from the late 30s to the early 50s. Currently, the *Tsukuru Kai* is organized nationwide and has a membership of approximately 7,500, a slight decline from a year ago. It is committed to writing Japanese history that it alleges has not been taught in secondary schools in the postwar period because history school textbook content has been dominated by left-wing, Marxist, and masochistic ideology. To correct these conditions the *Tsukuru Kai* has been engaged since 1996 in an effort to beautify and to sanitize Japanese history and civics, especially Japanese diplomacy of the modern period, 1868–1960.

To be fair, however, there is much less to criticize regarding the authors’ treatment of the pre-modern period. In fact a panel I organized in 2002 featured four scholars, one, William Londo, for the pre-Kamakura period, Ethan Segal for the Kamakura Period, James Huffman for the Meiji Period, and myself for the Occupation Period. London and Segal found the *Tsukuru Kai*’s attempt to beautify the past somewhat objectionable, the research occasionally a bit outdated— Segal found 7 problematic items in the Gempei War—, and exaggerated attention to emperors, but they gave a passing grade to the *ARK*. Huffman, and the late Mikiso Hane for a different panel I organized in 2003, however, found the following shortcomings for the Meiji Period (1868–1912):

A. excessive emphasis on Shintoism and slighting of Buddhism—the primary religion of the masses in the Edo Period;

B. minimization of political, economic, social, educational, and cultural shortcomings such as the following: German conservative influence and severe limitations of the Meiji Constitution including allowances for a powerful military powerful and absolute imperial rule; the harsh impact of modernization on peasants, urban poor, factory workers, and young girls; continued discrimination of
*Burakumin (eta)* by designating them as *shin-heimin* (new commoners) and compelling them to live in ghetto-like districts; continued relegation of women to an inferior status in such areas as politics, education, inheritance, and divorce; the Imperial Rescript on Education as a means to indoctrinate school children in the *Kokutai* (national polity) by State Shinto, nationalism, loyalty and lifelong obligations to the emperor by sacrificing individual, group, and corporate needs the state;

C. excessive emphasis on foreign affairs for the purpose of extolling and justifying Japan’s actions.

In an unpublished paper for the Midwest Association of Asian Studies in 2003, less than two months before his death, historian Mikiso Hane complained that the *Tsukuru Kai* had stressed Yosano Akiko’s achievements as a poet who upheld traditional family values by only citing the beginning of a poem dedicated to a younger brother. Instead she was famous as a person who expressed anti-war and anti-Emperor sentiments during the Russo-Japanese War. All of these shortcomings can be made for the post-Meiji period to the end of World War II.

The *Tsukuru Kai* allege that Japanese born in the postwar period have lost confidence, identity, pride, roots, and patriotism. The cause is less Japan’s defeat than the one-sided false propaganda about Japan’s dark past during the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952, particularly because of the prejudiced Tokyo War Crimes Trials. In fact, it blames many of Japan’s current problems 56 years later on the Occupation and left-wing textbooks. (It seems odd that in six decades Japanese have not been able to correct these allegedly bad conditions.) In an excellent, thoughtful, and very critical essay written by Laura Hein and Mark Selden they characterized the *Tsukuru Kai*’s motivations, mentality, and motivation as follows:

The movement can best be understood as a rear-guard reaction to Japanese and international critics, who had forced the government [in the late 1980s and early 1990s] to acknowledge culpability, apologize, and authorize significant changes in textbook accounts of the war. The Orthodox History Group [the English name the *Tsukuru Kai* goes by] hoped to influence public policy and debate by staunchly rejecting any need for official acknowledgement of Japanese wartime atrocities, let alone apologize or pay reparations. Distinctive features of the campaign include an innovative use of popular media, intense resentment of Japan’s low prestige in the world, insistence that any Japanese who expressed alienation from the state was psychologically sick; and a focus on textbooks as a critical battleground for creating the new Japan. Fujioka [Nobukatsu] baldly states that educational goals should be defined by the needs of the state and that if “Japanese are not proud of their own country, they will not be respected in the world.”

... Their logic criminalizes dissent ... The group members dismiss Japanese criticism of wartime policy and praxis as “self-flagellation” (*jigyaku*), that is, not just psychological sickness but treason. They reject the possibility that any Japanese could adopt an alternative view, for example, one based on humanist or internationalist principles.
As Yoshida Takashi shows in his essay, the *Tsukuru Kai* crusade to beautify and justify modern Japanese diplomatic history has had some success in altering post 2001 junior and senior high school textbooks. Discussions of such items as comfort women, the Nanking Massacre, Unit 731, and other wartime atrocities in the 1990 textbooks have been eliminated or considerably softened. In addition, only this late August, one Tokyo special school decided to adopt the *Atarashii Rekishi Kyôkasho* for its combined junior and senior high school. And what was the response of the male chauvinist, ultra nationalist, xenophobe, and right wing Governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintarô, to a female reporter’s question about its adoption: “Don’t make a fuss about it!”

Ironically, almost none of the authors are historians. They are more right-wing ideologues than historians. Nishio, himself, is a scholar of German literature at Electro-Communications University. Fujioka is a teacher of the history of education. As a result of my doctoral research on Japanese government-authored prewar textbooks, 1903–1945, and research on educational reform during the Allied Occupation, I have been surprised by the continuity in style, content and historical interpretation of *ARK* authors with prewar Ministry of Education textbooks. The authors have resolutely and radically departed from the more objective standards established for history textbook content by the Education Division, Civil Information Education Section of the Supreme Command for Allied Personnel and the Ministry of Education in 1945–1947.3)

The *Tsukuru Kai* justifies *ARK* content by two main arguments. One assertion is that history is subjective, only a story, and should be written from a national perspective. In that sense the *ARK* history is a retreat to nineteenth century history. A second argument is that historians should stop using history as a court of judgment. Nishio argues that history should not make judgments on the past based on today’s views. He wrote, “Studying history is not the same as passing judgment on the injustices and inequities of the past with present-day yardsticks. Filtering historical events through the lens of a modern-day pacifism does not constitute history education in the proper sense of the term.”4) The *ARK* preface “What is the Study of History?” baldly states: “Let’s also stop making history into a place of judgment in which we apply standards of good and evil and pass sentence based on today’s morality. Let’s try to thoroughly ascertain and corroborate facts viewing history in a fair and unprejudiced manner, and accumulate multiple viewpoints.”

Of course, Nishio et. al. have a point, but if the historian makes no judgments what does the student acquire to reflect upon and to learn to apply to his/her own age. We might ask what is the role of a historian and history textbook authors? Is it simply to exalt one’s country and put a pleasant face, even an untruth, on historical events? The *Tsukuru Kai*’s answer is that history textbooks should extol the countries history and heroes, distort historical truth, and deny any wrong doing by prewar Japan in foreign policy. There was no Nanking Massacre, no comfort women, no Unit 731 biological warfare, etcetera. “Hear no evil; see no evil; speak no evil of Japan” could well be its motto. I don’t think this is the role of a history teacher. Above all he/she should try as much as possible at their grade level to make them think about controversial historical issues and to reach their own conclusions. For example, when I teach about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki I try to place the students as much as possible in the context of the war at that time to gain an understanding of how such a terrible event could...
have occurred. But I do not hesitate to criticize the thinking and actions of both Japan and American during WW II and the Occupation Period from the standpoint of moral and humanitarian concerns that exist not only today, but also existed at that time. Paradoxically, by the Tsukuru Kai’s strong criticisms of the Allied Occupation Forces is it not guilty of contradicting itself and adopting a hypocritical double standard. The very weakness of the group is exactly that they do not view “history in a fair and unprejudiced manner, and accumulate multiple viewpoints.”

What will students in any country learn from such an approach? How will such history contribute to greater international understanding? Will teachers of such content gain the respect of their students as conscientious, objective teachers or be viewed as propagandists? Will students develop the critical judgment in evaluating sources that is essential to making judgments, becoming informed citizens, and being freer humans because they have arrived at a tentative truth? I don’t think so. The Tsukuru Kai’s approach is a retreat from pedagogical and civic responsibility into a distorted and narrow concept of patriotism and national needs. Instead, it should be nourishing an international outlook and active and critical thinking students. We need students to learn to play responsible, thoughtful, and active citizens’ roles for achieving greater international understanding, to strengthen democratic values, and to cope objectively with the admittedly agonizingly complex moral, social, and political problems that plague humans in the twenty-first century.

In many ways the leaders of the Tsukuru Kai remind me of Fundamentalist Christians in the United States. They also are earnest, dedicated, doctrinaire, moralistic, and simplify complex issues into black and whites. Where Fundamentalists rail at secularism, humanism, and a decline in belief in God and religious fervor, the Tsukuru Kai attributes Japan’s educational, familial, intellectual and spiritual decline to masochistic postwar textbooks, loss of patriotism, lack of subordination of the individual and self-interest to the needs of the state, and increase of individualism and selfishness. Neither the Fundamentalists nor the Tsukuru Kai understand that modernization, urbanism, secularism, incessant marketing, and a relentless emphasis upon growth undermine traditional values and are the primary causes for the current ills of all advanced industrial societies. In temperament they also remind me of the middle ranking military officers and bureaucrats of the 1930s in their passion, sense of justice, and one-dimensional, single-track devotion to the prewar sense of the kokutai (national polity). Fujioka, a Communist in his twenties went through an ideological conversion while in the United States during the Persian Gulf War that ended up in him embracing another authoritarianism—right wing ideology. Fujioka is an indefatigable publicist of his cause. Since 1996 he has been turning out many articles, mostly in right wing newspapers such as Sankei Shimbun, with such titles as “Sex Slave Issue Is a Scandal Invented to Bash Japan”, monthly publications, and books such as Kyōkasho ga oshienai rekishi (“The history not taught in textbooks”) and Ojoku no kin-gendai shi (Shameful modern history). Fujioka has shown that he is a gifted apologist and propagandist skilled at turning history, ideas, and ideologies on their head and using dubious tactics and strategies to try to disarm his opponents.

Let me give four examples of the Tsukuru Kai’s thinking and evangelistic zeal. Although Fujioka calls himself a liberal and initially named his group the Jiyūshugi Shikan
Kenkyukai (The Liberal View of History Study Group), in fact, as Gavin McCorkmick has shown so well, he is not liberal in the least. Instead, he has found his new religion in a narrow patriotism and subordination of the individual to state needs. McCormack correctly wrote:

Furthermore, like earlier tenkosha (ideological converts), Fujioka retains much of the structure and ‘agitprop’ style of his “leftist” days in his reborn “rightist” state. The same priority to structure that once inclined him to seek solace in the formulas of the Japan Communist Party appears to have survived his conversion intact and to be driving him to construct a new, no less dogmatic and even more self-righteous version of “correctness.”

A second contributor to the ARK, friend, gifted speaker, and dedicated teacher, Takahashi Shiro, makes 8 to 10 speeches a month throughout the country to parents, youth, and teachers in which he extols prewar traditions, censures current parental rearing and youth’s values, and criticizes allegedly mistaken Allied Occupation religious reforms, such as the State Shinto directive, and educational reforms and goals. Third, Kobayashi Yoshinori, popular with many youth, is noted as a revisionist right-winger, whose confrontational views appear in many places, including the magazine Sapio. For a final example, Nishio has also been publishing many history books on the pre-modern period to beautify the historical past. He, and other members continue to attack Japanese textbooks from the shallow claim that they are written by Marxists and the Marxist-oriented Japan Teachers Union. It is true that Marxists and Marxist influenced scholars were dominant in history and the social sciences in the 1950–1980 period, but history textbooks of the post-1980s have been written by more objective, conscientious historians much freer of ideological blinders than before. Furthermore, the power and Marxian orientation of the Japan Teachers Union is much less; fewer than 50 percent of elementary and secondary teachers are members today.

Prior to the ARK being published, similar to all textbooks, it had to undergo the Ministry of Education and Science’s Textbook Authorization Committee’s (Hereafter, TAC) scrutiny. The TAC is comprised of committees of specialized, conscientious and veteran educators. The history committee found 137 serious historical errors, distortions, and omission of relevant facts. I have also found the same defects as well as others that demonstrate the Tsukuru Kai’s partisan ideology for the 1890–1952 period. The intensity of this real objective to use history is clearly seen in their treatment of Japan’s foreign policy. More specifically stated, the Tsukuru Kai allocated 38 percent of total textbook content for only this period in the first and second (final) drafts—a striking contrast with all other secondary high school textbooks. However, almost 60 percent of TAC objections (81 of them) to ARK content were made for the same period. Moreover, TAC made 43 objections alone to the period of my content analysis, 1894–1931. Subsequently, the Tsukuru Kai compiled a second and final draft to meet TAC objections; however, they managed to preserve at least 15 percent of “objectionable content” by moving it to different chronological sections and placing it in isolated insertions or in “Columns.” In the process the Tsukuru Kai passed the second stage of TAC inspection. Then the authors boldly arranged with the Fuso Publishing Company to publish its
compilation as a private effort.

In short order the ARK became for a year a best seller because many right wing Japanese, and a much smaller number of curious general readers, journalists, schoolteachers, and researchers, purchased the book. Two characteristics of the Tsukuru Kai were subsequently exhibited. Similar to its treatment of modern Japanese history they portray Japanese and themselves as poor victims and criticize the opposition for the very aggressive tactics they have been using. Although thousands of avid ARK supporters throughout the country lobbied prefectural, metropolitan, and municipal school boards to adopt the textbook for junior high school usage, the Tsukuru Kai strongly criticized the Japan Teachers Union, and other opponents of the textbook for employing similar pressuring tactics.10) Alas, to their chagrin, only eleven junior high schools adopted it. Oddly, metropolitan Tokyo adopted the textbook for use at five junior high schools for disadvantaged children. Temporarily dejected by this defeat, but bolstered by its significant sales, the Tsukuru Kai has greatly increased publication of a number of books that beautify briefer periods of pre-modern Japanese history. Initially, it planned to publish a high school history textbook, but that project has not yet been achieved.

Given that the second draft of the textbook still includes many errors and ideologically is such a striking departure from pre-2001 textbooks, it is hard to understand why the Ministry of Education and Science approved the ARK? The subsequent paragraph is only speculation because I have not been able to interview Ministry personnel. The textbook review system is conducted in secrecy. Neither have I been able to do a precise reading of the first draft because the Tsukuru Kai would not release me a copy. Consequently, I have had to resort to a comparison of the first and final (draft on the basis of an assertive, apologetic publication, the Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukuru Kai no Shuchō (Assertions of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform) on June 30, 2001. My conjecture, and it is only pure speculation, is that the Ministry has become more lenient in accepting content with which it is not comfortable because it has received so much criticism over the years from the both the left and right wing. In that sense, the Tsukuru Kai and other right wing organizations and individuals’ activities since the mid-1990s bore fruit.

The Ministry finds itself in a dilemma on the textbook issue. On the one hand, if it approves textbooks of the right wing nature of the ARK, it presents a diplomatic problem with offended foreign governments because the Ministry appears to be putting its stamp of approval on “offensive” content. On the other hand, if the Ministry fails to approve a right wing textbook, millions of Japanese citizens would cry “foul,” accuse the Ministry of Education, and the government of appeasing China and Korea, and place intense pressure on the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. In the Ministry’s decision to approve the textbook several factors seem to have been at work. First, from 1989 the Ministry of Education decided to counter foreign criticisms by allowing textbook content that was more sensitive to international criticisms.11) Accordingly, junior and senior high school history textbooks of the 1990s taught of comfort women, Unit 731’s bacteriological warfare that killed many Chinese, the Nanking Massacre, etcetera. In that context, it may well be that in 2001 the Ministry decided to allow previously unacceptable content from the right wing. (If so, it flies in the face of the 1989 decision to make textbooks more internationally sensitive. In addition, at that time, the Koizumi Junichirō Cabinet was
formed and the new Prime Minister seemed willing to put a better light on prewar Japan’s historical past by his statements and visits to the Yasukuni Shrine—where important war criminals are also buried. In terms of political strategy, the Ministry’s choice of approving the publication of ARK was probably much easier because it would satisfy LDP supporters. The government then took the offensive by making the dubious argument to foreign governments that Japan’s textbook system allows both academic freedom of authors and free publication of textbooks. That argument, however, is a hard sell for two reasons. First, the claim is inconsistent with TAC making 137 objections to the textbook. Second, over the past forty-years the Ministry has been engaged in a strong monitoring of history textbooks, as anyone familiar with the Ienaga Saburo textbook controversy since the early 1960s knows.

I will now turn to a brief introduction to the style and content of the ARK and my interest in a content analysis of it. The ARK makes for difficult reading because the style is sometimes awkward and the content is too difficult, abstract, and ideological for junior high school students, sometimes even lower level high school and college students. The textbook also suffers from most writing by multiple authors faced by meeting an urgent deadline, namely, each author’s contribution is not always well integrated and chronology occasionally jumps around in a strange, illogical sequence. For example, textbook content returns to the Russo-Japanese War theme twice. The discussion of the Rise of Fascism and Communism is very good, presumably because Fujioka’s own experiences have facilitated its writing; however, it is too complex and ideological for junior high students. Throughout the textbook there are so many difficult kanji (Chinese characters) for junior high school students that they are accompanied by furigana (syllabary to show how to read and pronounce the kanji).

But the reader may justifiably ask why should a textbook that has been only adopted by eleven junior high schools merit scholarly attention? Aren’t this essay, and the other two accompanying essays accompanying it, much ado about nothing? My interests in making a content analysis of the book are four. First, I am interested as a historian of modern Japan in demonstrating the mediocre historical scholarship of the Tsukuru Kai’s treatment of the modern period in both the first and final drafts. Second, my objective has been to discover how ARK authors interpret their modern historical past from an ideological perspective. I want to make public to foreign Japan-watchers and Japanese who have not read the book, or have not read it carefully, that many textbook errors occur as a result of authors omitting and selecting historical facts convenient to their ideological prejudices. In this context, I am particularly eager to contrast the unadulterated thinking and attitudes of the Tsukuru Kai in its first draft of the 1890–1910 and 1928–1931 periods with the final drafts. Third, I want to show that TAC often expressed strong disagreement with the Tsukuru Kai’s historical scholarship and subjective ideology. As mentioned above, however, the TAC’s approval is in complete contradiction with the Ministry’s post 1989 National Curriculum Standards of laying “greater stress on Japan’s position in international society” and greater “internationalization.” Fourth, this new approach to the study of history for the 1990s that was hoped “would produce great results in the future” raises the fundamental question of why the Ministry of Education licensed ARK content that is in diametrical opposition to its avowed objective.12)
Author's explanation: Please note that my emphases regarding ARK content, other textbook content, other authors' analyses, and my own comments content are always in *italics*. TAC objections are always indicated by underlining and more objectionable content is indicated by brackets [ ] and underlining. Different brackets, { }, indicate my additions within quoted ARK content or elsewhere to improve readers’ understanding. Note also that after covering the period 1890 to 1910 my analysis of ARK content skips to the 1929–1932 Manchurian Incident and omits discussion of Japanese and Western Relations with China, 1912–1927, World War I, and Allied Intervention in the Soviet Union.

1. The Sino-Japanese War and the Breakdown of Chinese Order

1.1 The Korean Peninsula and Japanese National Security

**ARK first draft:**
Let’s look at the map of East Asia. Japan is separated a little from the Euro-Asian continent and is an island country floating on the sea. Facing Japan, the Korean peninsula pushes out like one arm from the continent. At that time, if the Korean peninsula were dominated by a hostile great power toward Japan it would become a suitable base for attacking Japan. The defense of our country became difficult because Japan is an island country that has no land in its rear. In this sense the Korean Peninsula had the relationship of a location that unceasingly had the potential for becoming a dangerous threat pointed at Japan. At the time, the Ch’ing dynasty held [supremacy] over Korea. At the time, the Ch’ing dynasty held [supremacy] over Korea. 46  At the time, the Ch’ing dynasty held [supremacy] over Korea. 47

Beyond that the *fearsome* great power, Russia, began to turn its eyes toward Asia in search of an ice-free port. In 1891, Russia embarked on the building of a Trans-Siberian Railway and that was an *impending* threat. The Japanese government thought that before the power of Russia extended to Korea it should conclude treaties with every country to make Korea a neutral country and Japan *must increase its military buildup* to preserve the latter’s neutrality. 48

**TAC objection 46:** “The relationship of this description with the preceding sentence is a difficult expression to understand as the consciousness of Japanese of that time.”

**TAC objection 47:** “The word ‘supremacy’ in general is difficult to understand and is something separate from the ‘suzerainty’ of the Ch’ing dynasty’s relationship with Korea.”

**TAC objection 48:** “There is a danger that this expression [of seeking neutrality for Korea] may mislead readers to think that this was a concrete idea.”

**ARK final draft:**
A) to meet TAC objection 46: Japan, an island country that does not have any land to its rear, was thinking it would become difficult to defend itself.

B) to meet TAC objection 47: At this time, the Ch’ing Dynasty held suzerainty over Korea. p. 216 of the final draft.

C) to meet TAC objection 48: Among Japanese government officials there were
also the concepts that before the power of Russia extended to Korea it should conclude treaties with every country to make Korea a neutral country and Japan must increase its military buildup to preserve the latter’s neutrality.

**My comment:** *ARK* authors wanted to emphasize strongly that Japanese of the Meiji period, 1868–1912, were all united in their belief that the location of Korea was viewed as a very dangerous security threat for Japan and East Asian peace and order. TAC correctly objected that there was no such unanimity in contemporary Japan on this point or by historians on the assertion of the *Tsukuru Kai* that Japan tried to gain other nations’ recognition of Korea’s neutrality. The entire account demonstrates the strong *real politick*, power politics, and Bismarkian diplomacy that is the *ARK* rationale for all of pre-1945 Japan’s actions in foreign policy. I do not think it is a sheer accident that the *ARK* authors chose the word “supremacy” over “suzerainty” to characterize the Ch’ing dynasty’s relationship with Korea. The use of “suzerainty” would have indicated to students a close, formal, and historical relationship between China and Korea that actually existed and compromised the *Tsukuru Kai*’s efforts to ignore China’s logical and expected military response to its Korean vassal’s request for help in suppressing domestic disorder. Similarly, suzerain assistance was logical when its Korean vassal asked China for help in suppressing the Tong-hak Rebellion.

In the second draft *ARK* authors responded to TAC objections 46, 47, and 48 by replacing “supremacy” with “suzerainty” and by making thinking among Japanese government leaders more diversified. In both drafts the authors demonstrate a clear bias against “fearsome” Russia and the Soviet Union. This hostility becomes more recognizable by repetition in subsequent textbook content.

1.2a The Opposition of China and Japan Centering on Korea

*ARK* first draft:
On the one hand, China had a different view as an East Asian Power ... After the opening of Korea, Japan assisted it with military reform to aid its modernization. Becoming a modern country that could defend itself and not be subordinated to the domination of another country was important for the safety of Japan. However, in 1882, the Jingo Jihen broke out as a riot by a part of the Korean military that was left behind by military reform. China took advantage of this discontent and immediately sent several thousand troops to suppress the riot and to weaken Japan’s influential power. In 1884, Kin Gyok Kin (Kim Okkyun) and others rose in a coup d’etat that tried to advance the modernization they had learned from the Meiji Restoration, but at this time also Chinese troops completely suppressed the pro-Japanese faction (Kōshin Jihen) ...

1.2b The Sino-Japanese War and Causes of Victory

*ARK* first draft:
In 1894, a farmers’ rebellion, the so-called Tong-hak Rebellion, occurred in the southern part of Korea. The Tong-hak was a group that believed in (Eastern Learning) a religion that opposed (Western learning) Christianity. They aimed at suppressing social changes, expelling foreigners, and purging corrupt public officials.
Temporarily, they almost reached Seoul. Korea, which had only a few troops, asked China to send troops to suppress the rebellion. Japan, in compliance with the agreement that it made with China after the Koshin Incident, sent troops. The troops collided with each other and the Sino-Japanese War began. [At this time, Chinese landing troops created violent incidents.] 49 (pp. 219, l. 18–19)

The battlefield, in addition to Korea, stretched to southern Manchuria and Taiwan and Japan overwhelmingly defeated China on both land and sea. 50 One cause of Japan’s victory was that {the people} worked with all their might for their country. [In contrast to that spirit, the Chinese soldiers fought for money and when fighting conditions became disadvantageous, instantly lost their fighting spirit.] 51 (pp. 220, l. 9.)

**TAC objection 49:** “You are not rigorously selecting appropriate items based on mastering basic and fundamental content.”

**TAC objection 50:** “Before the Peace treaty there was no battle field in Taiwan, and this is incorrect.”

**TAC objection 51:** “In regard to Japan’s victory there are many {reasons} and you are discussing it in a one-sided interpretation without sufficient consideration.”

**ARK final draft:**

As causes for Japan’s victory we can cite military troops training, discipline, and the superiority of Japanese military arms. In that background there was the fact that Japanese had become a {national people} who devoted themselves to the defense of their country.

**My comment:** Obviously, **ARK** authors’ intent was to make a strong appeal to Japanese patriotism. In the process the **Tsukuru Kai** rudely and unnecessarily ridiculed the Chinese side in a similar manner as contemporary soldiers, journalists, and textbooks. They referred to Chinese as “spiritually backward, dirty, lazy, lacking in patriotism and public feeling,” and as chankoro (“Chinks”) or tombi (“pigtails”). One journalist referred to China not as a “sleeping giant,” but a “sleeping pig.” 13) Of course, the **Tsukuru Kai** has been justifiably unhappy with current one-sided Chinese government-authored textbook content, but it simply fueled the fire of Chinese resentment by this gratuitous description. No other junior high school textbooks provided such an arrogant and insulting manner. The **Tsukuru Kai**’s unilateral presentation attributed China’s actions in Korea as almost entirely that of an Imperial China trying to regain its prestige following more than five decades of humiliating concessions to foreigners. It is no wonder that Koreans and Chinese objected strongly to the approval of the **ARK** by the Ministry of Education.

On the basis of my own research on prewar government-authored textbooks I agree completely with Hane. In correspondence with me and for the 2003 conference I mentioned earlier he wrote: “It is precisely these kind of passages that remind me of the prewar textbooks I studied as a child.” Note that there is no discussion here of the Treaty of Tientsin of 1885, of harmful Japanese actions in Korea that exploited Korea, the split in the Korean court between the majority who wanted to preserve traditional Korean culture by requesting Chinese support and modernizers supported by Japan, the killing of
the Korean queen, and Japan’s forcing the Korean king to sign an agreement authorizing Japan to expel Chinese. ARK content also fails to mention the provocative actions of Japanese ministers to Korea, private financing of Korean plotters, and Japan’s aggressive efforts to modernize Korea as causes of the Tong-hak “farmers” rebellion. The text tells students that Japan was required to send troops, but the Tientsin Treaty of 1885 only required each of the two signatories to inform the other in case it dispatched troops to Korea in response to a Korean request to suppress serious disturbances. However, Korea asked only China to send troops to put down the Tong-hak Rebellion. China responded by sending 4,000 troops, but Japan responded with a larger force.

Peter Duus, who has studied the Japanese penetration of Korea carefully, wrote:

By the early 1890s, ‘the independence of Korea’ had become a fixed goal for the Japanese government ... For the Japanese army, it meant a Korea free from Chinese rule and firmly under Japanese political domination. For Diet politicians and journalists, it meant a Korea free of ‘despotic’ government and open to guidance by a ‘progressive’ Japan dedicated to freeing the Korean people from the thrall of ignorance and backwardness. For the Meiji oligarchs, it meant both. In their eyes internal reform within Korea was inextricably linked with establishing a dominant Japanese political influence there.14)

Most ominous for the future of East and Southeast Asia, the Army’s desire for war against China and Chinese to achieve absolute dominance in Korea was in opposition to civilians leaders such as Ito Hirobumi and Foreign Minister Munematsu who favored a “balance of power with the Chinese, perhaps even persuading them to embark on a joint reform of the Korean court.”15) Moreover, the late and highly respected Princeton University scholar of Japanese history, Marius B. Jansen quoted a later comment of Foreign Minister Mutsu that was much less heroic than the ARK painted in its “Column”: “I never thought there was any reason for internal reform in Korea beyond our political interest and I thought that there was little use in trying to see ourselves as a chivalrous, crusading army. Our political interest was what mattered, and nothing was to be sacrificed to it.”16) In fact, as the war was winding down the Army favored keeping the Liaotung Peninsula and advancing onward to Chihli Province and even Beijing.

The Tsukuru Kai makes no mention of this increasing power of the Japanese military within the government that translated into adverse results in neighboring nations that experienced Japan’s dual diplomacy and increasing power of the military. Two examples: One was an increase in military spending from 19% of the budget in 1880 to 31 percent in 1890, 34 between 1890 and 1900, and to an incredible 48 percent between 1901 and 1910. The second example was the government’s use of most of the ¥364 million Treaty of Shimonoseki indemnity to carry out in 1896 a six-division increase in the army and a very expansive naval construction program that added four new battleships, sixteen cruisers, and twenty-three destroyers.17) Not so incidentally, in contrast with the allegation of the ARK, I have found no reference in other scholars’ accounts of a Japanese foreign policy objective in the 1880–1900 period to achieve Korea’s neutrality.

Strikingly conspicuous is the authors’ failure to mention that as a pretext for making war, contemporary Japanese officials deliberately imposed such severe demands for
reform on Korea that it (and China as its protector) could not agree. Jansen wrote, “When the Koreans hesitated and the Chinese refused to press Korea for reform, the Japanese Government on July 12, 1894 instructed its minister in Korea to “use any pretext available” to promote war.” In the second draft the ARK Tsukuru Kai eliminated specific content to which the TAC objected and excluded Taiwan as a scene of battle.

1.3 The Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Triple Intervention

**ARK first draft:**

In 1895, both China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki ... However, Japan was not permitted to become equal with the Great Powers so simply. 52 Russia, which had ambitions in East Asia, asserted the view of the [Yellow Peril Argument that it was the intention of the Yellow Race to make world racial misfortune.]

52 & 53 It invited France and Germany to press Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China from a background of powerful military force. Japan with the shibboleth of “endure the unendurable,” a historical allusion to [borrowed from] China, endeavored as officials and people to complete its national power for opposing Russia ... (p. 221, l. 16–18) The Sino-Japanese War was a confrontation between an Imperial China and a Japan that launched forward as a modern constitutional country of Western style that [could not be avoided.]

54 Against the expectations of the world, China which had been feared for its hidden power as a so-called “sleeping lion” was defeated as a frail country by a new, rising Japan ... After that the Great Powers as vultures in China immediately acquired respective leaseholds and created a foothold for advancing in China. [If Japan had been defeated, it is not impossible that it may have treaded the same destiny as China.]

55 ... (pp. 221, l. 3–5)

A military base was built in northern Korea and [land was leased in Southern Korea located on the opposite shore of Tsushima.]

TAC objection 52: “This expression of the Yellow Peril argument can be misunderstood as having begun first in Russia.”

TAC objection 53: “The racial argument that includes the Yellow Peril argument is historically unclear and even at present there is the fear that this expression will be misunderstood generally.”

TAC objection 54: “There is a risk that this expression will be misunderstood as if at the time there was completely no other way to be chosen.”

TAC objection 55: “The expression that if Japan had been defeated, it would ‘tread the same destiny as China’ is risky and difficult to understand.”

TAC objection 56: “The leasehold continued afterwards and this expression can be easily mistaken as a cause of the Russo-Japanese War.”

Another junior high school textbook published by Tokyo Shoseki in 1993 and the most widely used textbook avoided the Tsukuru Kai’s objectionable content by discussing the same content and Russo-Japanese War much more objectively.
The Sino-Japanese War and the Annexation of Taiwan

Korea, which had been of great interest to the English and Russian empires, was a point of tension also between Japan—which imposed an unequal commercial treaty (see p. 214) to increase its control over Korea—and China, which considered Korea a tributary state of its empire.

In 1894, a huge rebellion broke out amongst the peasants, centered around groups of those who believed in Tong-hak (“Eastern Learning”); they attempted to expel corrupt members of government and eliminate foreign influence. Japan was quick to respond when the Korean government asked China for troops to put down the rebellion and sent part of its army to the peninsula. Even after the rebellion had died down, though, neither Japan nor China removed their troops. In August that year, the Sino-Japanese War began.

Fighting took place mainly in Korea and southern Manchuria. During the same year, the Japanese army took over the Liaodong Peninsula, and the Japanese navy was victorious over the Chinese. The next year, in 1895, China, admitted defeat and agreed to sign a peace treaty at Shimonoseki (Yamaguchi Prefecture). Under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China gave up Liaodong and Taiwan to Japan, recognized Korea’s independence from China, and agreed to pay ¥10 million in reparations—a figure equal to two and a half years of Japan’s national revenues. Also, the equal treaty (see p. 213) that Japan had with China was dissolved and replaced with an unequal treaty framed to Japan’s advantage.

Rebellion broke out in Taiwan when it was annexed by Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Japan quickly suppressed the rebellion, set up a government general, and made Taiwan a Japanese colony.

Tripartite Intervention and Western Powers’ Aggression in China

When, China know as the sleeping lion, had been defeated by Japan, the western powers competed to extend their influence in China. When Russia learned of the contents of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, they joined with France and Germany to advise that Japan return the Liaodong Peninsula to China. That is called the Tripartite Intervention. Japan, threatened by the military might of those three nations, was forced to give in to their demands. Subsequently Russia, France, Germany, and England leased key areas of China and acquired rights to open mines and build railways ... The United States, which was slow to join the race for China, proclaimed respect for Chinese sovereignty and territory and worked for free economic penetration throughout China. [A map clearly shows European and Japanese spheres of influence, leased areas, railroads and Chinese government railways.]

Japan after the Sino-Japanese War

With the revision of the treaties and its victory in the Sino-Japanese War, Japan
ended its period of subordination to the western powers to become an independent nation in fact as well as name. At the same time, however, its take-over of Taiwan and the inclusion of Korea and that part of China facing the Taiwan coast in its sphere of influence meant that it had a foothold enabling it to join the western powers in their invasion of Asia.

At the same time, as their self confidence in themselves as an independent people was strengthened by the defeat of China, the Japanese acquired a sense of superiority, looking down on the Chinese and viewing Korea as a subject state. When the Tripartite Intervention became known, the newspapers and other insisted stridently that Japan strengthen its military power, even if this meant sacrifices by the people. The government used almost the entire compensation to build up its armed forces. (My emphasis.)

My comment: My italicized emphasis in the Tokyo Shoseki textbook account of military and diplomatic events calls attention to a striking contrast between its treatment of these military and diplomatic events in tone and content with the ARK! In contrast with the Tsukuru Kai, the Tokyo Shoseki authors did not arrogantly engage in a boasting at China’s expense and clearly called attention to Japanese development of a sense of superiority, invasion of China, subjugation of Taiwan, imposition of unequal treaties on Korea and China and strong emphasis on military strength after the Sino-Japanese war. However, the Tsukuru Kai was accurate about the Great Powers’ predatory behavior in China’s between 1895–1899, the so-called “Mad Scramble” for Chinese concessions. Jansen, however, concluded that “The Treaty of Shimonoseki was the most damaging that China signed in the nineteenth century” and Japan “achieved membership in the line of Western imperialists.”21) Moreover, it was simplistic of the Tsukuru Kai to write that Japan’s victory was a case of “a modern constitutional country against an imperial China?” In its second draft the ARK deleted the sections bracketed and underlined by TAC objections 52 and 53 regarding the Yellow Peril, but the original phrasing demonstrates again the authors’ anti-Russian bias by blaming Russia, not Germany for this racial discrimination. In that connection an ARK “Column” eulogized Mutsu Munemitsu, who had served as ambassador to China during the Boxer Rebellion by writing: “Komura read the intentions of Russia’s advance in Manchuria and after he became Foreign Minister he took a strong position toward Russia consistently.”

In the second draft ARK authors also deleted the expression “could not be avoided”—objection 54. It makes Japan’s action in going to war completely justifiable. Furthermore, historians like to avoid historical inevitability to explain an historical event. Had Koreans, Chinese, and Russians been familiar with the biased first draft they would have been incensed. On the other hand, the Tokyo Shoseki textbook’s treatment produced no foreign criticism. The strong implication the Tsukuru Kai wanted to impress upon students was that in the real politick wars of weak nations being devoured by strong powers; Japan’s diplomacy and victory saved it from China’s fate. However, Japan was an exceedingly weak country from 1853 through 1890; yet it never experienced China’s fate. History does not run in such a straight line.
2. Japan was admitted as a Member of the World Powers
2.1 The Price of Victory

**ARK first draft:**

58 As a result of victory in the Russo-Japanese war, Japan achieved membership as a Great Power. However, the rise to this position *did not necessarily mean advantage and security* ... From about the time of the Sino-Japanese War a cry of *Yellow Peril* began to be chanted in Western countries and it again caught fire.

As a result of victory in the Russo-Japanese War, countries of *colored races* were encouraged and nationalism arose. *And* in distant countries such as Turkey and India they joined in simple sympathy and respect for Japan. *However, on the other hand,* in nearby countries such as China and Korea, the [*nationalism that was awakened* *had the potential for being expressed* in the form of opposition to Japan. 58

In addition, Japan, as a great power, *needed to create and to continue to preserve a balance of power policy* with the other so-called big powers. In this new situation produced by the victory, *it was difficult for contemporary Japanese to respond sufficiently.* (p. 240, l. 8–12)

**TAC objection 58:** You are arguing the process of Asian nationalism from a standpoint that [*nationalism was awakened*] by the distance of countries from Japan, but your expression of why it came about [*in nearby China and Korea*] in opposition to Japan is an inadequate explanation and difficult to understand.

**ARK second draft:**

[The sections underlined and bracketed by TAC were deleted.]

From about the time of the Sino-Japanese War a cry of Yellow Peril began to be chanted in Western countries and it again caught fire.

In Asian countries encouraged by Japan’s victory, nationalism (*Love of country, and the viewpoint and thought of asserting national interest*) occurred. In distant countries such as Turkey and India they were linked with simple sympathy and respect for Japan, but in nearby countries such as China and Korea it appeared in the form of opposition to a Japan that expanded its power in their countries ...

**My comment:** The second draft satisfied TAC objection 58 by making it a bit clearer why Chinese and Koreans opposed Japan. *ARK* authors cannot do so because it would make its justifications regarding Korea and the later annexation ring hollow and contradictory. The narrow definition of nationalism by the *ARK* implies that love of country is associated with defending Japan’s national interests; however, nationalism can mean that out of love of country citizens speak and act in opposition to their country’s actions as some Japanese did during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese War and Americans are now doing regarding the occupation of Iraq.

Although a century has passed since the Russo-Japanese War, *ARK* authors failed here—and in two more discussions of that war out of chronological context—to admit that the war was only a qualified victory. In the last six months of the war it changed into a deadlock and General Nogi Maresuke lost 56,000 casualties in taking Port Arthur after six months of terrible attacks. Japan won many great battles, but could not win a decisive
victory. By the end of the war Russia had mobilized 2,000,000 troops, spent 2 billion yen, and suffered 115,000 deaths compared to Japan’s opposite numbers of 1,088,996 troops, 1.5 billion yen, and 118,000 deaths. The Tsukuru Kai fails to explain why the Treaty of Portsmouth was not as favorable as Japanese had expected and to tell that Japan secretly requested President Theodore Roosevelt to end the war. These failures in prewar Japanese textbooks resulted in prewar generations (even my students still today) believing that the civilian government had lost a war at the diplomatic table that the military had won completely on the battlefield. Truth is sacrificed to exaggerated patriotism.

2.2 The Annexation of Korea

ARK first draft:
59 Strategically, the Korean peninsula was important and militarily it was unstable. Three countries, England, America, and Russia, were all aimed at controlling it, and in reality the matter of maintaining its administration was thought to be difficult. They each wanted to avoid taking on the burden, but each would be inconvenienced if one or the other two countries did the administering, so the appearance on the scene of a rising nation, Japan, to carry out the administration was very convenient for all three countries. (p. 242, l. 1–6)

After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan established in Korea a Resident-General Government and strengthened its control. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea (Korean Annexation). 60 This step was supported by Western countries as a policy that would stabilize East Asia. (p. 242, l. 9–10) 61 Korean annexation was necessary for the security of Japan and for protecting special interests in Manchuria, but it did not necessarily bring benefits, either economically or politically. (p. 242, l. 10–12) 62 But at the time it was implemented, it was done in accordance with the principle of international relations and was carried out legally. (p. 242, l. 12–13) 63 However, within Korea, naturally there were pro and con arguments in regard to annexation and fierce resistance arose from a portion of those who opposed. (p. 242, l. 13–15)

TAC objection 59: “In regard to the movements of each country centering on the Korean Peninsula, you have adopted a one-sided view without sufficient reflection.”
TAC objection 60: “It is an expression that runs the risk of being misinterpreted to mean that the Great Powers declared their support of the annexation of Korea at that time.”
TAC objection 61: “The annexation of Korea is described solely in terms of “necessity” and “advantage;” these are one-sided expressions that run the risk of misunderstanding the annexation and the realities of the situation at that time.”
TAC objection 62: “Writing only that ‘it conformed with the principles of international relations and was carried out legally’ is a manner of expression that runs the risk of a misunderstanding of the realities of the annexation process.”
TAC objection 63: “The ‘violent resistance’ of those against annexation within Korea is a wording that runs the risk of being misinterpreted to mean only a small portion resisted.”
After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan strengthened its control over Korea and established a Korean Government-General Residency. The Japanese government thought the annexation of Korea was necessary for the purpose of defending Japan’s security and defending its rights and interests in Manchuria. Because the three countries of England, America, and Russia were mutually vigilant against each other expanding their influence in the Korean peninsula, they did not protest. Thus, in 1910, Japan resolutely decided to suppress the opposition of Koreans and to annex it in a military context (Korean annexation).

Domestically, in Korea there were some voices that accepted annexation, but fierce opposition arose by others over losing the people’s independence. Also after that, a restoration of independence movement was firmly carried out.

After the annexation of Korea, Japan carried out there the development of such things as building a railway and irrigation system and began a land survey. However, by this land survey project many Korean farmers were driven out of arable land. Furthermore, because an assimilation policy advanced such things as Japanese language education, Koreans intensified their anti-Japanese feeling. (My emphasis)

How did another junior high school history textbook of 1993, Shimpan chugaku shakai, the third most widely used textbook discuss the same issues.

*Shimpan chūgaku shakai* (Social Studies for Junior High School: History) Following its victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan made Korea a protectorate and set up a Residency-General depriving Korea in effect of the right to handle its own foreign policy and internal affairs. Eventually, it also disbanded the Korean forces, and in 1910, formally annexed Korea. (*Annexation of Korea*). For the next thirty-six years, Japan was to rule Korea by military force as a colony, inflicting indescribable suffering on the Korean people.

In an attempt to assimilate Koreans with Japan, Japan made use of the Japanese language compulsory in Korean schools, taught Japanese history and geography in preference to Koran history and geography, and sought to deprive Koreans of their ethnic awareness and pride. The formation of companies was subjected to a permit system, the setting-up of companies by Koreans being avoided as far as possible, and land surveys resulted in land being taken away from large numbers of Koreans. As a result, many Koreans whose livelihood become difficult moved to Japan or the northeastern part of China, where they were subjected to all kinds of discrimination where wages and social life in general were concerned. Such developments only reinforced the mistaken tendency of Japanese to despise Koreans.23)

**My comment:** On the same pages of *Shimpan chūgaku shakai* are a picture of Ito Hirobumi and the Korean Crown Prince. The textbook explains that the Korea was made to hand over rule of its country by Japan and the Korean crown prince made to dress in a Japanese kimono. Other items featured are a critical poem of the annexation.
by the poet Ishikawa Takuboku and a notation that despite “righteous” Korean army opposition and the actions of a “young Korean man, An Chung-gun,” who assassinated Ito Hirobumi, “imperialist Japan suppressed it by military force and eventually made Korea its colony.” Questions: Which one of these two textbooks’ content is objective, truthful, and lacking in ambiguity? Which one will incite Korean anger and recrimination and which one will contribute to Japanese children’s understanding of historical facts, the plight of their Korean neighbors, and to greater international understanding? The answers are too obvious. Furthermore, will the description of the latter textbook undermine Japanese students love of country? My answer is a resounding no, but I will return to address this question in my conclusion.

The ARK first draft completely justified Japan’s annexation of Korea. The implication is that if Japan had not annexed Korea, Russia, England, or America would have done so. In effect, students were told that Japan did a big favor for them by assuming the difficult “burden” of administering Korea! With the possible exception of Russia these were one-sided exaggerations that the ARK cannot substantiate. A keen objective scholar of Japanese colonialism and imperialism, Mark Peattie wrote the following criticism regarding the argument that contemporary Japan was only protecting its strategic interests:

Japan’s colonial territories, (with the possible exception of Taiwan) were, in each instance, obtained as the result of a deliberate decision by responsible authorities in the central government to use force in securing a territory that would contribute to Japan’s immediate strategic interests … But if strategic security was the initial rationale for obtaining control over adjacent island territories and continental buffer zones on the way to creating a near-at-hand formal empire, the same rationale made it impossible to give finite limits to Japan’s imperial ambitions even after it had assembled its formal empire. As early as the 1880s … Yamagata Aritomo … spoke of concentric circles of national interest radiating outward from the home islands: a “cordon [line] of sovereignty,” encompassing territory related to the nation’s survival and thus under direct and formal occupation, and a “cordon of advantage,” seen as necessary to protect and guarantee the inner line. Implied in this doctrine was the necessity of preserving the outer line through the control of buffer zones. Once those had become areas of Japanese “advantage,” territories still farther distant became matters of Japanese interest … The inner logic of Japan’s strategic doctrine thus committed the empire to ever-expanding and ever-receding security goals, each colonial acquisition being seen as a ‘base’ or ‘outpost’ from which the empire could, in some way, control a sphere of influence over more distant areas.

What we should note is this formula in practice through 1945 meant that each time Japan expanded strategic and economic interests into new territory the occupied area became a new security concern and strategic problem. Feeling insecure, Japan again would argue the need to advance Japan to advance its line of advantage to protect its new acquisition. This was a dynamic factor that had no end. Historians and political scientists characterize this thinking as the “pathology of imperialism.” Still more than six decades later the Tsukuru Kai and other right wing Japanese fail to recognize that this mentality
characterized Japan’s expansion right down to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Furthermore, the implication that the powers supported Japan’s annexation is certainly an exaggeration. Given the Russia Tsar’s objective of being an East Asian power, it is ludicrous to write that Russia docilely accepted Japan’s annexation of Korea. Once again Japan is judged as not worse and much better as a “young, emerging nation” for preventing a war among the powers and saving Korea from European domination. The text even ignores the Yamagata Aritomo-Ito Hirobumi differences on annexation. Finally, the authors trot out the tiresome old justification of all imperial powers about how much good they did for the annexed country. It is partially true, but much of Korean development fulfilled self-serving Japanese objectives as Shimpan chugaku shakai recognizes.

Had the TAC approved the first draft there would have been riotous demonstrations all over Korea. Even the ARK’s second draft is still not satisfactory for three reasons. First, it still justifies Korean annexation for defending Japan’s security and defending its rights and interests in Manchuria. Second, although it is true that England, America, and Russia did not protest, it does not mean that they were absolutely delighted by Japan’s annexation nor that they acceded solely because they were mutually afraid that one or the other country might expand its influence in the Korean peninsula. Third, it is a bit outrageous to imply that a significant number of Koreans accepted annexation. After the Korean emperor authorized a secret mission to the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 to protest Japanese rule, Japan burned villages and killed some 12,000 “rioters” who protested against Japan’s domination. The Imperial Japanese government, itself, reported another 1450 riots in 1908, 9000 and in 1909. There were only 147 riots in 1910 because the Imperial Japanese Army had established firm control. Mark Peattie referred to the contemporary Korean attitude as that of “outrage and despair.”

2.3 The Establishment of A Chinese Republic

ARK first draft:

By Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese war many Chinese foreign students gathered in Japan to study about Japan’s modernization. In 1905 Sun Yat-sen along with other foreign students in Tokyo, formed a Chinese Alliance, published the Three People’s Principles (National Independence, Democracy, and People’s Livelihood), and began a revolutionary movement in China. In 1911, in China the Chinese Revolution began, and the curtain closed on the Ch’ing Dynasty. The next year, the establishment of the [First] Chinese Republic was announced in Nanking and Sun Yet-sen became the provisional president. However, soon Yuan Shih-kai seized the seat of power. The ideals of the revolution were ignored and China lost its unity, and instead every local region came to be controlled separately by a few military cliques that formed regional governments supported by armed might. This state of internal division continued thereafter for approximately 40 years.

[By the victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War many Asian countries, such as China and Korea, began to open their eyes to a nationalism that aimed at a modern state.] At the same time, Japan joined the club of the Western Great Powers and became part of a new order based on a balance of power. [There were no paths remaining for Japan except to move forward within the responsibilities and agreements of a]
Contemporary Chinese and Koreans were not able to understand how Japan suffered in such a state of international politics. Japanese, for their part, also began gradually losing their ability to understand the sufferings of the Chinese and Koreans. (p. 241, l. 5–19)

TAC objection 64: “You do not follow the chronological course of the Chinese revolution and there are mistakes.”

TAC objection 65: “On page 267 you mention the advance of Chinese unification; this passage runs the risk of being misinterpreted to mean that approximately 40 years of divisive conditions followed as a result of military cliques.”

TAC objection 66: “Maintaining that it was after the Russo-Japanese War that China began aiming at a modern State is inaccurate in view of what appears in lines 13 to 16 on p. 177.”

TAC objection 67: The entire passage of “agreements and responsibilities as a Great Power,” “Japan’s suffering,” and “Chinese and Korean agony are difficult to understand and it is unclear what you are pointing out.

ARK second draft:

... The next year in January in Nanking the establishment of the [First] Chinese Republic was announced in Nanking and Sun Yat-sen became the provisional president. Yuan Shi-kai, who was a powerful figure in the Manchu government retired from the government and joined the revolutionary factions, overthrew the Manchu Dynasty, and succeeded to the position of President in exchange with Sun Yat-sen. However, when Yuan assumed the presidency he aimed at the strengthening of his power and began to suppress the revolutionary factions. He ignored the ideals of the revolution and China lost unity. Through large and small warlords, who held political power through military cliques, control became diffused in every local area.

My comment: TAC objections to the first draft were not trivial. It wanted to emphasize that ARK content lacked historical accuracy and contradicted other passages of the textbook. It is worth noting that Japan got off on the wrong foot with the First Chinese Republic because the Japanese Government initially supported the Manchu Dynasty against revolutionary forces and new Chinese Republic because it stood for greater order and preservation of Japanese interests. If the Ministry permitted the publication of objectionable items 65 and 66 it would give Japanese students the mistaken impression that a Nationalist Government formed in 1928 never achieved a considerable degree of national unity—a point that was inconsistent with the ARK’s acknowledgement on pages 177 and 267 that unification and modernization of China proceeded under the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist Government. Japan further offended Chinese nationalism during the next sixteen years by sometimes supporting whatever warlord was deemed strong enough to protect and advance Japan’s rights and special interests, especially between 1912 and 1928—a point that was also often true of the other Great Powers. If the passages were left to stand as written, they would also convey to students the impression that contemporary Chinese actions (and 2001 ARK’s complaints) justified Japanese actions in China over the
next forty years. TAC objection 67 reflected a wise Ministry of Education concern that emphasis upon Japan’s “suffering” makes Japan seem like a *victim* rather than Koreans who lost their independence and Chinese who were subjected to Western and Japanese imperialism. Comparing Japan’s pain with that of Korea and China is absurd and chastising them for not understanding Japan’s suffering ludicrous and difficult to fathom.

The second draft was historically much more accurate and the “Japan as victim” theme was removed. Worse yet, during those earlier years between 1911 and 1928, Japan and Western powers contributed to China’s weakness and political disintegration by supporting war lords that advanced their exploitation and domination at China’s expense. TAC also understood that interpretation of continued disorder and division would be offensive to both the Chinese Republic in Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China.

3. The Beginning of World War I
3.1 Limited War and Total War

**ARK first draft:**

At that time the view of war that dominated the world was completely different than current war views that experienced atomic weapons. Every country resorted to war comparatively easily. War was a means of diplomacy and *was a continuation of politics.* If you lost, you paid an indemnity and lost territory. All the people were not accused of moral responsibility. The matter of fighting was for the military and all the people were not mobilized. This sort of war is called a limited war.

For example, the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese war were clearly limited wars. Victorious Japan did not occupy Peking or Moscow. Defeated Chinese and Russians did not even have the meaning of being *morally censured as violators of war crimes.* However, together with the First World War, a new development called total war appeared on the scene in world history. The Great War was prolonged beyond expectations and lasted as long as four years. Every country put forth all its power and even conscripted soldiers from its colonies. It became a total war never seen before. People’s lives were caught up directly in the war. Tanks, airplanes, submarines, and finally poison gas were used and Europe took on a tragic misery. (pp. 245–46)

**TAC objection 68** was lodged against all three paragraphs: “The explanation is insufficient in regard to ‘limited wars’ that include those connected with the description you made earlier with the people’s war of the Russo-Japanese War in line 12 on page 225. Furthermore, in its entirety the expressions are difficult to understand and are also unclear in connection with the difference in ‘total war’ (sōryokusen) and ‘total war’ (zentaisen).”

**TAC objection 69:** “The expression in regard to ‘game of politics’ is difficult to understand and an inadequate explanation.”

**ARK second draft,** The heading of “Total War” was revised to “sōryokusen” and shortened to read as follows:

The view of war that had dominated the world to that time completely differed with
the current war view that experienced atomic bombing. Every country went into war relatively easily because war was an act of diplomacy and an extension of politics. If you lost, you paid an indemnity, lost territory, and it was not a problem of all the people taking moral responsibility. The ones who fought were the military and all the people were not mobilized for it. For example, the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War were such kind of wars.

However, this type of war changed totally when it came to the WW I. A new reality, so-called total wars, appeared in world history. The Great War exceeded anticipations; it lasted four years. Every country exerted all its power and also conscripted soldiers in its colonies. Peoples’ lives were directly caught up in the war. Tanks, airplanes, submarines, and, ultimately, poison gas were used and Europe took on a tragic sight.

My comment: Note that the Tsukuru Kai again demonstrates its admiration for nineteenth century Prussian diplomacy by using Von Clausewitz’s definition of war. Much of what the ARK said in its first draft about the horror of modern war is a justifiable philosophical view of whether modern man and civilization have really progressed over previous centuries. It seems fair to say, however, that the content was far too difficult for the mastery of learning for junior high school students subjected to entrance examinations that seek basic facts. But beyond a criticism of style is that of content. The three paragraphs are loaded with very angry, ideological criticisms and linked directly at Allied Forces postwar Occupation policy toward Japan. If readers skip ahead to the post-World War II Occupation Period and read carefully the author’s first and second drafts content, they will quickly observe that the Tsukuru Kai had led students in a straight line to a predisposition to criticize the nature of the Occupation and to swallow whole the interpretation of poor Japan as a victim.

3.2 Japanese Goods

ARK first draft:
In October 1929, in America, which was the greatest economic power in the world after the First World War, stocks dropped greatly and a depression occurred. Because America placed extremely high tariffs on imported goods to protect its own industries, trade within a year and a half declined by one-half and a world depression developed. America of this time lacked sufficient awareness that through its independent policy it swayed the world economy. By this policy a Japanese economy that relied on exports to America received a big shock and a great number of unemployed flooded the cities (Showa Panic), 81 (p. 266, l. 8–9)

England and France countered against America and, on the one hand, adopted an economic bloc that lowered tariffs and regulated the flow of supplies on colonial products and the home country as well as for products from other countries. The world’s free trade system collapsed. Japan’s cheap industrial products received especially unjust treatment in markets everywhere in the world and gradually were shut out. Through this sort of treatment Japan arrived at the conception that it also must have an
exclusive economic bloc for self-sustaining, self-sufficiency. So it came about that the place that gathered attention was Manchuria located in the northeastern part of China. 82 (p. 267, l. 3–5)

TAC objection 81: “[Japan was in a recession from before. This expression risks misinterpretation as if Japan’s economic condition began and deteriorated as a result of the world depression.”

TAC objection 82: “There is a risk that England and France’s economic bloc will be misinterpreted as if it began before the Manchurian Incident.” (The objectionable material was moved to p. 273 under the section on the “2-26-1936 Incident and the Emperor’s Will.”)

ARK second draft:
In October 1929, in America, which was the greatest economic power in the world after the First World War, stocks dropped greatly and a depression occurred. Because America placed extremely high tariffs on imported goods to protect its own industries, trade within a year and a half declined by one-half and a world depression developed. America of this time lacked sufficient awareness that through its independent policy it swayed the world economy. By this policy, a Japanese economy that relied on exports to America received a big shock and a great number of unemployed flooded the cities (Showa Panic).

Even in agriculture the volume of exports of silk headed for America dropped precipitously. For that reason, many hungry children who could not carry bento [to school] for lunch occurred. Many parents to overcome their debt sent their young daughters to work in the cities. The government’s countermeasures to counter the depression were inadequate. For that reason people’s trust in party government began to waver. Moreover, there was a growing attention on Manchuria in northeastern China as a means of extricating the nation from economic confusion. (pp. 262–63)

My comment: The ARK was correct in writing that the world depression had a drastic impact. It produced undesirable results on international cooperation and domestic developments in most nations and colonies. Moreover, by the Hawley-Smoot Tariff increasing import duties on Japanese products by an average of 23 percent, the U.S. did aggravate Japan’s economic depression.26) But no governments, with the exception of the Soviet Union’s planned economy and 5 Year Plans, adopted effective and non-military policies prior to 1933 to combat the business cycles that caused advanced industrial and capitalist societies to suffer periodic economic depressions. Instead, they reacted to the depression by self-centered policies of economic nationalism that deepened and lengthened it. Furthermore, as badly as Japan’s economy suffered, the impact was no more severe than in France, England, and the United States. For example, throughout the 1930s, the U.S. experienced unemployment of between 9 to 15 million and farmers’ loss of land and mass migration of more than a million from “Dust Bowl” areas to states such as California, Oregon, and Washington occurred. But these three nations did not turn to a loss of democratic practices, domination of politics by the military, military expansion, and extreme domestic solutions. Furthermore, after World War II it was Japan’s adoption
of freedom of the seas and free export markets that helped it to become the second world’s largest economy.

TAC was also absolutely correct in pointing out two glaring historical errors. First, Japan had already suffered in the 1920–27 period from financial panics, recession, and a fragile economy. To protect its economy Japan also had raised tariffs “substantially” in 1926 on “steel machinery and had given liberal protection to the heavy and chemical industries.” Furthermore, prior to and after the 1929–1930 stock market crash and early stage of the depression the Japanese government, itself, not other nations, had mistakenly adopted economic policies that made the depression even worse. Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke, a fiscal conservative, adopted a tight money policy and balanced budget, returned Japan to the gold standard with disastrous consequences for Japan’s agricultural sector, and reduced government expenditures, instead of stimulating the economy by heavy expenditures for public work projects.

The second historical error that TAC caught ARK authors in was that of moving the chronology of the French and British economic bloc backward before the Manchurian Incident. The authors had used this information to impress upon young readers that Japan was a helpless victim. It is another example of the authors distorting history by arbitrarily moving later events to a prior occurrence to support a desired conclusion, namely, that the subsequent Manchurian Incident was justified and unavoidable. Most surprising of all, the ARK completely ignored TAC objection and repeated the same paragraph verbatim.

3.3a China’s Anti-Japanese Movement

**ARK first draft:**

After the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty in China, rivalry of warlords with private armies occurred in every region. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the KMT aimed to unify China domestically by fighting warlords in every region. In 1928 Chiang Kai-shek took Peking and established a new government. That power reached also into Manchuria.

As a part of China’s national unification, a movement heightened to expel foreign powers that held special rights in China. It became active also in an anti-Japanese movement that attacked Japanese and boycotted Japanese products. This was an expression of Chinese nationalism, and simultaneously it received influence from the Soviet Union’s Communist thought that realized revolution by violence, and because it also in fact received orders from the Comintern, it was showered with the character of a radically destructive movement. 83 (p. 267, l. 6–18)

3.3b Stifling of a Cooperative Foreign Policy

**ARK first draft:**

From the end of Taisho to early Showa, it became common for the political party that gained the majority to form Cabinets. At this time, Shidehara Kijuro served twice as Foreign Minister [1/30/1926–4/20/1927 and 7/2/29–12/13/1931]. He cooperated with Britain and the U.S. to preserve the Washington Conference System and advanced a cooperative foreign policy that responded sympathetically to Chinese nationalism. In 1927 even when incidents of attacking foreigners occurred,
Japan adopted a generous attitude toward China. However, on the contrary because China intensified an anti-Japanese movement, within Japan voices heightened to criticize Shidehara’s foreign policy as weak-kneed. 84 (p. 268, l. 9–11)

(The following content was in a column on p. 269 and TAC included it in objection 84:) China, [seeing that in Japan there was a lack of resistance to raids against Japanese, became all the more violent.] 84 (l. 7–9)

On the other hand, in 1928, Chiang Kai-shek announced unilaterally the rescinding of the unequal treaties with Japan. This was called revolutionary diplomacy. 47 Japan also tried all the more to make its task that of revising the unequal treaties with the Great Powers of the West. In addition, Japan made an effort to establish a modern legal order [in China] and to the bitter end accomplished that objective through formal negotiations with those countries. The attitude of Chiang Kai-shek to these actions was the direct opposite.] 85 (p. 268, 12–16)

Japan appealed to America, which had the position of guarantor of the Nine Power Treaty, that the KMT regime was unjust but the American Government ignored the appeal of Japan and assisted the KMT regime for the purpose of opposing Japan. In Japan, disappointment spread towards America and the spirit of international cooperation toward China became difficult. 86 (l. 17–21)

TAC objection 83: “In regard to China’s anti-Japanese movement your account does not touch on the Japanese side’s actions and runs the risk of misinterpreting the course of that time period.”
TAC objection 84: “This is an expression that is unclear as to when it occurred and is difficult to understand.”
TAC objection 85: “Chiang Kai-shek did not rescind the treaties unilaterally. This is inaccurate.”
TAC objection 86: “[ ] “In regard to Japanese-American relations at this time, the policy of the Japanese Government was not uniform. Without reflecting on that fact you are discussing it everywhere with a view that is not sufficiently considered.”

ARK second draft:

After the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty in China, rivalry of warlords with private armies occurred in every region. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the KMT aimed to unify China domestically by fighting warlords in every region. In 1928 Chiang Kai-shek took Peking and established a new government. Its power reached also into Manchuria. (p. 263)

As a part of China’s national unification, a movement heightened to expel foreign powers that held rights in China through the unequal treaties. This was an expression of Chinese nationalism, but because it received influence from the Soviet Union’s Communist thought that realized revolution by violence, it took on a radical character. Also in regard to Japan, which had expanded its power, an anti-Japanese movement to expel Japanese and to boycott Japanese goods became active. On the other hand, the Chinese Government in 1928 hoisted a policy of unilaterally
declaring it would rescind the unequal treaties, including those with Japan, as invalid. This was called revolutionary diplomacy. Japan appealed to America, the guarantor of the Nine Power Treaty, on the inappropriate actions of the Chinese Government, but the American Government did not respond sufficiently. For this reason in Japan, people came forth, centering on the military, which thought it was difficult to respond to China in a spirit of international cooperation.

My comment: TAC objections 83–86 demonstrated correctly that the ARK had committed flagrant historical errors and poor judgment in overstating Japan’s pure heart and objectives. TAC underlined and enclosed in brackets the words “simultaneously,” “in fact received orders from the Comintern,” and “destructive movement” to emphasize strong disagreement. As a result, in the second draft the authors eliminated these words, recognized some Japanese provocation, and softened somewhat its criticism of the KMT, Nationalist Government, and Chinese people. It was true that between 1928 and 1931 the Kuomintang Party and the Nationalist Government did threaten to abdicate unilaterally the unequal treaties; however, it never unilaterally took such an action. By ARK authors failing to be more accurate historically they exaggerated the KMT and National Government as radical and unreasonable for the period 1927 up to the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. Far from the Nationalist Government taking orders from the Soviet Union it had broken off relations with the Soviet Government. In fact, it can be argued that American and British positions toward a KMT cancellation of the unequal treaties before early 1928 were more rigid at times than Japan. However, Japan was much less interested before and after 1928 in “revising the unequal treaties” than in obtaining other foreign powers’ cooperation to preserve their special right in China. TAC objection 84 regarding Japanese dissatisfaction with Shidehara diplomacy occurred more in the last year of his first tenure, 1927, and between 1929–31 in his second role as Foreign Minister. Even in the second draft, the authors did not retreat much from their preconceived interpretations. These historical errors again reflect the Tsukuru Kai’s attempts to force events into historical interpretations that are premature to justify a later Japanese action.

3.4 Manchuria the Night Before the Incident

ARK first draft:

By its victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan voluntarily evacuated that part of Manchuria that was excluded from Russian domination. In the Kwantung area of the southern part of Manchuria, Japan took over from Russia its operation rights to the South Manchurian Railway (Mantetsu) and obtained China’s approval. These rights were based on treaties and by Japanese investment Manchuria’s economy developed. However, in Manchuria from around 1929 an anti-Japanese movement by Chinese became conspicuously violent. [Illegal behavior in violation of treaties by such actions as train obstructions, rape of Japanese school children, boycott of Japanese goods, murders of Japanese military exceeded 300. However, in response to them the Japanese government did not adopt a resolute attitude and did not have a policy for solving them.]
At the time, 230,000 Japanese lived in Manchuria, and for protecting them 10,000 army soldiers (Kwantung Army) were stationed there for the purpose of guarding the South Manchurian Railway and Kwantung. Japanese rights and Japanese lives were threatened. In the north there was the threat of the Soviet Union and from the South the Kuomintang Party’s power had extended. Within this situation Ishihara Kanji and a part of the officers of the Kwantung Army polished a plan to solve the problem by a military occupation of all of Manchuria. 88 (l. 6–16)

(TAC objection 87, TAC’s objection underlined all of the first three paragraphs: “There is the possibility that this expression will be misunderstood as if Japan’s rights were based on a treaty of equality between Japan and China.”)

(TAC objection 88, Again TAC objected by underlining and bracketing the one-sided content, and with understatement wrote: “There is the possibility that this expression will be misunderstood as if mainly the Chinese side provoked Japan’s possession of Manchuria.”)

(TAC objection 89: “In regard to the contemporary dissatisfaction of the people it is inaccurate because it was as well chiefly an economic problem.”)

**ARK second draft:**

By its victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan leased Kwantung Province in South Manchuria and was handed over administrative rights to the South Manchurian Railway by Russia.

At the beginning of the Showa period already more than 200,000 Japanese lived in Manchuria. (The population of Chinese, mostly peasants, was 789,000 in 1927 and was increasing annually.) For the purpose of defending the railway and protecting Kwantung Province ten thousand army troops were stationed there. When the Kwantung Military sought to strengthen its domination of Manchuria they did such things as killing the Manchu War Lord Chang Tso-lin. The anti-Japanese movement by Chinese became more severe and they frequently did such things as sabotage the railroad. Furthermore, in Japan there was the fear of the Soviet Union in the north and from the south the Nationalist Party was extending its power. In this situation Ishiwara Kanji and one part of the Kwantung Army originated a plan to solve the problem by a military occupation of all of Manchuria ... 89

The [Japanese] people rose in discontent with the weak attitude of the government and strengthened their distrust in political party government. (p. 266)

The treatment of a third junior high school history textbook, the 1993 Osaka Shoseki publication, Chūgaku Shakai: Rekishiteki Bunya for the background and significance of the Manchurian Incident is a striking contrast with ARK content. It covered the topics fairly, adequately, and meaningfully as follows:

**Towards Unification in China**

In China, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), at the head of the Guomindang (Nationalist)
government, put a clamp on the activities of the Communist Party and military cliques (see p. 206) and pressed forth with the unification of the country. The Japanese army sent troops to Shandong Province in 1928 to try and prevent this. In the same year Japan killed (in an explosion) a leader of one of the military cliques {Chang Tso-lin} as he was retreating to Manchuria under pressure from the Nationalist government army. This provoked a new rash of anti-Japanese movements throughout China ...

**The Manchurian Incident**

In Manchuria (see p. 204) where most of Japan’s interests were concentrated, the power of the Guomindang (nationalist) government was growing and so were the nationalistic instincts of the people. As a result, the operations of the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway deteriorated, and the control of Manchuria was heading for a crisis. The Japanese military and nationalists at this stage plotted to take complete control of Manchuria. They played for the support of the Japanese public, who were suffering through a recession, by proclaiming Manchuria “Japan’s Lifeline.”

In September 1931, the Japanese army in Manchuria (Guandong Army) bombed a section of the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway on the outskirts of Fengtien (Mukden, now Shenyang). They blamed it on China and attacked the Chinese army. This was the start of the Manchurian Incident. Wishing to avoid a confrontation in Manchuria, the Guomindang army continued retreating, and the Japanese army occupied Manchuria in three months. By 1932 Japan had extended the front to Shanghai, and in March of the same year set up the state of Manchukuo. The last emperor of China was made the head of this state. On the surface it was claimed to be an independent state, but the real power lay in Japanese hands. The government brought struggling Japanese farmers to Manchuria and settled them en masse on land confiscated from Chinese farmers and others. Before long the zaibatsu (financial combines moved in as well. (On the same page there is a picture of a demon astride of two prone government officials and a fat military officer walking away with his eyes semi-closed, Under the picture is the following caption: “Political cartoon satirizing the growth of military expenses (1931). The government is being crushed by a demon (the government’s financial deficit), while the military pays no heed”.

**My comment:** On the surface there seems little to complain about the ARK’s first and second drafts. Based on this description, Japanese dissatisfaction with political parties, the rise of the military, and the subsequent Japanese seizure of Manchuria seem to be a logical and inevitable result. This conclusion seems warranted when a world depression, economic nationalism, and the Hamaguchi Cabinet’s inept decision to return Japan to the tight money gold standard of the time augmented this discontent. However, the Tsukuru Kai’s interpretation, in contrast to Chugaku Shakai makes the Kwantung Army’s seizure of Manchuria a justifiable reaction to the “bad things” Chinese were doing in violation of Japanese treaty rights. Furthermore, ARK authors considered Japan’s action was even more justifiable because of the fear of Russia and the expansion northward of the KMT.

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Three points need to be made. First, in 1931, the Soviet Union was not a serious threat because it was too preoccupied with carrying out the first five-year plan that entailed forced collectivization of farms. To overcome that strong opposition six to seven million farmers were killed. The Kwantung Army’s action was less a preemptive strike to take Manchuria because of an immediate Soviet threat than a long-range goal to strengthen Japan’s positions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and to control completely all of Manchuria before the Nationalist Government might prevent an expansion of Japanese rule.

Second, ARK authors insidiously used the expression “Kuomintang” [Nationalist Party]. This expression misleads students into thinking that only a Chinese radical political party, not a National Government, was extending its right to rule over historic Chinese territory in Manchuria. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek on several instances had let it be known to Japanese officials that his government would not interfere with existing Japanese special interests, but planned to be responsible for Manchurian foreign affairs.30) Third, and far from the Nationalist Government being manipulated by the Comintern and Soviet Government as an earlier ARK passage had claimed, Chiang’s government actually severed relations with the Soviet Union between 1929 and late 1932. Instead, it focused on its number one priority of destroying the CCP by a third extermination campaign against it. In that sense there was no need for a premature action by the Kwantung Army.

Accordingly, it was much closer to the truth that the Kwantung Army and Japanese ultranationalists did not want to accept Japanese multilateralists’ view that Manchuria was Chinese territory. In 1905, Ito Hirobumi stated strongly to Army Chief of Staff Kodama Gentarō that, “Manchuria is in no respect Japanese territory. It is simply part of Chinese territory. Since there are no grounds for exercising our authority in an area which is not our territory, there is no need to create something like a colonial ministry chiefly led by the military to handle such duties.”31)

The TAC correctly judged that these ARK passages would mislead junior high school students and anger China and Taiwan. Accordingly, the second ARK draft corrected some historical inaccuracies. Authors decreased the population of Japanese who lived in Manchuria, eliminated the implication that Japanese rights in China were achieved without force by a treaty negotiated between equals, and finally admitted the murder of Chang Tso-lin in 1928—but was vague about it and other Japanese provocation. The Tsukuru Kai’s justification for the Kwantung Army is not as blatant as in the first draft, but it retained the assertion that Japan felt its rights in China and national interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Nationalist Party were threatened. The textbook account still tells students indirectly and directly of Japan’s need for Manchuria as a lifeline for needed natural resources and Japan’s surplus population.

In criticizing the Japanese Government for not acting more resolutely against Chinese and China the ARK adopted two attitudes. First, it was still defending the seventy-year-old view that the Foreign Ministry and Japanese Government were not adequately defending Japanese interests. The Tsukuru Kai neglected to emphasize that here was another example of contemporary Japanese dual diplomacy—a condition that proved very harmful to future Japanese diplomacy right down to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Second, the ARK historical approach makes it possible in subsequent paragraphs to justify Japan’s subsequent actions in Manchuria. In regard to TAC objection 89, ARK authors slighted
reference to Japan’s economic problems in favor of directing its dissatisfaction toward political party government for a defective foreign policy. It was true in a sense, but the assertion does not deal with how Japanese unilateralists used popular discontent to achieve their aims in Manchuria. The text also fails to recognize that higher-level officers in the Kwantung Army had coveted the annexation of Manchuria for several years, and Ishihara Kanji and Itagaki Seishiro for three years, before the Manchurian Incident. It omits the key point that high-level army officers back in Tokyo not only had an awareness of the Kwantung Army’s planning prior to the China Incident, but also that Army headquarters’ was involved in planning for a forced seizure of Manchuria in late 1932. In that context, we should note that as part of the Japanese occupation army in Korea under General Honjo’s command moved quickly into Manchuria to assist the Kwantung Army without orders from Tokyo.

Conclusions

TAC and myself found much of the first draft content full of historical errors, one-sided interpretations, exaggerations, and selective omissions. This kind of erroneous historical writing would not occur if the Tsukuru Kai were interested in teaching youth historical truth rather than ideology. The salient features of the first draft of the ARK especially the first draft, and its authors were:

1. There is a very transparent agenda of teaching a right wing nationalistic interpretation of prewar Japan that justifies the nation’s colonial and imperialist past. It does so by adopting a nineteenth century Bismarkian view of relations among states as purely that of power politics. Four examples are the justification for the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the annexation of Korea, and the Mukden or Manchurian Incident.

2. A strong theme running through the first draft is that of poor Japan as a victim, not a victimizer—a red flag to peoples who experienced Japan’s imperialism, colonialism, and military campaigns.

3. The authors shape interpretations by omission and selective commission of facts, exaggeration, overstatement, and one-sided interpretations—most of which TAC discovered. For examples, I cite the gradual penetration and annexation of Korea, the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, the interpretation of China’s political order after the First Chinese Revolution, the overall interpretation of how WW I differed from previous and subsequent wars and peace conferences, and the background to and justification for the Mukden Incident.

4. Critics of my analysis will correctly say that a junior high school textbook cannot go into detail necessary to achieve rigorous historical scholarship. Others may point a finger at poor government-authored textbooks in North and South Korea and the People’s Republic of China, or even deficiencies in textbook writing in the United States. My answers to these criticisms are the rather detailed treatments and statistics of textbook content when it is convenient to the Tsukuru Kai to extol and justify Japan’s events of 1894–1910 and 1928–1931, but to be conspicuously silent when facts and statistics would be counter-productive. For example, the Tsukuru Kai did not objectively put Chinese demonstrations,
boycotts, and violence in the period 1925 through 1931 into a background that often was in response to Japanese exploitation, violence, and aggression. Furthermore, the content that I have cited from other textbooks shows it is possible to provide adequate, objective content to discuss the same historical topics and events.

5. As might be imagined the authors are not careful historians. TAC found 43 places to object to first draft content. I counted more than forty examples of historical inaccuracy. Approximately fifteen errors were results of the Tsukuru Kai presenting a later event as a fact that had occurred earlier to support their historical interpretation. This sloppy historical research demonstrated that the Tsukuru Kai was much more interested in supporting an ideological view than achieving historical accuracy.

6. After 1902, ARK content consistently fails to point out that American, British, and Chinese opposition to Japanese actions were based on Japan’s violations of the Open Door and denial of China’s sovereignty.

7. ARK content never really acknowledges that historically for Chinese and the Nationalist Government, Manchuria was an inextricable part of China. By such a historical account students are unprepared for Chinese, American, and British hostile reactions to the Mukden Incident of 1931. On the contrary, the intensity of Chinese opposition is difficult for students to understand and America is seen as strangely uncooperative and guilty of supporting Chinese opposition to Japan's foreign policy during the late 1920s. Akira Iriye wrote that from 1925 through 1931 Shidehara Kijūrō and Tanaka Gi'ichi thought ties with Great Britain and the U.S. were important, “but they saw nothing contradictory between these ties and pursuing an independent course of action in China and Manchuria.”

8. The second draft is still unacceptable history. Over all, the ideal of historical truth is sacrificed to ideological objectives. Biased ARK content would be tolerable, even acceptable to a dedicated, objective junior high school teacher, if Japan’s educational system and entrance examinations could encourage greater critical thinking about history rather than memorization of content that is considered to be truthful because it is a textbook. In such a case there would be room for teachers to adopt at least one other textbook and to circulate handouts from other textbooks to present different historical views to Japan’s youth. Because that is not the case, criticisms of foreign scholars and political leaders, beyond Koreans and Chinese, that the ARK is unacceptable are justified.

The Tsukuru Kai premise that teaching dark aspects of Japanese history undermines patriotism and creates masochistic Japanese is fundamentally false. They are correct that today’s students have a weak knowledge of their own history, but the reasons have nothing to do with a “masochistic” teaching of Japanese history. Based on teaching 21 years in Japan and thirty years in America, I have never encountered a student who thought teaching historical truth undermined patriotism. Because students are young and idealistic, they want to be taught the truth of their historical past in order to become more informed citizens and to create an even better nation. If they are not taught historical truth, they cannot understand the depth and anger of Chinese, Koreans, Taiwanese,
Southeast Asians, and peoples of other nations for past atrocities, exploitation, and wrongs. Not familiar with the historical past, present day resentments there produce anger and prejudice among Japanese young and middle aged and escalate more hard feeling between Japanese and other peoples. That attitude fuels more anger and prejudice abroad and so the cycle continues as it did between Germany and France for centuries.

Let’s take one example only to prove my assertion. At present the Japanese mass media and populace are justifiably infuriated at North Korea for abducting Japanese to serve its national interest. This was an unconscionable and cruel act. My heart goes out to the families who have suffered from this injustice. But when one thinks of at least 200,000 Koreans who were forced to come to Japan or to work in designated places in Korea or in Japanese occupied areas during World War II, Japanese righteousness, mass media demands, and anger produce two casualties. First, Korean suffering of the past is recalled; old wounds are re-opened; prejudice escalates; and an even more bitter attitude toward Japan is incited. Second, the Japanese government is sidetracked from the more important priority of advancing the six nations’ negotiations to dismantle a North Korean missile programs and atomic bomb production that threatens millions of Japanese lives. Japanese are too prone to forget the historical past; Koreans and Chinese, as well as other peoples, are too inclined to hang on to their victimized past.

Of course, Chinese and Koreans, themselves, should write less prejudiced and inflammatory school textbooks regarding Japan. The *Tsukuru Kai* is correct in their criticisms of those government-authored textbooks. The two Koreas and Chinese government should also teach truthful, objective, and non-inflammatory history to its youth and take increased measures to forgive the past, increase mutual understanding, engage in confidence building, and improve bilateral and regional relations. At the same time, Japan cannot just rely on Article IX of the Constitution to prove it is a peaceful nation or boast of its generous ODEA assistance to East and Southeast Asians. Instead the government, schools, mass media, think tanks, sports groups, and NGOs should take every step possible to improve mutual respect, good will, and international understanding. The present situation simply produces a vicious cycle of hatred and prejudice that does not serve well East and Southeast Asian prosperity, order, and peace.

Instead, the *Tsukuru Kai* fuels nationalism, misunderstanding, prejudice, and anger by casting Japanese as victims and sanitizing and beautifying 1868–1960 diplomatic history. It provokes recrimination and sends up a red flag in their foreign neighbors’ hearts and minds. *ARK* content leading up to the Mukden Incident of 1931 unfolds events and actions between 1928 and 1931 as if they could not have taken a different tack because of domestic and foreign developments. No doubt these were tumultuous and difficult times that led to extreme solutions in Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Even the United States and Great Britain’s democratic and capitalistic foundations were shaken before they adopted a much greater government intervention of Keynesian policies to revive their economies. But instead of justifying Japan’s actions of those times, the *Tsukuru Kai* should help students understand what deficiencies of that time led Japanese into a mistaken emphasis on ultranationalism, militarism, and State Shintoism, military domination of the government, a retreat from a budding Taisho liberalism, and imperialism and colonialism.

The *Tsukuru Kai* continued to provide prewar interpretations for the background and
results of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, to justify the annexation of Korea, and did not really retreat from the fundamental goal of justifying the eventual seizure of Manchuria. In doing so they conveniently ignored postwar scholarship and selected isolated segments of Hata Ikuhiko’s writings with which they agreed and ignored repeatedly his critical judgments to suit their right wing ideological beliefs and interpretations. This distortion of history is carried out by the ARK authors almost seventy-five years after the Manchurian Incident and countless scholarly writings by non-Marxist Japanese and foreign scholars that have debunked the propagandistic line of Japanese unilateralists of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Scholars may honestly disagree on the same facts, but the Tsukuru Kai’s repeated pattern of distortion of modern Japanese diplomatic history is completely unacceptable. In striking contrast with the ARK and other right wing apologists for contemporary Japanese behavior, Hata refutes not only the old argument of Manchuria as a lifeline for Japan, but also argues that the Kwantung Army and ultranationalists forced history by their actions and propaganda regarding the indispensability of Manchuria for Japan. He wrote:

It remains doubtful, however, whether Japanese ‘rights in Manchuria’ were of such enormous importance to Japan or so critically threatened as to justify a response by military action ... Even Colonel Komoto, the plotter of Chang Tso-lin’s assassination, admitted that the economic pressure felt by the Japanese residents in Manchuria was essentially due to their inability to compete with the Chinese immigrants’ low standard of living, that it was not due to the Chiang government’s anti-Japanese policy.

Seen in this light, the Manchurian incident was really the product of a false ‘crisis in Manchuria and Mongolia’ (Man-Mo no kiki). The Kwantung Army, as well as Japanese colonists favoring the use of force, worked hard to convince the Japanese government, the military high command, and the public at large that such a crisis existed.

Were the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931 and annexation of Manchuria spontaneous movements caused by the alleged threat of the Soviet Union, the Chinese Nationalist Government’s intent to eliminate Japan’s special interests, and the inability of political party governments to deal adequately with the depression and these external threats? Was the subsequent deterioration in relations between the U.S. and China with Japan because they failed to respond sympathetically to legitimate Japanese demands? Or did these events occur because Japanese ultranationalists, hawkish militarists, and an increasingly indoctrinated Japanese public had a different conception of the directions in which Japan should move, and, thereby forced historical developments? The last textbook I quoted on the Manchurian Incident did not think so. What moves history?

Ultimately people make history, especially those who make history because they move it from a nationalistic diplomacy based on real politick and power politics. (The Iraq War is one recent example.) Most historians believe that various right wing nationalists, ambitious military leaders, and military and civilian leaders, the so-called “unilateralist’s” actions in Japan during this period manipulated public opinion, weakened and intimidated political parties, made Japan’s actions in Manchuria seem justifiable, and
moved Japan toward the imperialistic ambitions of the Kwantung Army not only in Manchuria, but also beyond. The same judgment can be made for the annexation of Korea and events in China.

Had Koreans and Chinese been familiar with the even more biased first draft they would have been exceedingly angry. Japan also had become an imperialistic country, but one finds no criticism of that development in the ARK. What the authors fail to appreciate is that Japan was characterized repeatedly by dual diplomacy by the unilateralists on the one hand and by the multilateralists on the other hand. For that reason Japanese diplomacy and actions during this period and the 1930s was difficult for foreign countries of the time and amateur historians of the present with a hidden agenda to understand. The unilateralists’ arbitrary and unauthorized activities were continually pulling the Japanese Government, the multilateralists, into having to endorse unilateralists’ actions ex post facto. Akira Iriye wrote of this period, “It cannot be doubted that Japan’s difficulties after 1928 were due to a great extent to its unilateral action before then.”

Similarly, Andrew Gordon wrote, “In sum, when the imperial democratic order came under fire at home and abroad at the end of the 1920s and the early 1930s, Japanese leaders chose emperor and empire over democracy. At a time of economic depression and international tension they chose exclusive empire over cooperative imperialism. They abandoned the democratic path of parliamentary role for a reinforced authoritarian politics.” Multilateralists such as Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijûrō, interested in international cooperation were not so unhappy with America’s policies during this period, but the unilateralists were.

The Ministry of Education’s authorization of the ARK raises the question of why it felt compelled to authorize a fundamentally flawed textbook that was unacceptable because it used history to achieve an ideological objective. The reasons the Ministry departed so fundamentally from the direction it had established for history textbook content in the 1990s would make a most interesting scholarly article.

Notes
5) This past year a younger brother objected strongly to a draft I sent him on racial discrimination in the United States for my course on “What is an American?” He thought I should not be washing America’s dirty laundry before a Japanese audience that also has been guilty of racial discrimination. I answered by telling him that I am a teacher, not a propagandist, and that my students would not believe me if I just
talked of America’s merits. He subsequently agreed!


8) Ibid., 64.


10) See Fujioka for a description of their and other right wing groups’ efforts. Fujioka, 65.


14) Duus, 141.

15) Ibid., 142.

16) Jansen, 431–32.


18) Jansen, 432.


20) The textbook expressed sympathetically in a footnote: “The Chinese government was forced to borrow huge sums of money from foreign banks to pay this colossal sum.”

21) Jansen, 433.


28) Ibid., 454.


35) Gordon, 181.