The Bakumatsu Political Debate

The opening of the Japan to the West in 1853 began a process which economically, militarily, and politically destroyed the Tokugawa bakufu. A number of the domains demanded increased participation in national affairs. The imperial court in Kyoto was politicized. The political framework which had prevailed for over 200 years crumbled. The bakufu was no longer the national government. A new rearrangement, and a new definition of the nation, was required.

The bakumatsu period, fifteen years of intense political debate and civil strife, saw the working out of this new political alignment. In the end the bakufu was discarded, as were the domains. The court, under the control of progressive and tough-minded men, formed a new national government. It became the motive force behind Japan’s rapid industrialization and development into a modern and powerful nation.

The Meiji imperial system was not inevitable. There were other possible solutions to the central problem facing Japan during the period after 1853: how to unite the nation. Basically there were two alternatives. On the one hand were advocates of a more inclusive political union. Yokoi Shoñan’s notion of “government through open debate” (koği seitai) provided ideological underpinning for this position. There were calls for “unity between the court and the bakufu” (kobu gattai), for a “confederation of daimyō” (reppan doñei), and even for the establishment of a British-style parliamentary system. Katsu Kaishū, a bakufu retainer, is particularly known for his attempt in the 1860s to set up a national assembly so as to enable a more equal sharing of power between the bakufu, domains, and the imperial court.

On the other hand were supporters of a more exclusive arrangement. Political power, as Yoshida Shoín put it, should be the possession of one man (ikkun banmin). While this buttressed the movement to overthrow the Tokugawa “feudal” regime and create a centralized nation state under direct imperial rule, the argument was also available to those who sought to strengthen the bakufu. Oguri Tadamasa is the best known of these advocates of Tokugawa absolutism, but Fukuzawa Yukichi also issued a call for what he called a “Taikun monarchy.”

This paper deals with Fukuzawa Yukichi’s political thought in the period immediately before the collapse of Tokugawa rule. It takes the form of commentary and translations of several documents written by Fukuzawa in 1866 and 1867, including a
memorial advocating the subjugation of Cho¯shu¯. Fukuzawa was, of course, one of the leading experts on the West, and beginning in 1864 an official of the Tokugawa regime. He translated diplomatic correspondence and gleaned information useful to the government from newspapers and other foreign sources. In 1866 he published his first major book, *Seiyo¯ jijo¯* (Conditions in the West) and in 1867 founded Keio Gijuku. And despite later protestations of disinterest, he was passionately committed to the Tokugawa cause. His memorial sought the means to crush the Cho¯shu¯ “rebels” and thereafter he refined his thinking about the need to re-structure Japan’s government as a monarchy under the leadership of the shogun. By 1868 he may well have given up the bakufu as a lost cause, but his ideas about monarchy continued to inform his understanding of the new Meiji “monarchy.”

**The Memorial**

The years 1865 and 1866 were disastrous for the bakufu. A second expedition to chastise Cho¯shu¯ had been proclaimed in the fourth month of 1865. Actual military campaigns, however, did not begin until over a year later, in the sixth month of 1866. The insistent demands of the foreign powers complicated matters. The foreign nations, further, were often at odds with one another. The French supported the idea of a second Cho¯shu¯ expedition. The policy of Leon Roches centered around strengthening bakufu authority in the eventual hopes of obtaining extensive trading privileges. The British, reacting both to the French support and to the obvious weakness of the bakufu, began to develop sympathies with the southwestern domains, Cho¯shu¯ and Satsuma. These two, finally, began to develop sympathies with each other. In the first month of 1866, Sakamoto Ryo¯ma mediated a secret alliance; both parties agreed to cooperate in an anti-bakufu policy.

Political disorder contributed directly to economic anxiety and social unrest. The commencement of foreign trade created further dislocations. The price of rice skyrocketed and with it popular discontent. There were more riots and outbursts of commoner violence in 1866 than in any other year of the rule of the Tokugawa shoguns. When, in the fifth month of 1866, large-scale rural uprisings and urban riots took place in Hyogo, Osaka, and Edo, in which impoverished commoners wrecked the establishments of the rich and powerful, Katsu Kaishu¯ lamented that the bakufu was about “to collapse from within.”

Social unrest and foreign pressure buffeted the bakufu, but it was “sectionalism” that threatened to destroy it. One by one the domains found excuses not to contribute to the bakufu’s war effort against Cho¯shu¯. Satsuma, in particular, refused to send troops into the field, despite repeated bakufu and even imperial orders. And when the Tokugawa troops did take to the field, they were soundly defeated. The death of shogun Iemochi in the seventh month of 1866 further blackened the bakufu’s prospects, although it did provide a pretext to temporarily halt the hostilities. A cold war ensured. In the eighth month, Yoshinobu succeeded to the headship of the Tokugawa family and later, in the twelfth month, to the office of shogun. His advisers in Edo,
including Oguri Tadamasa, Ogasawara Nagamichi and Kurimoto Jo¯un, urged him to cooperate with Roches and carry out a series of military and administrative reforms designed to strengthen the bakufu. In the sixth month of 1866, Oguri explained his plan to Katsu Kaishu¯: “Since it is now a dangerous time for the bakufu, we are borrowing money from France and are asking for a warship and seven smaller ships to be purchased on time payments. Once these are obtained our first task is to subjugate Chošu¯ and next, to smash Satsuma. When we have done this there will be no more daimyo who meddle in the affairs of the bakufu. Taking advantage of this situation we will strip away all the land from the daimyo and create a gun-ken (centralized) state.”

Katsu was dismayed by Oguri’s vision of autocratic Tokugawa rule. His position was that the shogun should share rather than monopolize political authority. Soon after his meeting with Oguri, Katsu recorded his view of the crisis of 1866: “Since the times are such that one must enter into international relations as a united nation, the creation of a gun-ken (centralized) state is only natural. However, as to the means to that end, the Tokugawa family should not, simply for its own sake, crush all the other daimyo and by itself institute unified authority and rule over the nation. If the Tokugawa family sincerely thinks of Japan, it should voluntarily bring itself down and reduce its own lands. It should encourage those who are efficient in handling the affairs of the state to be placed into positions of actual power. It is a ridiculous thing to think of hating Satsuma and Chošu¯and wanting to crush them.”

Fukuzawa’s memorial must be placed within this context. Originally a retainer of the Nakatsu domain, in the tenth month of 1864 he accepted official employment with the Tokugawa government as a translator in Office of Foreign Affairs. Contrary to the “non-partisan” image later cultivated in his autobiography, Fukuzawa was in fact a passionate supporter of the bakufu. It was, perhaps, the lesser of two evils, but Fukuzawa clearly felt that the Tokugawa regime was Japan’s only hope of progressing along the lines of “civilization and enlightenment” (bunmei kaika). He saw the impending civil war in Japan in simple terms: the bakufu was on the side of order and progress and Chošurepresented chaos and retrogression. Privy to diplomatic correspondence and foreign news (one of his jobs was to translate the foreign press for the Tokugawa foreign office), Fukuzawa was also aware that the bakufu was in a precarious position. News of the outbreak of the “Four-Sided War” on the 7th day of the sixth month, 1866, quickly reached Fukuzawa’s ears. His source of information was probably his patron since the days of the Kanrin-maru voyage to San Francisco, Admiral Kimura Yoshitaka. By the 2nd day of the seventh month, both Fukuzawa and Kimura knew that the war was not going well. On the 26th Kimura was ordered to Edo Castle and appointed Acting Minister of the Navy; that day also brought the hushed news of the death of Iemochi, the Shogun, who had died in Osaka on the 20th. According to Kimura’s diary, Fukuzawa visited his house that night to discuss these turn of events. Then on the 29th, just before Kimura’s departure for Osaka, Fukuzawa brought his memorial and asked Kimura to forward it to bakufu officials in
Osaka. Included with the memorial was a draft of *Seiyo jijo* (Conditions in the West) which Fukuzawa was writing at the time.

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**Memorial Concerning the Subjugation of Chošu**

The deluded notion to “respect the emperor and expel the barbarians” (*sonno-joi*) has spread throughout the country since the time when treaties were first concluded with foreign nations. Due to this, great turmoil has arisen within the country. The court has been constantly troubled. In the end it would seem that the meaning of this slogan has nothing to do with respecting the emperor nor with expelling the foreigners. Rather it is only a tricky pretext to give wandering vagrants a chance to seek sustenance and further a chance for various daimyo who hold sinister designs to deviate further and further from the instructions of the Tokugawa family. There is no need to prove this. The evidence is obvious. Chošu is the number one rebel among the various lords and has begun mutinous plots. Therefore the plans now to attack and punish Chošu are most welcome. Thanks to this one event we can expect that the Tokugawa family will be brought closer to the day of its revitalization.

The current endeavor to attack and punish the Chošu rebels presents a good chance to make everything right once again. I pray that now we should resolutely decide to subjugate Chošu in one fell swoop and with this momentum go on to reassert control over the various lords and Kyoto, so that the bakufu will be able to conduct international relations without interference. Naturally there is no need to delve into military secrets, but being deeply moved by the unprecedented events I feel that I must relate the following two or three articles in connection with the present expedition to punish Chošu, even though I have never before submitted a memorial.

I. Block avenues of communication between the Chošu rebels and the foreign powers! Announce the charges against Chošu to the world!

As mentioned above regarding the true intentions of the Chošu rebels, the *sonno-joi* which they advocate has been, right from the outset, only a pretext. Two years ago, even after their defeat at Shimonoseki, Chošu men repeatedly approached foreigners [for assistance]. They endeavored to send students overseas; they invited dishonest merchants to Shimonoseki and other places to carry on secret trade; and they purchased much weaponry. In fact a prohibition of secret trade is specified in the treaties and the consuls try firmly to enforce it (previously the year before last the English consul issued an edict to English ships concerning this). In general, however, edicts and the such cannot prevent the abuse of the treaties by greedy and dishonest merchants. Moreover since at this time Chošu has determined to make ready for the inevitable, it is ever more necessary to devise a policy, poor thought it may be, for us [the bakufu] to purchase weapons from the foreigners, to borrow money, and if it comes to the worst, to depend upon the vagrant foreigners by employing foreign war-
ships, etc. Since this is treading the same path as the Chinese in suppressing the Taiping rebels, it is difficult to forecast what the eventual outcome may be. This is, I feel, something which must be considered very carefully.

Concerning this, at the present time several warships have been dispatched to Nagato and Suo as strict control measures to prevent foreign ships from approaching these two coasts. Furthermore if small boats from the Choššū rebels should approach the foreign ships, they will be immediately apprehended. Six years ago during the American civil war, England secretly sent the southern rebels the warship Alabama and also furnished weapons, etc., thereby causing the north great embarrassment. Looking at this precedent, the fact that Choššū now carries on intercourse with foreign countries may well lead later to complicated difficulties. In this point I think one should take special consideration.

Furthermore, in connection with the proclamation of the sins of Choššū to the world, we have already sent to the consul of each country a 14 point statement of the charges against Choššū. However, as I mentioned before, Choššū is dispatching students overseas to go around and campaign on Choššū’s behalf. They will necessarily aim only at Choššū’s profit, proclaiming to everyone far-fetched opinions to their own advantage and of course slandering the bakufu’s position. In particular, there is the faction which advocates the idea current now in newspapers of a daimyo confederation. Being not satisfied with the present government’s management of affairs, this argument holds that the existing treaties with foreign nations should be annulled and that the various daimyo should form a confederation much like the German confederation. The various lords of the new confederation should then individually conclude treaties. It seems that the British envoy Parkes and others are secretly in agreement with this proposal. Furthermore Satsuma and other domains are sending quite a number of students overseas and all of them advocate the daimyo confederation. Naturally overseas they meet together with and trust the Choššū “students.” If they go all over preaching and writing in the newspapers about the daimyo confederation argument they may temporarily influence public opinion, and I dare say that it might change the course of each government’s deliberations with regard to Japan. If by any chance something like this should happen, needless to say, a civil war would outbreak and all of Japan and the fortunes of the Tokugawa family would be in turmoil, resulting in an irrevocable condition whose harm would be greater in comparison than Choššū’s present treason. Immediately we must do something in order to prevent this from happening.

Given due consideration, at this time a resident minister should be dispatched to the capital city of each nation. It is a general custom to conduct diplomatic business with nations with which a treaty has been signed by mutually exchanging ambassadors; however, we have so far put of the obligation to send a resident minister [immediately after the conclusion of treaties]. Since we have only the consul of the foreign nations to pass on our intentions to the various foreign governments, naturally there is the danger that discrepancies in our intentions will occur. This is due to the impro-
priety of not having equal relations with the foreign nations. Due to this, the people of each country might somehow think that new treaties should be concluded since their government and ours do not seem to be equal. Therefore, now if we send a resident minister to England, France, America and Russia in order to carry our diplomatic business directly with these governments, all of the negotiations will thereby be thorough and efficient. Once the appearance of equality between each nation is possessed, the public feeling will become tranquil and I think that they will thereby have doubts concerning the arguments of the students over the daimyo confederation question.

In this way if we send resident ministers to every country, diplomacy will become in all ways more convenient and our intentions to the other countries more clear. It is customary for foreign nations to fully discuss all matters. Even though it is difficult to decide the truth or falseness of opinions in newspapers, everyone respects the written word and if the argument is persuasive, opinions in newspapers may temporarily influence a government’s deliberations. Therefore it is natural for the overseas students sent out by the previously mentioned domain to use the power of newspapers. Therefore it is imperative to have a newspaper announcement about the dispatching of resident ministers, and proclaiming our nation’s justification of its views, including, of course, a refutation of the daimyo confederation argument. Turning the tables on the Chošhu rebels, we should announce one by one, even the most trivial, the charges, old and new, against them. Issue this every day and finally the world will all detest the sins of Chošhu, and it will come to be said that those who are friendly with Chošhu do not know honor nor dignity.

Finally, since decisions concerning the dispatching of these resident ministers cannot be reached in a short time, we should first of all secretly send agents to Yokohama who would, in accordance with the previously mentioned plan, repeatedly expound the sins of Chošhu and stress the views of the government through the medium of the Yokohama newspapers. Furthermore it is imperative that it be proclaimed there also by sending position papers out from time to time to the Russians and Dutch and to all interested in learning by attaching them to the newspapers.

II. Suppression of civil war by use of foreign aid

First of all, in connection with the impending expedition of chastisement, Chošhu has for the past two years been secretly making military preparations. They have westernized both their weaponry and their military tactics. Furthermore the people of the domain are desperately hostile to the bakufu. Therefore they are not an insignificant enemy. Already there is the example of the rout of Ii’s and Sasakahara’s forces. No matter how many soldiers the various daimyo have in Japanese style, they are of no use and their numbers merely nominal.

In connection with this, although the Shogun’s military forces, both infantry and artillery are prepared, the Chošhu rebels will be fighting desperately a defensive war to protect their land. Moreover they have an advantage in weaponry. At present, with
the strength each side possesses, I am deeply worried over the outcome of the war. Such being the case, we should decide to call on the help of the military power of foreign countries and thereby in one effort smash the two provinces of Nagato and Suo. Of course we must take into consideration the fact that relying upon foreign military power may cause popular unrest and that the expenses incurred will be enormous. This argument may be true in times of peace when there is no particular cause for popular unrest. Now, however, with the impending fear that suddenly Japan may be involved in a civil war, and considering the fact popular unrest is already at its zenith, the above consideration should be dropped. No longer is public sentiment swayed by the various ideas of the world — only military power can control the nations. All nominal principles are worthless in the face of military power. For example Akechi Mitsuhide forced Oda Nobunaga into suicide and immediately by imperial proclamation received Oda’s position as shogun, and likewise when Toyotomi Hideyoshi successfully had Mitsuhide killed the realm immediately belonged to the Toyotomi family, the emperor having rewarded even this — and there was no one in the world who voiced doubts. This was all due to military power. Therefore, now at this time the Chošu rebels are opposing the government forces in actual battle and if by any chance they should win, they would then change their name “enemy of the court” (chofeki) to “supporter of the court” (kinno) and graciously give to the government the name “enemy of the court.” Such being the case, it depends entirely upon the strength and weakness of military power in order to correctly be named. Such things as imperial proclamations, similar to the edicts of the Roman pope, are merely embellishments to military power.

Since there is no end to adhering to such a practice, all the more the Chošu punishment is a great cause to both nominally and in fact carry out a punitive expedition against the sinner who has offended both god and man — and there is not a single doubt concerning this.

Accordingly it should be resolved without hesitation to crush the two provinces of Nagato and Suo with the help of foreign military power, and furthermore to direct the banner of subjugation directly against the various daimyo who are of a different opinion [than the bakufu].) With this one action I think that we must exhibit power to the extent that it completely changes the feudal system throughout all of Japan.

Concerning the purchase of weapons and the employment of foreign military power there is the consideration of expense, but here too there is nothing to worry about. This is because the income of the two provinces of Nagato and Suo is at present annually 1,000,000 pyo—which is in gold 2,000,000 ryo. After crushing Chošu—a profit of 2,000,000 ryo will forever be ours. Therefore now if we borrow 20,000,000 ryo and pay the interest, in 20 years the loan will be repaid in full. Of course this is not to say that such a great sum as 20,000,000 ryo is needed immediately. Our country is different from the various countries of the West in that we have never before had a law concerning the issuing of national securities. Therefore it is inconvenient to amass together a large amount of money at one time. When the Chošu subjugation affair is
over and all taken care of, when the 2,000,000 ryo comes through every year as excepted, and with the expectation to negotiate concerning the sending of mercenary soldiers to foreign countries, everything will be settled and there will be nothing to worry about whatsoever.

Almost all of the Western nations issue national security bonds. England, for example, in 1862 issued securities of 890,000,000 pounds. In that year the English government’s revenue was only around 70,000,000 pounds. Therefore the proportion for one year was an income of 700 ryo to a debt of 89,000 ryo. Looking at it in this way, Japan’s government can be thought of as having the richest treasury in the world. It would please me greatly if my humble opinions be looked at and adopted. Furthermore in order to verify the trends of external and internal affairs, since the middle of the 8th month of last year . . . . rest missing.

From Taikun Monarchy to Meiji Monarchy

Fukuzawa envisioned the shogun at the center of a centralized nation state committed to a program of Westernization. The emperor in Kyoto was likened to the Pope in Rome: a religious figure with no real political powers. The draft version of Seiyo jijo, which Fukuzawa appended to his memorial, offers clues to the sort of government system Fukuzawa thought best for Japan. He began with a statement of six features of civilized politics:

In Europe, civilized politics include the following six articles:
1. Freedom: Citizens may do what they please and their free will should not be constrained by law.
2. Justice: Citizens may depend upon law for protection against wrongdoing.
4. Education: [The government] should cultivate human talent
5. Health and Welfare: People should be protected from cold and famine
6. Arts and Science: [no text]

Fukuzawa then went to list four types of political systems:
1. Monarchy: Decisions are made in the name of the government in which there is one monarch and a fixed set of laws.
2. Republic: A leader is selected by the people without reference to wealth or status. Also called government by confederation (gošhu seiji).
3. Aristocracy: Government is carried out by an assembly of the wealthy and respected members of society.
4. Autocracy: The ruler is a despot; orders are issued arbitrarily in the name of the ruler.

The next section went on to praise England which to Fukuzawa was obviously the idea form of government: its monarchy give it central authority; its parliament provided democratic input; and the aristocracy provided stability. The text implied that
England could serve as a useful model for political reform in Japan. At this stage, however, Fukuzawa felt that the Tokugawa family should play the role as national monarch.

In 1866, Fukuzawa saw two possible routes for Japan’s future. First was a daimyo confederation, led by Cho¯ shu¯ and Satsuma. While these domains outwardly advocated an imperial restoration, Fukuzawa equated their “confederate” style of politics with republicanism—and a republicanism which would not be able to provide the basis for order among the more than 200 feudal lords. The example of the American Civil War was all too obvious. His hopes rested instead on monarchy. This conclusion is clearly stated in a letter written to Fukuzawa Einosuke on the 7th day of the tenth month, 1866.10)

Greetings. After you set sail on the 25th of the last month the weather has been fine. I can imagine that by now your are making your way through the Indian Ocean. All is well here. Three or five days ago people from Nakatsu domain arrived and they were all pleased to learn that everything is also well with you.

I have been given informal orders to go to America and if so ordered I will depart at the end of the twelfth month or before the 10th day of the first month [of 1867]. This time I intend to go aboard the mailship line which has opened between San Francisco and Hong Kong. I will take that ship as far as San Francisco and then cross over the Isthmus of Panama and go on to New York. It will take me around 45 days between Japan and New York.

After you departed conditions in Edo have gradually improved. At the Kaiseijo a Dutchman named [W. K.] Garatama has been employed and there is talk of the need to hire English and French instructors as well.

Drill in lance and sword has been terminated at the Kobusho [Military Academy] and a rifle unit called the Yugetai has been formed. In connection with this, it seems that the wearing of long and short swords will be ended as I have requested. It gives me the greatest pleasure that this autumn I will sell off my long and short swords. I can imagine the day when you will see none of them.

Two or three days ago it was announced that civil and military officials will be free to choose if they wish to wear tight-fitting drawers or not. When you return you will find that Japan has completely changed and you won’t see anyone wearing long and short swords. As for myself, in the near future I am hoping to build a house without tatami rooms. But I don’t have any “money” — pity me please!

The argument on behalf of establishing a confederation of daimyo is still very much alive. I have spoken in confidence about this matter to [Kawaji] Taro¯ and [Nakamura] Keisuke [two other bakufu students sent to England; Kawaji Taro¯, the grandson of Kawaji Toshiakira, and Nakamura Keiyu] and I would also like to hear what you think of my ideas. If the idea to establish a daimyo confederation goes forward, I realize that will make the country very “free,” but ‘This freedom is, I know, the freedom to fight among Japanese.’ [original in English] No matter how I look at it, if we don’t set up a Taikun monarchy, the various daimyo will simply squabble among
themselves and our country’s civilization and enlightenment will not advance. Those people who today advocate the establishment of a daimyo confederation stand in the path of the country’s civilization and enlightenment; they are criminals of the world [whose activities] are unacceptable by the law of nations (bankoku no kocho). You should, by no means, ignore this debate. I end my letter here written in haste and only touching on important matters. Please write to me when you have the opportunity.”

III. Switching Loyalties?

Fukuzawa maintained he was a non-partisan in the Restoration. His memorial and his letters show him instead to be a strong supporter of the bakufu. During the Meiji period, however, his loyalties were clearly with the Meiji state and its chief symbol, the Meiji emperor. When did he switch loyalties and why? These are not easy questions. Fukuzawa’s Autobiography cannot be trusted and other sources are ambiguous. It is probably safe to conclude that Fukuzawa was willing to support any government — and any monarch — that promised to advance Japan’s civilization and enlightenment. In 1867 Fukuzawa wrote a series of idle jottings or “sayings” which provides some clues to the question of his personal loyalties:

“It is also said that: A feudal retainer who is loyal only to the lord of the country may well have a weak sense of patriotic service to the country. A Japanese national who desires to possess a true sense of patriotic service to the country will not engage in senseless debate over the pros and cons of opening the country but simply argue on behalf of a strong and wealthy open country policy. Take this example. At the time of a village festival, people in the village freely spend money so as to ensure that their village is not outdone by neighboring villages. They decorate things and if the village near-by holds a joruri play, they must hold one too and endeavor not in any way to be left behind. At times of legal disputes between villages, people exert themselves to protect the good name of their village not done out of any sense of service to the village head, but rather because they are concerned about the reputation of their village. Written large, this resembles patriotic service to one’s country. Now in Japan there are warriors who embody this spirit and who seek to enhance national authority and ensure that Japan not fall behind foreign countries. If foreign countries have the technology to produce artillery, then our country also must manufacture them. And if they have ways to enrich the country through commerce, then we too must learn those ways. True patriotic service to one’s country consists, therefore, of not falling behind other countries even by one step. Although it is natural that retainers exert themselves in loyalty to their lord, they may not know the proper way to perform loyal service. Stubbornly, retainers may fail to take a broader world view and think only of service to their lord. In times of emergency those who are determined to risk their lives are called ‘stupidly loyal.’ The worst example of a ‘stupidly loyal’ person is one whose loyalty is unwittingly but an act of flattery. This is both dangerous and senseless. Those who wish to call themselves retainers should take the idea of patriotic service to the country as their basic premise. Moreover, they should seek to save the country
by ensuring that their lord as well is not lacking in the great responsibility of patriotic service to the country. Only in this way can one be said to be a loyal and patriotic retainer.\(^{11}\)

According to this line of reasoning, horizontal ties of loyalty to country are more important than vertical ties of loyalty to any one particular lord. Fukuzawa’s loyalty was pragmatic. He would support the Tokugawa monarchy so long as the shogun promoted policies designed to promote wealth and power, civilization and enlightenment. And he would support the new Meiji “monarchy” if and when it took up this mandate.

**Notes**


5) Quoted in Nakajima, 210.

6) The translation is based on the text included in the *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshu*, vol. 20, 6–11. Prewar editions of Fukuzawa’s writings failed to include the memorial. A modern Japanese version of the memorial is included in Kano, Masanao, ed., *Bakumatsu shiso-shu*, *Nihon no shiso*, vol. 20, Chikuma Shobo; 1969, 313–323.

7) This is probably a reference to the series entitled “English Policy” published in the *Japan Times* in December 1865 and May 1866 by Ernest Satow which described the real rulers of Japan as the feudal lords and not the shogun, nor the emperor. The text was translated into Japanese as *Eikoku sakuron* and as a political pamphlet exerted great influence on political thinking in 1866.

8) By this Fukuzawa referred to and supported plans to rely upon French assistance to subdue Cho¯shu.

9) The draft of *Seiyo’jijo* is included in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshu*, vol. 19, 176–204.

10) *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshu*, vol. 17, 30–32. Einosuke’s real name was Wada Shinjiro. He was a Nakatsu retainer and student of Fukuzawa. Fukuzawa took the unusual step of adopting Wada as his younger brother in order that he qualify for a bakufu scholarship to study in England. The scholarship was limited to bakufu retainers and their dependents. Einosuke was on his way to England as Fukuzawa was writing.