

The Korean Student Movement in Japan and Japanese Anxiety, 1910—1923

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Although most Koreans who entered Japan after the annexation of Korea in 1910 were illiterate workers, Korean students in Tokyo were a source of concern to the Japanese authorities. Tokyo-based Korean students were the most vocal opponents of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. Student leaders sponsored many meetings and demonstrations at which they condemned Japanese colonialism and passionately advocated Korean independence.¹⁾ They also urged all Koreans living in Japan to unite and forged links with Japanese radicals such as socialists, communists and anarchists.²⁾ In the view of the security-conscious police, the vigorous activities of these Korean students were a menace to Japanese safety. Student-sponsored activities not only reinforced official resentment toward the Korean student community, but also generated an obsessive fear among them that militant student leaders, angry at Japanese colonialism, might attempt vengeful acts against ordinary Japanese people. When Tokyo-based Korean students started the Korean independence movement in 1919 and were found to have been involved in acts of sedition harmful to Japanese safety, these events appeared to confirm the Japanese élite's long-standing anxiety and contributed in no small way to their willingness to believe rumors of Korean rioting following the Great Kanto Earthquake (関東大震災) in 1923.

Although scholars agree that the responsibility for the mass murder of Korean residents in Japan following the Great Kanto Earthquake lay in the prejudice and fear that characterised the attitude of the Japanese ruling class toward Korean nationalists,³⁾ the issue of the Korean student movement in Japan during the pre-1923 period, which reinforced such strong anti-Korean feelings, has rarely been the subject of systematic analysis. A small number of scholars have examined Tokyo-based student-sponsored activities during that period, but their analysis does not focus on the question of how students heightened the unease felt by the Japanese élite.⁴⁾ This article provides an analysis of the Korean student movement between 1910 and 1923: how it took place, and how it reinforced Japanese anxiety, which culminated in the deaths of more than 6,000 Koreans in September 1923.

The Korean Student Movement in Japan after 1910

In regulating the Korean community in Japan, it is *Senjin* (鮮人) students whose deportment requires strict surveillance. They belong to the intellectual class in Korea, and will constitute the middle class [of Korea] in the future. Therefore, their thoughts are crucial to Japanese colonial rule. Given the recent activities of these students, many harbour feelings of hatred against Japanese..., and among

them there are few who do not wish for the independence of Korea. ..., they get together, hold meetings..., read newspapers and journals, and study international relations... These *Senjin* students constitute the vast majority (151 people) of Koreans requiring surveillance (要視察朝鮮人) (212 people). Most live in Tokyo.

Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka (内務省警保局保安課)
Chōsenjin Gaikyō, vol. 3 (朝鮮人概況第三)、1920.⁵⁾

While there can be little doubt that a sense of anger and frustration at Japanese colonial rule was a main source of Korean student activities after 1910, it is impossible to dissociate their activism from the environment in which it developed. There were two significant events which stimulated the development of the Korean student movement in the mid-1910s. One was Japan's entry into World War I (1914-1918) on the side of the Allied Powers.⁶⁾ The other was the infamous "Twenty-One Demands" of 1915.⁷⁾ Encouraged by Japan's conflict with Germany in the Far East, and the increasing tension between Japan and China, Korean militant students became more vocal in their demand for Korean independence.⁸⁾ In January 1915, for example, Yi Tonghwi (李璣雨) suggested financial support for Germany, and Song Chinu (榮鎮禹) argued that if Japan declared war on China, it would be defeated, because the United States, a country which had great sympathy for China, would enter the war on China's side.⁹⁾ Pak Igyu (朴珥圭) also believed that assistance would be forthcoming from the United States and concluded: "If we declare the resurgence of Korea before the world, how will the United States and China intervene? We should just hope for the earliest possible disruption of diplomatic relations between Japan and China."¹⁰⁾

From this time on, a marked increase occurred in the number of meetings and activities sponsored by Tokyo-based Korean students. Student leaders managed to preserve and strengthen a Korean sense of identity among their countrymen living in Japan. In late 1915, three Korean students at Meiji University were found to have smuggled more than three hundred copies of Pak Ŭnshik's (朴殷植) "Hanguk T'ongsa" (*The Painful History of Korea* 韓国痛史) into Japan and to have distributed them amongst other Korean students.¹¹⁾ *The Painful History of Korea* contained descriptions of Japanese aggression, cruelty and arbitrary acts in Korea and, in the view of the Japanese authorities, these remarks aroused and fanned anti-Japanese sentiments among Koreans living in Japan. A Home Ministry report cited the comment of Chōng Chongu (鄭鍾翊), then a student at Meiji University, who read this book and was impressed by the act of An Chunggŭn (安重根): "Due to his patriotic conduct in the murder of Prince Itō Hirobumi (伊藤博文), An Chunggŭn won fame and went down in history. If, therefore, I remove someone more prestigious than [Prince] Itō, I will win fame greater than An."¹²⁾ A speech made by a Waseda University student, Yi Kwangsu (李光洙), had stronger appeal, insofar as it provoked even greater official anxiety over the intentions of Korean students in Japan. At a student meeting held at the Korean Youth Men's Christian Association (Korean YMCA) in Tokyo in 1916, Yi Kwangsu claimed that although every person had a right to pursue their lives unfettered, Japanese colonialism denied this right to the Korean people. He concluded that:

At the present time, the Japanese are increasingly migrating to our land. They oppress our people and monopolise any profitable activities. Meanwhile, our people repress their tears, abandon their native lands where their ancestors have lived for generations and wander far across mountains and seas to foreign countries. Nothing could be more tragic than this. Nevertheless, the Japanese government, far from expressing regret, continues to deprive us of all freedom and power, claiming that its policies are beneficial. Can we [continue to] tolerate this?¹³⁾

By the late 1910s, these Korean students adopted a more militant attitude. They began to assume more openly an anti-Japanese posture, and there were frequent calls for Korean students to take direct action against their Japanese oppressors. Typical of this was a speech made by Chang Töksu (張德秀) in which he urged his audience to prepare for resistance to Japanese colonial rule: “If someone abuses and insults our parents, family or ourselves, must we keep cool and tolerate it? As long as we are born as human beings, we should protect ourselves and take reprisals against those who assail us. This is our natural right.”¹⁴⁾

The official response to the increasing student militancy was an intensification of police surveillance on all activities of Korean students. In July 1916, the Minister of Home Affairs, Ichiki Kitokurō (一木喜徳郎), issued the “Internal Regulations for the Observation of Koreans Requiring Surveillance” (要視察朝鮮人視察内規) to all prefectural governors.¹⁵⁾ This was a set of instructions designed to systematize surveillance of any suspected Korean dissident or agitator within Japan. Every prefectural government was requested to compile a register of these Koreans. Each entry was to contain the suspect’s place of birth, occupations, addresses, and other relevant information such as organizations to which he belonged, rallies attended, writings and publications, associations with foreigners, and a record of his movement in Japan and between Japan and Korea.¹⁶⁾ The prefectural governors were also required to send copies of all dossiers that they compiled to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (M.P.D. 警視庁) and other relevant authorities.

Despite the intensifying police surveillance, Tokyo-based Korean students continued to hold meetings and sponsor activities.¹⁷⁾ Because of the presence of police officers and other informers at all Korean student-sponsored rallies, there was a tendency among the speakers to refer only indirectly to the issue of Korean independence. The use of phrases like “the responsibility of Korean students” or “[we Korean] students should be in the vanguard of the Korean people” effectively conveyed student criticism of Japanese colonial policies.¹⁸⁾ On the other hand, some militant students continued to publish statements, only to be accused of violating the Press Law¹⁹⁾ and see their publications censored. The articles that were censored commonly condemned both the forced annexation of Korea and the subsequent “military rule” (武断政治) by the Government-General. An article entitled “Tell Us of Your Intentions, Japan!” (日本の真意を知らしめよ), which appeared in the October 1918 edition of the *Reform News* (革新時報), was typical in this regard. The author, who chose to remain anonymous, accused the Japanese government of forcibly annexing Korea and mistreating the Korean people. Furthermore, it urged the Koreans to resist their harsh oppressors: “...

rather than shedding unnecessary tears or accepting the sort of harsh treatment usually meted out to slaves or animals, I believe that we Koreans should attempt a reprisal [against Japan] as far as possible, and develop a retaliatory spirit of patriotism.”²⁰⁾

Within four months of this article’s publication, Tokyo-based Korean students declared the independence of their country in February 1919.

Independence Movement of Korean Students in Japan in 1919

There were three major factors which exerted influence on the Korean independence movement in Japan in 1919. The first factor was an upsurge of various popular movements for democracy in the host society. These developments, which provided the foundation of what has come to be the “Taisho Democracy movement,” served to explain and justify the Korean independence movement.²¹⁾ The most consistent support came from well-respected Japanese liberals such as Yoshino Sakuzō (吉野作造), then a professor at Tokyo Imperial University. Yoshino was one of the most vocal opponents of Japanese colonial rule and his pleas had a particular appeal to Korean students in Tokyo.²²⁾ The second factor, which stimulated the development of the Korean independence movement, was the speeches of the President of the United States Woodrow Wilson in support of the principle of national self-determination.²³⁾ For many Korean nationalists, Wilson’s perceived support for colonial liberation justified their opposition to Japanese colonialism and offered a political and ideological basis upon which the independence movement could be built.²⁴⁾ The third factor was the vigorous activities of Korean nationalists and intellectuals in Korea, China and the United States.²⁵⁾ Their plan to send representatives to the Paris (Versailles) Peace Conference to appeal for Korean independence prompted Tokyo-based student leaders to launch their independence movement in Japan.²⁶⁾

According to government reports, the first discussion of the 1919 Korean independence movement to occur in Japan took place at a year-end party sponsored by the Fraternal Association (学友会) on 29 December 1918.²⁷⁾ The issue of the independence movement was again raised at a rally held on the following day at the Korean YMCA. Emotional speeches were made on the subject of Korean independence, and the students present were encouraged to sacrifice their lives for the cause. This was followed by a meeting held on January 6, 1919 at the same office. It was concluded that, “The present situation is ideal for Koreans to launch an independence movement. Moreover, since our comrades abroad have already managed to crystallize their activities into an independence movement, we should also start a campaign in earnest.”²⁸⁾

At this meeting, an executive committee of ten members was selected and, after lengthy deliberations, a plan was agreed upon. The members decided that a declaration of Korean independence would be drafted and presented to the Japanese cabinet and members of both houses of the Diet, and also sent to all foreign embassies in Tokyo. This plan was presented to a rally held at the Korean YMCA the following day and was greeted enthusiastically by the assembled students. However, in the view of an increasingly worried police-force, the speeches that followed this announcement were deemed to constitute a threat to public peace and safety. Consequently, the police broke up the rally and arrested twelve Koreans, including all the members of the

executive committee. Those at the rally were forcibly dispersed. This kind of police harassment was repeated on January 8, when two hundred Korean students again gathered at the Korean YMCA. Once again, the meeting was broken up by the police and two Korean students, who had been identified as organizers of the gathering, were arrested.²⁹⁾

Aware of the futility of this kind of open mass meeting in the face of police harassment, the members of the executive committee continued activities in a clandestine fashion after their release. Under strict police surveillance, they drafted the “Declaration of Independence” (独立宣言書) in Korean, Japanese and English and wrote the “Petition for the Calling of a National Congress” (民族大会召集嘆願書) in Japanese. By February 7, copies of both documents had been printed and, on the following morning, these were posted to the Japanese cabinet, all Diet members, all foreign embassies in Tokyo, the Government-General of Chōsen (朝鮮總督府), major Japanese newspapers, prominent intellectuals, and journalists. This was followed by a meeting of about 300 Koreans at which the executive committee declared the independence of Korea. Identifying itself with the representatives of the Korean Youth Independence Corps (朝鮮青年獨立團), the executive committee avowed the legitimacy of Korean independence and warned the Japanese government in the following way:

Although we seek the freedom of Koreans through legal means, if we fail to achieve our objectives we will take whatever action is necessary to gain our right to exist. We Koreans, one and all, are prepared to fight to the last man for our freedom. ... We do not have even a single soldier, nor have we the military power to resist to Japan, but if Japan fails to respond to our legitimate demands properly, we shall declare a bloody eternal war against it.³⁰⁾

Following the declaration of independence, the committee read aloud an “Independence Resolution” (決議文), which (1) criticized the forced annexation of Korea as something which threatened the existence and development of the Korean people, (2) demanded that the Japanese government and the Diet should allow the Korean Youth Independence Corps to call a Korean National Congress whose resolution would decide the freedom of Korea, and (3) urged that the principle of national self-determination be applied to Korea and that, to this end, two students be permitted to attend the Paris Peace Conference. The final article was a warning to the Japanese government, which stated that if the government were to reject the above demands, the Korean people would “declare eternal war on Japan and reject all responsibility for the tragic consequences of such an action.”³¹⁾

“The Petition for the Calling of a National Congress” was then read. It stated that Korea was capable of governing itself and that its independence would contribute to peace and stability in the East. In short, the petition urged the Japanese government to allow the establishment of a new Korean state: “If Japan agrees and supports us, we will no longer bear any animosity toward it, and make every effort to establish a true friendship between our two countries. We will never forget our debt of gratitude to Japan ...”³²⁾

These announcements were greeted with great enthusiasm but, in the eyes of the Japanese police, the gathered crowd had become over-excited. After the students rejected the order to disband the meeting, police officers from West Kanda Police Station rushed into the Korean YMCA and began making arrests. All the members of the executive committee and other prominent Korean activists were taken into custody.³³⁾ This was repeated on 12 February, when approximately 100 Korean students gathered at Hibiya Park to present the petition to the Japanese Diet and elect a new executive committee. No sooner had a student begun to address the rally than the police moved in and ordered the disbandment of the meeting. Thirteen students, including Yi Tal (李達) who had been elected as head of the new committee, were arrested and taken into custody at Hibiya Police Station.³⁴⁾

The outbreak of a nationwide independence movement in Korea, which began on 1 March of that year, promoted further student activities in Japan.³⁵⁾ While a number of students were urged by the Korean Youth Independence Corps to return to Korea and assist in the rapidly spreading nationwide independence movement, others continued their activities in Tokyo in the face of continual police harassment.³⁶⁾ Eight Korean students, for example, proclaimed the legitimacy of Korean independence at a meeting of the Dawn Society (Myŏnghae 黎明会).³⁷⁾ In addition, Yŏm Sangsŏp (廉尚燮), a former Keiō University student, contributed an article to *Democracy* in which he condemned the Japanese government's suppression of student activism. Comparing it to the Rice Riots, which had occurred in Japan a year before, Yŏm Sangsŏp explained and justified the student movement for Korean independence as a natural expression of a people's demand for subsistence. He also urged the Japanese people to cleanse themselves of class and racial prejudices so that they might cooperate with Koreans in their quest to ensure the eternal peace of both peoples.³⁸⁾

Encouraged by the student activities in Tokyo, a group of Korean students in Osaka decided to launch their own independence movement. Osaka-based Korean students managed to instigate the development of a national consciousness amongst Korean workers and urged the importance of solidarity among all Koreans living in the Osaka region. By March 18, these students, in collaboration with other students in Tokyo, copied the "Declaration of Independence," and, on the following day, attempted to distribute it at Tennōji Park in Osaka.³⁹⁾ But like the gathering in Tokyo, this meeting, too, was broken up by the police and twenty-three Koreans were arrested.⁴⁰⁾

The Response in Japan to the Independence Movement of 1919

The initial response of the Japanese authorities to Korean student activities in Japan was to intensify surveillance of the whole Korean community. On February 21, the Home Ministry issued an instruction to all prefectural governors, which was designed to systematize the surveillance of all suspicious Koreans. The prefectural authorities were required to discourage innocent Koreans from participating in the activities of Korean nationalists and to minimize contact between Koreans living within their respective jurisdictions and Korean demonstrators in Korea, China and Russia.⁴¹⁾ In addition, the Japanese government issued, on 20 May, the "Notification Concerning the Formulation of a List of Korean Students" (朝鮮人学生名簿調製ニ関スル通牒). This edict requested all local police authorities to complete a survey and register of the

names of all Korean students living within their respective jurisdictions.⁴²⁾ By means of this, all Korean students in Japan, regardless of their political sympathies, were placed under police surveillance.⁴³⁾

An assimilation policy was also suggested in order to contain the student movement in Japan. In July 1919, for example, the General Staff of the Imperial Army in Korea (朝鮮軍參謀部) compiled reports concerning the Korean independence movement. In these reports, the General Staff collectively urged a shift in Japanese attitudes toward Koreans and encouraged the assimilation of Korean students in Japan with the host society.⁴⁴⁾ According to the reports, Korean students in Japan became increasingly anti-Japanese in their attitudes in proportion to the length of their studies. It was reasoned that the condescending outlook, which characterized the attitudes of many Japanese, was responsible for anti-Japanese feelings among Korean students, and the following conclusion was reached: “It is necessary to treat Korean students compassionately as true brothers, so that they will come to love and respect for us.”⁴⁵⁾

The shift of Japanese colonial policy in Korea from military rule to “cultural rule” (文化政治), which took place in the aftermath of the independence movement, further encouraged policies of appeasement towards Korean students in Japan.⁴⁶⁾ In November 1920, the old regulations concerning Korean students dating from 1911 were abolished and replaced with a new code entitled “Regulations Governing Government-Sponsored Korean Students in Japan” (在日官費朝鮮学生規定).⁴⁷⁾ Under the new regulation the Government-General of Chōsen continued its responsibility for the schools and courses studied (Article II), yet the terms concerning the supervision of students in their daily lives — which were found in the old regulation — were entirely omitted.⁴⁸⁾ Student qualifications and the selection process for government-sponsored study in Japan were also relaxed. This, coupled with the abolition of the travel certificate system in 1922, led to an increase in the number of government-sponsored students from thirty-four to fifty-four between 1919 and 1922.⁴⁹⁾

This is not to suggest that the Japanese authorities relaxed their grip on Korean students in Japan. In 1920, the Office of the Korean Student Supervisor was abolished and the responsibility for supervising Korean students in Japan was transferred to the quasi-official Oriental Institute (東洋協会).⁵⁰⁾ The Oriental Institute established a separate section for the supervision of Korean students, called the Korean Student Educational Bureau (朝鮮学生督学部), which, through cooperation with the Japanese police and the Government-General of Chōsen, reinforced surveillance and control over all student activities. The reasons for this are expressed clearly in a report of the Government-General which body sponsored these Korean students:

Among Korean students [in Japan] there are many who harbour unhealthy thoughts, kindle anti-Japanese sentiments among other students and facilitate their dissemination. In fact, at the time of the Korean *disturbance* (騷擾) in 1919, they advocated the principle of national self-determination, which provoked the *disturbances* inside and outside Korea. Moreover, it is reported that they continue to move between Korea and Japan, forge links with *futei Senjin* (不逞鮮人) abroad, and attempt acts [of sedition harmful to Japan]. To deal with this behavior, more surveillance and control [over Korean students in Japan] are required in

cooperation with the police in Japan.⁵¹⁾

In response to the activities of Tokyo-based Korean students in 1919, the Japanese press adopted a relatively moderate attitude. Newspaper articles reported on the conflicts between Korean students and the Japanese police at the Korean YMCA and Hibiya Park, but few resorted to the sort of inflammatory terms which would normally arouse Japanese antagonism toward the Korean students.⁵²⁾ This attitude reflected the fact that the Korean student movement in Tokyo caused only minor injuries among the police and did not flare into a nation-wide mass movement. It appears, therefore, that Japanese journalists did not regard these student activities as a possible threat to Japanese colonial rule in Korea.

In contrast, the independence movement in Korea, which developed into violent uprisings after the brutal response of the Japanese army and military police (憲兵隊),⁵³⁾ appeared to the Japanese press as an immediate menace. The vast majority of Japanese newspapers adopted an uncompromising and even hostile attitude towards these events. They were unanimous in their condemnation of the Korean demonstrators and argued that the Koreans ignored the beneficial results of Japanese rule.

The arguments of the *Osaka Mainichi* and *Osaka Asahi Shinbun* were typical in this regard. An article in the *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun* argued that the present welfare of the Korean people owed much to Japan's long-standing efforts. According to the author of this article, Koreans had gained nothing from their own government before 1910. Conversely, under Japanese colonial rule their property, lives and honour had been protected. Emphasizing Japan's many efforts to shield Korea from invasion by China and Russia, and to ensure the welfare of Koreans, the author warned that, if Koreans forgot what Japan had done for them, they were doomed to a state of degeneration.⁵⁴⁾ The *Osaka Asahi Shinbun* also urged Koreans to compare the political and social corruption of pre-1910 Korea to the material innovation and development of post-1910 Korea under Japanese rule, and to consider which political system contributed most to their welfare.⁵⁵⁾ Citing an article from an English language newspaper, the *North China Daily News* (which regarded Japan as "the only country willing and able to lead Korea toward wealth and prosperity"), the *Osaka Asahi Shinbun* asked whether "national self-determination [is] beneficial to the enduring well-being of *Senjin*? *Senjin* must know that. We appeal to their self-awareness, and wish they would consider their own future."⁵⁶⁾

The assertion that Koreans had forgotten the beneficial results of Japanese colonial rule was expounded by a Japanese language newspaper in Korea, *Keijō Nippō* (京城日報). Established by the first Resident-General Itō Hirobumi (初代韓国統監 伊藤博文) in Seoul in 1906, *Keijō Nippō* was an advocate of Japanese colonialism and thus severely criticized the Korean independence movement of 1919. One article that appeared in the March 7 edition insisted that Korean demands for national independence showed a lack of understanding of Japanese sacrifices for the prosperity of the Korean people. This editorial urged Koreans to take into account their own inability to govern themselves and emphasized the fact that, unless Japan acted in support of Korean independence, it would have been annexed by an "alien race" (異人種). The writer of this article also ridiculed Koreans who optimistically speculated on

future trends in international affairs: “Koreans believe that after the President of the United States [Woodrow Wilson] established the League of Nations, even small and weak countries (小弱国) would avoid the domination of Great Powers, and be able to maintain their national independence. How foolish they are!”⁵⁷⁾ The writer insisted that national success was simply a manifestation of the “survival of the fittest” (優勝劣敗) and the principle of “struggle for survival” (生存競争), terms drawn directly from Social Darwinism.⁵⁸⁾ In conclusion, the writer warned Koreans, “Ah, [you] pitiful Koreans ! You are governed by evil thoughts. ... Awake! Awake! ... If you do not have an understanding of the situation of the world, you will be doomed to perish.”⁵⁹⁾

Even left-wing journals, which might otherwise have been expected to be strong supporters of a colonial liberation movement, limited themselves to parroting the opinions of the more conservative newspapers. Despite its progressive inclination, the journal *Reconstruction* (改造), for example, argued that Koreans were still unprepared for self-government because:

Koreans must consider their own abilities. The current situation in the world is still incompatible with their idealism. As long as they are manipulated by traditional misleading concepts concerning the [Korean] state or stirred by thoughtless students to commit reckless acts, ... even what they perceived to be happiness may turn into unhappiness. The country may return to the old tyranny [of the Yi Dynasty]. ... It is important for them to recall internal and external problems and the wretched standard of living that existed in Korea before 1910. The Koreans should compare the situation of pre-1910 Korea to the present situation, and consider what to do now.⁶⁰⁾

In the aftermath of the independence movement in Korea, Japanese journalists manifested another tendency. They commonly portrayed Korean demonstrators as dangerous, aggressive, and prone to anti-Japanese behavior. Characterized as *futei Senjin*, nationalist leaders of the demonstrations were alleged to be responsible not only for fanning anti-Japanese sentiments among the Korean public, but also for terrorizing the Japanese police, military police, and residents in Korea. *Osaka Asahi Shinbun*, for example, blamed Korean demonstrators in an article headlined “Christians and Koreans Opened Assault on a Police Station...”⁶¹⁾ Similarly, the newspaper *Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun* published an editorial entitled “A Thousand [Korean] Insurgents (暴民) Attack Japanese Military Police.”⁶²⁾ *Chōsen*, a daily Japanese-language newspaper in Korea published under the auspices of the Government-General, denounced the behavior of Korean demonstrators: “Approximately thirty thousand insurgents, carrying clubs, sickles and axes, assaulted a [Japanese] military police headquarters [in P’yōngan-namdo]. Since these insurgents destroyed windows and other things of the military police, the military policemen opened fire on them, which resulted in approximately twenty casualties. A squad commander was seriously injured during the incident.”⁶³⁾

The negative images of Korean nationalists projected by Japanese journalists during this period were echoed in their attitude toward the attempted assassination of the new Governor-General Saitō Makoto (朝鮮総督齋藤実). Arriving at the Seoul Railway

Station on September 2, 1919, Admiral Saitō was greeted by a Korean patriot who threw a bomb at him.⁶⁴ Although Saitō escaped injury, this incident reinforced pre-existing prejudices, which resulted not unnaturally in a proliferation of anti-Korean editorials. In an article published on 4 September, *Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun* claimed that Korean nationalists, realizing the futility of the demonstrations in the face of the Japanese forces, had decided to achieve their goal by killing high-ranking Japanese officials.⁶⁵ The same article also sought to attribute rebellious tendencies in the Korean character to conditions during the Chosŏn period (李朝時代 1392-1910): “As a result of long-standing sufferings under the cruel tyranny [of the Chosŏn government], Koreans became cunning, and are prone to murder...”⁶⁶ Similarly, *Tokyo Asahi Shinbun* condemned the attempted assassination of the Governor-General as an act of returning evil for good,⁶⁷ and the daily newspaper *Yorozuchōhō* (萬朝報) urged a vigorous response to seditious acts of this kind. The writer of the *Yorozuchōhō* reasoned that Koreans tended to adopt cowardly means (卑怯な手段) and that their ways of thinking and acting were unimaginable [for the Japanese].⁶⁸ Koreans were thus portrayed as inferior and morally culpable.

Japanese citizens in Korea were particularly given to viewing Korean demonstrators as dangerous and virulently anti-Japanese. The vigorous activities of the Korean people for national independence increased Japanese resentment and heightened tensions between Japanese citizens living in Korea and the general Korean population. According to Pak Ūnshik, Japanese residents, particularly members of the fire brigade, not only lent assistance to the suppression of the independence movement, but also assaulted Korean demonstrators allegedly responsible for rioting.⁶⁹ Some Japanese, in pursuit of revenge, used sickles, clubs and even their bare hands against the Koreans.⁷⁰ A comment in *Keijō Nippō* reveals the nature of their behavior: “Given the character of Japanese people, it is most likely that they perceived the disturbances of *Senjin* as impertinent (小癩), and impudent (生意氣千万)..., and thus they embarked upon a hunt for Korean demonstrators. ... this kind of behavior [by Japanese] is not unusual, for it had occurred previously...”⁷¹

The Korean Student Movement, 1920-1923

The most notable experience of Korean students in Japan during the suppression of the independence movement in 1919 was the discovery that the independence of Korea could not be accomplished without assistance from Japanese sympathizers. In the wake of this realization came proposals for closer cooperation with Japanese progressives and the establishment of left-wing organizations.⁷² Disillusioned with both the inability of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai (大韓民国臨時政府) to provide an effective base for an organized independence movement and the failure of western democracies to apply the principle of self-determination to Korea,⁷³ Tokyo-based Korean student leaders sought new supporters for their long-cherished goals, in addition to an ideological alternative to Wilsonian idealism.⁷⁴

Although Korean students in Japan temporarily suspended meetings and demonstrations after the suppression of the independence movement of February-March 1919, their campaigns were active again by the beginning of the following year. On February 22, 1920, militant student leaders gathered to discuss methods of re-

activating the Korean independence movement. At this meeting, they agreed to draft a congratulatory pamphlet to mark the first anniversary of the March First Movement. Decisions were also taken to send the pamphlet to the Korean Provisional Government, and to various parts of Korea in order to provoke another nation-wide mass movement.⁷⁵⁾ On March 1, a meeting was held at the Korean YMCA, which brought together approximately fifty students. Since, in the view of the police, this meeting constituted “a threat to public peace and safety,” the assembled students were immediately ordered to disperse. When this order was ignored, the police stormed the hall and arrested four students. The remaining students proceeded to Hibiya Park, where they cried “*Manse*” (万歳). The police again ordered them to disperse, and, when this failed, arrested most of the participants.⁷⁶⁾

Contact between militant student leaders and Japanese ideologues also increased in 1920. Government reports frequently cited the increasing participation of Korean students in meetings and activities sponsored by left-wing organizations such as Sakai Toshihiko’s (堺利彦) Kosumosu Kurabu (コスモス倶楽部), Takatsu Seidō’s (高津正道) Dawn of the People Society (暁民会), Katō Kazuo’s (加藤一夫) Freedom League (自由連盟), and the Japan Socialist League (日本社会主義連盟).⁷⁷⁾ A report of the Home Ministry, for example, described this cooperation as follows: “In recent years among Korean students in Japan who find it difficult to reclaim the independence of their homeland..., there are some who attempt to make connections with Japanese socialists and seem to be planning something together...”⁷⁸⁾

Korean student links with Japanese radicals were strengthened with the arrival of Yi Ch’unsuk (李春熟), a graduate of Chūō University and the former Vice Minister of Military Affairs in the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai. In August 1920, Yi Ch’unsuk entered Tokyo and held frequent meetings with a Meiji University student, Yi Chūngrim (李增林).⁷⁹⁾ The two Koreans discussed how to establish a socialist movement among Korean students and workers in Tokyo. They also made contact with Japanese progressives in an attempt to invite them to a Comintern-sponsored conference scheduled for October 1920 in Shanghai.⁸⁰⁾ Yi Ch’unsuk was unsuccessful in his approaches to Yamakawa Hitoshi (山川均) and Sakai Toshihiko,⁸¹⁾ but he was nevertheless able to persuade Ōsugi Sakae (大杉栄) to attend the meeting.⁸²⁾ Ōsugi went to Shanghai, where he met with Chen Tuxiu (陳独秀) from China, Ye Unhyōng (呂運亨) and Yi Tonghwi (李東輝) from Korea, and a representative of the Comintern. Together, they agreed to cooperate in future exchanges of information and communications among socialists in their respective countries, and with the Comintern.⁸³⁾ Yi Chūngrim continued his activities in Tokyo, and, in the following year, was successful in arranging cooperative links between Ōsugi’s friend Kondō Eizō (近藤栄蔵) and a communist group within the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai.⁸⁴⁾

Meanwhile, a Tokyo-based Korean student group attempted to put the case for Korean independence on the international arena again, in spite of their previous disillusionment with the Paris Peace Conference. In September 1921, this group met to discuss ways and means to turn the attention of the forthcoming Washington Conference toward the issue of Korean independence.⁸⁵⁾ At this meeting, they agreed to draft a declaration of Korean independence in English, Korean and Japanese and

send the English and Japanese versions of the document — along with copies of a manifesto — to the Government-General of Chōsen, the Japanese Cabinet and the Diet. Copies of these documents were also to be sent to newspapers in Korea and Japan, foreign embassies in Tokyo, as well as to universities and Tokyo-based Japanese socialists and left-wing organizations. It was also decided to hold a meeting at the Korean YMCA on 5 November to declare Korean independence.⁸⁶⁾ In the guise of a general meeting of the Fraternal Association, approximately 300 Tokyo-based Korean students gathered at the Korean YMCA in Kanda on the morning of the fifth. At this meeting, a Korean speaker urged that Korea, taking advantage of the Washington Conference, should declare its national independence. But the police, always present at large student rallies, quickly ordered the meeting to disperse. Ignoring this order, the organizers of the meeting managed to distribute 300 copies of the declaration of Korean independence. This document provoked a chorus of *Manse* among the assembled students since it declared that:

A love and longing for peace are emotions natural to all human beings. The numerous movements, which emerged after the First World War and were created for the sake of social justice and humanity in international, national and racial terms, are evidence of this. In particular, the present Washington Conference is instrumental in materialising our purpose. This organization [Korean Youth Independence Corps], affirming the path of justice and humanity and acknowledging the relationship between world peace and Korean issues, gives its blessing to the complete accomplishment of the objectives of the conference. World peace lies in the final solution of the problem of the Far East, and the peace in the area depends upon a just resolution to the issue of Korean independence. The principal issues to be discussed at the Washington Conference are those concerning the coastal nations of the Far East and the Pacific. Therefore, we place our absolute belief, hopes and expectations in this, and, in order to achieve our principles, announce the following manifesto to the Washington Conference and governments and people of the Great Powers.⁸⁷⁾

Manifesto:

1. We affirm that the independence of Korea promotes not only the peace in the Far East, but world peace as well.
2. The current situation in Korea proves that Japan's justification for the annexation of Korea was false.
3. We declare that the Korean people will never realise their full potential under Japanese rule.
4. We affirm that, if Japan continues its present policies, this will be a menace to world peace.
5. On the basis of the reasons given above, we assert that it is the legitimate duty of the Washington Conference to discuss and resolve the issue of Korean independence.
6. We affirm the duty of the governments and people of the Great Powers to support Korean independence.
7. This organization approves the conditions in their entirety as presented before

the Washington Conference by the representatives of the Korean Provisional Government [in Shanghai].⁸⁸⁾

Just like the Paris Peace Conference, the Washington Conference proved a disappointment to Korean students in Japan, for the assembled delegates failed to act upon their demands. The voice of the Korean students was ignored and their hopes and expectations dashed. With this, Tokyo-based militant student leaders moved toward the establishment of radical student organizations in earnest. In the same month of the independence declaration, a student group established the Black Wave Association (黒濤会), which represented the views of both communist and anarchist movements. This organization was dominated by Pak Yŏl (朴烈) and Kim Yaksu (金若水), to whom prominent Japanese left-wing leaders such as Ōsugi Sakae and Sakai Toshihiko acted as advisers.⁸⁹⁾ But its existence proved short-lived. Owing to ideological divisions between communist and anarchist factions, the association split in October 1922 into the communist North Star Society (北星会), and the anarchist Black Friends Society (黒友会).⁹⁰⁾

Established in November 1922, the North Star Society quickly moved to align itself with both Korean and Japanese workers. The North Star Society had actively been involved in the establishment of the Osaka League of Korean Workers (大阪朝鮮労働同盟会), while urging all the Korean and Japanese proletariat to unite.⁹¹⁾ The North Star Society stated that its intention was to: (1) make it clear that Koreans regard the Japanese ruling class, and not the Japanese proletariat, as their enemies; (2) strengthen the joint ideology and solidarity between the Korean and Japanese proletariat; and (3) establish a unified organization of all Korean workers in Japan.⁹²⁾ The activities of the North Star Society also included lecture tours in Korea, which aimed at the dissemination of proletarian ideologies. In the summer of 1923, Kim Yaksu and Kim Chongbŏm, accompanied by Takatsu Seidō, Kitahara Tetsuo (北原龍雄) and Fuse Tatsuji (布施辰治), toured parts of Korea and, while lecturing on Communism, urged Korean workers to develop a class consciousness.⁹³⁾ Meanwhile, this organization managed to forge links with the newly-established Japan Communist Party. Executive members of the Communist Party such as Sakai Toshihiko, Yamakawa Hitoshi and Arahata Kanson (荒畑寒村) were invited to give lectures at general meetings of the North Star Society. Katayama Sen (片山潜) characterized this association as a firm communist group under the guidance of the Japan Communist Party.⁹⁴⁾ The security-conscious police described the activities of the North Star Society during this period in the following way:

... Korean students have forged links with Japanese socialists who have themselves recently come into prominence and made ideological propaganda to attract newly arrived students. On the other hand, they are agitating for the development of class consciousness among Korean workers, organising labour unions and attempting to make use of them.⁹⁵⁾

The anarchist Black Friends Society was representative of only a small minority of Korean students, but, in the view of the police, this organization was more dangerous and predisposed to violence when compared to the North Star Society.⁹⁶⁾ This

impression was mainly due to the personality of Pak Yöl, the principal leader of the group. Pak Yöl was a passionate nationalist, anarchist and nihilist who urged “direct action” in order to terminate the Japanese domination of Korea.⁹⁷⁾ Prior to the establishment of the Black Friends Society, Pak organized a radical unit called the Unit of the Bloody Fists (血拳団), whose principal objective was the chastisement of pro-Japanese Korean elements.⁹⁸⁾ This was followed by the establishment of the Company of Malcontents (不逞社) in April 1923.⁹⁹⁾ Bringing together both anarchist and nihilist elements, the Company of Malcontents held monthly meetings and discussed direct action against Japanese colonial policies.¹⁰⁰⁾ In the meantime, Pak Yöl tried to make contact with two overseas Korean organizations: the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, and a Korean terrorist group known as the Unit of Righteous Fighters (義烈団).¹⁰¹⁾ According to government reports, Pak attempted to smuggle explosives into Japan with the assistance of overseas Koreans in order to carry out acts of sedition in Tokyo in the autumn of 1923.¹⁰²⁾ Although the smuggling attempt failed because of police action, the rumored bomb plot, coupled with the attempted assassination of General Tanaka Giichi (田中義一) by members of the Unit of Righteous Fighters in Shanghai in March 1922,¹⁰³⁾ appeared, in the eyes of the Japanese police, to be a direct threat to the state of Japan. These suspicions culminated in the arrest of Pak Yöl and his wife, Kaneko Fumiko (金子文子), in the midst of widespread rumors about Korean uprisings following the Great Kantō Earthquake in 1923.¹⁰⁴⁾

While the activities of the Company of Malcontents had been a source of concern to the Japanese authorities, Japanese newspapers were disseminating stories of Korean activities in Manchuria and Korea. Stereotyped views of Korean ultra-nationalists, whose behavior was defined in terms of opposition to Japan’s colonial policies, were contained in terms like *futei Senjin*. For example, in an article which appeared in the 4 October 1920 edition of *Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun*, a series of attacks by a band of mounted bandits upon Japanese residents in the Chientao (間島) area in Manchuria were described in the following terms: “Among the mounted bandits who attacked Japanese people, there were many *futei Senjin* ... Different from the old ways of mounted bandits, they [now] killed even [Japanese] women and children...”¹⁰⁵⁾ Similarly, the *Jiji Shimpō* gave the reader the impression that these incidents were not merely attacks by bandits and concluded that: “... given the behavior of the assailants who raided the Japanese Legation [in Hunchun (琿春), about 100 miles southwest of Vladivostok], and murdered many Japanese subjects in the area, it is clear that their actions are different from the previous methods of mounted bandits. ... The reason was the participation of a hundred *futei Senjin* and five Russians.”¹⁰⁶⁾ Meanwhile, *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun* cited copies of petitions drafted by Japanese residents of the Chientao region in which they requested the Japanese military to occupy the area. The petitioners reasoned that excessive violence committed by *futei Senjin* threatened their lives and property: “We long for the [Japanese] authorities to take immediate measures to alleviate our uneasiness.”¹⁰⁷⁾

The press coverage of Kim Iksang (金益相), who had been charged with the attempted assassination of General Tanaka Giichi in Shanghai, also appeared to foment Japanese fear of Korean extremists. According to an article in *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, published on July 1, 1922, Kim Iksang claimed at his trial that since his parents had

been mistreated by the Japanese, he had decided to devote himself to anti-Japanese activities. Kim also stated that although his attempt to assassinate General Tanaka had failed, his bombs were capable of killing thirty-five or thirty-six people and that, “If I had [killed General Tanaka and] fled from Shanghai, I planned to enter Japan and indiscriminately kill Japanese high ranking officials...”¹⁰⁸⁾

With the exception of the assassination of Min Wŏnshik (閔元植) (the president of a pro-Japanese organization in Korea) by a former Nihon University student Yang Kŭnhwan (梁權煥) at the Tokyo Station Hotel in February 1921,¹⁰⁹⁾ the Korean student movement in Japan, for the most part, remained non-violent. Nevertheless, student links with overseas Korean extremists following the independence movement of 1919 heightened the unease felt by the Japanese authorities. In the view of the Japanese élite, these activities were a threat not only to the colonial rule in Korea, but also to their safety. Thus the Japanese came to believe that militant Korean students who were angry at Japanese colonialism and the treatment meted out to their countrymen in Japan would seek revenge against them.

This view became apparent in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. For the Japanese ruling class, the rumors about Koreans throwing bombs, poisoning wells and setting fires that circulated in the aftermath of the earthquake confirmed their long-standing fear of militant Korean students in Tokyo. In other words, when faced with the reports of a Korean riot, the Japanese authorities were already predisposed to believe them. The following extract from Akaike Atsushi (赤池濃), the Inspector General of the Tokyo M.P.D. (警視総監) at the time of the earthquake, best illustrates this: “When I received reports that 2,000 Koreans had crossed the [Tama] River and were committing violent acts in the city [of Tokyo], I was soon convinced that extremists in the Korean community were fomenting unrest...”¹¹⁰⁾ In the context of the confusion, Akaike immediately imagined that certain Koreans were the instigators of the reported riot. This development drove him to press most emphatically for the imposition of Martial Law (戒嚴令), which came into effect on the afternoon of 2 September.¹¹¹⁾ The existence of the Martial Law had a profound impact on the public, for it gave credence to reports of a Korean riot and effectively drove the people toward Korean witch-hunt. A Japanese defendant who was tried at a local court of Saitama Prefecture for the murder of Koreans believed that, if he killed Koreans under Martial Law, he would receive medals (勳章) from the Japanese government.¹¹²⁾

The Japanese authorities also took the initiative in circulating the anti-Korean rumors and played a key role in murdering innocent Korean residents. Members of the Imperial Army and the police force killed a number of innocent Korean residents on the street, while they put up posters and distributed leaflets, urging the still bewildered and incredulous public to be vigilante and to cooperate with the police since bands of Korean extremists were committing acts of sedition.¹¹³⁾ These actions caused anti-Korean feelings to erupt throughout the Japanese population. On the other hand, the military and civilian leadership had also set up temporary “reception centers” in many parts of Japan for the purpose of safeguarding the lives of Korean residents. According to a report of the Home Ministry, 23,715 Koreans were housed in these centers after the earthquake.¹¹⁴⁾ It appears, however, that this “protective custody” was confused with “preventive detention.” Among the first to be interned were those

requiring surveillance like Park Yöl, ¹¹⁵⁾ and in Chiba Prefecture, the Japanese police committed mass murder of the Koreans in their protective custody.¹¹⁶⁾

Conclusion

The principal explanation for the anti-Korean sentiments that came to a head in the massacre of 1923 is that these sentiments were reinforced by the Korean student movement in Japan. Between 1910 and 1923, the fear of Tokyo-based Korean student leaders engaged the hearts and minds of an increasing numbers of Japanese élite. Their vigorous activism created in the Japanese minds negative stereotypes associated with Korean students — that they were dangerous and prone to anti-social and anti-Japanese behavior. In the *Weltanschauung* of the colonial ruler, their resistance to Japanese colonialism was perceived as a threat to Japan. The Japanese authorities thus came to regard the whole Korean student community in Japan in terms of those stereotypes. When faced with widespread rumors about a Korean riot in the confusion following the Great Kantō Earthquake, they were already predisposed to believe that militant Korean students might rise up and attack them. Accordingly, they embarked upon a relentless hunt for the reported Korean rioters. The mass murder of September 1923 should thus be read as a logical outcome of the Korean student movement that warped the thinking of many Japanese officials.

In sum, the Korean student movement between 1910 and 1923 illuminates much about the mass murder of the Korean residents in September 1923, for it offers unique insights into the actions taken by the Japanese élite during the first critical hours following the Great Kantō Earthquake. The Japanese ruling class was caught up in a vicious circle of racism. Their anti-Korean attitudes naturally drove Korean students into anti-Japanese and anti-social movements, and the development of these activities heightened, in turn, their anxiety over the Korean student community. This overt racial prejudice predisposed the Japanese élite to believe the rumors about Korean rioting which circulated after the Great Kantō Earthquake. As Yoshino Sakuzō put it:

There is a master who has usually bullied one of his apprentices. The master did not care much about the apprentice because he was normally an obedient boy. Then one day, for example, someone set the master's house on fire. In this case, many people will readily believe a rumor of the apprentice setting the house on fire. This is natural because they are well aware of his hatred for the master who has usually mistreated him.¹¹⁷⁾

End Notes

- 1) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka [内務省警保局保安課 Japan's Home Ministry Police Affairs Bureau Security Section], ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō' [朝鮮人概況 General Conditions of Koreans in Japan], in Pak Kyōngshik 朴慶植, ed., *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin Kankei Shiryo Shūsei dai 1 kan* [在日朝鮮人關係資料集成第一卷 Collected Materials Concerning Koreans in Japan, vol. 1], (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobō, 1975), 48 (hereafter referred to as *ZCKSS*). Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 2' [朝鮮人概況第二 General Conditions of Koreans in Japan, vol. 2], in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 62. Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3' [朝鮮人概況第三 General Conditions of Koreans in Japan, vol. 3], in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 83-7.
- 2) Shihōshō [司法省 Japan's Justice Ministry], ed., 'Naichi ni okeru Chōsenjin to sono Hanzai ni tsuite'

- [内地における朝鮮人とその犯罪について An Account of Koreans in Japan and Their Crime], in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 297-8.
- 3) See, for example, Kang Töksang 姜徳相, *Kanto Daishinsai* [関東大震災 The Great Kanto Earthquake], (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1975), 9-118. Imai Seichi 今井清一 and Saitō Hideo 斉藤秀夫, 'Daishinsai to Chōsenjin Gyakusatsu no Kyūmei' ['大震災と朝鮮人虐殺の究明 The Examination of the Korean Massacre and the Great Kanto Earthquake'] in *Kanto Daishinsai Gojūshūnen Chōsenjin Giseisha Tsuitō Gyōji Jikkō Iinkai* [関東大震災 50周年朝鮮人犠牲者追悼行事実行委員会 A Memorial Event Executive Committee for Korean Victims on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great Kanto Earthquake], ed., *Rekishi no Shinjitsu: Kanto Daishinsai to Chōsenjin Gyakusatsu* [歴史の真実：関東大震災と朝鮮人虐殺 Fact of History: The Great Kanto Earthquake and the Korean Massacre], (Tokyo: Gendaishi Shuppankai, 1975), 23-73.
 - 4) For example, see Michael Weiner, *The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan 1910-1923*, (NJ: Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1989), 126-163. Michael Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan*, (London: Routledge, 1994), 63-78. Abe Hiroshi 阿部洋, 'Kyū Kanmatsu no Nihon Ryūgakusei (III) — Shiryōteki Kōsatsu' ['旧韓末の日本留学生(三) — 資料的考察 Korean Students in Japan During the Final Years of the Great Han Empire (III) — An Account in terms of Materials'], *Kan* 韓, vol. 3 (July 1974), 103-128. Abe Hiroshi, 'Kaihō mae Nihon Ryūgaku no Shiteki Tenkai Katei to sono Tokushitsu' ['解放前日本留学の史的展開過程とその特質 Historical Review of Korean Students in Japan before 1945'], *Kan* 韓, vol. 5 (November 1976), 20-73. The present study was unable to refer to an article by Kenneth M. Wells, "Background to the March First Movement: Koreans in Japan, 1905-1919," *Korean Studies*, vol. 13 (1989), 5-21. To understand the Korean student movement in Japan before 1910, see also Takekoshi Reiko 竹腰礼子, 'Kanmatsu no Tonichi Ryūgakusei ni tsuite — Hogo Jōyaku ki no Ryūgakusei kai' ['韓末の渡日留学生について — 保護条約期の留学生界 An Account of Korean Students in the Final Years of the Great Han Empire-Korean Students at the Time of Protectorate Treaty'], *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjinshi Kenkyū* [在日朝鮮人史研究 Research into History of Korean Residents in Japan], vol. 6, no. 3 (June 1980), 24-42.
 - 5) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō, vol. 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 85. Italics added. *Senjin* is short for *Chōsenjin* (Koreans). Throughout the pre-war period, Japanese, be they officials or not, commonly used this term in a pejorative way when they referred to Koreans. Not only was the word used in government documents and/or any official reports, it also appeared in newspaper articles and even official journals of left-wing organizations such as the Japan Communist Party (日本共産党) and the Japan Confederation of Labour (日本労働総同盟).
 - 6) Invoking the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan declared war on Germany on August 23, 1914. Joining the Allied Powers in World War I allowed Japan to seize German-held territories in China and the Pacific Ocean and the war-industry boom offered her an opportunity to enter easily Asian colonial markets, which had been cut off from Europe owing to the war. See Janet Hunter, ed., *Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 244-5 (hereafter referred to as *CDMJH*).
 - 7) In an attempt to consolidate Japan's position in China, the Japanese government, in January 1915, presented to the Republic of China a list of twenty-one demands. These demands included transfer of former German rights in Shantung to Japan (which already occupied the area), extension of the leases and privileges in South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia which Japan had inherited from Russia in 1905, joint Sino-Japanese administration of the Hanyehping Iron Works, and a Chinese promise not to alienate any port or island to a third country. China appealed for foreign support but received little help because many of the Great Powers were involved in war in Europe. In May, China finally accepted these demands. Although the Japanese government gained considerable concessions, these demands not only provoked anti-Japanese criticism in China, but also damaged its international reputation. This aroused suspicions in Great Britain and the United States. See *CDMJH*, 235-6.
 - 8) News of the conflict with Germany and the prospect of a war between Japan and China also elicited similar responses among Koreans in China. See Chongsik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 101-2.
 - 9) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 51.
 - 10) *Ibid.*

- 11) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 50-1.
- 12) *Ibid.*, 52.
- 13) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 52.
- 14) *Ibid.*, 53.
- 15) Naimushō, ed., 'Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin Torishimari no Naimushō tō Tsūtatsu' ['在日朝鮮人取締りの内務省等通達 A Collection of Notifications by Home Ministry concerning the Regulation of Koreans in Japan'], in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 23-5.
- 16) *Ibid.*
- 17) *Ibid.*, 87.
- 18) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 2,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 72-3.
- 19) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 94-5.
- 20) *Ibid.*, 95.
- 21) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., Taishō 14 nen 12 gatsu: Zaikyō Chōsenjin Ryūgakusei Gaikyō' ['大正一四年十二月：在京朝鮮人留学生概況 General Conditions of Korean Students in Tokyo in December 1925], in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 324.
- 22) See Matsuo Takayoshi 松尾尊兌, 'Yoshino Sakuzō to Chōsen: 3・1 Undōki o Chūshin ni' ['吉野作造と朝鮮：3・1 運動期を中心に Yoshino Sakuzō and Korea: The Period of the March First Movement'] in Yui Masaomi 由井正臣, ed., *Ronshū Nihon Rekishi 12: Taishō Democracy* [論集日本歴史 12：大正デモクラシー Collected Materials Concerning Japan's History, vol. 12: Taishō Democracy] (Tokyo: Yūseidō Shuppansha, 1977), 101.
- 23) On January 8, 1918, Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States, set forth his Fourteen Points, in which the principle of self-determination was enunciated. Although this idea had already been developed in his numerous writings and speeches, it seems clear that the Declaration of the Fourteen Points aroused Korean hopes for national liberation.
- 24) See Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 86, 88. Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Taishō 14 nen 12 gatsu: Zai-Kyō Chōsen Ryūgakusei Gaikyō,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 324. The influence of the Russian Revolution on the Korean independence movement in 1919 has been a controversial issue among scholars. In *The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan 1910-1923* (p. 133), Michael Weiner has argued, "While the example set by the Russian Revolution undoubtedly encouraged anti-Japanese groups operating close to or inside the Soviet Union, there is no evidence to suggest that events in Russia had any appreciable influence on the activities of Koreans in Tokyo or Korea." On the other hand, Yamabe Kentarō's 山辺健太郎 'San Ichi Undō ni tsuite (1)' ['三一運動について (1) On the Uprising for Independence in Korea on March 1, 1919, (1)'], (*Rekishigaku Kenkyū* 歴史学研究), vol. 184 (June 1955), 6, pointed out the impact of the Russian Revolution on the independence movement initiated by Tokyo-based Korean students.
- 25) Kang Töksang 姜徳相, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 26: Chōsen 2* [現代史資料第二十六巻：朝鮮 2 Source Materials on Contemporary History, vol. 26: Korea, no. 2], (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1967), viii-ix, 18-9 (hereafter referred to as Chōsen, vol. 2). Also see Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 99.
- 26) Dae-yeol Ku, *Korea under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations*, (Seoul: Seoul Computer Press, 1985), 44.
- 27) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 98. Fraternal Association, which is also known as "Fraternal Association of Korean Students in Tokyo" (在東京朝鮮留学生学友会), was established in October 1912. The origins of this organization can be traced back to the "Greater Korea Association for the Promotion of Education" (大韓興学会), which was organized in March 1909. See Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 48.
- 28) *Ibid.*, 99.
- 29) *Ibid.*
- 30) *Ibid.*, 102-3. The English translations of "The Declaration of Independence," "The Independence Resolution," and "The Petition for the Calling of a National Congress" are cited in Appendix C6 of Michael Weiner's *The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan 1910-1923*, 219-24. Although all the English translations of these documents appearing in this paper are my own, I often referred to Weiner's translations.

- 31) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 103. After World War I, the allies held a conference at Versailles, near Paris, which began in January 1919, in order to decide the terms of a peace treaty with Germany. See *CDMJH*, 241.
- 32) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 104.
- 33) *Ibid.*, 99. Also see *Jiji Shinbō*, 9 February 1919. Quoted in Uchikawa Yoshimi 内川芳美 and others, eds., *Taishō Nyūsu Jiten dai 4 kan: Taishō 12 nen-Taishō 13 nen* [大正ニュース事典第四卷：大正十二年—大正十三年 Dictionaries of Taishō News, vol. 4: 1923-1924], (Tokyo: Mainichi Komyunikēshonzu, 1988), 439 (hereafter referred to as *Taishō Nyūsu Jiten*). Of those arrested, the members of the executive committee were charged with violation of the press law (出版法) and brought to trial before the Tokyo District Court. Others were released on February 9. All the executive members were found guilty of offences arising from their involvement in drafting the Declaration of Independence, and, in March, received prison sentences ranging from seven to nine months. In 1875, the press ordinance (出版条例) was issued to control popular rights movements. It regulated expressions of popular opinions and, in 1893, a new, harsher Press Law replaced the existing legislation. See Kokushi Daijiten Hensan Inkai [国史大辞典編纂委員会 National History Compilation Committee], ed., *Kokushi Dai Jiten 7 kan* [国史大辞典第七卷 Dictionary of National History, vol. 7], (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1988), 390.
- 34) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 100.
- 35) With regard to the relations between activities of Korean students in Tokyo and the independence movement in Korea, see Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 108. Also see Pak Ūnshik 朴殷植, (Kang Tōksang, trans.), *Chōsen Dokuritsu Undō no Kesshi 1* [朝鮮獨立運動の血史1 A Bloody History of Korea's Independence Movements, vol. 1], (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1972), 131-2. Yamabe Kentarō, *Nihon Tōchi ka no Chōsen* [日本統治下の朝鮮 Korea under Japanese Colonial Rule], (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974), 58-62. In January 1919, at a time when it had become clear that Korean students in Japan were about to take action, the former Emperor Kojong 高宗大皇帝 died and his funeral was scheduled to be held on March 3. Knowing that a large crowd of mourners would be in Seoul in early March, Korean nationalists decided to stage a nationwide independence demonstration on March 1. See Frank Prentiss Baldwin Jr., 'The March First Movement: Korean Challenge and Japanese Response,' Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1969. During the independence movement, a great number of Koreans were harassed and killed. In his *Chōsen Dokuritsu Undō no Kesshi* (vol. 1, 169-83), Pak Ūnshik argued that between March 1, and the end of May, more than 7,500 Koreans were killed, nearly 20,000 were injured, and about 47,000 were arrested, while in 'Daishinsai to Chōsenjin Gyakusatsu no Kyūmei,' in *Rekishi no Shinjitsu* (p. 142), Imai and Saitō estimated that 26,713 Koreans were arrested and 7,909 killed.
- 36) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 100-1.
- 37) Iwamura Toshio 岩村登志男, *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin to Nihon Rōdōsha Kaikyū* [在日朝鮮人と日本労働者階級 Koreans in Japan and the Japanese Working Class], (Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1972), 23. Inspired by the internationalism of Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造 (a professor at Tokyo Imperial University) and Fukuda Tokuzō 福田徳三 (a prominent economist from Tokyo Higher School of Commerce), the Dawn Society was founded on December 23, 1918. Within several months, the membership had reached forty-three, most of whom were university professors and personal acquaintances of either Yoshino or Fukuda. See Henry Dewitt Smith II, *Japan's First Student Radicals* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 44-5.
- 38) Iwamura, *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin to Nihon Rōdōsha Kaikyū*, 23-4.
- 39) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 106-8. *Tokyo Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞, 21 March 1919; quoted in Kang Tongjin 姜東鎭, *Nihon Genronkai to Chōsen* [日本言論界と朝鮮 Japanese Press and Korea], (Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Shuppankai, 1984), 174-5.
- 40) *Ibid.*
- 41) Naimushō Keihokyoku, 'Chōsenjin no Ōrai, Tsūshin, Kaigō tō ni kanshi Chūi gata no ken imei tsūtatsu' ['朝鮮人の往来、通信、会合等に関シ注意方ノ件依命通牒 A Cautionary Note concerning the Movement, Communication, and Meeting of Koreans in Japan'], in *Chōsen*, vol. 2, 28-9.
- 42) Naimushō, ed., 'Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin Torishimari no Naimushō tō Tsūtatsu,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 36-7.
- 43) Official anxieties over Koreans were reflected in their initial response to the assassination of Prime

- Minister Hara Takashi 原敬 at the Tokyo Railway Station in November 1921. Nakaoka Kon'ichi 中岡良一, who stabbed Hara to death, stated in his work that the detectives who arrested him assumed that he was a Korean. Nakaoka Kon'ichi, *Gokusō 13 nen* [獄窓十三年 Thirteen Years of Prison Windows]. Quoted in Kang, *Kanto Daishinsai*, 52.
- 44) Chōsengun Sambōbu [朝鮮軍參謀部 the General Staff of the Imperial Army in Korea], 'Sōjō no Gen'in oyobi Tōchi jō Chūi subeki ken ni tsuite: Naichi Ryūgakusei no Taigū oyobi Shidō' [騷擾ノ原因及朝鮮ノ統治上注意スヘキ件ニ就テ：内地留学生ノ待遇及指導 Concerning the Causes of the Disturbances and Other Issues relating to the Administration of Korea which Needs Special Attention: Treatment and Instruction of Korean Students in Japan], in *Chōsen*, vol. 2, 651-2.
- 45) *Ibid.* Similar suggestions were made by Ishizaka Kameharu 石坂亀治, a Christian who visited Korea immediately after the independence demonstrations. See Ishizaka Kameharu 石坂亀治, 'Chōsen Sōjō Jiken wo ronzu' [朝鮮騷擾事件を論ず Descriptions of the Korean Disturbance], in *Chōsen*, vol. 2, 638-9.
- 46) In response to the Korean independence movement in 1919, Prime Minister Hara Takashi made drastic adjustments in Japan's policy toward Korea. Hara, while sending additional troops to Korea to suppress the independence movement, appointed Admiral Saitō Makoto as the new Governor-General and prompted him to replace military rule with cultural rule. Under the administration of the new Governor-General Saitō, military police were replaced by civilian police and the publishing of Korean newspapers and magazines was permitted under strict government censorship. Hara Takashi (Hara Keiichirō 原奎一郎, ed.), *Hara Takashi Nikki 5* [原敬日記 5 Diaries of Hara Takashi, vol. 5], (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppansha, 1965), 125-6. Andrew C. Nahm, *Introduction to Korean History and Culture* (NJ: Hollym, 1993), 188.
- 47) Chōsen Sōtokufu Gakumukyoku [朝鮮總督府学務局 Government-General of Chōsen Educational Affairs Bureau], ed., 'Zai-Naichi Chōsen Gakusei Jōkyō' [在日朝鮮学生状況 General Conditions of Korean Students in Japan], in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 299-300. Also see Abe, 'Kaihō mae Nihon Ryūgaku no Shiteki Tenkai Katei to sono Tokushitsu,' 33, 35-8.
- 48) Abe, 'Kaihō mae Nihon Ryūgaku no Shiteki Tenkai Katei to sono Tokushitsu,' 46- 8.
- 49) An increase in the number of government-sponsored students in Japan was accomplished by (1) reducing the amount of student grants by nearly 50%, (2) by extending the selection process to include students already studying in Japan at their own expense, and (3) by stopping sponsoring students for their fare, living expenses, and medical fees. See Abe, 'Kaihō mae Nihon Ryūgaku no Shiteki Tenkai Katei to sono Tokushitsu,' 51. The relaxation of the regulations concerning Korean students in Japan was also reflected in a rapid increase of the number of self-financed students. The number increased 644 to 3,168 between 1919 and 1922. See *ibid.*, 50.
- 50) Italics added. Chōsen Sōtokufu Gakumukyoku, ed., 'Zai-Naichi Chōsen Gakusei Jōkyō,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 299-300. The Office of Korean Student Supervisor in Tokyo can be traced back to 1906, when the Korean government appointed Han Chiyu 韓致愈 as the supervisor of Korean students in Japan. See Abe, 'Kaihō mae Nihon Ryūgaku no Shiteki Tenkai Katei to sono Tokushitsu,' 32.
- 51) Chōsen Sōtokufu Gakumukyoku, ed., 'Zai-Naichi Chōsen Gakusei Jōkyō,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 300. Italics added. In many Japanese official documents and newspaper articles, the term *disturbance* was used to refer to the March First Movement. See, for example, Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 98-106; *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 4, 439-53.
- 52) See, for example, *Jiji Shimpō* 時事新報, 9 February 1919, 16 February 1919, and *Hōritsu* 法律, 13 February 1919, 18 February 1919; quoted in *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 4, 439.
- 53) See Baldwin, 'The March First Movement: Korean Challenge and Japanese Response,' 84-96. Yamabe, *Nihon Tōchi ka no Chōsen*, 93-7.
- 54) *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun* 大阪毎日新聞, 4 March 1919; quoted in *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 4, 441-2.
- 55) *Osaka Asahi Shinbun* 大阪朝日新聞, 8 March 1919; quoted in *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 4, 445-6.
- 56) *Ibid.* Italics added.
- 57) *Keijō Nippō* 京城日報, 7 March 1919; quoted in *Chōsen*, vol. 2, 664.
- 58) *Ibid.* Italics added.
- 59) *Ibid.*
- 60) Quoted in Kang, *Nihon Genronkai to Chōsen*, 221. The date of the publication was not provided.

- 61) *Osaka Asahi Shinbun*, 3 March 1919. Quoted in Kang, *Nihon Genronkai to Chōsen*, 165.
- 62) *Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞, 7 March 1919; quoted in Kang, *Nihon Genronkai to Chōsen*, 165.
- 63) *Chōsen* 朝鮮, 7 March 1919; quoted in *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 4, 443. Also see similar newspaper articles which are cited in Kang, *Nihon Genronkai to Chōsen*, 165-7, 174-6, and *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 4, 443-50.
- 64) Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, vol. 5, 137.
- 65) *Tokyo Nichinichi*, 4 September 1919; quoted in Kang, *Nihon Genronkai to Chōsen*, 226.
- 66) *Ibid.*
- 67) *Tokyo Asahi Shinbun*, 4 September 1919; quoted in Kang, *Nihon Genronkai to Chōsen*, 226.
- 68) *Yorozuchōhō* 萬朝報, 4 September 1919; quoted in Kang, *Nihon Genronkai to Chōsen*, 227.
- 69) Pak, *Chōsen Dokuritsu Undō no Kesshi*, vol. 1, 186-94. Also see Yamabe, ‘San Ichi Undō ni tsuite (1),’ 2. Yamabe Kentarō, ‘San Ichi Undō ni tsuite (2)’ [‘三一運動について(2) On the Uprising for Independence in Korea on March 1, 1919, (2)’], *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, vol. 185 (July 1955), 18. Yamabe argues that members of the Japanese fire brigades in Hamhŭng attacked Korean demonstrators from the evening of March 2 to the following morning. As a result, approximately 700 Koreans were injured.
- 70) Pak, *Chōsen Dokuritsu Undō no Kesshi*, vol. 1, 186-94.
- 71) *Keijō Nippō*, 25 March 1919; quoted in *Chōsen*, vol. 2, 667.
- 72) Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku [朝鮮総督府警務局], ed., ‘Zai-Kyō Chōsenjin Jōkyō’ [‘在京朝鮮人状況 Conditions of Koreans Residing in Tokyo’], in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 145-6. Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisho 14 nen chū ni okeru Zairyū Chōsenjin no Jōkyō’ [‘大正一四年中ニ於ケル在留朝鮮人ノ状況 Conditions of Koreans in Japan in 1925’], in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 158-9.
- 73) From Shanghai, Manchuria and the United States, Korean envoys were dispatched to the Paris Peace Conference. Only Kim Kyushik 金奎植, a representative of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, reached Paris in time. The Peace Conference failed, however, to discuss the issue of Korean independence, nor was the principle of national self-determination applied to Korea. See *Chōsen*, vol. 2, 82-7. Ku, *Korea under Colonialism*, 37-45. Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Zai-Kyō Chōsen Ryūgakusei Gaikyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 326-7.
- 74) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 87-8. Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisho 14 nen chū ni okeru Zairyū Chōsenjin no Jōkyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 158, 181-2.
- 75) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chōsenjin Gaikyō dai 3,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 104-5.
- 76) *Ibid.*, 105.
- 77) Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, ed., ‘Zai-Kyō Chōsenjin Jōkyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 144-5. Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chōsenjin Kinkyō Gaikyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 124.
- 78) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chōsenjin Kinkyō Gaikyō’ [‘朝鮮人近況概況 A Recent General View of Koreans’], in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 123. This source also cited Korean students who gave speeches urging social revolution at a meeting of the Kosumosu Kurabu in June 1920. See *ibid.*, 124.
- 79) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chōsenjin Kinkyō Gaikyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 124.
- 80) Ōsugi Sakae 大杉栄, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū dai 3 kan* [大杉栄全集第三卷 The Complete Works of Ōsugi Sakae, vol. 3], (Tokyo: Sekai Bunko, 1973), 386-7.
- 81) Yamakawa Hitoshi 山川均 (Yamakawa Kikue 山川菊枝 and Sakisaka Itsurō 向坂逸郎, eds.), *Yamakawa Hitoshi Jiden* [山川均自伝 Autobiography of Yamakawa Hitoshi], (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961), 389-90.
- 82) Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū dai 3 kan*, 386-90.
- 83) *Ibid.*, 396-401. Also see Thomas A. Stanley, *Ōsugi Sakae: Anarchist in the Taishō Japan: The Creativity of the Ego* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 134. The extent to which the meetings in Shanghai effectively strengthened solidarity between Korean radicals and their Japanese counterparts is open to question. In his autobiography Ōsugi indicated that his link with the communist group within the Korean Provisional Government ceased shortly after his visit to Shanghai. See Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū*, vol. 3, 396-401. Pak Yōl 朴烈, a Korean anarchist leader in Japan, also “saw no possibility of a tie between the Comintern and Ōsugi, because the latter had not only retained his anarchist views but had even asserted that, if there were outside interference in Japanese affairs, he

- would not accept aid.” Quoted in Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea, part I: the Movement*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 31. Neither Ōsugi nor Scalapino provides the Chinese titles of these Ōsugi met in Shanghai.
- 84) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chōsenjin Kinkyō Gaikyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 125. Also see Scalapino, *Communism in Korea, part I*, 30; Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū*, vol. 3, 400-1.
- 85) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chōsenjin Kinkyō Gaikyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 123. Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Zai-Kyō Chōsen Ryūgakusei Gaikyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 325.
- 86) *Ibid.*
- 87) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Zai-Kyō Chōsen Ryūgakusei Gaikyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 325.
- 88) *Ibid.*, 325-6. Further demonstrations took place at Ueno, Hibiya Park and the Korean YMCA on November 11, (the opening day of the Washington Conference), while there were student strikes at schools for several days. See *Ibid.*, 326.
- 89) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisho 15 nen chū ni okeru Zairyū Chōsenjin no Jōkyō’ [‘大正十五年ニ於ケル在留朝鮮人ノ状況 Conditions of Koreans in Japan in 1926’], in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 209; Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Zai-Kyō Chōsen Ryūgakusei Gaikyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 327.
- 90) Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, ed., ‘Zai-Kyō Chōsenjin Jōkyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 139. Horiuchi Minoru 堀内稔, ‘Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin Anākizumu Rōdō Undō (Kaihōmae)-Chōsen Tōkō Rōdō Dōmeikai to Chōsen Jiyū Rōdōsha Kumiai’ [‘在日朝鮮人アナーキズム労働運動 (解放前) — 朝鮮東興労働同盟会と朝鮮自由労働者組合 Anarcho-Labour Movement of Koreans in Japan (Before 1945)-Tōkō League of Korean Labour and Korean Liberal Labour Union’], *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjinshi Kenkyū*, vol. 16, no. 2 (October 1986), 39, 54.
- 91) Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, ed., ‘Zai-Kyō Chōsenjin Jōkyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 144.
- 92) Iwamura, *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin to Nihon Rōdōsha Kaikyū*, 74.
- 93) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisho 15 nen chū ni okeru Zairyū Chōsenjin no Jōkyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 209.
- 94) Quoted in *ibid.*, 74-5.
- 95) Shihōshō, ed., ‘Naichi ni okeru Chōsenjin to sono Hanzai ni tsuite,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 298.
- 96) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisho 14 nen chū ni okeru Zairyū Chōsenjin no Jōkyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 162. Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Zai-Kyō Chōsen Ryūgakusei Gaikyō,’ in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 333.
- 97) Xu Shikai, 許世楷, ‘Boku Retsu Jiken — Shiitageretamono no Hangyaku’ [‘朴烈事件 — 虐げられたものの反逆 Incident of Pak Yōl-Rebellion of the Oppressed’], in Wagatsuma Sakae 我妻栄, ed., *Nihon Seiji Saiban Shiroku 3: Taisho* [日本政治裁判史録第三卷：大正 Historical Documents Concerning Political Trials in Japan, vol. 3: Taisho Period], (Tokyo: Daiichi Hōki Shuppankai, 1977), 380-1.
- 98) *Ibid.*, 381. This organization is also known as Righteous Blood Unit (義血団) or Fist Unit (手拳団). See *KDJ*, vol. 12, 704.
- 99) Xu, ‘Boku Retsu Jiken,’ in *Nihon Seiji Saiban Shiroku*, 3, 384.
- 100) *Ibid.* According to government reports, members of the Company of Malcontents held meetings four times between May and August 1923 in which they discussed how to encourage popular and labour movements in Korea. They also planned an attack on Kim Tongwŏn 金炯元, an editor of the *Tonga Ilbo* 東亜日報 who was alleged to be pro-Japanese.
- 101) *Ibid.*, 386-90. The Unit of Righteous Fighters was organized in Manchuria in November 1919. The principal objective of this group was the assassination of officials of the Government-General of Chōsen, the emperor of Japan and officials of the Japanese government, and pro-Japanese Korean detectives. See *ibid.*, 388.
- 102) *Ibid.*
- 103) *Tokyo Nichinichi*, 20 May 1922; *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, 1 July 1922; quoted in *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 5, 424-5.
- 104) Xu, ‘Boku Retsu Jiken,’ 385. Pak Yōl and Kaneko Fumiko were later indicted for high treason and were sentenced to death on March 25, 1926. The first Wakatsuki Reijirō Cabinet 若槻礼次郎 (30 January 1926-20 April 1927), however, commuted the sentences to life imprisonment in the following month. See *ibid.*, 399.
- 105) *Tokyo Nichinichi*, 4 October 1920; quoted in *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 4, 432. In September and October

- of 1920, mounted bandits raided Hunchun and the Japanese Legation in the region. Recent studies, however, argue that the leaders of these bandits were Japanese collaborators. See, for example, Kang Töksang 姜徳相, 'Shiryō Kaisetsu' ['資料解説 Comments on Materials'], in Kang Töksang, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 28: Chōsen 4* [現代史資料第二十八巻：朝鮮 4 Materials in Contemporary History, vol. 28: Korea, no. 4], (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1972), viii-xi (hereafter referred to as *Chōsen*, vol. 4).
- 106) *Jiji Shimpō*, 9 October 1920; quoted in *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 4, 434-5.
- 107) *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, 8 October 1920. Quoted in *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 4, 433. On October 7, 1920, the Japanese government decided to send troops to the Chientao region. According to Japanese official reports, the number of Koreans killed by the Japanese forces during the military expedition, which lasted until December of that year, was 522, while a Korean source estimated 3,128. See Dai 19 Shidan Shireibu [第十九師団司令部 The Headquarters of the Nineteenth Division], ed., 'Kanto Jiken Sen-Shijin Shishōsha Shirabe' ['間島事件鮮支人死傷者調 Reports of Korean and Chinese Casualties at the time of the Chientao Incident'], in *Chōsen*, vol. 4, 520-43; Ku, *Korea under Colonialism*, 275.
- 108) *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, 1 July 1922; quoted in *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 5, 424-5.
- 109) Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Taisho 14 nen chū ni okeru Zairyū Chōsenjin no Jōkyō' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 182-3. Also see *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, 1 March 1921; *Tokyo Asahi*, March 1, 1921; quoted in *Taisho Nyūsu Jiten*, vol. 5, 586-7. Min Wōnshik was the president of the National Association (国民協会), a pro-Japanese organization in Korea. Min arrived in Tokyo in February 1921 and presented a petition to the Japanese Diet calling for the extension of the political franchise to Korea. Although this attempt failed, Koreans who resided in Japan were enfranchized under the Universal Suffrage Law of 1925. Naimushō Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., 'Taishō 14 nen chū ni okeru Zairyū Chōsenjin no Jōkyō,' in *ZCKSS*, vol. 1, 182-3.
- 110) Akaike Atsushi 赤池濃, 'Daishinsai tōji ni okeru Shokan' ['大震災当時に於ける所感 My Thoughts on the Time of the Great Kanto Earthquake'], in *Jikei* [自警 Vigilante], vol. 51 (November 1923); quoted in Kang Töksang 姜徳相 and Kūm Pyōngdong 琴秉洞, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 6: Kanto Daishinsai to Chōsenjin* [現代史資料第六巻：関東大震災と朝鮮人 Source Materials on Contemporary History, vol. 6: Great Kanto Earthquake and Koreans], (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1963), 9-11 (hereafter referred to as *Kanto Daishinsai to Chōsenjin*).
- 111) *Osaka Asahi Shinbun*, 5 October 1923; quoted in Kang Töksang 姜徳相, *Kanto Daishinsai* [関東大震災 The Great Kanto Earthquake], (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1975), 20. The motion to introduce Martial Law was withdrawn during the afternoon of September 1, 1923 owing to strong opposition within the government. However, amendments were made to the bill as a result of Akaike's strong arguments and Martial Law was imposed on the following day. See *Tokyo Asahi Shinbun*, 9 October 1923; quoted in Kang, *Kanto Daishinsai*, 17.
- 112) See *Kanto Daishinsai Gojūshūnen Chōsenjin Giseisha Chōsa Tsuitō Jigyō Jikkō Inkaï* [関東大震災六十周年朝鮮人犠牲者調査追悼事業実行委員会 The Standing Committee for Investigative and Memorial Enterprises, Fifty-Year Memorial for Korean Victims of the Great Kanto Earthquake], ed., Kakusareteita Rekishi: *Kanto Daishinsai to Saitama no Chōsenjin Gyakusatsu Jiken* [かくされていた歴史：関東大震災と埼玉の朝鮮人虐殺事件 The Hidden History: The Great Kanto Earthquake and the Massacre of Koreans in Saitama], (Omiya: Nicchō Kyōkai Saitama Rengōkai, 1974), 61 and 71.
- 113) *Kokumin Shinbun* 国民新聞, 14 October 1923. This is taken from an article of Uesugi Shingo 上杉慎吾, 'Keisatsu Kanken ni Kaitō o Motomu' ['警察官憲に回答を求め Requesting a Definite Response from Police Officials'], quoted in *Kanto Daishinsai to Chōsenjin*, 148. Newspaper and magazine articles did not play a major role in circulating the anti-Korean rumors among the Japanese public in the Kanto area partly because the earthquake and the subsequent fires prevented the immediate restoration of communications system in devastated areas and partly because the government exercised control over the publication of newspaper and magazine articles which were considered to be opposed to its handling of the Korean affair. On September 3, the Home Ministry Police Affairs Bureau notified Japan's newspapers that since any rumors about Korean rioting would only increase social unrest, the publication of articles concerning Koreans would culminate in a ban on the sale and distribution of the offending newspaper. See *Kanto Daishinsai to Chōsenjin*, 332-3. It was not until October 20, that the Japanese government lifted censorship on publication of newspaper and magazine articles dealing with the Korean issue.

- 114) Home Ministry, ed., ‘Shinsai ni tomonau Chōsenjin Hogo Shūyōjin’in Shirabe’ [‘震災に伴う朝鮮人保護収容人員調査 Studies of the Number of Protected Koreans at the time of the Earthquake’], quoted in Kūm Pyōngdong, ed., *Kanto Daishinsai Chōsenjin Gyakusatsu Mondai Kankei Shiryō II: Chōsenjin Gyakusatsu Kanren Kanchō Shiryō* [関東大震災朝鮮人虐殺問題関係資料：朝鮮人虐殺関連官庁資料 Historical Materials Concerning the Massacre of the Koreans after the Great Kanto Earthquake, vol. 2: Official Materials Concerning the Massacre of Koreans], (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 1991), 23-6.
- 115) *Kanto Daishinsai to Chōsenjin*, 264-5. On September 3, Pak Yōl and other radical student leaders were housed in the Setagaya 世田谷, Yodobashi 淀橋 and other police stations in Tokyo. See Xu, “Boku Retsu Jiken,” 379-411. Iwamura, *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin to Nihon Rōdōsha Kaikyū*, 92.
- 116) Chiba ken ni okeru Kanto Daishinsai to Chōsenjin Giseisha Tsuitō Chōsa Jikkō Iinkai [千葉県における関東大震災と朝鮮人犠牲者追悼・調査実行委員会 A Memorial Survey Executive Committee for Korean Victims in Chiba Prefecture at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake], ed., *Iwarenaku Korosareta Hitobito* [いわれなく殺された人びと The Unjustifiable Slaughter of Persons], (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1983), 116-31.
- 117) Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造, ‘Chōsenjin Gyakusatsu Jiken ni tsuite’ [‘朝鮮人虐殺事件に就いて An Account of the Massacre of Koreans’], in *Kanto Daishinsai to Chōsenjin*, 364-5.