Hannah Arendt, the Nation State, and Federalism
– Beyond the Sovereign State System? –

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I. Introduction

When Alexis de Tocqueville analyzed democracy and its new political culture in America about a hundred and sixty years ago, he uttered the well-known statement: “A new political science is needed for a world itself quite new.” (1) It seems to me that Arendt’s political theory of freedom and citizenship is capable of contributing to envisioning a novel theory of politics now postulated for a new world of the twenty-first century. The world of today is characterized by uncertainties surrounding the sovereign state paradigm of modernity that set forth the dominating pattern for the arrangement of political society over the past three centuries. It is true, however, that the sovereign state system of modernity still remains effective in the international politics of the early twenty-first century. Furthermore, it is difficult to locate a new and emerging paradigm of political society that will replace it. But we are witnessing “anomalies” in the sense used by Thomas Kuhn that the paradigm of the sovereign state can no longer explain.

Naturally, these “anomalies” are either engendered or highlighted by such socio-political realities of the early twenty-first century as the globalization of financial capitalism, the north-south dichotomy in the relations of international economy, the rapid spread of global terrorism, and the counter attacks and new types of retaliatory war policies initiated by the United States of America in the face of the post-September 11 crisis. The list may also include the ecological and natural resources crises which threaten the earth as the habitat for humanity

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and other creatures, and the explosive advancement of the mechanism of transportation, communication and information, brought by technological discoveries and advancements. These “anomalies” seem to be in part at least related to the essential significance of the territoriality of the sovereign state which categorically divides the inside from the outside. This categorical division between the inside and the outside of the territorial boundary of the sovereign state is too overarching and rigid to cope with a number of nonterritorial issues, which are becoming more and more pressing in the early twenty-first century reality of the world. The present world is on a constant move toward the new epoch when no longer the state sovereignty alone but the citizens of the world will begin to assume the primary category of the political.

To be sure, Arendt’s lack of institutional concerns, often criticized by a number of commentators, can be regarded as a weakness of her political theory. Except for some ideas regarding a vision of a worldwide federal system, the imaginative fertility of her political theorizing does not seem to yield much needed theories concerning those institutional frameworks and democratic rights and obligations in light of which citizens can pursue the implementation of the politics of freedom and citizenship. This is a fundamental problem in Arendt’s political theory.

But, as indicated above, Arendt showed some hints about the more appropriate and feasible alternative of the institutional design vis-à-vis the current nation state system. One of these possibilities is her occasional reference to the possibility of a worldwide federal system which she sporadically made from time to time. And as recent discussions on “new constitutionalism” proffered by Karol Edward Soltan, Stephen J. Elkin, and others seem to suggest, current political theorizing has become interested in the capacity of traditional concepts for providing the new political design for political society. The proposal for “new constitutionalism” is meant to express the theoretical effort to understand more broadly its meaning in order to cover not only the traditional significance of constitutionalism as the legal apparatus of check and balance to control the political power of rulership. It aims further at broadening the concept...
so as to signify the function of constitutionalism to constitute the institutional design for political society. Yet one of our purposes in this article is by no means to explore the conceptual possibility of “constitutionalism” but rather to claim that the traditional concept of federalism should be highlighted as to its capacity for institutional design in view of the fact that federalism has long served as the prominent mechanism of institutional design for political society for many centuries.

The strength of Arendt’s political theory, however, resides in its capacity to invite ordinary people and citizens to cultivate what can be termed as spirituality of citizenship. The essence of her theory of citizenship does not reside in the category of liberal right with its emphasis on the formal and legal aspects of citizenship. But, like Sheldon S. Wolin’s or Bernard Crick’s, it primarily belongs to its substantial category of constitution, participation, and solidarity which ultimately stems back to Aristotle. In this sense, Arendt’s theory of citizenship stands in sharp contrast to the formal and legal category of citizenship whose unique feature consists in the guarantee of the rights of the members of the nation (the subjects) and their incorporation into the state. This participatory category of citizenship does not remain within its formal and legal category of representation, corporation, right, and entitlement of which Jean Bodin—one might add Hobbes and Locke--was apparently an arch-theorist. The latter is constituted on the premise of ruling power of the sovereign state, i.e., its absolute control over the state boundaries. One can rightly say that the contemporary liberal theory of rights essentially resides in the Bodinist heritage.

Citizens who, Arendt presupposes, can be regarded as a sort of contemporary “political animals”(Aristotle). In her understanding citizens do not perceive themselves as the privatized inhabitants of the city, preoccupied with defending their own rights vis-à-vis others and the city. Moreover, they regard themselves as the political actors and initiators who make the city a genuine world of their own by loving, and caring for, it. Therefore, for Arendt citizens are not simply the indwellers of the city but the common builders of it. They are not naturally citizens by birth; rather they become citizens by loving
the city and committing themselves to its common welfare.\(^{(6)}\) This participatory conception of citizenship in Arendt is a fundamental “anomaly” with the modern conception of citizenship and nationality which is basically Bodinist, formal, and representational. At the same time, Arendt’s participatory conception of citizenship inserts a radical doubt into this modern conception of citizenship where a cultural community is simply superimposed. What unmistakably lies at the center of Arendt’s conception of citizenship is the spirit of *amor mundi* as the public bond which produces a citizens’ politics of solidarity and friendship. This politics of solidarity and friendship, which manifests itself in voluntary associations, aims at the constitution of the common world. It resists, if necessary, those world-alienating forces which would threaten their world-building capacity.

II. Arendt’s Two Notions of Action

Perhaps the best summary of Hannah Arendt’s political theory is her well-known statement: “The *raison d’être* of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action.”\(^{(7)}\) Herein is expressed Arendt’s vision of a politics of freedom in which politics, freedom, and action are integrated with one another in a tight trinitarian formula. In this vision, there lies at the core of politics the notion of public freedom as citizens’ collective action through speech and deed in the public realm. Politics, freedom, and action are so intimately fused with one another that whatever does not belong to this trinity—whether it is the social, truth, conscience, or goodness—is jealously warded off from the public realm, the only place for her where authentic politics takes place.

It is often—and correctly—noted that Arendt holds two different notions of action, both of which can be traced back to Greek antiquity and seem, at first glance, contradictory to each other. One notion is concerned with Aristotelian concerted action, the other with Homeric agonistic performance. Her *magnum opus*, *The Human Condition* (1958), is indeed an intriguing work where these two divergent notions of action are simply laid down side by side\(^{(8)}\) without any
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deliberate attempt on her part to account for the relationship of the two. Those two notions of action in turn compose the basic, inescapable ingredients in her dual conception of politics: a politics of world-constructing and a politics of resistance.

To begin with, insofar as a recent growing literature on Arendt claims to show, the current interest in the public sphere and deliberative democracy once again has drawn the attention of political theorists to her first notion of action, i.e., citizens’ cooperation or concerted action in speech and deed. They have rediscovered a political theorist of the public sphere par excellence in Arendt who, together with Jürgen Habermas and Sheldon S. Wolin in their respective manners, laid down creative ways of criticizing both the solidification of state power and the citizens’ privatization in late modernity. They singled out the public sphere or the political as the citadel of genuine politics and democracy.\(^9\) Insofar as Arendt is concerned, it is evident that the notion of citizens’ cooperation in terms of “acting in concert” (Edmund Burke) rests on her theoretical reconstruction of the ancient Greek experiences of the bios politikos as epitomized by Aristotle.\(^{10}\) According to her innovative understanding, since action like speech is based on the fundamental human condition of plurality, it goes on between persons and takes place in an already existing “web of human relationships.” “The surrounding presence of others” is the sine qua non of action; as such it is nothing else than its defining feature.\(^{11}\)

Most important in her notion of people’s concerted action is her idea that their “acting together” creates and preserves the polis or public space. In Arendt’s understanding the significant meaning of the ancient Greek polis should not be understood statically, as an ordinary institutional or topographical image.\(^{12}\) It is, instead, like the biblical idea of the ekklēsia (church), to be understood in the dynamic terms of a community’s living collective existence itself. In other words, it must be grasped as an interpersonal and phenomenological notion. Arendt described the interpersonal and phenomenological feature of the polis by invoking the famous saying of the ancient Greece, “Wherever you go, you will be a polis”: 

\(^9\)\(^{10}\)\(^{11}\)\(^{12}\)
The *polis*, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be.\(^{(13)}\)

Arendt applied the ancient Greeks’ phenomenological self-understanding of the *polis* to her own notion of the public realm. The public realm as such is neither necessarily nor automatically the public space for citizens’ appearance. Instead the public realm *becomes* the public space of appearance, or rather the public space of appearance *opens up* within the public realm *hic et nunc*, as it were, only when and where citizens act together by sharing words and deeds. If and only if this happens, the public realm as such *becomes* the locus of power and common action where freedom appears and the *who* of the actors is revealed.\(^{(14)}\) Understood in this way, the Arendtian phenomenological and somewhat existentialist understanding of the public space of appearance suggests that it can encompass such diverse forms of “acting together” as the “new social movements,” the anti-nuclear demonstrations, the citizens’ organizations joined together for the public debate about the ecological future of the globe, and other similar groups.

Behind Arendt’s notion of the public space of appearance and freedom one can rightly perceive her phenomenological idea of the world. As it was suggested by a number of commentators, this idea was influenced by Heidegger’s understanding of *Dasein’s* “In-der-Welt-sein.” More importantly, it was also influenced by Augustine’s understanding of the world (*saeculum* or *mundus*). In point of fact, these two thinkers’ impact on her idea of the world is traceable in the earliest stage of her scholarly career: her dissertation, *Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin* (1929).

If I am to confine myself merely to Augustine's influence here, Arendt is Augustinian through and through in her understanding of the world. It can be seen, especially when she evokes Augustine to maintain that not the inhabitants
of the world but those who love and care for the world alone can turn the world as God's creation into a genuinely human world of their own, which is to say, their own home, and that at the same time they themselves become the true citizens of the world by so doing.\(^{(15)}\) It follows that just as the family is not merely biologically constituted but more significantly the family becomes a true family by its members’ mutual love and care, so citizens’ *amor mundi* alone is what is capable of constituting the world and of making it a true world of their own. I would like to call attention to the generally overlooked fact that Augustine, often referred to as “my old friend”\(^{(16)}\) by Arendt, remains a decisive influence on the formation of her thought. For one can easily discern the imprint of both Augustine’s thought itself and his mode of thinking in such constitutive concepts as the world, world alienation, love, *amor mundi*, citizenship, natality, mortality, power, willing, freedom, and memory. These concepts are either what she rather directly came to acquire and make her own out of her examination of Augustine's thought or the result of having reformulated his ideas by means of her confrontation or dialogue with them.

To be sure, Arendt shares the common ground with Habermas’s communicative theory. This can be seen especially in identifying the creative and critical realm of people’s interaction in the public sphere. Both thinkers assume that the public sphere in its undistorted form signals the space of freedom and equality where prevails neither the pattern of domination nor the one of systematization as often seen in the state or in the market. Moreover, Arendt shares with Habermas the pessimistic understanding of the politics of our age. Both thinkers recognize the deepening crisis of the disintegration of the public sphere in the late-modern development of the “mass society.” Despite these points of concurrence, however, certain major differences between Arendt and Habermas figure prominently with regard to the assessment of the public sphere.

First, whereas Habermasian communicative theory--or ethics in more recent years--is aimed at consensus *per se* reached through discursive processes in the public sphere, Arendt is concerned not so much with the public space as the realm where consensus is to be reached as with the realm where people will
cooperate with one another in dealing with whatever is common and public, and where freedom as well as something new and virtuosic will appear.\textsuperscript{(17)} Second, a great difference consists in their views with regard to the relationship between the public sphere and civil society. On the one hand, Habermas's more or less sociological and institutional approach, especially in his early work on the structural transformation of the public sphere, assumes that the public sphere is rooted in, and emerges from, what has been traditionally called civil society. On the other hand, Arendt's approach refuses to conceive the public space in sociological or institutional terms. She also draws a sharp line of demarcation between it and whatever is social. As we shall see, Arendt tends to understand the social as the systematizing and totalizing forces which usurp the creative potentials of the public sphere and the freedom of politics as well.\textsuperscript{(18)}

Third, the two thinkers differ in their assessments of difference and struggle. This divergence is important for our concern here. On the one hand, the Habermasian theory of the public sphere generally emphasizes the establishment of unity and consensus as the \textit{telos} of communicative rationality. It cannot easily swallow difference and struggle as such.\textsuperscript{(19)} On the other hand, Arendt is concerned less about winning consensus or agreement than about doing justice to, and invigorating, the human condition of plurality. She insists that human plurality which “has the twofold character of distinction and equality” is the basic condition for freedom, as much as it remains the law of the world and of the self.\textsuperscript{(20)}

This observation in turn leads directly to Arendt's second notion of action, agonistic performance. The second notion of action itself accounts for her persistent concern to underscore a creative element in \textit{agôn}, struggle, diversity, and difference. This notion of agonistic and heroic action was again derived from her interpretative reconstitution of the Greek experiences of the warrior’s politics as seen through Homeric and Periclean notions of action. This agonal spirit was, according to Arendt, manifest in Achilles who was depicted by Homer as “the doer of great deeds and the speaker of great words.” \textsuperscript{(21)} The epic actor of agonistic performance was inspirted by the urge toward his own excellency in
extraordinary deeds and words so as to win “immortal fame.” As such it became “the prototype of action for Greek antiquity.” Needless to say, however, it is important to be reminded that this agonistic action tended to be anarchic, anti-democratic, and even destructive of the public realm itself.

A bewildering aspect of her sudden introduction of this agonistic performance in *The Human Condition* is that Arendt fails to account for the reason why this “highly individualistic” type of action, aiming competitively at distinction, glory and self-disclosure that is obtained often at the expense of other people, can be qualified as belonging to the category of action that is, by definition, based on plurality. To be sure, a political community is postulated by Arendt in order to remember, to tell a story about, and to pass to later generations, the great deeds and words of the political actors, lest the memory of their heroic virtù should be forgotten. But there seems to be no solid explanation provided, on Arendt’s part, for the ground on which agôn is tied up to “acting in concert.” Perhaps the only possible exception is her etymological delineation of action, i.e., the Greek word archein and the Latin agere. Arendt points toward the original meaning of archein or agere, which is, “to take an initiative,” “to begin something new,” “to lead,” or “to set something in motion.”

There is no doubt that as some of the recent commentators especially from the theoretical--not always but mostly postmodern--perspectives of difference and creative contest have made it clear, Arendt is indeed so fascinated with agonistic performance that her notion of action can be described as implying both a celebration of agonistic contestation and an almost dramaturgic significance of action itself. For instance, Bonnie Honig, in her stimulating work entitled *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* (1993), has submitted to a thoroughgoing criticism various types of what she calls “virtue theories of politics” whether republican, liberal, or communitarian. According to Honig, these various forms of political theorizing have resulted in what she refers to as “the displacement of politics in political theory,” due to their essential hostility to the disruptive and contentious elements of politics. Honig appeals to
Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and Arendt in particular, for a theoretical alternative, i.e., an agonistic, virtuosic, and invigorating vision of politics.\(^{(28)}\)

Despite the fact that we need to be constantly aware of their individualist and possibly anti-democratic tendency, there is little doubt that Honig and others have recovered as a necessary corrective an agonistic aspect of Arendt’s notion of action which is often overlooked by the theorists of the public sphere and deliberative democracy. After all, Arendt is a political theorist with an epic disposition who has ascribed to action “the shining brightness we once called glory” and “the criterion of greatness” in the manner of a Homeric and even Hesiodic poet.\(^{(29)}\)

As already mentioned, Arendt’s notion of action together with speech assumes its existentialist and phenomenological character in its revelatory or self-disclosing function. What action necessarily reveals is not the what of the actor, that is, his talents, qualities or attributes but the who of the actor, that is, his own *persona*, his qua-person character, his unique and distinct identity or personal traits.\(^{(30)}\) For Arendt this is why action reveals freedom, and why the public space is the space of freedom.\(^{(31)}\) As we shall see later, the interdependent relationship between action and freedom in Arendt’s thought resides in the former’s personal and self-disclosing capacity. Action is free, whenever it reveals something personal of the agent—that is, his *Selbständigkeit*. Thus, one may rightly say that the specific character of freedom consists in an uncoerced and spontaneous self-disclosing of the agent’s identity. Again, action is free, whenever it is guided by a value, an intention or a motivation which is personal or whenever it arises out of the agent’s willing consent. In contrast, action is not free, whenever it is dictated by what is not intrinsic of the agent, that is, some objective force outside of his willing, whether it be someone else’s will or the domineering power of the state, the force of capital, or the mechanism of the market. For Arendt such action cannot be legitimately regarded as an expression of freedom.
III. Arendt’s Politics of Freedom and Citizenship

When we analyze and examine Arendt’s ideas of politics within the broader framework of her major works, it becomes apparent that for her a politics of freedom basically consists of two fundamental modes of politics. One can be characterized as a politics of world-constructing and the other as a politics of resistance. Her two notions of action which we have already examined, i.e., people’s concerted action and their agonistic performance, serve as the basic stuff and ingredients which make up each of the dual aspects of politics. My understanding is that the Arendtian politics of freedom can become a source of great illumination for citizens both within and beyond the territorial boundary of the nation state in the light of their current quest for a theoretical formulation of citizens’ democratic politics of freedom.

First, Arendt’s fervor for a politics of constructing the common and public world from below can be traced in various forms in every single book she has written for political theory. The most conspicuous form of Arendt’s politics of world-constructing is beyond doubt a politics of founding, as developed particularly in *The Human Condition* (1958), *On Revolution* (1963), and *Between Past and Future* (enlarged ed., 1968). She was especially interested in the modern founding of the American Republic as well as the ancient foundation of the Roman Republic. These political foundings are not only the political acts of constituting the body politic but also the outcomes of people’s free action in terms of beginning something new and permanent. In the cases of ancient Rome and of modern America the political founding not only became the authoritative beginning but also came to guarantee the stability of the body politic for succeeding generations. Arendt pays close attention to the framing of a constitution in the modern age, since this act is understood as identical with the act of political founding under modern conditions. Her well-known preference for the founding of the American Republic over and against the French Revolution is backed up by her argument that the American case more closely than the French case resembled what the Medieval legist Bracton called *constitutio libertatis*. 
Arendt’s preoccupation with political *founding* is significant for our concern. For it belongs to both categories of action that we have already seen: agonistic action and cooperation. Without the agonal, virtuosic and revolutionary action of the founders, there can be no possibility for bringing about something new, i.e., a new body politic of freedom, and no way to set up the institutional framework for new political regime. Likewise, without the people’s concerted effort to create, care for, and maintain the body politic and its institutional framework, no political founding can succeed or endure.

Arendt’s notion of action as cooperation, her vision of common power from below as arising out of people’s concerted effort to “act together,” her idea of *amor mundi*, and her political notions of forgiveness and keeping promises, all seem to fit well with a politics of constructing the common world. The driving motor of the politics of world-constructing is nothing less than what she calls “the world-building capacity” of men and women, as it is displayed whenever they “act in concert” and thus keep power in existence by “binding and promising, and combining and covenancing.”

Second, Arendt’s vision of politics also comprises another mode of the politics of freedom, and I would like to call it a politics of resistance. To be sure, the resistance aspect of Arendtian politics of freedom might look less clear-cut and less developed than its counterpart, a world-constructing politics. Nonetheless, Arendt’s commitment to the philosopher’s existence in solitude, to the pariah’s dialectical attitude toward the surrounding world, to the political significance of civil disobedience, and even to the notion of *amor mundi* itself, all seem to point toward a politics of resistance. As a matter of fact, her vision of authentic politics itself signifies an aversion not only to the systematizing forces of the market, of capital, and of labor; but it also expresses an aversion to any politics of systematization, whether it be a bureaucratic politics of control or a hegemonic politics of rulership. Her ideal forms of politics are often those of either local and small-scale politics or revolutionary resistance. They include, for instance, the ancient Greek *polis*, the Roman *res publica*, the colonial American township, the American Revolution, the council system during the French
Revolution, the soviets on the eve of the Russian Revolution, the Hungarian Revolution, and the civil rights movement in the United States.

Thus, Arendt’s vision of politics is unmistakably one of resistance, which always makes a stand against any systematizing or automatizing force, whether social, scientific-technological or ideological, when they come to usurp the public space of action and freedom. There exists a certain resemblance between Arendt’s politics of resistance and the poststructuralist—and particularly Foucauldian—“resistance” as a local struggle against the centralizing hegemony of the knowledge/power compound.\(^{37}\) It is also true that the core of her agonistic action is manifest in this very politics of resistance. The arena of politics is here again the very locale for beginning something new where significant alterations or transformations will take place first in the world.\(^{38}\)

The general context informing this politics of resistance is Arendt’s multitudinous protest against what Hans Erler has once characterized as “the totalizing process-character of modernity.”\(^{39}\) Moreover, her politics of resistance signifies a politics of preservation, that is, an attempt to preserve the common world of human plurality and the possibility of action and freedom in the face of the systematizing, automatizing and totalizing forces of the modern world.\(^{40}\) She has identified a variety of alienating forces threatening the possibility of politics. The list of those forces is appalling both in their multiplicity and because of their sharing the common feature of modernity. They comprise the ideological and self-authenticating “laws of Nature or of History” in totalitarianism, the levelling and conforming demands of the social, the instrumentalism and utilitarianism of the mass and consumer society, the life-bound automatizing—at the same time endless and worldless—processes and mentality of labor, or the “universalization” of the techno-scientific knowledge/power.\(^{41}\) Thus, the theme of resistance to the systematizing and world-alienating forces of the modern world should be understood as the most comprehensive framework in which Arendt’s politics of resistance is set. But Arendt’s politics of resistance has been elaborated and treated more concretely at least in the following three specific areas: civil disobedience, the pariah’s attitude toward the world, and the solitary philosopher.
in his borderline existence. According to Arendt, while these forms of resistance attempt to challenge the evil and falsity of politics, they might, by so doing, save and preserve rather than destroy the possibility of politics without violating the rules of the realm of politics. Therefore, despite their anti-political or unpolitical outlook, they can remain to her distinctively political forms of resistance.

Thus, the content of Arendt’s politics of freedom is far from empty or insubstantial. This Arendtian vision of the politics of freedom, expressed concretely in terms of a politics of constructing the common world as well as a politics of resistance, seems to have rich potentials to be further employed and elaborated for the best advantage of the democratic politics of both the citizens within the nation state and the citizens of the world.\(^{42}\) Just as the Sitz im Leben for her notion of power is to be located not in the ordinary realm of the sovereign state but in the realm of citizens’ participation, so the very locus where the Arendtian politics of freedom is to be practiced and pursued is the field of the citizens’ democratic participation in politics both within and without the nation state. To be sure, such ideas as “world citizenship” and “democracy beyond the territorial boundary of the nation state” still have a certain utopian ring around them. For these ideas have not yet established sufficiently their institutional and legal underpinnings. As William Connolly indicated, however, the idea of “territorial democracy” as well as the idea of citizenship confined within the territorial boundary of the state clearly have the air of unreality and utopianism all the more in the world today.\(^{43}\) This view is compelling especially in the light of the present situation where the world is visited by globally related issues such as ecological disaster, the exhaustion of natural resources, the threat of nuclear weapons, the north-south dichotomy, the amalgamation or centralization of power and resources in international political economy, and ethnic and racial conflicts. It seems obvious then that besides the nation states and international organizations, the world citizens together with many reliable forms of non-governmental organizations, are called out as actors of worldwide-grassroots politics to participate in the public matters pertaining to the world as a whole.
IV. The Sovereign State, Human Rights, and Civil Rights

Arendt’s basic doubt about the sovereign state and its citizenship does not lead to the advocacy for the abolition of the modern sovereign state. Nor it leads to the endorsement of the liberal idea of world citizenship which enjoyed popularity with certain segments of intellectuals before, during, and after World War II. World War I had a significant impact on Arendt’s thinking, the indelible trace of which is found, for instance, in a chapter entitled “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man” in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. In this chapter she argues that the occurrence of World War I signaled the collapse of European civilization. It is important to note that Arendt’s own “stateless” predicament during World War II enabled her to perceive that the greatest and far-reaching consequence of World War I was its creation of massive “stateless,” “homeless” and “rightless” people in the midst of European Continent. In Arendt’s mind an essential characteristic of the twentieth-century refugees resides in the intimate interconnectedness in which their “statelessness,” “homelessness,” and “rightlessness” are set with one another. In reference to refugees, she states:

> Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth.

Particularly in the post-World War I context where took place the massive flow of the minorities and the stateless people of Eastern and Southern Europe into Central and Western Europe, according to Arendt, “hatred” began to play a central role in public affairs everywhere in Europe and “denationalization” became a new powerful weapon of totalitarian politics. The disintegration of Europe shattered the façade of Europe’s political system. It laid bare its hidden frame; European nation-states were unable to guarantee human rights to those who had lost nationally guaranteed rights. She states as follows:
The very phrase “human rights” became for all concerned--victims, persecutors, and onlookers alike--the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy.\(^{(49)}\)

As Arendt argues, the relationship between “human rights”--or natural rights--and nationally guaranteed “civil rights” is far from straightforward but replete with a series of “poignant” ironies not only by fact but also in principle.\(^{(50)}\) The most piercing irony consists in the fact that the experience of refugees in the twentieth century has shown that there can be no human rights without civil or nationally guaranteed rights, despite the fact that human rights have been conceived as “fundamental,” “natural,” and “inalienable” since the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789.\(^{(51)}\) This painful fact has been commonly recognized and experienced by millions of stateless and homeless people in the twentieth century which has been correctly labeled as “the century of the refugee.”\(^{(52)}\) Stateless persons suddenly discovered their plight in which they not only lost their home, i.e., a distinct place in the world, but also they lost government protection for their fundamental human rights. Human rights, whether life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, according to the American formula, or equality before the law, liberty, protection of property, and national sovereignty, according to the French, proved to be “unenforceable” even in countries whose Constitutions were based upon them.\(^{(53)}\) Needless to say, the loss of human rights for Arendt were detrimental both to human beings’ “humanity” and to their “political capacity.” The loss of human rights primarily meant “the loss of the relevance of the speech” and “the loss of all human relationship,” that is, the essential prerequisites for humanity and politics.\(^{(54)}\)

To begin with, human rights were commonly held to be independent of any nationality, government, citizenship and the state. Human rights were supposed to be, once and for all, bestowed inalienably and universally upon every person. The fact remains, however, that human rights presuppose national citizenship. Indeed, human rights are guaranteed in terms of civil rights by the Constitution of the sovereign state, so that the loss of national or civil rights may entail the
loss of human rights. Arendt’s view regarding the discrepancy between human rights and civil rights is basically twofold. First, she maintains over and against the theorists who claim the priority of “natural” or “human rights” over “civil rights” that the former not only in principle but also in fact depend on the latter. Consequently a political artifice is needed for the protection of human rights. Arendt states as follows:

... the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them.

As Robert Legros has persuasively argued, human rights in the thought of Arendt presuppose not the apriori idea of human beings’ innate and inalienable rights but rather their life in human plurality and the common world deeply rooted in the historicity of people.

Arendt’s second point is closely related to the first. She shows that the declaration of inalienable human rights out from the start produced “an ‘abstract’ human being who seemed to exist nowhere.” Both the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man used language like “inalienable,” “given with birth,” and “self-evident truth,” which undoubtedly stem from an “abstract” idea of human beings. In this connection, Arendt highlighted Edmund Burke’s criticism of the “natural rights” language of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in the French Revolution. According to Burke, the “rights of man” claimed in the French Revolution were an “abstraction.” For Burke, it was much wiser to rely on an “entailed inheritance” of rights which has been historically transmitted. Thus, Burke insisted that “human rights” should be claimed as the “rights of an English man” rather than as human being’s “inalienable rights.” Arendt approvingly appealed to Burke’s claim:

According to Burke, the rights we enjoy spring “from within the nation,” so
that neither natural law, nor divine command, nor any concept of mankind such as Robespierre’s “human race,” “the sovereign of the earth,” are needed as a source of law.\(^{(61)}\)

Arendt’s support of Burke’s argument that the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was human beings’ greatest danger betrays again her following conviction which lies at the center of her political theory: “Our political life rests on the assumption that we can produce equality through organization, because man can act in and change and build a common world, together with his equals and only with his equals.”\(^{(62)}\)

V. Toward a World Confederation and Dual Citizenship

There seems to be little question in my view that some substantial factors which make up Arendt’s political theory of freedom suggest the way beyond the modern paradigm of the sovereign nation-state. For example, her lifelong quest for the public vinculum points to the establishment of the artificial—not naturalistic—mode of political identity among the citizens as diverse equals.\(^{(63)}\) Her vision of the artificial public vinculum of the citizens is an expression of political and discursive “constructionism” of citizens; as such it is essentially incongruous with a naturalistic or quasi-naturalistic mode of political corporation inherent to the modern nation-state and its “primordialism” expressed in the modern nationalist ideology.\(^{(64)}\)

Furthermore, her animosity toward the notion of sovereignty as the basis for the consolidation of rulership, whether state sovereignty or the sovereignty of people, unmistakably expresses the core of her vision of a citizens’ politics informed by human freedom and plurality. In an unpublished manuscript entitled “Nationalstaat und Demokratie” (1965), she argues that the concept of sovereignty stemming anyway from absolutism is becoming “a dangerous illusion” in the contemporary international relation of powers. Arendt also argues that only in a decentralized “federation” alone a “real” democracy in world politics can become effective.\(^{(65)}\) It may be correct to say that Arendt’s
political reflection incorporates the same “weltbürgerliche Absicht” as she herself discovered in Immanuel Kant and Karl Jaspers.\(^{(66)}\)

Indeed, Arendt’s search for a decentralized “federation” for the future generations is a relevant contribution in view of the current plight of various types of refugees. Furthermore, it is not an exaggeration to claim that “federalism” broadly defined\(^{(67)}\) is postulated theoretically by the post-Cold War politics of the world. Theoretically speaking, the notion of “federalism” alone can do justice to the aspirations of our age as suggested by the two gigantic waves of the late-modern age, democracy and nationalism. Today’s world finds itself threatened to be engulfed by these two waves, as they often--but not always--battle against each other. As represented by the People’s Revolution of February 1986 in the Philippines and by a series of the Citizens’ Revolutions of 1989 in the countries of Eastern Europe, the world is visited with what Samuel P. Huntington called the “third wave of democracy.”\(^{(68)}\) Surprising to Marxists and liberals alike, as equally strong as the demand for democracy today is nationalism especially in the form of the reclaiming of ethnic identity and self-determination on the part of manifold minority groups in various parts of the world.

A common denominator governing the recent waves of democracy and nationalism is the political awakening of ordinary people and citizens. This is apparent in assertions based on self-determination and human rights. To be sure, many ethnic and racial conflicts today manifest the explosion of violence and inhumanity, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But we cannot deny the presence of democratic moments in some of the manifestations of recent national or ethnic identity and “multiculturalism.” In view of the strong influence of these double waves of democracy and nationalism, federalism is theoretically postulated today, insofar as it remains true to its own original definition: a combined system of self-rule and shared rule\(^{(69)}\) or a system of self-identity and interrelatedness to the world outside. In my view nationalism without being backed up by federalism cannot obtain its solid and constructive bridge to the world outside or whatever is heterogeneous to itself. Democracy as
well can neither fulfil its own principle nor ground itself solidly and enduringly in the historical situation it is confronted with, unless it is closely tied up with federalism. Therefore, federalism is the key that will unlock the dilemmas or problems that often plague both nationalism and democracy today.\(^{(70)}\)

But when we turn to Arendt’s own ideas regarding the possibility of overcoming the sovereign state paradigm, it is not a simple story. For, as we have just seen in the above section, Arendt’s astute analyses of the depoliticized calamity of stateless persons in the post-World War I Europe indicate that a state apparatus even in the form of the sovereign state is vital for the protection of human rights. Therefore, Arendt endorses neither the liberal notion of the world government nor the idealistic notion of world citizenship.\(^{(71)}\) What she found “nonsense” is the monolithic or universalist type of world citizenship which altogether disregards the historical and national diversities of peoples as well as the cultural, racial and ethnic identity of a person. Obviously she fears that where no solid institutional and legal apparatuses are organized to ground and nurture them, such liberal-idealistic notions as world government and world citizenship can easily turn into the dreaded Leviathan world state.

The centralist and monolithic world government was for Arendt a nightmarish prospect for the future world where authentic politics is surely to be wiped out. Her position here seems to be congruous, for example, with the view suggested by Stephen Toulmin. He also searched for a decentered world order by denying the Leviathan world state. Instead Toulmin upheld “Lilliputian organizations” such as citizens’ groups, non-governmental organizations, and small countries.\(^{(72)}\)

Although Arendt did not propose any clear alternative to both the modern paradigm of the sovereign state and to the Leviathan world government, it seems apparent that her seminal ideas would point to the possibility of a horizontal type of a worldwide federal system or, perhaps more accurately, a worldwide confederation.\(^{(73)}\) Such concepts as a federal system or a confederation in our usage signify both citizens’ politics from below and citizens’ solidarity forged out of their differences. By such concepts as worldwide federalism and
worldwide confederation we basically mean not merely the confederation of the states but more emphatically the formation of worldwide democratic political networks of citizens.

Yet we should be reminded of the fact that Arendt was open to--albeit by no means optimistic of--the future possibility of the international federal system in which “power .... is horizontally directed so that the federal units mutually check and control their powers.” (74) She also talked about the future and new form of government in terms of people’s “spontaneous organization of council systems” whose principle of organization “begins from below, continues upward, and finally leads to a parliament.” (75) She affirmatively referred to the possibility of a world-wide council state, stating that “a council state of this sort, to which the principle of sovereignty would be wholly alien, would be admirably suited to federations of the most various kinds.” (76)

What somewhat resembles her position in this respect is Thomas Jefferson’s well-known ideas about what he calls “elementary republics” or “little republics,” if they are reinterpreted to cover a global network of “elementary republics.” (77) In the case of Arendt, the main actors of the global “elementary republics” should be the citizens who are willing to participate in many different layers of politics by means of various kinds of council organizations. It seems natural to conclude then that Hannah Arendt is open, to say the least, to what Karl Jaspers used to maintain, that is, a diversified, horizontal and federative system in which the politics of world citizenship is to be sought after. (78)

Arendt’s vision of a worldwide federal system is a horizontally organized, decentralist and diversified type of a world confederation where various forms of local, national and collective identities will receive due regard and respect. Any vision of world federalism, if it remains relevant to the world today, must do justice to the local, cultural, ethnic, national, regional, and historical diversities of the peoples in the world. People are always embodied with various and particular “constitutive attachments.” (79) But at the same time the consolidation of the political identity of world citizens in the new global age will be encouraged and promoted. World confederation clearly means to be
above all the political space for coexistence with others. It is also the political mode of existing and living together with others. The political principle here is solidarity in which the possibility of coexistence with whatever is heterogeneous is pursued to its logical limit.

This new notion of world citizenship is by no means the simple restatement of the old abstract, amorphous, and monolithic liberal-idealistic idea. Rather, it represents the new political identity of the citizens of the world as diverse equals, as they are willing to share the responsibility for caring for the earth and the world. This new notion of world citizenship does not reject the old local--either national or regional--citizenship. It aims at creating and maintaining dual citizenship in which every citizen equally belongs both to a local political society from which he is derived and to the oikoumene--the “whole inhabited world”--whose member he unmistakably is. Local citizenship and world citizenship complement one another. Without local citizenship the citizens of the world lose sight of concrete, immediate, and day-to-day responsibilities. Without world citizenship the citizens of the world cannot fulfil their shared task of constituting a common world which is inhabitable and plural, just and sustainable.

* This paper was first presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, which was held on August 31 through September 3, 1995. Later I somewhat elaborated this original paper by reading new materials and rethinking the themes.
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Endnotes
(1) Tocqueville 1969, p. 12.
(3) E.g., Soltan 1993, pp. 3-20. Elkin 1993, pp. 21-37.
(4) This concept of citizenship with its stress on citizens’ solidarity and participation has been traditionally cultivated in the heritage of republicanism. Its theory of power, while depending on the modern theory of sovereignty on the one hand, at the same time is, on the other, based upon another understanding of power, which is to say, the one of citizens’ community-based power. This participatory type of citizenship in the contemporary context gropes in part for a departure from the absoluteness of the ruling power and the politics of sovereignty. It seeks for what Jean Bethke Elshtain calls “a post-sovereign politics.” Cf., Elshtain 1991, pp. 549-561.
(7) Arendt 1978a, p. 146.
(9) In my assessment the following three works can be conceived as the pioneer works in the political theory of the public sphere: Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition; Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Inc., 1960); Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Darmstadt und Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1962).
(11) Ibid., pp. 182-184, 198-205.
(13) Arendt 1958, p. 198.
(14) Ibid., pp. 198-199. Arendt’s following statement is worthy of quoting: “The space of appearance comes into being wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action, and therefore predates and precedes all formal constitution of the public realm and the various forms of government, that is, the various forms in which the public realm can be organized. .... Wherever people gather together, it is potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and not forever.” Ibid., p. 199.
(17) The point has been made by a number of commentators. E.g., Villa 1992, pp. 713-714.

(19) Chantal Mouffe, for instance, similarly criticized Habermasian discursive theorists, saying that “they envisage the possibility of a politics from which antagonism and division would have disappeared.” Mouffe 1992, p. 13.

From a not altogether different angle Nancy Fraser claimed that Habermas's theory tended to end up with “only a single, comprehensible public sphere” and as a result “members of subordinated groups would have no areas for deliberation among themselves about their needs, objectives, and strategies.” Fraser 1992, p. 13. William Connolly also criticized the Habermasian consensus model for its failure to come to terms with such existential issues as death, guilt, suffering or grief which have political implications. Connolly 1991, p. 162.


(21) Arendt 1978a, p. 46.


(25) Ibid., pp. 198, 204.

(26) Ibid., p. 177.

(27) E.g., Honig 1993, pp. 2-4, 76-125. Villa 1993, pp. 274-308. Isaac 1992, pp. 104-106, 140-148. For instance, Honig argues the following by understanding Arendt in the Nietzschean perspective: “The mark of true politics, for Arendt, is resistibility and a perpetual openness to the possibility of re-founding. Like Nietzsche, she is attracted to virtù as an alternative because it ‘rouses enmity toward order.’ ... Like Nietzsche, she admires agôn and seeks to protect it from closure, from domination by any one idea, truth, essence, individual, or institution.” Honig 1993a, p. 116.

While sharing with Honig the recognition of the resistance--or rather rebellion in his terminology--aspect of Arendt’s notion of action, Jeffrey C. Isaac cannot be classified in the category of postmodern theory. Isaac 1992, pp. 105-106. Furthermore, it should be noted that Dana R. Villa rightly stresses Arendt’s intersubjectivity side of political action as well by linking it to the Kantian theory of taste and judgment. Villa 1993, pp. 291-302. But even Villa’s notion of aestheticizing action in this excellent article does not seem to be successful in explaining persuasively the basic tension between Arendt’s two notions of action. Ibid., pp. 276-279.

For the differences and agreements, whether explicit or implicit, among these three scholars, see the following. Honig 1993b, pp. 528-533. Isaac 1993b, pp. 534-540.

(28) Honig 1993a, pp. 2-16, 76-84, 115-125. A Japanese political theorist, Osamu Kawasaki, made a similar point by maintaining that Arendt’s sense of reserve toward the communication theory of truth is partly dictated by her fear that accepting it might result in unduly overshadowing

Dana R. Villa sees the Arendtian connection with Nietzsche somewhat in a different light, that is, the aestheticization of political action. Villa 1996, pp. 80-109.


Arendt argued as follows: “In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, while their physical identities appear without any activity of their own in the unique shape of the body and sound of the voice. This disclosure of ‘who’ in contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is—his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide—is implicit in everything somebody says and does.” Ibid., p. 179.


The Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiēsis is crucial for Arendt’s notion of action. She has contrasted the Greek poleis with the Roman republic, as the former’s governance belongs to the instance of poiēsis (fabrication) and the latter’s to that of praxis (action). Arendt 1958, pp. 194-197.

Arendt’s politics of resistance, however, may overall remain a modern concept rather than a postmodern one; such ideas as protest or resistance are basically modern concepts. Cf., MacIntyre 1984, p. 71.

Erler 1979, S. 50.


See Jeffrey C. Isaac’s excellent article on Arendt’s vision of invigorating, participatory democratic politics which is posed against both “mass democracy” and “representative democracy.” Isaac 1994, pp. 156-168.

(47) Arendt 1966a, pp. 268-269.
(48) Ibid., p. 269.
(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid., p. 279. Concerning the theme of human rights and civil rights in the thought of Hannah Arendt, see also Legros 1985, pp. 27-53.
(51) Arendt 1966a, pp. 290-302.
(52) Cf., Xenos 1993, p. 422.
(53) Arendt 1966a, pp. 293-295.
(54) Ibid., pp. 295-297.
(57) Arendt 1966a, p. 292.
(59) Arendt 1966a, p. 291.
(60) Ibid., p. 299.
(61) Ibid.
(62) Ibid., p. 301.
(64) Concerning the distinction between “primordialism” and “constructionism” in the mode of political corporation, see Comariff and Stern 1994, pp. 38-42.
(66) Arendt 1994, pp. 441-442.
(67) I follow Susan Bishay’s definition of “federalism”: “Federalism may be defined as a system of constitutional arrangements among sovereign political units to carry out clearly outlined policies best dealt with collectively by a “federation” (e.g., foreign policy, defense, monetary policies, custom regulations, etc.) while at the same time guaranteeing the political autonomy of these self-governing units concerning all other matters.” Bishay 1993, p. 77.
This definition is based on the more traditional European idea of federalism which is grounded in the notion of dual sovereignty, rather than the modern American version of it which simply means the “federal,” unitary state. Bishay’s definition does justice to the idea of federalism as traditionally understood in the federalist lineage of European thinkers including Johannes Althusius, Hugo Grotius, and P.-J. Proudhon. Cf., Chiba 2005a, pp. 110-131.
(69) Elazar 1987, pp. 5, 12, 84.
(70) In my understanding a type of federalism postulated today has to satisfy three criteria. First, it has to do justice to the authentic demand of the age for a participatory form of democracy in
various layers of social organization and politics. Second, federalism must incorporate within itself the authentic demand of multitudinous peoples and groups for their national, racial, and ethnic identity. Third, it must provide both a theory and an institutional arrangement which will allow peaceful coexistence among diverse peoples and groups so as to avoid the exclusive and self-absolutizing claims of a particular group. Cf., Chiba 2000, p. 118.

(75) Ibid., pp. 231-232.
(76) Ibid., p. 233.
(77) Arendt 1976, pp. 249-255.
(78) E.g., Arendt 1968, pp. 84-94.

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アーレント、国民国家、連邦主義
－主権国家システムを越えて？－

＜要約＞

千葉 真

本論考は、主権的国民国家パラダイムへのハッファ・アーレントのアンビヴァレントな態度に焦点をあてながら、彼女の政治思想の特質を形づくる特有の政治観、世界規模の連邦主義への関心などを取り上げたものである。しばしば批判されるように、確かにアーレントの政治的考察には制度構想において具体性と内実に欠ける点があることを見出すしつつ、しかし連邦主義的構想が断片的であるが表明されている事実に注目した。議論の流れとしては、アーレントの政治思想にみられる参加的なシティジンシップ論、活動の二つの概念、政治の現象学的理論、アウグスティヌスの思想との親和性、ハーバーマスとの相違点、自由とシティジンシップの政治論、主権国家と人権と市民権の問題、分権型の連邦制への関心、多層的シティジンシップ論への志向性などが、順次取り上げられている。

人権の保障のための主権的国民国家パラダイムの重要性が前提とされつつも、その前提を乗り越えて脱主権国家を追求するアーレントの試みは逆説に満ちたものであるが、この逆説にこそ、暴力の跳梁や利益の配分等から軽視される政治の原則の役割を復権しようとする彼女の政治思想の独自の境地と特徴が示されていることを指摘している。