

# Early Modern Religions and the Construction of Japanese Individuality\*

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## Introduction

This paper is a brief outline of a very large topic and also a small part of a book project.<sup>1)</sup> Prior to the time of Oda Nobunaga (1534-82) religion in Japan was a relatively simple matter, and there was at best a weak sense of either collective or individual identity. In terms of religion, Buddhism's denominations could be counted on two hands: catholic and highly doctrinal denominations like Tendai and Shingon vied with protestant denominations that emphasized correct action more than correct belief, and included the faith-based salvific Pure Land variants, the exclusivist Lotus teachings of Nichiren-shū, and the elitist contemplative Zen schools. Taken together these Buddhist denominations contributed the prevailing world view, cosmology, ethics, ontology and epistemology that characterized medieval Japan. Belief in *kami* was widespread and almost universal, but it would be premature to identify this as Shinto as it is known today, and in the perennial struggle between Buddhist church (*Buppō* 仏法) and state (*Ōbō* 王法) in Japan—which dates to at least the Nara period—the state was consistently a poor second.

Resting his case in substantial measure on the fact that *shūkyō* (宗教), the most commonly used term for religion in Japan, is an early-Meiji neologism, Jason Ananda Josephson has argued that there was no formal concept of “religion” in Japan until Westerners demanded freedom of such.<sup>2)</sup> In Japan, Isomae Jun'ichi 磯前順一 has led a similar charge in his Tokyo University 2010 doctoral dissertation, which has recently been translated into and published in English.<sup>3)</sup> Linguistic determinism does argue that people who speak or think in different languages have different thought processes and thus experience the world differently.<sup>4)</sup> Linguistic relativity challenges this position by asking questions such as whether one can experience a shade of color for which one's language lacks a specific name or term, or whether cumulus nimbus clouds can be observed if there is no agreed-upon native word for them, to which the obvious answer in both cases is of course. But, Josephson's and Isomae's arguments

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can easily be misunderstood: yes, it is the case that at the midpoint of the nineteenth century, religion was understood differently in Japan and in Europe, but this does not mean that there was no religion in Japan until Westerners revealed its secrets and offered keys to its understanding.

As recently as thirty-five years ago similar claims based on linguistic determinism were raised regarding orthodox Neo-Confucianism arguing that since the term “Neo-Confucianism” is a twentieth-century neologism, Neo-Confucianism did not exist in Edo-period Japan in either orthodox or heterodox fashion. Such terms as Shushigaku (朱子学), Dōgaku (道学) and Yōmeigaku (陽明学) notwithstanding, proponents of this counter-intuitive view seized upon the frequently imprecise and variegated use of the term “Neo-Confucianism” to argue for the absence of equivalency. Indeed, one could make similar claims about “religion” and even about “Japan.”<sup>5)</sup> I challenged this view nearly thirty-five years ago by organizing a symposium on the theme of responses to Neo-Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan in which we confirmed the existence of the cause by examining its effects.<sup>6)</sup> In 2013, I organized another symposium in which we examined evidence for the relatively and surprisingly high levels of individuality in early modern Japan, something that conventional wisdom repeatedly rejected until not long ago.<sup>7)</sup>

## Christianity

In a sense Christianity changed everything. The Tokugawa state initially aspired to control every aspect of one’s behavior, including the spiritual realm of one’s religious affiliation. Christianity was the first religion to be banned in Japan, but it was certainly not alone. The Bakufu refused to tolerate the separatist defiance of the *fujufuse* (不受不施) movement within Nichiren-shū Buddhism, as well as what it perceived to be the destabilizing impact of Pure Land ecstatic dancing movements called *odori nenbutsu* (踊念仏). Once these prohibitions became a matter of law, the most straightforward way for the Bakufu to ensure compliance was to require all persons to register with a local temple belonging to one of the officially recognized denominations of Buddhism, a strategy that was known as the *Shūmon aratame* (宗門改め). Kurozumi Makoto has observed that the requirement to demonstrate that one is not a Christian contributed to an enduring and ironic Christian influence on early modern Japanese society,<sup>8)</sup> as has been confirmed more recently in Jan C. Leuchtenberger’s study of an enduring Christian presence in early modern Japanese literature.<sup>9)</sup> What Kurozumi and others neglected, however, is how the *individual* responsibility to perform one’s obedience to the decrees of the Bakuhan realm contributed to an acknowledgement of the nascent integrity of the individual.

Consider the following contemporary description by a foreign observer, Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716) who was a German physician attached for two years 1690-92 to the Dutch trading post on the islet of Deshima in Nagasaki harbor. Kaempfer wrote of how at the end of each year, the neighborhood liaison “for each street conducts the *hito aratame*, that is, the registration of all members of the household, including the children and old people, specifying their personal name, place of birth and the *shū*, or religious sect of the head of the household.”<sup>10)</sup> In areas like Nagasaki notorious for their experience with Christianity and Christians, the practice of the *efumi* (絵踏み)

was used to sniff out practitioners of the proscribed faith. Kaempfer described how within days of this registration, local officials went street-by-street and house-by-house requiring all residents of a household to desecrate an “image of the crucified Christ and on another one of a saint to show that they renounce and curse Christ and his messengers.” Kaempfer wrote:

“After the inquisition council has sat down on a mat and everybody, young and old, as well as additional families lodged in the same house and the closest neighbors, if their house is not large enough to conduct the procedure there separately, have assembled and the cast images have been placed on the bare floor, the scribe opens his inspection register and reads the names. *As people’s names are read*, they come forward and walk over the images or step on them. Small children who cannot yet walk are picked up by their mothers and have their feet placed on the images as expression of disdain. After that, the head of the household puts his seal at the bottom of the inspection register so that the inquisitors can prove to the magistrates that the inquisition has taken place in the house.”<sup>11)</sup>

Note the overlapping levels of jurisdiction. The inquisition of the population is organized by household, and heads of household have responsibility for those who live under their roofs, regardless of kinship ties. However, the actual reckoning and demonstration of the *efumi* occurs one named person at a time, children and the elderly included, and is in this sense an individual responsibility. Further even the inquisitors themselves are dependent on the head-of-household’s seal on their inspection register to demonstrate to their own minds that the inquisition has taken place. Such demonstrations were a form of performance, and in a study of the political spaces in Tokugawa Japan, Luke Roberts has observed that the “ability to command performance of duty—in the thespian sense when actual performance of duty might be lacking—was a crucial tool of Tokugawa power that effectively worked toward preserving the peace in the realm.”<sup>12)</sup> For our purposes in this essay, however, the critical point is that it was an individual performance that one could not perform on behalf of another.

In this same context, consider the offer made in 1629 by Takenaka Uneme, the Bakufu-appointed Commissioner (Bugyō 奉行) to Nagasaki, to Antonio Ishida (1570-1632), a Jesuit priest arrested for his activities on behalf of his Catholic faith. Uneme is said to have proposed to Ishida that if he would only formally acknowledge his obedience to the Shogun’s laws, he could “continue to believe what he pleased in his own heart.”<sup>13)</sup> This remarkable offer suggests the existence of an individual sphere of privacy, which allowed for liberty in matters of personal beliefs, though categorically not in the physical performance of one’s faith. Examples like this of the gap between what the law demanded and what was in reality allowed existed at all levels of Tokugawa society, and it is this space between the state as public authority and the individual as semi-autonomous actor that stands out.

The contribution of Christianity to the construction of individual identity was a negative one, in the sense that it was the persecution of Christians for their faith and religious practices rather than anything distinctively doctrinal that contributed the most to this individual responsibility and one’s attendant identity as a Christian practitioner, but Christianity was by no means the only religion or thought-system (I have in mind

anything that qualifies in Japanese as 思想) that contributed to the emergence of identity, and beyond identity to individuality. The remainder of this essay will thus focus in each case briefly on the following—Buddhism, orthodox Neo-Confucianism (朱子学·道学), Itō Jinsai's *kogaku* (古学) and Ogyū Sorai's *kobunjigaku* (古文辞学), and the *kokugaku* (国学) of Kamo no Mabuchi 賀茂真淵 and Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長—examining their direct and indirect contributions to the creation of identity and individuality during the Edo period.

## Buddhism

With its persistent denial of the existence of a permanent self or soul, it is difficult to argue that Buddhist doctrine contributed in any significant ontological or conceptual fashion to either identity or individuality in early modern Japan, but there still are points that deserve our attention. First, all Buddhists agreed that as sentient creatures, part of the human endowment includes a Buddha-nature or Buddha-mind (*Busshō*, *Busshin* 仏性, 仏心) that represents the dharma (佛法) within, and that makes enlightenment possible. This common nature or mind linked all persons into a single humanity, but one that also included heavenly beings like Buddhas and bodhisattvas as well as degraded creatures like denizens of hell (*jigoku* 地獄) and hungry ghosts (*gaki* 餓鬼). And second, despite the Pure Land doctrinal emphasis on the denial of self-power (*jiriki* 自力) and insistence on relying on supernatural power outside oneself (*tariki* 他力), Pure Land Buddhists along with Nichiren followers emphasized the individual responsibility for reciting the *nenbutsu* (念佛) or *daimoku* (題目) invocations. Zen Buddhism of course also had a close connection with *bushi* (武士), who were at the forefront of early modern efforts to make a name for oneself and thus pioneers of individuality, and Zen's Ōbaku variant was an important contributor to the faddish interest in China as an exotic Other during the eighteenth century.

But it was Buddhism's institutional importance that is of greatest interest to this paper's argument. Because of the requirement that all births, deaths, divorces, household membership and movements be recorded at local parish temples, all persons in Edo-period Japan were nominally Buddhist, making Buddhism the virtual state religion of Tokugawa Japan. One could certainly believe in other forms of spirituality and spiritual practices, *Shingaku* (心学) and divination (占) being among many examples, but one's spiritual "foundation" was always Buddhist even for as committed a nativist as Motoori Norinaga.<sup>14)</sup>

Changing one's affiliation from one Buddhist denomination to another was notoriously difficult, but still possible under exceptional circumstances, and the arrangement of all Japanese temples into a main temple — branch temple (*honji-matsuji* 本寺·末寺) network contributed to a spiritual arterial system that at least in theory allowed for Bakufu oversight and management of temple affairs.<sup>15)</sup> It is also well known that the Bakufu appointed Commissioners for Temple and Shrine Affairs (*Jisha Bugyō* 寺社奉行) who were responsible for enforcement of the Bakufu's religious policies, but after reaching a high-water mark during the mid-seventeenth century, enforcement of the Bakufu's religious policies grew increasingly uneven and sporadic until late in the eighteenth century. As I have argued elsewhere, for violators of the Bakufu's religious policies, concealing oneself for one's victimless transgressions was not as difficult as

imagined, creating in effect a de facto sphere of privacy in one's personal religious practices.<sup>16)</sup>

### **Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism (朱子学・道学)**

Confucianism looms large in this discussion, especially in its orthodox Neo-Confucian variants.<sup>17)</sup> First, Confucianism contributed to Tokugawa social organization by placing priority on households, which were understood to be the building blocks of society, as well as the laboratories in which personal growth in the direction of goodness takes its first steps. The Tokugawa Bakufu used households for its own statist purposes by making them responsible for mutual surveillance in the so-called Five-Household and Ten-household (*goningumi* 五人組, *jūningumi* 十人組) systems, whereby households in variously sized groupings were mutually responsible for each other's transgressions, obligations and surveillance. But during the seventeenth century, Confucianism went beyond this socio-political role by winning the hearts and minds of leading intellectuals as well as religious leaders within the Shinto community.

Orthodox Neo-Confucianism offered an altogether new understanding of human nature, positing that all of humanity shared a common and originally good nature (本然の性), which at least in theory provided a universal potential for sagehood. That people fell short of the mark of perfect goodness was owing to their inability to project this original nature in their relationships. At the same time orthodox Neo-Confucianism explained that all persons had a physical nature (氣質之性) that was uniquely their own and contained imperfections, which inhibited perfect relationships. The good news was that one could learn to overcome these imperfections through self-cultivation, which included learning how to tranquilize the inherent turbulence of the physical nature and thus to harmonize oneself with the Way of Heaven.

This Neo-Confucian understanding of a bifurcated dual nature provided a metaphysical foundation for the subsequent development of both individuality and collective identity, at first within a Confucian context and later within a nativist context. Clearly, if we all equally share a common human nature, we are part of a common collective humanity. At the same time, if our specific physical natures are infinitely variegated, therein lies the foundation for an acceptance of individual difference and hence individuality. Further, because the mind (心) was where the most fundamental principles of goodness resided, and because the mind is what linked individuals to the cosmos around them, understanding the mind was a religious quest of the highest order, and the pursuit of this "true mind" (*honshin* 本心 for Buddhists and *magokoro* 真心 for nativists) was part of a broader path to human perfection.<sup>18)</sup>

Perhaps the greatest difference with the pre-Tokugawa Buddhist understanding of humanity was Neo-Confucianism's emphasis on human development through self-cultivation, something that medieval Buddhism would have regarded as almost preposterous and precariously selfish. Self-cultivation was a critical issue for Confucians as well as liberal Buddhists during the Tokugawa period, and if there was any lingering problem with the notion of self-cultivation, it was that the activity is so obviously self-centered and hence prone to the criticism of being self-ish. Early modern forms of self-cultivation thus required apologetics, which tended to emphasize the possibility of creating a perfect society for everyone by perfecting one individual at a time. Self-cul-

tivation was also part of a broader early modern interest in self-improvement and personal advancement (self-interest).

Bitō Masahide (1923-2013) was perhaps the first to argue that the roots of modern Japanese individualism were to be found in orthodox (Zhu Xi style) Neo-Confucianism's mandate to its proponents to contribute to the social order by individually "plumbing principle" (*kyūri* 窮理), i.e., interrogating the true nature of things as a way of analogously interrogating the true nature of one's original endowment.<sup>19)</sup> In fact, it is precisely this altruistic dimension to self-cultivation that made it socially acceptable during the ideologically charged years of the early Tokugawa, though the extreme intellectualism of the activity also constrained its broader acceptance.

Confucianism from the outset exhibited a concern with a correct understanding of the past, and this helps us to understand why there were more works written on Japanese history during the seventeenth century than in all of Japanese history before 1600. Within this cornucopia of seventeenth-century historical writing one finds explicit confidence in and gratitude for the stability of the Bakuhō state, but for our purposes the greater significance lies in the fact that in subtle ways, the past was becoming the patrimony. In other words, even though Confucianism supported the notion of an infinitely hierarchical and stratified society, it also supported a horizontal fraternity whereby all persons in Japan were equal heirs to the blessings of Japan's historical past.

With the civilianization of the samurai class in an age of relative peace, the honorific valor that had once been part of the reward for success in combat was attained through other means during the Tokugawa period, and one of these was the ability to demonstrate—and note here again the requirement of performance—one's knowledge of Confucianism.<sup>20)</sup> For roughly the first Tokugawa century, progressive domains hired their own Confucian scholars like Kumazawa Banzan (1619-1691 熊沢蕃山) or Yamazaki Ansai (1619-1682 山崎闇齋) to train domainal samurai in ways that would render them of more use to administration while at the same time instilling in them those values deemed appropriate to and supportive of their respective forms of service, like loyalty (*shin* 信) and reverence (*kei* 敬).

Demand grew for such knowledge as its value increased for those who possessed it, creating an opening for the development of the private academy, i.e., an academy in which the instructor was compensated by the tuition of his students rather than salaried. The pioneer of the private Confucian academy was Itō Jinsai (1627-1705 伊藤仁齋), who went against the wishes of his merchant-class parents who wanted their brilliant son to study medicine, and instead followed his heart by starting a reading group, the Dōshikai (同志会) or Society of the Like-Minded, which gathered regularly under his leadership to read, study and discuss the classic works of Confucianism. This neighborhood study group grew to the point where it transitioned naturally into a fully self-sustaining private academy, the Kogidō (古義堂), which attracted hundreds of paying students during Jinsai's lifetime and thousands more after his death.

The principal activity in Jinsai's academy and others like it was a reading-and-discussion strategy called *kaidoku* (会読) or "gathering to read," in which students would interrogate a text collectively under the leadership of a scholar, but in a manner that involved vigorous mutual interaction. Maeda Tsutomu has argued that far from a pas-

sive activity, *kaidoku* developed into an accepted way of expressing individual opinion and thereby came to promote individual personal development through debate and academic enquiry.<sup>21)</sup> That non-samurai commoners could express opinions and engage in intellectual disagreements with samurai within the confines of the academy confirms this as a venue where individuals could interact in ways that would have been unlikely in more public surroundings.

From roughly the 1660s on Japanese scholarly circles began to break away from their initial embrace of orthodox Neo-Confucianism, opening the way for the radical ontological break represented by Ogyū Sorai's Way of the Former Kings as a means to instruct people who no longer knew how to cultivate themselves or how to bring peace to the world.<sup>22)</sup> And taking this argument to its logical conclusion, it was not until Sorai's ideas reached their peak of popular acceptance in the 1740s and began their decline that the way was opened to the resurrection of self-cultivation strategies of a fundamentally new kind, that of the private academy, initially Confucian and subsequently nativist.

### **Kokugaku (国学 Nativism)**

We have already noted how a Confucian-inspired concern with the past transformed Japan's historical heritage into a kind of patrimony shared equally by all Japanese. In a similar vein, the nativist concern with Japanese identity similarly implied that whatever their differences, all persons born in Japan are equally Japanese. Kamo no Mabuchi's and Motoori Norinaga's eighteenth-century nativist constructions differed in any number of important ways but nonetheless shared with their Neo-Confucian rivals the conviction that individuals share a common disposition. As described above, in orthodox Neo-Confucianism this was represented by the originally good nature that enabled one to conform oneself effortlessly to the Way of Heaven. Japanese nativists likewise believed that they and their countrymen possessed distinctive and essentially genetic attributes that similarly enabled their conformity to a uniquely Japanese Way: for Mabuchi this was the *magokoro* (真心) or True Heart (Mind) that made possible one's return to the Natural Way of Heaven and Earth (天地自然の道), and for Norinaga it was one's Japanese Heart (Mind) or *Yamatogokoro* (大和心) that enabled the resurrection of the Way of the Kami or Shinto (神の道) in the here-and-now.<sup>23)</sup>

At the same time and as just mentioned, both orthodox Neo-Confucianism and nativism allowed for individual difference, though in subtly different ways for Mabuchi and Norinaga. Mabuchi's arcadia was premised not on homogeneity or docility but rather on transparency and mutual understanding. Collective identity in Mabuchi's writings was thus balanced by an appreciation of individual identity or individuality, perhaps because Mabuchi himself was a well-known antiquarian eccentric, whose notoriety was sufficient to earn him posthumous inclusion in Ban Kokei's (伴蒿蹊 1733-1806) "Eccentrics of Our Times" (*Kinsei kijinden* 近世奇人伝). In Norinaga's case, his Shinto determinism meant that individual behavior was as morally variegated as the 80,000 (*yaoyorozu* 八百万) kami.

The construction of identity is always facilitated by the positing of an Other—something or someone against which to juxtapose oneself—and for the nativists this

Other was China, or more specifically Chinese rationalism and morality as represented principally by Confucianism. Ancient Japan, according to Mabuchi, was governed well, but the natural sincerity and directness of ancient people were abruptly changed and replaced by chaos upon the introduction of craftily convincing theories from abroad. The good news, according to Mabuchi, was that the ancient arcadia and its virtues were recoverable by mastering the verses of the *Man'yōshū*, taking their spirit as one's own, and thereby restoring one's original Japanese identity.

Mabuchi's and Norinaga's different understandings of human nature as a prerogative of one's Japaneseness also carried implications for differing ethical valences.<sup>24)</sup> In the case of Mabuchi, all humans—even Chinese—enjoy at birth hearts that are uncorrupted by Buddhist moralism or Confucian rationalism, and it is fundamentally their exposure to these destabilizing forms of didacticism that generates a kind of craftiness (さかしら) and scheming. Mabuchi claimed that it was evidence of a country's moral lassitude if it needed to invent ethical teachings, and that the absence of such teachings in ancient Japan was evidence of its intrinsic natural moral superiority. By this reasoning, the effect of introducing Buddhist and moral teachings was akin to giving a healthy patient a dose of too-strong medicine that has the ironic effect of making the person ill instead of well.

Again, however, note that the pre-moral societal perfection that Mabuchi championed was not based on any concept of universal goodness but rather on a kind of interpersonal transparency that precluded the minor ethical lapses which form a part of everyday life from festering into something more toxic. Accordingly, if one were to use the verses of the *Man'yōshū* as a medium to re-enter the ancient arcadia and thereby resurrect its virtues, the principal characteristic of the new/ancient persona would not be ethical perfection but rather a kind of social harmony with misdemeanors to be sure, but not felonious intent. In other words, for Mabuchi, a degree of mischief—both then and now—is both natural and inevitable.

Motoori Norinaga's kami-determinism likewise contains the seeds of problematic ethical implications. If human dispositions are as variegated as the infinite variety of kami, some good and some bad and every variation in between, and if these kami are ultimately in complete control of all human behavior, what is to stop one from saying a kind of Japanese exculpatory equivalent to what in a Judeo-Christian context would be “the devil made me do it”? Shimizu Masaaki has interpreted this as an issue of truth/sincerity (誠実) vs. lies/falsity (虚偽), and in much the same was as Takeuchi's linguistic argument regarding the dual character of 自 (おのずから vs. みずから) Shimizu regards this as deleterious to any doctrine of individual responsibility, suggestive of a disquieting gap (間) between individuality and individual responsibility of a sort that does not have an analogue in the Confucianism with which nativism shared so much in the way of assumptions and first principles.<sup>25)</sup>

## Conclusions

Despite arguments to the contrary, religions like Buddhism and Christianity, and religious modes of thought like Confucianism and nativism were alive and well during the Edo period. For proof of this, one need look no further than the fact that they contributed directly and indirectly, institutionally and intellectually to the distinctive

matrix that constitutes early modern Japanese values and identity.

And what about religions and religious thought in Japan today? One often hears it said that no more than 1-2% of Japanese people today embrace Christianity, but one also hears that only about 15% of Japanese today follow any doctrinal religion, meaning that one-in-ten of those who do are Christian. Not unlike the Bakufu of two centuries ago, Japan's government today seems once again eager to "protect" people from doctrines and theologies that resist its authority, confirming that the centuries-old struggle between "church" and "state" is ongoing. This, in turn, also suggests that despite relatively low levels of religious participation, religions and religious ideas continue to shape contemporary identity and individuality in Japan in the same direct and indirect, institutional and intellectual ways as I have tried to identify in the Edo period.

#### Notes

- 1) Tentatively titled *Thinking for Oneself: Individuality and Ideology in Early Modern Japan* forthcoming from Brill (Leiden) in 2016.
- 2) Jason Ānanda Josephson, *The Invention of Religion in Japan*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
- 3) The dissertation is titled *Kindai Nihon no shūkyō gensetsu to sono keifu: Shūkyō, kokka, Shintō* 近代日本の宗教言説とその系譜：宗教・国家・神道. In English the dissertation forms the basis for the volume *Religious Discourse in Modern Japan: Religion, State, and Shintō* (Nichibunken Monograph Series No. 17, Brill, 2014).
- 4) Many languages, like the Czech and Slovak I learned as a child, have a saying that claims that as many languages as you know, so many times are you a human being. I have many times heard people in Japan say that they can more freely express emotional matters in English than in Japanese, just as English-speakers often make similar claims for French and other Romance languages.
- 5) Some definitions may be helpful. For "religion" I follow William James's (1842-1910) definition in his *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (Longmans, Green and Co., 1902) to mean, "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine" (p. 31). When speaking about early modern Japan, I mean the three islands of Honshū, Shikoku and Kyūshū from roughly 1570-1870.
- 6) The symposium formed the basis of the edited volume *Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture* (Princeton University Press 1984, reprinted by University of Hawaii Press).
- 7) The 2013 symposium will result next year in the publication of an edited volume titled *Values, Identity and Equality in 18th- and 19th-Century Japan* (Brill). By "individuality" I mean an acceptance and tolerance of individual difference; I distinguish individuality from "individualism" understanding the latter as the advocacy and promotion of individual difference.
- 8) In his *Fukusūsei no Nihon shisō* 複数性の日本思想 [Pluralistic Japanese thought] (Tokyo: Perikansha, 2006), 100.
- 9) See her *Conquering Demons: The "Kirishitan," Japan, and the World in Early Modern Japanese Literature* (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, The University of Michigan, Michigan Monograph Series in Japanese Studies, Number 75, 2013).
- 10) Beatrice M. Bodart-Bailey ed., trans., and annotated, *Kaempfer's Japan: Tokugawa Culture Observed by Engelbert Kaempfer* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 163.
- 11) Ibid. Emphasis added.
- 12) *Performing the Great Peace: Political Space and Open Secrets in Tokugawa Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 3.
- 13) Quoted in George Elison, *Deus Destroyed: The Image of Christianity in Early Modern Japan* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1973), 189.
- 14) See Matsumoto Shigeru 松本茂, "Motoori Norinaga no bukkyō kan" 本居宣長の仏教観 in *Shūkyō bunka no shosō: Takenaka Shinjō hakase shōju kinen ronbunshū* 宗教文化の諸相：竹中信常博士頌寿記念

論文集 (Sankibō Busshorin, 1984), 211-220.

- 15) Tamamuro Fumio 圭室文雄 has written extensively on these matters, and I am especially indebted to his *Edo bakufu no Shukyo tosei* 江戸幕府の宗教統制 (Hyōronsha, 1971), in the series *Nihonjin no kōdō to shisō* 日本人の行動と思想.
- 16) See my “Keeping the Faith: *bakuhan* Policy toward Religions in Seventeenth-Century Japan,” in Peter Kornicki and Ian James McMullen, eds., *Religion in Japan: Arrows to Heaven and Earth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 136-155.
- 17) Without wishing to reopen the question of whether Confucianism or its Neo-Confucian variants are religions, it is basically unarguable that they have a religious dimension rooted in their concern with personal transformation in the direction of a moral absolute, in this case Heaven 天. For a fuller development of this argument see Rodney L. Taylor’s *The Religious Dimensions of Confucianism* (SUNY Series in Religious Studies, Albany 1990).
- 18) Janine Anderson Sawada, *Confucian Values and Popular Zen: Sekimon Shingaku in Eighteenth-Century Japan* (University of Hawaii press, 1993), 1.
- 19) See especially his *Nihon hōken shisōshi kenkyū* 日本封建思想史研究 [Studies in the History of Japanese Feudal Thought] (Aoki Shoten, 1961).
- 20) See Eiko Ikegami’s 池上英子 *The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan* (Harvard, 1995) and its translation *Meiyo to junnō* 名誉と順応 (translated by Morimoto Jun, NTT Shuppan, 2000).
- 21) *Edo kōki no shisō kukan* 江戸後期の思想空間 [The Vacuum of Late Edo Thought] (Perikansha, 2009), 21, 45.
- 22) Miyagi Kimiko 宮城公子 *Bakumatsuki no shisō to shūzoku* 幕末期の思想と習俗 [Late Tokugawa Thought and Customs], Perikansha, 2004.
- 23) As for whether *kokugaku* (translated here as nativism) is a religion, see Peter Flueckiger’s discussion of different definitions of *kokugaku* in his *Imagining Harmony: Poetry, Empathy and Community in mid-Tokugawa Japan* (Stanford University Press, 2008), n. 1 on 233. What is again unarguable, however, is that *kokugaku*, like Confucianism and mind cultivation, has at times exhibited a deeply religious dimension. Scholars writing on Kokugaku have approached this question in different ways, but I have followed Hisamatsu Sen’ichi (久松潜一 1894-1976) who as long ago as 1927 in his *Keichū-den* 契沖伝 (Osaka: Asahi Shimbunsha, 227) wrote of there being two meanings of the word *kokugaku*. The first and broader of the two would be all forms of Japanese studies, and used to distinguish Japanese studies from Chinese studies (*Kangaku*). The second and narrower definition would reference the application of philology to Japan’s most ancient literary and poetic sources in order to elucidate from them an ancient Way (*kodō*) and the attendant attempt to elevate that ancient Way to the status of a contemporary religion (emphasis added). It is this latter narrower sense that informs my discussion of *kokugaku* in this essay.
- 24) Shimizu Masayuki 清水正之, *Kokugaku no tashazō—makoto to itsuwari* 国学の他者像—誠実と虚偽 [The Nativist Understanding of the Other—Truth and Falsehood] (Perikansha, 2005), 82-102, 105-33.
- 25) *Ibid.*, 155-60. Takeuchi Seiichi (竹内整一), a specialist in ethics, has suggested that there is something fundamentally different about Japanese individuality and its relationship to ethical responsibility. Using a variety of essentially linguistic arguments to argue this, he points out that the character 自 (self) can be read both as *mizukara* (自ら), meaning “by oneself,” and as *onozukara* (自ずから) meaning “of itself,” and from this he infers a link between the two that blurs the distinction between agency and inevitability. When interpreted in this way, events are no longer the result of human action and instead have the character of sui generis, with an attendant erosion of personal responsibility. See his “*Onozukara*” to “*mizukara*”—*Nihon shisō no kisō* 「おのずから」と「みずから」—日本思想の基層 [Spontaneity and Self: The Foundation of Japanese Thought], revised and expanded ed., Shunjūsha, 2010.