Approaches to Human Security: Japan, Canada, and Europe in Comparative Perspective

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The concept of human security is related theoretically to the liberal school of thought in International Relations and Security Studies focusing on individuals as key subjects of security. This emphasis on the individual was already part of John Burton’s view on international security since the 1970s and has been qualified as the “conflict research” school by contrast with the realist “strategic studies” and the structuralist “peace research.” (1) It has been strongly revived after the end of the Cold war like other liberal and neo-Kantian concepts and approaches and got significant support within the research community. (2) As controversial as any of the concepts discussed in International Relations theory, (3) it has been criticized for underestimating the importance of states in security (4) and for contributing to post-Cold war views of the world based on inequality and hierarchy among states justifying Western interventionism. (5) Despite those critics it got support from important sectors of policymaking, think tanks, academia, and NGOs and has been promoted as a key component of a normative neo-Kantian approach to security challenging previous “state-centric” visions. (6)

The concept mainly surfaced in the world of policymaking in the early 1990s when two international organizations, OECD and UNDP, started to quote the concept in their 1994 annual reports. (7) It became really popular at the end of the 1990s when Canada and Japan adopted it as an official policy. (8) The concept got growing popularity and intellectual support from universities, research centres, and advocacy groups within this context but these non-state actors played much less role than governments and IGOs during the emerging phase

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approaches to human security of the concept. And also very interestingly, it was born in circles discussing development rather than security, but was considered later on as one of the challenges to the “traditional” state-centric definition of security.\(^{(9)}\)

This article explores the origins of human security in policy agendas, why and how it has been used in policy formulation in Canada, Japan, and the European Union, and proposes explanations of the divergences between those three international actors about the political use of this concept though their concrete policymaking agendas are rather convergent. It concludes that the success of the concept is mainly based on the need for some international actors (both in states and in the United Nations apparatus) to build a new legitimacy on global norm entrepreneurship in a time of change. Furthermore the paper shows that this lack of common normative discourse has not prevented Canada, Europe, and Japan to shape together with other industrialized states – including the USA – a “liberal peace”\(^{(10)}\) agenda summarized by the keywords “peace-building” and “security-development nexus” by rather intrusive policies of political, economic, judicial, and security control of post-conflict areas by Western donors and international agencies. Though weakened in its wide scope by the US-led fight against terrorism since 9.11.2001, human security has also proven to be very flexible and almost fully compatible with both neo-liberal economic agendas and “hard security” policies inspired by the US Administration.

I. Japanese and Canadian Policies and Their “Multilateralization”

In Japan, the reference to individuals' security faced up in policy discourse when Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s address to the UN General Assembly Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development in 1995 referred to "human-centered" social development as a focus of Japanese ODA. His vision was considered as part of a Japanese approach to multilateralism,\(^{(11)}\) followed and reinforced by his successor Ryutaro Hashimoto who spoke of "security of human beings" when addressing the UN General Assembly in 1997. It was based on two principles inspired by the debates within OECD/DAC, UNDP and Commission on Global Governance: on one side, “respect for the human rights
of every citizen on earth”; on the other side, protection from “poverty, disease, ignorance, oppression, and violence”. (12)

The financial crisis in Asia which erupted in 1997 has been a strong incentive for the promotion of human security by the Japanese leadership. (13) It led foreign minister, and then prime minister Keizo Obuchi to promote the concept of “human security” in order to address Asia’s new regional economic challenges and to open up a more assertive and independent international role for Japan without undermining its alliance with the United States. (14) At the same time, human security became so a cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy and a new way to define its overseas development assistance policy. Under Obuchi’s rule, Japan adopted what can be summarized as a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach to security: “In our times, humankind is under various kinds of threat. Environmental problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for us but also for future generations. In addition, trans-national crimes such as illicit drugs and trafficking are increasing. Problems such as the exodus of refugees, violations of human rights, infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, terrorism, anti-personnel landmines, and so on pose significant threats to all of us. Moreover, the problem of children under armed conflict ought never to be overlooked.” (15)

This definition of Human Security as “freedom from want” is echoing the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and makes Human Security almost synonymous to Human Development. (16) On this basis, the Japanese government supported in 1999 the establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) whose budget had risen to some USD 170 million by 2002 and was managed jointly by UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR, and WHO. (17)

Though based on wider principles and conceptual approaches, this Japanese vision of human security has developed convergences with the Canadian plea for defining human security as “freedom from fear”. These two approaches inspired decisively Kofi Annan’s speech at the 2000 United Nations’ Millennium Summit, as well as the Summit’s final declaration though it does not refer directly to human security. (18)
After the Millennium Summit, Japan initiated the Commission on Human Security (CHS) co-chaired by the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and Nobel Economics Prize-awarded Amartya Sen, and supported the holistic security concept promoted by CHS final report: “the aim of human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life … It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood, and dignity.”

Nevertheless, the CHS report was issued just before the 9.11 attacks in the United States and its impact was considerably reduced by a rapidly changing security environment. Facing China’s rising power, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, and the US war on terror, Japan completely reassessed its foreign and security policy and strengthened its alliance with the US. It took part actively in the US’s so-called “war on terror” and sent non-fighting troops to Iraq between 2004 and 2006. Japanese expectations about a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council were also part of the motivations for such a change, which was nevertheless perceived as a retreat from the previous Japanese emphasis on multilateralism and the centrality of the United Nations.

However, the Japanese approach to Human Security as developed by the CHS was not abandoned after September 11 and the Iraqi War. Interestingly, Japan's efforts were "multilateralized" through the adoption of human security by the UN Secretary-General and some UN agencies after the Millennium Summit. The recommendations of the CHS led in 2003 to the deepening of the reference to Human Security among UN agencies, especially the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), through the creation of an Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS) designed for advising the UN Secretary-General on the management of the UNTFHS. Japanese diplomats, CHS former members, and UN agencies are playing the dominant role within the ABHS. To some extent, this successful “multilateralization” of the Japanese
Human Security concept allowed it to survive despite the evolution of Japan’s national foreign policy agenda towards a rather militarized threat assessment after 9.11 and Iraq. Rather than contradictory, the two agendas can therefore remain complementary and even increase the diversification of Japanese foreign policy objectives and international coalitions. Since the Japanese definition of human security is mainly equivalent to human development and based on a "securitized" updating of ODA priorities, it has contributed to the profile of Japan as a global "soft power" without undermining the country's identity. The adoption of this approach by the United Nations bureaucracy was also possible because the concept remains very civilian and is compatible with UN objectives.

Canada is usually mentioned as the second medium power which used human security as a key component of its national security discourse in the 1990s.\(^{(21)}\) Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy played a pivotal role in promoting human security as "much more than the absence of military threat. It includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights."\(^{(22)}\)

Rather than Japan’s wide "freedom from want" approach, Axworthy proposed a narrow "freedom from fear" agenda considered as more feasible and more adapted to Canadian traditions and political position.\(^{(23)}\) Paramount issues were the establishment of a peace-building capacity, the banning of antipersonal landmines, the reduction of the flow of small arms and conflict commodities, the situation of children with regard to sexual abuse, child labor, and their protection from violence, the promotion of international criminal justice, and later on a renewed approach to development assistance, in addition to promotion of rules-based trade to spur economic development.\(^{(24)}\)

Canada's strategy was based on a two-track strategy: on one side, putting forward policy initiatives on specific issues in multilateral forums and on the other side, building coalitions with other countries and civil society including academia. Success stories of these efforts have been especially the Human Security Network established in 1999 by thirteen countries under a joint Canada-Norway initiative\(^{(25)}\) and the Human Security Report published in 2005 by the
Liu Institute at the University of British Columbia.\(^{(26)}\)

Canada's plea for human security has been considered as an updating of Canadian traditional security interests inspired by the need to keep an international profile towards the United States and a reaction to evolving NATO's internal balance after the establishment of the new EU military policy (ESDP). By some critics, it was also described as an attempt to hide Canada's decreased participation in UN peacekeeping activities and cuts in military and development budgets.\(^{(27)}\) Behind the diversity of motivations for such an evolution, there was obviously a new focus on several policy options and a securitization of the development agenda perfectly fitting OECD/DAC purposes.

Though engaged before, human security had been formalized as a foreign policy option. The campaign against anti-personnel landmines and the signing of the Ottawa Treaty are considered one of the most important outcomes of the Canadian human security policy and was converging with efforts by trans-national advocacy NGOs and other countries, especially some third world countries and small and medium member states of the European Union like Belgium and Sweden.\(^{(28)}\) Lloyd Axworthy considered it important to convince Japan to join this coalition in order to create a wider coalition and develop common agenda’s between the two major promoters of human security.\(^{(29)}\)

Interestingly, the action leading to the Ottawa treaty was described as a bottom-up type of diplomatic conduct, with an unprecedented involvement of NGOs and the formation of trans-national advocacy networks mixing NGOs, diplomats, and international organizations. The result of this action was also based on a strategy bypassing existing inefficient international fora, locked by US veto like the UN Conference on Disarmament, and negotiating an \emph{ad hoc} treaty outside existing institutional frameworks without an endorsement by several permanent members of the UNSC (not only the USA, but also Russia and China).\(^{(30)}\) This strategy has been used to a lesser extent for other similar treaties which were never signed/ratified by the USA (International Criminal Court, Kyoto Protocol) and could be considered as one approach for Canada/
EU/Japan-led coalitions when they obviously have to go beyond the traditional UNSC consensus-building.

Another key policy area in which Canada promoted human security was the strengthening of international criminal justice. The failure of the Blue Helmets under Canadian General Dallaire's command to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and similar feelings of UN peacekeeping inefficiency in stopping war crimes and crimes against humankind within the context of civil wars like in Bosnia and Herzegovina were strong incentives for promoting new approaches to international justice. Canada supported the creation of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), and later on the negotiation of the Rome Status of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Several leading Canadian lawyers like Louise Arbour (first Chief Prosecutor of ICTY and ICTR) and Philippe Kirsch (Chairman of the ICC) in these courts confirmed Canada's interest and visibility in this new policy.\(^{(31)}\)

A more controversial consequence of the Canadian reappraisal of international response to human rights abuses was the increasing readiness of the Canadian leadership to justify the use of force in the case of human rights abuses, even when the UNSC does not authorize it explicitly. The 1999 Kosovo crisis was the occasion for Lloyd Axworthy to integrate this approach into his human security concept. In a speech delivered to the G-8 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Cologne in June 1999, he emphasized that "The norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states remains basic to international peace and security, and the intervention in Kosovo must not be held as a precedent justifying intervention anywhere, anytime, or for any reason. However, in cases of extreme abuse, as we have seen in Kosovo and Rwanda, among others, the concept of national sovereignty cannot be absolute."\(^{(32)}\) Canada supported therefore the creation of an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which presented its report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* in 2001 discussing the concept of "humanitarian intervention" related to the Canadian human security concept, and when, how and under which authority such interventions can be performed.\(^{(33)}\) Despite all controversies about the concept
of "humanitarian intervention" and "responsibility to protect" (or R2P), the ICISS report has been widely discussed and shows the impact of the Canadian influence in the field, including within the United Nations’ apparatus since the ICISS report has influenced several paragraphs of the High Level Group’s report on Threats, Risks and Opportunities commissioned by Kofi Annan and published in 2004. Like Japan, Canada was to some extent able to “multilateralize” its own approach but with less success since most of the Canadian core agenda for human security was never endorsed fully by the major UNSC powers.

As we can see, human security has helped both Japan and Canada, two members of the G-8 but not of the UNSC, to strengthen their international profile and differentiate their international identity as an US ally without undermining this key alliance within a context of limited capacities and rapid international change (for Japan, the financial crisis in Asia and the attempts to get a permanent seat in the UN; for Canada the fear to be marginalized within NATO between the USA and an expanding and deepening EU). These very similar motivations show why, despite differences between their respective focuses on "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear", Japan and Canada have converged in shaping the concept of human security as their contribution to a "new security" agenda. Before the United Nations Millennium Summit, they were able to create a joint platform for lobbying the other UN member-states, adopted a Canada-Japan Action Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation, and got support from Kofi Annan, who referred to "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" in his opening speech.

Many similarities can also be described in the way they promoted the concept:

• both foreign policies have put the emphasis on the security of individuals;
• both concepts were developed by political elites, with a strong contribution by one foreign minister (and later Prime Minister in the case of Japan) on each side;
• both strategies were based on coalition-building at the inter-state level and the creation of an epistemic community at the trans-national level,
with a strong emphasis on NGOs, academia and advocacy groups;
• both concepts were helping to differentiate from the USA at low cost;
• both agendas became quickly operational and encompassed concrete policy cases.

Furthermore, despite their differences and the maintenance of separate policies under the heading "human security," a common agenda has been established de facto at the crossroads of military security and development policies, encompassing the following policy arenas all related to a wider definition of peace-building:
• elimination of anti-personnel landmines;
• combating proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW);
• implementing effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs for combatants in conflict/post-conflict areas, especially child soldiers;
• working towards security sector reform (SSR) and good governance in security sector, including not only the armed forces, but the police and criminal justice system;
• promoting collaboration with civil society, especially women's groups, in peace-building activities (though Japanese NGOs remained almost uninvolved);
• introduction of peace-building conditionality clauses in agreements with countries concerned.

II. The Western peace-building consensus

This agenda has been integrated into most of the policies discussed within OECD/DAC towards so-called "fragile states," converge widely with World Bank's policy in the same field, and represent the basis for what Mark Duffield, Roger Mac Ginty, and Oliver Richmond called "the liberal peace agenda." Inspired by a “soft power” or “civilian power” approach for Japan,
and by a more “robust” approach for Canada, the human security concept and its implementation has served to make the two countries stronger partners in this joint agenda. For Japan, it helped to build a more assertive profile and more comprehensive security role corresponding to its post-Cold War challenges.\(^{(38)}\) For Canada, it contributed to keep a “hard security” identity extending Canada’s world security role despite the reduction of its military budget and forces deployed abroad. For both of them, this helped to build an “alternative” security agenda, alternative because it was developed almost without the main powers of the UNSC, though its content was very much corresponding to OECD/DAC and World Bank mainstream policies regarding the security-development nexus. Most European countries have also embarked onto the same kind of *peace-building* agenda though almost never using the human security concept for addressing it. The convergence between all Western donor states about this core joint agenda for connecting security to development happened within the context of the OECD/DAC, especially when it discussed the ways to address conflict prevention and peace-building in development policies.\(^{(39)}\) Within this context it mapped the four dimensions of peace-building that donor states have to address through their security and development policies. These four dimensions have been almost identically defined within the EU conflict prevention programme adopted during the Gothenborg European Council in June 2001. The following figure summarizes these four dimensions.
This catalogue of peace-building policies is integrating most of what Canada on one side and Japan on the other side have called “human security” but it is to some extent mixing the two agendas, expanding and re-organizing them, and putting aside the whole debate about the Responsibility to Protect promoted mainly by Canada. Except for the latter, the security dimension of peace-building according to OECD/DAC and the EU gathers all policies related directly to the security-development nexus and the securitization of the development agenda: de-mining activities; destruction of small arms and light weapons (SALW); disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities; security sector/system reform (SSR); and the deployment of civilian police forces (CIVPOL) and of peacekeeping forces. Most of these activities have been already identified as a core Japan-Canada agenda for human security while others are mainly promoted by Canada and European countries and almost ignored by Japan (peacekeeping and the most interventionist aspects of CIVPOL deployments).

OECD/DAC countries have closely related this security dimension with two other dimensions of the peace-building agenda: the political/governance (mediation in conflict resolution, monitoring of elections, support to local
administration, support to institution-building, association of civil society, and international territorial administration); and the rule of law dimensions (support to human rights, fight against human trafficking, support to the rebuilding of the judicial, support to local criminal courts – also called transitional justice, and the establishment of international criminal courts). This interdependence between security, governance, and the rule of law has been encompassed within the OECD/DAC by the concept of “security system reform” considered as wider than “security sector reform.”

The last dimension includes all economic, social and environmental activities which can contribute to peace-building: rebuilding of infrastructure; support to refugees and displaced persons; trade and investment; implementation of long-term Millennium Development Goals; support to sustainable development; and the control of natural resources and conflict commodities.

This whole catalogue of activities around the four dimensions of peace-building has been shaped step by step since the mid-1990s within the OECD/DAC as the common agenda of donor states about the security-development nexus. It implies a rather interventionist and centralized approach to the “liberal peace agenda” in which donor states and international organizations play the leading role in defining principles of governance, security and development. Canada, Japan and the European Union countries have all experienced the outcomes of this approach, sometimes together, sometimes separately, sometimes with the USA, in cases like Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo, and even Iraq for some of them. Though not exactly identical in their origins, these experiences converged with the US dilemma’s about nation-building which occurred in parallel. In such cases, Western donors and international institutions have increasingly pointed the ineffectiveness of some states to secure their citizens and therefore justified their increasingly intrusive and interventionist policies. Not surprisingly, when this Western predominance leads to substitution of international control on national sovereignty (international territorial administration, control of economic policies and resources, international criminal courts, and military intervention), there are
more divergences not only with recipient states, but also among donor states. While Canada, the UK and some other European states (mainly those who took part in the Human Security Network) have been rather assertive in their definition of peace-building tasks, Japan, Sweden, and other European states have usually emphasized a civilian and inclusive approach to those dimensions of peace-building, and remained reluctant to deep interventionism.

Despite these nuances, the core Western peace-building agenda is gathering Canada, Japan, and the European Union states. For Canada and Japan, it is perfectly in line with their emphasis on human security, even when the concept has been challenged by international events. The consequences of the 9.11 attacks, the NATO war in Afghanistan, and the US war on Iraq, as well as the fast change of Japan’s security environment (North Korean military build-up and the rise of China) have of course led to a change of centre of gravity in both Canadian and Japanese security policies. But both countries kept nevertheless human security policies on track, and could combine the reference to human security with their participation to some of the US-led “hard security” responses to terrorism, WMD proliferation, and regional conflicts (like Canadian contribution to the war in Afghanistan or Japanese deployment of non-combatant troops in Iraq and involvement in the US anti-missile project). Rather than contradictory, those “soft security” and “hard security” dimensions look rather complementary and keep at low cost a national identity on the world stage for Canada and Japan fully compatible with their alliance with the USA.

This post-2001 evolution shows once more the catch-all dimension of the human security concept and its potential for adaptation to many political uses. Despite this comparative advantage its has been almost ignored in official security documents of the European Union like the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on December 12, 2003. In other words, despite a converging peace-building agenda with Canada and Japan and a strong socialization framework through the OECD/DAC and a same interest to fill a niche as “civilian power” in world politics during the 1990s, Europeans have not identified human security as the major keyword for selling this agenda to their
III. The Hour of Europe?

Indeed, European states were facing a different political timing than Canada and Japan during the late 1990s. After having used and abused all possible “post-modern” discourses about “civilian power Europe” and its “sui generis nature” in order to justify the absence of military dimension in the European Communities’ and later on Union’s competences, the European states faced in 1999 the need to justify their decision to develop a military arm as decided during the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki meetings of the European Council after the Saint-Malo compromise between Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair. This implied to militarize the EU’s approach to security but also to make it compatible with all national traditions, stretching from the French and British nuclear, military and post-colonial powers to the neutral political cultures, or from countries spending little for defence to intermediate powers like Germany which combine a tradition of military self-restrain with a recent assertive participation in NATO’s offensive actions (Kosovo, Afghanistan).

A concept like “human security” did not represent a good center of gravity for reconciling all these traditions and legitimizing the EU’s military build-up. Other semantic tools have been used for representing the European new security convergence during the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1999, the Helsinki European Council adopted in parallel two documents regarding EU’s security policies: one document about military aspects of crisis management and the other one about the civilian aspects of crisis management. This two-track approach (promoted by the Finnish Presidency in 1999 and deepened by the Swedish Presidency in 2001 when the EU adopted the Gothenborg Platform for Conflict Prevention) helped all member-states to fill a niche within the EU security policy and to shape at the same time a peculiar profile for the EU emphasizing the originality of its approach combining military and civilian instruments for crisis management by contrast with the US emphasis on the use of force. By this reference to a “policy mix” combining the military and
civilian dimensions, the EU could at the same time build an internal consensus, including NGOs and military forces, and keep an international profile different from the US and even to some extent go on referring to its “civilian power” nature despite the militarization of its agenda.\(^{(44)}\) One of the founding fathers of this EU vision, the British senior diplomat Robert Cooper, who successively advised British Prime Minister Tony Blair and EU High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana, has perfectly summarized this in his writings in which he describes the EU as a “post-modern” power and pleads for its military build-up.\(^{(45)}\)

The EU’s High Representative for CFSP appointed in 1999, Javier Solana, has deepened this all-encompassing definition of EU’s security policy by pointing it as the most holistic and multi-faceted ever. The European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council on December 12, 2003 under the title *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy* perfectly illustrates this discourse.\(^{(46)}\) The strategy articulates a framework based upon a comprehensive or holistic approach to security which helped to reconcile EU’s positions after the divergences about the Iraqi war. EU and its member states are told to co-operate in tackling their security priorities within the context of “effective multilateralism” (specifically the UN and regional organisations) and the promotion of the rule of law, but also by emphasizing the principle of the use of force as a last resort. This means that even security “threats” (weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, terrorism and organized crime) should be addressed through “effective multilateralism”: in other words, by supporting the UN system, strengthening national responses through EU synergies, and by addressing root causes such as poverty and weak governance through community instruments and regional dialogue.\(^{(47)}\) Javier Solana considers indeed that this holistic approach proves the difference between Europe and America. He argues, with reference to a comprehensive notion of security, that active engagement is in Europe’s security interests since these are affected by poor governance, insecurity, poverty, and conflict far beyond its borders. Europe must therefore meet these challenges, which it is well placed to do with a range of diplomatic, development, economic, humanitarian, and
military instruments. EU’s discourse on holistic security and the combination on military and civilian aspects of crisis management play *mutatis mutandis* the same role as the catch-all concept of human security for Canada and Japan helping them to build an international identity without undermining their close relationship with the United States of America.

To some extent, what Canada or Japan call “human security” can be integrated into this holistic view but the European Union and its member states had no interest in the late 1990s and early 2000s to make “human security” central in their vocabulary. Furthermore, like Canada and Japan after 9.11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, who made human security one of the components of their security policies rather than their cornerstones, Europe can also play several diplomatic cards by keeping some particular tones (e.g., about the rise of its military role) and applying at the same time the core human security agenda without qualifying it as such. It would be typical of the EU’s constructive ambiguity helping to reconcile its member-states with different political cultures. This explanation is confirmed by the fact that, despite their absence from any key official security document, the words “human security” have surfaced within the EU’s security discourse, but as one dimension of the “holistic and multi-faceted security” approach.

The process started already in the late 1990s when Sweden took with Japan the initiative leading to the creation of the Commission on Human Security while Canada and Norway convinced five EU countries (Austria, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Slovenia) to take part in the Human Security Network. Furthermore, before the UN Millennium Summit, a joint EU-Japan Declaration also used the concept once. But the large member States, Javier Solana, and the European Commission had less interest for such a concept, at least for giving much centrality to it since they had already other keywords for addressing the conflict prevention and peace-building agendas and needed a wider definition helping to legitimize the expanding security agenda of the EU and its militarization.

But Javier Solana had also the interest to create a wide support and
legitimacy for the European Security Strategy (ESS) and for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) whose implementation started in 2003 with the first EU police and military missions in the Balkans and DR Congo. Therefore, he started a dialogue with several promoters of human security among NGOs and academia by commissioning in 2003 a report to a group of scholars led by Mary Kaldor (London School of Economics) named the Barcelona Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities.

This report published in 2004 is the basis for most of the attempts currently promoting the adoption of the Human Security concept by the European institutions. Members of the Barcelona Group had all a mixed background in research institutes who took a position in favor of human security, international organizations, peace NGOs, or policymaking positions. The logistic support to the group by the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (linked to the German SPD) and by the Barcelona-based peace institute CIDOB also indicate that this group is part of an epistemic community gathering former peace activists and researchers linked to the European social-democrats. Besides the report delivered to Javier Solana in 2004, the group has produced one book and several articles disseminating the plea for a “Human Security Doctrine for Europe”(50) and widening the research community concerned. The Barcelona group’s discourse about human security has a lot of commonalities with the Japanese and Canadian discourses of the late 1990s, especially in their normative, individual-centered and civilian/soft security dimensions. But the European group also develops its own doctrinal sources. It refers not only to the conclusions of the Commission on Human Security, but also to the European Security Strategy(51) and seems to adopt the paradoxical argument of the main author of the ESS, Robert Cooper, who at the same time shares Robert Kagan’s caricatural definition of the EU as a post-modern neo-Kantian paradise(52) and challenges it by proposing a military build-up for Europe.(53) Furthermore, the Barcelona group’s rationale for supporting human security refers not only to moral and legal dimensions – like Axworthy and Obuchi – but also to an “enlightened self-interest case,”(54) mixing value-centered and interest-oriented rationales in order to reconcile idealist and
realist visions like Robert Cooper himself does.

Rather than converging with the Japanese concept, an EU approach inspired by the Barcelona group would rather be closer to the Canadian *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine. Despite the emphasis of its promoters on “civilian capabilities” in case studies mixing natural disasters, secessionist movements, and open conflicts, they might contribute to legitimize intervention and “militarize” development rather than to “civilianize” security, as often said about the R2P doctrine itself. By proposing a synthesis between all previous approaches to human security, a combination of military and civilian capabilities and a discourse very similar to Javier Solana’s ambivalent emphasis on the holistic definition of security, the Barcelona report and its promoters might contribute to the widest catch-all security concept ever produced. It is nevertheless very meaningful that Javier Solana himself is almost never using the reference to human security in his own speeches and goes on with the previous mantra about holistic and multi-faceted security policy.

The intensification of the reference to human security comes rather from some sectors of the European Commission who initially did not find any special interest (both in DG DEV and DG RELEX) in using this concept since they had other semantic ways to address the security-development nexus and civilian approaches to security. The change in the Commission’s discourse clearly came in 2004 with the appointment of Benita Ferrero-Waldner as Commissioner for External Relations. Austria, the country she had been the Foreign Minister of between 1999 and 2004, is a member of the Human Security Network, and the right-ultra-right-wing government to which she had belonged moved from the traditional neutrality of social-democratic inspiration to a more assertive and interventionist position in international relations though neutrality and non-NATO membership remained the official doctrine. To some extent, the Austrian conservatives have been able to diversify and adapt the country’s foreign policy like Canada and Japan. Furthermore the normative content of the human security discourse was useful for combining traditional neutrality with some external projection of Austria’s interests abroad.
When she became Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner anyway had to imagine new concepts allowing to cope with the new challenges of EU external relations after the enlargement stretching from its wide peace-building activities all around the world to the stabilization of the Balkans, the new neighbourhood policy, the EU presence in Afghanistan, or the co-operation with the US regarding fight against terrorism and WMD. This need was also inspired by the willingness to keep a high profile for the Commission despite High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana’s increasing role and to keep some difference within the Commission with the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel.

Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner started soon in 2004 highlighting her “personal commitment to the concept of human security” defined as “putting people and their human rights, as well as the threats they face, at the centre of our policies.” She integrated easily this definition centered on the individual into a discourse referring to all military and non-military challenges that the ESS had defined since December 2003. For her, even the fight against terrorism was part of the broad human security agenda—a way also likely to keep some role in this field mainly addressed by the Council and by Commissioner Franco Frattini.

In 2006, she also referred to human security when addressing wide security policies related to the peace-building agenda and link with development policies, while Commissioner Louis Michel and DG DEV were not using the concept. This was obviously allowing her to embrace the whole security-development nexus and challenge Michel’s portfolio (in non-ACP countries at least). In May 2006, for example, she emphasized the importance of “promoting human rights and democracy, fighting poverty, confronting the illicit spread of small arms and light weapons, and encouraging economic development (by) tackling inequalities and potential environmental, migration and conflict threats.” In June 2006, she insisted that “Humanity will not enjoy security without development, and it will not enjoy development without security.” In a speech delivered at the Overseas Development Institute in London in October 2006 about Human Security and
the Efficiency of Aid,\(^{(62)}\) she referred not only to the usual peace-building agenda (conflict prevention, security sector reform, fight against small arms and light weapons, attention paid to vulnerable populations like women and children, and support to international humanitarian law) but also openly to development issues (food policy, Millennium Development Goals), and added a long reference to environmental challenges and climate change.

Those environmental features had almost been ignored both in the Japanese and Canadian concepts (except in the initial official Japanese speeches in the mid-1990s). By introducing them into the European approach to human security, Benita Ferrero-Waldner supports the new European discourse using environment, climate change, and energy challenges as a component of the European international identity. Furthermore, the first document from DG DEV ever using the expression “human security” has been the strategy towards the Horn of Africa published in 2006 which defines as “human security” issues: “human and social rights and gender, demographic issues, and the environment (water, coastal zones and forest sustainable management, desertification, and adaptation to climate change).”\(^{(63)}\)

This recent intensification of references to human security seems to indicate that more actors within the Commission believe in this concept’s added value and that they introduce new dimensions into it. Again, despite the convergence in many policy agendas, the European concept of human security – if it prevails one day – might be rather divergent from the Canadian and Japanese ones.
Notes


(7) Most of the literature quotes the UNDP as the promoter of the concept but the first reference came in the OECD report.


(15) Obuchi, "Opening Remarks by Prime Minister Obuchi" (paper presented at the An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, Tokyo, 12 December 1998).

(16) Okuma, "New Directions in Japan’s Official Development Assistance," in Ueta and Remacle,
(23) About Canada's traditions in the field of security, see e.g. Jaumain and Remacle 2006.
(25) Countries involved are Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand, and South Africa (as an observer) (http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php).
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(34) Copeland, "The Axworthy Years: Canadian Foreign Policy in the Era of Diminished Capacity."


(36) Japan has never endorsed the humanitarian intervention concept and Canada remained outside the Human Security Trust Fund.


(42) Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative," Survival 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000).


(44) Stavridis, "Militarising the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Revisited."


(49) Remacle, "The European Security Strategy and Its Impact on Europe-Japan Relations."


(52) Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York:


(54) Ibid., 10


(58) Ferrero-Waldner, "The Future of the UN: Results of the Kofi Annan High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change" in *conference organized by the European Policy Centre and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung* (Brussels: 2004b).


(60) ————, *The EU’s Role in Protecting Europe’s Security* (Brussels: 30 May, 2006).

(61) ————, *The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: A Partnership for Reform* (Hamburg: German World Bank Forum, 2 June, 2006b).


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Approaches to Human Security: Japan, Canada, and Europe in Comparative Perspective

<Summary>

Eric Remacle

This article explores the origins of human security in policy agendas, why and how it has been used in policy formulation in Canada, Japan, and the European Union and proposes explanations of the divergences between those three international actors about the political use of this concept though their concrete policymaking agendas are rather convergent. It concludes that the success of the concept is mainly based on the need for some international actors (both in states and in the United Nations apparatus) to build a new legitimacy on global norm entrepreneurship in a time of change. Furthermore the paper shows that this lack of common normative discourse has not prevented Canada, Europe, and Japan to shape together with other industrialized states—including the USA—a “liberal peace” agenda summarized by the keywords “peace-building” and “security-development nexus” by rather intrusive policies of political, economic, judicial and security control of post-conflict areas by Western donors and international agencies. Though weakened in its wide scope by the US-led fight against terrorism since 9.11.2001, human security has also proven to be very flexible and almost fully compatible with both neo-liberal economic agendas and “hard security” policies inspired by the US Administration. On the other hand, the new European discourse using environment, climate change and energy challenges as a component of the European international identity might
be rather divergent from the Canadian and Japanese concepts of human security.